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Ecce unus est populus et unum labium omnibus; et hoc est initium operationis 
eorum, nec eis erit deinceps difficile, quidquid cogitaverint facere. Venite igitur, 
descendamus et confundamus ibi linguam eorum, ut non intellegat unusquisque 










“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, “it means 
just what I choose it to mean — neither more nor less.” 
“The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make words mean so many 
different things.” 
“The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be master — that's all.” 
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1. Purpose and methodology of the study 
1.1. Purpose of the study 
 
The purpose of the present study is: 
(i) to single out and clarify the most common types of issues emerging in the 
interpretation of multilingual tax treaties (i.e. tax treaties authenticated in two or 
more languages), as well as 
(ii) to suggest how the interpreter should tackle and disentangle such issues under 
public international law, with a particular emphasis on the kinds of arguments he 
should use and the kinds of elements and items of evidence he should rely upon 
in order to support his construction of the treaty. 
 
The issues on the interpretation of multilingual tax treaties dealt with in this study may 
be broadly divided in two groups ratione materiae: 
(i) those general in nature, which may potentially concern all multilingual treaties; 
(ii) those specific to multilingual tax treaties.  
 
 
1.1.2. Issues potentially concerning all multilingual treaties 
 
Certain fundamental issues concerning the interpretation of multilingual treaties appear 
to arise independently from the nature and content of the treaty actually at stake. Such 
issues may be expressed by means of the following general questions, each followed by 
a brief exemplification of the core issues dealt with. 
 
a) Must all authentic texts be given the same status for the purpose of interpreting 
multilingual treaties? 
 
The issue at stake here may be aptly illustrated by means of reference to Article 41 of the 
ICJ Statute, which in its English and French authentic texts reads as follows (italics by 
the author): 
 
1. The Court shall have the power to indicate, if it considers that circumstances so require, any provisional 
measures which ought to be taken to preserve the respective rights of either party. 
2. Pending the final decision, notice of the measures suggested shall forthwith be given to the parties and to the 
Security Council. 
--- 
1. La Cour a le pouvoir d'indiquer, si elle estime que les circonstances l'exigent, quelles mesures conservatoires 
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du droit de chacun doivent être prises à titre provisoire. 
2. En attendant l'arrêt définitif, l'indication de ces mesures est immédiatement notifiée aux parties et au Conseil 
de sécurité. 
 
Assume that the question to be answered by the interpreter is whether the provisional 
measures indicated by the ICJ pursuant to Article 41 of its Statute must be considered (or 
not) as binding orders. The French expression “doivent être prises” appears imperative in 
character. However, the English text, in particular the use of “indicate” instead of 
“order”, of “ought” instead of “must” or “shall”, and of “suggested” instead of 
“ordered”, seems to suggest that the ICJ’s decisions under Article 41 of its Statute lack 
of mandatory effect.  
 In this case, may the interpreter rely exclusively or predominantly on one of these 
two authentic texts for the purpose of construing Article 41 of the ICJ Statute and, 
therefore, answering the above question? If so, on which arguments might he justify his 
choice in that respect? 
 More specifically, supposing the interpreter knows that the ICJ Statute was 
originally drafted in French and that the English text is a subsequent translation based on 
the former, may or should he decide that the provisional measures indicated by ICJ 
under Article 41 are binding (also) on the basis of the drafting history of that article, 
which may support the conclusion that the French text should be given more 
interpretative weight?1 
 
b) What is the relevance of non-authentic texts for the purpose of construing 
(multilingual) treaties? 
 
Consider a bilateral treaty authenticated only in French, which uses the expression 
“propriété ou contrôle public”, for instance in the following provision of a bilateral 
treaty: 
 
L’administration aura pleins pouvoirs pour décider quant à la propriété ou contrôle public de toutes les 
ressources naturelles du pays, ou des travaux et services d'utilité publique déjà établis ou à  établir.2 
 
In this context, the French expression “propriété ou contrôle public” is ambiguous, since 
it may be regarded as limited to the various methods whereby the public administration 
might take over (or dictate the policy of) undertakings not publicly owned, or as 
including also every form of supervision that the administration might exercise either on 
the development of the natural resources of the country or over public works, services 
and utilities. Assume in that respect that, in French, the latter construction appears to 
flow more naturally from the text.  
 Imagine a non-official version of the treaty exists, which has been drafted by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of one of the contracting States as an official translation in 
its own official language, say English. In such a translation, the expression “public 
                                                     
1 The example is derived from ICJ, 27 June 2001, LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), judgment. 
2 The example is derived (with significant deviations) from PCIJ, 30 August 1924, The Mavrommatis Palestine 
Concessions (Greece v. Britain), judgment. 
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ownership or control” is used, which appears to point towards the former of the above-
mentioned possible constructions. 
 May or should the interpreter take into account such a translation for the purpose 
of determining the meaning of the treaty-authentic text and rely thereon in order to 
support his construction? Is in that respect relevant for him to know that the translation 
has been drafted by the very same negotiators of the treaty, or, on the contrary, by the 
translation bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs? Should the interpreter change his 
perspective if the other contracting State had also translated the treaty in its own official 
language and that official translation points towards the same meaning of the English 
non-official version?    
 
c) Is there any obligation to perform a comparison of the different authentic texts 
anytime a multilingual treaty is interpreted? 
 
This issue may be briefly illustrated with reference to Article 5(1)(e) of the ECHR, 
which allows the lawful detention “of persons of unsound minds, alcoholics or drug 
addicts or vagrants”.  
 In order to construe that article, in particular for the purpose of determining 
whether it allows the lawful detention of non-alcohol-addicted drunk persons, may the 
interpreter rely solely on the English authentic text of the ECHR, or is he obliged to 
compare the latter with the French authentic text thereof?3  
 
d) If the previous question is answered in the negative, when does an obligation to 
compare the different authentic texts arise? 
 
In the example given with reference to question c), the term “alcoholics” appears prima 
facie ambiguous since, on the one hand, in its common usage it denotes persons addicted 
to alcohol, but, on the other hand, such a meaning does not seems to fit well in the 
context of Article 5(1)(e) of the ECHR, the meaning corresponding to the expression 
“drunk persons” appearing to fit better.  
 The question thus arises whether the interpreter should be obliged to compare the 
English with the French authentic text from the outset, in order to solve the prima facie 
ambiguity of the former, or whether he should be entitled to rely on other available 
means of interpretation (elements and items of evidence) before reverting to a 
comparison of the authentic texts. Moreover, where the latter question is answered in the 
affirmative, uncertainty could exist on whether the interpreter should be also entitled to 
rely on supplementary means of interpretation (for instance, the treaty travaux 
préparatoires of the ECHR) in order to solve the apparent ambiguity of the English 
authentic text, before being required to compare the latter with the French text. 
 
e) How should the interpreter solve the prima facie discrepancies among the various 
authentic texts emerging from the comparison? 
                                                     




Consider a case where the application of Article 8(1) of the ECHR is at stake. The latter, 
in its English and French authentic texts, reads as follows (italics by the author):  
 
Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. […] 
--- 
Toute personne a droit au respect de sa vie privée et familiale, de son domicile et de sa correspondance. […] 
 
The English term “home” generally denotes solely the private dwelling of an individual, 
while the corresponding French term “domicile” has a broader intension and may be 
regarded as denoting also business and professional premises.  
 In order to reconcile such a prima facie discrepancy, which elements should the 
interpreter take into account and which arguments should he use? Should his analysis be 
limited to the comparison of the texts? Should he give preference to one meaning over 
the other exclusively on the basis of the former appearing more in line with the treaty’s 
object and purpose?4 
 
f) What should the interpreter do where the prima facie discrepancies could not be 
removed by means of (ordinary) interpretation? 
 
The possibility that the ordinary process of interpretation might fall short in removing 
the prima facie discrepancies in meaning among the various authentic treaty texts seems 
to be suggested by Article 33(4) VCLT, according to which, where the contracting States 
did not agree on a different solution and the application of Articles 31 and 32 VCLT has 
failed to remove the apparent discrepancy, “the meaning which best reconciles the texts, 
having regard to the object and purpose of the treaty, shall be adopted”.  
 Such a provision raises three issues that an interpreter has to deal with. 
 First, one might doubt whether and to what extent, in cases of divergences not 
removed by the application of Articles 31 and 32 VCLT, the presumption established by 
Article 33(3) VCLT (the terms of the treaty are presumed to have the same meaning in 
each authentic text) continues to play a role for interpretation purposes. Should one 
accept that the various authentic texts may have (and actually do have) different 
meanings? And what should follow from such a conclusion?  
 Second, one could wonder what the meaning of the expression “the meaning 
which best reconciles the texts” is. Does it mean that the interpreter has to stretch the 
meaning of one text towards the other texts’ meaning(s)? And, in such a case, how much 
is the interpreter entitled to stretch the former meaning? Does it mean, instead, that the 
interpreter is bound to find some midpoint between the meanings of the various 
authentic texts? Does he have to give preference to the meaning common to the highest 
number of authentic texts? Or does he have to apply the most restrictive interpretation, if 
any? 
 Third, what is the relevance of the final reference to the treaty object and purpose 
(“having regard to the object and purpose of the treaty”), considering that such object 
                                                     
4 The example is derived from ECtHR, 16 December 1992, Niemietz v. Germany (Application no. 13710/88). 
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and purpose is to be taken into account also for the purpose of Articles 31-32 VCLT? 
 
g) Where the treaty provides that a certain authentic text is to prevail in the case of 
divergences: 
 
i. At which point of the interpretative process must there be recourse to such a 
prevailing text? 
 
This issue may be illustrated by taking as case study Article 208 of the Peace Treaty of 
Saint German, concluded on 10 September 1919 in Saint-Germain-en-Laye.  
 According to the English authentic of the treaty, the States to which the territory 
of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was transferred at the end of World War I 
and the States arising from the dismemberment of that Monarchy acquired all property 
and possessions situated within their territories belonging to the former or existing 
Austrian Government, including “the private property of members of the former Royal 
Family of Austria-Hungary”. The French authentic text of the treaty, in that respect, 
made reference to the “biens privés de l’ancienne famille souveraine d’Autriche-
Hongrie”. Between the English and the French authentic texts, therefore, a prima facie 
divergence of meaning might be alleged to exist, where the former was construed as 
referring to all private property owned by members of the Royal Family of Austria-
Hungary, while the latter was construed as limiting the scope of the provision to solely 
the private property directly owned by the Royal Family as such. 
 Under the final clause of the treaty, the French authentic text of Article 208 was 
to prevail over the English and Italian authentic texts in cases of divergences. 
 Assume that the members of the former Royal Family of Austria-Hungary held 
some of their property in their individual capacity and not together as Royal Family.5  
 In order to decide whether the property individually held by the members of the 
former Royal Family could be legitimately transferred to the States arising from the 
dismemberment of the Monarchy under Article 208 of the Peace Treaty of Saint 
German, an interpreter could follow two alternative and mutually exclusive 
argumentative paths, as well as any of the paths laying between such two extremes. The 
two outermost argumentative paths that the interpreter might follow are as such: 
(i) he automatically applies the French (prevailing) text, since a prima facie divergence 
between the French and English texts was alleged to exist; 
(ii) he has recourse to all available means of interpretation in order to reconcile the 
French and English texts, before concluding that there is an actual divergence between 
the provisional meanings of such texts and, therefore, before relying exclusively on the 
prevailing treaty text. 
 In this respect, the question arises of whether an obligation exists for the 
interpreter to follow some of the above paths, or, in any case, whether any reason exists 
to prefer one to the others.  
                                                     
5 The example is derived from Supreme Court (Poland), 16 June 1930, Archdukes of the Habsburg-Lorraine 
House v. The Polish State Treasury, 5 Annual digest of public international law cases (1929-1930), 365 et seq. 




ii. What if the prevailing text is ambiguous or obscure? 
 
With regard to the previous example and assuming that the French prevailing text 
appeared ambiguous (or obscure, or unreasonable), what relevance should the interpreter 
attribute to the other authentic texts for the purpose of construing Article 208 of the 
Peace Treaty of Saint German, in particular where he concluded that the English and 
Italian authentic texts pointed towards the same meaning? 
 
iii. What about the contrast between the prevailing text and the other authentic 
texts if the latter are coherent among themselves? 
 
With regard to the previous example, what should an interpreter do where he 
provisionally concluded that (i) the French (prevailing) text of Article 208 of the Peace 
Treaty of Saint German did not to allow the transfer of the property individually held by 
the members of the former Royal Family to the States arising from the dismemberment 
of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, while (ii) both the English and the Italian authentic 
texts seemed to permit such a transfer? Should he try to remove the apparent difference 
in meaning by having recourse to all available means of interpretation? Where he failed 
to remove the prima facie discrepancy among the French, English and Italian authentic 
texts, should he opt for the meaning attributable to the most numerous texts in 
concordance, or rely on the French prevailing text? 
 
h) What is the impact of the fact that legal jargon terms are employed in the treaty 
texts on the answers to be given to the previous questions?  
 
Consider the English and French authentic texts of Article 6 of the ECHR, according to 
which (italics by the author): 
 
1.  In the determination […] of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair […] hearing by 
an independent and impartial tribunal […]  
[…] 
3.   Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:  
[…]  
--- 
1. Toute personne a droit à ce que sa cause soit entendue équitablement […] par un tribunal indépendant et 
impartial, établi par la loi, qui décidera […] soit du bien-fondé de toute accusation en matière pénale dirigée 
contre elle. […] 
[…] 
3. Tout accusé a droit notamment à:  
[…] 
 
With regard to the interpretation of Article 6(3) of the ECHR, in particular for the 
purpose of determining whether a person has been charged with a criminal offence in a 
specific case, the above-mentioned questions are compounded by the fact that the 
relevant terms used in the two authentic texts, i.e. “criminal charge” and “accusation en 
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matière pénale”, are (i) legal jargon terms (i.e. technical legal terms) used under the 
laws of States employing English and French as their official languages (e.g. legal jargon 
terms used under English and French domestic laws) and (ii) terms generally regarded as 
corresponding to legal jargon terms used under the laws of other contracting States (e.g. 
the German legal term “Straftat”).  
 Suppose that certain misconduct, for instance careless driving causing a traffic 
accident in Germany, is considered a “criminal offence” under English law, but is not 
considered a “Straftat” under German law (or under French law).6 
 In order to decide the case, i.e. in order to determine whether such misconduct 
falls within the scope of Article 6(3) of the ECHR, an interpreter should ask himself and 
should answer some difficult interpretative questions, such as: 
(i) did the parties intend to attribute to the terms “criminal charge” and 
“accusation en matière pénale” a meaning other than the meanings they have 
under the laws of the States using them (e.g. under English and French domestic 
laws) and other than the meanings of the corresponding terms used under the 
domestic laws of other contracting States, which are drafted in languages other 
than English and French (e.g. the German legal jargon term “Straftat”)? 
(ii) if question (i) is answered in the affirmative, how such a meaning should be 
determined? Should it be determined autonomously from the meanings under 
domestic law? Or should it reflect the minimum common denominator of the 
meanings that the legal jargons terms used in the authentic treaty texts have 
under the laws of the States using such terms (e.g. under English and French 
domestic laws)? Or should such a common denominator be determined taking 
into account also the meanings of the corresponding terms used under the 
domestic laws of other contracting States, which are drafted in languages other 
than English and French (e.g. the German legal jargon term “Straftat”)? 
(iii) if question (i) is answered in the negative, which domestic law meaning should 
be used? Should it be the meaning under, say, English or French law? Or should 
it be the meaning under the law of the State(s) presenting the most relevant 
connection(s) with the case (although such a law is written neither in English, 
nor in French)? Or, on the contrary, should it be the meaning under the lex 
fori?7 
(iv) how should questions (i) through (iii) be solved where the terms and 
expressions employed in the authentic treaty texts seemed to diverge to a more 
significant extent, for instance where the English authentic text used the terms 
“regulatory charge” and “regulatory offence”?  
 
 
1.1.3. Issues specifically concerning multilingual tax treaties 
 
                                                     
6 The example is derived from ECtHR, 21 February 1984, Öztürk v. Germany (Application no. 8544/79). 
7 With regard to private law disputes, a relevant alternative would be the meaning under the law of the State to 
which the private international lex fori directs. 
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Some interpretative issues relate specifically to multilingual tax treaties,8 due to the 
following features:  
(i) most tax treaties are based on the OECD Model,9 which is officially drafted only 
in the English and French languages; 
(ii) the OECD Model comes with a commentary (the OECD Commentary) intended 
to explain, sometimes in great detail, the purpose and the application of the rules 
expressed by means of the model articles; the OECD Commentary is also 
officially drafted only in the English and French languages; 
(iii) most tax treaties include a rule of interpretation according to which each 
undefined treaty term must be given the meaning it has under the law of the 
contracting State applying the treaty, unless the context otherwise requires. 
 
Such idiosyncratic issues may be expressed by means of the following general questions, 
each followed by a brief exemplification of the core matters dealt with. 
 
a) What is the relevance of the OECD Model official versions for the purpose of 
interpreting multilingual tax treaties (either authenticated also in English and/or 
French, or authenticated in neither of such languages) and monolingual tax treaties 
authenticated neither in English, nor in French? 
 
For the purpose of exemplification, a parallel may be drawn with questions a) and b) of 
the previous section. 
 When the interpreter is faced with a multilingual tax treaty authenticated also in 
the English and/or French languages (together with other languages, e.g. Italian), may 
the interpreter rely exclusively or predominantly on the English and/or French authentic 
texts for the purpose of construing the relevant treaty article? In particular, may he 
support such a choice by arguing that, since the English and/or French authentic texts 
reproduce without significant deviations the OECD Model official versions, it is 
reasonable to infer that the agreement of the parties was to import into the treaty the 
content of the Model and, therefore, the other authentic texts should be construed in 
harmony with the meaning derived from the interpretation of the English and/or French 
texts? 
 On the other hand, when the interpreter is faced with a multilingual or 
monolingual treaty authenticated neither in English, nor in French, may or should he 
take into account the OECD Model English and/or French official versions for the 
purpose of determining the meaning of the authentic treaty text(s) and rely thereon in 
order to support his construction? In case such question was answered in the affirmative, 
should the OECD Model official versions be used only to confirm the meaning 
determined on the basis of the authentic treaty text(s) or to determine the meaning where 
the construction based on the authentic text(s) left the meaning ambiguous, obscure, or 
                                                     
8 Or other types of treaties that have similar features, e.g. bilateral treaties concerning estate, inheritance and 
gift taxes. 
9 Or on other models (such as national models, or the United Nations Model, which in turn are based to a large 
extent on the OECD Model). 
INTRODUCTION 
 9
unreasonable, or, on the contrary, should the meaning determined on the basis of the 
OECD Model official versions be adopted also where conflicting with a reasonable, 
clear and unambiguous meaning based on the authentic treaty text(s)? 
 
b) What is the relevance of the OECD Commentary for the purpose of interpreting 
multilingual tax treaties? 
 
Consider a tax treaty authenticated in English and French, Article 12 of which 
reproduces without significant deviations Article 12 of the OECD Model. The interpreter 
might be faced with an interpretative issue regarding the meaning to be attributed to the 
terms “copyright” and “droit d’auteur” employed in the English and French authentic 
texts, respectively. In particular, he could have to decide whether or not the right of an 
actor to authorize the reproduction of a movie in which he acted falls within the scope of 
the two above-mentioned terms, thus triggering the application of Article 12.  
 In French legal jargon, the term “droit d’auteur” does not seem to encompass 
such a right, which, on the contrary, appears to be denoted by the term “droit voisin” (to 
the “droit d’auteur”). However, in English legal jargon, the term “copyright” seems to 
include within its scope the right of an actor to authorize the reproduction of a movie in 
which he acted. Therefore, a prima facie discrepancy in meaning appears to exist 
between the English and French authentic texts of the treaty. 
 In this respect, paragraph 18 of the Commentary to Article 12 OECD Model 
seems to support a broad interpretation of the terms "copyright" and “droit d’auteur”, 
such as to include droits voisin. According to that paragraph, where the musical 
performance of a musician (or orchestra director) is “recorded and the artist has 
stipulated that he, on the basis of his copyright [author’s note: “droit d’auteur” in the 
French official version]10 in the sound recording, be paid royalties on the sale or public 
playing of the records, then so much of the payment received by him as consists of such 
royalties falls to be treated under Article 12”.  
 The question thus arises whether and to what extent the interpreter should take 
into account the content of paragraph 18 of the Commentary to Article 12 OECD Model 
in order remove the prima facie discrepancy in meaning between the two authentic treaty 
texts. 
 
c) The relevance of Article 3(2) of OECD Model-based multilingual tax treaties for the 
purpose of their interpretation 
 
This macro-issue may be divided into the following questions: 
 
                                                     
10 The relevant excerpt of paragraph 18 of the Commentary to Article 12 OECD Model, in its French official 
version, reads as follow: “Lorsqu'en vertu du même contrat ou d'un contrat distinct, la prestation musicale est 
enregistrée et que l'artiste a accepté, sur la base de ses droits d'auteur concernant l'enregistrement, de recevoir 
des redevances sur la vente ou sur l'audition publique des disques, la partie de la rémunération reçue qui 
consiste en de telles redevances relève de l'article 12”. 
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i. Does Article 3(2) have an impact on the nature of the potential discrepancies in 
meanings among the authentic texts of a multilingual tax treaty? Where this 
question is answered in the affirmative, which are the various types of prima 
facie discrepancies that may arise? Should the interpreter put all of them on the 
same footing for the purpose of interpreting multilingual tax treaties?  
 
While the various authentic texts of a multilingual treaty are generally interpreted in 
accordance with their own genius,11 the presence of Article 3(2) in OECD Model-based 
tax treaties may have a bearing on such a practice.  
 Consider a tax treaty authenticated in two languages, for instance Italian and 
German. The typical discrepancy that may emerge between the two authentic texts is the 
one arising by comparing the meanings that they have where interpreted in accordance 
with their own genius, i.e.:  
(a) the meaning that the Italian text has where construed on the basis of the 
meaning that the terms employed therein have in the Italian language and under 
Italian law, with  
(b) the meaning that the German text has where construed on the basis of the 
meaning that the terms employed therein have in the German language and 
under German law. 
For instance, where the treaty to be interpreted used the terms “impresa” and 
“Unternehmen” in the Italian and German authentic texts of Article 7, these two terms 
might be construed on the basis of the meaning that they have under Italian and German 
law, respectively. Where such meanings were not absolutely equal (as actually is the 
case, for example, in respect to certain forestry and agriculture activities), a prima facie 
discrepancy might be said to exist between the two texts. 
However, the presence of Article 3(2) may raise the question of whether the 
interpreter may and should compare a different pair of meanings. Consider, in this 
respect, a tax treaty authenticated in the Italian and English language. Where Italy is 
applying the treaty, the first part of Article 3(2) requires non-defined terms to be 
construed in accordance with the meaning that they have under Italian law. In this case, 
the easiest way to comply with such a rule is probably to use the Italian authentic text in 
order to interpret the relevant article of the treaty, thereby finding out what meaning the 
terms used in the Italian text (or proxies thereof) have under Italian law. Nevertheless, 
nothing prohibits the interpreter from employing the English text in order to construe the 
relevant article of the treaty. In this case, the interpreter should find out the domestic law 
meaning of the Italian term that he considers to best correspond to the English term 
employed in the English authentic text. 
 It might happen, for instance, that the Italian text used the term “lavoro 
autonomo” in a certain article of the treaty, while the English authentic text used the 
term “employment”. The Italian term that is generally considered to correspond to the 
English term “employment” is the term “lavoro subordinato” (or “lavoro dipendente”). 
Under Italian (tax) law, the concepts corresponding to the terms “lavoro autonomo” and 
                                                     
11 See YBILC 1966-II, p. 100, para. 23, per Sir Humphrey Waldock, acting as Special Rapporteur. 
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“lavoro subordinato” are significantly different, the former denoting as prototypical 
items the activities carried on by a self-employed person. Therefore, in this case a prima 
facie discrepancy may be said to exist between the two authentic texts.  
 The question thus arises of whether those two types of discrepancies should be 
equally taken into account by the interpreter for the purpose of interpreting multilingual 
tax treaties, or, on the contrary, whether they should be differently weighted and 
reconciled by the interpreter. In order to properly answer such a question, the response to 
the following questions appears particularly relevant.  
 
ii. Is there any obligation for the interpreter to reconcile (at least to a certain 
extent) the prima facie divergent authentic texts of an OECD Model-based tax 
treaty? 
 
With regard to the above-described types of discrepancies, the foremost question that the 
interpreter should ask himself is whether any obligation exists for him to take care and 
reconcile them,12 at least to a certain extent and on certain occasions, or whether he may 
always and exclusively rely on the meaning emerging from the interpretation of one 
authentic text, taken in isolation. In particular, the doubt might arise whether the 
interpreter is entitled to rely exclusively on the domestic law meaning of the terms 
employed in the authentic text drafted in the official language of the State applying the 
treaty (if existing), disregarding the possible existence of prima facie different meanings 
that might be determined on the basis of the other authentic texts.  
 With regard to the two examples given in the previous section, and supposing that 
Italy is applying the relevant treaty, the question would be whether the interpreter was 
allowed to simply construe the treaty in accordance with the meaning that the terms 
“impresa” and “lavoro autonomo” have under Italian law, without the need to reconcile 
them with the meaning that the terms “Unternehmen” and “lavoro subordinato” (which 
is regarded as corresponding to the English term “employment”) have under German and 
Italian domestic law, respectively.  
 
iii. If the previous question is answered in the affirmative, to what extent must the 
differences of meaning deriving from the attribution of the domestic law 
meanings to the corresponding legal jargon terms used in the various authentic 
texts be removed (e.g. in accordance with Article 33(4) VCLT) and, instead, to 
what extent must such differences be preserved in accordance with Article 3(2)?  
 
Assume that the Italy-United Kingdom tax treaty, authenticated in the English and 
Italian languages, makes reference to the “board of directors” of a company in the 
English authentic text of Article 16, while in the Italian authentic text it employs the 
term “consiglio di amministrazione”.13 Although under the Italian Civil Code the 
                                                     
12 A similar question may be asked in respect of the alleged divergences existing between the apparent 
meanings of the terms employed in one of the authentic treaty texts and those underlying the corresponding 
terms used in the OECD Model official versions.  
13 Actually, the Italian authentic text of the 1988 Italy-United Kingdom tax treaty employs the expression 
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“consiglio di amministrazione” is entrusted with pure management functions, bilingual 
dictionaries generally equate it to the “board of directors”, which under English law is 
entrusted with both management and supervisory functions.  
In this case, the interpreter faced with such a prima facie discrepancy should decide 
whether: 
(a) that discrepancy should be removed by attributing the same meaning to both the 
terms “board of directors” and “consiglio di amministrazione”, for instance by 
attaching to the latter the broader meaning of the former (or vice versa), or 
whether  
(b) Article 3(2) of the treaty required those terms to be construed more narrowly 
where Italy applies the tax treaty and more broadly where the United Kingdom 
applies it.14 
 
This question would be particularly relevant where the interpreter had to decide whether 
the income received by an English resident member of the “collegio sindacale” of an 
Italian resident company, which is the body entrusted with control and supervisory 
functions under the Italian Civil Code, is covered by Article 16 of the treaty.  
 
iv. What is the relevance of Article 3(2) for the purpose of resolving the prima 
facie discrepancies in meaning among the various authentic texts, where the 
treaty’s final clause provides that a certain authentic text is to prevail in the case 
of discrepancies? 
 
Consider the previous example and assume that the Italy-United Kingdom tax treaty 
included a French authentic text, prevailing in the case of discrepancies in meaning 
among the various authentic texts, which employed the term “conseil de surveillance” in 
Article 16. Under French law, the “conseil de surveillance” is entrusted with both 
management and supervisory functions, similarly to the “board of directors” under 
English law.  
 The question thus arises whether the existence of the prevailing French text 
demands that the interpreter attribute to the Italian text the same (broader) meaning that 
the other two texts have where construed in accordance with English and French laws, 
respectively, or, on the contrary, whether Article 3(2) of the treaty requires him to attach 
to the term “consiglio di amministrazione” the narrower meaning it has under Italian law 
whenever Italy applies the treaty. 
 
                                                                                                                                  
“consiglio di amministrazione o […] collegio sindacale”; however, for the sake of the example, it is assumed 
that the reference to the “collegio sindacale” is not included in that treaty (as it is the case with regard to many 
other Italian tax treaties). 
14 Assuming here, for the sake of simplicity, that Italy applies the treaty whenever a person resident in the 
United Kingdom receives income in his capacity as a member of the management or supervisory boards of 
companies set up under Italian law and the United Kingdom applies the treaty whenever a person resident in 
Italy receives income in his capacity as a member of the management and supervisory board of companies set 
up under the laws of the United Kingdom. 
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1.2. Methodology of the study 
 
In order to suggest how the interpreter should approach the above issues and support his 
solution to them, the author needs a yardstick, a parameter of value against which he 
may measure the appropriateness of a certain solution and its underlying arguments and 
assess whether they should be preferred over other possible solutions and arguments.  
 
Since the object of this study is the interpretation15 of multilingual tax treaties under 
international law, the first and foremost reference coming to mind is the VCLT, in 
particular Articles 31-33 thereof, which deal with the interpretation of treaties. 
 However, on the one hand, those very same articles must be interpreted in order 
to extract from them any applicable rule or principle of law and, on the other hand, they 
have not rarely appeared vague and ambiguous where construed and applied in 
practice.16 Although such vagueness and ambiguity appear less significant where 
analysed against the background of the mainstream interpretations of those articles made 
by international law scholars, as well as by national and international courts and 
tribunals (sometimes indirectly resulting from the mere application of those articles to 
                                                     
15 “Interpretation” is an ambiguous term. As Linderfalk notes, “[i]n one sense, we can say that we are engaged 
in an act of INTERPRETATION each time we are faced with a text, to which we (consciously or 
unconsciously) attach a certain meaning. Regardless of how carefully the text of a treaty is drafted, no one 
expression contained in the treaty can be regarded as clear until it has gone through interpretation. In this 
sense, INTERPRETATION is the only way to an understanding of a treaty. In another sense, it is only when 
we have already read a text, and the text has shown to be unclear, that we can say that we then INTERPRET it” 
(see U. Linderfalk, On the Interpretation of Treaties. The Modern International Law as Expressed in the 1969 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Dordrecht: Springer-Verlag, 2007), p. 10). While the latter sense of 
the term “interpretation” is the one used in the maxim “in claris non fit interpretatio”, in the present work the 
term “interpretation” is used in the former, broader meaning. Such a choice is made for the following reasons: 
(i) this is the meaning generally attributed to the term “interpretation” in modern linguistics; (ii) whether a text 
is clear or unclear is a matter of subjective judgment (i.e. of interpretation, from an philosophical hermeneutics 
perspective), which makes the distinction between prior reading and interpretation too blurred to be useful; 
(iii) it appears that, in order to make the principles enshrined in Articles 31-33 VCLT actually binding, the 
clearness and acceptability of the result of the prior reading should be assessed against the yardstick of those 
very same principles of interpretation (otherwise any interpreter might simply disregard such principles, where 
construing a treaty, and be legally justified in doing so by arguing that he clearly understood the treaty text at 
its first reading and, thus, he did not need to interpret it), which makes the distinction between prior reading 
and interpretation untenable. To argue, as Linderfalk does (see U. Linderfalk, On the Interpretation of 
Treaties. The Modern International Law as Expressed in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(Dordrecht: Springer-Verlag, 2007), p. 10) that the term “interpretation” is used in the VCLT in the latter, more 
limited, meaning on the basis of the text of Article 33(4) VCLT (“when a comparison of the authentic texts 
discloses a difference of meaning which the application of Articles 31 and 32 does not remove”) appears to the 
author to read too much in such a text, which was purported to solely stress the principle that “before simply 
preferring one text to another and discarding the normal means of resolving an ambiguity or obscurity […] 
every reasonable effort should first be made to reconcile the texts and to ascertain the intention of the parties 
by recourse to the normal means of interpretation” (YBILC 1966-II, p. 225, para. 7).  
16 See, among many, D. P. O’Connell, International Law (London: Stevens & Sons, 1970), p. 253; 
U. Linderfalk, On the Interpretation of Treaties. The Modern International Law as Expressed in the 1969 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Dordrecht: Springer-Verlag, 2007), pp. 1-4, in particular at p. 3, 
where the author states that “the textual cast used for Vienna Convention articles 31-33 has rendered possible a 
wide variety of opinions as to their normative contents”.  
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the case under decision), they cannot be completely eradicated. The reasons for this are 
manifold, the most relevant being: 
 (i) the intrinsic vagueness and ambiguity of language as means of 
communication,  
(ii) the different cultural backgrounds, interests and purposes of the persons 
interpreting and applying those articles and  
(iii) the unclearness concerning the purpose and the (ontological) nature of the 
interpretative process that at times seems to underlie court decisions and scholarly 
writings. 
 
Therefore, in order to suggest valuable and durable solutions to the question of how the 
interpreter should tackle and disentangle the various issues that he might face where 
confronted with a multilingual tax treaty, the author chose to anchor his analysis to a 
deeper and hopefully more stable and clear foundation. He decided to primarily 
approach his task on the basis of modern linguistic and, more specifically, semantic and 
pragmatic theories.  
 This approach is not absolutely new in supranational law writings. Lindefalk, for 
instance, resorts to the “general theory of verbal communication”17 in order to establish a 
more definite description of the rules of treaty interpretation laid down in international 
law. In that respect, he affirms, although with some reservations, that the “correct 
meaning of a treaty corresponds to the utterance meaning of that treaty”,18 “utterance 
meaning” being a technical term used in modern linguistics.19 In the same vein, he 
maintains that “to determine the correct meaning of a treaty, the applier should proceed 
in the exact same way as any common reader would proceed to determine the utterance 
meaning of any text”; moreover, in order to explain how verbal communication between 
writers and readers is achieved, he resorts to what he calls the “inferential model”20 and 
the “communicative assumption”,21 which have been developed in modern semantic and 
                                                     
17 U. Linderfalk, On the Interpretation of Treaties. The Modern International Law as Expressed in the 1969 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Dordrecht: Springer-Verlag, 2007), p. 33. 
18 Ibidem, at p. 30. From such premises, Linderfalk reasonably infers that “the correct meaning of a treaty 
should be identified with the pieces of information conveyed by the treaty, according to the intentions held by 
each individual party, but only insofar as they can be considered mutually held” (ibidem, at p. 32). 
19 The term “utterance meaning” will be used several times in the present work. Its underlying concept, which 
will be discussed in detail in Chapter 2 of Part I, constitutes a cornerstone of the normative legal theory of 
treaty interpretation developed by the author in this work. 
20 See U. Linderfalk, On the Interpretation of Treaties. The Modern International Law as Expressed in the 
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Dordrecht: Springer-Verlag, 2007), p. 35: “In this model, the 
utterance is just a piece of indirect evidence. The utterance is a fact, from which the receiver-reader can only 
infer what the sender-writer wished to convey. The receiver-reader must insert the utterance into some sort of 
context. Only by drawing on a context is it possible for the reader to arrive at a conclusion with regard to the 
content of the utterance”. See also ibidem, at pp. 37-38, 40 and 48, where he states that the “CONTEXT means 
the entire set of assumptions about the world in general that a reader has access to when reading a text”.   
21 See ibidem, at p. 36: “considering that a reader has access to thousands and thousands of contextual 
assumptions, how can she succeed in selecting the ones that lead to understanding? According to the answer 
offered by linguistics, the reader resorts to a second-order assumption. The reader assumes about the utterer 
(the writer) that he is communicating in a rational manner. In other words, the utterer is assumed to be 
conforming to some certain communicative standards. It is this communicative assumption together with the 
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pragmatic theories. As he explicitly points out, the choice to rely on linguistics, in order 
to “construct a model that describes in general terms the contents of the rules laid down 
in international law for the interpretation of treaties”, is based on the fact that “linguistics 
offers us explanations that, better than others, describe the way an applier shall proceed 
to determine the correct meaning of the treaty, considered from the point of view of 
international law”.22  
 Similarly Russo, dealing with the interpretation of European Union secondary 
law, affirms that the theory of interpretation of such legal texts must be seen as part of 
the broader field of linguistic theory and, therefore, it must be dogmatically founded 
thereon.23 To him, interpreting legal texts implies the pragmatic, semantic and 
syntactical analysis thereof; such an analysis must be carried out in accordance with 
modern linguistics, which therefore must be regarded as a fundamental tool of 
interpretation in the legal field.24 Russo builds his methodological approach on the 
premise that legal discourse is, like any discourse, subject to the natural rules of 
interpretation generally applicable for the purpose of construing all forms of language 
expressions; such rules have been analysed and explained by linguistic studies to which 
one has to resort in order to properly understand them. In this respect, Russo recognizes 
that the legislator may, to a certain extent, modify such natural rules of interpretation in 
order to create parallel legal rules of interpretation. While this can theoretically create 
room for a conflict between the two sets of rules, as a matter of fact such a risk does not 
appear particularly significant since legal rules often represent nothing other than 
codifications of natural rules of interpretation.25  
  
Following this approach, the author focused on the answers that modern semantics (here 
intended in a broad sense, as including pragmatics as well) has given to key questions 
such as:  
 (i) what is the goal pursued by persons using (written) language as means of 
communication?  
 (ii) how do persons actually create their utterances and use language in that 
respect? 
 (iii) how do other persons interpret the utterances they hear or read?  
 (iv) why do utterances seem inextricably affected by vagueness and ambiguity?  
(v) how is it possible to reduce the impact of such vagueness and ambiguity in 
creating and/or interpreting utterances?  
Then, on the basis of such answers, the author established the fundamental principles 
that should guide the interpreter whenever construing a treaty. Such principles, which 
together work as a yardstick, a parameter of value to be used in order to assess the 
                                                                                                                                  
context that makes it possible for the reader to successfully establish the content of an utterance”. See also 
ibidem, at pp. 43 et seq. 
22 See ibidem, at p. 57, note 22. 
23 See E. Russo, L’interpretazione dei testi normativi comunitari (Milano: Giuffrè, 2007), pp. 7, 75 et seq., 
178-179. 
24 See ibidem at pp. 13 and 19. 
25 See ibidem at pp. 181-182 and 191-192. 
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appropriateness of any treaty interpretation in light of the explicit or implicit arguments 
supporting it, try to cope with the following essential questions: 
(i) what is the purpose of treaty interpretation, i.e. what should the interpreter 
look for when construing a treaty?    
(ii) does the interpreter follow any discernable path when attributing a meaning to 
a treaty provision? Is there any preferable path to be followed? 
(iii) what are the elements and items of evidence that should be taken into account 
in order to interpret a treaty? 
(iv) what weight should be attributed to those elements and items of evidence and 
what arguments should be used in order to support the chosen construction of the 
treaty? 
 
This is obviously a normative (prescriptive) type of legal analysis, which is purported to 
highlight the fundamental principles of treaty interpretation solely on the basis of 
semantics. Like all normative legal analyses, it raises the primary questions of:  
(a) whether its results also represent, at least to a certain extent, a reasonable 
approximation of the law as it stands; and  
(b) what should be done with its results where they prove to conflict with the 
law as it stands.  
In order to answer question (a), the author has carried out a positive (descriptive) 
analysis, which is aimed at revealing how national and international courts and tribunals 
have approached the interpretation and application of treaties, in general, and tax 
treaties, in particular, as well as how international scholars have construed Articles 31-33 
VCLT and, with regard to tax treaties, Article 3(2) OECD Model. The positive analysis 
conducted by the author does not focus exclusively on the interpretative issues 
concerning multilingual treaties, but it embraces more broadly all primary issues 
concerning treaty interpretation, since its aim is to provide the author with a map of the 
currently accepted rules and principles of interpretation, against which he could test the 
fundamental principles of treaty interpretation determined on the basis of his normative, 
semantics-based analysis, which by its nature is very general in scope. 
 With regard to question (b), the author has developed a theory of the interaction 
between normative and positive legal analyses. Adhering to the conclusions already 
drawn by some constitutionalists and general theorists of law,26 the author maintains that 
normative and positive legal analyses, as well as the results thereof, may be seen as 
interrelated and mutually affecting each other. Although “[p]ositive and normative legal 
theory […] often seem radically disjunct”,27 the latter obviously creates the cultural 
                                                     
26 See R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), at 225 et seq.; G. Jellinek, 
Allgemeine Staatsleere (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1929), at 338; A. Vermule, “Connecting Positive and 
Normative Legal Theory”, 10 University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law (2008), 387 et seq., in 
particular at 389-395; T. W. Merrill, “Bork v. Burke”, 19 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy (1996), 509 
et seq., in particular at 511 et seq.; E. Young, “Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean Political Theory and 
Constitutional Interpretation”, 72 North Carolina Law Review (1994), 619 et seq., at 697 et seq.; L. B. Solum, 
“Constitutional Possibilities”, Illinois Public Law and Legal Theory Research Papers Series, Research Paper 
No. 06-15 (available at the following url address: http://papers.ssrn.com/pape.tar?abstract_id=949052). 
27 A. Vermule, “Connecting Positive and Normative Legal Theory”, 10 University of Pennsylvania Journal of 
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background that influences law makers, judges and scholars when producing (drafting 
and interpreting) law and, therefore, significantly affects future positive legal theory; on 
the other hand, and more interestingly, positive legal theory may affect normative legal 
theory both as a source28 and as a constraint.29 Positive legal theory serves as a source of 
normative legal theory every time the latter is significantly based on the actual content of 
the law, either because the relevant normative theory is a prescriptive theory that needs a 
legal status quo to which being applied in order to produce legal outcomes, or because 
the relevant normative theory draws from legal traditions in order to minimize social 
costs and disruption, to protect legal expectations, or to capitalize on the intellectual 
efforts of generations of legal theorists.30 Positive legal theory produces indirect 
constraints to normative legal theory by:31  
(i) setting significantly high costs (in terms of legal uncertainty, infringement of 
legal expectations, social and cultural transition) to be met in order to substitute 
the state of affairs that could be proposed in the normative legal theory (first-best 
solution) for the status quo; and 
(ii) limiting the feasible set of legal rules and policies that may be implemented. 
It is the author’s belief that the last kind of interaction between positive and normative 
legal theory32 is particularly significant for the purpose of the present research. The rules 
and principles of treaty interpretations set forth in Articles 31-33 VCLT have been 
generally recognized as a codification of customary international law and, as such, 
applicable to all treaties.33 In addition, for more than forty years legal scholars, courts 
and tribunals have expressed their qualified views on how such articles should be 
construed, i.e. on which legal rules and principles should be derived therefrom. Although 
the conclusions reached by those interpreters often vary to a considerable extent, certain 
mainstream constructions may be identified, as well as the outer borders beyond which 
any interpretation of those articles that was proposed would be rejected by the vast 
majority of international lawyers. Against this background, drawing a normative legal 
theory of treaty interpretation affirming principles that conflicted with the generally 
accepted constructions of Articles 31-33 VCLT, or that lie to a significant extent outside 
the generally accepted borders of a perceived reasonable interpretation of such articles, 
would be equal to sustaining a legal theory of interpretation that, in the best case, could 
establish itself only in the very long run and would cause a protracted period 
                                                                                                                                  
Constitutional Law (2008), 387 et seq., at 387. 
28 G. Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatsleere (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1929), at 338. 
29 R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), at 225 et seq.; L. B. Solum, 
“Constitutional Possibilities”, Illinois Public Law and Legal Theory Research Papers Series, Research Paper 
No. 06-15 (available at the following url address: http://papers.ssrn.com/pape.tar?abstract_id=949052), in 
particular at 18 et seq. 
30 See, similarly, A. Vermule, “Connecting Positive and Normative Legal Theory”, 10 University of 
Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law (2008), 387 et seq., at 390-393. 
31 See A. Vermule, “Connecting Positive and Normative Legal Theory”, 10 University of Pennsylvania 
Journal of Constitutional Law (2008), 387 et seq., at 394-395; R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1986), at 225 et seq., where the author develops his idea of “law as integrity”. 
32 I.e. that positive legal theory produces indirect constraints to normative legal theory. 
33 See section 2 of Chapter 2 of Part II. 
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characterized by more legal uncertainty than in the current state of affairs34 and, in the 
worse case, would be generally regarded as utopian, since too detached from Articles 31-
33 VCLT to be considered a reasonable interpretation thereof, thus lacking the legal 
status to be applied in practice as long as those articles remained in force.35 However, 
since the purpose of the present research is to suggest how the interpreter should now 
tackle and disentangle the most common types of issues emerging from the interpretation 
of multilingual tax treaties under public international law, the author is not willing to 
accept the above-described drawbacks of a normative legal theory infringing the 
generally accepted rules and principles of treaty interpretation derived from Articles 31-
33 VCLT. In the author’s intention, his normative legal theory should be shaped so as to 
fit within the generally accepted borders of a perceived reasonable interpretation of such 
articles; where the inferences drawn from the semantic analysis appeared to lie outside 
those outer borders, such inferences should be disregarded for the purpose of setting up 
the author’s normative (semantics-based) theory of treaty interpretation. Hence, from a 
theoretical perspective, the author’s normative legal theory of interpretation must be 
regarded as a non-ideal normative theory, as opposed to ideal normative theories.36    
 As a matter of fact, the fundamental principles established by the author on the 
basis of the semantic analysis turned out (at least in his own eyes) not to conflict with 
any generally agreed construction of Articles 31-33 VCLT37 and, therefore, they have 
been used for the purpose of building up the author’s normative theory of treaty 
interpretation. That obviously does not imply that the positions upheld by the author, as 
part of his semantics-based normative theory, never conflict with the positions expressed 
by other scholars, courts or tribunals. This study has plentiful instances of this. It simply 
means that none of the principles drawn by the author from his semantics-based analysis 
conflict with any unambiguous and generally accepted interpretation of Articles 31-33 
VCLT.38  
 From this point of view, the fundamental principles on treaty interpretation 
established by the author on the basis of his normative analysis may be regarded as a 
compass for the interpreter to direct himself in the stormy ocean of the overlapping and 
conflicting positions on treaty interpretation expressed by traditional international law 
                                                     
34 In particular, there would be a strong argument against its application for the purpose of interpreting treaties 
concluded when conflicting rules and principles of interpretation were generally accepted, i.e. that the parties 
to the treaty expected the latter to be interpreted according to the rules and principles of interpretation accepted 
at the time of the treaty conclusion and, therefore, agreed on the meaning that the treaty provisions had as 
construed in accordance with the latter rules and principles. 
35 The fact that customary international law principles of interpretation, which are contrary to the generally 
accepted constructions of Articles 31-33 VCLT, establish themselves in the years to come, although 
theoretically possible, appears at the best very improbable as long as the VCLT remains in force, especially 
where one considers that the VCLT applies as such (i.e. as a convention and not as a text codifying customary 
rules and principles of international law) to a vast range of treaties, thus reducing the chance for the formation 
of a diurnitas contrary to the generally accepted construction of Articles 31-33 VCLT. 
36 On this distinction see, among many, the famous sketch of it made in J. Rawls, A theory of justice 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), at p. 243 et seq. 
37 Nor with any generally agreed construction of Article 3(2) OECD Model, with regard to tax treaties. 




scholars, courts and tribunals.  
 At the same time, however, such fundamental principles of interpretation 
counterbalance the results of those (many) studies on the interpretation of treaties that 
prove to be unduly silent on the most important semantic aspects of the activity of 
meaning attribution to treaty texts, often losing sight of the fact that such texts are no 
more than an imperfect means to express the agreement (if any) reached by the treaty 
parties. Such fundamental principles are grounded on the awareness of the imperfections 
of written language as means to convey concepts (in the case of treaties, rules and 
principles of law), of how human beings unconsciously sidestep such imperfections and 
play with them, both when formulating and decrypting utterances, and of how any 
language is inextricably tied to the background knowledge of people employing it, the 
absence of which (awareness) has often led interpreters to an over-rigid and narrow 
approach to treaty interpretation.39 
 On such fundamental principles the author has thus built up his normative legal 
theory, dealing with how interpreters should tackle and disentangle the most common 
types of issues emerging in the interpretation of multilingual tax treaties under 
international law. 
 
With regard to the methods underpinning the research conducted and the analysis carried 
out, the author briefly highlights the following. 
The sources of information and materials have been kept as wide and 
unconstrained as possible, taking into account the expected addressees of the study and 
the cultural background of the author. This means that literature, both on law and 
semantics, case law and tax authorities’ positions have been looked for and selected 
mainly in English and French, although a significant amount of the materials referred to 
is in German, Italian and Spanish.  
Furthermore, although special attention has been paid to the case law of 
international courts and tribunals, since tax treaties are mainly interpreted and applied at 
the domestic level, domestic case law and tax authorities’ positions have been 
considerably referred to and commented upon. Similarly, domestic case law dealing with 
private international law treaties has been sometimes quoted. In such cases, where the 
choice of the legal arguments used and of the elements and items of evidence admitted 
and relied upon appeared to be influenced by the idiosyncratic features of the relevant 
national system of law, the author singled out such influence, at the best of his 
knowledge, and noted its possible effects. Moreover, due to the relevance of the rules 
and principles of interpretation enshrined in the VCLT for the subject matter of the 
present study, special attention has been paid to the documents issued by the 
International Law Commission of the United Nations on that topic, as well as to the 
minutes of the relevant meetings of that Commission and of the United Nations 
Conference held in Vienna in 1968 and 1969, which led to the signature of the VCLT. 
                                                     
39 As Linderfalk puts it, the “linguistic meaning is nothing but a piece of indirect evidence, based on which the 
reader can only infer what the writer is trying to convey” (see U. Linderfalk, On the Interpretation of Treaties. 
The Modern International Law as Expressed in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 




A special remark concerns the way in which case law and tax authorities’ positions have 
been used throughout this study. Unlike most of the literature on tax treaties, the author 
did not focus on interpretation as the result of legal construction, but on interpretation as 
the process of arguing in favor of such result. In particular, special consideration has 
been devoted to the types of arguments used by courts or other bodies and to the 
elements and items of evidence relied upon in order to support those arguments. 
Accordingly, one of the fil rouge of this study is that the interpretative result is, to 
a large extent, irrelevant for academic purposes, while the path followed to reach it is the 
fundamental subject of the scholarly quest. Such an interpretative path, however, is not 
intended by the author to mean the intimate, unfathomable mental process that leads the 
interpreter to solve the relevant issues in the way he does, such process being 
inscrutable. On the contrary, the interpretative processes analysed and referred to in this 
study are only those that may be made the subject of external knowledge, i.e. the a 
posteriori analytical arguments used by the interpreter (courts, tribunal, tax authorities) 
in his written defense of the conclusion reached. Therefore, this study takes much 
recourse to such arguments and assesses them for what they are: rhetorical means to 
support a thesis on the basis of the available premises (elements and items of evidence).     
 
Finally, it must be clear from the outset that this study looks at the interpretation of 
multilingual tax treaties from the perspective of international law, disregarding the 
impact that the idiosyncratic features of national systems of law (mainly constitutional 
law and procedural law) may have on the legal arguments, elements and items of 
evidence that could be employed in order to support the construction of those treaties. 
The aim of this study, that is to reach an international audience of tax treaty scholars and 
practitioners, makes it, on the one hand, useless to deal only with the additional issues 
and the different perspectives emerging under the domestic laws of a few selected States 
and, on the other hand, too burdensome to widen the scope of the analysis to a 
sufficiently large number of States to be regarded as representative worldwide. 
 Consequently, this study is solely purported to sketch the (common) international 
law approach to the interpretation of multilingual tax treaties, which scholars and 
practitioners from different jurisdictions may then customize according to the specific 
features and requirements of their respective legal systems.   
 
2. Structure of the study  
 
This study includes three parts, in addition to this introduction. 
 
Part I comprises the analysis of modern semantics works on which the author based his 
normative legal theory, as well as the illustration of the inferences that the author drew 
from them and their impact on the above-mentioned normative legal theory. It is divided 
into three chapters.  
 Chapter 1 describes the content of Part I, explains the reasons behind its structure 
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and illustrates how the subsequent two chapters interact with each other. 
 Chapter 2 deals with the use of language as a means of communication. It 
represents, to a large extent, a summary of the materials studied and the conclusions 
reached by the author in the fields of semantics and (analytical) philosophy of language. 
Its main purpose is to make the readers aware of (i) the imperfections of language as a 
means to convey ideas and meanings, (ii) how human beings unconsciously sidestep 
such imperfections and play with them, both when formulating and decrypting 
utterances, and (iii) the way any language is inextricably tied to the background 
knowledge of the people employing it. This awareness is the necessary prerequisite for 
the reader to fully understand the analysis and the arguments developed in the remainder 
of the study 
Chapter 3 illustrates the general principles of interpretation that the author 
derived from the above semantic analysis, describes the formal nature of the normative 
legal theory developed in the following parts on the basis of those principles and gives 
reasons for the author’s choice of such a formal approach. In particular, section 1 depicts 
the general principles of treaty interpretation inferred from the semantic analysis carried 
out in Chapter 2 and points out how they will be used for the purpose of setting up the 
author’s normative legal theory on treaty interpretation. Section 2 illustrates the 
principles of interpretation specific to multilingual treaties that have been derived from 
the semantic analysis carried out in Chapter 2 and explains how they will be used in 
order to build up the author’s normative legal theory. Section 3 portrays the descriptive 
and formal nature of that normative legal theory, which attempts to provide:  
(i) a clear picture of the nature of the issues arising from the interpretation and 
application of multilingual (tax) treaties,  
(ii) the elements and items of evidence that may be used to support the possible 
solutions to such issues and  
(iii) the arguments that may put forward in order to justify the above solutions on 
the basis of the available elements and items of evidence.  
 
Part II is purported to design a normative legal theory on the interpretation of 
multilingual tax treaties based on the results of the semantics-based normative analysis 
carried out in Part I. It is divided into six chapters, dealing with the following matters.  
Chapter 1 draws a concise sketch of the linguistic practices in international 
affairs, starting with an historical overview of the use of languages in international 
relations and then presenting a synopsis of the trends concerning the conclusion of 
multilingual treaties, in general, and tax treaties, in particular. In this section, statistical 
data such as those regarding the number of language versions used in tax treaties, which 
languages are most commonly employed, the existence of final clauses providing that a 
certain text is to prevail in the case of differences of meanings among the various 
authentic texts are illustrated and commented upon. 
Chapter 2 provides the reader with a brief introduction to the VCLT. In particular, 
section 1 gives a picture of the historical background of the VCLT and the International 
Law Commission, in order for the reader to better appreciate the relevance of the latter’s 
contribution to the systematization of the rules and principles of interpretation applicable 
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to international agreements. Section 2 analyses the scope of the VCLT, in particular with 
regard to the articles dealing with the interpretation of treaties. 
 Chapter 3 carries out a positive legal analysis purported to illustrate the generally 
accepted constructions of Articles 31 and 32 VCLT and, at the same time, it is aimed at 
assessing whether the rules and principles of law resulting from such constructions 
conflict with the semantics-based principles of treaty interpretation established by the 
author in Chapter 3 of Part I, or, on the contrary, whether the latter may coexist with the 
former and be used in order to construe Articles 31 and 32 VCLT. Chapter 3 consists of 
3 sections. After the introduction, section 2 presents a positive legal analysis intended to 
reveal how scholars, courts and tribunals have construed Articles 31 and 32 VCLT and, 
more generally, how they have addressed the subject of treaty interpretation both before 
and after the conclusion of the VCLT. Section 3 is devoted to a comparison between the 
principles of interpretation developed by the author in section 1 of Chapter 3 of Part I 
and the generally accepted rules and principles of treaty interpretation resulting from the 
positive analysis carried out in the previous section. The inferences drawn from such a 
comparison constitute the foundations on which the author will build the answers to the 
research questions on the interpretation of multilingual (tax) treaties in Chapters 4 and 5 
of Part II, i.e. his normative legal theory on the interpretation of multilingual tax treaties. 
Chapter 4 is purported (i) to construe, as far as possible, Article 33 VCLT in 
coherence with the results of the analysis carried out in the previous chapters of the 
study, (ii) to assess whether such construction is in line with any generally accepted 
interpretation of that article provided for by scholars, courts and tribunals and (iii) to 
compare the rules and principles of interpretation derived from Article 33 VCLT with 
the semantics-based principles of interpretation established by the author in section 2 of 
Chapter 3 of Part I, in order to highlight the existence and possibly investigate the 
reasons of any significant discrepancies between them. The construction of Article 33 
VCLT based on the author’s semantics-based normative analysis, so far as it does not 
encroach any generally accepted interpretation thereof, is employed as a legal basis in 
order to answer the seven research questions concerning the interpretation of 
multilingual treaties (in general), which are outlined in section 1.1.1 of this Introduction. 
The structure of the chapter may be summarized as follows. Section 1 serves as an 
introduction to the chapter, highlighting its goals and organization. Section 2 describes 
the historical background of and the preparatory work on Article 33 VCLT. Section 3 
examines what rules of interpretation may be (and have been) construed on the basis of 
Article 33 VCLT and compares them with the fundamental principles of interpretation 
established by the author in Part I; on the basis of such an analysis, this section attempts 
to answers general research questions a) through g). Section 4 deals with the specific 
interpretative issues emerging where the multilingual treaty employs legal jargon terms 
and is thus purported to answer general research question h). Section 5 presents a brief 
excursus on the legal maxims that sometimes scholars, courts and tribunals have 
advocated for the purpose of construing multilingual treaties and discusses their status 
under current international law. Finally, section 6 draws some general conclusions.  
 Chapter 5 deals with the interpretative issues specifically concerning multilingual 
tax treaties and is accordingly aimed at answering the three research questions outlined 
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in section 1.1.2 of this Introduction. Section 1 sets out the goals of the chapter, settles 
certain preliminary issues (such as the need to distinguish between the interpretation of 
legal jargon terms and that of non-legal jargon terms, where construing tax treaties, as 
well as the choice of the author to tackle the research questions addressed in this chapter 
solely from the perspective of international law) and describes the structure of the 
following sections. Section 2 briefly examines how scholars, domestic courts and 
tribunals have applied to tax treaties the rules of interpretation enshrined in Articles 31 
and 32 VCLT, in order to confirm that the conclusions drawn in sections 3.4 through 3.6 
of Chapter 4 with regard to the solution of prima facie discrepancies among the authentic 
texts of a treaty, which are mainly based on the application of Articles 31 and 32 VCLT, 
remain valid also in connection with tax treaties. Section 3 analyses the significance of 
the OECD Model, in its English and French official versions, for the purpose of 
interpreting multilingual tax treaties and, in particular, its relevance for removing prima 
facie discrepancies among the tax authentic treaty texts; it thus attempts to answer tax 
treaty research question (a). Section 4 deals with the relevance of the OECD 
Commentary for the purpose of interpreting multilingual tax treaties and, more 
specifically, in order to remove prima facie discrepancies among the tax authentic treaty 
texts; hence, it attempts to answer tax treaty research question (b). Section 5 tackles tax 
treaty research question (c) and its sub-questions by examining how the interpreter 
should approach the interpretation of the legal jargon terms used in tax treaties and, in 
particular, how he should solve the prima facie divergences of meaning among the legal 
jargon terms employed in the various authentic texts. In order to answer such questions, 
section 5 preliminary analyses how the rule of interpretation encompassed in Article 3(2) 
OECD Model should be construed and then discusses its specific bearing on the 
interpretation of multilingual tax treaties. That analysis is mainly based on the results of 
the study carried out in section 4 of Chapter 4. Section 6 portrays the most important 
decisions on the interpretation of multilingual tax treaties delivered by domestic courts 
and tribunals and identifies any possible relevant departure from the conclusions reached 
in the previous sections. Finally, section 7 draws some general conclusions. 
 Chapter 6 analyses the rules governing the correction of errors in multilingual 
treaties, as established by Article 79(3) VCLT, and investigates the interaction between 
these rules and those provided for in Article 33 VCLT, both concerning, to a certain 
extent, the lack of concordance between two or more authentic texts of a treaty.  
 
Finally, Part III describes and systematically arranges the answers given to the research 
questions outlined in this Introduction, thus spelling out the author’s normative legal 
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CHAPTER 1 - FORWARD 
 
This part is aimed at laying the foundations for the analysis of the issues that constitute 
the subject matter of the present study, i.e. the most common types of issues emerging in 
the interpretation of multilingual tax treaties. Those issues have been already pointed out 
in section 1 of the Introduction and will be thoroughly analysed in Part II.  
 
The foundations presented in this part may be divided into two categories: substantive 
and methodological foundations. 
 
With regard to the first category, it has already been noted in the Introduction that, in 
order to suggest valuable and durable solutions to the question of how the interpreter 
should tackle and disentangle the various issues that he might face when confronted with 
a multilingual tax treaty, the author has chosen to anchor his analysis to a deeper and 
hopefully more stable and clear foundation than the mere text of Articles 31-33 VCLT. 
He has decided to primarily approach his task on the basis of modern linguistic and, 
more specifically, semantic and pragmatic theories. 
 Accordingly, Chapter 2 of this part is dedicated to the analysis of the answers that 
modern semantics (here intended in a broad sense, as including pragmatics) has given to 
key questions such as:  
(i) what is the goal pursued by persons using (written) language as a means of 
communication?  
(ii) how do persons actually create their utterances and use language in that 
respect? 
 (iii) how do other persons interpret the utterances they hear or read?  
 (iv) why do utterances seem inextricably affected by vagueness and ambiguity?  
(v) how is it possible to reduce the impact of such vagueness and ambiguity in 
creating and/or interpreting utterances? 
On the basis of the results stemming from the analysis of the relevant semantic studies, 
the author has then established the fundamental principles that should guide the 
interpreter whenever construing a treaty. Such principles, which together work as a 
yardstick, a parameter of value to be used in order to assess the appropriateness of any 
treaty interpretation in light of the explicit or implicit arguments supporting it, are 
described in section 1 of Chapter 3. Moreover, in Chapter 3 of Part II, the results of this 
normative analysis are tested against the results of the positive analysis of the case law 
and scholarly writings concerning the application of Articles 31 and 32 VCLT, in order 
to assess whether the semantics-based principles established by the author represent, at 
least to a certain extent, a reasonable approximation of the law as it stands. 
 Thereafter section 2 of Chapter 3 scrutinizes whether and how those fundamental 
principles may impact on the interpretation of multilingual (tax) treaties and, more 
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specifically, endeavors to concisely answer the most crucial questions arising in the 
interpretation of multilingual treaties. Such questions are further analysed and the 
relative answers expanded in Chapters 4 and 5 of Part II, with regard to, respectively, 
multilingual treaties in general and multilingual tax treaties in particular. Such chapters 
also compare the author’s approach with those taken by scholars, courts and tax 
administrations in the application of Article 33 VCLT and, more generally, in connection 
with the interpretation of multilingual (tax) treaties.   
 
Finally, the methodological foundations of this research are set out in section 3 of 
Chapter 3.  
 Specifically, that section highlights that the present study does not attempt to put 
forward any solution to specific multilingual tax treaty interpretative issues, but, on the 
contrary, is committed to designing the formal legal and logical structure within which 
any interpreter of multilingual tax treaties may move in order to choose and reasonably 
justify his interpretation.  
 In that respect, it also outlines the reasons why the author has decided to choose 
such a methodological approach, reasons that may be ascribed to the inherent ambiguity 
and vagueness of treaties (and which characterize any type of linguistic expression) and 
to the significant influence that the socio-political values of the persons called to 
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CHAPTER 2 – SEMANTIC ANALYSIS  
 
1. Language as means of communication 
 
“Without language we cannot influence other people in such-and-such ways; cannot 
build roads and machines, etc. And also: without the use of speech and writing people 
could not communicate.”40 
 
Language: means of communication among human beings.41  
 This is a possible definition of language, one that highlights its purpose, the 
reason why it was born and is used. 
 Every time human beings communicate with each other, some kind of language is 
used.42 Therefore, as long as it proves true that man by nature is a social (politikos) 
animal, as Aristotle maintained as early as in the IV century B.C.,43 language represents 
the most fundamental of human inventions. One could aphoristically argue that without 
language there would be no human beings. 
 
The above-mentioned use by Aristotle of the term “politikos”, from which the English 
term “political”, the Italian “politico”, as well as many other terms, etymologically 
derive, gives the author the opportunity to highlight the obvious: language is also the 
means used by human beings to agree upon, set and communicate the rules that regulate 
the social life (i.e. to conduct politics) and to administer and verify the correct 
application and respect of those rules. Therefore, without language there would be no 
law either. 
 
Since the present study concerns a small part of the law universe, the author thought it 
necessary to very briefly clarify in his mind the way language functions and whether 
many of the ideas he ordinarily took for granted with reference thereto continue to hold 
true where analysed with a more critical attitude.  
Understanding how language works out and, more importantly, how and in which 
situations it does not work out as expected, is the best first step in the path of studying 
                                                     
40 L. Wittgenstein (translated by G. E. M. Anscombe), Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953), 
p. 116, para. 491. 
41 A semantically equivalent definition is “language as a system for the expression of thought”, whose 
underlying idea is rooted in early philosophy, e.g. in Heraclitus among pre-Socratic philosophers (see, for 
example, fragments III and IV reported in C. H. Kahn, The Art and Thoughts of Heraclitus: an edition of the 
fragments with translation and commentary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 28-29).  
42 It is not relevant here to discuss what kind of signs could or should be considered to be “language”. What is 
relevant, for the purpose of the present study, is that natural languages used in the day-to-day communication 
by human beings (e.g. the English language, the Italian language, the Arabic language) are considered 
“languages”. 
43 Aristotle, Politics, Book I (see Aristotle (translated by B. Jowett), Politics (The Internet Classics Archive) – 
available online at http://classics.mit.edu//Aristotle/politics.html). 
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and researching on law.  
 
As language is a means of communication, its primary function is to convey meanings. 
This function is performed by combining the meanings encapsulated in listemes into the 
complex meanings of phrases, clauses, sentences and longer texts according to agreed 
grammatical rules.44 A listeme may be defined as a language expression whose meaning 
is not determinable from the meanings (if any) of its constituent forms (i.e. its graphic 
and phonological components) and which, therefore, a language user must memorize as 
a combination of form and meaning.45 Such a combination of form and meaning that 
determines a listeme is typically that found in dictionaries and corresponding to an 
independent lexicon entry46 (e.g. the lexicon entry for the listeme “red”, or that for the 
listeme “-s” in an English dictionary).  
 Therefore, from a structural perspective, meaning is compositional:47 any 
complex language expression can be analysed in terms of simpler constituent 
expressions down to:  
(i) the semantic components of listemes and  
(ii) the grammatical structures that combine them (i.e. syntactical and 
morphologic structures).48 Language users combine listemes into words, phrases, 
clauses, sentences, constructing new meanings at each level of aggregation.49 For 
example, the meaning of the word “books” is composed of:  
(i) the meanings of the listemes “book” and “-s” and  
(ii) the morphosyntactic relationship between the two listemes.  
Similarly, the meaning of the noun phrase “old books” is composed of:  
 (i) the meaning of the adjective listeme “old” and the compound meaning of the 
word “books” and  
(ii) the syntactic relationship between those two words (“old” restricts the 
                                                     
44 K. Allan, Natural Language Semantics (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), p. 254. 
45 K. Allan, Natural Language Semantics (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), p. 6. 
46 For each lexicon entry, dictionaries usually include, in addition to the “forms” and the “semantic (meaning) 
specifications”, the rules of syntax associated with the specific listeme, i.e. its “morphosyntactic 
specifications”; in particular, dictionaries include information relating to the morphosyntactic class of the 
listeme (e.g. its type - verb, noun, adjective, etc. -, its paradigm - conjugation, declension -, its gender, etc.) and 
certain irregular rules of morphosyntactic peculiar of the specific listeme (e.g. irregularities, as compared to the 
general rule, in conjugating a verb in German). Therefore, dictionaries generally include three types of 
information for each entry: (i) its formal specifications (graphic form, phonological specification); (ii) its 
semantic specifications (meaning); (iii) its morphosyntactic specifications. 
47 See Frege’s principle of compositionality as expressed in L.T.F. Gamut, Logic, Language, and Meaning. 
Vol. 1. Introduction to Logic (Chicago: Chicago University Press. 1991), p. 15 as follows: “[E]very sentence, 
no matter how complicated, can be seen as the result of a systematic construction process which adds logical 
word one by one”. 
48 H. Kamp and B. Partee, “Prototype theory and compositionality”, 57 Cognition (1995), 129 et seq., at 135-
136; K. Allan, Natural Language Semantics (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), pp. 6-7; G. Sandu and P. 
Salo, “Compositionality”, in K. Allan (ed.), Concise Encyclopedia of Semantics (Oxford: Elsevier, 2009), 117 
et seq. 
49 On the different functions of words and phrases and on the formation thereof see L. Bauer, English Word-
Formation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 142. 
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reference of the head noun “books” to a subset of books).50 
 
From a causal perspective, on the other hand, meaning appears to be cognitively and 
functionally motivated.51 It is cognitively motivated since the categories and structure of 
language reflect the way human beings perceive and conceive of the world(s).52 It is 
functionally motivated since the categories and structure of language are motivated by 
their actual uses. In fact, the social-interactive function of language has determined a 
heavily reliance on extra-utterance elements (i.e. elements external to the sentence 
written or spoken) in order to convey (for the speaker) and understand (for the hearer) 
the intended meaning, such as common ground, common principles on behavior when 
communicating (the “cooperative principle”), implicatures and inductive inferences from 
shared general and specific experiences. This confirms that language normally provides 
a set of underspecified clauses that need to be expanded by semantic and pragmatic 
inferences based on the awareness of the lexicon and grammar (morphology and syntax) 
and heavily reliant on common ground, in particular encyclopedic knowledge (i.e. 
information supposedly available to the specific hearers and speakers on all branches of 
knowledge) and relevant conventions for language use.53 
An extreme vision (and correlated explanatory model) of the relations existing 
between language, its functioning and the way human beings perceive and conceive of 
the world(s) has been expressed in the well-known Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. According 
to this hypothesis, no single “real world” exists, since its representation is to a large 
extent unconsciously built on the language habits of the various communities of human 
beings. Since no two languages are ever sufficiently similar to be considered to represent 
the same social reality, also the worlds in which different societies live are distinct 
worlds, not merely the same worlds with different labels attached.54 To put it differently, 
users of markedly different grammars are pointed by such grammars towards different 
types of observations and different evaluations of externally similar acts of observation 
and, therefore, are not equivalent as observers and must arrive at somewhat different 
views of the world.55 
 
Although not endorsing the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis and not relying on it for the purpose 
of the present study, the author finds it interesting to recall that hypothesis as additional 
                                                     
50 Compare with the example of the noun phrase “young bachelors” given in K. Allan, Natural Language 
Semantics (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), p. 6. 
51 According to Wittgenstein, the need determines the use of the language, which entails that the need 
determines the language, since the language is nothing other that its use (“(…) doesn’t the fact that sentences 
have the same sense consist in their having the same use?”) (see L. Wittgenstein (translated by G. E. M. 
Anscombe), Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953), p. 8, para. 20). 
52 Not just the real present world, but also any kind of hypothetic, past, future, abstract world.  
53 K. Allan, Natural Language Semantics (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), p. 475. 
54 E. Sapir, “The status of linguistics as a science”, in E. Sapir (ed. D. G. Mandelbaum), Culture, Language and 
Personality: Selected Essays (Berkley: University of California Press, 1949), 160 et seq., at 162. 
55 B. L. Whorf, “Linguistics as an exact science”, in B. L. Whorf (ed. J. B. Carroll), Language, Thought, and 
Reality: Selected Writings (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1956), 220 et seq., at 221, who speaks of “linguistic 
relativity principle”. 
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evidence of how linguists have recognized, substantially without significant deviations, 
that language, its functioning and human perception and conception of the worlds are 
strongly interconnected and influence each other. This shows, if needed, that a study on 
the interpretation of specific legal texts (tax treaties), which results in a study of human 
perceptions and conceptions of a particular intellectual world (law of treaties) and of its 
impact on human relations, cannot be logically and coherently carried out without 
attributing an appropriate relevance to the linguistic aspects thereof.  
 
By expanding the general considerations put forward in this section, this chapter focuses 
on certain aspects of semantics and pragmatics,56 cumulatively intended as the study of 
meaning in human languages, i.e. the analysis and representation of the meaning of 
linguistic expressions, of their constituents, as well as of the meaning-relations between 
them.57 The study will be limited to those aspects of semantics and pragmatics that the 
author considers relevant in order to better analyse and theoretically systematize the core 
issues of the present research (issues arising in the interpretation of tax treaties, with 
specific regard to multilingual tax treaties). In doing so, the author will use semantics 
metalanguages58 as little as possible in order to make this part of the study more 
intelligible for readers lacking a background in linguistics. Where words and expressions 
characteristic of semantics metalanguages will be used, the author will provide the 
reader with definitions and examples thereof, unless such words and expressions have 
the very same generally recognized meaning in the day-to-day English language.  
  




                                                     
56 Both semantics and pragmatics concern the meaning of linguistic expressions, but they do it from slightly 
different perspectives. Quoting the incipit of Jaszczolt’s Semantics and Pragmatics, “semantics pertains to the 
meaning of words and sentences; pragmatics pertains to the meaning of utterances, or speaker meaning. (…) 
pragmatics take the interlocutors, the speaker and the hearer, as the focus of attention, whereas semantics 
focuses on linguistic expressions. Pragmatics is a study of how hearers add contextual information to the 
semantic structure and how they draw inferences from what is said. The distinction between these two sub-
disciplines of linguistics has standardly been founded on the context of the discourse; pragmatics has been 
claimed to study the contribution of the context (that is linguistic and situational context) to the meaning. But 
this is not a successful foundation for differentiating between the two. (…) semantics has also to make use of 
contextual clues and enrich the information provided by words and grammatical constructions. Hence, both 
semantics and pragmatics make use of context to a smaller or grater degree: the two fields are not disjoint.” 
(see K. M. Jaszczolt, Semantics and Pragmatics, Meaning in Language and Discourse (London: Longman, 
2002), p. 1). In the present study, both semantics and pragmatics issues are dealt with. Moreover, in light of the 
strict relation existing between the two, the author decided to use the term “semantics” in a broad sense, i.e. as 
also encompassing pragmatics. This approach is consistently applied hereafter, unless otherwise stated. 
57 K. Allan, Natural Language Semantics (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), pp. 5-6. 
58 Semantics metalanguages may be defined as artificial or natural languages (including technical vocabulary) 
used by linguists in order to analyse and describe the subject of their semantic studies, i.e. natural languages 
(e.g. the French language, the German language, etc.). 
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“Et memini hoc, et unde loqui didiceram, post adverti. Non enim docebant me maiores 
homines praebentes mihi verba certo aliquo ordine doctrinae sicut paulo post litteras, 
sed ego ipse mente, quam dedisti mihi, Deus meus, cum gemitibus et vocibus variis et 
variis membrorum motibus edere vellem sensa cordis mei, ut voluntati pareretur, nec 
valerem quae volebam omnia nec quibus volebam omnibus. Prensabam memoria, cum 
ipsi appellabant rem aliquam et cum secundum eam vocem corpus ad aliquid movebant, 
videbam, et tenebam hoc ab eis vocari rem illam, quod sonabant, cum eam vellent 
ostendere. Hoc autem eos velle ex motu corporis aperiebatur tamquam verbis 
naturalibus omnium gentium, quae fiunt vultu et nutu oculorum ceteroque membrorum 
actu et sonitu vocis indicante affectionem animi in petendis, habendis, reiciendis 
fugiendisve rebus. Ita verba in variis sententiis locis suis posita et crebro audita quarum 
rerum signa essent paulatim colligebam measque iam voluntates edomito in eis signis 
ore per haec enuntiabam. Sic cum his, inter quos eram, voluntatum enuntiandarum signa 
communicavi et vitae humanae procellosam societatem altius ingressus sum pendens ex 
parentum auctoritate nutuque maiorum hominum.”59 
 
This excerpt from St. Augustine’s Confessions is (almost entirely) reported at the 
beginning of the Philosophical Investigations of Wittgenstein, who labeled it as giving a 
“particular picture of the essence of human language”.60 That holds true with reference 
to both the way language is learned by children (i.e. by means of ostensive definitions 
and words teaching) and the intrinsic nature of language. 
 
According to Wittgenstein, in the description Augustine gives every word has a 
meaning, which is the object for which the word stands. This is certainly true with regard 
to objects, such as “lamp”, “moon”, or “cat”. But it is also true with regard to actions, 
such as “to go”, “to eat”, “to speak”; and also with regard to the properties of objects and 
actions, such as “red”, “five”, “to sit ON”, “to go TO”.  
                                                     
59 Augustinus, Confessionum Libri Tredicim, Liber Primus, c. 8 (see Augustinus, Confessionum Libri Tredicim 
(Citta Nuova Editrice) – available on-line at http://www.augustinus.it/latino/confessioni/index.htm). The 
following is the English translation of the excerpt found in St. Augustine, Confessions and Enchiridion, newly 
translated and edited by Albert C. Outler  (Philadelphia: Christian Classics Ethereal Library, 2007), p. 17: “I 
remember this, and I have since observed how I learned to speak. My elders did not teach me words by rote, as 
they taught me my letters afterward. But I myself, when I was unable to communicate all I wished to say to 
whomever I wished by means of whimperings and grunts and various gestures of my limbs (which I used to 
reinforce my demands), I myself repeated the sounds already stored in my memory by the mind which thou, O 
my God, hadst given me. When they called some thing by name and pointed it out while they spoke, I saw it 
and realized that the thing they wished to indicate was called by the name they then uttered. And what they 
meant was made plain by the gestures of their bodies, by a kind of natural language, common to all nations, 
which expresses itself through changes of countenance, glances of the eye, gestures and intonations which 
indicate a disposition and attitude--either to seek or to possess, to reject or to avoid. So it was that by 
frequently hearing words, in different phrases, I gradually identified the objects which the words stood for and, 
having formed my mouth to repeat these signs, I was thereby able to express my will. Thus I exchanged with 
those about me the verbal signs by which we express our wishes and advanced deeper into the stormy 
fellowship of human life, depending all the while upon the authority of my parents and the behest of my 
elders.” 
60 L. Wittgenstein (translated by G. E. M. Anscombe), Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953), 
p. 2, para. 1. 
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The position expressed by Wittgenstein fits in the description of language given 
in the previous section, where the compositional nature of language has been noted and 
the function played by listemes as building blocks of the utterance meaning explained. In 
the remainder of this chapter, the term “listeme” will be generally used instead of 
“word”, since the meaning of certain words is the result of the combination of the 
meanings of two or more listemes (see the previous example on the word “books”) and, 
therefore, “words” do not seem suitable to be presented as the building blocks of 
semantics.61  It is also worth mentioning, for the sake of clarity, that a listeme is not 
always represented by a single word, such as “dog” or “herring”; compound terms whose 
meaning cannot be determined by simply taking into account the meanings of the single 
words composing them and the syntactic rules regulating those words’ interaction are 
also regarded as listemes (the compound term “red herring” is a good example thereof). 
Every time a listeme is used to indicate a specific object, action, quality, etc. the 
latter represents the referent of the listeme (i.e. what the listeme is pointing at in the 
intention of the uttering person). According to Wittgenstein,62 when children are taught a 
language by means of ostensive listeme teaching,63 an association is established between 
the listeme and the specific referent pointed at (the specific cat pointed at, the specific 
action of eating carried on while saying the word “eat”, that specific color [red] of the 
sofa pointed at, etc.). Due to such association, every time a specific listeme (or its 
closely derived words and expressions) is uttered, a mental picture of the referent comes 
in the child’s mind.64 After different referents are pointed at and shown in connection 
with the same listeme, the mental image takes a more focused and sharp shape. At this 
point, the author suggests, the mental image no longer refers to a specific referent, but to 
a certain concept, i.e. a mental object having the main characteristics common to the 
various referents pointed at.  In the process of creation of the mental object 
corresponding to a certain listeme, the context of the utterance is of primary importance; 
to give just an example, “ball” may mean “a spherical or approximately spherical body 
or shape”65 in a certain context, but it may also mean “pass me the ball now” in a 
different context, such as that of a football match.  
Modern studies on the process of language acquisition by children tend equally to 
                                                     
61 On the contrary, Wittgenstein uses the term “Wort”, which is generally translated in English as “word” or 
“term”. That does not change the substance of his reasoning. 
62 L. Wittgenstein (translated by G. E. M. Anscombe), Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953), 
p. 4, para. 6. 
63 Ostensive teaching means the act of teaching something new to somebody by means of showing that 
something. Ostensive listeme teaching therefore is the act of teaching someone the meaning of a listeme by 
means of pointing at, or showing, something that represents an exemplification of the meaning of the listeme 
taught.  
64 Such an idea of mental images corresponding to listemes, put forward by Wittgenstein, has been later 
developed by Jackendoff, with reference to the idea of “conceptual structures”, according to which the 
meaning of a language expression is also given by means of a mental three-dimensional image associated with 
the word uttered (see R. Jackendoff, Consciousness and the Computational Mind (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
1987), p. 201; R. Jackendoff, Semantics and Cognition (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1983), p. 139). 
65 This is the first entry for “ball” at the Dictionary.com Unabridged. Random House, Inc. (accessed 13 Oct. 
2009). 
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stress the relevance of the context for this process, especially in its early stages.66 
Children start the process of language acquisition with no knowledge about the relation 
between listemes and meanings; thus, when they are presented with a listeme for the first 
time, the context in which the listeme is uttered is the only information they can rely on. 
When the experience with the listemes of the relevant language grows, the ability to 
associate listems to referents and concepts grows as well, up to the point that, even 
without reference to a specific contextual situation, children are aware of and can choose 
among the various concepts corresponding to a listeme.67  
In order to explain the process of language acquisition, contemporary researchers 
tend to attribute a significant importance to the inputs that adults give to children, in 
terms of frequency and manner of uttering the various listemes. However, it is also 
generally recognized that other factors play a substantial role in that process. Proof 
thereof is given by fact that listemes such as “the” and “a”, which are among the most 
frequent listemes used by adults, are not acquired particularly early by children; 
moreover, although children theoretically have an infinite set of possible meanings to 
choose from, when presented with a novel listeme, they usually seem to figure out quite 
well what is meant by that listeme.68  
First, it has been noted that children tend to interpret novel listemes as referring to 
objects or object categories.69 In this respect, some scholars have suggested that since, 
from a perceptual-cognitive perspective, concrete objects are easier to separate from the 
stream of surrounding information than activities or relations, due to their stability 
and/or saliency, they capture the children’s attention first. As a logical consequence, 
children tend to perceive the listemes they hear as referred to those objects.70  
Second, it has been suggested that children generally assume that different 
listemes contrast in meaning and, consequently, they tend to assign the novel listemes 
they hear to gaps in their lexicon (i.e. to referents and concepts for which they do not 
have yet any referring listeme).71 This conclusion relies on the idea that, in the process of 
language acquisition by children, language follows cognition and that there is normally a 
                                                     
66 For a very clear summary of recent studies on the process of language acquisition by children, see L. 
Hogeweg, Word in process. On the interpretation, acquisition, and production of words (Utrecht: LOT, 2009), 
pp. 87 et seq.  
67 See, similarly, L. Hogeweg, Word in process. On the interpretation, acquisition, and production of words 
(Utrecht: LOT, 2009), pp. 4-5. 
68 See M. Tommasello, “Learning to use prepositions. A case study”, 14 Journal of Child Language (1987), 79 
et seq.; L. Hogeweg, Word in process. On the interpretation, acquisition, and production of words (Utrecht: 
LOT, 2009), p. 88. 
69 See E. M. Markman and G. F. Wachtel, “Children’s use of mutual exclusivity to constrain the meaning of 
words”, 20 Cognitive Psychology (1988), 121 et seq. 
70 See, for instance, D. Gentner, “Why Nouns are Learned Before Verbs: Linguistic Relativity versus Natural 
Partitioning”, in S. A. Kuczay (ed.), Language development. Vol. 2. Language, thought, and culture (Hillsdale: 
Erlbaum, 1982), 301 et seq.  
71 See the theory based on the Principle of Contrast, developed by Clark (E. V. Clark, “The principle of 
contrast: A constraint on language acquisition”, in B. MacWhinney (ed.), Mechanisms of language acquisition 
(Hillsdale: Erlbaum, 1987), 1 et seq.), and the slightly different theory based on the Principle of Mutual 
Exclusivity, described by Markman and Wachtel (E. M. Markman and G. F. Wachtel, “Children’s use of 
mutual exclusivity to constrain the meaning of words”, 20 Cognitive Psychology (1988), 121 et seq.). 
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temporal gap between the emergence of a concept in a child and his ability to properly 
associate it with a listeme.72 Nonetheless, it has also been put forward that the process of 
language acquisition cannot be reduced to the learning of listemes to be associated to 
predefined and pre-acquired concepts, since an important phase in the process of 
language acquisition is represented by the very same construction of those concepts.73 In 
particular, empirical evidence seems to exist in support of the hypothesis that children, 
when faced with new listemes, tend to create new (corresponding) concepts, if no 
previoulsly-created unlabelled concept is available. Such new concepts often relate to a 
salient part, or property of a familiar object.74 
Based on the above, scholars have upheld the view that the relation between 
language acquisition and cognition is bidirectional, in that, on the one hand, children 
must be able to conceptualize aspects of their perceptual experience to recognize the 
appropriate way of referring to those aspects and, on the other hand, linguistic forms 
(e.g. listemes) may focus children’s attention on certain aspects of experience that they 
would not have focused on otherwise.75 As Hogeweg puts it, “linguistic development is 
inextricably bound up with cognitive development and they influence each other. Certain 
cognitive abilities are prerequisite to be able to learn language but at the same time 
linguistic conventions may influence the categorization of concepts”.76  
 
The above description of the process through which children learn the meaning of 
listemes, words and expressions holds true more generally for the entire category of 
human beings. More importantly it highlights, by exemplifying a technique of learning, 
the general existence of a structural relation between listemes and concepts, which 
characterizes human language and thought. 
The relation between listemes and concepts, as well as the characteristics of 
concepts as such, are duly analysed in the following sections. 
 
                                                     
72 See, for instance, J. R. Johnston and D. I. Slobin, “The development of locative expressions in English, 
Italian, Serbo-Croatian and Turkish”, 6 Journal of Child Language (1979), 529 et seq. 
73 See L. Steels, The Talking Heads Experiment (Antwerpen: Laboratorium, 1999) and A. D. M. Smith, “The 
Inferential Transmission of Language”, 13 Adaptive Behavior (2005), 311 et seq.  
74 See E. M. Markman and G. F. Wachtel, “Children’s use of mutual exclusivity to constrain the meaning of 
words”, 20 Cognitive Psychology (1988), 121 et seq. 
75 L. Hogeweg, Word in process. On the interpretation, acquisition, and production of words (Utrecht: LOT, 
2009), p. 98, citing M. Tommasello, Constructing a Language. A Usage-Based Theory of Language 
Acquisition (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003). See, similarly, the Division of Dominance theory 
developed in D. Gentner and L. Boroditsky, “Individuation, relational relativityand early word learning”, in M. 
Bowerman and S. Levinson (eds.), Language acquisition and conceptual development (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), 215 et seq.; this theory constitutes the basis of the Relational Relativity hyphothesis, 
according to which there is much more cross-linguistic diversity in the naming of relations between entities 
and actions, than there is in the naming of objects. Such a hypothesis proves useful in order to explain the non-
perfect overlapping of similar legal concepts (which mainly concern relations) employed within different legal 
systems, and the related absence of synonymity between the corresponding legal terms, which is discussed in 
section 4 of Chapter 4 of Part II of this dissertation. 
76 L. Hogeweg, Word in process. On the interpretation, acquisition, and production of words (Utrecht: LOT, 
2009), p. 99. 
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2.2. The relation between listemes and concepts: basic features 
 
In order to illustrate the basic features of the relation existing between listemes and 
concepts, the spotlight is moved back to the previous example of a “ball”. When 
someone utters “ball” in the context of a football match, he exactly wants to say “ball”, 
meaning a request to the person in possession of the ball to pass it to him as soon as 
possible. Thus, the meaning of the utterance “ball” is, translated into our day-to-day 
language, the meaning of a sentence such as “pass me the ball now”. The latter is just a 
means to make someone (the reader, for example) understand what the speaker means by 
saying “ball”, that is what the speaker wants to obtain by uttering “ball”. The need to 
express “ball” in terms of “pass me the ball now” is due to the fact that the hearer does 
not know the language spoken in the context of the football match, but knows what the 
author referred to as the day-to-day language. Moreover, none of the two expressions is 
intrinsically superior to the other: they are simply two expressions in two different 
languages.  
 
Even assuming the substantial correspondence of meanings between the expressions 
“ball” and “pass me the ball now” within the football match context, it must be 
recognized that such expressions may denote different actions depending on the type of 
football match that is actually played. For instance, the actions connected to the passing 
of the ball in a soccer match significantly diverge from those connected to the passing of 
the ball in an American football match, since the rules of the two games are different.  
This remark may seem puzzling and can legitimately lead someone to wonder, on 
the one hand, whether two distinct concepts of “passing the ball” exist in connection 
with soccer and American football  and, on the other hand, whether it is correct to say 
that “pass me the ball” is one and the same day-to-day language expression when used in 
the context of a soccer match and in the context of an American football match.  
These questions are two sides of the same coin and originate from the complex 
relation existing between the two levels characterizing the use of language. The first one 
is the level of the concepts, which relies significantly upon the encyclopedic knowledge 
of the people communicating with each other. The second one is the level of the listemes 
used in order to refer to such concepts, where the very same concept may be referred to 
by means of different listemes and the very same listeme may be used to refer to more 
than one concept.  
 These two levels (concepts and listemes) are strictly interconnected with each 
other and together characterize any kind of language use: to have a useful knowledge of 
a certain listeme in a specific language implies having some knowledge of the concept 
referred to by means of that listeme in that language. Such knowledge is not limited to 
the definitions of the specific listeme that may be found in dictionaries (i.e. the semantic 
specifications of that listeme as a lexicon entry), but includes the encyclopedic 
knowledge of the underlying concept and of the fields where the latter is relevant.77 That 
                                                     
77 The dividing line between the knowledge that may be derived from dictionaries (i.e. the lexicon knowledge, 
in particular with regard to semantic specifications) and the encyclopedic knowledge is blurred. Traditionally, 
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is because, where the knowledge of a specific listeme does not encompass some 
encyclopedic knowledge of the concept referred to by means of that listeme in that 
specific language, that listeme cannot be suitably used for communication purposes.78 If, 
for example, we assume that the listeme “ball” in the specific language of soccer refers 
to the concept of passing the ball (the encyclopedic knowledge of which also includes 
the rules on how to pass the ball in soccer), a person may be said to usefully know the 
listeme “ball” in the soccer language only where he actually knows the concept of 
passing the ball in soccer and its relevant rules, at least to a certain extent. Where this is 
not the case, that person cannot communicate by means of that listeme with other people, 
since there will be no agreement between the speaker and the hearer on the content of the 
message transmitted by means of such a listeme, if not by mere chance.79  
In that respect, there are various degrees of knowledge of a concept and, 
theoretically, it is possible to ordinate such levels on a continuous scale80 whose edges 
could be named superficial knowledge (the least knowledge necessary in order to 
theoretically communicate by means of the corresponding term) and in-depth knowledge 
(the maximum level possible). The possibility of an effective communication between 
two persons by means of a specific listeme does not require an in-depth knowledge of 
the corresponding concept. What is necessary, instead, is that the hearer does have at 
least the same level of knowledge implicitly required by the speaker when he chose and 
used a specific listeme in its specific context (including the utterance in which the 
                                                                                                                                  
a lexicon is considered to contain lexicographical information about listemes (i.e. formal, morphosyntactic and 
semantic specification) in the language, whereas an encyclopedia is considered to contain extra-linguistic 
semantic information about a name-bearer, in particular information about what listemes are used to refer to 
(see K. Allan, Natural Language Semantics (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), pp. 100 et seq.). Within the 
present study, in many occasions the concept of encyclopedic knowledge is intended as inclusive of the 
semantic specifications of a listeme generally included in dictionaries.  
78 Consider the following instance (discussed, in a slightly different fashion, in L. Wittgenstein (translated by 
G. E. M. Anscombe), Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953), p. 125, paras. 554-555). 
Consider two groups of people that apparently use the same language and, in particular, do use the very same 
negation sign. For both groups, such a negation sign determines the negation of the meaning of the expression 
to which it is attached. For one group, however, where the expression to be negated already contains one 
negation, the addition of the negation sign just works as an intensifier of the first negation (e.g. the expression 
“non-non-good” somewhat corresponds to the expression “very bad”). On the contrary, for the other group, the 
two negations offset each other (e.g. the expression “non-non-good” somewhat corresponds to the expression 
“good”). According to Wittgenstein, the question whether the negation does have the same meaning to these 
two groups of people would be analogous to the question whether the figure “5” meant the same to people 
whose numbers ended at 5 as to us.  
79 A similar consideration is expressed by Fillmore and Atkins, who point out that a word’s meaning can be 
understood only with reference to a structured background of experience, beliefs, or practices, constituting a 
conceptual prerequisite for understanding the meaning. They conclude that speakers can be said to understand 
the meaning of the word only by first understanding the background frames that motivate the concept that the 
word encodes (see C. J. Fillmore and B. T. Atkins, “Toward a frame-based lexicon: the semantic of RISK and 
its neighbors”, in A. Lehrer and E. F. Kittay (eds.), Frames, Fields, and Contrasts. New Essays in Semantic 
and Lexical Organization (Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1992), 75 et seq., at 76-77).  According to Allan, 
language is a cognitive and psychological entity that must be “known” in order to be used. In addition, he 
points out that meaning in natural languages is very responsive to, and often a reflex of, human perception and 
conception (see K. Allan, Natural Language Semantics (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), p. 3).  
80 As most of the things concerning human thought, the scale is a continuous one, the boundary between one 
level and the following one being blurred, or even notexisting at all. 
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listeme has been used) in order to transmit the message he had in mind.   
 
The example of the ball and the distinction made between the two levels of the language 
structure constitute a good starting point to highlight the two main characteristics of the 
relation existing between concepts and listemes: conventionality and ambiguity. 
 
2.3. The relation between listemes and concepts: conventionality 
 
The correspondence between concepts and listemes is conventional, i.e. the meaning of 
listemes is conventional.81 82  
 
The conventional correspondence between a listeme and a concept presupposes a 
necessary agreement between the people using such a listeme.83 Without an agreement 
on the correspondence between listemes and concepts, listemes cannot be used to 
express concepts and, therefore, they cannot be used in order to communicate: they are 
outside the scope of language (as previously defined). Such a necessary agreement is 
between the person using a specific listeme in an utterance and all the potential 
recipients of that utterance. The agreement generally points to the correspondence 
established by a specific person, or group of persons, and then accepted by others. 
 
With reference to the content of the agreement, i.e. the conventional correspondence 
between a concept and a listeme, it is useful to distinguish between the way in which the 
correspondence is established, on the one hand, and the techniques through which it may 
be expressed, on the other.  
 
In relation to the first aspect, the content of the agreement may be established (i) by 
means of an ad hoc arrangement among all the persons that are using the listeme in the 
specific circumstance, both as speakers and hearers, (ii) by a recognized rule84 that 
                                                     
81 The contrast between the naturalist hypothesis, according to which the original meaning of a word gives rise 
to its original form “naturally”, and the conventional hypothesis, according to which the correspondence 
between meaning and form is entirely arbitrary and, at the same time, conventional because it needs to be 
agreed upon and learned by the language community, dates back at least to the age of classic Greek 
philosophers (see Plato (translated by B. Jowett), Cratylus (The Internet Classics Archive) – available online at 
http://classics.mit.edu//Plato/cratylus.html). The very same etymology of the word “etymology” seems to 
confirm that in ancient Greece the naturalist hypothesis was widespread and well-rooted: “etymology” in fact 
derives from the combination of the listeme “etymos”, which means “true sense of words”, and the listeme 
“logìa”, which means “study of”. 
82 On the conventional nature of language expressions and their typical feature of quickly changing meanings, 
it is interesting to read the criticism of Wright’s naturalistic theory made by Allen in K. Allan, Natural 
Language Semantics (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), pp. 159-160.  
83 On the relation between conventional correspondence and agreement, as well as on the different types of 
agreement, see L. Wittgenstein (translated by G. E. M. Anscombe), Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1953), p. 23, paras. 53 and 54. 
84 The rule must be recognized among the people that are supposed to use that specific listeme as 
corresponding to that specific concept. 
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attributes to a person or a group of person the power to do so,85 or, in the majority of 
cases, (iii) by praxis.  
With regard to praxis, it is necessary to keep in mind that this is empirical and not 
uniform. Praxis is empirical since the correspondence between the listeme and the 
concept must have been previously established at least once by at least one person and 
because the more frequently such a correspondence has been agreed upon in the past 
within a certain group of people, the more probable is that it will be upheld in the future 
within the same group. Praxis is not uniform in the sense that it varies according to the 
context, i.e. across different times, geographical and cultural areas, depending on the 
subject matter of the utterance and the people involved (i.e. the speaker and the potential 
hearers). 
Therefore, in the vast majority of cases the correspondence between listemes and 
concepts established by praxis appears to be erratic. Once the context in which the 
listeme is used is established, however, the variety of the correspondence is narrowed 
down.86 Still, due to the empirical nature of praxis, it is possible that, in a given context, 
there is more than one possible correspondence between a given listeme and the 
underlying concept. That makes the correspondence ambiguous, as will be discussed 
below. 
For the reasons just summarized, the questions whether an agreement exists and 
which correspondence constitutes its content appear to be matters of inductive inference 
based on the frequency of the praxis in the given context and on all other items of 
evidence available. 
 
With regard to the second aspect, the established content of the agreement may be 
expressed by means of (i) ad hoc definitions (descriptions)87 of the listemes and (ii) 
exemplifications (which include ostensive exemplifications).  
Definitions have the drawback of being made up of listemes that correspond to 
other concepts, here referred to as sub-concepts.   
                                                     
85 For example, in western democracies, the power attributed to the legislator of establishing a correspondence 
between a listeme and a concept that has to be universally accepted within the community where such a 
correspondence is established as part of the law. 
86 As stated by Wittgenstein, words have meaning only as part of a sentence (see L. Wittgenstein (translated by 
G. E. M. Anscombe), Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953), p. 21, para. 49). This function 
performed by the context is one of the specific fields of pragmatics, on which, in general, see J. L. Mey, 
Pragmatics, An Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001); K. M. Jaszczolt, Semantics and Pragmatics, Meaning 
in Language and Discourse (London: Longman, 2002) and the vast bibliography cited therein. 
87 Definitions and descriptions may be distinguished by considering (i) the descriptions as assertive sentences 
made of listemes, through which the correspondence between the listeme described and a concept is expressed; 
and (ii) the definitions as particular kind of descriptions, in which the concept corresponding to the defined 
listeme presents several features and these features are also proper to the sub-concepts corresponding to the 
(sub-)listemes used in the definition itself. When a definition, in this sense, is used, the features of the sub-
concepts corresponding to the listemes used in the definition, taken as a whole, biunivocally match the features 
of the concept corresponding to the defined listeme. Substantially, this is the distinction between definitions 
and descriptions drawn in L. Wittgenstein (translated by D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuiness), Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus (London: Routledge, 2001). For the purpose of the present study such a distinction is not 
relevant and, therefore, is not maintained; the terms “definition” and “description” here are used as synonyms 
having the meaning attached to the listeme “description” above. 
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The correspondence between the sub-concepts and the listemes used in a 
definition is also conventional and has to be expressed somewhat. Therefore, for a 
definition to work, it is necessary to agree upon the correspondence between the listemes 
used in the definitions itself and the related concepts (sub-concepts) and to express such 
a correspondence through one of the means previously discussed. Theoretically, if such 
(sub-)correspondences were always expressed by means of definitions, the process of 
expressing the initial correspondence would prove either never-ending or circular and, 
therefore, useless.88 An instance of such an issue appears from the following example,89 




Definition 1: an electronic device designed to accept data, perform prescribed 
mathematical and logical operations at high speed, and display the results of these 
operations. 
 
The author then considers one listeme of definition 1: device 
 
Listeme: device 
Definition 2 (the first of seven alternative definitions in the dictionary): a thing 
made for a particular purpose; an invention or contrivance, esp. a mechanical or 
electrical one. 
 
The author then considers one listeme of definition 2: purpose 
 
Listeme: purpose 
Definition 3 (the first of eleven alternative definitions in the dictionary): the 
reason for which something exists or is done, made, used, etc. 
 
The author then considers one listeme of definition 3: reason 
 
Listeme: reason 
Definition 4 (the first of nineteen alternative definitions in the dictionary): a basis 
or cause, as for some belief, action, fact, event, etc.: the reason for declaring war. 
 
The author then considers one listeme of definition 4: cause 
 
Listeme: cause 
                                                     
88 Similarly, L. Wittgenstein (translated by G. E. M. Anscombe), Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1953), p. 35, para. 87. With reference to the interpretation of treaties, see W. Hummer, ““Ordinary” 
versus “Special” Meaning. Comparison of the Approach of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and 
the Yale-School Findings”, 26 Österreichische Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht (1975), 87 et seq., at 95. 
89 The following definitions are provided by the Dictionary.com Unabridged. Random House, Inc. (accessed 
15 Jan. 2010). 
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Definition 5 (the first of ten alternative definitions in the dictionary): the reason 
or motive for some human action: The good news was a cause for rejoicing. 
 
Would the reader continue by choosing the listeme reason or motive? Where the listeme 
reason was chosen, the reader would be sent back to definition 4 and, thus, the definition 
of the listeme computer would prove to be circular. Where, on the contrary, the listeme 
motive was selected, the reader should have recourse to another definition, with the risk 
of continuing endlessly.   
 
However, as a matter of fact, in many instances the agreed correspondence is expressed 
by means of exemplifications (as well illustrated in the above example by both 
definitions 4 and 5) and the risk of circular or never-ending streams of definitions is 
therefore actually removed.     
The fact that definitions are means to express a potentially agreed correspondence 
between listemes and concepts implies that a definition is never correct or incorrect per 
se. A definition is, per se, simply tautological. A definition may be called incorrect only 
where it is presented as expressing a correspondence agreed upon within a certain group 
of people, but, as a matter of fact, such a correspondence proves to be non-established 
within that group. In the latter case, however, the issue is not in the definition per se, but 
rather in the way in which that is portrayed.  
 
Moving to exemplifications, the latter consist in pointing to specific facts, things, 
actions, etc. as prototypes of (the set of features of) specific concepts. The most evident 
and relevant features of the specific facts, things, actions, etc. pointed at in a certain 
context are, by means of induction, conventionally established as the set of features of 
the concept corresponding to the listeme at stake.  
 
2.4. The relation between listemes and concepts: ambiguity 
 
The correspondence between concepts and listemes is characterized by ambiguity.  
This idea may be differently expressed by saying that generally the 
correspondence is not biunivocal,90 i.e. in the majority of cases a concept does not 
correspond to a single listeme (synonymy) and a listeme does not correspond to a single 
concept (polysemy).91 
                                                     
90 As a consequance, “when a particular word is used, there is not one corresponding meaning which the hearer 
can automatically associate with it. Instead, the hearer chooses the best or optimal interpretation of a word in a 
given situation. Similarly, when a speaker wants to express something, there is not always a form available that 
perfectly corresponds to the intended meaning. Therefore, the speaker chooses the word that corresponds to the 
intended meaning the best, in other words, she chooses the optimal form.” (L. Hogeweg, Word in process. On 
the interpretation, acquisition, and production of words (Utrecht: LOT, 2009), pp. 2 and 3). 
91 Linguists distinguish between polysemy and homonymy. The former is generally intended as referring to the 
plurality of meanings attributable to one and the same listeme, which is characterized by a single form and a 
single set of morphosyntactic specifications and corresponding to a single lexicon entry in dictionaries. 




The phenomenon of ambiguity is the result of the way in which the agreed 
correspondence between listemes and concepts is established, in particular it is the result 
of the above-described process of agreement formation by means of praxis. As already 
mentioned, praxis is characterized by significant spatial and temporal variability, which 
leads to both the stratification of meanings expressed by a single listeme and the use of 
different listemes to express the very same concept. The magnitude of the phenomenon 
has been further enhanced, in many language communities, by the custom of having new 
correspondences between listemes and concepts unilaterally and generally established by 
the act of a person (or group of persons) properly empowered to do so by a recognized 
rule of the community.  
The phenomenon of polysemous listemes is explained well by the theory of 
semantic chains.92 According to this theory, in most cases listemes originally correspond 
                                                                                                                                  
Typically, when polysemy is at stake, the various concepts corresponding to a single listeme are semantically 
related, either in a systematic way (i.e. each listeme of a particular semantic class potentially corresponds to the 
same variety of concepts; e.g. “door”, “gate”, “window” may be used to refer to both the aperture and the 
covering of such aperture) or in a non-systematic way (i.e. there is no predictable pattern of concepts 
corresponding to a particular semantic class; e.g. the listeme “arm” may refer both to the arm of government 
and to human arm) (see A. Koskela and M. L. Murphy, “Polysemy and Homonymy”, in K. Allan (ed.), 
Concise Encyclopedia of Semantics (Oxford: Elsevier, 2009), 711 et seq., at 711). Homonymy, on the other 
hand, is generally intended as referring to the phenomenon of two listemes with coincidental identical form, 
i.e. having the same form but usually different morphosyntactic specifications and corresponding to two 
different lexicon entries in dictionaries. Homonyms arise either accidentally through lexical borrowings and 
changes, or through some semantic or morphological drift such that a previously polysemous form is no longer 
perceived as being the same listeme in all its senses. In the latter case, the passage from polysemy to 
homonymy is subjective and sometimes conventionally recognized within a certain community. Unlike the 
concepts corresponding to a single polysemous listeme, concepts corresponding to different homonymous 
listemes are, in most cases, not semantically related (see A. Koskela and M. L. Murphy, “Polysemy and 
Homonymy”, in K. Allan (ed.), Concise Encyclopedia of Semantics (Oxford: Elsevier, 2009), 711 et seq., at 
711). However, this does not always hold true and linguists recognize that a clear distinction between 
polysemous and homonymous listemes remains difficult to draw (see A. Koskela and M. L. Murphy, 
“Polysemy and Homonymy”, in K. Allan (ed.), Concise Encyclopedia of Semantics (Oxford: Elsevier, 2009), 
711 et seq., at 711). Nonetheless, while drawing such a distinction remains relevant for linguists, in particular 
semanticists and lexicographers, it is not so for the purpose of the present study, in relation to which what is 
relevant to highlight is the fact that in natural languages the phenomenon of having different concepts 
corresponding to a single graphic form (either a single listeme or multiple homonymous listemes) is 
widespread. Therefore, in the remainder of this study, each reference to “polysemy” must be read as made to 
“homonymy” as well, unless otherwise indicated in the text.   
92 Such a theory is also known in linguistics as the chain of similarities theory and the family resemblance 
theory. On semantic chains, G. Lakoff, Woman, fire and dangerous things. What categories reveal about the 
mind (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), in particular Part I.  
Similarly, semantic map theory may also be used to explain the phenomenon of polysemous listemes. Semantic 
maps aim at representing form-meaning correspondences and, by linking up language-specific formal 
categories to semantic categories, are purported to show that the multiple uses of a listeme are related in a 
systematic and universal way (J. van der Auwera and C. Temürcü, “Semantic Maps”, in K. Allan (ed.), 
Concise Encyclopedia of Semantics (Oxford: Elsevier, 2009), 863 et seq., at 863). On semantic map theory see 
also J. van der Auwera and V. Plungian, “Modality’s semantic map”, 2 Linguistic Typology (1998), 79 et seq.; 
J. van der Auwera, N. Dobrushina and V. Goussev, “A semantic map for imperative-hortatives”, in D. Willems 
et al. (eds.), Contrastive Analysis in Language. Identifying Linguistic Units of Comparison (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillian, 2004), 44 et seq.; M. Haspelmath, “The geometry of grammatical meaning. Semantic 
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to a single concept. By means of praxis, the listemes then start to be used by a part of the 
language community in order to refer to items that are outside the scope of the original 
concept, but which present some kind of similarities with the items typically 
encompassed within its scope. When such a new use of the specific listeme becomes 
widespread within a relevant part of the language community, it may be said that listeme 
corresponds to two concepts within that language community. The process of creation of 
new correspondences between the listeme and concepts continue along these lines, so 
that a certain point in time a semantic chain of concepts corresponding to a single 
listeme appears to be in place. Along the chain, the first and the last concepts are 
semantically quite distant.93 Allan gives the example of the listeme “mother” in order to 
show the effects of the process.94 The prototypical meaning of the listeme “mother”, 
which is most probably the original meaning thereof, denotes the female human beings 
that produce the ovum, conceive, gestate, give birth and nurture the child. Starting from 
such a concept, praxis has then extended the use of the listeme “mother” to: (i) the 
concept of the nurturant mother that is not the biological mother;95 (ii) the concept of 
biological mother that does not nurture the child; (iii) in turn, from the concept of 
biological mother are derived the distinct concepts of ovum source mother96 and 
gestation-birth mother; (iv) from the concept of nurturant mother are derived the 
concepts of spiritual mother and of mother superior in a religious context. Other 
concepts corresponding to the listeme “mother” could be added to the above list.  
Semantic chains prove useful in order to analyse and explain why two listemes of 
two natural languages share just a part of their respective corresponding concepts. 
Consider, for instance, the listemes “ride” in English and “reiten” in German.97 Both 
                                                                                                                                  
maps and cross-linguistic comparison”, in M. Tommasello (ed.), The new psychology of language, Vol. 2 
(Mahwah: Erlbaum, 2003), 211 et seq.   
93 Lakoff distinguished two types of semantic chains, which he called family resemblance categories. The first 
type is that of generative categories, which can be formed by taking the prototypical concept corresponding to 
a listeme member of a certain semantic class and applying to such a concept the class rules of generation in 
order to designate category membership, i.e. in order to determine the other concepts that correspond to the 
same listeme. The concepts pertaining to a generative category appear thus semantically related in a systematic 
way, in the sense described in previous note 91 (i.e. each listeme of a particular semantic class potentially 
corresponds to the same variety of concepts; e.g. “door”, “gate”, “window” may be used to refer to both the 
aperture and the covering of such aperture). The second type is that of radial categories, whose actual structure 
is not predictable since the category is not determined by application of any class rule of generation. The 
concepts pertaining to a radial category appear therefore semantically related in a non-systematic way, in the 
sense described in previous note 91 (i.e. there is no predictable pattern of concepts corresponding to a 
particular semantic class). It should be noted that the idea of family resemblance categories was originally put 
forward by Wittgenstein (see L. Wittgenstein (translated by G. E. M. Anscombe), Philosophical Investigations 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1953), p. 26, paras. 66-67) and only later developed by Lakoff in G. Lakoff, Woman, fire 
and dangerous things: What categories reveal about the mind (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 
Chapter 2. 
94 K. Allan, Natural Language Semantics (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), pp. 328-329. The example is a 
reformulation of that originally discussed in G. Lakoff, Woman, fire and dangerous things: What categories 
reveal about the mind (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), pp. 82-83. 
95 The nurturant mother may be adoptive, foster, etc. 
96 Generally called genetic mother. 
97 Example taken from J. Lyons, Semantics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977) – Vol. 1, pp. 263-
264. 
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listemes were originally used to refer to the action of riding on horseback.98 However, in 
German the original meaning has expanded as to include actions such as sitting astride a 
beam;99 in this case, the specific posture or position of sitting was determinative in 
directing the meaning expansion. Differently, in English the original meaning has 
expanded as to include both (i) the act of transportation by means of bikes or motorbikes 
on which the posture is similar to that on a horse, and (ii) the act of transportation by 
other means such as coaches, trains and cars, where the original horseback-riding posture 
is not required; in this case, the fact of being conveyed was decisive in directing the 
meaning expansion.  
However, the theory of semantic chains, although useful in order to explain ex 
post the reasons why certain semantically distant concepts correspond to the same 
listeme, cannot be used to predict the future evolution of such chains, since in many 
instances semantic chains spread out in various directions creating a sort of non-
systematic radiations.  
 
From a different perspective, the extent of language ambiguity is directly related to and 
influenced by the level of (intellectual) specialization that characterizes the community 
where the language is used. In communities where the aggregate wealth and its 
distribution within the group is such as to guarantee that some part of community 
population may commit part or the whole of its time to intellectual speculations and 
scientific research, as well as in communities where human activities are specialized and 
accordingly performed by dedicated subgroups, the ambiguity of language is generally 
higher due to the birth and proliferation of jargons. Jargon may be defined as the 
language (especially the vocabulary) peculiar to a particular trade, profession or 
group.100 Jargons contribute to increase the ambiguity of language since they (i) increase 
the polysemy of existing listemes and (ii) create new listemes to express concepts that 
are similar to concepts corresponding to pre-existing listemes, the difference between 
such concepts being sometimes blurred (or, in extreme cases, becoming non-existent). 
Jargons are, in fact, characterized by novel listemes and pre-existing listemes used in 
new ways, especially because the specialized vocabulary needs to name those concepts 
that are special to the domains in which the jargons are used. Although performing this 
proper and necessary function, jargons (and their specialized vocabulary) are in some 
cases vacuous and pretentious, adopting harsh neologisms to express well-known 
concepts just for the pleasure of making the jargon community appear to be an elite 
group and producing, as a consequence, the above-mentioned undesirable effect of 
making language more ambiguous.101 In this sense, the members of certain groups use 
jargons as entrance-barriers in order preserve any possible caste or competitive 
                                                     
98 They have common origin in the Proto-Germanic language(s). See Online Etymology Dictionary (Douglas 
Harper. Accessed 09 Oct. 2009). With reference to their common etymology, see also the reference to their 
diachronic relation in J. Lyons, Semantics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977) – Vol. 1, p. 263. 
99 Auf einem Balken reiten in German. 
100 This is the first entry for “jargon” at the Dictionary.com Unabridged. Random House, Inc. (accessed 18 Jan. 
2010). 
101 K. Allan, Natural Language Semantics (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), pp. 170-172. 
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advantages against outsiders. These (limited) negative features of jargons give the 
reasons why in current English (as well in other languages) “jargon” is still used 
sometimes with a negative connotation. It is enlightening, in this respect, to report other 
dictionary definitions of jargon: unintelligible or meaningless talk or writing; gibberish; 
any talk or writing that one does not understand; language that is characterized by 
uncommon or pretentious vocabulary and convoluted syntax and often vague in 
meaning.102 The etymology of the listeme “jargon” and the meanings it used to express 
in the past confirm the historical and widespread negative connotation of jargons, as well 
as the related general aversion and prejudice towards the underlying phenomenon of 
class-languages.103 
However, in modern society jargons indisputably play a fundamental role as 
technical or specialist languages, providing the members of the various groups with a 
precise, efficient and economical language tool, capable of capturing distinctions not 
made in the ordinary language.  
Jargons are characterized (and their existence identified) by the presence of 
certain common features.104 These are mainly of a lexical nature, such as the existence of 
specialized vocabularies for specific domains and the use of idioms, abbreviations and 
acronyms,105 although some are of syntactic (e.g. the widespread use of “shall” in the 
third person) or presentational nature (e.g. the format in which a written text is 
presented). In any event, the boundaries of a jargon are difficult if not impossible to 
draw, which makes any particular jargon difficult to define precisely, especially because 
every jargon borrows from language that is common to other jargons.106 
In light of the subject matter of the present study, it may be interesting to briefly 
highlight the main features of English legal jargon (some of which are common to legal 
jargons expressed in other natural languages). First, English legal jargon is characterized 
                                                     
102 These are entries 2, 3 and 5 for “jargon” at the Dictionary.com Unabridged. Random House, Inc. (accessed 
18 Jan. 2010). 
103 Allan reports that, in middle English, “jargon” was generally used to describe the chattering of birds, or 
human speech that sounded as meaningless as the chattering of birds (see K. Allan, Natural Language 
Semantics (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), p. 169). Etymologically, “jargon” and the corresponding 
Italian “gergo” seem to derive from the Indo-European root “garg”, from which the Latin “gùrgula”, the Italian 
“gargana” and the Spanish “garganta” derive, all of which denotate the “throat”, or from the Indo-European 
root “gar”, from which the greek “Geryo” and the Italian “gridare” derive, which means to speak loudly (see 
Vocabolario Etimologico Pianigiani della lingua italiana on-line, accessed 10 February 2010; K. Allan, Natural 
Language Semantics (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), p. 169). 
104 K. Allan, Natural Language Semantics (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), p. 172 et seq. 
105 It is interesting to note that the “English international tax language” presents to a certain extent the lexical 
features of a jargon. This is apparent when we think about the existence of certain technical terms such as 
“resident” and “permanent establishment”; idiomatic expressions such as “beneficial owner” and “at arm’s 
length”; acronyms such as “CFC”, “DTC” and “LOB”. It is also interesting to note that the international tax 
community has enhanced this process of jargon formation by creating specialized glossaries, such as the 
“IBFD International Tax Glossary” in the English language. Notwithstanding these features and the efforts of 
the international tax community, the international tax domain still heavily relies on the official national tax 
languages of the various States of the international community and, thus, the scope of the international tax 
jargon (if any) is very limited. In contrast, at the level of the various States of the international community, the 
official national tax languages generally constitute quite well-developed jargons.  
106 K. Allan, Natural Language Semantics (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), p. 176. 
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by an ad hoc vocabulary, made of (i) listemes exclusively used in the legal language and 
(ii) listemes that are used in the legal language to convey meanings different from those 
corresponding to those listemes when used in the day-to-day language. Furthermore, 
English legal jargon vocabulary presents a significant number of listemes borrowed (or 
derived) from Latin and French. From the syntactical and formal perspectives, it is 
common practice to structure long and very complex sentences,107 frequently difficult to 
comprehend, in which two or three synonyms are often strung together.108 It is also 
characterized by the large numbers of passives, nominalizations, multiple embeddings, 
intrusive phrases, multiple negatives and other features that generally make the public 
feel offended by the perception that the writer of the legal text is requiring them to spend 
an unreasonable effort in order to understand what the document means.109 110 
Based on the above, the conclusion may be drawn that the adoption of a particular 
jargon in formulating an utterance generally implies the correspondence between the 
listemes used therein and the concepts that are associated with such listemes within that 
specific jargon (if any). This has remarkable consequences for the meaning of the 
utterance itself. In fact, where the hearer may reasonably establish that a particular 
jargon has been used in formulating the utterance, a plausible presumption exists that, 
among the various concepts theoretically corresponding to a certain listeme, the speaker 
has chosen the one(s) whose correspondence to the listeme is typical of jargon used (e.g. 
the concept of “pass me the ball now” in soccer jargon). Various kinds of evidence exist 
that may lead the hearer to conclude that a specific jargon is used by the speaker, the 
most relevant being: the subject matter of the utterance (e.g. a technical subject matter to 
which a specific jargon corresponds), the identity and capacity of the speaker (e.g. a 
professor in a specific subject matter that has its own jargon, giving a lecture on such a 
subject matter), the identity and capacity of the prototype hearers (e.g. doctors attending 
a conference on recent medical developments in neurology), the purpose of the utterance 
(e.g. an in-depth analysis of a technical subject matter), the extensive use of idiomatic 
expressions and listemes specific to a certain jargon. The attribution of different weights 
to the items of evidence available in order to conclude whether a specific jargon has 
been used by the speaker implies a discretionary assessment (judgment) from the hearer.    
 
However, even when the ambiguity of certain listemes used in the utterance is reduced 
by the conclusion that the speaker adopted a specific jargon in formulating it, the overall 
ambiguity of the utterance cannot be entirely removed. This is due to various factors. 
                                                     
107 Danat reports that the average length of a sentence in a legal document is 55 words, which is 8 times the 
length found in dramatic texts (see B. Danat, “Language in the legal process”, 14 Law and Society Review 
(1980), 445 et seq., at 479). 
108 According to Allan (see K. Allan, Natural Language Semantics (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), p. 
173), this feature derives from the early practice in English legal texts of conjoining a term of Germanic origin 
with a synonym of Romance origin. 
109 These features, commonly emphasized in the critical observations made by legal researchers, are even more 
precisely perceived by non-legal researchers, in particular linguists, among whom, for extensive references, K. 
Allan, Natural Language Semantics (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), p. 174.  
110 The prototype of the lawyer abundantly mis(using) legal jargon is incomparably well sketched by 
Alessandro Manzoni when describing the “eloquence” of dottor Azzeccagarbugli in “I promessi sposi”. 
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First, within a specific jargon, the correspondence between a listeme and a concept is not 
always biunivocal: a certain listeme may be characterized by polysemy even within a 
specific jargon. Second, concepts may be vague with regard to their scope, in the sense 
that there are often borderline items the inclusion of which in the scope of the relevant 
concept is uncertain. Third, many jargons are variations of day-to-day languages, from 
which they borrow most of their vocabulary and their morphosyntactic rules; therefore, 
even if the ambiguity is reduced with regard to the technical listemes of the jargon, it 
almost invariably remains in respect of those listemes borrowed directly from the day-to-
day language. Fourth, ambiguity may derive from the combination of listemes into 
sentences and from the underspecification of the latter.111  
 
To conclude, the potential ambiguity of the listemes used in an utterance appears notably 
narrower than it seemed at first glance. The relevance that the context may have for 
ascertaining the meaning that a specific listeme does have in a specific utterance has 
already been mentioned. For the time being,112 the author assumes the context is made of 
all information regarding the framework where the specific listeme and the utterance in 
which it is encompassed have been pronounced. The context may thus be deemed to 
encompass: the subject matter of the utterance, the identity and capacity of the speaker 
and of the potential hearers, the purpose of the utterance, the use of a specific jargon, the 
semantic content of (the remainder of) the utterance where the listeme is used and of 
nearby utterances, the cooperative principle (i.e. the common rules on human behavior 
when communicating), as well as the background and experiences of the speaker and 
hearers, including their encyclopedic knowledge.113 In particular, the encyclopedic 
knowledge plays a primary role for the purpose of narrowing down the ambiguity of the 
specific listeme. On the one hand, part of the contextual information derives its actual 
content from the encyclopedic knowledge of the speaker and the potential hearers (e.g. 
the subject matter of the utterance, the capacity of the speaker, etc.) and, on the other 
hand, the various concepts associated with the specific listeme may be comparatively 
assessed against the background of the utterance context only where each of them has 
been already analysed and understood in its own context, i.e. in the framework of the 
encyclopedic knowledge field to which such concept pertains. However, it must be kept 
in mind that the process of narrowing down the ambiguity of the specific listeme by 
discharging the meanings that do not respond (or correspond) to the context 
requirements, i.e. that are not sensible in the actual context, is not a mechanical task, but 
implies the hearer’s discretionary assessment of the various significant factors.114  
 
                                                     
111 This type of ambiguity is analysed in section 4 of this chapter. 
112 The concept of “context” will be expanded in the following sections. 
113 These elements partially overlap with those previously mentioned as relevant for the purpose of determining 
whether the speaker has adopted a certain jargon. Such a partial overlap emphasizes the fact that in both cases 
the context plays a major role.  
114 In linguistic terms, that activity represents a pragmatic assessment. 
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3. The characteristics of concepts 
3.1. Introduction 
 
“Meaning in natural language is an information structure that is mentally encoded by 
human beings”115 
 
Human beings have knowledge of the world they live in and think about through specific 
mental processes, which work as lenses put between them and such worlds. From the 
human perspective, there is no other knowledge than that acquired by means of these 
mental processes.116 Through such processes, which are generally labeled as perception 
and cognition, people (i) elaborate ideas and mental images that are part of abstract or 
metaphysical worlds, (ii) decrypt the information received from the external world 
through the senses and (iii) organize all these ideas, images and information in the form 
of data that are categorized according to mental schemes biologically and culturally 
driven. These mental schemes consist of concepts and the intricate net of relations 
existing among such concepts. Concepts and the relations among them are not a priori 
schemes for categorizing knowledge data; on the contrary, they are the product of human 
cognitive processes that, in turn, are influenced by the very same knowledge data that 
such schemes are used to categorize. 
In this perspective, social and cultural differences, as well as differences in life 
experiences between various communities do have a significant impact on the actual 
shape that concepts and relations among concepts tend to assume within such 
communities. The interaction, however, is biunivocal. In fact, the specific pattern of 
concepts and relations among them that characterizes a specific community is a 
fundamental part of its cultural legacy and, as such, is transmitted through the 
generations and contributes to informing both the social life of the community and the 
way in which experiences, facts, things are looked at and approached.    
From a linguistic standpoint, cognitive linguists have advanced the hypothesis 
that language (including grammatical structures and rules) is constrained and informed 
by the relations that human beings (i) perceive in nature, (ii) experience in the world they 
inhabit, and (iii) conceive of in abstract and metaphysical domains.117 More specifically, 
the idea upheld by cognitive linguistics is that the way in which people perceive the 
worlds and conceive of them informs their linguistic categorization (by means of 
concepts).  
 
The most relevant consequences of such premises are the following. 
                                                     
115 R. Jackendoff, Consciousness and the Computational Mind (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987), p. 122.  
116 On the relation between the world (things and facts), cognition and language, the best reference is L. 
Wittgenstein (translated by D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuiness), Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (London: 
Routledge, 2001). 
117 J. R. Taylor, “Cognitive Semantics”, in K. Allan (ed.), Concise Encyclopedia of Semantics (Oxford: 
Elsevier, 2009), 73 et seq.; K. Allan, Natural Language Semantics (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), pp. 
247 and 288. 
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First, the meaning of language expressions reflects the speaker’s perception and 
cognition of the denotata, his perception being heavily influenced by the cultural and 
social environment where he has grown up and has lived.118 In particular, concepts and 
the related mental categorizations reflect human needs and purposes and are constructed 
on the basis of the speaker’s personal point of view in the specific situation he is living 
in (space and time-wise), which in turn is greatly influenced by the surrounding cultural 
and social environment. Concepts and categorizations, on the other hand, influence the 
language spoken in that specific cultural and social environment, the language being the 
means used in order to communicate thoughts that are the result of cognitive processes 
based on the above concepts and categorizations. The perceptions that different people 
have of the same phenomenon may be different as a result of the dissimilarities between 
their cognitive processes and their categorizations based on concepts.119  
The perceptions differ in terms of selective emphasis, i.e. the emphasis that each 
person attributes to specific similarities and differences between the various phenomena 
that are perceived by means of the senses. The similarities and differences pertain to the 
various features of the phenomena and the emphasis that a certain person may attribute 
to such similarities or differences depends on the relevance that those features have for 
each of the concepts used by that very person as basis for categorizing and developing 
the cognitive process. Thus, the actual emphasis on similarities or differences in concrete 
cases mirrors the emphasis attributed to certain features rather than others in designing 
mental concepts.120 In general terms, emphasis on similarities corresponds to composite 
concepts in respect of specific features, while emphasis on differences corresponds to 
individual concepts in respect of specific features. The contraposition between 
                                                     
118 This first consequence has been originally noted and developed by R. E. MacLaury under the label of 
“Vantage Theory” (see R. E. MacLaury, “Coextensive semantic range: Different names for distinct vantages in 
one category”, in E. Shiller and A. Bosh (eds.), Papers from the Twenty-Third Annual Meeting of the Chicago 
Linguistics Society (Chicago: Chicago Linguistic Society, 1987), 268 et seq.; R. E. MacLaury, “Vantage 
theory”, in J. R. Taylor and R. E. MacLaury (eds.), Language and the cognitive construal of the world (Berlin: 
Mouton de Gruyter, 1995), 231 et seq.; R. E. MacLaury, Color and Cognition in Mesoamerica. Constructing 
Categories as Vantages (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1997), p. 93). For an analysis thereof in the context 
of cognitive semantics, J. R. Taylor, “Cognitive Semantics”, in K. Allan (ed.), Concise Encyclopedia of 
Semantics (Oxford: Elsevier, 2009), 73 et seq.; K. Allan, “Categorizing Percepts: Vantage Theory”, in K. Allan 
(ed.), Concise Encyclopedia of Semantics (Oxford: Elsevier, 2009), 51 et seq. 
119 This is particularly evident when the approaches of different cultures to the process of cognitive 
construction of what is perceived are compared. Since the cognitive construction of what is perceived is strictly 
related to the mental categories and concepts used in such a process and these mental categories and concepts 
are named for communication purposes, in order for people within a speech community to understand each 
other, there are agreed conventional names used that correspond to agreed conventional mental categories and 
concepts, which in turn correspond to generally agreed approaches to the process of cognitive construction 
within that community. When different communities are at stake, in cases where such communities are not (or 
have not been for a long time) in the necessity to communicate with each other, the above described reason for 
a convergence of language expression and therefore of concepts and approaches to the process of cognitive 
construction are missing and, as a result, such approaches and the resulting categorizations and concepts appear 
sometimes significantly distant (see K. Allan, Natural Language Semantics (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 
2001), pp. 287 et seq.). 
120 See the various examples on color perceptions and classification provided in the literature concerning the 
“Vantage Theory” quoted in footnote 118. 
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composite and individual concepts is, in turn, echoed at the language level by means of 
corresponding listemes. From a dynamic perspective, the shift in emphasis from 
similarity to difference, and vice-versa, does not occur for no reason. People must have a 
reason to perpetrate a cognitive change,121 which is generally culturally and socially 
driven.  
 
Second, since perception and conception are products of the human mind and body, the 
latter may be considered to constrain and inform language and linguistic categorization. 
Indeed, language appears to be clearly anthropocentric,122 in that human beings are used 
to describe the world of their experience by reference to the human body and their 
everyday experiences and to adopting the human body and its parts as a basis for 
describing and measuring other things in the world around them, as well as pure 
metaphysical concepts (such as “legal person”, “arm’s length”, “company residence”, 
just to give some of the possible examples from the English tax law language). It is the 
above-mentioned human-centeredness of human cognition that leads to the human-
centeredness of the language, since the latter, as already mentioned more than once, just 
reflects human cognition. 
 
Third, the distinction between lexicon knowledge (i.e. semantic specifications of 
listemes provided by dictionaries) and encyclopedia knowledge is superseded. 
According to Jackendoff, for example, knowing the meaning of a word that denotes a 
physical object includes knowing what such an object looks like; the traditional-style 
lexicon entry is a partial, insufficient representation of the concepts associated with 
listemes, since conceptual structure must also contain a partial three-dimensional model 
structure based on visual (and other sense) perception.123 All in all, there is a “single 
level of mental representation, conceptual structure, at which linguistic, sensory, and 
motor information are compatible”124 and the semantic specifications (dictionary 
meaning) of a listeme are just one part of the conceptual structure corresponding to that 
listeme.125 The additional information that characterizes the concept is encyclopedic in 
nature, not lexical. The same idea may be expressed in terms of conceptual frames, 
which may be described as systems identifying and encompassing the characteristic 
features, attributes and functions of a specific concept and its characteristic interactions 
with other concepts necessarily or typically associated with it. Under this perspective, a 
listeme meaning can be understood only with reference to its background frame, which 
                                                     
121 R. E. MacLaury, Color and Cognition in Mesoamerica. Constructing Categories as Vantages (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 1997), p. 93. 
122 K. Allan, Natural Language Semantics (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), pp. 289-290. 
123 R. Jackendoff, Consciousness and the Computational Mind (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987), p. 201; R. 
Jackendoff, Semantics and Cognition (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1983), p. 139. 
124 R. Jackendoff, Semantics and Cognition (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1983), p. 17. 
125 In this context, it should be noted that the semantic specifications of most of the listemes is distilled from 
encyclopedic information about the salient characteristics of the concepts corresponding to such listemes and 
that lexical information is recognized to be just one kind of encyclopedic information (i.e. lexical knowledge is 
a part of the encyclopedic knowledge) (see K. Allan, Natural Language Semantics (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishers, 2001), p. 101). 
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elucidates (and is the reason for) the concept that the listeme encodes. Also in this case, 
most of the information encoded in the framework is of an encyclopedic nature: in 
particular, the interactions among concepts and the role played by one concept in relation 
to others are part of the encyclopedic knowledge of the language users.126   
 
Against this background, the author, after having drawn some preliminary 
distinctions among certain terms that will be repeatedly used in the remainder of this 
chapter, proceeds to analyse which are the structural characteristics of concepts 
according to the leading linguistic theories. 
 
3.2. Reference, denotation, intension and extension 
 
At the outset, it is necessary to draw a basic distinction between reference and 
denotation. Such a distinction, although described and relied on inconsistently by 
scholars, may be sketched in the following terms for the purpose of the present study.127 
The referent of a listeme in a certain utterance is what the speaker actually wants to point 
at when using that listeme in that utterance (a particular entity, event, time, thing, etc.). 
The referent is, therefore, something intimately connected with the meaning that the 
speaker wants to convey.128 Denotation, on the other hand, refers to the theoretical 
relation between listemes and concepts, to which in turn the things or events in the 
specific world spoken of may correspond or not.  
 A good example for figuring out the difference between reference and denotation 
is represented by the case of a speaker erroneously using a certain listeme. Consider a 
speaker using the listeme “dog” while pointing at a cat and assume that the meaning of 
the listeme “dog” agreed upon by the speaker and all the hearers of that utterance is 
something like “a domesticated animal of the canidae family”. In such a case the referent 
of the listeme “dog” uttered by the speaker is a cat; the fact that it appears impossible to 
bring a cat within the meaning of the listeme “dog” does not change the fact that the 
speaker, when uttering “dog” intended to make reference to the cat. On the other hand, 
the denotata of the listeme “dog” are all the items that are within the scope of the 
concept of dog corresponding to that listeme, among which the cat actually pointed at by 
the speaker does not figure. Clearly, when more than one concept corresponds to a 
certain listeme, the related denotata may vary greatly among each other and may be 
theoretically grouped into clusters, each of which corresponding to a different concept.129   
                                                     
126 K. Allan, Natural Language Semantics (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), pp. 252 et seq. 
127 A similar distinction, although by means of different terminology, is drawn by Wittgenstein in L. 
Wittgenstein (translated by G. E. M. Anscombe), Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953), p. 
18. 
128 K. Allan, Natural Language Semantics (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), p. 46. On reference and its 
relation with linguistic expressions, see A. Sullivan, “Reference: Philosophical Theories”, in K. Allan (ed.), 
Concise Encyclopedia of Semantics (Oxford: Elsevier, 2009), 810 et seq. 
129 Such a subdivision of denotata into clusters, even if theoretically conceivable, presents practical difficulties 
due to the vagueness of concepts, their blurred borders and the consequent difficulties of fitting certain 
denotata within the proper clusters. In addition, since concepts may overlap, some denotata may fit in more 




The above example may be also used in order to draw a second distinction: that between 
intension and extension.130 In the case just described, the listeme “dog” does not have 
any extension in the world spoken of131 (the world of which the speaker is uttering about 
at that specific time), since no denotatum of the listeme “dog” exists in the state of the 
affairs taken into account and described by the speaker. The listeme “dog” that has been 
uttered, however, does still have its own intension, i.e. the concept of dog connected 
thereto, which continues to exist at a metaphysical level and within whose scope are all 
the theoretical denotata of the listeme “dog”.132 When more than one concept 
corresponds to a single listeme, the intension of that listeme is made of the combination 
of all such concepts. In contrast, when a single concept corresponds to a specific listeme, 
the intension thereof results made of that concept. As far as the author could find out, 
Frege was the first one to clearly draw this distinction by referring to Sinn and 
Bedeutung,133 which have been transposed into the listemes “intension” and “extension” 
by intensional logicians.134 Frege explained the difference between Sinn and Bedeutung 
by means of the (now famous) example of Venus. He pointed out that the well-known 
“morning star” and “evening star” are, in astronomic terms, the same thing: the planet 
Venus that appears in the east part of the sky before sunrise and in the west part thereof 
after sunrise. These two expressions, although corresponding to two different concepts 
(“a heavenly object appearing in the east part of the sky in before sunrise” and “a 
heavenly object appearing in the west part of the sky after sunrise”) and, therefore, 
having two different intensions, have the same extension represented by the planet 
Venus, which is also the referent thereof.  
 
                                                                                                                                  
than one cluster independently of the vagueness of the related concepts.  
130 The terms intension and extension date back to the turning of the XX century, when a discussion arose 
about the meaning and nature of “reality” and two opposite schools of thought faced each other in that respect, 
i.e. intensionalism and extensionalism. Various philosophers took positions in the course of that debate, such as 
Meinong, Russell and Quine. On such a debate, see among others B. Russell, The principles of mathematics 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903); B. Russell, “On denoting”, 14 Mind (1905), 479 et seq.; W. 
V. O. Quine, From a logical point of view. Nine Logico-Philosophical Essays (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1953).  
131 It is worth stressing here that the world spoken of, being the world mentioned or implied in the utterance, 
may be the real world where the speaker is living, as well as a pure hypothetic or metaphysical world. 
Therefore, the extension of a certain listeme or expression in the world spoken of may be also determined on 
the basis of non-physical or non-actual clues, such as, for example, the assertion or negation of a complement 
noun phrase or of a clause connected to the listeme or expression at stake (e.g. in the utterance “we do not have 
a crocodile at home”, the listeme “crocodile” does not have an extension in the world spoken of, unless a 
different proof is given). 
132 On extension and intension (with the warnng caveat that the listemes ”extension”, “intension”, “denotation” 
and their related expressions are sometimes used with meanings different from those adopted in the present 
study), N. Oldager, “Extensionality and Intensionality”, in K. Allan (ed.), Concise Encyclopedia of Semantics 
(Oxford: Elsevier, 2009), 301 et seq. 
133 G. Frege, “Über Sinn und Bedeutung“, in 100 Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik (1892), 
25 et seq. 
134 For example, R. Carnap, Meaning and Necessity. A Study in Semantics and Modal Logic (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 1956). 
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A final distinction that may be drawn is that between sense and intension: the sense of a 
certain listeme is generally intended by linguists to be a description of its intension by 
means of language expressions. So, while intension is something outside language, sense 
is the linguistic correspondent thereof and is, therefore, within language. Sense is no 
more than a translation or paraphrase of the specific listeme, which is required by the 
fact that we need language in order to write about language and its meaning.135  
 
3.3. Linguistic theories of concepts 
 
That said, the problem is still to clarify what a concept is. Linguists have proposed many 
theories in this respect, which the author has decided to group into three main clusters: 
the traditional theories, the prototype semantics theory and the stereotype semantics 
theory. 
 
3.3.1. Traditional theories 
 
The traditional theories consider that a concept is nothing other that the characteristic set 
of necessary and sufficient properties for an item to be included within the scope of the 
corresponding listeme. Under this perspective, concepts appear to be some sort of 
checklists.136 This explanation is quite intuitive, since in our daily experience we make 
often reference to certain characteristics or properties that a specific item presents or 
does not present, in order to argue and decide whether it may be considered to be within 
the scope of a certain listeme.  
 This approach has also been presented in terms of the decomposition assumption: 
the meaning of a listeme (or a more complex expression) can be exhaustively 
decomposed into a finite set of semantic or conceptual primitives that are together 
necessary and sufficient to determine the meaning of every instance of the listeme (or 
expression).137  
 
However, this approach presents certain drawbacks.  
 A first drawback is that it clashes with the basic observation that certain items are 
commonly considered to be within the scope of a certain listeme even if they do not 
exactly fulfill all the requirements of the checklist. For instance, nobody would seriously 
omit from the intension of the listeme “lion” a lion cub because he was born without a 
leg. At the same time, however, most people would probably agree on including the 
                                                     
135 K. Allan, Natural Language Semantics (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), p. 50. 
136 Among the upholders of the theory of concepts as checklists of necessary and sufficient conditions (features 
that may be decomposed), see J. J. Katz, The Philosophy of Language (New York: Harpen and Raw, 1966) and 
A. Wierzbicka, “Semantic Primitives and Semantic Fields”, in A. Lehrer and E. F. Kittay (eds.), Frames, 
Fields, and Contrasts. New Essays in Semantic and Lexical Organization (Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum, 
1992), 209 et seq. 
137 On the decomposition assumption, J. J. Katz, The Philosophy of Language (New York: Harpen and Raw, 
1966), pp. 70 et seq. 
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property “four legs” among those that characterize the concept corresponding to the 
listeme “lion”.  
 A second drawbackis that this approach does not give the appropriate relevance to 
the fact that certain features, recognized as pertaining to a specific concept, are 
nonetheless generally disregarded both when considering whether an item is within the 
scope of the corresponding listeme and when giving examples of that concept.  
 Even more interesting is the fact that certain features that do not characterize (i.e. 
are not necessarily included in) the concept are nonetheless generally taken into account 
for the purpose of determining whether an item is among the denotata of that concept.138 
Sometimes these features are taken into account for such a purpose to such a great extent 
that they override characteristic features of the concept in that respect.139 
 
 
3.3.2. The prototype semantics theory 
 
In order to remedy to these drawbacks and explain the above-mentioned human behavior 
when dealing with items classification and concepts exemplification, linguists have 
developed a different approach, the most famous example of which is represented by 
prototype semantics.140  
 
In prototype semantics, prototypes are the most typical exemplars141 among the denotata 
of a listeme. Since more than one concept may correspond to a single listeme, the 
prototypicality may be seen at two different levels: (i) there may be concepts that are 
more typical than others as correspondent to the listeme and (ii) there may be denotata 
that are more typical than others within the scope of a specific concept. These 
“semantic” prototypes (and their typical features) are what people generally have in 
mind when uttering a listeme.  
 The basic idea of prototype semantics has been clearly pointed out by Fillmore, 
according to whom it consists in the following: “Instead of the meaning of a linguistic 
form being represented in terms of checklist of conditions that have to be satisfied in 
                                                     
138 For example, the capability of flight is not a necessary feature of the concept of bird; nonetheless, it is 
probably the first and most important feature to come to one’s mind whenever it has to be decided whether a 
certain animal falls within the scope of such a concept. This is the main reason why most people are uncertain 
about whether penguins are denoted by listeme “bird”. 
139 With reference to the instance given in the previous footnote, the relevance attributed by some people to the 
the capability of flight as a distinctive feature of birds frequently leads such people to bring bats within the 
intension of the listeme “bird”, notwithstanding the fact that bats do not lay eggs, the latter being one of the 
essential features of the concept of bird. 
140 On prototype semantics, C. J. Fillmore, “An alternative to checklist theories of meaning”, in C. Cogen et al. 
(eds.), Proceeding of the First Annual Meeting of the Berkeley Linguistics Society (1975), 123 et seq.; G. 
Lakoff, Woman, fire and dangerous things. What categories reveal about the mind (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1987); J. R. Taylor, Linguistic categorization. Prototypes in linguistic theory (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1989); R. E. MacLaury, “Prototypes revisited”, 20 Annual Review of Anthropology (1991), 
55 et seq. 
141 “As good an example as can be found” according to the different definition provided by Allan (see K. Allan, 
Natural Language Semantics (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), p. 335). 
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order for the form to be appropriately or truthfully used, it is held that the understanding 
of meaning requires, at least for a great many cases, an appeal to an exemplar or 
prototype – this prototype being possibly something which is innately available to the 
human mind, possibly something which, instead of being analysed needs to be presented 
or demonstrated or manipulated.”142  
 
The interesting point of such a theory is that it does not try to modify the actual 
definitions provided by dictionaries or to criticize the idea that a listeme might 
correspond to a theoretical concept, i.e its meaning, but it turns the attention to the 
processes of learning the meaning of listemes and using listemes in practice. The 
prototype semantics theory puts under the spotlight the fact that, within the scope of a 
certain listeme (or one corresponding concept thereof), items that may be considered 
prototypical (e.g. a sparrow with reference to the listeme “bird”) generally coexist with 
others that are peripheral (e.g. an emu with reference to the listeme “bird”) and that 
prototypical and peripheral items are not given the same attention by people when 
deciding to use a certain listeme rather than another and when attributing meaning to an 
utterance.  
A corollary of such an argument is that prototypes may vary space-wise and time-
wise, depending on changes in culture and customs. Furthermore, even in an 
environment that is well identified from a spatial and temporal perspective, cultural 
differences may have an impact on the choice of prototypes, typical examples thereof 
being the differences in the level of education and in the profession carried on.  
 
For the sake of fairness, on the other hand, it should also be mentioned that the idea of 
people reasoning in terms of prototype(s) of a certain category of items seems to lose 
part of its strength in relation to listemes denoting very general categories. These 
categories, usually named by superordinate listemes with many hyponyms (e.g. 
“vegetable”), do not have such clear and convincing prototypes as “basic level 
categories” (e.g. “carrot”). However, in these cases, a function similar to that of 
prototypes is played by the strong family resemblances typically existing among the 
category members,143 in particularly by the limited number of features common to most 
of them, which therefore become essential for the purpose of identifying the intension of 
the listeme.144   
 
3.3.2.1. Prototype semantics and language vagueness 
 
                                                     
142 C. J. Fillmore, “An alternative to checklist theories of meaning”, in C. Cogen et al. (eds.), Proceeding of the 
First Annual Meeting of the Berkeley Linguistics Society (Berkeley: Berkeley Linguistics Society, 1975), 123 
et seq., at 123.  
143 L. Wittgenstein (translated by G. E. M. Anscombe), Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1953), 66-71. 
144 Obviously family resemblances increase at lower level of categorization, where the categories are more 
specific.  
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Prototype semantics has also proved useful in analyzing vagueness. Vagueness may be 
defined as the particular kind of uncertainty about the applicability of a predicate145 to a 
specific thing or state of affairs.146  
 The main issue raised by vagueness consists in whether a certain item falls within 
the scope of a certain concept, i.e. whether that item is a denoted by the listeme 
corresponding to that concept. Although the standard example of vague listemes and 
predicates is that of gradable adjectives, such as tall, fat, large, etc., members of other 
lexical categories may be vague as well. In general, any grammatical element whose 
applicability to a specific thing or state of affairs requires perception, categorization, or 
judgment of gradient contingent facts suffers from an incurable susceptibility to vague 
uncertainty.147  
 Furthermore, vagueness is often contagious, in the sense that complex language 
expressions built up from vague listemes are often themselves vague as result.148  
 
What generally does make a certain predicate vague is that it has borderline cases and 
seems to lack sharp boundaries: thus, it appears not to have a well-defined extension. In 
this respect, vague predicates give rise to what are known as sorites149 paradoxes, the 
most famous of which is that of the heap, which may be summarized as follows.150  
 Imagine you have a heap of sand before you and remove a single grain from it. 
You would certainly say that you still have a heap of sand before you after you removed 
that grain. However, if you accepted such a premise and continued to remove the grains 
from the heap, one by one, you would end up with a single grain, which then – absurdly 
– would be a heap as well.  
 Similar paradoxes may be constructed for any vague predicate; instead of the 
grains of sand, the paradoxes would be based on the more or less significant presence of 
one or more features that characterize the concept corresponding to the predicate at 
stake. Consider, for instance, the noun “man”. The distinction between a boy and a man 
is mainly one of age. Assume we take somebody that, at a certain moment, is considered 
by everybody to be a boy. An hour later, he is still a boy. The same holds true if we wait 
for another hour and then we look at him again. Therefore, one could conclude that he 
will never become a man. Even less an old man. That would be pleasant, but, 
unfortunately, that’s not (yet) the case. Consider the place of business of an entrepreneur. 
                                                     
145 A predicate may be defined as a language expression, composed of one or more listemes, which may be true 
of something in the world spoken of. 
146 Similarly C. Barker, “Vagueness”, in K. Allan (ed.), Concise Encyclopedia of Semantics (Oxford: Elsevier, 
2009), 1037 et seq., at 1037. 
147 C. Barker, “Vagueness”, in K. Allan (ed.), Concise Encyclopedia of Semantics (Oxford: Elsevier, 2009), 
1037 et seq., at 1037. 
148 C. Barker, “Vagueness”, in K. Allan (ed.), Concise Encyclopedia of Semantics (Oxford: Elsevier, 2009), 
1037 et seq., at 1038. 
149 The listeme “sorites” etymologically derives from the Greek word “soros”, which means “heap”. The 
original formulation of the paradox of the heap is generally attributed to the Megarian philosopher Eubulides 
of Miletus. 
150 R. Keefe, “Vagueness: Philosophical Aspects”, in K. Allan (ed.), Concise Encyclopedia of Semantics 
(Oxford: Elsevier, 2009), 1041 et seq., at 1041. 
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Suppose that it is theoretically movable, but as a matter of fact it has not moved for the 
last fifty years. One would probably say that it is fixed. Therefore, it could be a 
permanent establishment under Article 5 of an OECD Model-based tax treaty, provided 
that the other requirements thereof were satisfied. Now imagine that the entrepreneur 
decides to move it one centimeter every week. The author would still be inclined to say 
that it is fixed. Assume that, after one year, the entrepreneur decides to move it one 
centimeter more every week, i.e. two centimeters every week. If it was fixed before, it 
should be considered fixed even after such a change for the purpose of determining 
whether it does constitute a permanent establishment. If the entrepreneur (and his 
descendants) repeated such behavior endlessly, this would lead to the absurd situation in 
which the place of business would be considered fixed even where moving, say, a 
hundred kilometers every week in a straight direction.  
 The issue arises because there seems to be no specific borderline between cases 
where a certain predicate clearly applies and those where it clearly does not. Moreover, 
the issue cannot be solved by simply recognizing that vague predicates do have 
borderline cases and identifying some of them. In fact, the group of borderline cases 
does not have sharp borders either. One could say that the group of borderline cases 
almost inevitably does have its own borderline cases; the latter would be borderline-
borderline cases.151 Such analytical approach would thus prove never-ending.  
 
Wittgenstein considered vagueness caused by the absence of a conventional regulation 
of listemes use: we would not know the exact boundaries of the concept corresponding 
to a vague listeme since none has ever been drawn.152 He found this lack of sharp 
boundaries perfectly justified by the fact that, in the vast majority of cases, sharp 
boundaries are not necessary for the listemes to be properly and effectively used.  
 Moreover, the absence of clearly drawn boundaries is independent from the 
existence of a definition of the concept or from its detailed exemplification. Both the 
definition and the exemplification leave the concepts, and thus the listemes, vague: the 
former since generally made of listemes, some of which present the very same vagueness 
of the defined concept; the latter since it is generally limited to a finite number of 
instances, therefore leaving open the possibility that some borderline cases remain in the 
shadow.153  
 Even if it were possible to clearly draw the boundaries of a concept by means of a 
definition, the issue would remain of the existence of agreement on such a definition. 
According to Wittgenstein, if “someone were to draw a sharp boundary I could not 
acknowledge it as the one that I too always wanted to draw, or had drawn in my mind. 
(…) His concept may then be said to be not the same as mine, but akin to it. (…) The 
                                                     
151 This phenomenon is generally known as “higher-order vagueness” (see C. Barker, “Vagueness”, in K. Allan 
(ed.), Concise Encyclopedia of Semantics (Oxford: Elsevier, 2009), 1037 et seq., at 1040; R. Keefe, 
“Vagueness: Philosophical Aspects”, in K. Allan (ed.), Concise Encyclopedia of Semantics (Oxford: Elsevier, 
2009), 1041 et seq., at 1041). 
152 L. Wittgenstein (translated by G. E. M. Anscombe), Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1953), p. 28, paras. 68-69. 
153 L. Wittgenstein (translated by G. E. M. Anscombe), Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1953), p. 29, para. 71. 
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kinship is just as undeniable as the difference”.154 He compared such a kinship to that 
existing between two pictures, one of which consists of color patches with vague 
contours and the other with patches similarly shaped and distributed but with clear 
contours. For Wittgenstein no one may say that the picture with clear contours rightly 
corresponds to the blurred one. Many different pictures with clear contours could go 
along well with the blurred picture; this means that there is no right definition, but just 
many possible ones.155 He based this conclusion on the perception that, although the vast 
majority of people forming a linguistic community generally agree upon the core, typical 
situations that fall within the scope of a concept, other situations are considered to be 
covered by that concept by certain people, but not by others.156  
  
This approach to the description and actual use of concepts very closely resembles that 
adopted in prototype semantics. Transposing the thoughts of Wittgenstein in the field of 
prototype semantics, one could conclude that, whenever people have to use a concept in 
practice, (i) they first check whether the actual situation at stake matches the prototypical 
situations of that concept and, if this is not the case, (ii) they assess whether the 
analogies between the prototypical situations and the actual situation at stake are strong 
and numerous enough to justify that an exception to the prototypical situations is 
included within the scope of that concept. It is a matter of family resemblance, where the 
resemblance is discretionarily assessed by each individual and the prototypical situations 
are used as yardstick for the family. The family resemblance is therefore assessed on the 
basis of the similarities existing between the features believed to be salient in the 
prototypes and those perceived in the potential denotata.  
 This is substantially the position taken by Lakoff, according to whom the 
relevance of prototypical situations may be explained in large part as being due to the 
effects of idealized cognitive models. I.e. domains are organized with an ideal notion of 
the world, which may fit one’s understanding of the world either perfectly, very well, 
pretty well, somewhat well, pretty badly, badly, or not at all. The ideal notion of the 
world consists of prototypes. He gives the example of the listeme "bachelor", which, 
although commonly defined as "unmarried adult male", has been created with a 
particular ideal of what a bachelor is like, i.e. the bachelor prototype: an adult, 
uncelibate, heterosexual, and promiscuous man. People typically agree in considering 
the males presenting the above prototypical qualities as denoted by the listeme bachelor. 
However, this is no longer the case with regard to borderline cases, such as that of 
sexually active seventy-year-old tycoons, who might be considered by some person as 
having been denoted by the listeme157 and by some others as not denoted. Moreover, 
most people would tend to exclude from the concept of bachelor certain individuals that, 
                                                     
154 L. Wittgenstein (translated by G. E. M. Anscombe), Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1953), p. 31, para. 76. 
155 L. Wittgenstein (translated by G. E. M. Anscombe), Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1953), p. 31, para. 77. 
156 See, by analogy, L. Wittgenstein (translated by G. E. M. Anscombe), Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1953), p. 52, para. 156 et seq. 
157 In this case, the sexually active seventy-year-old tycoon would be considered an exception to the prototype.  
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although apparently falling within the scope of the definition of "unmarried adult male", 
do not bear much resemblance to the prototype, such as the Pope.158  
 
Setting the problem in this perspective, it clearly appears that a fundamental issue with 
regard to the effective use of vague listemes consists in determining which is the 
threshold generally accepted within a certain language community for considering a 
certain situation to be a prototype.  
 In fact, although from a dynamic perspective the sorites paradoxes would make it 
doubtful whether a threshold could ever been established, nonetheless from a static 
perspective it is the very same idea of prototypes, as well as the necessary premises of 
the same sorites paradoxes,159 which lead one to conclude that a threshold usually exists. 
Such a threshold, which may be expressed in terms of significant presence of the 
characteristic features of the concepts or indirectly by means of prototypes inventory, 
may vary within a single language community from one subgroup to another. Moreover, 
it may also significantly vary within a homogeneous linguistic group in a diachronic 
perspective, due to changes in culture and social customs.  
 What is of capital relevance for the present study, however, is that the threshold is 
context-dependent. Even within a cultural and linguistic homogeneous group taken at a 
certain point in time, the threshold may vary depending on the relevant comparison 
class160 and the purpose of the utterance of which the listeme is part.161  
 All in all, the actual location of the threshold, i.e. the number and nature of the 
prototypes, is heavily influenced by the overall context of the utterance of which the 
listeme is part.162 Establishing the location of the threshold is important for determining 
how vague listemes are used in practice since, while the classification of a situation that 
is above the threshold as a situation outside the scope of the relevant concept is so 
infrequent that it would be commonly seen as an error of classification, the same 
classification of a situation that is below the threshold would be generally considered to 
be the result of the discretionary judgment of the person making the classification. Such 
a judgment could be criticized on the merit, but would not usually considered to be an 
error. In addition, from a mere statistical point of view, the more an actual situation is 
below the threshold the higher the chance is that it is classified as outside the scope of 
the relevant concept.  
 Therefore, where, ceteris paribus, the threshold is set at two significantly 
                                                     
158 G. Lakoff, Woman, fire and dangerous things: What categories reveal about the mind (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1987), pp.68 et seq., in particular at 70. 
159 E.g. the existence of something that is commonly considered to be a heap of sand. 
160 I.e. the class of the actual situation whose inclusion in the scope of the concept is going to be assessed.  
161 Similarly C. Barker, “Vagueness”, in K. Allan (ed.), Concise Encyclopedia of Semantics (Oxford: Elsevier, 
2009), 1037 et seq., at 1038. 
162 For instance, the threshold for “ripped” is certainly different for ordinary people and for professional body-
builders; the shape and dimension of the cakes actually present in a bakery is determinative in order to set the 
threshold for “big cake”, where someone wants to order “one big chocolate cake” in that very same bakery; the 
way in which a certain type of business is customarily conducted (e.g. mining activity) is determinative for 
setting the threshold for “fixed place of business”, in order to determine whether a permanent establishment 
exists for tax treaty purposes. 
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different levels in two different communities, the situations commonly denoted by the 
relevant listeme in these two communities differ as well. Where this is the case, one 
could infer that the very same listeme corresponds to two different concepts in the two 
different communities. Such an issue is frequent when different languages are at stake, 
not because of the difference between the languages used by the different communities 
per se, but for the reason that the difference of language is one of the various aspects of a 
more general cultural difference which may easily lead the two communities to set the 
thresholds of potentially similar concepts at different levels.163 
 
3.3.2.2. Prototype semantics, vagueness and polysemy 
 
The above analysis of linguistic vagueness and its connected semantic issues leads the 
author to consider whether the borderline between polysemy and vagueness is in fact as 
clear as might appear at first sight.164  
 
As previously indicated, a listeme is generally regarded as polysemous where it 
corresponds to two or more concepts, while it is considered vague where it corresponds 
to a single concept whose borders are blurred. However, a vague listeme may become a 
polysemous one, especially where, by lowering the concept borderline threshold, new 
situations are perceived by the vast majority of the language community as falling within 
the scope of the relevant concept up to becoming prototypes thereof. As noted before, 
vague concepts do have prototypes around which the classes of denotata grow. 
Prototypes tend to attract new potential members of the class that, in turn, attract other 
new potential members and so on. This process may be described also in terms of the 
progressive lowering of the concept “borderline threshold”.  
 
Each step in the chain of attraction just described is based on similarities, common 
features and links that are different as compared to those relevant in previous or 
successive steps of the chain.  
 In the first phase of each step of attraction, the new potential members of the class 
are borderline items: they are below the threshold and, in fact, some people within the 
community consider them to be denoted by the relevant listeme, while others do not. 
However, there is a subsequent phase in which the threshold is lowered so that at least 
certain of these new potential members start to be considered by the vast majority of the 
community to be clearly denoted by the relevant listeme. The blurred border has not 
disappeared, it has been simply moved to a lower level.  
 At a certain point of this process, the differences existing among the various 
                                                     
163 This determines (i) an actual difference between the two concepts and, thus, (ii) the fact that the 
corresponding listemes in the two languages cannot be considered to be synonyms. The translation of one 
listeme by means of the other listeme will determine a (partial) change in the actual denotata of the language 
expression.  
164 On the difficulty of clearly distinguishing between homonyms, polysemes and vague listemes, see D. 
Tuggy, “Ambiguity, polysemy and vagueness”, 4 Cognitive Linguistics (1993), 273 et seq. 
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subgroups of denotata are so significant that the entire class of denotata is generally seen 
as composed of distinct sub-classes of denotata, sub-grouped according to their main 
common features and differences. These sub-classes, then, begin to be seen as 
corresponding to different concepts: at this point of the process, the vague listeme has 
become polysemous. The original vagueness of the listemes, however, has not 
disappeared; it has simply moved to the level of each single concept so that, in many 
cases, the borderline between two concepts corresponding to the same listeme appears to 
be blurred.  
 Furthermore, within such a process, the exact moment when a vague listeme 
becomes a polysemous cannot be determined with certainty. In general, the recognition 
of a former vague listeme as polysemous is conventional and established by praxis: 
therefore, the very same concept of polysemy is vague in nature.  
 
Finally, also the borderlines between different concepts that are semantically related, 
whether or not corresponding to the very same listeme, often appear blurred in such a 
way that such concepts appear to merge gradually one into the other. In fact, although 
the prototypic denotata of each concept are clearly distinguished, borderline items may 
be potentially denoted by both neighboring concepts. This is the case, for instance with 
reference to couples of listemes such as “rug and carpet”, “cup and mug”, or “shrub and 
bush”.165 
 
3.3.3. The stereotype semantics theory 
 
While, according to prototype semantics, prototypes in no way define concepts or 
categories but simply try to explain how such concepts are actually used, a different 
perspective has been taken by (the otherwise somewhat similar) stereotype semantics.166  
 
The latter upholds the prototype semantics criticism of the traditional theories, especially 
with regard to the notion of concepts as being checklists of features, and its idea that 
within the potential scope of listemes and concepts there are a core area, where the 
prototypical denotata are located, and a peripheral area, where non-prototypical items are 
situated, some of which could be considered outside the scope of the relevant listemes 
(or concepts) by some members of the community.  
 On the other hand, stereotype semantics maintains that these observations on how 
people actually interact with listemes are to be taken into account in order to create a 
better theory of what concepts are. On this basis the idea of stereotypes, intended as 
mental images having the features of the typical denotata, has been developed. 
Stereotypes are conceived as models for attributing intension to listemes167 and are 
                                                     
165 Examples taken from K. Allan, Natural Language Semantics (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), p. 312. 
166 On the slightly different concept of gestalt see M. Wertheimer, Productive Thinking (New York: Harper, 
1959). 
167 K. Allan, Natural Language Semantics (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), p. 339; K. Allan, “Stereotype 
Semantics”, in K. Allan (ed.), Concise Encyclopedia of Semantics (Oxford: Elsevier, 2009), 939 et seq., at 942. 
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presumed to include the prototypes thereof.168  
 
In this perspective, each concept is generally presumed to have all the attributes common 
to the typical denotata of the corresponding listeme. However, this presumption is not an 
absolute one; it simply reflects the expectations within a community and, as such, it 
holds true until evidence to the contrary is given.  
 For instance, such evidence may result from the presence of a qualifying 
adjective,169 or from elements of the context such as certain features of the potential 
referent which differ from those of the stereotype although reasonably within the scope 
of the listeme. In this perspective, the position upheld by Putnam, according to which the 
meaning of a language expression is a minimum set of stereotypical facts about the 
typical denotatum thereof,170 seems to better match the idea that concepts have a hard 
core and elastic peripherals.  
 The issue becomes therefore to distinguish between (i) the minimum set of 
stereotypical facts that are necessarily to be present in order for a item to be considered 
within the scope of a certain concept and (ii) the other characteristics that are expected to 
be present in the items in order for them to be included within the scope of the concept, 
but which may be missing in the specific case without preventing such an inclusion (e.g. 
the capability to fly for a bird).171  
 Such characteristics (both compulsory or merely expected), however, correspond 
in turn to concepts to which the same analysis in terms of stereotypical characteristics 
may be applied. In addition, the above-mentioned features may be characterized by 
vagueness. Therefore, even with regard to the minimum set of stereotypical features of a 
concept, the issue may arise of whether they are in fact present in the specific item under 
analysis. This is typically the case with reference to the features that identify a certain 
range of values within a larger graduate scale (e.g. “red” within the graduate scale of 
color, or “big” within the graduate scale of dimensions), since the edges of the range are 
generally blurred and vanish into the edges of neighboring ranges (e.g. the borderline 
between red and orange, if it exists at all, is blurred for human perception). 
 
Finally, it cannot be forgotten that the intension of a listeme is an abstract and theoretical 
                                                     
168 Allan gives the example of the listeme “vehicle”, whose stereotype includes the prototypical car, as well as 
the peripheral horse-drawn wagon (see K. Allan, “Stereotype Semantics”, in K. Allan (ed.), Concise 
Encyclopedia of Semantics (Oxford: Elsevier, 2009), 939 et seq., at 942).  
169 Allan gives the example of the expression “blue tomato”, where the stereotype of the listeme tomato is 
probably ”red”, but the specification introduced by the adjective “blue” makes clear that the concept 
corresponding to the expression “blue tomato” is characterized by the color blue matched with the other 
attributes of the items typically denoted by the listeme “tomato” (excluding the color) (see K. Allan, 
“Stereotype Semantics”, in K. Allan (ed.), Concise Encyclopedia of Semantics (Oxford: Elsevier, 2009), 939 et 
seq., at 942). 
170 H. Putnam, “The meaning of “meaning”, in K. Gunderson (ed.), Language, mind, and knowledge 
(Minneapolis: University on Minnesota Press, 1975), 131 et seq. A comment of Putnam’s view is found in K. 
Allan, Natural Language Semantics (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), pp. 333 et seq. 
171 These characteristics have also been called “quantity implicatures” by those linguists that rethought the 
traditional theories on concepts in light of the criticism made by prototype and stereotype semantics (see K. 
Allan, Natural Language Semantics (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), p. 321). 
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construction and that, in reality, the meaning attributed to a specific listeme may be 
different for different people: as previously mentioned, the correspondence between the 
theoretical intension of a listeme and the intended referent may be perfect, very good, 
good, pretty good, somewhat good, pretty bad, bad, non-existing and may depend upon 
what one knows about the referent.172 
 
 
3.3.4. Final remarks 
 
In light of the above analysis, one may conclude that the correspondence between 
referents and listemes (via concepts) is not an exact one but is generally based on 
approximation, in the sense that the referents should generally present features that 
approximate those of the concepts corresponding to the listemes (i.e. the features of the 
typical denotata of those listemes), in order to be included within the scope of the 
latter.173  
 If recognizing such an approximate correspondence is generally easy where the 
speaker refers to a physical item before both the speaker and the hearers,174 the same 
does not hold true with regard to metaphysical or hypothetic items. The approximation 
may be even looser where the utterance refers to hypothetic future events, which may be 
anticipated only in their most common and general terms by the speaker,175 in the sense 
that the person assessing whether a specific item falls within the scope of the listeme 
used by the speaker in his utterance should use an even looser concept of approximation 
in order to evaluate the correspondence between the features of the underlying concept 
and those of the items actually at stake.   
 
Another interesting observation derived from the foregoing analysis is that there is 
sometimes a discrepancy between the intension of a listeme and its prototypes, in the 
sense that the latter may be characterized by features that are neither necessary nor 
sufficient to the former, bur just ordinarily expected. This discrepancy leads to the 
possibility that:  
(i) when the speaker refers to a specific item existing in the world spoken of by 
means of an utterance, he uses a listeme whose prototype shares its most relevant 
characteristics (from the speaker’s perspective) with the item referred, although 
the item referred is outside the scope of that listeme intension (e.g. the listeme 
“bird” is used to refer to a bat since the bird prototypes and the bat share the most 
relevant feature – from the speaker’s perspective – of being animals capable to 
fly) or that, more commonly,  
                                                     
172 Paraphrasing G. Lakoff, Woman, fire and dangerous things: What categories reveal about the mind 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), p. 69; see also K. Allan, Natural Language Semantics (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers, 2001), p. 336. 
173 Similarly K. Allan, Natural Language Semantics (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), pp. 337-338. 
174 For instance, where the listeme “sofa” is used in order to refer to the specific couch before the speaker and 
the hearers. 
175 This is typically the case of provisions of a law. Such a case will be analysed in more detail in section 4.4 of 
this chapter.  
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(ii) when a speaker wants to refer to a hypothetical item, he uses a listeme whose 
prototypes present, as their most relevant characteristics (from the speaker’s 
perspective), the same characteristics the speaker was thinking of as the most 
relevant in the hypothetical item he has in mind, although the intension of such a 
listeme is such as to potentially exclude some of the items that the speaker could 
have been willing to include in the abstract item he had in mind.  
For instance, if the speaker wanted to refer to flying animals, he would probably use the 
listeme “bird” in his utterance, since flying birds are the most common flying animals – 
in the speaker’s experience – and they are also the prototypes of the listeme “bird”; 
however, a bat, which is a flying animal and which the speaker may have been willing to 
include within the scope of the hypothetical item he thought of, is outside the intension 
of the listeme “bird”. On the other hand, it is possible that the intension of the listeme 
used is such as to include items that the speaker was not thinking of and was not willing 
to include within the scope of the hypothetical item he had in mind. For example, the 
speaker, when uttering the listeme “bird”, did not think of non-flying birds and had no 
intention of referring to such kind of birds by means of the listeme uttered. 
 
Finally, prototype and stereotype semantics are useful in order to better define when two 
concepts, corresponding to two different listemes, may be considered similar. This is an 
issue of capital importance where multilingual texts have to be critically analysed. On 
the basis of the above investigation, the author maintains that two concepts may be 
considered similar:  
 (i) when they share most of their prototypes, or  
(ii) in the case their prototypes are limited to a few or do not coincide, when most 
of the features176 that characterize such prototypes do coincide or, at least, present 
strong similarities.  
What does constitute the majority of the respective prototypes and their distinctive 
features which have to be taken into account for the purpose of assessing the similarity 
cannot be said in vacuo. The answer to that question depends upon:  
(a) the nature of the concepts concerned,  
(b) the context in which the listemes corresponding to such concepts are used and, 
in particular, the object and purpose of the utterance containing those listemes, 
and  
(c) the reason why those listemes and not others have been used in that context.  
Similarity is, in fact, a vague concept and, as such, it is also context-dependent. 
 
3.4. The relations among listemes (as well as among their corresponding concepts) 
 
As noted in the previous section, the position taken in this study is that the meaning of a 
listeme may be properly grasped only with reference to a structured background of 
experience, knowledge and practices, which constitute a kind of conceptual prerequisite 
                                                     
176 Including the functions typically performed by the prototypes within the relevant context. 
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for its understanding (i.e. the relevant encyclopedic knowledge). Speakers and hearers 
may be said to properly understand the meaning of the listemes used only by first 
understanding such background frames that motivate the concepts that the listemes 
encode. These background frames may be thus defined as those parts of the encyclopedic 
knowledge:  
(i) in which the specific concepts corresponding to the listemes used are relevant 
and  
(ii) that identify the structural relations among the various concepts encompassed 
therein.177  
Under this approach, listemes are not related to each other directly, but only by way of 
their link to common background frames: in this respect, the semantic relation between 
two listemes mirrors the underlying structural relation between the two areas of the 
common background frames identified by their corresponding concepts.178 Since, as 
previously recognized, human categorization and concepts are constrained and informed 
by the relations that human beings perceive in nature, have experienced in the world 
around them, or conceive of in abstract fields (conceptual constraint), one may infer that 
semantic relations among listemes are also constrained and informed by the human 
processes of perception and conception and, therefore, by the dominant cultural and 
social environment. This appears in line with the conclusions reached in the previous 
sections on the cognitive motivation of the language structure.  
 
From the above premises it derives that, as each concept has its own background frame 
that identifies the structural connections among that concept and other related concepts, 
so each corresponding listeme has its own semantic field179 that identifies the semantic 
relations between that listeme and the listemes corresponding to the related concepts in 
the background frame (semantic network). As Allan puts it, a semantic field is structured 
in such a way as to mirror the structure of the conceptual field.180  
Each listeme therefore denotes, through its corresponding concept(s), a specific 
part of the conceptual field encompassed in the background frames. In this perspective, 
the differential value of each listeme, in comparison with another listeme, is given by the 
                                                     
177 For instance, with reference to the concept of passing the ball in the soccer game, one relevant frame would 
be the field of encyclopedic knowledge pertaining to such a game, which also identifies the structural relations 
among the various concepts relevant for playing soccer (e.g. the concepts of ball, passing, goal, corner, yellow 
card, etc.). 
178 C. J. Fillmore and B. T. Atkins, “Toward a frame-based lexicon: the semantic of RISK and its neighbors”, 
in A. Lehrer and E. F. Kittay (eds.), Frames, Fields, and Contrasts. New Essays in Semantic and Lexical 
Organization (Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1992), 75 et seq., at 76-77. 
179 On semantic fields, among many, J. Lyons, Semantics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977) – 
Vol. 1, Chapter 8; R.E. Grandy, “Semantic fields, Prototypes, and the Lexicon” in A. Lehrer and E. F. Kittay 
(eds.), Frames, Fields, and Contrasts. New Essays in Semantic and Lexical Organization (Hillsdale: Lawrence 
Erlbaum, 1992), 103 et seq.; A. Wierzbicka, “Semantic Primitives and Semantic Fields”, in A. Lehrer and E. F. 
Kittay (eds.), Frames, Fields, and Contrasts. New Essays in Semantic and Lexical Organization (Hillsdale: 
Lawrence Erlbaum, 1992), 209 et seq. On the relation between semantics and background frames, C. J. 
Fillmore, “Frame Semantics”, in K. Allan (ed.), Concise Encyclopedia of Semantics (Oxford: Elsevier, 2009), 
330 et seq. 
180 K. Allan, Natural Language Semantics (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), p. 258. 
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part of the conceptual field encompassed in the background frames that it denotes in 
contrast to the part thereof denoted by the other listeme.181 In this way, cultural and 
social differences among communities may lead to different partitions of the conceptual 
field by different communities through their respective relevant concepts, the result 
being that certain concepts (and categorizations) used within one community do not 
exactly correspond to any concept (and categorizations) used within other communities. 
Such a lack of equivalence between concepts is mirrored, at the language level, by the 
absence of true synonyms between the listemes used by the various communities, due to 
the correspondence existing between concepts and listemes. 
A famous example of this issue was given by Rosch with regard to colors 
naming.182 Rosch showed that the Dani,183 who have two basic color terms (one for cool-
dark and another for warm-light) can readily distinguish and refer to the colors that have 
distinct names in English, but their language does not make it as easy for them as it is for 
English speakers. The way they do it is to compare a specific color to something in the 
environment (e.g. the color of a tree leaves). The presumption is that the Dani speech 
community, until recently, has not had any great need to make frequent reference to the 
same number of colors as English speech communities. This example shows that, 
although the sensory data in the color spectrum are the same for all human beings, the 
various language communities may conceptually divide the color spectrum differently 
from one another and, as a consequence, their respective languages may have listemes 
corresponding to such conceptual partitions that do not have proper synonyms in the 
languages of other communities. The same holds true in any field of knowledge, 
including tax law: for instance, different tax jurisdictions may group differently the 
same184 types of income.  
 
Based on this general setting, the author analyses below some of the most common types 
of relation existing between listemes.   
 
Hyponymy relations185 play a major role among the various kinds of listemes relations 
due to their widespread use in many branches of human knowledge. For the purpose of 
the present study, hyponymy relations may be considered to be those relations that 
connect a specific listeme with other listemes that denote a subcategory or a supra-
category of the class denoted by the former listeme (e.g. blue is hyponym of color and 
azure is hyponym of blue).  
                                                     
181 Similarly, K. Allan, Natural Language Semantics (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), p. 258. 
182 See E. Rosch, “On the internal structure of perceptual and semantic categories”, in T. E. Moore (ed.), 
Cognitive Development and the Acquisition of Language (New York: Academic Press, 1973), 111 et seq. An 
analysis of Rosch’s experiment is given by K. Allan, Natural Language Semantics (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishers, 2001), p. 259. 
183 People divided in tribes originally leaving in the Irian Jaya area, West Papua. 
184 For the purpose of the present example, two items of income may be considered to be of the same type 
where generated from the same source (e.g. income from playing football in a professional team, income from 
the sale of properties, income from teaching activity, etc.).  
185 On hyponymy relations, see M. L. Murphy, “Hyponymy and Hyperonymy”, in K. Allan (ed.), Concise 
Encyclopedia of Semantics (Oxford: Elsevier, 2009), 393 et seq.  
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 Hyponymy relations may develop along different lines, according to the elements 
and features taken into account in order to assess differences and similarities among the 
underlying concepts and denotata. Chaffin,186 for example, identifies four elements of 
hyponymy: (i) physical similarity, (ii) functional similarity, (iii) same location, (iv) 
countability, but the list is not at all exhaustive. 
 A relevant characteristic of hyponymy relations is that they are generally 
transitive, but only where they are established by taking into account the very same 
element or feature.   
 Another relevant characteristic is that co-hyponyms187 are contraries,188 but not 
always contradictories, since the negation of one does not entail the other; for instance, 
the fact that something is not vermillion does not entail that it is scarlet, since it could be 
magenta.189 In addition, a hyponym is contrary to the co-hyponyms of its own 
superordinate and with their hyponyms; for example, pigment blue, which is a hyponym 
of blue, is incompatible with red, as well as with magenta, vermillion, and scarlet. 
 
The study of the hyponymy relations within a semantic field is particularly relevant 
where a compositional (or componential) analysis190 is performed, i.e. where the sense of 
a specific listeme is decomposed and expressed in terms of its semantic components.191 
In fact, the relations between a listeme and many of its semantic components are in the 
nature of hyponymy relations. For example, the “Valencia” (a type of orange fruit) does 
have “orange” as one of its semantic components, the latter entailing the semantic 
component “citrus”, which in turn entails the semantic component “fruit”. Thus, for the 
transitive property of hyponymy relations mentioned above, “fruit” is also a semantic 
component of “Valencia”. According to componential analysts, most of the listemes are 
analyzable in terms of semantic components and those that share one or more semantic 
components are semantically related, i.e. they are part of the same semantic field. 
Hyponymy and semantic components are the basis of the probably most common type of 
                                                     
186 R. Chaffin, “The concept of a semantic relation”, in A. Lehrer and E. F. Kittay (eds.), Frames, Fields, and 
Contrasts. New Essays in Semantic and Lexical Organization (Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1992), 253 et seq. 
187 E.g. vermillion and scarlet are co-hyponyms of red. 
188 Two items are contraries when they cannot co-occur at the same time in respect of the same thing 
(contraries are therefore incompatible). 
189 On the relations contrary-contradictory and incompatible-antonym, M. L. Murphy, “Antonymy and 
Incompatibility”, in K. Allan (ed.), Concise Encyclopedia of Semantics (Oxford: Elsevier, 2009), 25 et seq. 
190 The first broad study on compositional analysis was carried out by Bishop John Wilkins in his An Essay 
Towards a Real Character and a Philosophical Language; his purpose was to construct a universal or 
“philosophical” language by categorizing all of human experience and labeling each category by a symbol 
(corresponding to a listeme) in his philosophical language; each of such categories is comparable to a semantic 
component (see J. Wilkins, An Essay toward a Real Character and a Philosophical Language (London: 
Thoemmes Continuum, 2002), quoted in K. Allan, Natural Language Semantics (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishers, 2001), pp. 269-270).  
191 In semantics, most authors distinguish semantic components from semantic primitives, the latter being those 
semantic components definable only circularly and by ostensive definition such as “color of the sky” in the 
entry for blue. The author believes that such a distinction is not relevant for the purpose of the present study 
and thus it is not described and analysed here. With reference to semantic primitives, see U. Weinreich, On 
Semantics (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania  Press, 1980), pp. 50 and 300 et seq. 
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definition in jurisprudence, i.e. the definition per genus et differentiam.192 
 
The theory of compositional analysis, which determines the compositional (and 
hyponymy) relations among listemes that determine the sense of some of them, presents 
the same drawbacks in particular with reference to those approaches that present and 
explain the meaning of listemes as checklists of features.193 The semantic components of 
a listeme are indeed nothing more than other listemes, which in turn have to be 
decomposed in their own semantic components. Apart from the risk, implied by such 
chain of semantic decompositions, that the process may end up as circular or never-
ending,194 the theory of compositional analysis must face the critical remarks 
emphasized by the prototype and stereotype semantics. In particular, the decomposition 
of listemes in terms of their semantic components appears over-rigid when compared 
with the way in which the listemes are actually used by the language community 
members.  
The example below is enlightening in this respect.195  
“Bull” is the result of the semantic components “bovine” AND “adult” AND 
“male”; “cow” is the result of the semantic components “bovine” AND “adult” AND 
“female”; “calf” is the result of the semantic components “bovine” AND “young”. The 
three listemes analysed are within the same semantic field, are connected by hyponymy 
relations and present the common semantic component “bovine”. However, in 
dictionaries the listeme “bull” is generally given certain definitions that appear to be 
non-compatible with the above semantic decomposition. For example, Dictionary.com 
Unabridged gives, among other ones, the following definition: “the male of certain other 
animals, as the elephant and moose”.196 This example shows that:  
(i) the idea of a semantic decomposition of listemes as such is unsatisfactory 
since, as the author has already pointed out more than once, each single listeme 
generally corresponds to more than one concept and, therefore, the 
(de)compositional analysis should be carried out at the level of each single 
concept and not at the level of the listeme;  
(ii) the compositional analysis theory cannot give account of the fact that people, 
when using a certain listeme, have in mind either a prototype thereof or a 
stereotypical image of the corresponding concept and that this fact plays a major 
role on how listemes are actually used and which meaning is actually attributed 
                                                     
192 Examples of definitions per genus et differentiam are that of income tax, as a tax (genus) that is applied on 
the income produced in the certain period of time (differentiam); or that of permanent establishment, as place 
of business (genus) that is fixed for a certain period of time in a certain place (differentiam). On the definition 
per genus et differentiam, see H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), 
Chapters I, section 3; G. Tarello, L’interpretazione della legge (Milano: Giuffrè, 1980), pp. 194-202.  
193 In fact, upon a closer look, the compositional analysis presents the same “checklist” approach under a 
slightly different perspective. 
194 See the conclusions reached on the similar issue with regard to definitions in previous section 2.3. 
195 Example taken from K. Allan, Natural Language Semantics (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), pp. 271-
273. 
196 This is the second entry for “bull” at the Dictionary.com Unabridged. Random House, Inc. (accessed 25 
Nov. 2009). 
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thereto in any specific utterance.  
At the same time, the example is interesting since, provided that the concept 
corresponding to the result of the semantic components “bovine” AND “adult” AND 
“male” represents the prototype of the listeme “bull”, our discontent with the definition 
of bull as “the male of certain other animals, as the elephant and moose” clearly shows 
that the actual use of such meaning in an utterance would be acceptable only where the 
context made it crystal clear that a bovine was not being referred to.197  
 
Another interesting type of semantic relation is that existing among the listemes that 
name the different levels of a certain feature on a category scale. Category scales, with 
respect to which actual features may be measured, have their upper and lower ends 
bounded by pairs of gradable antonyms, which are contraries, but not contradictories, 
since the negation of one does not entail the other, an intermediate value of the specific 
feature being an acceptable alternative as well.198  
 Many such scales are characterized by the presence in their semantic fields of 
more than two listemes that denote different values on the scale itself. Such listemes 
have a relative order in the comparative scale and their meaning may be expressed in 
terms of their relative position in respect of the other listemes of the scale, i.e. in terms of 
their reciprocal semantic relations. For example, on the category scale of temperature, 
which may be conceived of as being characterized by the ordinate listemes “cold”, 
“cool”, “temperate”,199 “warm” and “hot”:  “hot” means upscale of “warm”; “temperate” 
means non-(“hot”, “cold”, “warm”, etc.); “warm” means upscale of “temperate”; “cool” 
means the downscale of “temperate”, “cold” means the downscale of “cool”. However, 
and here is the interesting point, “warm” is generally intended neither as downscale of 
“hot”, nor as non-“hot”.200 This is because the listeme “warm” and the listeme “hot” both 
contain the semantic component “warm” and, more specifically, the intension of the 
listeme “warm” encompasses the intension of the listeme “hot”, i.e. what is hot is always 
warm as well, but not vice-versa. However, the cooperative principle requires that the 
use of the listeme “warm” implicates that the referent is not hot, unless the context 
makes crystal clear that a hot thing is referred to.  
 
The above analysis of the relations existing among listemes, as well as among their 
concepts,201 brings to the surface the fundamental reasons for the difficulties faced when 
translating from one language to another and when attributing a meaning to a 
multilingual text.  
 The author previously mentioned that the meaning of listemes and more complex 
                                                     
197 For instance, this might be the case where (i) in the world spoken of there was an adult male elephant, or (ii) 
the speaker used the expression “bull elephant”.  
198 Therefore, gradable antonyms are not true antonyms (see K. Allan, Natural Language Semantics (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers, 2001), pp. 262 et seq.).  
199 In this example, temperate is considered the mid-point in the relational scale and is therefore not gradable. 
200 The same holds true, mutatis mutandis, with reference to “cool”. 
201 This analysis has shown that we cannot deal with semantic relations without recourse to intensions and 
encyclopedia knowledge, i.e. without taking into account the perception and conception processes that 
language users go through. 
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language expressions are related to one another in a way that reflects the community’s 
perception of relations among their denotata, i.e. the categorizations and the relations 
among concepts generally adopted within such a community. Different language 
communities and subgroups within a community may divide up “the same” sensory and 
purely conceptual data differently, i.e. may use different concepts and achieve different 
categorizations. As a result, the meanings of linguistic labels given by different 
communities to the same specific referents and denotata often overlap without being 
fully identical.202 Therefore, it is very possible that in a certain language items A and B 
are denoted by the listeme “X” and item C is denoted by the listeme “Y”, while in a 
different language item A is denoted by the listeme “Z” and items B and C are denoted 
by the listeme “W”.203 
 
4. The meaning of sentences  
 
In the previous sections the author has analysed the relations between single listemes and 
their corresponding concepts, as well as those existing among listemes in their semantic 
fields and those among concepts in their background frames. He has also (i) investigated 
in detail the nature of concepts, (ii) drawn the connected distinctions between reference 
and denotation, on the one hand, and intension and extension, on the other hand and (iii) 
introduced the notions of prototype and stereotype semantics in that context. The entire 
analysis has developed around the agreed correspondence between single listemes and 
concepts, i.e. the attribution of meanings to single listemes. 
However, human beings generally communicate their thoughts by means of 
complex utterances, which take the form of coordinated systems of sentences, through 
which they combine the meaning encapsulated in single listemes into complex meanings. 
Therefore, a primary purpose of this study should also be to investigate how meaning is 
conveyed by means of coordinated systems of sentences. That is the aim of the present 
section.   
 
4.1. The role of grammar  
 
The combination of the meanings encapsulated in listemes into more complex meanings 
is made possible by grammar, i.e. the system of rules, agreed within a specific language 
community, regulating how and under which conditions listemes may be combined, as 
well as the semantic effects of such combinations. Grammar is therefore a fundamental 
requisite of any language, which restricts the actual freedom of the language users to 
                                                     
202 Similarly K. Allan, Natural Language Semantics (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), p. 267. 
203 Moreover, the difficulties are not only generated by the different division of “the same” data, but also by the 
fact that the data may be different, since, starting from the same basic data, certain communities build up 
synthetically-derived additional data while others do not (or do it differently); this phenomenon is generally 
due to the effect on the cognitive process of social and cultural differences (including differences in the 
encyclopedic knowledge). 
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combine listemes in the way they prefer for the purpose of conveying a meaning. 
Linguists have in fact emphasized that, in any specific community language, the 
combination of listemes in complex language expressions is significantly conditioned by 
the rules of grammar.204  
The speaker’s actual respect of such rules is imposed by his will to convey a 
message that is to be understood by the hearers. If the speaker did not conform his 
utterance to the rules of grammar, the risk would arise that the hearers do not understand 
the message and, therefore, that the purpose of the utterance is not achieved. The actual 
respect of such rules is thus based on mutual convenience and agreement. The content of 
the rules, on the other hand, is conventional in nature and generally established by 
praxis. This makes it difficult to identify a priori and to categorize the existing 
restrictions imposed by grammar to the process of listemes combination in any specific 
language community.205 Some of the basic rules of grammar associated with listemes, 
however, are seen in the morphosyntactic specifications of most dictionaries’ lexicon 
entries.206  
 
From what was just stated it follows that each language has its own conventional 
grammar,207 with its distinguishing features and patterns, such as the rules governing the 
use of anaphoras, subjunctives and negations, the need to express the copula, the types, 
purpose and functioning of quantifiers (such as the English most, each, every, none, 
etc.),208 the distinction between countable and uncountable,209 or definite and indefinite, 
the existence of phrasal verbs and idioms.210  
The central role of such specific sets of grammar rules for the purpose of 
                                                     
204 E.g. K. Allan, Natural Language Semantics (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), p. 254. 
205 E.g. K. Allan, Natural Language Semantics (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), p. 257. 
206 This is the case, in particular, with regard to the category features (e.g. the categorization of the listeme as 
noun, verb, article, etc.) and other morphosyntactic categories strictly connected to the listeme (e.g. the 
presence of a noun-phrase object with reference to syntactically transitive verbs; the paradigm of a certain 
lexeme). 
207 This conclusion is also upheld by those linguists that, following the Chomsky’s approach, maintain that, in 
addition to specific languages grammars, a universal grammar exists, which is common to all languages since 
it is innate in the human mind in the form of a mental structure. See, for instance, the discussion on the relation 
between universal grammar and specific languages’ grammars (and the related distinction between deep 
structure and surface structure of linguistic expressions) in N. Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1965).  
208 It should be emphasized that quantifiers are often a source of ambiguity, due to the syntactic rules governing 
their use. Consider, with regard to English quantifiers, the paradigmatic case illustrated by Allan with the 
clause “everyone loves someone”, which could be interpreted either as “each person loves at least some other 
person” or as “some people are loved by everybody” (see K. Allan, Natural Language Semantics (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers, 2001), p. 461). 
209 An interesting example of the different rules concerning the use of countable nouns in the grammars of 
different languages is the following. In English it is possible, and not infrequent, that a verb in the plural 
governs a subject noun in the singular (so-called “number discord”), for example when there is a collectivizing 
phenomenon in which the absence of the plural inflexion in the subject is due to the fact that the referents are 
not perceived to be significant as individuals by the speaker. This is often the case where large groups of 
animals are at stake. In Italian, on the other hand, such number discord is generally not allowed.  
210 Idioms may be defined as multi-word listemes (i) that look like phrases or clauses and (ii) the meaning of 
which is figurative and not predictable from the literal meaning of the their constituents. 
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attributing meanings to utterances may be illustrated by the following example.211 
Consider the English utterance “The toves gimbled in the wabe”. The words used therein 
are per se nonsense and, as a consequence, one would expect the utterance to be 
completely lacking of any communicative power. However, “toves” is clearly a plural 
noun and therefore denotes more than one entity; “gimbled” is the past tense of a verb 
and so denotes an act or state in the past of the toves, which are the subjects of the verb; 
“wabe” is a noun, given that it follows the article “the”; in addition, since it falls within 
the scope of the preposition “in”, “wabe” identifies a place or time. If the clause were 
uttered in a well-defined context, such (grammatical) information could perhaps allow 
the hearer to guess its meaning.212  
Interestingly, it may be noted that, while speakers start their communicative 
process from specific semantic specifications (meanings) and try to express them by 
means of combining listemes according to rules of grammar, hearers on the contrary start 
their understanding process from specific formal (listemes) and morphosyntactic 
(grammatical clues, such as those discussed in the above example) specifications and try 
to grasp the message that the hearer intended to convey. For the purpose of 
understanding the meaning of an utterance, as well as of interpreting a legal text, 
therefore, grammatical aspects represent a crucial starting point of the analysis.  
 
 
4.1.1. The combination of listemes: morphology and syntax 
 
In general terms, the listemes combination may assume two basic forms:  
(i) the combination of two or more listemes in a single lexeme (e.g. the word 
“dogs” is obtained by combining the listemes “dog” and “-s” and both “dog” and 
“dogs” are two forms of the same lexeme), which is regulated by morphology;  
(ii) the combination of different lexemes into phrases, clauses and sentences, 
which is regulated by syntax.213  
 
In light of this, it is thus necessary to introduce the concept of lexeme.  
 Lexemes214 are members of particular lexical classes (such as nouns, verbs, 
adverbs, adjectives, etc.), which derive their morphosyntactic specifications and their 
functions from their very same inclusion in such classes. They are independent linguistic 
items from both a semantic and syntactic standpoint, in the sense that their meaning 
unitarily derives from their whole form and that they generally prohibit the insertion 
                                                     
211 The example is taken from K. Allan, Natural Language Semantics (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), p. 
81. Scientifics writings on the relation between grammar and meaning are full of similar examples, the most 
famous of which is probably “colorless green ideas sleep furiously”, used by Chomsky as an instance of a 
grammatically correct but senseless sentence (see N. Chomsky, Syntactic Structures (The Hague: Mouton, 
1957), pp. 15 et seq.). 
212 On the relevance of grammar in the process of meaning attribution, R. Jackendoff, Architecture of the 
Language Faculty (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997), in particular Chapter 4. 
213 Interestingly, the listeme syntax derives etymologically from the combination of the ancient Greek listemes 
“syn” and “taxis”, which may be translated as “ordering together”. 
214 On lexemes, K. Allan, Natural Language Semantics (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), pp. 119 et seq. 
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(and extraction) of linguistic elements in (and from) their boundaries by means of 
syntactic processes. A lexeme may take different forms (e.g. the singular and plural 
forms) while still remaining the very same lexeme.215  
 Sometimes lexemes may have the appearance of phrases, from which, however, 
they must be distinguished since the latter are not part of any lexical class and are not 
semantically and syntactically independent items. For example, the expression “man in 
the street” may refer to both (i) the lexeme man in the street (occasionally written as 
“man-in-the-street”), which is a noun bearing the meaning of “the ordinary person” and 
(ii) the phrase man in the street, composed of the distinct lexemes “man”, “in”, “the” and 
“street” and meaning “the man who is in the street”. This phenomenon contributes to 





Turning to morphology,216 it must be initially pointed out that its basic tools are morphs 
and morphemes. The latter term refers to the abstract theoretical concepts representing 
the smallest units of morphological analysis bearing an autonomous meaning. The 
former term, on the contrary, indicates the forms that morphemes assume. For example, 
in the word cats, “-s” is the morph of the plural morpheme, i.e. of that morpheme that 
allows the switch from the singular to the plural of a word.  
 
Morphemes may be distinguished as free form and bound form morphemes.  
 The former are those that can stand alone within a sentence according to the 
current grammatical rules, while the latter are those that cannot. An example of free form 
morphemes is that corresponding to the morph “cat”, whereas an instance of bound form 
morphemes is that corresponding to the morph “-s”.  
 
Bound form morphemes,217 which are always combined to other morphemes, may be 
divided into inflexional and derivational morphemes.  
 Inflexional morphemes generally add, to the meaning of the listeme (basic 
lexeme) to which their morphs are attached, the meaning of a secondary grammatical 
category (e.g. aspect, tense, mood, person, with regard to verb lexemes; number, gender, 
case, with regard to noun lexemes), so producing related forms of the same lexeme.218 A 
typical case is represented by the above example of “cat” and “cats”: the meaning of the 
                                                     
215 See the previous example relating to the words “dog” and “dogs”, which are two forms of the same lexeme. 
216 On morphology and morphosyntactic, K. Allan, Natural Language Semantics (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishers, 2001), pp. 109 et seq. 
217 Bound form morphemes may be classified in prefixes, suffixes and infixes, according to the part of the basic 
lexeme in which their morphs are inserted (at the beginning of, at the end of and within the basic lexeme, 
respectively). The part of the basic lexeme that does not change when an affix (i.e. a prefix, suffix or infix) is 
attached thereto is generally named stem. For example, the stem of the listeme “make” is “mak” (which 
together with the suffix “-ing” creates the present participle “making” and the derived noun “making”). 
218 The lexeme remains the same even though both its meaning and its form change. See K. Allan, Natural 
Language Semantics (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), p. 110. 
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inflected word “cats” is given by the combination of the meaning of the basic lexeme 
“cat” and the meaning of the bound inflexional morph “-s”. The complete set of forms 
that a single lexeme may assume by means of inflection constitutes the linguistic 
paradigm of that lexeme, whose typical examples are declension for nouns and 
conjugation for verbs. 
 Derivational morphemes, on the contrary, produce new lexemes either by 
changing the morphosyntactic specification of the basic lexeme,219 or by modifying the 
semantic and form specifications thereof (or both). An example is given by the 
derivation of the lexeme “happiness” (a noun) from the combination of the basic lexeme 
"happy” (an adjective) and the morph “-ness”, corresponding to a derivational 
morpheme that allows the transformation of an adjective into a noun. It is interesting to 
note that the meaning of derived lexemes is sometimes partially independent from the 
meaning of their combined components, especially with regard to those derived lexemes 
that have been in common use for a long period of time.220 This may also be a source of 
ambiguity, where the independent meaning of a derived lexeme co-exists with the 
meaning thereof determined by mingling the meanings of the combined listemes.  
 A particular type of derivational morpheme is the zero-derivation (conversion) 
morpheme, so called since it is not associated with any morph and, therefore, has no 
form.221 When attached to an existing lexeme, the zero-derivation morpheme causes it to 
shift its lexical class and, therefore, to change its meaning and become a different 
lexeme. Consider the instance of the noun “metal”, which is transformed into the verb 
“metal” by a zero-derivation morpheme. As a result of such a transformation, the derived 
lexeme adopts the syntactic function and the regular inflexional morphology of the new 
lexical class. The existence in a grammar of zero-derivation morphemes is an additional 
source of ambiguity, due to homonymy of the derived and original lexemes. It is true 
that, in most cases, the different syntactic functions thereof, together with the actual 
structure of the utterance where the lexeme appears, makes it clear which is the meaning 
to be attributed to the lexeme. However, there are cases where the ambiguity deriving 
from the correspondence of forms between two lexemes cannot be cleared by means of a 
mere grammatical analysis. This may be the case, for instance, with regard to the use of 
adjectives and verbs having the same form. Consider the following example: the word 
“broken” may represent the adjective “broken”, as well as the past participle of the verb 
“to break”. However, no equality of meaning corresponds to the equality of form, since 
the adjective “broken” does have a stative denotation (it refers to something that is and 
was already broken before), while the past participle “broken” does have a non-stative 
denotation (it refers to something that is getting broken at the time spoken of by the 
utterance). In order to untie the semantic knot in this case, it is necessary to rely on all 
                                                     
219 See the example of zero-derivation morphemes discussed below.  
220 See the examples concerning the derived lexemes “womanize” (“woman” and “-ize”) and “computerize” 
(“computer” and “-ize”) given in K. Allan, Natural Language Semantics (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), 
p. 112.  
221 On zero-derivation morphemes, K. Allan, Natural Language Semantics (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 
2001), pp. 113 et seq. 
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the available information, mainly of a pragmatical nature.222 
 
Finally, the formation of new lexemes by means of combination may also be achieved 
through the different process of compounding, which consists in creating compound 
polyword expressions that are regarded as lexemes. An example of compounded lexeme 
is the above-mentioned “man in the street”; another could be “beneficial owner”, as used 





When the focus of the analysis is shifted from the creation of lexemes to the creation of 
phrases, clauses and sentences, the object of the study becomes syntax, i.e the agreed set 
of rules regulating the aggregation of lexemes into semantically sensible groups.  
 
The basic form of semantically sensible groups of lexemes is the phrase, which consists 
in a polyword expression that is not member of any lexical class and whose meaning 
may be consistently determined on the basis of the meanings of its formal 
components.223 An example of a phrase is the following: a black crow (noun phrase).  
 Phrases (or single lexemes) are combined to form clauses, which consist in 
semantically coordinated groups of words built around a predicate (mostly explicit) and 
its (explicit or implicit) subject. Clauses may be distinguished in independent and 
subordinate clauses. The former are syntactically and semantically autonomous, while 
the latter have to be attached to another clause in order to be syntactically and 
semantically acceptable.  
 Lastly, sentences are also meaningful combinations of lexemes, which may be 
constituted by a single independent clause, or by a coordinated group of independent and 
subordinate clauses. In the English language, sentences are traditionally classified on the 
basis on the number and type of clauses they are composed of: hence, a simple sentence 
consists of a single independent clause with no dependent clauses; a compound sentence 
consists of multiple independent clauses, joined together by conjunctions and/or 
punctuation, with no dependent clauses; a complex sentence consists of at least one 
independent clause and one dependent clause; a complex-compound sentence consists of 
multiple independent clauses, at least one of which has at least one dependent clause.  
 
As for morphology, the above description of the basic components of syntax is merely 
indicative, since each language does have its own morphological and syntactical rules 
and peculiarities that are not worthanalyzing in the course of this study.224 Even the 
relative weights that morphology and syntax bear on the process of meaning expression 
                                                     
222 On what kind of information is needed to untie the knot and on how such information is actually used in the 
course of a pragmatic analysis, see the remainder of this section. 
223 These two characteristics make phrases clearly distinct from compound lexemes. 
224 The same holds true with reference to paragraph structure and punctuation, which bear semantic content in 
written language.  
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by means of utterance vary greatly from one language to another, certain languages225 
tending to convey complex meanings mainly through syntactical combinations, while 
others226 do so through morphological alteration of lexemes, especially by means of 
inflection and derivation.  
 
4.2. The semantic analysis of clauses and sentences (utterances) 
 
Given the purpose of the present study, it does however appear more interesting to 
analyse more closely clauses and sentences from a semantic and pragmatic perspective, 
rather than from a grammatical one.  
 
Sentences represent the most typical formal components of utterances, the latter being 
the language expressions used by speakers to communicate a certain message to one or 
more hearers at a certain time and in a certain place.227  
 Each utterance may theoretically perform various possible functions, such as 
stating an opinion, ordering a behavior, making a promise, etc. In most cases, however, 
the speaker generally wants to convey one single message to the hearers by means of it. 
More precisely, the speaker does not simply want to convey a message by means of the 
utterance; he intends to cause a specific reaction to the utterance in the hearers. In order 
to achieve such a result, the speaker needs the hearers to recognize the meaning of the 
message and, as a consequence, identify which reaction to the utterance the speaker 
would like the hearers to have.  
 To put it differently, the speaker wants to deliver a specific message to the hearers 
in order to stimulate a specific reaction from them and, thus, he needs to put the hearers 
in the best situation possible to do so. Therefore, the speaker tailors the utterance to suit 
the hearers, taking into account the presumed common ground, the context of the 
utterance and what the speaker guesses about the hearers’ ability to understand the 
message conveyed by the utterance.228 
 
 
4.2.1. The underspecification of utterances and the role played by the overall context 
 
In the course of this process of utterance formation, the speaker economically 
underspecifies the meaning of the message he wants to convey, more or less consciously 
relying on the hearers’ ability to correctly infer such a meaning without the need for 
everything to be made explicit.  
 In this perspective, the use of language may be certainly considered a constructive 
                                                     
225 These are typically labeled “isolating” or “analytical” languages (e.g. Vietnamese) (Encyclopædia 
Britannica. Retrieved January 29, 2010, from Encyclopædia Britannica Online). 
226 These are typically labeled “synthetic” languages (e.g. Latin) (Encyclopædia Britannica. Retrieved 29 
January 2010, from Encyclopædia Britannica Online).  
227 Similarly K. Allan, Natural Language Semantics (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), p. 15. 
228 K. Allan, Natural Language Semantics (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), p. 18. 
PART I: CHAPTER 2 
 78 
and cognitive process, both from the point of view of the speaker and from that of the 
hearers.229 The effectiveness of the utterance, consisting in the fact that the hearers 
understand the meaning of the message conveyed and recognize the reaction expected by 
the speaker, very much depends on the speaker’s ability:  
(i) to make the most accurate assumptions about the hearers (their knowledge, 
background experiences, etc.) and the situation existing at the moment of the 
interpretation and  
(ii) to properly take into account the situation of the utterance.  
 
All in all, the effectiveness of the utterance heavily depends on how the speaker does 
take into account the overall context when constructing the utterance.  
 
But what is exactly is such overall context that the speaker has to take into account and 
assess when formulating the utterance and the hearers will symmetrically consider when 
interpreting it?  
This is composed by various elements, the first being the world (and time) spoken 
of. When attributing a meaning to an utterance, in fact, both the speaker and the hearers 
generally construct a mental model of the world (and time) the utterance is partially or 
totally about. Such a world does not have to be a factual one, but may be a metaphysical, 
imagined, desired, or supposed one. Notwithstanding this, in many cases the world (and 
time) spoken of is somewhat linked to the world (and time) spoken in, i.e. the world (and 
time) in which the utterance occurs. The relevance of the world (and time) spoken of is 
mainly due to the fact that, among the various meanings attributable to the utterance, the 
hearers tend to consider only those meanings that appear coherent and sensible, i.e. those 
making the world (and time) spoken of internally consistent and in accordance with 
common ground.  
 
Common ground is the second element of the overall context. That is made up of:  
(i) things that should be obviously perceived and taken into account by the 
hearers,  
(ii) things that should be obviously inferred and taken into account by the hearers 
on the basis of their perceptions, their expected knowledge of the language 
used,230 including the common principles on behavior when communicating 
through language (cooperative principles), and their expected encyclopedic 
knowledge.231  
As a mere exemplification, common ground includes the identity and capacity of the 
speaker and of the potential hearers, the purpose of the utterance, the use of a specific 
jargon, the cooperative principles and the background and experiences of the speaker 
and hearers, including their encyclopedic knowledge. Moreover, one of the most relevant 
cooperative principles forming part of the common ground consists in the expectation, 
by the speaker, that the hearers will use their knowledge and will draw inferences in 
                                                     
229 K. Allan, Natural Language Semantics (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), p. 25. 
230 I.e. its grammar, semantics and other conventions pertaining to its functioning. 
231 Which includes the knowledge gained through direct experiences of the worlds around them. 
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order to attribute a meaning to the utterance in light of the world being spoken of. In 
other words, the speaker expects the hearers to make constructive inferences from their 
expected knowledge and constructs his utterance accordingly.232 Common ground may 
vary from one language community to another and, within a community, from a sub-
group to another, in the sense that in different communities and sub-groups people may 
be expected to know or believe in different things and to draw from them different 
conclusions.233  It is therefore important that the speaker makes the correct assumptions 
on what constitutes common ground within a certain community and on whether the 
hearers are part of such a community, so that they may be reasonably presumed to know 
or believe in given things.234 Finally, it is worth noting that common ground is generally 
presupposed by the speaker, who considers it superfluous to make it explicit.  
The third element to be taken into account as part of the overall context is the co-
text, i.e. the text that precedes and succeeds a given utterance. Co-text is significant for 
the purpose of identifying the world (and time) spoken of, or better specifying something 
within that world. It provides additional information relevant to the proper interpretation 
of ambiguous forms and expressions.235  
These three interconnected236 elements of the overall context, where appropriately 
taken into account by the speaker in formulating his utterance, will ordinarily enable the 
hearers to reduce the ambiguity of that utterance, since just a few of the possible 
interpretations thereof will make sense in the overall context. 
 
 
4.2.2. The cooperative principles 
 
The author just described what the speaker should take into account when formulating 
his underspecified utterance, so that the hearers can properly understand the meaning of 
the message conveyed.  
 The issue, however, remains why the speaker should underspecify the meaning of 
the utterance and why he should take into account the overall context in order to 
properly shape it.  
 Looked at from a different angle, this issue consists in why the speaker should 
expect the hearers to appropriately use the overall context to integrate the underspecified 
                                                     
232 K. Allan, Natural Language Semantics (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), pp. 22 and 25. 
233 See K. Allan, Natural Language Semantics (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), pp. 21 et seq., who 
highlights that common ground is similar to a convention, i.e. a regular behavior to which, in a given situation, 
almost everyone within a community conforms and expects almost everyone else to conform. 
234 This implies that the relevant common ground, in particular encyclopedic knowledge, has to be shared for 
the most part by the speaker and the hearers.  
235 For example, the ambiguity deriving from anaphors.  
236 The interconnection is multidirectional: the content of the world (and time) spoken of is co-defined by the 
co-text and common ground, including encyclopedic knowledge; the world (and time) spoken of, in turn, 
guides the hearers in picking up from the lexicon and encyclopedia the information relevant for attributing a 
sensible meaning to the utterance (e.g. the world spoken of guides the hearers in choosing the right lexicon and 
encyclopedic entry for a certain language expression used in the utterance); the meaning of the utterance has to 
make sense in the so-defined world (and time) spoken of. 
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meaning of an utterance; which, in turn, implies the question of why the hearers should 
integrate an underspecified utterance using the overall context.  
 
This behavior has been empirically verified by linguists, who explained it in terms of 
praxis within a community.  
 Grice,237 in particular, described such behavior making recourse to underlying 
cooperative principles that operate within a specific community and are part of the 
culture and social customs thereof. He formulated the general cooperative principle as 
follows: “make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at 
which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you 
are engaged”.238 According to Grice, this general cooperative principle, which is 
widespread in the vast majority of language communities, operates in two directions: 
speakers generally observe the cooperative principle and hearers generally assume that 
speakers are observing it and behave accordingly.  
 This allows for the possibility of implicatures, i.e. meanings that are not explicitly 
conveyed in the utterance, but that are nonetheless inferred from the overall context.  
 Grice distinguished within the scope of this general cooperative principle four 
categories of maxims that he labeled Quantity, Quality, Relation and Manner.239 The 
most-relevant maxims included in the four categories may be expressed as follows:240  
(i) Quantity maxim – the speaker is expected to give (no more and) no less than 
the information required by the hearer in order to proper interpret the utterance, 
the latter, in turn, being expected to draw the strongest inference possible from 
the utterance on the basis of the context;  
(ii) Quality maxim – the speaker is expected to be sincere and truthful;  
(iii) Relation maxim – the speaker is expected to make an utterance that is 
relevant in the overall context;  
(iv) Manner maxim – the speaker is expected to be as clear, unambiguous, brief 
and coherent (systematic) as possible.241  
 
The Gricean theory is today formalized in bidirectional optimality theory (within formal 
pragmatics),242 according to which the hearer determines the meaning of an utterance 
                                                     
237 H. P. Grice, "Logic and conversation", in P. Cole and J. Morgan (eds.), Syntax and Semantics, vol. 3. Speech 
Acts (New York: Academic Press, 1975), 41 et seq. 
238 H. P. Grice, "Logic and conversation", in P. Cole and J. Morgan (eds.), Syntax and Semantics, vol. 3. Speech 
Acts (New York: Academic Press, 1975), 41 et seq., at 45. 
239 Echoing Kant, as the very same author admitted (see H. P. Grice, "Logic and conversation", in P. Cole and 
J. Morgan (eds.), Syntax and Semantics, vol. 3. Speech Acts (New York: Academic Press, 1975), 41 et seq., at 
45). 
240 H. P. Grice, "Logic and conversation", in P. Cole and J. Morgan (eds.), Syntax and Semantics, vol. 3. Speech 
Acts (New York: Academic Press, 1975), 41 et seq., at 45-46. 
241 An interesting example of the relevance of such maxims is represented by the case, illustrated by 
Wittgenstein, of the possible strange and unpredictable reactions of the hearers to an utterance in which the 
composite expression “the broomstick and the brush which is fitted on to it” is used instead of the common 
lexeme “broom” (see L. Wittgenstein (translated by G. E. M. Anscombe), Philosophical Investigations 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1953), p. 25, para. 60). 
242 On (bidirectional) optimality theory and its application to natuaral language interpretation, see, among 
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under two types of contraints, which may conflict with each other, i.e.:  
(i) the semantic (and grammatical) constraints, represented by the set of semantic 
(and grammatical) features typically associated with the terms and expressions 
employed in the utterance, and  
(ii) the pragmatic constraints, represented by the pragmatic implicatures that may 
be inferred from the overall context.243  
Such constraints are ordered according to a strict priority ranking and any specific 
constraint may be violated where this is necessary in order to satisfy higher ranked 
constraints. Among the possible meanings that might be attributed to an utterance, the 
optimal interpretation, i.e. the interpretation to be preferred under (bidirectional) 
optimality theory, is the one that best satisfies the relevant ranked constraints, although 
not satisfying all of them. This means that an interpretation that violates some of the 
existing constraints may nonetheless be regarded as the optimal interpretation of the 
utterance, where it satisfies higher constraints.  
 Semantic (and grammatical) constraints (i), which are types of faithfulness 
constraints, require the interpretation to be sematically (and grammatically) faithful to 
the expressions used in the utterance; thus, they rank prototypical meanings higher than 
peripheral, or unusual meanings.244  
 Pragmatic constraints (ii), which are types of markedness constraints,245 require 
the interpretation not to conflict with the overall context.246 In bidirectional optimality 
                                                                                                                                  
others, A. Prince and P. Smolensky, Optimality Theory. Constraint interaction in generative grammar 
(Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2004); H. de Hoop and H. de Swart, “Temporal adjunct clauses in Optimality 
Theory”, 12 Rivista di Linguistica (2000), 107 et seq.; H. de Hoop, “Optimal scrambling and interpretation”, in 
H. Bennis M. Everaert and E. Reuland (eds.), Interface Strategies (Amsterdam, KNAW, 2000), 153 et seq.; R. 
Blutner, “Some Aspects of Optimality in Natural Language Interpretation”, 17 Journal of Semantics (2000), 
189 et seq.; H. de Hoop, P. Hendriks and R. Blutner, “On compositionality and bidirectional optimization”, 8 
Journal of Cognitive Science (2007), 137 et seq.; J. Zwarts, “Competition Between Word Meanings: The 
Polysemy of (A)Round”, in C. Meier and M. Weisgerber (eds.), Proceedings of the Conference “sub8 – Sinn 
und Bedeutung” (Konstanz: Fachbereich Sprachwissenschaft der Universität Konstanz, 2004), 349 et seq. 
243 See L. Hogeweg, Word in process. On the interpretation, acquisition, and production of words (Utrecht: 
LOT, 2009), p. 4. 
244 See the use of the constraint STRENGTH in J. Zwarts, “Competition Between Word Meanings: The 
Polysemy of (A)Round”, in C. Meier and M. Weisgerber (eds.), Proceedings of the Conference “sub8 – Sinn 
und Bedeutung” (Konstanz: Fachbereich Sprachwissenschaft der Universität Konstanz, 2004), 349 et seq., at 
356 et seq., as modified in L. Hogeweg, Word in process. On the interpretation, acquisition, and production of 
words (Utrecht: LOT, 2009), pp. 83-85: “I propose to reformulate STRENGTH in such a way that it pertains 
only to the set of features that are associated with the form under consideration” (italics by the author). 
245 I.e. constraints that require unmarked (i.e. more natural) interpretations to be preferred to marked (i.e. more 
complex) interpretations, provided that the speaker, in the light of the overall context, could have not expressed 
the resulting meaning through a less marked (i.e. more natural) expression. As Blutner puts it, an expression is 
blocked with regard to a cartain interpretation, if this interpretation can be generated more economically by an 
alternative expression, i.e. if it can be generated by a less complex expression; however, linguistic and 
contextual factors can trigger deblocking in case they revese the corresponding cost values (R. Blutner, “Some 
Aspects of Optimality in Natural Language Interpretation”, 17 Journal of Semantics (2000), 189 et seq., at 194 
and 198). Similarly, under the Manner principle elaborated by Levinson, marked messages are supposed to 
indicate marked situations (S. Levinson, Presumptive Meanings. The Theory of Generalized Conversational 
Implicature (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000)).  
246 See the use of the constraint FIT in J. Zwarts, “Competition Between Word Meanings: The Polysemy of 
(A)Round”, in C. Meier and M. Weisgerber (eds.), Proceedings of the Conference “sub8 – Sinn und 
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theory, the above-mentioned Gricean maxims are typically re-expressed in terms of 
pragmatic constraints.247   
 As the semantic (and grammatical) constraints may sometime require marked 
interpretations of the relevant utterances, the two types of constraints are potentially 
conflicting.248 However, pragmatic constraints rank generally249 higher than semantic 
(and grammatical) constraints, which entails that interpretations that conflict with the 
overall context of an utterance cannot be normally regarded as optimal interpretations 
thereof under (bidirectional) optimality theory;250 conversely, an interpretation based on 
unusual or peripheral meanings of the listemes employed in the utterance may represent 
the optimal interpretation, where it is the most faithful construction of the utterance 
not at variance with the overall context. 
 
 
4.2.3. The utterance meaning 
 
The role played and the linguistic effects produced by the cooperative principles and the 
overall context, of which the former may be considered to be part (as a component of the 
common ground), lead the author to conclude that there are three conceptually different 
levels of meaning of an utterance.  
 At a first level, an utterance may be said to have as many potentially correct 
meanings as the grammar and the semantic specifications of the listemes used allow it to 
have. This level is not relevant per se; it simply provides us with part of the raw material 
needed to construct the other two levels of meaning.  
 The second level is that of the speaker’s meaning, which is the private meaning 
thought of by the speaker when constructing the utterance.  
 The third level is that of the meanings that the hearers may attribute to the 
utterance. Among the meanings of the third level, it appears particularly significant the 
meaning(s) that any reasonable hearer would assign to the utterance, given (i) the first 
level meanings of the utterance and (ii) the hearer’s analysis of and inferences from the 
overall context (including the speaker’s presumed purpose in using that particular 
                                                                                                                                  
Bedeutung” (Konstanz: Fachbereich Sprachwissenschaft der Universität Konstanz, 2004), 349 et seq., at 356 et 
seq. 
247 See R. Blutner, “Some Aspects of Optimality in Natural Language Interpretation”, 17 Journal of Semantics 
(2000), 189 et seq., at 198 et seq., whith particular reference to the decomposition of the Gricean Quantity 
maxim in Q-principle and I-principle, where the former works to select the most coherent interpretation of an 
utterance, while the latter acts as a blocking mechanism and blocks all the interpretations of that utterance that 
can be derived more economically from an alternative utterance. 
248 L. Hogeweg, Word in process. On the interpretation, acquisition, and production of words (Utrecht: LOT, 
2009), p. 8. 
249 See R. Blutner, “Some Aspects of Optimality in Natural Language Interpretation”, 17 Journal of Semantics 
(2000), 189 et seq., at 191. 
250 See J. Zwarts, “Competition Between Word Meanings: The Polysemy of (A)Round”, in C. Meier and M. 
Weisgerber (eds.), Proceedings of the Conference “sub8 – Sinn und Bedeutung” (Konstanz: Fachbereich 
Sprachwissenschaft der Universität Konstanz, 2004), 349 et seq., at 357; L. Hogeweg, Word in process. On the 
interpretation, acquisition, and production of words (Utrecht: LOT, 2009), p. 82. 
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utterance). Linguists call the latter meaning(s) the utterance meaning.251  
 
Interpretative processes have the utterance meaning as their only possible goal (and, 
therefore, outcome).  
 In fact, the first level of meaning does not take into proper account the final goal 
of the utterance, which is to convey a message from the speaker to the hearers.  
 The second level of meaning is a private one and, as such, cannot be known by 
anybody except the speaker.252 What the hearers may find at the end of their 
interpretative inquiry is the meaning that they think the speaker had in mind when 
formulating the utterance and that, as such, may be agreed upon by the speaker 
himself253 (which does not ontologically convert it into the meaning the speaker had in 
mind when formulating the utterance, the latter being and remaining a private, 
unknowable meaning, the proof of which cannot be given in any way).  
 Useless to say that it is possible, and actually common, that, on the one hand, 
different hearers find the same utterance to have different (utterance) meanings and, on 
the other hand, that the speaker asserts that the meaning he had in mind was different 
from those found out by the hearers. This creates disputes over the meaning of the 
utterance.254 These differences in meaning may be due to various factors, among which 
the wrong assessment by the speaker of the common ground,255 the fact that different 
hearers do not share the same common ground, the differences between the actual 
inference process followed by the hearers and the one anticipated by the speaker, the 
possible misspeaking of the speaker. 
 
What the author has just described and analysed constitutes the background of the 
following analysis on how the utterance meaning is generally determined.   
 
4.2.3.1. Determining the utterance meaning (1): propositional calculus 
 
A first level of analysis relevant for the purpose of interpreting an utterance is that of 
propositional calculus,256 which characterizes analytical logic and which is based on 
deductive inferences.  
 The basis for the application of propositional calculus to language257 is the 
                                                     
251 K. Allan, Natural Language Semantics (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), p. 44. 
252 See the example of the beetle given in L. Wittgenstein (translated by G. E. M. Anscombe), Philosophical 
Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953), p. 85, para. 293. 
253 For practical purposes, the utterance meaning is generally presumed to reveal the speaker meaning, unless 
the speaker himself makes it apparent that this is not the case. Accordingly K. Allan, Natural Language 
Semantics (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), p. 44. 
254 These disputes are more than common where the interpretation of legal documents is at stake. 
255 In particular, his wrong assessment of the encyclopedic knowledge of the hearers. 
256 Propositional calculus is also known as propositional logic. 
257 On the application of analytical logic and propositional calculus to language, L. Wittgenstein (translated by 
D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuiness), Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (London: Routledge, 2001); B. Russell, 
The principles of mathematics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903); B. Russell, “On denoting”, 
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acknowledgment that sentences are mostly formed of declarative clauses, whose 
meaning (proposition) may be either true or false, according to the well-known logical 
principles of excluded middle and of (non-)contradiction.258 
 
Propositional calculus establishes the truth conditions and the truth deductive inferences 
between propositions that are joined by logical connectives. The typical logical 
connectives259 are: AND, AND/OR, EITHER … OR,260 IF … THEN, IF AND ONLY IF 
… THEN.  
 Substantially, where applied to natural languages, propositional calculus allows 
us to conclude whether the meaning of a sentence composed by two or more 
propositions joined by logical connectives is true or false, based on whether the 
underlying propositions are true or false. To put it differently, it allows us to determine 
under which conditions, i.e. whether the underlying propositions are to be true or false, 
the meaning of a sentence composed by two or more propositions joined by logical 
connectives is true.261  
In this respect, meanings are deemed to be true when they correspond to the 
situation in the world (and time) spoken of. For instance the proposition “a black cat is 
on the table” is true if and only if there is a black cat on the table in the world (and time) 
spoken of, which could be the real world before the eyes of the speaker and hearers, as 
well as the world of a fairytale.  
 When the logical connective AND is used, all the propositions of a sentence 
joined by such a connective must be true, in order for the meaning of the sentence to be 
true. A well-known example, among international tax practitioners, is that of Article 
15(2) OECD Model, where the three propositions under letters a), b) and c) must be all 
true, to make the meaning of the sentence encompassing them true and, thus, to satisfy 
the condition for the exclusive right to tax of the residence State.  
 When the logical connective AND/OR is used, at least one of the propositions of 
a sentence joined by such a connective must be true, in order for the meaning of the 
sentence to be true.  
                                                                                                                                  
1905 Mind 14, 479 et seq.; H. Kamp and U. Reyle, From Discourse to Logic. Introduction to Modeltheoretic 
Semantics of Natural Language, Formal Logic and Discourse Representation Theory (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 
1993); K. M. Jaszczolt, Semantics and Pragmatics, Meaning in Language and Discourse (London: Longman, 
2002), Chapters 3-4.  
258 On the principle of (non-)contradiction, according to which in a specific world and time two propositions 
such as “X is Y” and “X is not Y” are mutually exclusive, see Aristotle, Metaphysics, book IV, part 4 (see 
Aristotle (translated by W. D. Ross), Metaphysics (The Internet Classics Archive) – available online at 
http://classics.mit.edu//Aristotle/metaphysics.html); on the principle of excluded middle, according to which in 
a specific word and time, given a certain proposition such as “X is Y”, either that proposition is true or its 
negation is, see Aristotle, Metaphysics, book IV, part 7 (see Aristotle (translated by W. D. Ross), Metaphysics 
(The Internet Classics Archive) – available online at http://classics.mit.edu//Aristotle/metaphysics.html).   
259 Logical connectives are indicated in logic with well-known symbols, such as “V” or “”; here these 
symbols are dropped and the corresponding English terms are used instead.  
260 Also known as ONLY ONE OF and OR(ELSE). 
261 Therefore, propositional calculus is limited to assigning a truth value (true or false) to sentences, consisting 
of propositions connected by logic connectives, on the basis of (i) the truth functions (truth logical meaning) of 
the logical connectives and (ii) the truth value of each proposition in the sentence. 
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 When the logical connective EITHER … OR is used, one and only one of the 
propositions of a sentence joined by such a connective must be true, in order for the 
meaning of the sentence to be true.  
 The logical connective IF … THEN appears particularly interesting for the 
purpose of the present study, due to its significant rate of utilization in legal texts. It may 
be analysed under two different, and reciprocal, perspectives. Under the modus ponens, 
if the proposition following IF (premise) is true, the proposition following THEN 
(conclusion) is also true.262 Under the modus tollens, if the proposition following THEN 
(conclusion) is false, then the proposition following IF (premise) is also false. However, 
the contrary is not true: if the proposition following THEN (conclusion) is true, this does 
not entail that the proposition following IF (premise) is also true.263  
 This holds true, on the contrary, where the logical connective IF AND ONLY IF 
… THEN is used. When this is the case, if the proposition following IF AND ONLY IF 
(premise) is true, the proposition following THEN (conclusion) is also true; at the same 
time if the proposition following THEN (conclusion) is true, then the proposition 
following IF AND ONLY IF (premise) is also true.264  
 
Propositional calculus applied to language is particularly useful in determining when a 
certain proposition entails another proposition. In terms of truth-value, a certain 
proposition may be said to entail another proposition when, if the meaning of the former 
is true, then the meaning of the latter is true in all possible worlds (and times). For 
example, for the purpose of the OECD Model, the proposition “X is a body corporate” 
entails the proposition “X is a company”,265 since whenever the former is true, the latter 
is also true.  
 Moreover, the analysis of entailment relations in terms of propositional calculus 
permits a simple application of the logical transitivity principle, according to which if 
proposition A entails proposition B and the latter entails proposition C, then proposition 
A entails proposition C. Expanding the above example, since the proposition “X is a 
body corporate” entails the proposition “X is a company” and the latter entails the 
proposition “X is a person”, then the proposition “X is a body corporate” entails the 
proposition “X is a person”.266  
 Also synonymy relations may be expressed in terms of propositional calculus: a 
proposition A may be said to be synonym of another proposition B if, and only if, the 
meaning of the former is semantically equivalent to the meaning of the latter in all 
possible worlds, so that whenever the former is true, the latter is also true and vice 
                                                     
262 The modus ponens of the logical connective IF … THEN is typically used in order to construct logical 
syllogisms, on which, Aristotle, Prior Analytics, book I, part 1 (see Aristotle, (translated by A. J. Jenkinson), 
Prior Analytics (The Internet Classics Archive) – available online at 
http://classics.mit.edu//Aristotle/prior.html).  
263 The most effective example is that of the snoring wife: if your wife is snoring, then she is sleeping; but, 
luckily enough, this does not mean that every time that she falls asleep, she starts snoring too. 
264 Symmetrically, where either of the two propositions is false, the other one is false as well. 
265 Based on Article 3(1) OECD Model. 
266 Based on Article 3(1) OECD Model. 
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versa.267 An example may be derived from Article 4(1) OECD Model: the proposition 
“X is a person who, under the laws of State Y, is liable to tax therein by reason of his 
domicile, residence, place of management or any other criterion of a similar nature”268 
and the proposition “X is a resident of State Y for the purpose of this Convention” are 
synonyms. In fact, whenever the former is true, the latter is also true and vice versa. 
 
Propositional calculus, however, is to a certain extent inadequate as a means of analysis 
of natural languages and must therefore be paired by semantic and pragmatic analysis.  
 The first reason for its inadequacy is that the use of logical connectives in natural 
languages is sometimes ambiguous. Take, for instance, the case where the conjunction 
“or” is used in a sentence. Does it correspond to the logical connective EITHER … OR, 
therefore requiring that only one of the joined propositions is true for the sentence 
meaning to be true, or does it stand for the logical connective AND/OR, in which case 
the sentence meaning is true even where all the joined propositions are true? When this 
is the case, the ambiguity is generally solved by an analysis of the overall context, i.e. by 
means of pragmatics. A similar problem exists with reference to the conjunction “if”, 
which, in the praxis of many natural languages may stand for both the logical 
connectives “IF … THEN” and “IF AND ONLY IF … THEN”.  
 Another cause of inadequacy consists in the need to extract a proposition from the 
relative clause, before the propositional calculus may be applied. In other terms, 
propositional calculus is a type of analysis that presupposes propositions, the latter being 
the meanings of clauses that must be determined by the hearers. In order to construct the 
meanings of such clauses, the hearers cannot rely on propositional calculus,269 but have 
to carry out a semantic and pragmatic analysis on the basis of the overall context of the 
utterance.  
 Third, when the meanings of the joined clauses have been made clear by means of 
interpretation and the correspondence between the conjunction joining the underlying 
clauses and the logical connective joining the propositions is undisputed, an issue may 
arise as to the semantic meaning of the conjunction used. In English, for instance, the 
conjunction “and”, which corresponds to the logical connective AND, may be attributed 
the meaning of “and then” in certain instances. While its function as a logical connective 
is undisputed (both joined propositions must be true for the meaning of the sentence to 
be true), its semantic meaning, relevant for determining the utterance meaning, is not. 
Take, for example, the following sentence: “Foreman got hit by Ali and was knocked 
out”.270 It does not have the same meaning as “Foreman was knocked out and got hit by 
Ali”, although from a propositional calculus standpoint they are equivalent, since in the 
                                                     
267 Synonymy is the relation that characterizes every proper definition, where the defined term and the 
definition itself are synonyms in every world (and time) where the definition applies. 
268 For ease of presentation, the references in Article 4(1) OECD Model to States, political subdivision and 
local authorities, as well as the contents of the second sentence of the very same paragraph and of paragraphs 
4(2) and 4(3) are disregarded in the example. 
269 In fact, as previously illustrated, the scope of propositional calculus is limited to ascertaining the truth-value 
relations among propositions and does not concern the extraction of such propositions from the underlying 
clauses. 
270 Ali v Foreman, Kinshasa (Zaire), 20 October 1974. 
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first sentence “and” implies a causal/temporal relation between being hit and being 
knocked out, which is absent in the second sentence. This implied meaning is outside the 
scope of propositional calculus, since it concerns a different level of analysis, i.e. that of 
the semantic and pragmatic meaning of sentences.  
 
4.2.3.2. Determining the utterance meaning (2): implicature relations 
 
At the semantic and pragmatic level of analysis, implicature relations play a role that, at 
least for its significance, corresponds to that played by entailment relations in the 
propositional calculus.  
  
An implicature is a meaning of a sentence that, although not entailed by the propositions 
composing the sentence, is implied on the basis of the cooperative principles and the 
overall context.  
 Implicatures may be more or less strong. They are considered to be strong 
whenever they cannot be canceled or denied without creating incoherence in the 
sentence meaning. In the opposite case, they are considered weak implicatures.  
 
Strong implicatures are generally implicated by the very same conventional meaning of 
the lexemes composing the sentence, in particular by the meaning of certain 
conjunctions and adverbs within it. These are the kind of implicatures identified by Grice 
as conventional implicatures.271  
 For example, the sentence “He is Italian; he is, therefore, brave” conventionally 
implicates that the speaker believes that Italians are usually brave.272 This implicature is 
conventional since it is determined by the conventional meaning of the adverb 
“therefore”. It is noteworthy that the fact that the person spoken of is Italian does not 
entail that he is brave, since it could turn out that he is a coward although he continues to 
be Italian; at the same time, it cannot be said that the meaning of the sentence “He is 
Italian; he is, therefore, brave” entails the proposition “Italian are always (or 
generally)273 brave” since, if the latter is false, the former anyway proves true whenever 
the person spoken of is Italian and is brave. The adverb “therefore” is not a logical 
connective; however, since it is used to express a relation of consequence, it creates a 
conventional implicature.  
 Take the following sentence: “Sally got pregnant, but Max was pleased”.274 From 
a propositional calculus perspective, the conjunction “but” is equivalent to “and”, in the 
sense that both conjunctions correspond to the logical connective AND and, therefore, 
                                                     
271 H. P. Grice, "Logic and conversation", in P. Cole and J. Morgan (eds.), Syntax and Semantics, vol. 3. Speech 
Acts (New York: Academic Press, 1975), 41 et seq., at 44-45. 
272 A similar example is found in H. P. Grice, "Logic and conversation", in P. Cole and J. Morgan (eds.), 
Syntax and Semantics, vol. 3. Speech Acts (New York: Academic Press, 1975), 41 et seq., at 44-45.  
273 Here a difficulty would arise with reference to the attribution of a truth-value to a proposition where the 
adverb generally is used. This issue, however, lies outside the scope of the present study. 
274 Example taken from K. Allan, Natural Language Semantics (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), p. 190. 
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bear its truth function. However, “but” conventionally implicates some sort of contrast, 
unexpectedness, or adversity. In the above sentence, “but” conventionally implicates that 
Max was expected not to be happy that Sally is pregnant.  
 These two examples have in common that, if the implicatures did not hold true or 
were denied,275 the main sentences would somehow appear incoherent.  
 
Weak implicatures, on the other hand, are generally the effect of the overall context of 
the utterance; in this perspective, they correspond to those identified by Grice as 
conversational implicatures.276  
 Consider the following sentence: “I have to work on my PhD thesis”. Per se it 
does not implicate anything, apart from the fact that the person speaking is a PhD 
student, working on his PhD thesis. However, when we take into account its overall 
context and the cooperative principles, the result may be that such an utterance 
implicates additional information. For instance, if the co-text includes a previous 
question made by a different speaker, such as “Do we watch the Cavs playing tonight?”, 
then the following “I have to work on my PhD thesis” seems conversationally to 
implicate that the PhD student is not going to watch the Cavs’ game.  
 However, contrary to what observed in respect of conventional implicatures, 
conversational implicatures may be canceled or denied without creating incoherence. In 
the above example, if the PhD student completes the sentence by saying “but, you know 
buddy, the Cavs are the Cavs”, this implicates that he is going to watch the Cavs’s game; 
at the same time, the denial of the previous implicature does not create any incoherence, 
taken the dialogue as a whole. Thus, a conversational implicature is a pragmatic and 
inductive inference determined on the basis of the utterance meaning that appears the 
most probable given the overall context.277  
 
Conversational implicatures are particularly relevant for interpretative purposes because 
they represent the principal device for the speaker to minimize the quantity of language 
used, i.e. to underspecify the meaning of the utterance, and for the hearers to supplement 
the utterance in order to understand the meaning of the message conveyed and to be 
aware of the reaction expected by the speaker.278 For this reason, here the author briefly 
analyses the most common types of conversational implicature, which are quantity 
conversational implicatures.279  
                                                     
275 For instance: Italians are generally considered not to be brave; Max is expected to be very happy of Sally 
being pregnant. 
276 H. P. Grice, "Logic and conversation", in P. Cole and J. Morgan (eds.), Syntax and Semantics, vol. 3. Speech 
Acts (New York: Academic Press, 1975), 41 et seq., at 45. 
277 It may therefore be concluded that, while conventional implicatures are mainly semantic-based, since 
determined by the conventional meaning of the lexemes (in particular conjunctions and adverbs) used in the 
utterance, conversational implicatures are mainly pragmatic-based, since they are determined by the overall 
context of the utterance (including the operation of the cooperative principles).  
278 K. Allan, Natural Language Semantics (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), p. 192. 
279 On quantity conversational implicatures and their subdivision into two distinct types, see H. P. Grice, 
"Logic and conversation", in P. Cole and J. Morgan (eds.), Syntax and Semantics, vol. 3. Speech Acts (New 
York: Academic Press, 1975), 41 et seq., at 45 et seq. See also K. Allan, Natural Language Semantics (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers, 2001), pp. 196 et seq. 




Quantity conversational implicatures may be divided into two types.  
 The first one is generally known as scalar implicature280 and consists in the 
following: given any ordinate scale in the form [E1, E2, E3, …, En], if the speaker 
asserts the value/item Ei in the utterance, that assertion conversationally implicates that 
values/items greater than Ei are not referred to by means of that utterance. For example, 
if Rita says “I have two cats”, this conversationally implicates that she does not have 
three or more cats. If, as a matter of fact, she has four, although she uttered a logical 
truth, she could be accused of speaking “falsely” since she has failed to observe the 
conventions of the normal use of the language (cooperative principles) and has misled 
the hearers. Scalar implicatures, as any other conversational implicature, may be 
cancelled (denied) without creating incoherence in the utterance.  
The quantity implicatures of the second type, known as preference conditions,281 
are direct consequences of the quantity maxim of the cooperative principles, according to 
which the speaker is supposed to give no more and no less information than is required 
for the hearer to properly interpret the utterance. These implicatures are therefore 
strongly based on common ground, i.e. on shared knowledge and expectations in a 
specific community. Preference conditions based on common ground are thus generally 
implicated by the utterance, unless an indication of the contrary is given. The following 
is an instance of preference conditions. The utterance “I am looking at a bird”, said in an 
ordinary conversation between two men in the street (i.e. non-specialists, such as non-
ornithologists) conversationally implicates that the speaker is looking at a bipedal animal 
with beak and feathers and which is capable of flying.282 This holds true unless an 
indication of the contrary is given by the overall context283 and although the listeme 
“bird” may also denote animals incapable to fly (e.g. penguins).  
It appears, therefore, that quantity implicatures may be, and often are, influenced 
by the conventional prototypes, within a certain community, of the listemes used by the 
speaker. Similarly, the use of the verb “walk” conversationally implicates “walk 
forward”, so that, if walking in any other direction is intended, that direction must be 
made explicit. Also, the use of the lexeme “transazione” in a contract concluded under 
Italian civil law conversationally implicates that the contracting parties intended to refer 
to “a legal agreement between the same parties that may be reached, by means of the 
reciprocal waiving of claims, in order to avoid a lawsuit” and not to a “sale” or any other 
“business transaction” between the parties,284 since (i) the former is the generally agreed 
technical (legal) meaning of the lexeme “transazione” within the community of lawyers 
and (ii) a contract concluded under Italian civil law is a legal agreement, generally 
                                                     
280 On scalar implicatures, L. R. Horn, A Natural History of Negation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1989), p. 232.  
281 On preference conditions, R. Jackendoff, Semantic Structures (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990), pp. 34 et seq. 
282 A similar example is given by Allan (see K. Allan, Natural Language Semantics (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishers, 2001), p. 197). 
283 For example, by the following statement by the very same speaker: “It is a penguin!”. 
284 The term “transazione” is currently used in the Italian day-to-day and business language in order to refer to 
a business transaction, in particular the transfer of a right against consideration. 
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concluded through the intervention of lawyers.  
 
Finally, conversational implicatures are relevant in order to reduce the ambiguity of 
utterances since, in the common case where a certain expression appears to be 
polysemic:  
(i) the cooperative principles, in particular the relation and the manner maxims, 
lead the hearers to presume that the speaker intended to convey a coherent and 
clear message;  
(ii) the coherence and clearness of the message are assessed and determined on 
the basis of the overall context;  
(iii) based on the above, the hearers substitute the few senses that appear 
reasonable in the overall context285 for the ambiguous expression at stake. In 
many instances, these senses amount to one only.  
 
4.2.3.3. Determining the utterance meaning (3): presuppositions 
 
Another interesting point, in the analysis of the utterance meaning, relates to 
presuppositions.  
 Presuppositions may be analysed and classified both in terms of entailment 
(propositional calculus) and in terms of implicatures (both conventional and 
conversational). The actual analysis and classification depends on the intrinsic feature of 
the specific presupposition at stake, as well as on the purpose of the analysis conducted.  
 For instance, the proposition “my bike is blue” entails the proposition “I do have 
a bike”. One could generally conclude that also the proposition “my bike is not blue” 
entails the proposition “I do have a bike”. However, this is not always the case. The 
issue here is the ambiguity of the clause “my bike is not blue”, which may expresses 
both the propositions “I do have a bike that is not blue” and “I do not have any bike, not 
even a blue one”. If the clause “my bike is not blue” is deemed to express the former 
proposition, then it is true that it entails the proposition “I do have a bike”; if it is 
deemed to express the latter proposition, then this is not the case. The issue, therefore, 
may become that of determining the meaning of the relevant clauses, i.e. which 
propositions correspond to those clauses. This issue may be solved by means of 
pragmatic analysis, taking into account the cooperative principles and in light of the 
overall context. For example, in the above instance, one could conclude that the clause 
“my bike is not blue” presupposes the proposition “I have a bike” since, unless evidence 
to the contrary is given by the overall context, the maxims of quantity, manner and 
relation would require the speaker to clearly state that he does not have any bike at all, if 
that was the case. However, as for every conversational implicature, the speaker could 
cancel that implicature by stating, for example, that in fact he does not have any bike at 
all. 
 
                                                     
285 I.e. the senses that make the message conveyed both coherent and clear in light of the overall context. 
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4.3. Final remarks: the role of grammar and semantics in the formulation and 
interpretation of utterances  
 
The analysis performed in this section leads the author to devise the following two 
interconnected conclusions.  
 
First, in formulating the utterance, the speaker is subject to certain potential restrictions, 
caused by the necessity that the hearers properly understand its meaning and, therefore, 
that the speaker’s message is effectively conveyed.  
 These potential restrictions are primarily of a grammatical nature, in the sense 
that the lexemes, phrases, clauses and sentences that compose the utterance must fulfill 
the conditions of being well formed of the community language for the hearers to be able 
to establish the utterance meaning.  
 In addition, when choosing the lexemes to be used and the structure of the clauses 
and sentences, the speaker is potentially restricted:  
(i) by the semantic specifications of the listemes and  
(ii) by the inferences that he expects the hearers will draw from the overall 
context of the utterance on the basis of the cooperative principles.  
Anomalies from a grammatical, semantic, or pragmatic perspective may block the ability 
of the hearers to determine the utterance meaning and, thus, could make impossible for 
the utterance to convey the intended message.  
 These restrictions, however, are just potential, in the sense that they create the 
risk for the speaker that the hearers cannot properly understand the message he wants to 
convey. The actual effect of these potential restrictions, that is to say the fact that the 
above-mentioned elements actually did operate as restrictions, making the speaker fail in 
conveying the intended message or obliging him to modify ex post the utterance 
meaning by means of an additional utterance, may, however, be assessed only 
synthetically and a posteriori, i.e. on the basis of the actual structure of the utterance and 
of the actual overall context thereof.286 Consider the following instance: “Pizza a ate 
Paul night yesterday”. In terms of orthodox English grammar, this is a very badly 
structured sentence. One should conclude that grammar restrictions would prevent the 
readers from understanding it. However, the author imagines that most readers attributed 
to that sentence the same meaning they would have attributed to the sentence “Paul ate a 
pizza yesterday night”. This is because the semantic and pragmatic information provided 
by the overall context (i.e. world spoken of: eating; time spoken of: the past, probably 
yesterday night; encyclopedic knowledge: pizza is a well-known Italian kind of food and 
Paul is probably the name of a person, who could like to eat pizza; etc.) is, quantity and 
quality-wise, enough in order to attribute to the former sentence such a meaning. 
 
                                                     
286 Allan correctly points out that the a priori drafting of a list of actual restrictions (of a grammatical, semantic 
and pragmatic nature) would entail the need to try every conceivable combination of listemes in every 
conceivable context, such a task being at best impracticable and at worst impossible (see K. Allan, Natural 
Language Semantics (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), p. 256). 
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Second, in determining the utterance meaning, the hearers take into account the rules of 
grammar, in particular those of morphology and syntax, conventionally agreed upon 
within the community language and make the inferences that they are expected to draw, 
on the basis of the cooperative principles, from the semantic specifications of the 
lexemes used in the utterance and its overall context. These inferences generally takes 
the forms of implicatures, both conventional, i.e. determined by the conventional 
meaning of the lexemes used in the utterance, and conversational, i.e. pragmatic 
inferences based on the overall context.  
 In contrast, propositional calculus has a more limited relevance for the purpose of 
determining the utterance meaning, both because its scope is limited to truth-value 
analysis, i.e. the assessment of whether a sentence composed by propositions joined by 
logical connectives is true in the specific world and time spoken of, and because it 
heavily relies on implicatures and pragmatic analysis in order to determine the meaning 
of the clauses (the propositions) to which the propositional calculus must be applied.  
 
4.4. The special case of sentences that cover the future 
 
When an utterance is used in order to describe or cover the future, there is a 
supplementary factor, in addition to those illustrated in the previous sections, which may 
contribute to increasing its ambiguity and vagueness. In such a case, in fact, a 
discrepancy usually exists between the general intention of the speaker,287 on the one 
hand, and the situation described in his utterance, on the other. This discrepancy is 
difficult to avoid in many instances.  
 
The key reason for such a discrepancy is that human thought generally works by means 
of prototypes, exactly as language does.  
 When a person wants to convey a certain message (for example, a rule of 
behavior to be applied in the future), which corresponds to his general intention, he 
instinctively thinks about the prototypical situation(s) to which his message is intended 
to refer and, consequently, he builds his utterance around that prototypical situation(s). 
However, this does not mean that the content of the message he wanted to convey was 
limited to the prototypical situation(s) he referred to in his utterance.  
 If a mother tells her 14-year-old daughter that she cannot go to her first high 
school party wearing a short skirt, this does not mean that she intended to allow her 
daughter to go there wearing mini-pants. The author assumes that the vast majority of 
parents would agree on this inference.  
 
As discussed in section 3.3.2, prototype semantics has demonstrated the fundamental 
role played by prototypes in the choice of the listemes and expressions actually used by 
the speaker and stereotype semantics has even led to the conclusion that the intension of 
a specific listeme is based on the minimum set of stereotypical features that the typical 
                                                     
287 I.e. his vision of the future. 
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denotata of that listemes present.  
 By analogy, it may be asserted that prototypical situations commonly constitute 
the models around which the speaker instinctively constructs his utterances. The scope 
of the prototypical situations may more or less approximate the abstract scope of the 
general intention of the speaker. However, it is generally difficult (sometimes 
impossible) and time-consuming for the speaker to determine a priori the gap existing 
between the scope of the former and that of the latter, which makes the effort of 
anticipating all the possible relevant situations substantially unworkable.  
 Therefore, although it is viable for the speaker to more analyse his general 
intention in greater depth in order to find better prototypical situations thereof,288 in 
many instances seeking all prototypical situations whose aggregate scope matches 
exactly with the scope of the speaker’s general intention proves to be in vain. The reason 
for such a difficulty lies in the fact that the very same speaker is unable to properly 
express his general intention and to anticipate all possible future instances, although, 
where put before an actual case, he would without doubt be capable of determining 
whether or not the specific item falls within the scope of his general intention. As St. 
Augustine acknowledged with reference to the concept of time, “Quid est ergo tempus? 
Si nemo ex me quaerat, scio; si quaerenti explicare velim, nescio”.289  
Moreover, the prototypical situations that come to mind and that are thus used by 
the speaker in his utterances vary greatly according to the overall context of those 
utterances, since they somewhat depend on the world (and time) spoken of, on the co-
text of the utterances and on common ground.290 This may contribute to making even 
more difficult for the hearers to determine the general intention of the speaker, especially 
where significant differences exist between the encyclopedic knowledge of the hearers 
and that of the speaker at the moment of producing the utterance.  
 
The phenomenon just described often determines a status of uncertainty whenever the 
speaker’s task is that of formulating generally applicable commands and rules of 
behavior.291 Thus, it characterizes and contributes to determining the ambiguity and 
vagueness of the law.292 
                                                     
288 Even a “general definition” may be seen as a prototype, with a very broad scope, of a general intention. A 
clear instance is the definition of resident person in art. 4(1) OECD MC, the latter being a very elaborated 
prototype of the general intention of the OECD in respect of the concept of “residence for treaty purposes”. 
The existence of a discrepancy between the general intention and the prototype (Article 4(1) definition) is 
proved by the large amount of academic discussion and literature on what should fall within the scope of such 
a prototype (definition).  
289 Augustinus, Confessionum Libri Tredicim, Liber Undecimus, c. 14 (see Augustinus, Confessionum Libri 
Tredicim (Citta Nuova Editrice) – available on-line at http://www.augustinus.it/latino/confessioni/index.htm). 
The excerpt may be translated as follows: “What is then time? If nobody asks me, I know; if I have to explain 
to somebody asking me, I don’t”. 
290 In particular, they may vary depending on the encyclopedic knowledge shared by the speaker and the 
hearers. 
291 On the relation between “command” and “rule” and on the connected legal issues, H. L. A. Hart, The 
Concept of Law (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), Chapters I through III.  
292 See, with regard to the ontological vagueness of the rules of law, H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 124-135. 
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In fact, the persons drafting a certain law provision293 in most cases cannot 
properly anticipate all the situations they would be willing to regulate by means of that 
provision. In such instances, where a situation occurs that is seemingly outside the scope 
of that provision, the choice for the interpreters,294 from a general theory of law 
standpoint, is either (i) to consider that situation as non-regulated by that specific piece 
of law, which means that the situation at stake usually ends up being regulated by other 
provisions of law (including general principles of law, customs, ex aequo et bono) or (ii) 
to consider that situation as regulated by an extensive or analogical application of that 
provision. The latter solution may encounter the approval of the community, where it 
may be reasonably inferred that the situation falls within the scope of that provision as 
ascertainable from the analysis of the overall structure, content and purpose thereof.  
Consider, in this respect, the following instance. The regulation of the new 
greenhouse of your city contains the following provision: “birds cannot be introduced in 
the greenhouse”. You are one of the persons working at the greenhouse and, being 
allowed by the regulation to propose new plants, insects and animals to be put therein, 
you propose five bats. Your supervisor, however, believes that the regulation does not 
allow bats to be put in the greenhouse and rejects your proposal. One might reasonably 
wonder whether the supervisor is right in this respect. On the one hand, the intension of 
the listeme “bird” does not seem to include bats; therefore, it might be argued that your 
proposal was not in breach of the applicable regulation. On the other hand, it could be 
inferred from the overall context of the relevant article of the regulation that the 
reference to birds should be intended as a reference to “all flying animals that, due to 
their size and potential speed, are capable to damage the air system plants attached to the 
ceiling of the greenhouse”. Whether it is reasonable to construe the relevant article in 
this manner is a matter that depends on the overall context, i.e. the whole content of the 
regulation, the type of air system plants actually installed, the shared encyclopedic 
knowledge of the drafters and the potential addressees of the regulation, etc. In any case, 
it does not seem prima facie absurd to assume that the lexeme “bird” has been employed 
in that provision because it denotes the prototype of the flying animals whose presence 
in the greenhouse the drafters intended to prohibit.  
 
All in all, finding out the utterance meaning of any legal provision exactly consists in 
assessing what is its most reasonable meaning295 on the basis of the actual text thereof, 
the cooperative principles and all other elements of the overall context.  
 The result of such an inferential process is not determinable a priori and, as has 
already been noted in the previous section, it may vary according to the person carrying 
it out since, where items of evidence exist in favor of more than one construction of the 
relevant legal provision, as is often the case, such items may be weighted differently by 
                                                     
293 E.g. the legislator with reference to a statute, the contracting parties with reference to a contract, the 
contracting States with reference to a treaty, etc. 
294 I.e. the “hearers” of the utterance.  
295 I.e. either the one incorporating the above-proposed meaning of the lexeme “birds” (all flying animals that, 
due to their size and potential speed, are capable to damage the air system plants attached to the ceiling of the 
greenhouse) or any alternative reasonable meaning thereof.   
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different people for the purpose of determining the utterance meaning.  
 As a matter of fact, in most cases there will be a person competent to decide on 
this and other similar matters, who will settle the issue on the basis of “his” established 
meaning of the provision, as determined by discretionarily assessing the relative weights 








CHAPTER 3 – NORMATIVE ANALYSIS AND NECESSITY OF A FORMAL 
APPROACH  
 
1. A normative theory on treaty interpretation based on semantic analysis  
 
By transposing the results of the above semantic analysis in the field of international 
treaties, the author attempts in this section to establish the fundamental principles of a 
normative legal theory on treaty interpretation. Such principles, which are described 
below, should operate as a compass for the interpreters whenever they are construing 
treaties and arguing for their chosen interpretations. 
 As clarified in section 1.2 of the Introduction, however, the drafting of such 
principles represents only the first step in the process of establishing a useful and 
accurate normative legal theory on treaty interpretation under international law. It is, in 
fact, the author’s belief that positive legal theory may produce indirect constraints to 
normative legal theory by:  
(i) setting significantly high costs (in terms of legal uncertainty, infringement of 
legal expectations, social and cultural transitions) to be met in order to substitute 
the state of affairs that could be proposed in the normative legal theory (first-best 
solution) for the status quo; and 
(ii) limiting the feasible set of legal rules and policies that may be implemented. 
In the following parts of this study a positive legal analysis is carried out with a view to 
identifying the generally accepted constructions of Articles 31-33 VCLT and Article 
3(2) OECD Model, or, at least, the outer borders beyond which any proposed 
interpretation of those articles would be rejected by the vast majority of international 
lawyers. Since the purpose of the present research is to suggest how the interpreter 
should now tackle and disentangle the most common types of issues emerging from the 
interpretation of multilingual tax treaties under international law, the author is not 
willing to accept the drawbacks of a normative legal theory infringing the generally 
accepted rules and principles of treaty interpretation derived from Articles 31-33 VCLT 
and Article 3(2) OECD Model, i.e. that such a normative legal theory: 
 (i) could establish itself only in the very long run,  
(ii) would cause a protracted period characterized by more legal uncertainty than 
in the current state of affairs and 
(iii) in the worse case scenario, would be generally regarded as utopian, since too 
detached from those articles to be considered a reasonable interpretation thereof, 
thus lacking the legal status to be applied in practice as long as those articles 
remained in force.  
This implies that the author’s normative legal theory must be shaped so as to fit within 
the generally accepted borders of a perceived reasonable interpretation of Articles 31-33 
VCLT and Article 3(2) OECD Model. Where the principles of interpretation inferred 
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from the semantic analysis appear to lie outside those outer borders, such principles will 
be disregarded for the purpose of setting up the author’s normative (semantics-based) 
legal theory of treaty interpretation. On the contrary, where they appear to fit within 
those borders, they will be confirmed and used as cornerstones of that normative legal 
theory. 
 
Listed below are the general principles of treaty interpretation drawn by the author from 
the semantic analysis carried out in the previous chapter. 
 
(i) For the purpose of legal theories, interpretation should not be intended as the intimate, 
unfathomable mental process that leads the interpreter to establish the treaty utterance 
meaning, such process generally being purely intuitive and synthetic and, most 
importantly, inscrutable. Nor should it be intended as the result of such a process. In 
contrast, the term “interpretation” should be used to denote those processes that are 
subject to external knowledge, i.e. the a posteriori analytical written (or oral) arguments 
used by the interpreter to support the meaning he attributed to the legal text: 
interpretation as a rhetorical means to uphold a thesis on the basis of the available 
premises (elements and items of evidence). 
 
(ii) The goal of treaty interpretation is to establish the message (meaning) that the 
contracting States’ representatives intended to be conveyed to the potential addressees of 
the treaty. In different terms, the quest of the interpreter is directed towards the intention 
of the parties. 
 
(iii) However, the meaning that the interpreter must look for is obviously not the private 
meaning thought of by the contracting States’ representatives when concluding the 
treaty, since that meaning is a private one and, as such, cannot be known by anybody 
other than the representatives themselves. The only possible object of the interpretative 
process is the utterance meaning of the treaty text, i.e. the meaning(s) that any 
reasonable interpreter would assign to that text, as expression of the intention of the 
parties, given:  
(a) the various meanings that the grammar and the semantic specifications of the 
terms used in the treaty allow it to have and  
(b) the interpreter’s analysis of and inferences from the overall context.  
Thus treaty interpretation is purported to establish and argue for the meaning that most 
fairly and reasonably could be said to have been intended by the parties (the utterance 
meaning). 
 
(iv) The overall context is made up of all those elements and items of evidence that are 
helpful for the purpose of determining and arguing for the utterance meaning. The 
overall context in particular includes: 
(a) the subject matter of the treaty and its object and purpose [world spoken of]; 
(b) the international legal context of which the treaty is part, the legal systems of 
the States concluding the treaty, the encyclopedic (legal) knowledge of the 
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persons involved in its drafting, the expected encyclopedic (legal) knowledge 
of the addressees of the treaty, the commonly accepted principles of behavior 
in the international community (including any cooperative principle of 
communication), every reasonable inference that the drafters and the 
addresses might be expected to derive from the above [common ground]; 
(c) the text that precedes and succeeds the text to be interpreted [co-text].  
 
(v) None of the elements that constitute the overall context is inherently superior (or 
inferior) to the others. The weight that any specific element of the overall context may 
(or should) be given for the purpose of establishing and arguing for the utterance 
meaning depends on the circumstances of the case. 
 
(vi) The interpreter should construe the treaty text on the basis of all implicatures that 
may be derived from the text and the overall context, i.e. by duly taking into account 
those meanings which, although not entailed by the text as such, are implied by the very 
same text and the overall context. In order to determine such implicatures, the interpreter 
should take into consideration the following generally accepted cooperative principles of 
communication (together with any other principle accepted within the international 
community):  
(a) the parties are expected to give (no more and) no less than the information 
required by the addressees in order to properly interpret the treaty;  
(b) the parties are expected to be sincere and truthful;  
(c) the parties are expected to include in the treaty provisions that are relevant in 
the overall context;  
(d) the parties are expected to be as clear, unambiguous, brief and coherent 
(systematic) as possible.  
 
(vii) The relevance of the treaty text must not be overestimated. In fact, like any other 
human-drafted texts, treaty texts are: 
(a) sets of underspecified clauses that need to be expanded by semantic and 
pragmatic inferences, in particular implicatures, based on the relevant 
lexicon, grammar and overall context; 
(b) inherently characterized by ambiguity and vagueness. 
 
(viii) The relevance of grammatical constraints must not be overestimated. Since it is 
possible that the treaty text is affected by grammatical anomalies and errors, nothing 
precludes the interpreter from establishing and arguing for an utterance meaning that 
appears prima facie to be irreconcilable with the grammatical structure of the text to be 
construed. 
 
(ix) Where the interpreter may reasonably establish that a particular jargon (e.g. legal 
jargon) has been used in drafting the treaty, a plausible presumption exists that, among 
the various concepts theoretically corresponding to the terms used, the parties have 
chosen the ones whose correspondence to the terms is typical of jargon used (e.g. the 
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legal jargon meaning of a certain term).  
Various kinds of evidence exist that may lead the interpreter to conclude that a specific 
jargon has been used by the parties, the most relevant being: the subject matter of the 
treaty, the identity and capacity of the treaty drafters, the identity and capacity of the 
expected addressees, the object and purpose of the treaty, the extensive use of idiomatic 
terms and expressions specific of that jargon. 
 
(x) In establishing the utterance meaning of a treaty provision, the interpreter should 
consider that the contracting States’ representatives in most cases choose the terms to be 
employed in the treaty on the basis of the approximate overlapping between the 
prototypical items denoted by those terms and the items that they intended to be covered 
by those terms. The approximation is due to the fact that it is generally very difficult and 
time-consuming (if not impossible) for the contracting States’ representatives to 
anticipate all possible cases in which they intend to apply the treaty and, therefore, the 
choice of the treaty terms is based on the items that the representatives had actually 
anticipated at the time of the treaty’s conclusion.  
For this reason, it is possible that the generally accepted intension of a term used in a 
treaty results in both: 
(a) too broad a meaning as compared to the parties’ intended denotata of that 
term, since the former includes peripheral (non-prototypical) items that the 
parties did not intend to be denoted by that term as they do not have the 
characteristics that warrant their inclusion; 
(b) too narrow a meaning as compared to the parties’ intended denotata of that 
term, since the former does not include items that parties intended to be 
denoted by that term as they have the characteristics that warrant their 
inclusion (characteristics similar to those of the prototypic denotata of the 
term). 
Therefore, the interpreter should always carefully consider whether it seems reasonable 
that the parties would have intended:  
(a) that certain items, which do not have the relevant characteristics of the 
prototypical items denoted by the relevant treaty term, were excluded from 
the scope of that term, although being within the generally accepted intension 
thereof, and 
(b) that certain items, which present some relevant characteristics in common 
with the prototypical items denoted by the relevant treaty term, were included 
in the scope of that term, although not being within the generally accepted 
intension thereof.  
An example of (a) is represented by the possible exclusion from the scope of the term 
“boat”, as used in Article 6(2) OECD Model, of a vessel permanently anchored in one of 
Amsterdam canals and exclusively used as a dwelling. An example of (b) is represented 
by the possible inclusion in the scope of the term “alienation”, as used in Article 13(1) 
OECD Model, of the creation by the owner (or the transfer) of a usufruct right on an 
immovable property in favor of (to) another person. 
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(xi) In addition, since cultural and social differences among national communities may 
lead to different partitions of the conceptual field by different national communities 
through their respective relevant concepts, it is possible that when the contracting States’ 
representatives agree on a certain term to be used in a treaty, each of them actually looks 
at that term through the glasses of his own partition of the conceptual field, i.e. he prima 
facie attributes to that term the meaning (concept) that such a term, or a similar term in 
his own language, has within his own encyclopedic knowledge, which in turn is strongly 
influenced by his national culture. This phenomenon, which contributes to increasing the 
vagueness of treaty terms, is particularly acute where legal jargon terms are at stake, due 
to the frequent discrepancies among the meanings that the same, or similar, terms have 
under the laws of different States. 
For instance, it is quite common that the meanings of terms used in two different 
languages in order to denote the same items often overlap without being fully identical. 
In this regard, it is possible that in language 1 items A and B are denoted by term “X” 
and item C is denoted by term “Y”, while in language 2 item A is denoted by term “Z” 
and items B and C are denoted by term “W”.296 If item A is the prototype of terms “X” 
and “Z” in the two respective languages and the treaty employs term “X” in its authentic 
text, the representative of the State using language 2 will probably attribute prima facie 
to term “X” the meaning that the corresponding term “Z” (which is the term sharing its 
prototype with treaty term “X”) has under his language. This raises the issue of what the 
agreement among the parties is (if an agreement exists) on whether or not item B is 
denoted by treaty term “X”. 
In these cases, the interpreter should determine the utterance meaning by: 
(a) first assessing whether the parties intended the relevant term to be attributed 
a uniform meaning by all contracting States, or whether they intended each 
State to interpret that term on the basis of its own concepts; 
(b) in case a uniform meaning was intended by the parties, attributing a 
particular relevance to the overall context and to the prototypical items 
common to all or most national concepts; 
(c) in case a uniform meaning was not intended by the parties, determining what 
(type of) national concept the parties meant to be used for the purpose of 
construing the treaty term. 
 
(xii) Any subsequent act of the parties that directly or indirectly may shed light on the 
meaning that they attribute to the treaty should be taken into account by the interpreter in 
his quest for the utterance meaning. 
 
 
                                                     
296 Moreover, the difficulties are not only generated by the different division of “the same” data, but also by the 
fact that the data may be different, since starting from the same basic data certain communities build up 
synthetically-derived additional data while others do not (or do it differently); this phenomenon is generally 
due to the effect on the cognitive process of social and cultural differences (including differences in the 
encyclopedic knowledge). 
PART I: CHAPTER 3 
 102 
2. The impact of the semantic analysis on the interpretation of 
multilingual treaties  
 
The semantic analysis that has led the author to establish the above fundamental 
principles of treaty interpretation plays a significant role as well in respect of 
multilingual treaty interpretation. The two main reasons for its relevance in that respect 
may be summarized as follows. 
 First, the interpretation of a multilingual treaty is nothing more than the 
interpretation of its authentic texts. Since there does not appear to be any intrinsic 
difference between the sole text of a monolingual treaty and one of the authentic texts of 
a multilingual treaty (the only differences being extrinsic, i.e. that the latter text is part of 
a wider group of texts), there is no reason to consider the principles of interpretation 
established in the previous section inapplicable with regard to each authentic text of a 
multilingual treaty taken in isolation.   
 Second, in order to remove a prima facie discrepancy in meanings between two 
(or more) authentic texts of a multilingual treaty the interpreter needs a compass: he 
needs to know what he is supposed to look for and how he is supposed to do it. This 
compass is represented by the principles of interpretation established in the previous 
section, which provide for guidance on how the interpreter should determine and argue 
for the utterance meaning of the treaty. In fact, the purpose of the treaty interpreter 
remains establishing and arguing for the utterance meaning of the treaty, notwithstanding 
the number of texts in which the latter is authenticated. In this respect, the act of 
removing the prima facie discrepancy in meanings between two (or more) authentic texts 
of a multilingual treaty coincides with the act of establishing the utterance meaning of 
that treaty.  
 
Starting from these two basic remarks, the author has developed the following principles.  
 
(i) For the purpose of interpreting one authentic text of a multilingual treaty, the other 
authentic texts are part of the overall context and, therefore, may be used in order to 
construe the former.  
 
(ii) However, since the relevance of the treaty text(s) must not be overestimated, where 
the parties have agreed that more than one treaty text is authentic, it is reasonable to infer 
that those parties intended to allow treaty interpretation to be based on any one of such 
authentic texts, taken in isolation, together with the elements of the overall context other 
than the other authentic texts. To put it differently, it is reasonable to assume that the 
parties to a multilingual treaty generally did not intend to oblige the interpreter to read 
and compare all authentic texts for the purpose of construing the treaty. 
 
(iii) The interpretation of a multilingual treaty on the basis of just one of its authentic 
texts is not different from the interpretation of a monolingual treaty. In this case, the 
principles of interpretation established in the previous section also apply to multilingual 
treaties.  




(iv) Any alleged discrepancy in meaning among the authentic texts of a treaty is just 
apparent, since the treaty is an instrument for the parties to convey a single message and, 
therefore, it must always be attributed a single utterance meaning, notwithstanding the 
number of its authentic texts. 
 
(v) Where an alleged discrepancy in meaning among the authentic texts of treaty is 
pointed out, the interpreter must remove it by establishing the single utterance meaning 
of all authentic texts. In order to determine and argue for that utterance meaning, the 
principles established in the previous section should be applied; in particular, the 
relevance of the treaty texts for that purpose should not be overestimated. 
 
(vi) Since the quest of the interpreter is directed at establishing the common intention of 
parties, it is reasonable for him to attribute, in the case of a prima facie discrepancy in 
meaning among the authentic treaty texts, a particular relevance to the text that has been 
originally drafted by the contracting States’ representatives and on which the consensus 
among them was formed, for the purpose of removing that prima facie discrepancy. This 
holds particularly true where evidence exists that the other authentic texts are subsequent 
translations prepared by persons that did not participate in the treaty negotiation and 
conclusion. 
 
(vii) The interpreter may take into account non-authentic language versions of a treaty, 
such as the official translations thereof produced by the contracting States, for the 
purpose of construing it. The interpretative weight that the interpreter should attribute to 
such language versions varies depending on the available evidence that they may 
contribute to ascertain the common intention of the parties (for instance, the fact that 
both official translations produced by the contracting States of a bilateral treaty seem to 
suggest the same construction of a certain treaty provision, which appears, in contrast, 
ambiguous on the basis of the sole authentic text).  
   
(viii) Where the treaty provides that a specific text has to prevail in cases of discrepancy 
in meanings among the authentic texts (the prevailing text), it appears reasonable to 
assume that the parties intended the utterance meaning of that text to prevail only where 
an interpretation based on the prima facie divergent authentic texts and the overall 
context does not lead the interpreter to convincingly attribute a single utterance meaning 
to all such texts.  
Considering that the various texts of the provision to be interpreted are just one of the 
elements that must be taken into account for the purpose of establishing the utterance 
meaning of that provision, together with the elements of the overall context, and that the 
relevance of the text for treaty interpretation purposes should not be overestimated, it 
seems to the author that the recourse to the prevailing text should be quite limited in 
practice.      
 
(ix) Especially in the case of treaties authenticated in all the official languages of the 
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contracting States, the question may arise of whether the parties intended the relevant 
terms used in the various authentic texts to be attributed a uniform meaning by all 
contracting States, or whether they intended each State to interpret those terms in 
accordance with the meaning of the term used in the text authenticated in its own official 
language (i.e. in accordance with its own domestic law meaning of that term, where legal 
jargon terms are at stake). In fact, as previously noted, it is possible that cultural and 
social differences among national communities may lead to different partitions of the 
conceptual field by different national communities through their respective relevant 
concepts and, therefore, that the meanings of terms used in different national languages 
in order to denote the same items often overlap without being fully identical. This 
phenomenon, which contributes to increasing the vagueness of treaty terms, is 
particularly acute where legal jargon terms are at stake. 
Similarly to what mentioned at point (xi) of the previous section, which deals with a 
somewhat analogous case, the interpreter should first answer this question on the basis of 
the treaty text(s) and of overall context and then determine the utterance meaning of the 
relevant treaty provision: 
(a) in case a uniform meaning was intended by the parties, by attributing a 
particular relevance to the overall context and to the prototypical items 
denoted by all or most of the terms employed in the various authentic texts; 
(b) in case a uniform meaning was not intended by the parties, by construing the 
treaty in accordance with the (national) meaning of the term used in the text 
authenticated in the official language of the State applying the treaty, 
provided that such term is similar to the (majority of the) terms used in the 
other authentic texts. Where the test of similarity fails, the reasonable 
suspicion may arise that the parties did not intend the relevant treaty 
provision to be construed in accordance with the (national) meaning of that 
term.  
For the purpose of such a comparison, two terms, construed in accordance with their 
respective national meanings, may be considered similar:  
(a) when they share most of their prototypes, or  
(b) in the case their prototypes are limited to a few or do not coincide, when 
most of the features (including their function in the relevant field of 
knowledge) that characterize such prototypes coincide or, at least, present 
strong similarities.  
What does constitute the majority of the respective prototypes and their distinctive 
features, which have to be taken into account for the purpose of assessing the similarity, 
cannot be said in vacuo. The answer to that question depends upon:  
(a) the nature of and the functions performed by the concepts underlying those 
terms;  
(b) the overall context in which those terms are used (in particular, the object and 
purpose of the provision containing those terms). 
 
For the reasons already discussed in the previous section, the drafting of these principles 
represents only the first step in the process of establishing a useful and accurate 
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normative legal theory on treaty interpretation under international law. In the remainder 
of this study, such principles will be assessed against the background of the generally 
accepted interpretations of Articles 31-33 VCLT and Article 3(2) OECD Model, as 
resulting from the positive legal analysis carried out in the following parts. Where the 
principles of treaty interpretation inferred from the above semantic analysis appear to 
conflict with the generally accepted rules and principles of interpretation derived from 
Articles 31-33 VCLT and Article 3(2) OECD Model, the former principles will be 
disregarded for the purpose of setting up the author’s normative (semantics-based) legal 
theory of treaty interpretation. In contrast, where they appear not to encroach the latter 
rules and principles, they will be confirmed and used as cornerstones of the author’s 
normative legal theory. 
 
3. Liberal theory of politics and international law: the necessity of a 
formal approach 
3.1. The non-existence of a single meaning of treaty provisions: the discretion of 
the interpreter   
 
This study is directed to drawing a sketch, as precisely and comprehensively as possible, 
of the issues that may be faced by a person called on to interpret and apply a multilingual 
tax treaty and, more precisely, those issues that are caused by the multilingualism of that 
treaty.  
Although not limited to highlighting the legal issues at stake, the sketch is of a 
pure descriptive and formal nature. It does not provide the reader with a recipe for 
infallibly solving such issues, since such a magic formula does not exist. However, it 
attempts to provide (i) a clear picture of the nature of the issues arising from the 
interpretation and application of multilingual tax treaties, (ii) the elements and items of 
evidence that may be used to support the possible solutions to such issues and (iii) the 
arguments that may be put forward in order to justify the above solutions on the basis of 
the elements and items of evidence available.  
 
Therefore, in the present study there is no endeavor to find out the “correct” (or best) 
interpretation of specific tax treaty provisions and not even to argue in favor of any 
specific construction thereof, since it is the author’s opinion that such “correct” 
interpretation do not exist per se: there is no such thing as only one possible 
interpretation of a treaty provision.  
First, the interpretation depends on the overall context and, in particular, on the 
legal and factual situations in the relation to which the interpreter is called on to apply 
the treaty provisions.  
Second, with regard to a relatively297 high number of specific legal and factual 
                                                     
297 I.e. relatively as compared to the total number of the legal and factual situations to which the interpreter 
might be willing to test the applicability of the treaty provisions. 
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situations, there is more than one interpretation that could be plausibly argued for on the 
basis of sound reasoning and principles.298 Among such various possible interpretations, 
the relation is not one between a correct interpretation and the other incorrect 
interpretations and not even one that orders them on an objectively graduated scale 
ranging from the worse to the best possible interpretation. The choice of the 
interpretation to be argued for in any specific case is a subjective one, in the sense that it 
entails the discretionary (not arbitrary) judgment of the interpreter. This subjectivity is 
caused by several interconnected factors, a significant part of which is semantic in nature 
and has been analysed in the previous chapter.299  
Nonetheless, the author would like to scrutinize some of these factors here from a 
different (non-semantic) perspective, in order to better show the kaleidoscopic nature of 
(tax) treaty interpretation. The chosen foundation of this analysis consists of an 
international socio-political and legal theory that, as such, articulates the basic 
assumptions underlying both modern socio-political and legal international discourse. 
Such theory is that proposed by Koskenniemi in From Apology to Utopia and there 
labeled the “liberal theory of politics”.300 This theory is based on two assumptions, 
which probably few international lawyers would seriously challenge.  
 
3.2. The liberal theory of politics and its bearing on treaty interpretation   
 
3.2.1. Concreteness and normativity of international treaty law    
 
The first assumption underlying Koskenniemi’s liberal theory of politics is that 
international law (including treaties) emerges from the international legal subjects 
themselves (mainly States). It is therefore an artificial, non-natural order, which is 
justified only insofar as it is created by and linked to the actual wills and interests of 
those legal subjects.301 In this sense, international law is characterized by “concreteness”; 
                                                     
298 Such reasoning and principles pertain, quite obviously, not only to the domain of law, but also to the 
domains of logic and semantics as well. In addition, it should be noted that whether a specific interpretation of 
a treaty provision is plausibly argued for is (again) a matter of subjective appreciation, which leads the 
interpreter into a hermeneutical circle. 
299 See U. Linderfalk, On the Interpretation of Treaties. The Modern International Law as Expressed in the 
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Dordrecht: Springer-Verlag, 2007), pp. 43-44: “It is a fact 
that the rules of interpretation laid down in international law are not always sufficient to generate a determinate 
interpretation result. […] We have to accept that, although a treaty may have been interpreted in full 
accordance with the rules of interpretation laid down in international law, there will nevertheless be situations 
where two conflicting interpretation results must both be regarded as legally correct. […] In the inferential 
model, an interpretation result is always an assumption. […] An assumption is neither true nor false; it is 
measured in terms of strength. […] In the situation where two conflicting interpretation results are both to be 
regarded as correct, considered from the point of view of international law, we can still defend our claim that 
they are both prima facie warranted”. See also ibidem, at pp. 343 and 346. 
300 See M. Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia. The Structure of International Legal Argument (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 5-6, 21-23. 
301 I.e. of the individuals that act on their behalf. See M. Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia. The Structure 
of International Legal Argument (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 21.  
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it is the result of voluntary political choices made by States, which are postulated as all 
sovereign, equal and independent.302  
 
The second assumption is that, once created, international law becomes binding on the 
same international legal subjects that have produced or have agreed on it. They cannot 
invoke their subjective opinions to escape its constraining force, for otherwise the object 
and purpose of their original order-creating will would be frustrated.303 In this sense, 
international law is characterized by “normativity”, since it effectively limits the conduct 
of the States subject to it.304   
 
There is, underlying the liberal theory of politics, a clear analogy between the position of 
States within the world order and that of individuals within their own States: both create 
the law and are subject thereto.305 To put it differently, concreteness bases international 
law on States’ behavior, while normativity makes the former independent of the latter.  
Both concreteness and normativity are thus necessary constituents of international 
law: the lack of the former would reduce international law to a complex of norms based 
on some natural morality; the absence of the latter would equate international law to an 
apologetic description of States’ behavior. Evidence of the necessary co-presence of both 
aspects in international law is given by the very same fact that modern international law 
scholarship focuses on the interplay between them and tries to figure out which 
intermediate position best portrays current international law.306   
At the same time, however, concreteness and normativity seem to inherently 
conflict with each other. This clash clearly surfaces as soon as an international law 
dispute arises. Even where the analysis is limited to the interpretation and application of 
                                                     
302 See O. Schachter, “International Law in Theory and Practice. General Course in Public International Law”, 
178 RCADI (1982), 9 et seq., at 24 and 26. In this respect and with specific regard to treaties, it is worth 
recalling that the Preamble to the VCLT (i) notes that the principle of States’ free consent is universally 
recognized and (ii) recalls certain principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United 
Nations, such as the principles of the equal rights and self-determination of peoples and those of the sovereign 
equality and independence of all States. 
303 See M. Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia. The Structure of International Legal Argument (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 21-22. 
304 See O. Schachter, “International Law in Theory and Practice. General Course in Public International Law”, 
178 RCADI (1982), 9 et seq., at 25-26. With regard to treaties, it must be noted that, while the Preamble to the 
VCLT recognizes that the principle pacta sunt servanda is universally recognized, Articles 26 and 27 thereof 
state that “Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith” 
and that “A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a 
treaty”, respectively. 
305 M. Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia. The Structure of International Legal Argument (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 22. On the analogy between liberal democracies and world order, see 
the original thinking of Rousseau in J. J. Rousseau (ed. M. Cranston), The Social Contract (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin Books 1986), book I, Chapter 7. 
306 See M. Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia. The Structure of International Legal Argument (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 20-21 (citing J. Fawcett, Law and Power in International Relations 
(London: Faber & Faber, 1982), pp. 38 et seq.), who depicts extreme scholars’ positions, on the scale that goes 
from concreteness to normativity, as apologist and utopian respectively; R. A. Falk, The Status of Law in 
International Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), pp. 41 et seq.    
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treaties, the issue obviously appears. 
Take the following basic instance. A State intends to exercise certain of its 
sovereign powers. However, an interested person opposes the exercise of such powers by 
pointing to the contrary rule enshrined in a specific provision of a treaty to which that 
State is party. The latter, in turn, while recognizing being bound by that treaty, maintains 
that it has never consented to the interpretation of the relevant treaty provision put 
forward by the opponent.  
On the one hand, it could be argued that no one knows what that State has agreed 
to, when signing and ratifying the treaty, better than the State itself (as expressed through 
one of its representatives). In this respect, it might be argued that any interpretation 
different from the one submitted by the contracting State itself should be disregarded, as 
otherwise that State would be made subject to a rule to which it has never consented. 
Such a result would, in fact, be contrary to the concrete nature of international law.  
On the other hand, however, this argument would lead to a fully apologetic vision 
of international (treaty) law, for every time that international (treaty) law was potentially 
useful,307 it would in fact turn out to be useless since it would never bind any State.308 In 
pretty skeptical terms, international (treaty) law would apply only in so far as no conflict 
arose. If the maxim pacta sunt servanda has any meaning at all, it is common sense that 
international (treaty) law must be capable of being applied also against the will of the 
States. In other words, international (treaty) law must be truly normative.  
 
 
3.2.2. The claimed (apparent) solution of the clash between concreteness and 
normativity: the relevance of the common intention of the parties as expressed 
by the treaty text 
 
Hence, the issue arises as to how to solve the apparent conflict between the normativity 
and concrete characters of international law. One could start by making clear that the 
State’s will - relevant from a concreteness perspective - is the one through which the 
State has originally consented to be bound by international law. Therefore, with 
reference to treaty law, the State’s will is that to be bound by a specific treaty and 
expressed through one of the means listed in Article 11 VCLT. From a purely theoretical 
perspective, such a will may be clearly distinguished from the will subsequently 
expressed by a State (through its agents), which, as in the previous example, may also 
concern how the specific treaty is to be interpreted and applied in a specific case. If it 
were possible to establish with certainty that the latter will does not conform to the 
former, the conclusion would follow that the State is bound by the treaty against its 
current will as long as such a treaty remains in force.   
 
However, drawing such a sharp distinction between original will and subsequent will is 
problematic.  
                                                     
307 I.e. any time it had to be used in order to solve a potential conflict. 
308 Unless one took the rather formalistic view that a State is considered to be bound even where international 
law is interpreted in accordance with its will. 
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First, the original will does not simply consist, as may appear at first glance, of 
the will to be bound by a certain document (the treaty), but of the will to be bound by 
certain rules and principles expressed by means of that document. Therefore, the consent 
to be bound (the will) entails a (logically) previous interpretation of the treaty 
provisions: the consent, in fact, is one to be bound by such an interpretation, i.e. by the 
rules and principles expressed through the treaty.  
Second, the meaning attributed by a contracting State (through its representatives) 
to the treaty provisions, i.e. the interpretation thereof that constitutes a logical 
prerequisite of that State’s consent, is from the ontological perspective a speaker’s 
meaning. The latter has been described above in Chapter 2 as the private meaning 
thought of by the speaker when constructing the utterance, which, as such, cannot be 
known by anybody except the speaker. Thus, no one can know what a State has actually 
consented to be bound to except the State itself, i.e. no one except the persons involved 
in the conclusion of the treaty on behalf of that State.309 Therefore, speaking of 
ascertaining the original State’s will is, rigorously speaking, epistemological nonsense. 
Third, the fact that the content of the State’s original will cannot be known by 
anyone except the State itself gives that State the theoretical chance to hold that its 
subsequently stated will is nothing other that a restatement of its original will, for 
nobody can seriously maintain the view that he knows better than the State itself what its 
original will was. This leads to the potential disappearance of the theoretical clear-cut 
distinction between original and subsequent State’s wills. 
  
Thus, if (i) a treaty binds a State only insofar as the latter consented to be bound and (ii) 
a treaty so binding continues to bind that State even against its subsequent contrary will 
as long as it is in force with respect thereto, but (iii) it is not possible to know what a 
State actually consented to be bound to, then the interpreter may be reasonably seen as 
locked in a cul-de-sac. Either he upholds the position later expressed by the State (or its 
agents) concerning its original will, thus making the maxim pacta sunt servanda 
substantially void, or he rejects that position as such310 and construes the treaty in an 
autonomous way, thus preserving the normativity character of international law but, at 
the same time, opening the door to two kinds of criticism: first, that his approach may 
lead the State to be bound by a rule or principle that it never agreed upon and, second, 
that his position is utopian since his autonomous interpretation of the treaty provisions is 
based on a subjective understanding of what such a provision requires, under the mask of 
the intrinsic, ontological, natural, ordinary (and so forth) meaning thereof.  
 
In the current state-of-art, the commonly adopted solution to this paradox, with specific 
                                                     
309 It is self-evident that such persons could theoretically have different understandings among themselves as to 
what they exactly bound their State to. In addition, even where they subscribe to a common statement on what 
was their original interpretation of the treaty provisions (original will), there would be no possibility to 
ascertain the correspondence between the content of such a statement (which should in turn be interpreted) and 
the original will as such.  
310 Which does not entail that he cannot then construe that treaty provision in the same way as the State did in 
the specific case. 
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regard to treaty law, consists in asserting that the purpose of treaty interpretation is to 
reveal the common intention of the treaty parties as primarily expressed by the treaty 
text.311  
At first sight, this appears an extremely sensible solution: on the one hand, it 
rejects the decisive relevance per se of the unilateral subsequent interpretation put 
forward by a treaty party and preserves the normative character of treaties312 by making 
reference to the tangible result of the parties’ negotiations and agreement, i.e. the treaty 
text; on the other hand, it links, at least from a theoretical perspective, the actual bearing 
of the treaty to the original intention of the parties by requiring its interpretation to be 
aimed at elucidating the presumed common initial will, thus attempting to preserve the 
concrete nature of treaty law.  
However, at a closer look, the very same attempt to reconcile the conflicting 
characters of concreteness and normativity leaves that conflict very much alive at two 
interconnected levels: (i) at the level of the elements and items of evidence that should 
be used in order to interpret the treaty and (ii) at the level of the arguments that may be 
used for supporting the chosen interpretation. 
At the first level, the positions expressed by modern scholars on the subject of 
treaty interpretation range from those of attributing paramount importance to the treaty 
text and suggesting as far as possible a literal interpretation thereof, in accordance with 
Vattel’s maxim “it is not permissible to interpret what has no need of interpretation”,313 
to that of allowing free recourse to all available evidence and factors which could be 
relevant for ascertaining the meaning intended by the parties to be attached to the treaty 
terms.314 Between these two extremes is a rainbow array of positions which seek to 
balance (all in somewhat different fashions) the relevance of the treaty text with that of 
                                                     
311 See, among many references to such an approach, the Commentary to arts. 27-29 of the 1966 Draft (YBILC 
1966-II, pp. 218-226). 
312 It is generally recognized that the normative character of international law requires it to be capable of being 
impartially and objectively ascertained and applied. In this respect, see O. Schachter, “International Law in 
Theory and Practice: General Course in Public International Law”, 178 RCADI (1982), 9 et seq., at 58; L. 
Ehrlich, “The Development of International Law as a Science”, 105 RCADI (1962), 177 et seq., at 177; P. 
Reuter, Droit International Public (Paris: Presse Universitaires de France, 1972), pp. 35-36. However, at a 
closer look, it seems that the concrete character of international law also requires it to be capable of being 
impartially and objectively ascertained and applied in order to prevent the national and international entities 
entrusted with the power of interpreting, applying and enforcing international law to use such powers so as to 
further their own interests in a way not warranted by the original States’ will (see, by analogy, M. 
Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, The Structure of International Legal Argument (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 22).  
313 See E. de Vattel, Le droit des gens. Ou principes de la loi naturelle, appliqués à la conduite et aux affaires 
des Nations et des Souverains (London, 1758), Book II, § 263. A somewhat similar position is taken by 
McNair, according to whom interpretation is just a secondary process that only comes into play where it is not 
possible to make sense of the “plain terms” of a treaty in their context (see A. D. McNair, The Law of Treaties 
(Oxford; The Clarendon Press,1961), p. 365, note 1). 
314 See American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law, Second: Foreign Relations Law of the United States 
(St. Paul: American Law Institute, 1965), §146, p. 449; Research in International Law, “Draft Convention on 
the Law of Treaties with Comments”, 29 American Journal of International Law - Supplement (1935), 653 et 
seq., at 937 (Article 19); M. S. McDougal et al., The Interpretation of Agreements and World Public Order. 
Principles of Content and Procedure (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967). 
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other evidence of the common intention of the parties.315 It is not difficult to recognize, 
in the clash between such different positions, the conflict between concreteness (any 
evidence or element may be legitimately used in order to ascertain the common intent of 
the contracting States) and normativity (the treaty text is the result of the agreement of 
the contracting States and its plain meaning is binding on them as such), although 
portrayed from a different angle. The issue is particularly evident with regard to the 
debate concerning the possibility to use the travaux préparatoires for the purpose of 
treaty interpretation and the limits on such use.316  
At the second level, an analysis of the case law of and the proceedings before 
international courts and tribunals show a regular swing from ascending arguments, i.e. 
arguments based on the concreteness of treaty law, to descending arguments, i.e. 
arguments based on the normativity thereof,317 and vice-versa, both in the pleadings of 
the parties and in the decisions of the judges and arbitrators. As Koskenniemi puts it, 
descending arguments are premised on the assumption that a normative code overrides 
individual State behavior, will or interest, and works so as to produce conclusions about 
State obligations from such a code; on the contrary, ascending arguments are premised 
on the assumption that States’ behavior, will and interest are determinant of the law. 
Under the descending arguments, the normative codes, i.e. rules and principles of law, 
are effectively constraining; under the ascending arguments, the justifiability of such 
normative codes is derived from the facts of States’ behavior, will and interest. The two 
                                                     
315 As mere instances of a potential never-ending list, one may recall the position of Schwarzenberger on the 
ambiguity of words and his consequent rejection of literal interpretations (see G. Schwarzenberger, “Myths and 
realities of treaty interpretation: articles 27-29 of the Vienna draft convention on the law of treaties”, 9 Virginia 
Journal of International Law (1968), 1 et seq.), the repudiation of restrictive interpretation and the connected 
upholding of the principle of effectiveness by Lauterpacht (see H. Lauterpacht, “Restrictive Interpretation and 
the Principle of Effectiveness in the Interpretation of Treaties”, 26 British Yearbook of International Law 
(1949), 48 et seq.), the research for a balance apparent in both the 1956 resolution on treaty interpretation 
issued by the Institute of International Law (see Institute of International Law, 46 Annuaire de l’Institut de 
Droit International (1956), 364 et seq.) and the principles of treaty interpretation elaborated by Sir Gerald 
Fitzmaurice (see G. Fitzmaurice, “The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice 1951-54: Treaty 
interpretation and other treaty points”, 33 British Yearbook of International Law (1957), 203 et seq., at 211-
212). 
316 See infra. As indicative references, see U. Linderfalk, “Is the Hierarchical Structure of Articles 31 and 32 of 
the Vienna Convention Real or Not? Interpreting the Rules of Interpretation”, 54 Netherlands International 
Law Review (2007), 133 et seq.; J. Klabbers, “International Legal Histories: The Declining Importance of 
Travaux Préparatoires in Treaty Interpretation?, 50 Netherlands International Law Review (2003), 267 et seq.; 
S. M. Schwebel, “May Preparatory Work be Used to Correct Rather Than Confirm the “Clear” Meaning of a 
Treaty Provision?”, in J. Makarczyk (ed.), Theory of International Law at the Threshold of the 21st Century, 
Essays in honour of Krzysztof Skubiszewski (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1996), 541 et seq.; M. Ris, 
“Treaty Interpretation and ICJ Recourse to Travaux Préparatoires: Towards a Proposed Amendment of Articles 
31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties”, 14 Boston College International and 
Comparative Law Review (1991), 111 et seq.; M. S. McDougal, “The International Law Commission’s Draft 
Articles upon Interpretation: Textuality Redivivus”, 61 American Journal of International Law (1967), 992 et 
seq.   
317 The terms “descending” and “ascending” are derived from Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, The 
Structure of International Legal Argument (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), in particular pp. 
59-60, who in turn takes such terminology from Ullmann (see W. Ullmann, Law and Politics in the Middle 
Ages; an introduction into the sources of medieval political ideas (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1975), pp. 
30-31.   
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types of argument seem both exhaustive and mutually exclusive. From an ascending 
perspective, the descending arguments are too subjective and must be consequently 
rejected, since they fail to demonstrate the content of the normative codes in a reliable 
manner, unless they make reference to the actual behavior, will and interest of the treaty 
parties, therefore becoming ascending in nature. From a descending perspective, the 
ascending arguments are too subjective as well, for they privilege the States’ behavior, 
will and interest over objectively binding normative codes, hence appearing nothing 
more that an apologia for the States’ conduct. The result is a never-ending swinging of 
the legal arguments between such opposing positions in the quest for an impossible static 
equilibrium. Each interpretative argument put forward may always be theoretically 
challenged from both extreme positions (normativity-descending; concreteness-
ascending), or at least from the position that is conceptually more distant from the 
argument itself. Under this perspective, treaty interpretation appears an inherently 
infinite dynamic process where each construction is rejected, as either not enough 
normative (descending argument), or not enough concrete (ascending argument), in 




3.2.3. Articles 31 and 32 VCLT as legal codification of the general principles 
underlying the quest for the utterance meaning 
 
The above analysis is obviously applicable to the two-pronged rule of interpretation 
provided for by Articles 31 and 32 VCLT, which represents a specific instance of the 
common approach of considering treaty interpretation as aimed at elucidating the 
common intention of the treaty parties as primarily expressed by the treaty text.319 
 It is one of the author’s theses (as it will be illustrated in detail in Chapter 3 of 
Part II) that such articles express, in the context of treaty interpretation, the same 
principles established by modern linguistics for the purpose of determining the utterance 
meaning.  
                                                     
318 See, in a similar vein, Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, The Structure of International Legal 
Argument (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 59-60.  
319 See the following comment by Arnold: “The obvious difficulty with Art. 31(1) (even as supplemented by 
the rules in Art. 31(2)-(4)) [VCLT] is that it can support any type of interpretive approach. A literal approach 
can be justified on the basis of the reference to the text of the treaty in Art. 31(1). There is nothing in Art. 31(1) 
to prevent a judge or other interpreter of a treaty from arguing or concluding that, if the words of a treaty 
provision are reasonably clear, they must simply be applied without regard to the context and purpose. A 
somewhat more nuanced approach would be that the text of the treaty must be the dominant consideration even 
if it i s not the exclusive consideration – in other words, although the context and purpose of the treaty should 
be taken into account, they can never override the clear meaning of the text of the treaty. Alternatively, a judge 
or other interpreter of a treaty can use the reference to the context and purpose in Art. 31(1) to justify a 
contextual or teleological approach under which the words of the treaty can be stretched, and in some 
circumstances even ignored, in order to ensure that the treaty is interpreted and applied in accordance with its 
perceived purpose. In the end, Art. 31(1) does not dictate how much weight must be given to each of the three 
elements – text, context, and purpose – in any particular case.” (B. Arnold, “The Interpretation of Tax Treaties: 
Myths and Realities”, 64 Bulletin for international taxation (2010), 2 et seq., at 6). 
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 However, as already pointed out in Chapter 2 of this part, the quest for the 
utterance meaning does not lead all interpreters to the same result: what the utterance 
meaning is for one person may not be the utterance meaning for a different person; even 
more interestingly, what constitutes the utterance meaning for one interpreter (i.e. an 
interpretation in good faith of a treaty provision in accordance with the interpretative 
rule provided for by Articles 31 and 32 VCLT) may differ from what one contracting 
State affirms to be its own original understanding of that treaty provision and, therefore, 
from the basis of its original consent to be bound by such a treaty provision.  
 
3.2.3.1. The impact of language vagueness and ambiguity on the establishment of the 
utterance meaning of a treaty provision 
 
The possibility that two or more persons give different interpretations, as utterance 
meanings, of a certain treaty provision in a certain overall context depends on the 
language vagueness and ambiguity, which have been discussed in Chapter 2 of this part. 
It must be emphasized, in this respect, that the language vagueness and ambiguity having 
a bearing on the process of construing a treaty provision do not concern solely the text of 
the very same treaty to be interpreted, but also terms, expressions, and provisions 
external to the treaty that might be taken into account for the purpose of its interpretation 
and application. Among the latter, a significant role is played by those terms, 
expressions, and provisions:  
(i) included in agreements relating to the treaty and made between all the parties 
in connection with the conclusion of the treaty,  
(ii) included in the instruments made by one or more parties in connection with 
the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as instruments 
related to the treaty,  
(iii) included in subsequent agreements between the parties regarding the 
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions,  
(iv) included in any document taken as an evidence of or as expressing the 
subsequent practice of the parties in the application of the treaty,  
(v) expressing rules and principles of international law applicable in the relations 
between the parties and provided for by customary law, other (more or less 
related) treaties, or maxims on principles of law generally recognized by civilized 
nations,  
(vi) recorded in the courses of the travaux préparatoires.  
Similarly relevant for treaty interpretation, although different in nature, are those terms 
and provisions used to express meta-rules, i.e. rules establishing how treaty provisions 
should be construed for the purpose of determining the rules and principles to be applied 
to specific legal and factual situations; Articles 31, 32 and 33 VCLT, for instance, 
contain sentences expressing such meta-rules.  
Some terms, expressions and provisions, both internal and external to the treaty to 
be interpreted, are so ambiguous and vague that in the international setting in which they 
are used they are capable of being reasonably interpreted in many conflicting ways. This 
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remark is obvious where terms and expressions such as “sovereignty”, “self-defense”, 
“good faith”, “law”, “unless the context otherwise requires”, “reasonable” are at stake. In 
such cases, no person could seriously counter the claim that those terms and expressions 
might reasonably320 denote different things where used in respect of different legal and 
factual situations and where uttered or interpreted by different people, especially in case 
the latter have significantly different cultural backgrounds. However, a similar issue may 
arise where apparently more precise terms such as “dividends”, “company”, “paid to”, 
“ship”, “similar nature”321 are at stake.   
In addition, such terms, expressions and provisions are sometimes construed as to 
express rules and principles that conflict with each other and, therefore, need to be 
balanced, thus introducing another element of uncertainty and possible conflicting views. 
In fact, where principles (and rules) of law are to be balanced against each other, a 
subjective (political) decision must be taken in order to determine under which 
conditions a certain principle is to prevail over another (or over an apparently conflicting 
rule) and vice versa.322 
 
3.2.3.2. The impact of the cultural background of the interpreter on the establishment 
of the utterance meaning of a treaty provision 
 
Moreover, the multiplicity of the utterance meanings of a single treaty provision is 
enhanced by the impact thereon of the different cultural backgrounds of the interpreters, 
as more generally outlined in Chapter 2 of this part. 
 Law in general, and international law in particular, is nowadays viewed as a 
social phenomenon reflecting the underlying social reality. Different schools of legal 
thought, even if to different extents, recognize that law is not a pre-existing and 
immutable set of rules and that its actual content depends on the social environment in 
which it is applied.323 Thus, most of them highlight the need for studying the relevant 
political and social background.  
 Nonetheless, social reality is not made up solely of the behavior of people (and 
States’ acts by means of such human behavior), which can be studied in an empirical 
manner, but also and more importantly of people’s underlying ideas about (international) 
                                                     
320 And what does “reasonably” denote? In which context? 
321 Just to use terms and expressions familiar to international tax lawyers. 
322 On the possible distinctions between rules and principles and on the nature of the latter as commands to be 
“optimized” (i.e. balanced), see R. Dworkin, “The Model of Rules”, 35 University of Chicago Law Review 
(1967), 14 et seq.; A. Aarnio, “Taking Rules Seriously”, 42 Archives for Philosophy of Law and Social 
Philosophy – Supplement (1990), 180 et seq.; R. Alexy, “On the Structure of Legal Principles”, 13 Ratio Juris 
(2000), 294 et seq.; on whether those enshrined in Articles 31 – 33 VCLT should be regarded as rules or 
principles, see R. Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 36-38.  
323 See, for example, the somewhat converging approaches in this respect of the policy-oriented school of 
McDougal (see H. D. Lasswell and M. S. McDougal, “Trends and Theories about Law: Clarity in Conceptions 
of Authority and Control”, in M. K. Nawaz (ed.), Essays in International Law in Honour of Krishna Rao 
(Leyden: Sijthoff, 1976), 68 et seq.) and the neo-natural school (see L. Strauss, Natural Right and History 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 120 ff; J. Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), pp. 23-55). 
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society, which in part determine their behavior and influence how people see their own 
and other people’s behavior.324 The relevance of social ideas for the purpose of 
perceiving, conceiving and creating social behavior determines that, whenever law is 
construed taking into account people’s social behavior, the consequence is that such a 
construction of the law is more or less significantly influenced by the social ideas 
underlying both human behavior and the representation of such behavior that social and 
historical studies give.  
 From this perspective, construing the law from a normative text appears to be a 
more or less conscious political exercise, in the sense that the result of the interpretation 
is influenced by the socio-political ideas that are widespread in the community where the 
law is to be applied, as well as those of the persons that have to construe the law. As 
Unger puts it, and Koskenniemi restates with specific reference to international law, in 
order for the law to work properly without the need to refer to political ideas external to 
its own concepts and categorizations, it is necessary that the law itself is based and 
designed to sustain coherent and widely-accepted ideas inherent in the society that it has 
to regulate.325  
 
However, international law326 is not characterized by such coherent and widely accepted 
ideas underlying the international community. Even the existence of an accord, among 
international lawyers, on the socio-political ideas underlying broadly used terms, such as 
State “sovereignty”, “independence”, “equality”, appear to be only theoretical: as soon 
as the question arises as to what such terms (and the related concepts) in fact require in 
actual situations, the apparent agreement falls apart and conflicting answers are given 
and vigorously supported. The same holds true, in the field of treaty law, with regard to 
the ideas underlying terms and expressions such as “good faith” or “pacta sunt 
servanda”. One should take into account that, although nomina sunt consequentia 
rerum,327 the consequentia are potentially different for each different person.328   
Take the well-known and long-standing debate about the interaction between 
abuse of law and tax treaties. Scholars fight with one another on (i) whether domestic 
anti-abuse (or avoidance; is there any inherent difference?) provisions should prevail 
over tax treaty provisions, (ii) whether tax treaty provisions can be construed in an anti-
avoidance fashion, (iii) whether tax treaties contain a unwritten anti-abuse principle, (iv) 
and so forth. Similarly, different national courts have strongly upheld this or that 
position, i.e allowing or counteracting manifestly (in their view) abusive tax planning 
schemes relying on tax treaty provisions. Such conflicting positions have been argued 
with force and supported by sound arguments. If one analyses this debate seriously, one 
most probably will draw the conclusion that the different positions are not per se right or 
                                                     
324 In this respect, such ideas constitute the glasses through which people perceive reality. 
325 See R. M. Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), 5-8; 
M. Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, The Structure of International Legal Argument (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 474-475. 
326 And (tax) treaty law in particular. 
327 Justinian, Institutiones, Book II, 7, 3.   
328 And they are normally different for culturally diverse communities. 
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wrong, since they are built on partially contrasting concepts of “good faith” or “pacta 
sunt servanda”, as well as of State “sovereignty” and “equality”. Such contrasting 
concepts are in turn based on the different socio-political ideas (values) of the scholars 
supporting the relevant doctrines and of the judges delivering the relevant decisions.  
Where the socio-political background of a person includes the idea that the abuse 
of tax law is an absolutely unacceptable behavior, for instance because it encroaches on 
fundamental values such as taxpayer equality and constitutional obligations such as that 
of paying taxes in accordance with a person’s own ability to pay, that person will 
probably tend to construe tax treaties as allowing the application of domestic anti-abuse 
rules or principles, or, in any case, so as to allow the tax authorities to counteract the 
alleged abusive practices. Such an interpretation will then be supported by “legal” 
rhetorical arguments based on the interpreter’s idiosyncratic concepts of “good faith”, 
“pacta sunt servanda”, “State sovereignty” and “State equality”. For instance, the 
interpreter might use the following ascending arguments: the “pacta sunt servanda” 
principle is based on the contracting States’ equality and sovereign consent to be bound 
by the rules enshrined in the treaty provisions; such rules have been understood in good 
faith by one of the contracting States as not covering (or precluding their favorable 
application to) clear-cut abusive practices;329 such an understanding is reasonable since 
the purpose of the treaty is to enhance sound economic trade between the contracting 
States and abusive practices generally entail some kind of lack of economic substance; a 
different interpretation of the treaty provision would have the unacceptable effect of 
binding the above-mentioned contracting State more than it consented to be bound, thus 
encroaching on its sovereignty and infringing the principle of equality between 
contracting States.330 In addition, the interpreter might justify its conclusion by means of 
certain descending arguments. For instance, he could maintain that the principle of 
“good faith” is fundamental in both the interpretation and the application of tax treaties 
and that such a principle does not admit that the benefits of a tax treaty are extended to 
artificial, tax-planning driven schemes; he could recall that both the title and the 
preamble of the treaty make reference to the purpose of counteracting tax evasion and 
that the “pacta sunt servanda” principle thus precludes any interpretation leading to 
disregard of the clear commitment undertaken by the contracting States to neutralize 
abusive practices;331 finally, he could  argue that counteracting abusive practices is a 
                                                     
329 Where such abusive practices are counteracted by domestic anti-abuse rules or principles, the interpreter 
could also support his position by stating that the tax treaty provisions have been understood and consequently 
agreed upon by the contracting States on the obvious premise that the facts to which such provisions are 
applied have to be previously selected and “labeled” on the basis of the contracting States’s domestic law, of 
which the domestic anti-abuse rules and principles are a part, since there is no “natural” meaning of terms such 
as “dividends”, “interest”, “business profits”, “employer” (and so forth) and Article 3(2) of the tax treaty 
clearly refers to the contracting States’s domestic law for the purpose of construing undefined treaty terms. In 
this respect, he could also rely on paragraphs 22 and 22(1) of the OECD Commentary to Article 1 OECD 
Model Convention, as evidence of the understanding of the contracting States on such an issue, especially 
where the contracting States were members of the OECD and did not insert any observation in the OECD 
Commentary with regard to those paragraphs.  
330 The latter would be the case where the thesis of the non-applicability of domestic anti-abuse law was upheld 
by the other contracting State. 
331 He could add, ad abundantiam, that the reference to tax evasion (instead of tax avoidance) should not be 
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political and legal commitment adopted worldwide in all developed jurisdictions and its 
underlying legal principle must thus be considered to be a commonly recognized 
principle of law that cannot be disregarded in interpreting an international instrument.  
Correspondingly, where the socio-political background of a person includes the 
idea that tax abuse may be tolerated in certain cases, for instance where there is no 
express prohibition thereof and, thus, counteracting it would conflict with the principles 
of legal certainty and protection of legitimate expectations or where, in certain forms, it 
may guarantee a net benefit to his own State’s economy, that person may arrive at the 
conclusion that, in such cases, tax treaties are to be construed as prohibiting the 
application of domestic anti-abuse rules  and principles, or, in any case, so as to secure 
the tax treaty benefits to the abusive schemes. This interpretation will be supported by 
legal rhetorical arguments based on the interpreter’s idiosyncratic concepts of “good 
faith”, “pacta sunt servanda”, State “sovereignty” and “equality”. Therefore, similarly to 
the previous example, ascending arguments might be used. For instance, the interpreter 
might put forward that the treaty text does not contain an anti-abuse provision and, 
therefore, reading the existence of an inherent anti-abuse provision in it would amount to 
superseding the contracting States’s agreement and, thus, sovereignty and equality. In 
addition, descending arguments could be made as well. For example, the interpreter 
could maintain that the “pacta sunt servanda” principle requires that tax treaty provisions 
securing certain tax benefits prevail over the conflicting domestic anti-abuse rules, since 
if a State were lawfully entitled not to apply the treaty provisions merely because of the 
existence of a conflicting domestic law provision (even an anti-abuse provision), that 
State would have as a matter of fact carte blanche as to when to comply with the treaty 




3.2.4. The double nature of treaty interpretation  
 
So far, each ascending legal argument could be counteracted by a descending one and 
vice-versa. The point is, however, not only that conflicting positions may be sensibly 
supported by equally strong legal arguments, but also and foremost that, although such 
legal arguments are presented by scholars and judges as an elucidation of the reasoning 
that led them to their chosen interpretation, the unstated socio-political values of the 
interpreter also play a significant role in the decision-making process. One could thus 
distinguish, by following by analogy the division between the pairs invention-intuition 
and demonstration-logic drawn by Poincaré,332 between the phase of (i) interpreting the 
treaty provision (i.e. choosing the interpretation) and that of (ii) justifying the 
interpretation (i.e. supporting it with legal arguments).  
                                                                                                                                  
read literally, especially taking into account the flexible language that characterizes the preamble and the 
clarification recently inserted in the widely accepted OECD Commentary to the OECD Model , on which the 
tax treaty is based. 
332 See H. Poincaré (translated by G.B. Halstead), The Foundations of Science: Science and Hypothesis, The 
Value of Science, Science and Methods  (Lancaster: The Science Press, 1946), p. 219. 
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In the first phase, the interpretation is intuitively arrived at through the interaction 
between the treaty provision and the interpreter’s overall context, in which both his 
socio-political background and his knowledge of legal rules and principles, which are in 
turn somewhat influenced by his socio-political background, play a relevant role.333  
In the second phase, socio-political considerations are generally set aside, in order 
to preserve legal interpretation from the criticism of being nothing more than a 
sociological exercise. In such a second phase, logical, semantic and legal considerations 
take the entire scene. At the same time, the “legal” nature of the second phase 
determines that an interpretation which cannot be reasonably supported by purely legal, 
semantic and logical arguments will never be accepted by the relevant community as a 
proper legal interpretation; in this sense, the conventional “legal” nature of treaty 
interpretation restricts the spectrum of the possible constructions that may arrived at 
through the first phase of the process.334  
 
 
3.2.5. The existence of trends in the interpretation of treaties  
 
The above analysis, however, does not conflict with the common-sense perception that 
certain trends exist in the interpretation of treaty provisions. These trends surface where 
a significant number of interpretations of a certain treaty provision (or similar treaty 
provisions, as in the case of different treaties concluded along the lines of a common 
model, such as the OECD Model) are looked at and grouped according to a geographical 
or temporal perspective.  
 They represent further evidence supporting the thesis of the significance of socio-
political backgrounds in the process of construing tax treaty provisions.  
                                                     
333 It is in this phase that legal dogmatics plays a prominent role in leading the interpreter to a certain (set of) 
construction(s) of the treaty. It enables the interpreter to have a prejudice on, a pre-cognition of the meaning of 
the treaty, thus playing a heuristic function in the interpretation process (see similarly E. Russo, 
L’interpretazione dei testi normativi comunitari (Milano: Giuffrè, 2007), pp. 23-25; on the relevance of the 
prejudice for hermeneutics see, above all, H.-G. Gadamer (originally translated by W. Glen-Doepel and revised 
by J. Weinsheimer and D. G. Marshall), Truth and Method (London: Continuum International Publishing 
Group, 2004) and, with particular reference to legal hermeneutics, ibidem at 320 et seq.). 
334 See U. Linderfalk, On the Interpretation of Treaties. The Modern International Law as Expressed in the 
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Dordrecht: Springer-Verlag, 2007), pp. 4 and 5, where the 
author assesses as inadequate both the “radical legal skepticism” theory of treaty interpretation, according to 
which “legal norms capable of constraining political judgment [in the interpretation of treaties] simply do no 
not exist”, and the “one-right-answer” theory of treaty interpretation, according to which “an applier can 
interpret a treaty by applying a number of legal rules and be perfectly certain of always arriving at a 
determinate result in a completely value-free way [without] room for political judgment”, none of which “can 
be taken as a sound description of the prevailing legal state of affairs”. The author maintains that “legal rules 
[of interpretation] capable of constraining political judgment certainly do exist [but they] are far from the self-
sufficing regime suggested by the one-right-answer thesis. The rules of interpretation provide a framework for 
the interpretation process; but within this framework, appliers are often left with what could be called a certain 
freedom of action. […] Typically, whether a certain understanding of a treaty will be perceived as correct or 
not is a matter partly of whether the understanding can be shown to conform to the standards laid down in 
international law, partly of whether it can be shown to be legitimate [this author’s note: i.e. politically 
correct]”. 




A good example of what has just been said may be drawn from the reports submitted to 
the International Fiscal Association with regard to the topic “Tax treaties and tax 
avoidance: application of anti-avoidance provisions”, published in the 2010 Cahiers de 
droit fiscal international,335 which substantially discuss the same topic that has been 
previously analysed by the author for exemplification purposes. In the Summary and 
conclusion section of his General Report, van Weeghel points out the following:  
(i) it seems that in many countries the application of general anti-avoidance 
rules can be reconciled with tax treaty obligations; in particular, it is 
remarked that the statements in paragraph 22(1) of the commentary on 
Article 1 of the OECD Model Convention, according to which the domestic 
substance over form, economic substance and general anti-abuse principles 
are part of the basic domestic law for determining which facts give rise to a 
tax liability, seem to be endorsed in the branch reports for countries that 
have relevant experience;336 however, the General Report recognizes that 
significant exceptions exist in that respect, such as those put forward in the 
Netherlands, Luxembourg, Indian and Portuguese reports;337 
(ii) it appears more difficult to reconcile specific domestic anti-avoidance 
provisions with tax treaty obligations; moreover, even in the same 
jurisdiction, conflicting conclusions have been reached with regard to 
different specific anti-avoidance provisions;338 with specific reference to exit 
tax provisions, although States generally have been able to preserve the 
application thereof, because the taxable event (the deemed disposition of 
assets) takes place just prior to the transfer of residence to the other 
contracting State, in cases where the balanced allocation of taxing rights 
attained through the treaty is altered in substance after the transfer of 
residence, the principle of good faith does prevent the materialization of the 
exit charge;339 
(iii) with regard to the issue whether abuse of tax treaties should be regarded as 
an abuse of domestic law or as an abuse of the tax treaty itself, the responses 
given by the branch reporters vary considerably; however, in practice this 
does not seem to lead to different outcomes as a result of the different 
approaches;340 
                                                     
335 International Fiscal Association, Cahiers de droit fiscal international, Vol. 95a (The Hague: Sdu Uitgevers, 
2010). 
336 See S. van Weeghel, “General Report”, in International Fiscal Association, Cahiers de droit fiscal 
international, Vol. 95a (The Hague: Sdu Uitgevers, 2010), 17 et seq., at 19. 
337 See S. van Weeghel, “General Report”, in International Fiscal Association, Cahiers de droit fiscal 
international, Vol. 95a (The Hague: Sdu Uitgevers, 2010), 17 et seq., at 26-28. 
338 See the examples he gives concerning CFC and thin capitalization provisions. (see S. van Weeghel, 
“General Report”, in International Fiscal Association, Cahiers de droit fiscal international, Vol. 95a (The 
Hague: Sdu Uitgevers, 2010), 17 et seq., at 19).  
339 See S. van Weeghel, “General Report”, in International Fiscal Association, Cahiers de droit fiscal 
international, Vol. 95a (The Hague: Sdu Uitgevers, 2010), 17 et seq., at 29. 
340 See S. van Weeghel, “General Report”, in International Fiscal Association, Cahiers de droit fiscal 
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(iv) finally, with reference to treaty shopping cases, the branch reports show an 
array of different outcomes: very comparable facts have resulted in opposite 
judgments in treaty shopping cases; in addition, even with appreciation for 
the factual elements, it is clear that the approach to treaty interpretation in 
different countries is very different, varying from pacta sunt servanda in the 
Netherlands and India, to a denial of treaty benefits based on the lack of 
economic substance and the presence of a tax avoidance motive in China, 
Switzerland and Israel.341 
 
3.3. Conclusions  
 
Turning back to the purpose of the present study, the author believes that the brief 
analysis above has uncovered what all international tax lawyers have in front of their 
eyes every day, but probably too close and too big to be clearly noticed.342  
 Tax treaty provisions are often so ambiguous and vague that, even taking into 
account their overall context, more than one interpretation thereof may reasonably be put 
forward.  
 Furthermore, the choice of the interpretation is significantly influenced by the 
socio-political values of the persons called upon to construe the tax treaty provisions, 
although such preferences and their impact on the interpretative result is usually not 
made overt, but veiled by the dynamic of the ascending and descending legal arguments 
used to justify the choice.  
 
The preliminary conclusion that the author draws from this analysis is that linguistic 
aspects, although being relevant for interpretative purposes since they (i) restrict the 
array of interpretations that may be reasonably considered viable, (ii) provide the 
interpreter with certain elements to be used in order to justify its interpretative choice 
and (iii) are part of the overall context that influences such a choice, are not per se 
determinative of the interpretation in the vast majority of cases. Linguistic analysis, and 
a semantic one in particular, is just an important tool at the disposal of the interpreter. 
  
The present study is built up on the above reflection.  
 On the one hand, this study does not endeavor to put forward any best solution for 
                                                                                                                                  
international, Vol. 95a (The Hague: Sdu Uitgevers, 2010), 17 et seq., at 35. 
341 See S. van Weeghel, “General Report”, in International Fiscal Association, Cahiers de droit fiscal 
international, Vol. 95a (The Hague: Sdu Uitgevers, 2010), 17 et seq., at 35-42, in particular at 38 and 39 
(where there is a detailed description of the significant opposite conclusions reached, with regard to similarly 
patterned facts, in the Swiss case A Holding ApS (Federal Court  (Switzerland), 29 November 2005, A Holding 
ApS v. Federal Tax Administration, 8 ITLR, 536 et seq.) and in the Indian case Azadi Bachao Andolan 
(Supreme Court (India), 7 October 2003, Union of India and another v. Azadi Bachao Andolan and another, 6 
ITLR, 233 et seq.) and 41. 
342 Hence, the author would suggest to those scholars studying and writing on the subject of tax treaty 
interpretation: “don’t think, but look!” (L. Wittgenstein (translated by G. E. M. Anscombe), Philosophical 
Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953), p. 27, para. 66). 
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multilingual tax treaty interpretative issues, since the choice between the various 
possible solutions is not directed by only semantic and legal considerations, but also by 
socio-political discretionary choices. The opposite approach would, therefore, lead the 
author outside the boundaries of his research into the realm of socio-political studies.  
 On the other hand, this study is committed to designing the formal legal and 
logical structure within which the interpreter of multilingual tax treaties may move in 
order to choose and reasonably justify his interpretations. That formal structure is made 
up of the rules and principles to be complied with by the interpreter in justifying the 
chosen interpretation by means of legal and logical arguments.343 These rules and 
principles hence constitute (or should constitute) part of the encyclopedic knowledge of 
the interpreter and, as such, are also part of the elements of the overall context that direct 
the interpreter in choosing a certain construction of the tax treaty provisions.  
 This is the normative legal theory that the author is committed to establishing 
through the present work. 
 
From the standpoint of the sources, the rules and principles constituting the formal 
structure sketched in the present study are primarily derived from:  
(i) the principles of logic generally used in the linguistic field and in legal rhetoric 
and argumentation; 
(ii) the semantics-based principles of treaty interpretation established by the 
author in sections 1 and 2. 
Chapters 3 and 4 of Part II will endeavor to demonstrate, by means of a positive analysis 
of the history, case law, scholarly writings and States’ practice concerning Articles 31-33 
VCLT, that the principles of interpretation generally derived from such articles may be 
regarded as not appreciably departing from the principles of treaty interpretation 
established by the author in sections 1 and 2 and may, therefore, be referred to in order 
to give more concreteness and precision to the latter principles. 
 Similarly, the positive analysis carried out in Chapter 5 of Part II with regard to 
Article 3(2) OECD Model will attempt to show that the generally accepted 
interpretations of that article do not conflict with the principles of treaty interpretation 
established by the author in sections 1 and 2, which implies that Article 3(2) OECD 
Model may be construed in harmony with those principles for the purpose of designing 
the formal legal and logical structure within which the interpreter of multilingual tax 
treaties may move in order to choose and reasonably justify his interpretations.   
 
From the standpoint of the content, those rules and principles deal with: 
(i) the elements and items of evidence that may (and should) be taken into 
account for the purpose of tax treaty interpretation;  
(ii) the interrelation between such elements and items of evidence (in particular 
between equally authentic treaty texts) and  
                                                     
343 See the closing remark in B. Arnold, “The Interpretation of Tax Treaties: Myths and Realities”, 64 Bulletin 
for international taxation (2010), 2 et seq., at 15, which reads: “In the end, however, all arguments about 
methods or rules of interpretation are rhetorical (in the classical sense) devices that can be used to impress and 
persuade others about the meaning of language.” 
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(iii) how and to what extent such elements and items of evidence may be used in 
order to interpret multilingual tax treaties.  
In this respect, Articles 31-33 VCLT and Article 3(2) OECD Model, when construed in 
light of the generally accepted principles of logic and the semantics-based principles of 
treaty interpretation established in sections 1 and 2, provide the author with suitable rules 
and principles to deal with those three matters. Yet, as the analysis performed in the 
following parts will show, such rules and principles are often vague enough to allow 
different interpretative results when applied to concrete cases. 
 
Someone may say that the result of the present study is itself so vague that it is 
practically useless and the author could better have spent his time differently. To this 
criticism the author will reply that “[i]t is the business of philosophy, not to resolve a 
contradiction by means of a […] discovery, but to make it possible for us to get a clear 
view of the state of [affairs] that troubles us: the state of affairs before the contradiction 
is resolved”.344  
 
 
                                                     
344 L. Wittgenstein (translated by G. E. M. Anscombe), Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 
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CHAPTER 1 - LINGUISTIC PRACTICES IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 
 
1. In general 
 
For a long time, diplomatic relations among Western countries (including their overseas 
possessions) had been carried on in an international lingua franca, that being originally 
Latin, from the Roman Republic through the Holy Roman Empire up to the XXVI – 
XVII century, then followed by Castilian Spanish from the XVI century and French from 
the XVIII century.345  
However, as Ostrower points out,346 the identification of diplomatic language 
with French and Latin is Eurocentric and omits the entire effort of political relations in 
the original cradles of civilization in Africa, Asia and Asia Minor.347 In fact, languages 
such as Greek, Chinese, Akkadian, Aramaic, Persian, Arabic and Sumerian served as 
recognized diplomatic languages, for a certain period, in the areas of influence of their 
respective nations.348 
Ostrower also recognizes that both European and non-European diplomatic 
languages have gone through similar paths, characterized by slow rise and (often) abrupt 
falls, as have the national civilizations that spread them out.349 His impressive study 
highlights that struggle for linguistic domination has persisted uninterruptedly in 
international relations and that national languages are constantly maneuvering for 
recognition and supremacy; such a struggle is against the back-drop of the political, 
cultural and social agitation that result from the clash of national groups and their 
interests.350 
 
                                                     
345 See J. B. Scott, Le Français, Langue Diplomatique Moderne: étude critique de conciliation internationale 
(Paris: Pédone 1924); H. Wheaton, Elements of International Law: with a sketch of the history of the science 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936), p. 197; H. Bonfils, Manuel de droit international public (droit de gens) 
(Paris: Fauchille, 1914), p. 555; and more extensively, A. Ostrower, Language, Law, and Diplomacy – Volume 
One (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1965), pp. 27-30. 
346 A. Ostrower, Language, Law, and Diplomacy – Volume One (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 1965), p. 30. 
347 As well as in America and Oceania, in relation to which the sources at our disposal are scarcer.  
348 See M. Tabory, Multilingualism In International Law and Institutions (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & 
Noordhoff, 1980), p. 4; D. Shelton, “Reconcilable Differences? The Interpretation of Multilingual Treaties”, 20 
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review (2007), 611 et seq., at. 613; A. Ostrower, Language, 
Law, and Diplomacy – Volume One (Phioladelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1965), ch. VIII. 
349 See A. Ostrower, Language, Law, and Diplomacy – Volume One (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 1965), pp. 58-59, referring to the theory of the languages internecine wars, which would take place at an 
advanced stage of the process of civilizations disintegration, developed in A. J. Toynbee, A Study of History – 
Vol. V: The Disintegrations of Civilizations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1939). 
350 See A. Ostrower, Language, Law, and Diplomacy – Volume One (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 1965), pp. 59-60. 
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The quest for mutually intelligible languages that could enhance diplomatic relations 
among nations has thus led in the course of human history a few languages, among the 
multitude available, to succeed as common vehicles of understanding. It has been noted 
that their success has often depended upon highly complex social, cultural, military, 
economic and political factors, among which the most important are (i) the numerical 
superiority of the group using that language, (ii) the military conquests and political 
power of such a group, (iii) the flexibility and richness of that language’s grammar and 
semantics, (iv) the limited difficulties connected to learning it and (v) the wealth and 
prominence in commerce of the group using that language.351  
At the end of the XIX century, diplomatic activities and relations were widely 
carried out in either French or English. For instance, at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference 
both languages were given the status of official languages; the Treaty of Versailles, 
which incorporated the Covenant of the League of Nations, was concluded in the French 
and English authentic texts; the Permanent Court of Arbitration set up in 1899 used to 
employ both French and English as its working languages; and both in the League of 
Nations Assembly and in the PCIJ, only those two languages were given an official 
status.352  
This trend of subsequent dominant, at least regionally, languages in the 
international relations seemed, however, to have taken a pause in the mid XX century. 
Present international diplomacy does not appear to be dominated by a lingua franca; on 
the contrary, multilingualism seems to take control in international organizations, 
multilateral conferences and also in bilateral negotiations. Such a new scenario appears 
to be the result of the interaction of multiple factors, such as the possibility of multiple-
language simultaneous translations, modern education (which is more oriented to the 
learning of foreign languages) and new communication technologies. The United 
Nations Conference initiated the modern era in the conduct of diplomatic affairs, with 
French, English, Chinese, Russian and Spanish serving as its official languages.353 From 
that moment on, the UN General Assembly has always used these as its official 
languages, to which Arabic was added at the end of 1973.354 Similarly, in the last 60 
years, many other international organizations and conferences have adopted three or 
more languages as their official means of communication.355 
                                                     
351 See A. Ostrower, Language, Law, and Diplomacy – Volume One (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 1965), pp. 75-80; see also the examples (and exceptions) he reported in Chapter XXII of Volume One; J. 
B. Scott, Le Français, Langue Diplomatique Moderne: étude critique de conciliation internationale (Paris: 
Pédone 1924), p. 129.  
352 See M. Tabory, Multilingualism In International Law and Institutions (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & 
Noordhoff, 1980), pp. 4-5 and notes 8-12 at pp. 48-49; D. Shelton, “Reconcilable Differences? The 
Interpretation of Multilingual Treaties”, 20 Hastings International and Comparative Law Review (2007), 611 
et seq., at 614 and footnotes therein.  
353 See United Nations, Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, held from 
25 April to 26 June 1945 in San Francisco, vol. 1, pp. 165-166; vol. 2, pp. 589-590; vol. 3, pp. 223 et seq.; vol. 
5, pp. 17-19, 50-52; vol. 8, p. 191; vol. 12, pp. 65-67; vol. 13, pp. 651-653. 
354 See UN General Assembly’s resolutions 3190 (XXVIII) and 3191 (XXVIII) of 18 December 1973. 
355 For a detailed analysis of the current linguistic practice in most international organizations and their organs, 
see M. Tabory, Multilingualism In International Law and Institutions (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & 
Noordhoff, 1980), pp. 7-31; with reference to the current linguistic practice in multilateral conferences 
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In their extensive studies on the use of languages in international relations, both 
Ostrower and Tabory point out the pros and cons of such a recent trend towards 
multilingualism.  
The use of variety of languages and the abandonment of a single dominant idiom 
in both organized diplomacy and bilateral relations has better fulfilled the doctrine of the 
equality of States;356 in this respect, especially at the level of international organizations, 
multilingualism has been regarded as a major step towards the recognition of the equal 
status of groups of nations using a particular idiom, and thus capable of unhinging the 
previous linguistic practice, which was generally regarded as one of the means through 
which super-powers (or former powers) sought to dominate international diplomacy.357   
In addition, it has been pointed out that it may be preferable for States’ diplomatic 
agents to speak in a language with which they are familiar, rather than risking incorrectly 
expressing their arguments and ideas in a foreign official language, with the consequent 
hazard of causing misunderstandings.358 
Such advantages, however, are counterbalanced by problems caused by linguistic 
multiplicity, in particular the heavy administrative and financial burdens associated with 
multilingualism, including those connected to the huge and expensive bureaucracy and 
translation machinery.359  
 
2. Treaties 
2.1. In general 
 
As for the use of diplomatic language in general, the conclusion of treaties has witnessed 
the increasing use of multiple languages since the end of the Second World War. In this 
respect, the ILC noted that the “phenomenon of treaties drawn up in two or more 
                                                                                                                                  
convened to draw up treaties, see ibidem, pp. 31-36. 
356 See A. Ostrower, Language, Law, and Diplomacy – Volume One (Phioladelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1965), pp. 127, 403, 414 et seq.; Volume Two, pp. 731-732. 
357 See M. Tabory, Multilingualism In International Law and Institutions (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & 
Noordhoff, 1980), p. 144. 
358 See M. Tabory, Multilingualism In International Law and Institutions (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & 
Noordhoff, 1980), p. 145, referring to C. Boothe Luce, “The Ambassadorial Issue: Professionals or 
Amateurs?”, 36 Foreign Affairs (1957), 105 et seq., at 109-110.  
359 According to the interview given by (then) EU Commissioner Leonard Orban to EurActiv and published 
on-line on 13 November 2008 (available at: http://www.euractiv.com/en/culture/orban-multilingualism-cost-
democracy-eu/article-177107), the “amount of money spent by the European Union's institutions on translation 
and interpretation represents approximately €1.1 billion per year, which represents one percent of the EU 
budget”. On the issue of the cost of multilingualism in diplomatic relations, see, among many others, M. 
Tabory, Multilingualism In International Law and Institutions (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 
1980), p. 146, note 195 at p. 157 and note 319 at p. 166; with specific reference to the European Union, see H. 
Haarman, "Language Politics and the New European Identity", in F. Coulmas (ed.), A Language Policy for the 
European Community: Prospects and Quandaries (Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 1991), 103 et seq., in particular 
at 114. 
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languages has become extremely common and, with the advent of the United Nations, 
general multilateral treaties drawn up, or finally expressed, in five different languages 
have become quite numerous”.360 
Multilateral treaties are generally authenticated in all the official languages of the 
international organization under whose auspices the relevant conference is held, or, in 
any case, sponsoring the treaty conclusion.361 This holds true with regard to both the 
United Nations362 and regional organizations, such as the Council of Europe363 and the 
Organization of American States.364 It is also interesting that certain treaties creating 
international organizations have been authenticated in the official languages of all 
member States of the organization itself.365 
Where international organizations are not involved in the treaty conclusion or 
conference organization,366 the tendency is to authenticate treaties in all official 
languages of the contracting States;367 however, where the official languages of the 
contracting States are numerous, it is customary that the parties agree to authenticate the 
treaty solely in one or a few of the internationally known languages, such as, English, 
French, or Spanish.368 
 
The conclusion of treaties authenticated in multiple languages indubitably presents 
certain advantages. 
For example, scholars have argued that, where multiple languages are used at the 
drafting stage, the process of treaty negotiation may clarify and bring to the surface 
                                                     
360 See YBILC 1966- II, p. 224, para. 1. 
361 See U. Linderfalk, On the Interpretation of Treaties. The Modern International Law as Expressed in the 
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Dordrecht: Springer-Verlag, 2007), p. 355; M. Tabory, 
Multilingualism In International Law and Institutions (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1980), pp. 
37-38.  
362 Which does have six official languages: English, French, Arabic, Chinese, Russian and Spanish (see 2003 
UN Final Clauses of Multilateral Treaties Handbook, p. 77, letter M). 
363 Which does have two official languages: English and French (see Article 12 of the Statute of the Council of 
Europe, done in London on 5 May 1949). 
364 The Charter of the Organization of American States has four authentic texts: English French, Spanish and 
Portuguese (see Article 139 of the Charter of the Organization of American States, concluded in Bogotá on 30 
April 1948, as last modified by the “Protocol of Managua”, adopted on 10 June 1993, at the Nineteenth Special 
Session of the Organization General Assembly).  These are also the official languages of most of its organs 
(see, for instance, Article 64 of the Inter-American Juridical Committee).    
365 The clearest example is represented by the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union (see Article 55 of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union (2010/C 
83/01) and Article 358 of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(2010/C 83/01)). 
366 See M. Hilf, Die Auslegung mehrsprachiger Verträge. Eine Untersuchung zum Völkerrecht und zum 
Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1973), pp. 37 et seq.; an example 
thereof, in the tax field, is the Nordic Tax Convention (Convention between the Nordic Countries for the 
Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, concluded in Helsinki on 23 
September 1996), which has been authenticated in all official languages of the six contracting States, i.e. 
Danish, Faroese, Finnish, Icelandic, Norwegian, and Swedish.  
367 With the possible addition of an authentic text in an internationally well-known language.  
368 See U. Linderfalk, On the Interpretation of Treaties. The Modern International Law as Expressed in the 
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Dordrecht: Springer-Verlag, 2007), p. 355. 
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possible problems of formulation, which otherwise could later lead to interpretative 
issues. Rosenne, for instance, pointed out that “the process of trilingual drafting (as 
opposed to mere translation) frequently brought to light questions of substance, 
sometime quite unsuspected, requiring further elucidation.”369 This, however, does not 
hold true when the drafting is carried out exclusively in one language and the other 
authentic texts, added subsequently, are just mere translations of the negotiated one.   
Another advantage derives from the possibility for the contracting States’ public 
bodies to apply domestically the treaty without the need for ad hoc (internationally non-
authoritative) translations, where the treaty has been authenticated in one of the official 
languages of the relevant contracting State. The advantage, in this case, is two-fold: on 
the one hand, it avoids the risk that different bodies use different ad hoc translations; on 
the other hand, it may reduce future interpretative issues and misunderstanding regarding 
the intension of certain treaty terms and expressions, by means of bringing forward the 
analysis thereof at the drafting stage.370 
 
However, as already pointed out, such advantages are counterbalanced by significant 
disadvantages.  
Apart from the general issue of the financial and administrative burdens 
connected to multilingualism,371 certain drawbacks exist that are specific for multilingual 
treaties. 
First, in the course of negotiation, the feasibility of simultaneous drafting seems 
to be limited to three or four languages. The use of a higher number of authentic 
language texts might cause substantial effort to be devoted to the concordance between 
the various texts, rather than to the substance thereof. Similarly, the probability of 
confusion, errors and prima facie discrepancies may be regarded as proportional to the 
number of authentic texts.372  
Second, this has a significant effect on treaty interpretation. As the International 
Law Commission of the United Nations pointed out, “[f]ew plurilingual treaties 
containing more than one or two articles are without some discrepancy between the 
texts. The different genius of the languages, the absence of a complete consensus ad 
idem, or lack of sufficient time to co-ordinate the texts may result in minor or even 
major discrepancies in the meaning of the texts. In that event the plurality of the texts 
may be a serious additional source of ambiguity or obscurity in the terms of the 
treaty”.373  
Finally, small or poor States generally do not have adequate staff, with regard to 
the number of their components and their overall linguistic capabilities, to check all the 
authentic texts of the treaties to which they are part, both before signing and ratifying 
                                                     
369 See Rosenne, The Law of Treaties – A Guide to the legislative history of the Vienna Convention (New York: 
Oceana Publications, 1970), p. 36. 
370 See M. Tabory, Multilingualism In International Law and Institutions (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & 
Noordhoff, 1980), pp. 145-146. 
371 See section 1 of this chapter. 
372 See M. Tabory, Multilingualism In International Law and Institutions (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & 
Noordhoff, 1980), p. 146. 
373 See YBILC 1966- II, p. 225, para. 6. 
PART II: CHAPTER 1 
 130 
them and at the subsequent stage of their application and interpretation.374 This 
obviously creates an unwarranted advantage for bigger and richer States. 
   
2.2. Bilateral treaties in particular 
 
When concluding bilateral treaties, contracting States tend to authenticate them in all 
their official languages and, often, in a “neutral” internationally well-known language 
(usually either English or French) as well.375  
Since most States have just one official language and not many States use the 
same official languages, the actual situation is that the majority of bilateral treaties are 
authenticated in two or three languages.  
 
A study published by Gamble and Ku in 1993,376 based on the nearly 12,500 bilateral 
treaties signed between 1920 and 1970 and contained either in the League of Nations 
Treaty Series or in the United Nations Treaty Series, shows that (i) about 55% of the 
treaties concluded between 1920 and 1942 have been authenticated solely in the official 
languages of both contracting States, while (ii) with regard to the treaties concluded 
between 1945 and 1970, such a ratio has increased to about 87%.377 
That study also provides two additional interesting features. First,378 in cases 
where the treaties have been authenticated solely in the official languages of both 
contracting States, the majority of treaties have two authentic texts; in contrast, in cases 
where the treaties have not been authenticated solely in the official languages of the 
contracting States, the vast majority of treaties (about 95%) have just one authentic 
text.379 Second, while the average number of authentic texts for the treaties concluded 
between 1920 and 1942 is about 1.6, the average number for the treaties concluded 
between 1945 and 1970 is nearly 2.0,380 which seems to confirm the above-illustrated 
                                                     
374 M. Tabory, Multilingualism In International Law and Institutions (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & 
Noordhoff, 1980), p. 146. 
375 See U. Linderfalk, On the Interpretation of Treaties. The Modern International Law as Expressed in the 
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Dordrecht: Springer-Verlag, 2007), p. 355. With regard to tax 
treaties, it is interesting to note that, in recent years, a few States started to conclude their treaties in one 
authentic language only, generally English or French (see in that respect G. Maisto (ed.), Multilingual Texts 
and Interpretation of Tax Treaties and EC Tax Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2005), at xxi).  
376 J. K. Gamble and C. Ku, “Choice of Language in Bilateral Treaties: Fifty Years of Changing State 
Practice”, 3 Indiana International and Comparative Law Review (1993), 223 et seq. 
377 See J. K. Gamble and C. Ku, “Choice of Language in Bilateral Treaties: Fifty Years of Changing State 
Practice”, 3 Indiana International and Comparative Law Review (1993), 223 et seq., at 242. 
378 See  J. K. Gamble and C. Ku, “Choice of Language in Bilateral Treaties: Fifty Years of Changing State 
Practice”, 3 Indiana International and Comparative Law Review (1993), 223 et seq., at 243. 
379 Such a single authentic text is in the French language in nearly 60% of the cases and in the English language 
in nearly 30% of the cases; however, the study shows an inversion in the tendency to choose the language for 
the single authentic text: in fact, while in the ’20, ’30 and ’40 of the last century French overwhelmed English, 
the ’50 and ’60 are characterized by an inverse trend (seeJ. K. Gamble and C. Ku, “Choice of Language in 
Bilateral Treaties: Fifty Years of Changing State Practice”, 3 Indiana International and Comparative Law 
Review (1993), 223 et seq., at 243-245). 
380 See J. K. Gamble and C. Ku, “Choice of Language in Bilateral Treaties: Fifty Years of Changing State 
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trend toward abandoning the use of a lingua franca and toward restating the equal status 
and sovereignty of the contracting States through the use of their own official languages 
for treaty purposes. 
It is necessary to stress, however, that the study of Gamble and Ku does not 
provide the author with any data on the treaties concluded in the last 40 years, a period 
long enough to indicate significant reversals of linguistic trends in bilateral treaty 
practice. 
 
In 2005, Maisto published a study on the impact of multilingualism on the interpretation 
of tax treaties and (then) European Community law.381 In that study, country reporters 
from Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Switzerland listed 
the tax treaties (in force) concluded by their respective countries, including information 
concerning the authentic texts thereof. The analysis of such lists sheds some light on the 
linguistic practice followed by (a few) OECD member States when concluding their tax 
treaties. Although the sample, amounting to 512 treaties, covers just about one sixth of 
the total tax treaties currently in force worldwide, which may be estimated as 
approximately 3,000 units,382 and does not include any treaties concluded between 
developing countries, which might present different linguistic features due to the 
widespread diffusion of the French, Spanish and Portuguese languages in certain areas 
caused by historic political reasons, this study highlights some interesting trends.  
Of the tax treaties listed, about 17% have been authenticated in one language 
only, 39% in two languages, 39% in three languages and 5% in four or more 
languages.383 Moreover, 189 treaties provide that a specific authentic text is to prevail in 
the case of (apparent) conflicts; this means that, of the 424 tax treaties authenticated in 
two or more languages, about 45% provide for a prevailing language in cases of 
(apparent) divergences among the texts and 55% do not. 
About 55% of the sample tax treaties have been authenticated only in the official 
languages of the two contracting States. Of these treaties, the overwhelming majority do 
not provide for any prevailing language.384 Moreover, 14% thereof have been 
                                                                                                                                  
Practice”, 3 Indiana International and Comparative Law Review (1993), 223 et seq., at 263. 
381 G. Maisto (ed.), Multilingual Texts and Interpretation of Tax Treaties and EC Tax Law (Amsterdam: IBFD 
Publications, 2005). 
382 According to Eassen, citing the Worldwide Investment Report 1998: Trends and Determinants (UNCTAD, 
1998), at the end of the the XX century the number of tax treaties in force was approaching 2,000 (see A. 
Easson, “Do We Sill Need Tax Treaties?”, 54 Bulletin for international taxation (2000), 619 et seq., at 619). 
According to Arnold, Sasseville and Zolt, this number exceeded 2,500 at the beginning of the XXI century (see 
B. Arnold, J. Sasseville and E. Zolt, “Summary of the Proceedings of an Invitational Seminar on Tax Treaties 
in the 21st Century”, 56 Bulletin for international taxation (2002), 233 et seq., at 233; see similarly P. Egger et 
al., “The Impact of Endogenous Tax Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment: Theory and Evidence”, 39 
Canadian Journal of Economics (2006), 901 et seq., at 902). A query made by the author on the IBFD Tax 
Treaty Database (accessed on 24 June 2011) shows the number of income and capital tax treaties currently in 
force to equal 4,419; this figure, however, significantly exceeds the actual number of tax treaties currently in 
force worldwide due to the fact that each authentic text and unofficial English translation of these tax treaties is 
included in the database as an autonomous item. 
383 Only the 1998 Belgium-Kazakhstan tax treaty has been authenticated in five languages, namely the French, 
Dutch, English Russian and Kazakhstan ones, English prevailing in the case of conflict.  
384 Exceptions are, for instance, the 1999 Austria-India tax treaty, where the German, English and Hindi texts 
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authenticated in one language only,385 14% in three languages and 71% in two 
languages; only three treaties have been authenticated in four languages.   
Among the other 45% of the tax treaties listed, i.e. those authenticated (also) in a 
language that is not an official language of any contracting State, approximately 22% 
have been authenticated only in a “neutral” language, 68% in three languages and 10% 
in four or more languages; none has been authenticated in two languages. Those 
authenticated in three or more languages generally provide for the text drafted in the 
“neutral” language to prevail in the case of (apparent) divergences among the texts.386 
                                                                                                                                  
are all equally authentic, but, “[i]n the case of a divergence among the texts, the English text shall be the 
operative one”;  the 1973 Germany-South Africa tax treaty, where the English, Afrikaans and German texts are 
all equally authentic, “except in the case of doubt when the English text shall prevail”; the 1968 Belgium-
Greece tax treaty, where the Dutch, French and Greek texts are all equally authentic, but, “[i]n the event of 
divergence between the texts, the French text shall be decisive” (the same holds true with regard to the 2004 
Belgium-Greece tax treaty, which entered into force in 2006). 
385 The majority of these tax treaties have been authenticated in a language that is official in both contracting 
States, such as (i) German in the 2000 Austria-German tax treaty, the 1969 Austria-Lichtenstein tax treaty, 
1962 Austria-Luxembourg tax treaty, the 1974 Austria-Switzerland tax treaty, or the 1971 Germany-
Switzerland tax treaty; (ii) French in the 1964 Belgium-France tax treaty (although De Boek (see R. De Boek, 
“Belgium”, in G. Maisto (ed.), Multilingual Texts and Interpretation of Tax Treaties and EC Tax Law 
(Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2005), 165 et seq., at 172 and 196) affirms that the 1964 Belgium-France tax 
treaty has been authenticated in both the French and the Dutch language, from the text of the treaty as resulting 
from Volume 557 of the United Nations Treaty Series and the United Nations on-line registry (Url: 
http://treaties.un.org/pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=080000028012bf50) it appears that the treaty has been 
concluded in the French language only; see accordingly C. Legros, “France”, in G. Maisto (ed.), Multilingual 
Texts and Interpretation of Tax Treaties and EC Tax Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2005), 199 et seq., 
at 217), the 1975 Benin-France tax treaty, the 1965 Burkina Faso-France tax treaty, the 1987 Congo (Republic 
of)-France tax treaty, the 1966 France-Gabon tax treaty and the 1966 France-Switzerland tax treaty; (iii) Italian 
in the 1976 Italy-Switzerland tax treaty; (iv) Dutch in the 1975 Netherlands-Suriname tax treaty.  
386 That is the case in about the 34% of the total sample, i.e. the 85% of the relevant sub-category. This figure 
might be taken as evidence of the willingness of the contracting States to prevent errors occurring in the 
translation from the originally agreed-upon text (i.e. the one drafted in the “neutral” language by the treaty 
negotiators) into the texts drafted in the contracting States official languages could negatively affect the 
interpretation and thus the application of the tax treaty.  
It is interesting to note that, according to the final clauses of a few tax treaties, the texts drafted in the official 
languages of the two contracting States are equally authentic and, in the case of any divergence between such 
texts, the “neutral” text is to prevail. For instance, the final clause of the 1970 Japan-Netherlands tax treaty 
states the following: “Done at The Hague, on March 3, 1970 in six originals, two each in the Netherlands, 
Japanese and English languages. The Netherlands and Japanese texts are equally authentic and, in case there is 
any divergence of interpretation between the Japanese and Netherlands texts, the English text shall prevail”. 
Where the final clause is drafted along such an unusual pattern, the question may arise as to whether the 
interpreter is entitled to consult and base his construction (also) on the English text before an (apparent) 
divergence between the Japanese and the Dutch authentic texts is detected and noted. According to Lang, this 
question should be answered in the negative (see M. Lang, “The Interpretation of Tax Treaties and Authentic 
Languages”, in G. Maisto, A. Nikolakakis and J. M. Ulmer (eds.), Essays on Tax Treaties. A Tribute to David 
A. Ward (Amsterdam: IBFD and Canadian Tax Foundation, 2013), 15 et seq, at 16; see also M. Lang, 
“Auslegung von Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen und authentische Vertragssprachen”, 20 Internationales 
Steuerrecht (2011), 403 et seq.). The author, however, notes that Lang’s conclusion, although supported by the 
syntax of the final clause in the English authentic text (which, ironically, according to that reading of the final 
clause itself cannot be relied upon before a potential divergence between the other two authentic texts has been 
mentioned), does appear in conflict with the reasonable object and purpose of providing for a prevailing text, 
the latter being to avoid that the translation of the “neutral” text, originally agreed upon by the contracting 
States representatives (in primis the treaty negotiators), into the other authentic texts, drafted in the official 
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The “neutral” language commonly employed is English, French being used only in 14 
treaties. 
One may thus conclude that contracting States are quite firm in not conceding any 
linguistic advantage to the respective treaty partners and to preserve State equality in this 
field. About 89% of the listed treaties have their authentic texts drafted in the official 
languages of both contracting States (at least one official language for each State), while 
about 10% are authenticated only in a “neutral language”: this means that in only 1% of 
the sample treaties one party has conceded a linguistic advantage to the other contracting 
State, by authenticating the tax treaty only in the official language of the latter; that 
appears to be the case only where the former State is a developed country, while the 
other is (or was) a developing one.387 Furthermore, in very few cases the listed tax 
treaties provide that the official language of one or both contracting States (i.e. not a 
“neutral language”) is to prevail in the case of (apparent) conflict: over 12 cases (just 2% 
of the total sample), in eight the prevailing text is drafted in English, which is also the 
official language of the economically weaker388 contracting State;389 in four the 
prevailing text is drafted in French.390   
 
Finally, the comparison between the tax treaty lists included in the study published by 
Maisto and the statistics reported by Gamble and Ku confirms the trend of contracting 
                                                                                                                                  
languages of the two contracting States by the relevant departments of the respective Ministries of Foreign 
Affairs (or Ministries of Finance), could inadvertently lead to a perceived change in the meaning of the treaty 
provisions. If that is the object and purpose of the final clause, it would seem reasonable to conclude that the 
interpreter is always allowed to consult the “neutral” text and to compare it with the authentic text drafted in 
the language of his own State in order to construe the treaty in accordance with, as far as possible, the intended 
meaning agreed upon by the parties. This inference is particularly strong in cases where, such as with regard to 
the 1970 Japan-Netherlands tax treaty, it is reasonable to suspect that the persons called upon to apply the tax 
treaty (taxpayers, tax authorities, tax judges) are not familiar with the official language(s) of the other 
contracting State, in which the other authentic text is drafted: in these cases, in fact, allowing the recourse to 
the “neutral” text only after a potential divergence between the other texts is detected would substantially 
amount to rendering the provision of a prevailing text substantially inoperative, contra the maxim ut res magis 
valeat quam pereat.  
387 E.g. the 1974 Belgium-Malta tax treaty, the 1989 Belgium-Nigeria tax treaty, the1991 Netherlands-Nigeria 
tax treaty, the 1989 Netherlands-Philippines tax treaty and the 1989 Netherlands-Zimbabwe tax treaty, all 
authenticated only in the English language. 
388 At the time of the tax treaty conclusion.  
389 See the 1999 Austria-India tax treaty, authenticated in the German, Hindi and English languages; the 1993 
Belgium-India tax treaty, authenticated in the Dutch, French, Hindi and English languages; the 1995 Germany-
India tax treaty, authenticated in the German, Hindi and English languages; the 1973 Germany-South Africa 
tax treaty, authenticated in the German, Africaans and English languages; the 1993 India-Italy tax treaty, 
authenticated in the Italian, Hindi and English languages; the 1988 India-Netherlands tax treaty, authenticated 
in the Dutch, Hindi and English languages; the 1994 India-Switzerland tax treaty, authenticated in the German, 
Hindi and English languages; the 1998 Philippines-Switzerland tax treaty, authenticated in the German and 
English languages. 
390 See the 1968 Belgium-Greece tax treaty, authenticated in the Dutch, French and Greek languages; the 1982 
Belgium-Hungary tax treaty, authenticated in the Dutch, French and Hungarian languages; the 1996 Belgium-
Romania tax treaty, authenticated in the Dutch, French and Romanian languages; the 1975 Belgium-Tunisia 
tax treaty, authenticated in the Dutch, French and Arabic languages (it should be noted, however, that the 
French language, although not possessing an official status under Tunisian law is widely used within the 
country). 
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States concluding bilateral treaties solely in their official languages. However, with 
regard to treaties concluded not only in the contracting States’ official languages, while 
the statistics provided by Gamble and Ku show that the majority thereof has (or had) 
only one authentic text, generally drafted in a “neutral” language, according to the lists 
reported in the study published by Maisto the majority of such treaties do have three or 
more authentic texts, one drafted in a “neutral” language and the remainder in the 
official languages of the two contracting States. These general trends are symptomatic of 
the willingness of the contracting States, on the one hand, to reaffirm their sovereignty 
and internationally equal status from a linguistic standpoint as well and, on the other 
hand, which seems distinctive of tax treaties, to guarantee that the authentic treaty texts 
are generally also available in their own official languages, in order to facilitate the 
treaties’ interpretation and application by the taxpayers, the tax authorities and the 
competent tax courts, who might not be familiar with other languages, not even French 
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CHAPTER 2 – INTRODUCTION TO THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF 
TREATIES 
 
1. Brief historical background of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
and the International Law Commission391 
 
The idea of developing international law through its codification by means of both the 
restatement of existing rules and the formulation of new rules dates back the end of the 
eighteenth century. In one of his masterpieces, Principles of International Law392 (on 
which he mainly worked between 1786 and 1789), Bentham envisaged the possibility of 
drafting an international law code, based on the application of his principle of utility to 
the relations between nations. However, in planning the structure and content of such a 
code, he made little reference to the existing law of nations, so that the project resembled 
more an integrated collection of new rules than a codification and systematization of 
existing customary international law.  
 
From that moment on, the trend towards the codification of international law has been 
constantly growing, especially due to the initiative of private institutions such as the 
Institut de Droit International, the International Law Association and the Harvard 
Research in International Law.393 Intergovernmental efforts to promote codification and 
development of international law date back to the beginning of the nineteenth century 
and, more specifically, to the Congress of Vienna (1814-1815), where legal provisions 
relating, inter alia, to the abolition of the slave trade and the rank of diplomatic agents 
were adopted by the signatory Powers of the 1814 Treaty of Paris.394  
 
A major step in this intergovernmental activity is represented by the resolution taken by 
the Assembly of the League of Nations on 22 September 1924, which envisaged the 
creation of a standing organ (the Committee of Experts for the Progressive Codification 
of International Law) with the task of (i) preparing a list of subject matters whose 
regulation by means of international agreements was the most desirable and realizable; 
                                                     
391 For complete references to the history of the International Law Commission and the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties see The Work of the International Law Commission, United Nations, Office of Legal 
Affairs (2004) and S. Rosenne, The Law of Treaties – A Guide to the legislative history of the Vienna 
Convention (New York: Oceana Publications, 1970), respectively. See also F. Engelen, Interpretation of Tax 
Treaties under International Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2004), in particular Chapters 3 and 4. 
392 J. Bentham, Principles of International Law (Bowring edition, 1843) is available on the website of the 
University of Texas at Austin: http://www.laits.utexas.edu/poltheory/bentham/pil/index.html  
393 In this respect, see document A/AC.10/25, “Note on the private codification of public international law” 
available on the website of the United Nations: http://www.un.org/law 
394 Treaty signed on 30 May 1814 by France, on the one side, and the Allies (i.e. Austria, Great Britain, 
Prussia, Russia, Sweden and Portugal), on the other side. 
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(ii) examining and reporting on the comments made by governments on such a list and 
(iii) making proposals on the procedures to be followed in preparing the conferences for 
the regulation of these  subject matters.395 The Committee of Experts for the Progressive 
Codification of International Law was, therefore, an organ with both a proposing and an 
advisory scope and represented the major means of the first intergovernmental attempt to 
codify and develop entire fields of international law with a worldwide reach. However, 
the only tangible result of the League of Nation’s initiative was the drafting of four 
international instruments, all concerning different issues relating to nationality, by the 
Codification Conference held in The Hague from 13 March through 12 April 1930; this 
Conference had worked on an initial proposal by the Committee of Experts for the 
Progressive Codification of International Law, then developed by a five persons 
Preparatory Committee.396 On 25 September 1931, the League of Nations Assembly 
adopted a resolution on the procedure of codification, which strengthened the influence 
of governments at every stage of the process of codifying international instruments.397 
Such a resolution appears particularly relevant since some of its most significant features 
and recommendations were subsequently incorporated in the Statute of the International 
Law Commission of the United Nations, in particular the requirement of a greater 
involvement of governments in all the different stages of the codification process, the 
call for a close collaboration in such a process of international and national scientific 
institutes and the need to entrust an expert committee with the preparation of draft 
instruments.  
 
After the Second World War, the role played by the League of Nations was picked up by 
the United Nations. As well documented by the transcripts of the United Nations 
Conference on International Organization,398 the governments participating in the 
Conference were neither strongly oriented toward leaving any legislative power to the 
United Nations for issuing binding instruments of international law, nor to accepting any 
such instruments that could have been voted by the majority of the member States. On 
the contrary, widespread agreement existed on the opportunity to give the United 
Nations the task of studying problematic subject matters in the field of international law 
and recommending possible solutions to the member States.399 This approach resulted in 
the inclusion of Article 13(1) in the United Nations Charter, according to which the 
“General Assembly shall initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of 
                                                     
395 See the Official Journal of the League of Nations, Special Supplement, no. 21, p. 10. 
396 On 12 April 1930, the Conference adopted the following instruments: (i) Convention on certain questions 
relating to the conflict of nationality laws (see League of Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 179, p. 89); (ii) Protocol 
relating to military obligations in certain cases of double nationality (see League of Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 
178, p. 227); (iii) Protocol relating to a certain case of statelessness (see League of Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 
179, p. 115); (iv) Special Protocol concerning statelessness (see League of Nations, document 
C.27.M.16.1931.V). The first three instruments have been in force since 1937.  
397 See the Official Journal of the League of Nations, Special Supplement, no. 92, p. 9. 
398 The conference held from 25 April to 26 June 1945 in San Francisco and resulted in the creation of the 
United Nations Charter. 
399 See United Nations, Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, held from 
25 April to 26 June 1945 in San Francisco, vol. 3, documents 1 and 2; vol. 8, document 1151; and vol. 9, 
documents 203, 416, 507, 536, 571, 792, 795 and 848. 
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(…) encouraging the progressive development of international law and its codification”. 
In light of this obligation, the General Assembly400 decided to create a Committee on the 
Progressive Development of International Law and its Codification, which, in turn, had 
to study and recommend the methods by which the United Nations and, more 
specifically, the General Assembly should have encouraged the progressive development 
of international law and its codification.401 The Committee on the Progressive 
Development of International Law and its Codification concluded its work by adopting a 
report recommending the establishment of an international law commission and 
proposing some provisions for drafting its statute.402  
 
Following that proposal, the General Assembly, on 21 November 1947, adopted 
resolution 174(II) by means of which the International Law Commission (hereafter 
“ILC”) was established. According to Article 1 of the ILC’s Statute, the object of the 
ILC is “the promotion of the progressive development of international law403 and its 
codification”. In that respect, Article 15 of the same Statute defines “for convenience” (i) 
progressive development as “the preparation of draft conventions on subjects which have 
not yet been regulated by international law or in regard to which the law has not yet been 
sufficiently developed in the practice of States” and (ii) codification as “the more precise 
formulation and systematization of rules of international law in fields where there 
already has been extensive State practice, precedent and doctrine”.  
 As a matter of fact, the Commission’s work on a certain topic generally involves 
aspects of both the progressive development and the codification of international law.404 
The 34 members of the ILC are chosen among persons of recognized competence in 
international law and serve in their individual capacity.405 In addition, no two members 
of the ILC may be nationals of the same State.406 With reference to the structure of the 
ILC, a figure of capital importance for the functioning thereof is that of the Special 
Rapporteur. This is a member of the ILC who is appointed by the latter at the early stage 
of the consideration of a topic and who continues to perform his specific functions until 
the ILC has completed its work on such a topic, provided that he remains a member of 
the ILC until that moment. The Special Rapporteur performs many crucial tasks, among 
whichs worth highlighting is (i) the preparation of reports on the topic that are submitted 
                                                     
400 Hereafter, unless otherwise specified, any reference to the General Assembly is intended as made to the 
General Assembly of the United Nations. 
401 See the Resolution 94 (I) adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 11 December 1946. 
402 See the Official Records of the General Assembly, Second Session, Sixth Committee, Annex 1. 
403 According to the second paragraph of Article 1 of the its Statute, the ILC “shall concern itself primarily 
with public international law, but is not precluded from entering the field of private international law”. As a 
matter of fact, since its institution the ILC has predominantly worked in the field of public international law 
and criminal international law.  
404 See, among other ones, paragraph 102 of the Report of the Working Group on review of the multilateral 
treaty-making process (Document A/CN.4/325), in YBILC 1979-II (part I), p. 210. 
405 See Article 2(1) of the ILC’s Statute and the historical backgroung thereof in United Nations, The Work of 
the International Law Commission (UN Office of Legal Affairs, 2004), pp. 5 et seq. and the extracts thereof 
available on their website: http://www.un.org/law/ilc/. There were originally 15 members. The current number 
has been established by the General Assembly by its resolution no. 36/39 adopted on 18 November 1981. 
406 See Article 2(2) of the ILC’s Statute. 
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to the plenary ILC, (ii) the participation in and contribution to the work of the ILC’s 
Drafting Committee407 on the topic and (iii) the elaboration of commentaries to draft 
articles. In substance, his main functions consist in drawing the borders of the topic 
discussion, developing its content for the purpose of the analysis to be performed by the 
ILC and making proposals for draft articles of an international instrument on the topic.408 
 
The ILC, whose first election took place on 3 November 1948, opened the first of its 
annual sessions on 12 April 1949. During that session, the ILC drew up a provisional list 
of 14 topics suitable for future codification. The “Law of Treaties” was one of the topics 
included in the list. However, until the end of the fifties, notwithstanding the work 
carried on by the Special Rapporteurs409 and the reports produced thereby, the ILC had 
barely discussed the topic. Things changed at the beginning of the following decade.  
 Between 1962 and 1966, the ILC had done significant work on the topic on the 
basis of the six reports submitted by Sir Humphrey Waldock, who acted as Special 
Rapporteur.410 In 1966, the ILC delivered a draft convention to the General Assembly 
(hereafter, the “1966 Draft”), accompanied by a commentary thereon and a 
recommendation, according to which the General Assembly was to organized an 
international conference for the purpose of studying the draft and concluding a 
convention on the topic.411 In 1966 and 1967, the General Assembly issued two 
resolutions addressed to member States by means of which it convened the United 
Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties (hereafter the “Conference”).412 The 
                                                     
407 The Drafting Committee is a working sub-group of the ILC whose members vary from session to session 
and, since 1992, from topic to topic at any given session. The Drafting Committee plays an important role in 
harmonizing the various viewpoints and working out generally acceptable solutions. The Drafting Committee 
is entrusted with the task of harmonizing the different viewpoints of the ILC’s members both from a purely 
drafting perspective and from a more substantive perspective, especially when the plenary ILC has been unable 
to resolve certain issues or an unduly protracted discussion is anticipated. This activity generally leads to the 
drafting of a specific text on the topic, or part thereof (e.g. draft articles or commentaries), which is presented 
as proposal to the plenary ILC. The latter may subject such text to amendments or alternative formulations and 
then refer it back to the Drafting Committee for further consideration. See YBILC 1958-II, p. 108, para. 65; 
YBILC 1979-II (part I), pp.197-198, paras. 45 et seq.; YBILC 1987-II (part II), p. 55, paras. 237 et seq.; 
YBILC 1992-II (part II), p. 54, para. 371; YBILC 1996-II (part II), p. 85, para. 148 (j) and pp. 93-94, paras. 
212 et seq. 
408 See, among other documents, YBILC 1982-II (part II), pp. 123-124, para. 271; YBILC 1996-II (part II), p. 
91, paras. 188 et seq.  
409 The Special Rapporteurs who dealt with the “Law of Treaties” in this period were Brierly, Lauterpacht and 
Fitzmaurice.  
410 At its thirteenth session, in 1961, the ILC elected Sir Humphrey Waldock to succeed Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice 
as Special Rapporteur on the Law of Treaties, since the latter had to retire from the ILC on his election as 
judge of the International Court of Justice. At the same time, the ILC took three main decisions as to its work 
on the law of treaties, according to which: (i) the aim of the work on that subject was to prepare draft articles 
on the law of treaties intended to serve as the basis for a convention; (ii) the Special Rapporteur had been 
requested to re-examine the work previously done in this field by the ILC and the previous Special 
Rapporteurs; (iii) the Special Rapporteur had to begin with the issues concerning the conclusion of treaties and 
then proceed with the remainder of the subject, if possible covering the entire subject in two years. See Official 
Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Supplement no. 9 (A/4843), para. 39. 
411 The procedure followed by the ILC founds its legal basis in Article 23(1-d) of the ILC’s statute. 
412 General Assembly Resolution 2166(XXI) of 5 December 1966 (see Official Records of the General 
Assembly of the United Nations, Twenty-first Session, Supplement No. 16, UN Doc. A-6316, p.95) and 
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Conference was held in Vienna between 26 March and 24 May 1968 and between 9 
April and 22 May 1969. The VCLT was adopted by the Conference on 22 May 1969 and 
opened for signature on 23 May 1969.413 It entered into force on 27 January 1980 for the 
35 States that deposited their instruments of accession or ratification with the Secretary-
General of the United Nations on or before 28 December 1980.414 As of 26 September 
2011, the VCLT has entered into force for 111 States.415  
 
2. Scope of the VCLT 
 
The VCLT applies (only) to treaties concluded between States.416 For the purpose of the 
application of the VCLT, the term “treaty” must be understood as “an international 
agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, 
whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and 
whatever its particular designation”.417 It is important to note that an international 
agreement is to be considered a “treaty” for the purpose of the VCLT only where the 
parties intended to create a legal relationship from which international rights and 
obligations arise. This is made clear by the Commentary on Article 2 of the 1966 Draft, 
according to which the element of intention is implicit in the phrase “governed by 
international law”.418 Where such an intention is present, written agreements419 between 
States420 constitute “treaties” for the purpose of the VCLT even if informally concluded 
                                                                                                                                  
General Assembly Resolution 2287(XXII) of 6 December 1967 (see Official Records of the General Assembly 
of the United Nations, Twenty-second Session, Supplement No. 16, UN Doc. A-6716, p.80). 
413 The VCLT was concluded in the following authentic languages: English, French, Spanish, Russian and 
Chinese. For the purpose of its signature, it was deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 
Interestingly, the VCLT was open for signature not only by States who were members of the United Nations, 
but also by any of the specialized agencies, the International Atomic Energy Agency and parties to the Statute 
of the International Court of Justice, and any other State invited by the General Assembly to become a party to 
the Convention. 
414 See Article 84(1) VCLT to this extent. 
415 See United Nations Treaty Collection Database, available at http://treaties.un.org. 
416 Article 1 VCLT.  
417 Article 2(1-a) VCLT. On the definition of “treaty” for the purpose of the VCLT, see R. Jennings and A. 
Watts (eds.), Oppenheim’s International Law. Volume I. Peace (London: Longman, 1992), pp. 1199-1203.  
418 See YBILC 1966- II, p. 189, para. 6. 
419 It is important to emphasize that, even if oral agreements are excluded, as such, from the definition of 
“treaties” relevant for the application of the VCLT, this does not mean that they have no legal status as 
international obligations among States, as clarified by Article 3 VCLT. In this respect, the Commentary to the 
1966 Draft recognizes that oral international agreements may “possess legal force and that certain of the 
substantive rues set out in the draft articles may have relevance also in regard to such agreements” (YBILC, 
1966- II, p. 190, para. 3). In addition, Article 3 VCLT also makes clear that the rules of the VCLT that 
represent customary international law apply to oral international agreements. To that extent, see also UNCLT-
1st, p. 146, paras. 5-6. 
420 Treaties between one or more States and one or more international organizations are regulated by the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between 
International Organizations of 21 March 1986. However, according to Article 3(c) VCLT, the VCLT applies to 
the relations between States that are regulated by international agreements to which other subjects of 
international law are also parties. For the purpose and scope of such provision of Article 3 VCLT, see also 
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as “memoranda of understandings”, “exchange of note”, or similar instruments.421 In that 
case, the rules enshrined in the VCLT, in particular the provisions on treaty 
interpretation, apply to the treaties notwithstanding their specific nature and object.422 
 
With regard to the temporal scope of the VCLT, the general rule is established by Article 
4 VCLT, according to which the convention does not have retroactive effect.423 This rule 
appears coherent with that provided for in Article 28 VCLT, stating that the provisions 
of a treaty do not bind a party in relation to any act or fact that took place or any 
situation that ceased to exist before the date of entry into force of the treaty with respect 
to that party, unless a different intention appears from the treaty itself or is otherwise 
established.  
 However, such a general rule does contain a relevant exception, provided for in 
the very same Article 4 VCLT:  the ban of retroactive effect does not apply with 
reference to all rules enshrined in the VCLT that would have been applicable under 
international law independently from the entry into force of the VCLT. In that respect, 
this exception makes clear that rules of customary international law that predate the 
(entry into force of the) VCLT continue to apply as if the latter had never come into 
force.424  
 
In light of the above analysis and for the purpose of the present study, it is critical to 
ascertain whether the rules on treaty interpretation, provided for in Articles 31 through 
33 VCLT, may be considered to be codification of customary law. The answer to such a 
question constitutes guidance in determining whether the rules on interpretation 
mentioned in the VCLT are applicable to treaties concluded by States not party to the 
VCLT, and to treaties concluded before the entry into force of the VCLT.  
 
Throughout the debate on treaty interpretation and up to the formulation of Articles 27-
29 of the 1966 Draft, the ILC was careful not to go beyond the realm of declaratory 
codification and not to formulate innovative rules or, in any case, provisions for which 
                                                                                                                                  
UNCLT-1st, p. 147, para. 7. Finally, pursuant to Article 5, VCLT also applies to treaties between States 
through which international organizations are constituted and to treaties adopted within international 
organizations, without prejudice to any applicable rule of the organization. 
421 See YBILC 1966- II, p. 188, para. 2.  
422 To this extent, see YBILC 1966- II, p. 219, para. 6. For a specific instance, see ICJ, 12 November 1991, 
Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bassau v. Senegal), judgment, para. 48. 
423 On the topic of the temporal application of the VCLT see, among others, I. Sinclair, The Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), pp. 7-9; S. Rosenne, “The Temporal 
application of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties”, 4 Cornell International Law Journal (1970), 1 
et seq., at 5-12; F. Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law (Amsterdam: IBFD 
Publications, 2004), pp. 48-54. Article 4 VCLT was not included in the 1966 Draft and was added to the final 
version of the VCLT following a proposal submitted by five States during the second session of the 
Conference. 
424 See also the Preamble to the VCLT, where it is affirmed that “the rules of customary international law will 
continue to govern questions not regulated by the provisions of the present Convention”.  The same holds true 
for rules of international law from sources other than custom that predate the entry into force of the VCLT. 
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there was no basis in existing usage.425 The final text of the VCLT testifies to such an 
approach, having many instances of this kind, such as: the primary reference to the text 
of the treaty as expression of the intention of the parties; the absence of detailed rules of 
interpretation, in favor of broad and general principles; the refusal to include automatic 
rules of interpretation that could prove unsatisfactory in certain circumstances, leading to 
faulty conclusions; the relevant role played by the object and purpose of the treaty; the 
provision that all authentic texts have equal authority, lacking a different agreement of 
the parties thereon; the absence of any guidance concerning the moment when the agreed 
rule giving priority to one authentic text over another should be activated, due to the lack 
of unequivocal guidance from previous jurisprudence on such an issue.426  
 
This would make a good argument in favor of the possibility that the principles 
enshrined in Articles 31-33 VCLT, or at least most of them, could be considered rules of 
customary international law. 
The point is of primary relevance, since a conclusion in the affirmative would 
lead to the undisputed application of such rules both in respect of treaties concluded 
before the entry into force of the VCLT and in respect of treaties concluded by States 
that are not party to the VCLT. 
According to Rosenne, regardless of what may have been customary international 
law before the VCLT, the meticulous preparation of its provision by the ILC, the careful 
study and reactions by governments and the proceedings of the Vienna Conference 
constitute a significant process of definition and consolidation of the customary 
international law of treaties that became crystallized through the adoption of the 
VCLT.427 Since the relevant conditions were generally fulfilled,428 that author concluded 
that most of the rules of the VCLT could have become customary law and, as such, 
binding as well for those States that did not become party to the VCLT. Rosenne also 
noted that the original purpose of the ILC’s activity (i.e. finding out and clarifying just 
the general principles of law applicable to treaties) and the abandonment by the ILC of 
the distinction between the activity of “codification” and that of “progressive 
development” of international law, as provided for in the ILC’s statute, pointed towards 
the characterization of the VCLT provisions as “rules of international law”, with the 
meaning this expression assumes under Article 4 VCLT (i.e., mainly, customary 
                                                     
425 Similarly, M. Tabory, Multilingualism In International Law and Institutions (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff 
& Noordhoff, 1980), p. 175. 
426 See M. Tabory, Multilingualism In International Law and Institutions (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & 
Noordhoff, 1980), p. 175. 
427 S. Rosenne, “The Temporal application of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties”, 4 Cornell 
International Law Journal (1970), 1 et seq., at 20. Apparently against the possibility that the provisions of 
Articles 31 and 32 VCLT represented a codification of customary law was the representative of Sweden at the 
Committee of the Whole of the Vienna Conference, who, in his capacity as such, emphasized that “codification 
would obviously not have sufficed” and the that work of the ILC “involved the progressive development of a 
part of the law of treaties which was as yet obscure” (UNCLT-1st,, p. 178, para. 18). Similarly, see S. E. 
Nahlik, “La conférence de Vienne sur le droit des traités: une vue d'ensemble”, in 15 Annuaire français de 
droit international (1969), 24 et seq., at 40. 
428 See the conditions discussed in S. Rosenne, “The Temporal application of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties”, 4 Cornell International Law Journal (1970), 1 et seq., at 20 et seq. 
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international law).429 In that respect, Rosenne concluded that such a role assumed by the 
provisions of the VCLT, except the provisions of Article 66 thereof, should be 
recognized erga omnes, at least with regard to all treaties concluded since 22 May 
1969.430 
 
Tabory elaborated on the thesis of Rosenne and affirmed that most of the principles of 
interpretation enshrined in the VCLT, including those relevant for the interpretation of 
multilingual treaties, constituted pre-existing rules of customary law.431 Their generality, 
the lack of specific technical rules to be applied and of a rigid order in the rules for 
resolving divergences among the various authentic texts (which have been often 
criticized) represented a flexible and generally accepted framework, within which it was 
left to the interpreter to find the best solution with regard to both the specific principles 
and maxims to be applied in the actual case and the meaning to be attached to terms and 
expressions selected by the parties to convey a certain agreed message. According to 
Tabory, in fact, no mechanical rule was provided for in the VCLT since “(t)reaties being 
arrangements negotiated and drafted by human beings, expressed in words which are by 
nature perhaps ambiguous and in languages which are inherently different, they will 
necessarily be open to interpretation by a combination  of human discretion, 
understanding, expertise and judgment, which go beyond any mechanical rules”.432 The 
nature of the rules of interpretation enshrined in the VCLT made easier to consider them 
either as codification of pre-existing customary rules, or as customary rules crystallized 
by means of the very same VCLT.  
 
On the other hand, Sur pointed out that the actual impact of the VCLT provisions dealing 
with the interpretation of treaties depended on whether many States had become parties 
to the VCLT and on the subsequent practice based on the application of that 
convention.433 In this respect, he noted that before the conclusion of the VCLT, the case 
law of international courts and tribunals dealing with treaty interpretation appeared 
controversial and lacking of a solid theoretical basis, while the constructions developed 
by scholars appeared fragile and not well-rooted. Based on this analysis, he concluded 
that, at least until the beginning of the seventies, the interpretation of treaties was 
characterized to a great extent by uncertainty.434 
 
                                                     
429 See S. Rosenne, “The Temporal application of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties”, 4 Cornell 
International Law Journal (1970), 1 et seq., at 21 et seq. 
430 Date of adoption of the VCLT. See S. Rosenne, “The Temporal application of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties”, 4 Cornell International Law Journal (1970), 1 et seq., at 23-24. 
431 See M. Tabory, Multilingualism In International Law and Institutions (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & 
Noordhoff, 1980), p. 218. 
432 M. Tabory, Multilingualism In International Law and Institutions (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & 
Noordhoff, 1980), p. 218. 
433 S. Sur, L'interprétation en droit international public (Paris: Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, 
1974), pp. 284 and 285. 
434 S. Sur, L'interprétation en droit international public (Paris: Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, 
1974), pp. 266-267. 
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From the above, it is clear that, although the rules on treaty interpretation provided for in 
the VCLT are potentially of a norm-creating character435 and, as such, they can form the 
basis of generally-accepted rules of international law, the actual recognition thereof as 
rules of customary international law depends to a large extent on the judicial practice 
following the conclusion of the VCLT. 
According to Torres Bernárdez,436 former ad hoc judge of the ICJ, until the 
nineties of the last century, the ICJ had never explicitly recognized the declaratory nature 
of Articles 31-33 VCLT. While other international courts and tribunals, only a few years 
after the conclusion of the VCLT, took the position that such articles merely codified 
principles of customary international law,437 the ICJ waited until 1991 to do the same. In 
the case Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989, the ICJ concluded that Articles 31 and 32 
VCLT might, in many respects, be considered a “codification of existing customary 
international law”.438 Since then, the Court has consistently upheld the conclusion 
reached in such a judgment439 and, in the Kasikili/Sedudu Island case, it even found the 
rule enshrined in Article 31 VCLT applicable for the purpose of interpreting a treaty 
concluded in 1890.440 As Torres Bernardez put it, according to the recent jurisprudence 
of the ICJ, the VCLT “rules on interpretation of treaties as they stand” are fully 
recognized as “existing customary law”.441  
With specific regard to Article 33 VCLT, Torres Bernárdez recognized, on the 
one hand, that until 1998 (the year of publication of his article on the subject) the ICJ 
had never affirmed the customary law nature thereof; on the other hand, however, he 
took the view that the absence of an express characterization in that sense of Article 33 
VCLT was probably the mere consequence of the circumstances of the cases actually 
                                                     
435 See S. Rosenne, “The Temporal application of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties”, 4 Cornell 
International Law Journal (1970), 1 et seq., at 22. 
436 See S. Torres Bernárdez, “Interpretation of treaties by the International Court of Justice following the 
adoption of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties”, in G. Hafner et al. (eds.), Liber Amicorum 
Professor Seidl-Hohenvelder – in honour of his 80th birthday (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998), 
721 et seq.   
437 See the case law mentioned by in I. Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1984), p. 19 and, with specific reference to Article 33 VCLT, Arbitral Tribunal 
for the Agreement on German External Debts, 16 May 1980, The Kingdom of Belgium et al. v. the Federal 
Republic of Germany (Young Loan), 59 International Law Reports (1980), 494 et seq., at 529, para. 16. 
438 ICJ, 21 November 1991, Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bassau v. Senegal), judgment, para. 48. 
439 See, among other decisions, ICJ, 11 September 1992, Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El 
Salvador v. Honduras), judgment, para. 380; ICJ, 3 February 1994, Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya v. Chad), judgment, para. 41; ICJ, 15 February 1995, Maritime Delimitation and Territorial 
Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), judgment, para. 33. For an exhaustive list of the 
International Court of Justice’s case law dealing with this issue, see S. Torres Bernárdez, “Interpretation of 
treaties by the International Court of Justice following the adoption of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties”, in G. Hafner et al. (eds.), Liber Amicorum Professor Seidl-Hohenvelder – in honour of his 80th 
birthday (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998), 721 et seq., at 735 et seq.; F. Engelen, Interpretation 
of Tax Treaties under International Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2004), pp. 55-56. 
440 See ICJ, 13 December 1999, Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana v. Namibia), judgment, para. 18. 
441 S. Torres Bernárdez, “Interpretation of treaties by the International Court of Justice following the adoption 
of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties”, in G. Hafner et al. (eds.), Liber Amicorum Professor 
Seidl-Hohenvelder – in honour of his 80th birthday (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998), 721 et seq., 
at 737. 
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considered by the Court, rather than evidence of the refusal by the Court to consider the 
principles enshrined in that article as part of customary international law.442 In fact, in 
the recent LaGrand case,443 the ICJ stated that, in cases of a divergence between the 
equally authentic texts of a treaty and where the latter does not indicate how to proceed, 
it is appropriate to refer to Article 33(4) VCLT, which “in the view of the Court again 
reflects customary international law”.444 In this respect, it is interesting to note that (i) 
the specific issue faced by the ICJ445 concerned the interpretation of Article 41 of the 
Court’s Statute, which, being an annex and integral part of the UN Charter, predates the 
adoption of the VCLT and (ii) the case related to a conflict between Germany and the 
United States of America, the latter not being a party to the VCLT at the time of the 
facts, nor at the time of the legal proceedings and of the judgment.  
In light of the previous analysis, it seems reasonable to infer that the ICJ 
considers Articles 31-33 VCLT to reflect customary international law and, thus, regards 
them as applicable in order to interpret both treaties concluded before the adoption of the 
VCLT and treaties concluded by States that are not party to that convention.446 
 
 
                                                     
442 See S. Torres Bernárdez, “Interpretation of treaties by the International Court of Justice following the 
adoption of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties”, in G. Hafner et al. (eds.), Liber Amicorum 
Professor Seidl-Hohenvelder – in honour of his 80th birthday (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998), 
721 et seq., at 737. 
443 ICJ, 27 June 2001, LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), judgment.   
444 See ICJ, 27 June 2001, LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), judgment, para. 101. For a 
previous explicit reference by the ICJ to the relevance of Article 33 VCLT, although without an express 
recognition thereof as customary international law, see ICJ, 13 December 1999, Kasikili/Sedudu Island 
(Botswana v. Namibia), judgment, para. 25.  
445 ICJ, 27 June 2001, LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), judgment, paras. 92 et seq., concerning 
Germany’s third submission.  
446 According to Linderfalk, “customary law also contains a set of rules to be used for [interpretation] purpose. 
These rules of international custom are identical to the rules laid down in the Vienna Convention – nowadays, 
a fact on which not only states, but also authors, as well as international courts and tribunals, seem to be in 
agreement. Articles 31-33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties should therefore be seen as 
evidence […] also of the rules that apply according to customary international law between states in general” 
(see U. Linderfalk, On the Interpretation of Treaties. The Modern International Law as Expressed in the 1969 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Dordrecht: Springer-Verlag, 2007), p. 7, notes omitted). 
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CHAPTER 3 – POSITIVE ANALYSIS OF THE RULES ENSHRINED IN ARTICLES 31 
AND 32 VCLT AND THEIR CONTRIBUTION TO THE AUTHOR’S 




This chapter is divided into two main sections. 
 
In section 2 the author carries out a positive analysis aimed at revealing the commonly 
accepted practices concerning the interpretation of treaties under international law and, 
more specifically, in the application of Articles 31 and 32 VCLT. In that respect, the 
author’s analysis is mainly based on (i) the case law of international courts and tribunals 
(and, to a lesser extent, national courts) both preceding and subsequent to the conclusion 
of the VCLT, (ii) scholarly writings on the interpretation of treaties and (iii) the travaux 
préparatoires of the VCLT. 
 
Section 3 is devoted to the comparison between the principles of interpretation 
developed by the author in section 1 of Chapter 3 of Part I and the generally accepted 
rules and principles of treaty interpretation resulting from the positive analysis carried 
out in section 2 of this chapter. 
 The inferences drawn from such a comparison will constitute the foundations on 
which the author will build the answers to the research questions on the interpretation of 
multilingual (tax) treaties in Chapters 4 and 5 of this part, i.e. his normative legal theory 
on the interpretation of multilingual tax treaties. 
 
2. Positive analysis of the rules of interpretation enshrined in Articles 
31 and 32 VCLT 
 
“Thus logic and intuition have each their necessary role. Each is indispensable. Logic, 
which alone can give certainty, is the instrument of demonstration; intuition is the 
instrument of invention.” 447 
 
2.1. The ILC’s approach to the codification of the rules on treaty interpretation 
 
                                                     
447 See H. Poincaré (translated by G.B. Halstead), The Foundations of Science: Science and Hypothesis, The 
Value of Science, Science and Methods (Lancaster: The Science Press, 1946), p. 219. 
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From a structural perspective, the task of codifying rules on treaty interpretation required 
the ILC to answer three interrelated sets of questions.  
First, was there any generally accepted rule on interpretation that could be 
inferred from the case law of international courts and arbitration tribunals and from 
States’ practice? If the preceding question was answered in the affirmative, what was the 
nature and content of such rules? Were they detailed and strict, or loose enough to leave 
a certain discretionary power to the interpreter? Were they technical rules applicable 
only to specific situations, or were they principles of general application? 
Second, in the event such customary rules prove to exist, should have they been 
codified as part of the law of treaties? 
Third, where the second question had answered in the affirmative, do these rules 
have to be organized in any hierarchical order?  
 
The first and second sets of questions are dealt with together in the remainder of this 
section. The third question is considered in the following section. 
 
At the ILC’s 726th meeting, i.e. at the beginning of the ILC’s work on the law of treaties, 
Mr Ago submitted that the interpretation of treaties was an issue of capital importance 
for the Commission's work and for the law of treaties in general.448 In this respect, he 
emphasized that the questions concerning the existence and the content of generally 
accepted rules on treaty interpretation449 could not be left aside by the ILC, since such 
rules were the first and foremost means to secure certainty on the law of treaties.  
 This position was upheld by other members of the ILC, such as Mr Elias450 and 
Mr Paredes,451 although with diverging opinions on whether general rules on 
interpretation, or just some detailed rules on specific matters, were to be included in the 
draft codification. Mr Verdross, however, drew attention to the fact that, before 
answering the question of whether rules on interpretation had to be included in a report 
of the law of treaties, the ILC should have clarified whether it recognized the existence 
of such rules; he further noted that it was highly controversial whether the rules 
established by the case law of arbitral tribunals and international courts were general 
rules of international law or merely technical rules.452  
 
At the end of its work on the subject matter, the ILC decided to include in the 1966 Draft 
only the comparatively few general principles that appeared to be largely accepted as 
compulsory rules for the interpretation of treaties.  
 The ILC was aware of the customary recourse to other principles and maxims in 
                                                     
448 YBILC 1964-I, p. 23, para. 34. 
449 Mr Ago put forward the following questions as exemplifications: “what precisely was a technical rule? Was 
it or was it not mandatory? Was there or was there not a rule under which the terms of a treaty must be 
construed in the etymological sense or having regard to the context of the treaty? Was there or was there not a 
rule that in deciding between two possible interpretations of a treaty the preparatory work, the object of the 
treaty and the practice of the parties concerned must be taken into account?” (YBILC 1964-I, p. 23, para. 34). 
450 YBILC 1964-I, p. 22, para. 24. 
451 YBILC 1964-I, p. 22, para. 28. 
452 YBILC 1964-I, p. 21, para. 15. 
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international practice.  
However, it recognized that they were, for the most part, principles of logic and good 
sense and that the recourse to many of them was discretionary rather than obligatory. 
According to the ILC, such principles and maxims were valuable as guides to assist the 
interpreter in appreciating the meaning that the parties might have intended to attach to 
the expressions employed in the treaty, but their suitability for use in any given case 
depended on a variety of considerations that had first to be appreciated by the interpreter 
himself.  
 Therefore, the ILC decided not to codify them as law of treaties and to leave the 
interpreter free to adopt them depending on the particular circumstances of each case.453  
 
The draft articles on treaty interpretation submitted by the ILC to the General Assembly 
(1966 Draft) were then incorporated, with just one relevant change,454 in the VCLT. 
The rules on treaty interpretation included in the VCLT read as follows: 
 
 Article 31  
 General rule of interpretation  
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be 
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.  
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to 
the text, including its preamble and annexes:  
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in 
connection with the conclusion of the treaty;  
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the 
conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the 
treaty.  
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context: 
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty 
or the application of its provisions;  
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement 
of the parties regarding its interpretation;  
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.  
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.  
 
 Article 32  
 Supplementary means of interpretation  
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory 
work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning 
resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the 
interpretation according to article 31:  
 (a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or  
 (b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.  
 
 Article 33  
                                                     
453 Commentary on Articles 27-28 of the 1966 Draft, para. 4 (YBILC 1966-II, p. 218). 
454 See Article 33(4) VCLT, on which see infra. 
PART II: CHAPTER 3 
 148 
 Interpretation of treaties authenticated in two or more languages  
1. When a treaty has been authenticated in two or more languages, the text is equally 
authoritative in each language, unless the treaty provides or the parties agree that, in case 
of divergence, a particular text shall prevail.  
2. A version of the treaty in a language other than one of those in which the text was 
authenticated shall be considered an authentic text only if the treaty so provides or the 
parties so agree.  
3. The terms of the treaty are presumed to have the same meaning in each authentic text.  
4. Except where a particular text prevails in accordance with paragraph 1, when a 
comparison of the authentic texts discloses a difference of meaning which the application 
of articles 31 and 32 does not remove, the meaning which best reconciles the texts, having 
regard to the object and purpose of the treaty, shall be adopted.  
 
2.2. The hierarchical order of the rules of interpretation encompassed in Articles 31 
and 32 VCLT and the metaphor of the “crucible”  
 
With regard to the question whether the few general principles to be included in the draft 
convention on the Law of Treaties had to be organized in some hierarchical order,455 the 
solution adopted by the ILC, and then implemented in the VCLT, is two-sided.  
 
On the one hand, there is hierarchical distinction between the means of interpretation 
provided for in Article 31 VCLT, which “all relate to the agreement between the parties 
at the time when or after it received authentic expression in the text”, and those provided 
for in Article 32 VCLT, which are supplementary and somewhat subordinated to the 
former.456  
This solution has been welcomed by most scholars dealing with the subject 
matter.457 Bernhardt, for instance, praised this solution, which he regarded as reflecting 
the intention of the ILC to give precedence to the text of the treaty, as expression of the 
intention of the parties, over the subjective intention to be derived from other, less 
                                                     
455 On such an issue see Institute of International Law, “Observations des membres de la Commission Sur le 
rapport de M. Lauterpacht. Comments by Sir Eric Beckett”, 43-I Annuaire de L’Institut de Droit International 
(1950), 435 et seq., at 439-440. 
456 Commentary on Articles 27-28 of the 1966 Draft, para. 10 (YBILC 1966-II, p. 220) 
457 See, for example, among the first scholars commenting the 1966 Draft and the VCLT, R. Bernhardt, 
“Interpretation and Implied (Tacit) Modification of Treaties. Comments on Arts. 27, 28, 29 and 38 of the ILC’s 
1966 Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties”, 27 Zeitschrift für Ausländisches Öffentliches Recht und 
Völkerrecht (1967), 491 et seq., at 496; M. Hilf, Die Auslegung mehrsprachiger Verträge. Eine Untersuchung 
zum Völkerrecht und zum Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1973), pp. 87 
and 102 (also quoted in M. Tabory, Multilingualism In International Law and Institutions (Alphen aan den 
Rijn: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1980), p. 205); M. Schröder, “Gedanken zu einer Hierarchie der 
Interpretationsregeln im Völkerrecht”, 21 Revue hellénique de droit international (1968), 122 et seq., at 131-
132. However, others, such as McDougal, strongly criticizes the solution adopted by the ILC, mainly because it 
would unduly restrict the freedom of the interpreter of choosing the most adequate means of interpretation 
available in each specific case (see M. S. McDougal et al., The Interpretation of Agreements and World Public 
Order. Principles of Content and Procedure (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), pp. 992-1000).   
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reliable, sources.458 Similarly, Schröder appreciated the ILC’s decision to distinguish 
between primary (later, Article 31 VCLT) and supplementary (later, Article 32 VCLT) 
means of interpretation and to put the latter in a subsidiary position as compared to the 
former, since it removed the uncertainty existing in practice on the relevance of the 
travaux préparatoires.459 
The above hierarchical distinction between Articles 31 and 31 VCLT, however, 
should not be intended to be a strict one. In this respect, the commentary to the 1966 
Draft made clear that no rigid line is intended to exist between the primary means of 
(now) Article 31 and the supplementary means of (now) Article 32: the possibility that 
the latter are used to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of Article 31 
constitutes a bridge (a “general link”) between the two articles and maintains the unity of 
the process of interpretation.460 
 
On the other hand, there is no hierarchy of means within Article 31 VCLT.461 The 
commentary to Articles 27-28 of the 1966 Draft states that the text of Article 31 (then 
27), when read as a whole, cannot be properly regarded as laying down a legal hierarchy 
of norms for the interpretation of treaties.462 The very same title of Article 31 reads 
“General rule of interpretation”, in the singular, and thus puts emphasis on the 
connection between the different paragraphs and means of interpretation, in order to 
show that their application involves a single operation.463 The various means of 
interpretation have been ordered in Article 31 VCLT on the basis of considerations of 
logic, rather than of any obligatory legal hierarchy.464  
This approach has been assessed differently by scholars: some, like Germer, have 
expressed a positive assessment of the “logical” structure of Article 31,465 while others 
                                                     
458 R. Bernhardt, “Interpretation and Implied (Tacit) Modification of Treaties. Comments on Arts. 27, 28, 29 
and 38 of the ILC’s 1966 Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties”, 27 Zeitschrift für Ausländisches Öffentliches 
Recht und Völkerrecht (1967), 491 et seq., at 496. 
459 M. Schröder, “Gedanken zu einer Hierarchie der Interpretationsregeln im Völkerrecht”, 21 Revue hellénique 
de droit international (1968), 122 et seq., at 131-132. 
460 See the commentary on Articles 27-28 of the 1966 Draft, para. 10 (YBILC 1966-II, p. 220). On the 
(uncertain) relationship existing between the means of interpretation encompassed in Article 31 and those of 
Article 32 see also S. Sur, L'interprétation en droit international public (Paris: Librairie générale de droit et de 
jurisprudence, 1974), pp. 274-279; for an actual instance thereof, see ICJ, 25 July 1974, Fisheries Jurisdiction 
(United Kingdom v. Iceland), judgment, separate opinion of Judge de Castro. 
461 The commentary to the 1966 Draft highlights that the way in which the various means of interpretation are 
organized within Article 31 VCLT is just the result of logical considerations. Logic suggested that the first 
element to be mentioned was “the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and 
in the light of its object and purpose”. Again, logic suggested that the second elements to be mentioned (in 
paragraph 2 of Article 31) were those comprised in the “context”, due to fact that they either form part of the 
text or are intimately related thereto. Other elements of primary importance for interpretation purposes were 
included in paragraph 3 of Article 31; their placement after those comprised in the “context” was due to the 
logical consideration that, since they are extrinsic to the text, they are less connected to paragraph 1 than the 
elements forming the “context” (see YBILC 1966-II, p. 220, para. 9). 
462 See commentary on Articles 27-28 of the 1966 Draft, para. 9 (YBILC 1966-II, p. 220). 
463 See, similarly M. Tabory, Multilingualism In International Law and Institutions (Alphen aan den Rijn: 
Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1980), p. 203.  
464 See commentary on Articles 27-28 of the 1966 Draft, para. 9 (YBILC 1966-II, p. 220). 
465 See P. Germer, “Interpretation of Plurilingual Treaties: A Study of Article 33 of the Vienna Convention on 
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have criticized it, saying that it misses the primary object of a rule of interpretation, i.e. 
establishing a clear order among the means of interpretation to be used. O’Connell, in 
particular, points out that the VCLT fails to clearly separate and indicate the priority 
between the textual and the teleological approaches to interpretation. According to that 
author, the VCLT seems to concede that “whenever a problem of interpretation arises the 
object of the treaty must be taken into account”, without unambiguous “precedence is 
allotted to literal interpretation”.466 
The rejection, first by the ILC and then by the Vienna Conference, of the 
possibility of establishing a clear hierarchical order among the primary means of treaty 
interpretation is not, according to Schröder, due to the inability of the ILC to achieve it, 
but rather to the combined effect of the following reasons: the fact that international law 
scholars opposed for the most part to such a hierarchical arrangement; the absence of 
sufficient material confirming the existence of such a hierarchical order in the case law 
of arbitral tribunals and international courts; and the difficulty to make States converge 
on any possible hierarchy.467  
 
The most relevant inference that may be drawn from the analysis of Articles 31 and 32 
VCLT, in particular regarding their structure, is that the interpretative process consists of 
a single operation. The metaphor generally used in order to express the unity of the 
interpretative process is that of the “crucible”: the interpreter has to find out all 
potentially relevant means to construe the specific treaty, in light of the circumstances of 
the case, and throw them into the crucible of interpretation: a proper construction of the 
treaty will come out of such a crucible.468  
 In other words, the final interpretation should be reached only after all relevant 
elements and means of interpretation have been taken into account and duly weighted in 
light of the whole analysis carried out: such relative weights may be reasonably 
attributed only on the basis of a careful scrutiny of all such elements and means, their 
cross-comparison, and their combined assessment.469 Therefore, the analysis of the 
possible “vocabulary” meanings that may be attributed to a term, the study of the related 
context, the investigation of the object and purpose of the treaty, as well as the analysis 
of the subsequent agreement and the concordant subsequent practice of the parties, of the 
relevant rules of international law applicable in relations between them and of the 
supplementary means of interpretation should be carried out without any interruption in 
the interpretative process and without a rigid order being imposed. In this perspective, 
                                                                                                                                  
the Law of Treaties”, 11 Harvard International Law Journal (1970), 400 et seq., at 415. 
466 See D. P. O’Connell, International Law (London: Stevens & Sons, 1970), p. 255. 
467 See M. Schröder, “Gedanken zu einer Hierarchie der Interpretationsregeln im Völkerrecht”, 21 Revue 
hellénique de droit international (1968), 122 et seq., at 131-132. 
468 See YBILC 1966-II, p. 95, para. 4 and pp. 219-210, para.8; R. Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 9-10. See also International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, 
21 October 2005, Aguas del Tunari v. Republic of Bolivia, Case No. ARB/02/3, para. 91. 
469 Such a process is to be followed also for the purpose of concluding that a “special” meaning, in the sense of 
Article 31(4) VCLT, is to be attributed to a term, since it is only from the contemporary analysis of all 
elements and items of evidence available that it is possible to establish whether the parties actually intended 
such a “special” meaning to be attributed to that term. 
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treaty interpretation is regarded as an art and not an exact science,470 since such a 
mandated process of interpretation may lead to different conclusions according to the 
different factual circumstances of each case and due to the different weights attributed 
by the interpreter to the various elements and evidence that must be taken into account 
according to the rules enshrined in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT.  
 
In this respect, the supplementary means of interpretation referred to in Article 32 VCLT 
should be placed on the same footing as the means encompassed in the general rule of 
interpretation from a procedural standpoint. It is therefore important to distinguish 
between:  
(i) the interpretative weight to be attributed to the elements and items of evidence 
resulting from the analysis of such a supplementary means of interpretation and  
(ii) the chronological place that such an analysis occupies in the process of 
interpretation.  
With reference to (ii), it appears from the recent case law of international courts and 
tribunals471 that the analysis of all the potentially relevant means of interpretation, 
including the supplementary means, constitutes a single intellectual process. Under this 
approach the position is rejected whereby the process of finding out the appropriate 
meaning of a term should be carried out without any investigation of, for example, the 
travaux préparatoires or the circumstances of the conclusion of the treaty and that such 
means had to be resorted only in a second, logically distinct, moment for the purpose of 
confirming such a meaning, or determining the appropriate one where the first part of the 
process did not lead to a satisfactory result. The unity of the entire interpretative process, 
moreover, is certainly not a creation of the ILC; the very same Vattel pled for an 
“accumulation”472 approach, where different rules and means of interpretation had to be 
taken into account simultaneously.473  
With reference to (i), the supplementary means of interpretation generally have to 
be attributed a qualitatively lower weight, as compared to the means of interpretation 
encompassed in the general rule, for the purpose of attributing the appropriate meaning 
to treaty terms and sentences. In many cases, they are helpful in directing the interpreter 
in the choice of the meaning when the elements and items of evidence stemming from 
the application of the general rule are not in themselves conclusive, i.e. where the 
meaning of the terms or sentences remain ambiguous or excessively vague. They may 
play an important role as well in the less common cases where the meaning is obscure, 
or manifestly absurd or unreasonable. However, according to Article 32 VCLT, they 
                                                     
470 See ILC Draft Commentary, YBILC 1966-II, p. 218, para.4. 
471 See R. Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), Chapter 1, in particular pp. 
39 et seq. 
472 This term is taken from R. Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 163. 
473 See E. de Vattel, Le droit des gens. Ou principes de la loi naturelle, appliqués à la conduite et aux affaires 
des Nations et des Souverains (London, 1758), Book II, § 322, where the author, at the end of the paragraphs 
on treaty interpretation, states that “Toutes les Règles contenuës dans ce Chapitre doivent se combiner 
ensemble, & l'Interprétation se faire de manière qu'elle s'accommode à toutes, selon qu'elles sont applicables au 
cas.   Lorsque ces Règles paroissent se croiser, elles se balancent & se limitent réciproquement, suivant leur 
force & leur importance, & selon qu'elles appartiennent plus particulièrement au cas dont il est question”. 
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may be only used for purposes of confirmation whenever the elements and evidence 
stemming from the application of the general rule lead to a clear, unambiguous and 
reasonable meaning; that is to say that such a meaning cannot theoretically474 be 
overturned by a different meaning clearly pointed to by the supplementary means of 
interpretation.  
 
With regard to multilingual treaties, some scholars475 uphold the existence of a 
compulsory process of interpretation organized in well-defined, subsequent steps to be 
walked through under the provisions of Article 33 VCLT. The soundness of this thesis 
will be analysed in Chapter 4. In the remainder of this chapter, as its title suggests, only 
the rules of interpretation enshrined in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT will be dealt with.  
 
2.3. The content of the rules of interpretation enshrined in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT  
 
2.3.1. In general 
 
A quick analysis of the rules encompassed in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT shows that such 
rules contain elements taken from the three main approaches habitually advocated with 
regard to treaty interpretation.  
 
Traditionally, scholars used to distinguish among:476  
(i) the textual approach, according to which the text of the treaty is considered the 
authentic expression of the agreed intention of the parties;  
(ii) the subjective approach, whereby the intention of the parties is considered a 
subjective element, distinct from the text of the treaty, which is to be 
“discovered” by making recourse to other relevant means of interpretation in 
addition to the text (e.g. the travaux préparatoires);  
(iii) the teleological approach, for which the declared or apparent object and 
purpose of the treaty is the fundamental guideline for interpretation purposes, 
even where such object and purpose seem to go beyond, or even diverge from, the 
intentions of the parties as expressed in the treaty text. 
 
Although the VCLT approach to treaty interpretation is an integrated one, where the 
above theories appear to be tightly mingled, the ILC appeared willing to attribute a 
prominent role the text of the treaty,477 which was considered the starting point of the 
interpretative process.  
                                                     
474 The issue of the relation between the seemingly clear, unambiguous  and reasonable meanings based on the 
means of interpretation provided for in Article 31 VCLT and the different meanings suggested by 
supplementary means of interpretation is dealt with in section 2.3.5 of this chapter. 
475 The most representative of whom is M. Tabory, Multilingualism In International Law and Institutions 
(Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1980), p. 205. 
476 See commentary on Articles 27-28 of the 1966 Draft, para. 2 (YBILC 1966-II, p. 218). 
477 See commentary on Articles 27-28 of the 1966 Draft, para. 9 (YBILC 1966-II, p. 220). 
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 The prominence of the text was also recognized by the studies previously carried 
on by the Institute of International Law and the case law of the ICJ and PCIJ. As stated 
by the ILC, “the starting point of interpretation is the elucidation of the meaning of the 
text, not an investigation ab initio into the intentions of the parties. The Institute of 
International Law adopted this—the textual—approach to treaty interpretation. […] 
Moreover, the jurisprudence of the International Court contains many pronouncements 
from which it is permissible to conclude that the textual approach to treaty interpretation 
is regarded by it as established law. In particular, the Court has more than once stressed 
that it is not the function of interpretation to revise treaties or to read into them what they 
do not, expressly or by implication, contain.” 478 
 
The prominence of the text, however, is not an absolute one, since it is generally 
recognized that the treaty terms and the ordinary meaning thereof must be duly weighted 
against all other relevant elements and items of evidence, which together must be thrown 
into the crucible.479  
 In this respect, the work of the ILC and, thus, the VCLT appear to have been 
significantly influenced by both the 1956 Resolution of the Institute of International 
Law480 and the principles on interpretation formulated by Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice,481 
which point to the text as a start, but also highlight that the treaty is to be interpreted as a 
whole, taking into account its object and purpose.482 
 
The practical effects of the VCLT approach are thus twofold.  
 On the one hand, it is now “generally recognized that an interpretation that does 
not emerge from the text cannot be accepted, however plausible it may be in view of the 
circumstances, unless failure to do so would lead to an obviously unreasonable result”.483  
 On the other hand, the interpretations that may be grounded in and derived from a 
single text are often so kaleidoscopically different from each other that the text cannot, 
by itself, suffice in order to solve all the interpretative issues. Moreover, an integration 
of the text with other elements and items of evidence is generally required also for the 
purpose of establishing whether an unreasonable result emerges from a “textual” 
interpretation, since the soundness of an interpretation may be assessed only where a 
yardstick exists for the purpose of this evaluation; such a yardstick, in turn, must be 
determined on the basis of all the elements and items of evidence available, the bare text 
often not sufficing in that respect.   
                                                     
478 See commentary on Articles 27-28 of the 1966 Draft, para. 11 (YBILC 1966-II, pp. 220-221). 
479 Similarly R. Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 144. 
480 Institute of International Law, “Résolution of 19 avril 1956: Interprétation des traités”, 46 Annuaire de 
l’Institut de Droit International (1956), 364 et seq.  
481 G. Fitzmaurice, “The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice 1951-54: Treaty interpretation 
and other treaty points”, 33 British Yearbook of International Law (1957), 203 et seq., at 211-212.  
482 See YBILC 1964-II, pp. 55-56. 
483 R. H. Berglin, “Treaty Interpretation and the Impact of Contractual Choice of Forum Clauses on the 
Jurisdiction of International Tribunals: the Iranian Forum Clause Decisions of the Iran-United States Claims 
Tribunal”, 21 Texas International Law Journal (1986), 39 et seq., at 44; see also R. Gardiner, Treaty 
Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 145. 
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In a nutshell, the approach implemented in the VCLT cannot be reduced to a 
textual interpretation approach, since an accurate reading of Articles 31 and 32 VCLT 
and an analysis of their application by courts and tribunals clearly show that elements 
typical of the different approaches coexist therein and interact strictly with one 
another.484 
 
The following subsections analyse in some detail the various elements of interpretation 
to be taken into account under Articles 31 and 32 VCLT. 
 
 
2.3.2. Good faith 
 
“Tamerlane, after having engaged the city of Sebastia to capitulate, under his promise 
of shedding no blood, caused all the soldiers of the garrison to be buried alive”485  
 
The origin of the international legal concept associated with the English term “good 
faith” may be traced back to the concept corresponding to the Latin term “bona fides” 
used in Roman law, particularly in the law of contracts.486 Such a concept then evolved 
in the field of the international relations among Nations up to the point of becoming a 
well-established principle of international law. In its current international legal meaning 
the term “good faith” was mentioned as early as at the beginning of the XX century in 
the North Atlantic Fisheries arbitral award.487  
Its general recognition and relevance as a fundamental principle in international 
relations is adequately shown by the following three notations:  
(i) it is set forth in Article 2(2) of the Charter of the United Nations;  
(ii) it is embodied in Articles 26 and 31 VCLT as the leading principle to be 
followed in the interpretation and application of treaties;  
(iii) it has been included by the Institute of International Law, as the cornerstone 
of the interpretative process, in Article 1 of its resolution on treaty 
                                                     
484 See S. Torres Bernárdez, “Interpretation of treaties by the International Court of Justice following the 
adoption of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties”, in G. Hafner et al. (eds.), Liber Amicorum 
Professor Seidl-Hohenvelder – in honour of his 80th birthday (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998), 
721 et seq., at 747-748; F. Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law (Amsterdam: IBFD 
Publications, 2004), p. 121. 
485 E. de Vattel, Le droit des gens. Ou principes de la loi naturelle, appliqués à la conduite et aux affaires des 
Nations et des Souverains (London, 1758), Book II, § 273, quoting  Paffendorf’s Law of Nature. 
486 See J. F. O’Connor, Good Faith in International Law (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1991), pp. 5 et seq.; F. 
Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2004), pp. 
122 et seq. See also PCIJ, 17 March 1934, Lighthouses case between France and Greece, judgment, separate 
opinion by Judge Séfériadès, p. 47. 
487 See Arbitral award of 7 September 1910, The North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Case (Great Britain, United 
States), in 11 Reports of International Arbitral Awards, 167 et seq., at 188. For a list of international law cases 
where the principle of good faith is referred to, see ICJ, 11 June 1998, Land and Maritime Boundary between 
Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), judgment, para. 38. See also paragraph 2 of the Commentary to 
art. 55 of the Third Report on the Law of Treaties prepared by Sir Humphrey Waldock (YBILC 1964-II, p. 8, 
para. 2). 




The foremost aspect to be taken into account, when dealing with good faith in 
international relations, is that such a principle, just as bona fides in Roman and civil law, 
“has strong connotations with such moral virtues as honesty, fairness, reasonableness 
and trustworthiness”.489 
The second aspect to consider is that, notwithstanding its capital importance, the 
principle of good faith is not itself a source of legal obligations. According to the ICJ, 
the principle of good faith, although is “one of the basic principles governing the 
creation and performance of legal obligations […] it is not in itself a source of obligation 
where none would otherwise exist”.490 Conversely, since it represents the fundamental 
principle from which legal rules distinctively and directly related to honesty, fairness and 
reasonableness are derived, it directs the way in which such legal rules must be 
interpreted and applied. In particular, it amounts to fundamental guidance for the 
interpretation and application of international agreements. Therefore, quoting Rosenne, it 
“constitutes a series of conduct-regulating rules” having normative value since their non-
observance “may give rise to an instance of international responsibility”, while their 
observance “may justify what is otherwise an international wrongful act”.491 
It should be finally noted that, since honesty, fairness, reasonableness and 
trustworthiness are mainly moral virtues strictly linked to human culture and customs, 
the shape and content of the principle of good faith change across the decades according 
to the development of such values as recognized by and in the international 
community.492  
 
Although being a principle applicable to the whole spectrum of international law, the 
principle of good faith is particularly important with regard to treaties, which it governs 
“from the time of their formation to the time of their extinction”,493 since “contracting 
parties are always assumed to be acting honestly and in good faith”.494  
In this respect, the contextual analysis of the VCLT shows that a legal symbiosis 
exists between the principle of good faith mentioned in Article 31 and the pacta sunt 
                                                     
488 Institute of International Law, “Résolution of 19 avril 1956: Interprétation des traités”, 46 Annuaire de 
l’Institut de Droit International (1956), 364 et seq.  
489 F. Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2004), 
p. 123. 
490 ICJ, 20 decembre 1988, Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras), judgment, para. 
94. 
491 S. Rosenne, Developments in the Law of Treaties 1945-1986 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1989), p. 135. 
492 J. F. O’Connor, Good Faith in International Law (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1991), p. 124. See also F. 
Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2004), p. 
123. 
493 B. Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals (London: Stevens & 
Sons, 1953), p. 106 
494 PCIJ, 17 March 1934, Lighthouses case between France and Greece, judgment, separate opinion by Judge 
Séfériadès, p. 47. 
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servanda rule established by Article 26:495 treaties must be interpreted and applied in 
good faith. Performing a treaty strictly according to its prima facie literal meaning it is 
not sufficient in this respect.496 Treaty obligations must be carried out honestly and 
loyally according to the common and real intention of the parties, i.e. according to “the 
spirit of the treaty and not its mere literal meaning”.497 Performing a treaty in good faith 
requires that “a party to a treaty shall refrain from any acts calculated to prevent the due 
execution of the treaty or otherwise to frustrate its objects”.498 According to Rosenne, 
this is particularly relevant when the circumstances and situations of a concrete case 
could have been unforeseen by the contracting parties.499 
For the same reasons, applications of treaties that result in abuses of rights are 
generally regarded as infringing the fundamental principle of good faith.500  
 
As the other side of the coin, respect of a good faith treaty application, a good faith 
treaty interpretation has been defined as a reasonable,501 honest and fair502 interpretation. 
In this sense, good faith implies the need to elucidate the meaning of the terms used by 
the parties for the purpose of finding out the agreement reached by them.503 
Therefore, the reference to good faith, especially where coupled with the mirror 
reference to the object and purpose of the treaty at the end of Article 31(1) VCLT, leads 
to an interpretative approach highly focused on finding out the intention of the parties 
starting from the text and rejects a mere literal approach. In this respect, the requirement 
to construe the treaty in good faith may lead the interpreter to face two critical questions:  
                                                     
495 See the Commentary to Article 27 of the 1966 Draft, according to which the interpretative principle of good 
faith flows directly from the pacta sunt servanda rule (YBILC, 1966-II, p. 221, para. 12). 
496 F. Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2004), 
p. 125. 
497 B. Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals (London: Stevens & 
Sons, 1953), 114. See also G. Schwarzenberger, “Myths and realities of treaty interpretation: Articles 27-29 of 
the Vienna draft convention on the law of treaties”, 9 Virginia Journal of International Law (1968), 1 et seq., 
at 9-10. 
498 Paragraph 2 of Art. 55 (Pacta sunt servanda) of the Third Report on the Law of Treaties prepared by Sir 
Humphrey Waldock (YBILC 1964-II, p. 7). The paragraph was then dropped since the ILC considered it 
implicit in the general obligation to perform treaties in good faith (YBILC 1966-II, p. 211, para. 4). 
499 S. Rosenne, Developments in the Law of Treaties 1945-1986 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1989), p. 176. As shown in section 4.4 of Chapter 2 of Part I, this is a rather common situation whenever a 
sentence that covers the future is at stake. 
500 G. Schwarzenberger, “Myths and realities of treaty interpretation: Articles 27-29 of the Vienna draft 
convention on the law of treaties”, 9 Virginia Journal of International Law (1968), 1 et seq., at 9-10; F. 
Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2004), pp. 
126-128. On the relation between interpretation in good faith, abuse of rights and need to balance the 
conflicting rights and obligations dealt with in the treaty, see WTO Appellate Body, 12 October 1998 United 
States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, AB-1998-4 (WT/DS58/AB/R), paras. 158-
159.  
501 See R. Jennings and A. Watts (eds.), Oppenheim’s International Law. Volume I. Peace (London: Longman, 
1992), p. 1272, note 7; R. Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 151. 
502 See F. Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 
2004), p. 131. See also B. Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals 
(London: Stevens & Sons, 1953), pp. 105 et seq. 
503 See R. Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 148. 
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(i) where the treaty appears silent on a certain case, whether the parties have 
deliberately agreed to leave some gaps in the treaty, i.e. they have forecasted 
certain possible future scenarios and decided not to include them in the scope of 
the treaty, or whether the specific case was unforeseen, but the parties would have 
explicitly brought it within the scope of a certain treaty rule, had they anticipated 
it;504 
(ii) whether the interpretation based on the ordinary meaning of the treaty terms in 
their context and in light of the object and purpose of the treaty conflicts with the 
otherwise seeming intention of the parties.505  
In relation to the first question, it is interesting to recall the position expressed by Sir 
Humphrey Waldock in the Commentary to Article 72 of his Third Report on the Law of 
Treaties, where he stated that it is justifiable to imply terms in a treaty for the purpose of 
giving efficacy to an intention of the parties “necessarily” to be inferred from the express 
provisions of the treaty.506 Similarly, the possibility of implying terms not expressly 
included in the text, when interpreting treaties, was also upheld by the ILC in its 
Commentary to the 1966 Draft, provided that it did not lead to an “extensive” or 
“liberal” interpretation.507 
 In relation to the second question, good faith is to be seen not only as a standard 
of behavior that applies to the entire process of interpretation (including the examination 
of the text, context and subsequent practice), but also as a yardstick to be used in order to 
assess whether the apparent result of the interpretative process is manifestly absurd or 
unreasonable in light of the particular circumstances of the case and, therefore, must be 
rejected.508  
                                                     
504 See House of Lords (United Kingdom), 9 December 2004, Regina v. Immigration Officer at Prague Airport 
and another ex parte European Roma Rights Centre and others, [2004] UKHL 55, in particular para. 43, per 
Lord Steyn, and para. 63, per Lord Hope. See also ICJ, 18 July 1966, South West Africa (Ethiopia/Liberia v. 
South Africa), judgment, para. 92. 
505 A good example of the difficulties to be faced when trying to attribute a meaning to the absence of expected 
terms, or to an omission, is illustrated by the WTO case Argentina – Safeguard measures on Imports of 
Footwear. In that case, the Appellate Body and the Panel  (of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body) reached 
opposite conclusions on the meaning to be attributed to the absence of an explicit reference to the criterion of 
“unforeseen developments” (included, on the contrary, in Article XIX of the 1947 General Agreement on 
Tarifs and Trade) in Article 2 of the Agreement on Safeguards (see WTO Appellate Body, 14 December 1999, 
Argentina – Safeguard measures on Imports of Footwear, AB-1999-7 (WT/DS121/AB/R), para. 88).    
506 YBILC 1964-II, p. 61, para. 29. According to the author, the use of the adverb “necessarily” (in italics in 
the original) by the Special Rapporteur constitutes a rhetorical expedient employed in order to make clear that 
the intention of the party should not be determined independently from the reasonable meaning attributable to 
the express treaty provision; since the inference of the intention of the parties from the treaty text is of an 
inductive nature, the result thereof can never necessarily descend from the available clues (in this case the 
express treaty provisions). Therefore, setting aside the rhetorical effect, the sentence contained in the draft 
commentary should read “it is justifiable to imply terms in a treaty for the purpose of giving efficacy to the 
intention most probably to be inferred from the express provisions of the treaty”.  
507 YBILC 1966-II, p. 219, para.6. 
508 See I. Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1984), p. 120. See also S. Rosenne, “The Election of Five Members of the International Court of Justice in 
1981”, 76 American Journal of International Law (1982), 364 et seq., at 365-366; J. F. O’Connor, Good Faith 
in International Law (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1991), p. 109. With regard to the relevance of supplementary 
means of interpretation for the purpose of avoiding absurd or unreasonable interpretative outcomes, see ICJ, 15 
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In addition, it may be noted that many rules and maxims of interpretation applied by 
international courts and tribunals are the result of the application of logic and common 
sense and, as such, are nothing more than particular manifestations of the principle of 
good faith.509 
Probably, the most important of such rules and maxims is the one commonly 
referred to as the principle of effectiveness (sometimes referred to as ut res magis valeat 
quam pereat).510 The ILC linked such principle to that of good faith and, to a certain 
extent, to the object and purpose of the treaty. According to the Commission, “in so far 
as the maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat reflects a true general rule of 
interpretation, it is embodied in Article 27, paragraph 1,511 which requires that a treaty 
shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to 
its terms in the context of the treaty and in the light of its object and purpose”.512 
Consequently, the ILC decided not to explicitly provide for such a principle in the 1966 
Draft, notwithstanding the fact that it constituted the subject of a separate article in the 
original draft prepared by Sir Humphrey Waldock.513 
At a closer look, the principle of effectiveness appears to encompass two strictly 
related, but distinguished, rules of interpretation.514 
On the one hand, there is the principle of effectiveness strictu senso, identified 
with the maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat. According to this maxim, good faith 
requires that all the terms and expressions included in a treaty are to be given a meaning 
and that an interpretation of the treaty, or a particular provision thereof, that attributes a 
meaning to all the terms is to be preferred, ceteris paribus, to an interpretation that does 
not attribute any meaning to certain terms or expressions, as if they were not part of the 
interpreted sentence.515 
                                                                                                                                  
February 1995, Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. 
Bahrain), judgment, paras. 30-41 of Judge Schwebel’s dissenting opinion. 
509 In this sense, J. F. O’Connor, Good Faith in International Law (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1991), p. 109; H. 
Lauterpacht, “Restrictive Interpretation and the Principle of Effectiveness in the Interpretation of Treaties”, 26 
British Yearbook of International Law (1949), 48 et seq., at 56. 
510 The principle of effectiveness had first been codified by Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice in his formulation of the 
major principles of interpretation (G. Fitzmaurice, “The Law and Procedure of the International Court of 
Justice 1951-54: Treaty interpretation and other treaty points”, 33 British Yearbook of International Law 
(1957), 203 et seq., at  211), which, together with the 1956 Resolution of the Institute of International Law, 
was taken by the Sir Humphrey Waldock as inspiration for its work on treaty interpretation (see YBILC 1964-
II, pp. 55-56, paras. 10 et seq.). 
511 Now Article 31(1) VCLT. 
512 See para. 6 of the Commentary to Arts. 27 and 28 of the 1966 Draft  (YBILC, 1966-II, p. 219, para. 6) 
513 See Article 72 of the Special Rapporteur’s Third Report on the Law of Treaty (YBILC 1964-II, p. 53). 
514 See R. Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 148. The double nature 
of the principle of effectiveness may be already seen in the formulation of such a principle elaborated by Sir 
Gerald Fitzmaurice (see G. Fitzmaurice, “The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice 1951-
54: Treaty interpretation and other treaty points”, 33 British Yearbook of International Law (1957), 203 et seq., 
at 211). Reference to both rules of interpretation may be found in ICJ, 3 February 1994, Territorial Dispute 
(Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Chad), judgment, paras. 47 and 51-52. 
515 See, for instance, ICJ, 9 April 1949, Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v. Albania), judgment, p. 24; ICJ, 3 
February 1994, Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Chad), judgment, para. 47; ICJ, 22 July 1952, 
Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (United Kingdom v. Iran), judgment, p. 105. In the specific case, however, the ICJ 
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On the other hand, there is the principle of effectiveness latu senso: an 
interpretation of the treaty that is more in line with the object and purpose thereof is to 
be preferred to an interpretation that is less in line with it.516 In this case, the object and 
purpose of the treaty is not used solely, although it is used primarily, as prescribed by 
Article 31 VCLT, for the purpose of choosing among the various possible ordinary 
meanings of a certain term, but, more generally, to ensure that the interpretation of the 
treaty or a certain provision thereof is apt to realize the aims of the treaty itself.517 
However, as the ICJ affirmed in the Interpretation of Peace Treaties case, the duty of the 
interpreter is to construe and not to revise the relevant treaty and the principle of 
effectiveness cannot justify the interpreter in attributing to treaty provisions a meaning 
that would be contrary to their letter and spirit.518 
 
A final remark concerns the relation between the application in good faith of the treaty 
and the protection of the legitimate expectations of the (other) treaty parties, which may 
take the technical forms of estoppel or acquiescence.  
 In particular, it is generally recognized that, where the action or inaction of a 
contracting State has generated the legitimate expectation in the other contracting States 
that a certain behavior is admissible under the treaty and accepted as such by the first-
mentioned State, this State cannot claim that behavior to constitute a breach of the 
treaty.519 Similarly, if the other contracting States have for a long period of time 
accepted, without any complaint, the action or inaction of the first-mentioned State, they 
may be considered to have created a legitimate expectation in the first-mentioned State 
of the existence of an agreement on the admissibility of its action or inaction under the 
treaty; under these circumstances, the other contracting States cannot subsequently claim 
that the behavior of the first-mentioned State constitutes a breach of the treaty.520 
                                                                                                                                  
found that such an approach was not to be followed, since the text of the Iranian Declaration (the text at stake) 
was not a treaty text resulting from negotiations between two or more States, but the result of a unilateral 
drafting by the Government of Iran, which appeared to have shown a particular degree of caution when 
drafting the text of the Declaration and appeared to have inserted, ex abundanti cautela, words which, strictly 
speaking, might seem to have been superfluous. See also WTO Appellate Body, 14 December 1999, Korea — 
Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain Dairy Products, AB-1999-8  (WT/DS98/AB/R), para. 80. 
516 See PCIJ, 19 August 1929, Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex (France v. Switzerland), 
order, p. 13; ICJ, 3 February 1994, Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Chad), judgment, paras. 51-
52. See also para. 6 of the Commentary to Articles 27 and 28 of the 1966 Draft  (YBILC, 1966-II, p. 219, para. 
6). 
517 This may be the case, for instance, where the interpretation based on the attribution of a special meaning to 
a treaty term is more in line with the object and purpose of the treaty than the construction based on the 
attribution of an ordinary meaning thereto. 
518 ICJ, 18 July 1950, Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, advisory opinion, 
p. 229. See, in this sense, also G. Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice. 
Volume I (Cambridge: Grotious Publications Limited, 1986), p. 357; YBILC 1966-II, p. 219, para. 6. 
519 B. Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals (London: Stevens & 
Sons, 1953), 143-144; F. Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law (Amsterdam: IBFD 
Publications, 2004), 129 and 136-137. 
520 As instances of the application of the principles of acquiescence and estoppel see PCIJ, 28 June 1937, 
Diversion of Water from the Meuse (Netherlands v Belgium), judgment, paras. 84-85; ICJ, 15 June 1962, 
Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), judgment, pp. 32-35. 




2.3.3. Ordinary meaning  
 
Under the general rule of interpretation enshrined in Article 31 VCLT, the treaty text is 
the starting point of the interpretative process, since it is presumed to be the authentic 
expression of the intentions of the parties. Such a presumption implies that, in order to 
find out the intention of the parties, it is necessary to elucidate the meaning of the treaty 
text by means of interpretation.521 
More specifically, as the ILC put it, the parties are to be presumed to have the 
intention that appears from the ordinary meaning of the terms used by them.522 
Therefore, the presumption is not limited to equating the treaty text to the authentic 
expression of the parties’ intention, but extends to assuming that the parties have used all 
words in that text according to their “ordinary meaning”, unless a proof to the contrary is 
given. 
 
The adjective “ordinary” is qualified by the subsequent specifications encompassed in 
Article 31 VCLT: the ordinary meaning is the one, among the many that a term may be 
attributed in a particular language, that better fits within its context523 in light of the 
object and purpose of the treaty.524  
 According to Sir Humphrey Waldock, speaking in his capacity of expert 
consultant to the UN Conference on the Law of Treaties,525 “nothing could have been 
further from the Commission’s intention than to suggest that words had a ‘dictionary’ or 
intrinsic meaning in themselves” and that the “Commission had been very insistent that 
the ordinary meaning of terms emerged in the context in which they were used, in the 
context of the treaty as a whole, and in the light of the object and purpose of the treaty”.  
 The position articulated by Sir Humphrey Waldock is semantically supported by 
the use of the expression “the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms” in Article 31(1) 
                                                     
521 See the commentary to Articles 27-28 of the 1966 Draft, paras. 2, 11 and 18 (YBILC 1966-II, pp. 218 et 
seq.) 
522 See the commentary to Articles 27-28 of the 1966 Draft, paras. 12 (YBILC 1966-II, p. 221) 
523 Including the means of interpretation referred to in Article 31(3) VCLT. 
524 See commentary to Articles 27-28 of the 1966 Draft, paras. 12 (YBILC 1966-II, p. 221), where it is stated 
that the ordinary meaning of a term is not to be determined in the abstract but in the context of the treaty and in 
light of its object and purpose. See also Sir Humphrey Waldock reply to the comments made by the Israeli and 
United States governments on the draft articles provisionally adopted by the ILC in 1964 (YBILC, 1966-I, 
para. 5 at p. 95 and para. 8 at p. 96) and the Separate Opinion of Judge Torres Bernárdez in the Land, Island 
and Maritime Frontier Dispute case, where he referred to the concept of “fully qualified” ordinary meaning  
(ICJ, 11 September 1992, Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador v. Honduras), judgment, 
para. 190 of the Separate Opinion of Judge Torres Bernárdez). For an historical reconstruction of the ILC 
discussions on the term “ordinary meaning” in the context of the articles on treaty interpretation, see F. 
Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2004), pp. 
142 et seq. According to Lindefalk, “it is not unjustified to argue that an ordinary meaning independent of the 
context and the object and purpose simply does not exist” (see U. Linderfalk, On the Interpretation of Treaties. 
The Modern International Law as Expressed in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(Dordrecht: Springer-Verlag, 2007), p. 344). 
525 UNCLT-1st , p. 184, para. 70. 
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VCLT,526 which indicates that the ordinary meaning is not intrinsic to the terms, but 
must be attributed by the interpreter by choosing among the various possible meanings 
according to the specific circumstances of the case.527  
A similar conclusion has been reached by international courts and tribunals, 
which have held that the principle of the ordinary meaning does not entail that words and 
phrases are always to be interpreted in a purely literal way and that, often, the interpreter 
must choose among the multiple meanings of a term or expression on the basis of their 
context and of the object and purpose of the treaty.528 According to the ICJ, this is 
particularly true where a purely literal, or grammatical, interpretation of the text leads to 
a somewhat surprising or absurd result.529 
 
In this respect, where a term is used in a technical context (e.g. a specific legal subject 
matter), its ordinary meaning should be generally considered to coincide with the 
meaning attributed to that term in the relevant technical jargon (e.g. in the specific legal 
jargon). This inference is called for by the principle of good faith, since the attribution of 
whatever meaning different from that customarily used in a certain technical context 
would deprive the interpretation of any reasonableness in light of the good faith 
expectations of the parties involved.530 Such ordinary jargon meaning may be usually 
determined on the basis of (i) dictionaries,531 (ii) the analysis of the terms used in similar 
or related treaties,532 or (iii) other technical documentary material.533  
                                                     
526 See Article 27 of the 1966 Draft (YBILC 1966-II, p. 181), which is identical in this respect to Article 31 
VCLT.  
527 Similarly, R. Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 164. 
528 See, for instance, PCIJ, 12 August 1922, Competence of the International Labour  Organization in Regard 
to International Regulation of the Conditions of Labour of Persons Employed in Agriculture, advisory opinion, 
p. 23; ICJ, 26 May 1961, Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), judgment, pp. 31-32 and case law 
quoted therein; International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, 21 October 2005, Aguas del Tunari 
v. Republic of Bolivia, Case No. ARB/02/3, para. 91; ICJ, 12 November 1991, Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 
(Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal), Judgment, para. 29. 
Among scholars, see ex multis G. Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice. 
Volume I (Cambridge: Grotious Publications Limited, 1986), p. 52; A. D. McNair, The Law of Treaties 
(Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1961), p. 367. 
529 ICJ, 19 December 1978, Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turkey), judgment, para. 52. See also, 
even if in slightly different terms, ICJ, 18 July 1966, South West Africa (Ethiopia/Liberia v. South Africa), 
judgment, para. 48, where the Court stated that the rule of interpretation based on the natural and ordinary 
meaning of the words employed is not an absolute one, since, where such a method of interpretation results in a 
meaning incompatible with the spirit, purpose and context of the clause or instrument in which the words are 
contained, no reliance can be validly placed on it. 
530 See, for instance, PCIJ, 5 September 1933, Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Denmark v. Norway), 
judgment, pp. 49-50. With regard to the relevance of the principle of good faith for the purpose of establishing 
the ordinary meaning of treaty terms, see B. Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International 
Courts and Tribunals (London: Stevens & Sons, 1953), p. 107. 
531 E.g. ICJ, 12 December 1996, Oil Platforms, (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), 
judgment, para. 45. Furthermore, dictionaries are often used as well to elucidate the day-to-day meaning of 
treaty terms. See, for instance, WTO Appellate Body, 2 August 1999, Canada – Measures Affecting the Export 
of Civilian Aircraft, AB-1999-2 (WT/DS70/AB/R), para. 154, where the possible meanings of the term 
“confer” are sought. 
532 E.g. ICJ, 11 September 1992, Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador v. Honduras), 
judgment, para. 380. As Gardiner points out, courts often do not explain whether this practice of referring to 
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 Moreover, the subsequent agreements between the parties, their subsequent 
practice, the rules of international law applicable in the relations among them, as well as 
the available supplementary means of interpretation often prove helpful for the 
interpreter to refine the selection of the ordinary meaning that best fits in the 
circumstances of the case.534  
 
Thus, since the ordinary meaning of any treaty term is a meaning qualified by all 
interpretative elements referred to in Article 31 (and, to a certain extent, Article 32) 
VCLT, the following sections deal with the content and usage of such elements.  
 
2.3.3.1. Object and purpose of the treaty 
 
With regard to the object and purpose of the treaty, two preliminary issues need to be 
tackled. 
 First, the fact that the term “object and purpose” is expressed in the singular raises 
the question of whether only the most important aim of a treaty should be taken into 
account for the purpose of Article 31 VCLT, as it is generally recognized that “most 
treaties have no single, undiluted object and purpose, but rather a variety of different, 
and possibly conflicting, objects and purposes”.535 That question should be answered in 
the negative, the opposite conclusion appearing too simplistic and over-rigid, especially 
where it is considered that Article 31 VCLT has an enormously wide scope and thus it 
must be flexible enough to be effectively applied in extremely different circumstances. 
Thus, the interpreter should always consider which of the various objects and purposes 
of a treaty are relevant with reference to the provision at stake and, where more of them 
appear relevant, he should assess how they interact with each other and how the 
contracting parties decided to balance them, as may appear from the context of the treaty 
and from the other available elements and items of evidence.536  
                                                                                                                                  
the use of a certain term in other treaties is (i) in pursuit of its ordinary meaning, (ii) an implementation of rules 
of international law applicable in relation between the parties, (iii) one of the means of interpretation allowed 
under Article 32 VCLT, or (iv) simply a standard practice in the application of the VCLT (see R. Gardiner, 
Treaty Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 175-176, citing F. Berman, “Treaty 
“Interpretation” in a Judicial Context”, 29 Yale Journal of International Law (2004), 315 et seq., at 317) .  
533 E.g. ICJ, 13 December 1999, Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana v. Namibia), judgment, paras. 20 and 30. 
534 See ECtHR, 4 April 2000, Witold Litwa v. Poland (Application no. 26629/95), paras. 60-63 (and 34-39 with 
regard to the travaux préparatoires), where the Court attributed a significant relevance to (i) the context in 
which the relevant term was used, (ii) the apparent object and purpose of the relevant article of the treaty and 
(iii) the travaux préparatoires of the ECHR, in order to support an interpretation of the term “alcoholics”, as 
used in Article 5 of the ECHR, which included not only persons addicted to alcohol, but also persons in a 
temporary state of drunkenness. For a lengthy description and discussion of the case, especially with reference 
to the role played by the travaux préparatoires in the decision, see R. Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 39-41. 
535 WTO Appellate Body, 12 October 1998, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products, AB-1998-4 (WT/DS58/AB/R), para. 17. 
536 One could reasonably argue that the object and purpose of a specific section or article is not denoted by the 
expression “its object and purpose” contained in Article 31(1) VCLT, since the latter might be seen as referring 
exclusively to the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole. In that respect, the author is of the opinion that 
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Second, the object and purpose of the treaty should not be seen as “something 
that exist[s] in abstracto”, but as something that “follow[s] from and are closely bound 
up with the intentions of the parties”.537 To put it differently, the object and purpose of a 
treaty does not exist independently from the parties’ intentions, which represent the sole 
source of the object and purpose. This conclusion is rooted in the principle of good faith 
and entails, as one of its corollaries, that under the system of interpretation provided for 
by the VCLT the extreme forms of teleological approach, which deny any relevance of 
the intentions of the parties and affirmed the absolute independence from them of the 
treaty object and purpose,538 have to be rejected.  
 
With regard to the role played by the object and purpose in the process of treaty 
interpretation, its main function appears that of a qualifier of the ordinary meaning to be 
attributed to treaty terms under Article 31(1) VCLT. In fact, as the interpretative process 
in the VCLT system mainly consists of discovering the meaning that the parties 
attributed to the treaty text, the object and purpose is primarily used to elucidate the 
ordinary meaning of the terms used in the text539 and not to find out a meaning 
independent from the text on the basis of a purely teleological interpretation of the 
treaty.540  In this respect, the object and purpose of the treaty must not be looked at in 
isolation from the context of the treaty as a whole; on the contrary, it must be regarded as 
the most important part of such a context and taken into account together with it.541   
Moreover, from this vantage point, the object and purpose of the treaty appears strictly 
intertwined with the principle of effectiveness latu senso, according to which treaty 
terms should be interpreted so as to give them, as far as possible, an effect consistent 
with the object and purpose of the treaty.542 
                                                                                                                                  
the expression “its object and purpose” should not be read too strictly, mainly due to the broad scope of Article 
31 VCLT. However, even where that expression was construed strictly, the relevance of the object and purpose 
of specific sections or articles, in order to interpret provisions encompassed therein, would be preserved by the 
need to take into account the context of such provisions in order to construe them. In fact, since the treaty 
context includes the text of the treaty, which in turn includes the titles of the relevant sections and articles, 
where the reading of the text of such sections and articles (inclusive of their titles) highlights the object and 
purpose thereof, the latter must be taken into account for interpretative purposes as part of the context (see, 
similarly, F. Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 
2004), pp. 178-179). 
537 ECtHR, 27 October 1975, National Union of Belgian Police v. Belgium (Application no. 4464/70), para. 9 
of Judge Fitzmaurice’s Separate Opinion. 
538 For an analysis of such theories and their application by international Courts and Tribunals, see I. Sinclair, 
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), pp. 131 et 
seq. 
539 See YBILC 1964-I, pp. 281 et seq., for the discussion that took place among the ILC’s members at 
Commission’s 765th meeting on this matter, and YBILC 1964-I, p. 309, para. 3 for the consequent redrafted 
version of Article 70. 
540 See, inter alia, the observations submitted by Mr Luna at the 871st session (YBILC 1966-1(part II), p. 193, 
paras. 7-10). 
541 See the statement of the Uruguayan representative at the Committee of the Whole of the Vienna Conference 
(UNCLT-1st, p. 170, para. 67). 
542 See ICJ, 12 December 1996, Oil Platforms, (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), 
judgment, para. 52; ICJ, 13 December 1999, Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana v. Namibia), judgment, para. 
43.  
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The above-mentioned function, however, is not the only one played by the object and 
purpose in the process of treaty interpretation. In fact, together with the principle of good 
faith, the object and purpose of the treaty also draws the dividing line between 
acceptable and non-acceptable interpretations. Such a function was explicitly attributed 
to the object and purpose of the treaty in the first draft of the provisions on treaty 
interpretation prepared by Sir Humphrey Waldock543 and is now implicitly brought into 
effect by the requirement that treaties are interpreted in good faith, i.e. reasonably, 
honestly and fairly.  
Even if it does not always appear easy to distinguish between this and the 
previous function, they are to be kept logically distinguished since there might be 
occasions where the meaning to be attributed to a specific term could appear prima facie 
unambiguous and clear, independently from any reference to the treaty object and 
purpose, but the interpretation based on such a meaning could prove absurd or 
unreasonable in light of the object and purpose and the context of the treaty as a whole. 
In this case, the interpretative process is not yet at its end, since all the elements and 
means of interpretation put in the “crucible” must be assessed together and balanced 
against each other for the purpose of finding out the proper interpretation of the treaty. 
The fact that the prima facie construction, obtained by attributing to the relevant terms of 
the treaty their seeming ordinary meaning, is unreasonable or absurd against the 
background of the object and purpose of the treaty compels the interpreter to again 
analyse all the interpretative elements and items of evidence at his disposal for the 
purpose of assessing whether it is possible to give the relevant treaty terms an ordinary 
meaning leading to an interpretation that does not contrast with the object and purpose of 
the treaty. Where this is not possible, the interpreter must decide whether the object and 
purpose requires the treaty to be given an interpretation going beyond that based on the 
ordinary meaning of the treaty text, for instance by attaching a special meaning to the 
relevant undefined treaty terms.544 
While the principle of good faith represents the reason for the existence of a 
dividing line between acceptable and non-acceptable interpretations, the object and 
purpose of the treaty constitute, together with the context of the treaty as a whole, the 
major yardstick to test the acceptability of the result of the interpretative process: a 
                                                     
543 See Article 70(2) of the Third Report on the Law of Treaties submitted by the Special Rapporteur to the ILC 
(YBILC 1964-II, p. 52). See also the explanation given by the Special Rapporteur on the meaning of “the 
context of the treaty as a whole” and its relation with the object and purposed of the treaty (the latter being the 
most important element of the former – see also F. Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International 
Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2004), p. 168) at the ILC’s 765th meeting, held on 14 June 1964 (YBILC 
1964-I, p. 281, para. 87). 
544 This double function in the use of the objective and purpose of the treaty for interpretative purposes appears 
to be perceived also by Sinclair (see I. Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1984), p. 130). In this respect, Hummer points out that, if one looks at Articles 
31-33 VCLT as a whole, the impression is that the principles of interpretation put forward therein are closer to 
the teleological method than is generally perceived (see W. Hummer, “Problemas jurídico-lingüísticos de la 
dicotomía entre el sentido ‘ordinario’ y el ‘especial’ de conceptos convencionales según la Convención de 
Viena sobre el Derecho de los Tratados de 1969”, 28 Revista Española de Derecho Internacional (1975), 97 et 
seq., at 119-120). 
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construction that leads to absurd or unreasonable results, having regard to the object and 
purpose of the treaty (and the context of the treaty as a whole), should generally be 
rejected.545 
 This prominence given to the object and purpose of the treaty for interpretative 
purposes, however, does not entail that teleological interpretations going beyond the text 
of the treaty are unconditionally allowed under the system of the VCLT.546 Even where 
the object and purpose of the treaty functions as yardstick to draw the borderline 
between acceptable and unacceptable interpretations, it is only where the meaning 
attributable the treaty text appears absurd or unreasonable in light of the object and 
purpose and the context of the treaty as a whole that an interpretation that departs from 
the meaning of the text is acceptable (e.g. an interpretation that clearly results from the 
travaux préparatoires). 
 
A third function played by the object and purpose in this context concerns the 
interpretation of multilingual treaties. An analysis thereof is carried out in section 3.4 
and the following ones of Chapter 4.  
 
A conceptually different issue concerns where the interpreter should be supposed to look 
in order to find out the object and purpose of the treaty. 
The intention of the parties and, as a result thereof, the object and purpose of the 
treaty may be established on the basis of all elements and items of evidence at the 
disposal of the interpreter. However, under the system of the VCLT, the sources referred 
to in Article 31 VCLT547 should be generally regarded as bearing more weight than the 
supplementary means of Article 32 VCLT for the purpose of determining the treaty 
object and purpose.548 
                                                     
545 This reflects, in substance, the conclusion reached by Mr Jimenez de Aréchaga and Mr Luna at the ILC’s 
870th and 871st meetings (YBILC 1966-1(part II), p. 190, para. 69 and p. 193, paras. 4, 7 and, especially, 8).  
For a judicial application, see the decision of the ICJ in the Territorial Dispute (Libya v Chad) case, where the 
Court used the object and purpose of the treaty, largely determined on the basis of the treaty preamble, to 
verify the acceptability of an interpretation already reached through the other means provided for in the VCLT 
and not (only) to determine the ordinary meaning to be attributed to the relevant terms (see ICJ, 3 February 
1994, Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Chad), judgment, para. 52). See also the approach taken 
by the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes in the Plama v. Bulgaria case, where the 
Tribunal, after having concluded that the language of the treaty was unambiguous, that the clear meaning of the 
text was confirmed by the title of the relevant article and that it would have required a gross manipulation of 
the language to reach a different conclusion, stated that it had, however, considered whether any such 
manipulation was permissible in light of the treaty object and purpose (see International Centre for Settlement 
of Investment Disputes, 8 February 2005, Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, Case No 
ARB/03/24, para. 147. 
546 See, among scholars, F. Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law (Amsterdam: 
IBFD Publications, 2004), pp. 172 and 174 and F. G. Jacobs, “Varieties of Approach to Treaty Interpretation: 
With Special reference to the Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties Before the Vienna Diplomatic 
Conference”, 18 International and comparative law quarterly (1969), 318 et seq., at 338 (also cited by the 
former author). 
547 On the relevance of the whole text of a treaty, and not only of its preamble, for the purpose of finding out 
the object and purpose see R. Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 
196-197 and the case law cited in footnote 171 at p. 197. 
548 See the opinion expressed by Mr Verdross at the ILC’s 870th meeting, held on 15 June 1966 (YBILC 1966-I 
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In particular, while the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole is often stated 
in the treaty preamble,549 the object and purpose of the specific sections or articles must 
be generally determined on the basis of their text.   
 
2.3.3.2. Context  
 
“[W]ords are chameleons, which reflect the color of their environment”550 
 
The first issue to be considered, with regard to the context, concerns the role that it plays 
within the VCLT system of interpretation.   
 Indubitably, the main interpretative function of the context is that of qualifier of 
the treaty terms for the purpose of attributing them their ordinary (or special) meaning.551 
In this respect, Sir Humphrey Waldock, referring to the Principle of Integration included 
by Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice in his Major Principles of Interpretation, affirmed that “the 
natural and ordinary meaning of terms is not to be determined in the abstract but by 
reference to the context in which they occur”.552 This constitutes a further proof of of the 
fact that an over-literal approach was rejected in the system of the VCLT. 
 In addition, as noted in the previous section, the context helps the interpreter, 
together with the object and purpose of the treaty, to draw the borders of what may be 
considered an acceptable interpretation according to the canon of good faith.  
 
The second issue to be tackled regards the elements that should be regarded as part of the 
context. 
 
In this respect, within the context referred to in Article 31(1) VCLT a distinction may be 
drawn between two concepts: the “narrow” context553 and the “wide” context.554 
                                                                                                                                  
(part II), p. 186, para. 14). See also ECtHR, 27 October 1975, National Union of Belgian Police v. Belgium 
(Application no. 4464/70), para. 9 of Judge Fitzmaurice’s Separate Opinion, where Judge Fitzmaurice 
mentioned that the intentions of the parties and, therefore, the object and purpose of the treaty are supposed to 
be expressed or embodied in - or derivable from - the text finally draw up and may not therefore legitimately 
be sought elsewhere, save in special circumstances. 
549 See F. Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 
2004), p. 176, G. Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice. Volume I 
(Cambridge: Grotious Publications Limited, 1986), p. 362. See also the reference to the ICJ’s practice of 
looking for the object and purpose of a treaty in its preamble contained in the Commentary to Article 27 of the 
1966 Draft (YBILC 1966-II, p. 221, para. 12). 
With regard to judicial decisions, see ICJ, 27 August 1952, Rights of Nationals of the United States of America 
in Morocco (France v. United States of America), judgment, p. 197; ICJ, 3 February 1994, Territorial Dispute 
(Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Chad), judgment, para. 52. 
550 Hand J. in Court of Appeals (United States), 31 March 1948, Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. National 
Carbide Corporation, 167 F.2d 304, at 306, also quoted in R. Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), p. 178. 
551 See YBILC 1966-II, p. 221, para.13. 
552 YBILC 1964-II, p. 56, para. 14. 
553 On the necessity not to limit the context to the sole text of the provision (or article) to be interpreted (i.e. the 
narrow context), see I. Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Manchester: Manchester 
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The former is constituted by the sentence in which the term is located and the 
other closest sentences, the title of the article where the above sentences are located,555 
the structure or scheme of the provision at stake,556 as well as the specific agreements 
reached by the parties for the purpose of clarifying the meaning to be attributed to such a 
term and embodied in the treaty. In the “narrow” context, the grammar of the 
paragraphs, sentences and phrases in which the terms are located is a relevant, although 
not decisive,557 element that must be carefully analysed, although not determinative.  
The “wide” context includes the other means of interpretation that are classified 
as context under Article 31(1) VCLT, which are discussed in the rest of this section.  
 
Article 31(2) VCLT provides for a definition of the term “context”, which should be 
read into Article 31(1) for the purpose of its interpretation.558 According to that 
definition, the context encompasses:  
(i) the text of the treaty, including its title,559 preamble and annexes;  
(ii) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in 
connection with the conclusion of the treaty; and  
(iii) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with 
the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument 
related to the treaty.  
These three elements present a common characteristic that constitutes their distinctive 
feature: they reflect the agreement of the parties at the time of the treaty conclusion.560 
                                                                                                                                  
University Press, 1984), p. 127; F. Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law 
(Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2004), p. 146. The issue was discussed at the ILC’s 893rd meeting, held on 18 
July 1966, where Mr Yasseen (Chairman) and Sir Humphrey Waldock, both replying to an issue raised by Mr 
Jiménez de Aréchaga concerning the wording of (now) Article 31(1) VCLT, stated that “the terms of a treaty 
should be interpreted in the light of the treaty as a whole and not of a single article” and that such a conclusion 
was made fully clear by the definition of context provided for in (now) Article 31(2) VCLT (YBILC 1966-I 
(part II), p. 329, para. 32 and pp. 328-329, para. 25).    
554 A good illustration of the difference existing between the “narrow” and the “wide” context, as well as of the 
role played by the context in treaty interpretation is represented by ICJ, 11 September 1992, Land, Island and 
Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador v. Honduras), judgment, paras. 373 and 374. 
555 The relevance of the titles is well illustrated by the VCLT itself, for example in the use of the singular in the 
title of Article 31 “General rule of interpretation”, purported to convey the idea of the unity of the 
interpretative process, where all the elements have to be thrown together in the crucible. However, in certain 
instances, the role of the titles of articles may be limited by the very same treaty. A clear example is that, given 
by Gardiner (see R. Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p.181, footnote 
124), of the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, where it is expressly provided 
that the titles of articles “are included solely to assist the reader”. 
556 See, for example, WTO Appellate Body, 2 August 1999, Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of 
Civilian Aircraft, AB-1999-2 (WT/DS70/AB/R), paras. 152-156. 
557 See, for example, ICJ, 19 December 1978, Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turkey), judgment, 
paras. 53-55. 
558 See YBILC 1966-II, p. 220, para.8. 
559 See, for example, ICJ, 12 December 1996, Oil Platforms, (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of 
America), judgment, para. 47: “It should also be noted that, in the original English version, the actual title of 
the Treaty of 1955 — contrary to that of most similar treaties concluded by the United States at that time, such 
as the Treaty of 1956 between the United States and Nicaragua — refers, besides “Amity” and “Consular 
Rights”, not to “Commerce” but, more broadly, to “Economic Relations”.” 
560 See the French authentic text of Article 31 VCLT, where the expression “à l’occasion de la conclusion du 
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This usually excludes the possibility that such elements do not reflect the final 
agreement reached by the parties with reference to the actual content of the treaty. In this 
respect, that characteristic distinguishes them from the travaux préparatoires, whose 
words might refer to provisionary agreements between the parties that did no longer held 
at the time of the treaty conclusion.561 
It is common practice in international affairs to consider a treaty concluded when 
it is authenticated, i.e. at the date generally indicated in the testimonium of the treaty as 
the date of signature.562 However, an analysis of the various provisions of the VCLT that 
refer to the treaty conclusion shows that the term “conclusion” may assume different 
meanings according to the object and purpose of the provision where it is used, the 
meaning being either the process leading the contracting States to be bound by the treaty, 
or the point in time when the treaty text is authenticated (generally the moment when the 
treaty is signed).563 In that respect, for the purpose of Article 31 VCLT, the term 
“conclusion” is probably to be seen as denoting the process starting from the adoption of 
the text564 and ending at the moment when the contracting States become bound by the 
treaty (e.g. the moment of the ratification, exchange of instruments, accession), or, if 
subsequent, the moment when the contracting States have to take some agreed action for 
the purpose of bringing the treaty into force (e.g. an amendment to the original treaty 
necessary for this purpose).565  
However, the requirement provided for by Article 31(2) VCLT that the agreement 
between the parties is to occur at the time of the conclusion of the treaty should not be 
read too strictly. This requirement, in fact, must be assessed in light of its own object and 
purpose, that is to distinguish agreements and instruments that almost certainly reflect 
the final intention of the contracting States as to the actual content of the treaty, on the 
one hand, and instruments (such as the travaux préparatoires) that probably do not, on 
the other hand. Under this perspective, where evidence exists that an agreement made 
between the parties during the negotiation process, i.e. before the signature of the treaty, 
was still valid at the time of the conclusion of the treaty, it is reasonable to conclude that 
such an agreement should be taken into account as a primary means of interpretation 
under Article 31(2) VCLT.566 
 
                                                                                                                                  
traité” is used. See also YBILC 1964-I, p. 313, para. 53. 
561 It is, in fact, possible that subsequent changes in the agreement could have been not properly registered in 
the travaux préparatoires, due to the fact that they are usually incomplete. 
562 See R. Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 209. 
563 See the provisions included in Section I of Part II of the VCLT, in particular Articles 10 and 11 (read in 
combination with Articles 2(1)(a), 2(1)(f), 2(1)(g)). In that respect, see also YBILC 1962-II, p. 30, para.9.  
564 See Article 9 VCLT. 
565 See, similarly, R. Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 211 and E. 
W. Vierdag, “The Time of the ‘Conclusion’ of a Multilateral Treaty: Article 30 of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties and Related Provisions”, 59 British Yearbook of International Law (1988), 75 et seq., at 
pp. 83-84. 
566 See YBILC 1966-II, p. 221, para. 14; YBILC 1964-I, p. 311, para. 18. See also the reply to the Australian 
representative given by the Chairman of the Drafting Committee of the Vienna Conference (UNCLT-1st, p. 
442, para. 31) and the position expressed in R. Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008), pp. 341-342. 
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With regard to the first of the three elements constituting the context for the purpose of 
Article 31 VCLT, i.e. the text of the treaty, this must be considered to include the 
preamble and annexes of the treaty,567 as well as any other instrument that the parties 
intended to be part of the treaty.568 
Where a separate instrument is not, because of the explicit or implied agreement 
between the parties, to be characterized as an integral part of the treaty, it is nonetheless 
treated, in most cases, as part of the treaty context under Article 31(2)(a) VCLT.569  
 
With regard to the second element of the context, i.e. any agreement relating to the treaty 
made between all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty, the 
following points can be made.  
First, the term “agreement” should be construed as denoting both written and 
unwritten (i.e. verbal and tacit) agreements.570 This conclusion is supported by manifold 
arguments, the most important being that:571 
(i) the term “agreement” is also used in Article 31(3)(a) VCLT and, in connection 
with the latter provision, it is widely recognized that it encompasses non-written 
agreements;572  
(ii) the means of interpretation referred to in Article 31 VCLT are all of a juridical 
binding nature as between the parties, while the supplementary means of 
interpretation are not; since written and unwritten agreements are, under 
customary international law, of an equal status, both being binding on the parties 
according to the pacta sunt servanda rule,573 an interpretation of the term 
                                                     
567 See F. Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 
2004), p. 187. With reference to preambles, not all of them seem bear the same interpretative value, especially 
as a consequence of the broad range of carefulness spent by the contracting parties in their negotiation. As 
Gardiner rightly points out, the travaux préparatoires may shed light on whether or not the parties have paid 
attention to the drafting of the treaty preamble (R. Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008), p. 186). 
568 See the combined reading of Article 31(2) and 2(1)(a) VCLT. See also ICJ, 1 July 1952, Ambatielos Case 
(Greece v. United Kingdom), judgment, pp. 42-44. 
Typical examples of this kind of instrument are the Protocols of Signature (see the definition of Protocol of 
Signature on the Treaty Reference Guide of the United Nations defines available at the following url: 
http://untreaty.un.org/ola-internet/assistance/guide.htm) and the Protocols to bilateral tax treaties concluded at 
the time of signature of the relevant treaty, which are often considered to constitute integral part of the treaty 
text because of their ancillary and subsidiary nature. 
569 For instance, agreements not in written form cannot constitute an integral part of the treaty, due to the 
specific provision of Article 2(1)(a) VCLT. That notwithstanding, they constitute part of the context whenever 
they relate to the treaty and are made between all the parties in connection with the conclusion thereof. 
570 See YBILC 1964-I, p. 310, para. 15; YBILC 1964-I, p. 313, para. 51.  
571 For a more extensive analysis of the possible arguments in support of the wide construction of the term 
“agreement”, as used in Article 31(2) VCLT, see F. Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under 
International Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2004), pp. 196-199. 
572 See the position expressed by the German representative at the plenary session of the Vienna Convention 
(UNCLT-2nd, p. 57, para. 65), who, somewhat inconsistently, also maintained that the very same term 
“agreement” should be interpreted as referring solely to written agreements where used in Article (now) 31(2) 
VCLT (UNCLT-2nd, p. 57, para. 64).  
573 See Article 3 VCLT; among scholars see, for instance, R. Jennings and A. Watts (eds.), Oppenheim’s 
International Law. Volume I. Peace (London: Longman, 1992), p. 1201. 
PART II: CHAPTER 3 
 170 
“agreement” used in Article 31(2) VCLT leading to the inclusion of unwritten 
binding agreements among the supplementary means of interpretation for the 
purpose of treaty interpretations appears unsatisfactory; 
(iii) a narrow interpretation of the term “agreement” would disregard the above-
mentioned rule of customary international law and, therefore, might be seen as 
infringing Article 31(3)(c) VCLT, which prescribes customary international law 
to be taken into account for the purpose of treaty interpretation; 
(iv) the fact the term “agreement”, and not terms such as “treaty” or “instrument”, is 
employed in Article 31(2)(b) VCLT appears relevant, since the use of the latter 
terms would have made it clear that the agreement had to be in written form.  
In relation to the means that may be used in order to prove the existence and the content 
of unwritten agreements, it is admitted that both acquiescence and estoppel, on the one 
hand, and the subsequent practice of the contracting States, on the other hand, may be 
taken into account in that respect.574 
 Second, Article 31(2)(a) VCLT does not require the agreement to relate only, or 
mainly, to the interpretation of the treaty (or a part thereof). It is enough that the 
agreement is somewhat connected to the treaty, so that it may directly or indirectly shed 
some light on the proper meaning to be attributed to certain terms or expressions.575 
According to Sinclair (citing Yasseen), the agreements referred to by Article 31(2)(a) 
must be “concerned with the substance of the treaty and clarify certain concepts in the 
treaty or limit its field of application”.576 Moreover, Article 31(2)(a) VCLT is relevant 
only where an express reference to the agreement is missing in the text of the treaty. In 
contrast, where such a reference is included in the treaty, the agreement becomes part of 
the context because incorporated in the text by means of an express renvoi.577 
 Third, the expression “all the parties” should not be intended as entailing that, in 
cases of bilateral treaties based on a common model (like the OECD Model), all the 
States that participated directly or indirectly in the development of the model must have 
agreed on the interpretation of a specific term or clause of the model given in the 
commentary thereto, in order for that interpretation to be relevant for the bilateral treaty 
actually at stake. In fact, under Article 31(2)(a) VCLT, the expression “all the parties” 
denotes just the States party to the actual treaty and, therefore, once the proof is given 
(even by inference) that such States have agreed on the relevance of the interpretation 
provided for in the commentary to the model for the purpose of construing the actual 
treaty, that commentary must be regarded as included in the treaty context.  
 Finally, where the agreement between the parties provides for an interpretation 
                                                     
574 See, for instance, R. Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 209. 
575 See similarly F. Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law (Amsterdam: IBFD 
Publications, 2004), p. 201. 
576 See I. Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1984), p. 129. 
577 Examples of such express renvoi have been examined in ICJ, 11 September 1992, Land, Island and 
Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador v. Honduras), judgment (see in particular the dissenting opinion of 
Judge Torres Bernárdez, paras. 195-196) and ICJ, 3 February 1994, Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya v. Chad), judgment, in particular, para. 53. For a similar, even though not identical, conclusion, see 
R. Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 180.  
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that apparently contradicts the prima facie “ordinary meaning” of the treaty terms, it 
seems reasonable to conclude that such an interpretation must prevail and that the 
meaning of the treaty terms resulting from it must be seen as a “special meaning” 
according to Article 31(4) VCLT. 
 
With regard to the third element of the context, i.e. any instrument made by one or more 
parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties 
as instruments related to the treaty, the following points can be made. 
First, the term “instrument” seems to require the existence of a written document: 
since the other parties to the treaty have to accept it, it would appear difficult to imagine 
some parties accepting statements of other parties, unless such statements have been 
recorded in a written document.578  
Second, although Article 31(2)(b) VCLT seems intended to cover cases where 
instruments such as ratifications, reservations and policy declarations are at stake,579 
where interpretative instruments come into play, the acceptance by the other parties of 
the instrument as related to the treaty often extends to the acceptance of the substance of 
the interpretation provided for in the instrument. This may lead to the creation of an 
agreement between the parties on the interpretation of the treaty that, as such, falls 
within the scope of Articles 31(2)(a) or 31(3)(a) VCLT.  
 Third, the instrument is to be made by one or more parties, i.e. it is not required 
that the instrument is made by all the parties.580 
Fourth, it seems reasonable that the instrument must be accepted by all other 
parties to the treaty: an instrument accepted only by some parties may be relevant for the 
purpose of applying and interpreting the treaty among those parties, but cannot be 
considered to form part of the context.581  
Fifth, the acceptance of the instrument by the other parties may be either explicit 
or tacit.582 On the one hand, the text of Article 31(2)(b) VCLT is broad enough to allow 
tacit acceptance.583 On the other hand, the VCLT generally adopts more explicit 
expressions whenever a written acceptance is required.584  
Finally, VCLT requires the parties that did not make the instrument only to 
                                                     
578 See, for a similar conclusion, F. Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law 
(Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2004), pp. 205-206, where the author also briefly describes the history of the 
term “instrument” as used in Article 31 VCLT. 
579 See the similar statement by Sir Humphrey Waldock at the ILC 769th meeting (YBILC 1964-I, p. 311, para. 
23). 
580 The latter instrument would probably fit within Article 31(2)(a) VCLT, if relating to the treaty. 
581 See the statement made in this respect by Mr Ago (Chairman) at the ILC’s 766th meeting (YBILC 1964-I, p. 
287, para. 63). See also F. Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law (Amsterdam: IBFD 
Publications, 2004), p. 212. A fortiori a unilateral instrument not accepted by the other parties to the treaty 
cannot be considered to be covered by the provision at stake.  
582 This conclusion may be of particular relevance with reference to reservations (i) permitted by the treaty 
itself and (ii) for which an express acceptance by the other parties is not required (see F. Engelen, 
Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2004), pp. 213-214). 
583 See YBILC 1966-II, p. 98, para. 16. 
584 See, for instance, the expression “formulated in writing” in Article 23 VCLT. 
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accept it as “related to the treaty”.585 Thus, since it is not required that the all the parties 
agree on the content of such an instrument, its value as evidence of the meaning to be 
attributed to a term of the treaty may vary substantially according to the level of 
agreement reached between the parties in that respect. An instrument made by some 
parties whose content has been explicitly agreed upon by the other parties will have a 
much greater interpretative value than an instrument produced by the former parties and 
just accepted as related to the treaty by the latter parties without any additional 
clarification on the agreement reached with reference to its content.586  
 
2.3.3.3. Subsequent agreements and practice  
 
Under Article 31(3) VCLT, the following must be taken into account, together with the 
context: 
a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of 
the treaty or the application of its provisions; 
b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the 
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation. 
According to the commentary to the 1966 Draft, subsequent agreements and practice, as 
well as relevant rules of international law, are “all of an obligatory character and by their 
very nature could not be considered to be norms of interpretation in any way inferior to 
those which” are part of the context.587 This statement is further supported by the 
following arguments:  
(i) the title of Article 31 VCLT makes reference to a single, general rule of 
interpretation, thus putting the various elements referred to in that article on the 
same footing for hermeneutical purposes;  
(ii) the phrase “There shall be taken into account, together with the context” is apt 
to incorporate these means of interpretation into Article 31(1) VCLT.588  
 
The main difference between the elements referred to in Article 31(3)(a) and (b) VCLT, 
as compared to those mentioned in Article 31(2) VCLT, is represented by their temporal 
aspect. In particular, while the latter are always contemporary to the conclusion of the 
treaty, the former are subsequent thereto. This temporal aspect serves also to distinguish 
these means of interpretation from the travaux préparatoires since the former, being 
subsequent to the conclusion of the treaty, may be said to most probably reflect an 
agreement between the parties on the interpretation of the treaty that is still valid at the 
moment of its application (unless a different agreement is reached later on), while the 
latter might record provisional agreements between the parties that no longer held true at 
                                                     
585 See YBILC 1966-II, p. 221, para.13. 
586 See, accordingly, R. Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 204. 
587 YBILC 1966-II, p. 220, para. 9. See, with specific reference to subsequent agreements, YBILC 1966-II, p. 
221, para. 14. See also R. Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 206-
207. 
588 See also, in this respect, YBILC 1966-II, p. 220, para.8. 
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the time of the conclusion of the treaty (and, a fortiori, at the later time of its 
application).589 
 In addition, the two elements mentioned in Article 31(3)(a) and (b) VCLT have in 
common that they both require an agreement between the contracting States on the 
interpretation of the treaty to exist. 
 
Since the agreement between the parties is, in this case, subsequent to the conclusion of 
the treaty, two issues arise concerning (i) where the dividing line between interpretation 
and amendment of the treaty must be drawn and (ii) whether special rules and formalities 
apply where the agreement amounts to an amendment of the treaty. 
 
With regard to the first issue, Sir Humphrey Waldock, speaking in his capacity of Expert 
Consultant to the Vienna Conference, clarified that the ILC, in distinguishing between 
subsequent practice590 modifying a previous agreement and that merely interpreting it, 
focused on whether “a subsequent practice departed so far from any reasonable 
interpretation of the terms as to constitute a modification”.591 Similarly, according to 
Engelen, where a subsequent agreement or practice between the parties cannot 
reasonably be reconciled with the text of the treaty, it has the effect of modifying the 
treaty and, therefore, has no role to play in the application of the general rule of 
interpretation, but rather comes under the general rule regarding the amendment of 
treaties (Article 39 VCLT), which requires that the amendment complies with the rules 
laid down in Part II of the VCLT (Conclusion and Entry into Force of Treaties), unless 
the treaty itself otherwise provides.592  
 In that respect, however, it must be kept in mind that the rules of interpretation 
laid down by Articles 31 and 32 VCLT do not provide for a literal approach and 
establish that the ordinary meaning of a treaty term may be displaced in some occasions, 
recognizing that:  
(i) a special meaning may be given to a term where the parties so intended and  
(ii) decisive recourse to supplementary means of interpretation is allowed in order 
to determine the treaty meaning when the latter appears ambiguous, obscure, 
manifestly absurd or unreasonable.  
Therefore, it seems that the range of situations where it may be reasonably concluded 
that the agreement between the parties is of an interpretative character (i.e. reaffirming 
the original intention of the parties) or, in any case, does not contradict such an intention 
(e.g. where the specific case had not been forecasted at the moment of the treaty 
conclusion) and, therefore, it is not of an amending character, is remarkably broad.  
Moreover, the possibility of an evolutive interpretation is also to be taken into 
                                                     
589 See the previous section in this respect. 
590 But the same holds true with reference to subsequent agreements. 
591 See UNCLT-1st, p. 214, para. 55. An illustration of the possible distinction between amendments and 
interpretations resulting from the subsequent practice followed by the parties (taken together with other 
relevant elements for interpretation), is given in ECtHR, 12 March 2003, Öcalan v. Turkey (Application no. 
46221/99), paras. 193-198.   
592See  F. Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 
2004), pp. 220 and 240. 
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account in this regard. As the HCHR expressly stated, an “evolutive interpretation allows 
variable and changing concepts already contained in the Convention to be construed in 
the light of modern-day conditions”.593 Evolutive interpretation is generally accepted in 
two cases (although the dividing line between them is sometimes indistinct):  
(i) in cases of treaties that use general legal terms whose meaning might be 
expected by the parties to change over time according to the development of the 
law from which they derive;594 and  
(ii) in cases of treaties that are, by their nature, designed to allow for their 
progressive development and elaboration.595  
Under this perspective, for instance, changes in the commentaries to Model Conventions 
might be considered, in some cases, to be evidence of the agreement of the parties to 
refine their interpretation of previously concluded treaties. 
 
With regard to the second issue, under Article 39 VCLT treaty amendments must 
comply with the rules laid down in Part II of the VCLT (Conclusion and Entry into 
Force of Treaties). That, however, does not mean that amendments to treaties must be in 
written form. It is in fact generally recognized that amendments to treaties may be 
agreed upon orally, or even tacitly.596  
This conclusion is confirmed by the commentary to the 1966 Draft, where it is 
stated that an “amending agreement may take whatever form the parties to the original 
treaty may choose. Indeed, the Commission recognized that a treaty may sometimes be 
modified even by an oral agreement or by a tacit agreement evidenced by the conduct of 
the parties in the application of the treaty. Accordingly, in stating that the rules of part II 
regarding the conclusion and entry into force of treaties apply to amending agreements, 
the Commission did not mean to imply that the modification of a treaty by an oral or 
tacit agreement is inadmissible.”597 
In any case, amendments may be subject to specific requirements, with regard to 
their form and procedure of acceptance, under the constitutional law of the contracting 
States.  
                                                     
593 HCtHR, 29 May 1986, Feldbrugge v. the Netherlands (Application no. 8562/79), para. 24 of the Joint 
Dissenting Opinion of Judges Ryssdal, Bindschedler-Robert, Lagergren, Matscher, Sir Vincent Evans, 
Bernhardt and Gersing, where the following case law of the ECtHR is cited: ECtHR, 25 April 1978, Tyrer v. 
the United Kingdom (Application no. 5856/72), para. 31; ECtHR, 13 June 1979, Marckx v. Belgium 
(Application no. 6833/74), para. 41; ECtHR, 22 October 1981, Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom (Application 
no. 7525/76), para. 60. 
594 E.g. ICJ, 19 December 1978, Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turkey), judgment, para. 77 of the 
decision. See also the reference to the concept of “known legal term” in Judge Higgins’ Separate Opinion in 
the case Kasikili/Sedudu Island (ICJ, 13 December 1999, Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana v. Namibia), 
judgment, para. 2 of Judge Higgins’ Separate Opinion). 
595 See R. Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 242-243. 
596 See for instance, before the conclusion of the VCLT, Arbitral Tribunal, 17 July 1965, Italy-USA Air 
Transport Arbitration, 45 International Law Reports (1972), 393 et seq. and, after the conclusion of the VCLT, 
Arbitration Tribunal, 29 September 1988, Case concerning the location of boundary markers in Taba between 
Egypt and Israel, 20 Reports of International Arbitral Awards, 1 et seq. See also R. Jennings and A. Watts 
(eds.), Oppenheim’s International Law. Volume I. Peace (London: Longman, 1992), pp. 1254-1255. 
597 YBILC 1966-II, pp. 232-233, para. 4. 
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As concern the scope of Article 31(3)(a) VCLT, the following points can be made.   
First, the term “agreement”, as previously noted in the context of Article 31(2) 
VCLT, should be construed as denoting both written and unwritten agreements.598 
However, as a matter of fact, where no written document exists, evidence of the 
existence and content of the agreement may be mostly given by reference to subsequent 
practice.599 In such a case, the agreement appears to be substantially subsumed under the 
following provision of the VCLT. 
 Second, Article 31(3)(a) VCLT defines the subsequent agreement as “between the 
parties”. The different wording, as compared to that used in Article 31(2)(a) VCLT, 
raises the question whether, in the case of a multilateral treaty, a subsequent agreement 
reached between solely some of the parties to the treaty would fit in the provision of 
Article 31(3)(a) VCLT. In this respect, both the French and English authentic texts of 
Article 31(3)(a) employ terms that seem to denote the parties as a whole (“les parties”; 
“the parties”)600 and the Commentary to the 1966 Draft, although with reference to 
(now) Article 31(3)(b) VCLT, states that the reference to “the parties” must be intended 
as being to “the parties as a whole”.601  
Third, although unilateral interpretative statements do not fall, as such, under the 
general rule of interpretation provided for in Article 31 VCLT, where they are coupled 
with concordant practice by the other parties or any evidence confirming that the other 
parties endorsed such unilateral statements, their content may assume the status of an 
agreed interpretation of the treaties and fall within the scope of Article 31(3)(a). 
Finally, the agreement must be one regarding the interpretation or the application 
of the treaty; however, in addition, it may also concern other issues among the parties.  
 
With regard to Article 31(3)(b) VCLT, the following observations can be made.   
 First, the practice referred to therein is only that establishing an agreement 
reached between the parties in respect of the interpretation of the treaty. Where the 
practice does not establish the tacit agreement of the parties on the treaty construction, 
such a practice is still relevant for the purpose of interpreting the treaty, but just as a 
supplementary means of interpretation.602  
Second, the relevant practice must be carried out by bodies revealing the State’s 
position and commitment with reference to the treaty.603 In general terms, the relevant 
                                                     
598 See Arbitral Tribunal, 3 August 2005, Methanex Corporation v. the United States of America, final award 
on jurisdiction and merits, para. 20 of Part II - Chapter B. The text of the award is available on the website of 
the United States government at the following url: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/51052.pdf. 
599 According to Gardiner, the less formal the agreement, the greater the significance of subsequent practice 
confirming such less formal agreements or understandings (see R. Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 222). 
600 See, similarly, F. Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law (Amsterdam: IBFD 
Publications, 2004), pp. 220-221. 
601 See YBILC, p. 222, para.15. 
602 See, although with regard to Third Report of the Law of Treaties submitted by Sir Humphrey Waldock to 
the ILC, YBILC 1964-II, p. 60, paras. 23-25. See also YBILC 1964-I, p. 298, paras. 56 and 59. 
603 See, accordingly, R. Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 228. 
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practice, at least in modern western countries, encompasses (i) that of the States’ 
legislative power (usually the parliaments); (ii) that of the executive power (typically the 
government and any other public body charged with the authority of the State); and that 
of the jurisdictional power (usually the judiciary). In this respect, the evidence of such a 
practice may be obtained from a wide number of sources, e.g. policy statements from 
representatives of the legislative or executive power, statements from the representatives 
of the executive before the legislative body, domestic legislation, other treaties 
concluded, decisions of the judiciary, decisions by international courts and tribunals, 
press releases, opinions and declarations of official legal advisors, practice within 
international organizations, diplomatic correspondence, official manuals on legal issues, 
comments by governments on drafts produced by the ILC.604 Since practice must be 
under the authority of the States party to the treaty, it is potentially admissible to take 
into account the practice of international organizations, this being indirectly a practice of 
its member States, and international tribunals.605  
Third, it seems that where reputable studies have been carried out by international 
organizations, research institutes and others, the treaty interpretation provided for in such 
studies, coupled with the conduct, or even absence of conduct of the parties may amount 
to a practice establishing the agreements of those parties for the purpose of Article 
31(3)(b) VCLT.606  
Fourth, it does not seem that Article 31(3)(b) VCLT requires active practice by all 
contracting States.607 The relevant practice may result from the active practice of some 
parties, coupled with the explicit (rare), or implicit acceptance of such a practice by the 
other parties. Implicit acceptance may be constituted by the absence of any reaction to 
the conduct of the other States; in this case, acquiescence and (to certain extent) estoppel 
may be relevant.608 However, the tacit acceptance by the other parties cannot be lightly 
assumed. Parties that are not engaged in the practice might abstain from protest for 
reasons different from acquiescence, e.g. because the practice or issue at hand is not 
relevant for them: according to the majority of authors,609 in these cases the silence of 
the parties is not conclusive.610 Thus, the silence or inaction of a State may be interpreted 
                                                     
604 For a quite comprehensive list of material sources of international customary law, see I. Brownlie, 
Principles of public international law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 6. 
605 See R. Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 229, 235 and 246; I. 
Brownlie, Principles of public international law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 6. 
606 See, accordingly, R. Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 239. For a 
judicial application, see Court of Appeal of England and Wales (United Kingdom), 23 July 1999, Regina v. 
Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Adan, [1999] 3 WLR 1274, at 1296. 
607 See YBILC 1966-II, p. 99, para. 18. 
608 See ICJ, 15 June 1962, Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), judgment, p. 32; ICJ, 13 
December 1999, Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana v. Namibia), judgment, para. 74. On the relevance of 
estoppel before the VCLT rules received widespread application, see R. Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 220 et seq. 
609 See, ex multis, I. Brownlie, Principles of public international law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 
pp. 7 et seq.; F. Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law (Amsterdam: IBFD 
Publications, 2004), p. 234. 
610 See also the conclusion reached by the ICJ in the Kasikili/Sedudu Island case with reference to the fact that 
the conduct of one party and the absence of reaction by the other party of a bilateral treaty did not amount to a 
subsequent practice in the sense of Article 31(3)(b) VCLT in the particular circumstances of the case (see ICJ, 
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as consent only where the circumstances were such as to call for some reaction, on the 
part of that State, if it wished not to consent.611  
Fifth, the practice should be sufficiently repeated and consistent.612 In this sense, 
practice establishing an agreement on the interpretation of a treaty appears conceptually 
similar to the diuturnitas required for having customary law, i.e. “evidence of a general 
practice accepted as law”,613 although the period for which the practice must endure 
(repeated action) does not have to be as long as in the case of customary law.614 
Finally, in some cases the evidence from practice required in order to establish 
the existence of an agreement on the interpretation of the treaty may be less than usually 
needed, for instance where (i) evidence exists of an informal agreement reached between 
the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty and relevant for its 
interpretation and (ii) the practice seems to conform to such an agreement.615 This may 
also be the case where (i) a common model and a commentary thereon exist, on which 
the actual treaty is widely based616 and (ii) there is a substantial number of other treaties 
concluded by the contracting parties following that model and, in respect of such other 
treaties, evidence of consistent practice is available.617 This means that, although with 
due caution, practice in the application of similar or related treaties may be useful in 
order to attribute to the undefined terms of the relevant treaty their ordinary or special 
meanings, particularly where a common model convention is used as basis for their 
drafting.618  
 
2.3.3.4. Relevant rules of international law 
 
“A word is not crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and 
may vary greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and the time in 
which it is used”619 
                                                                                                                                  
13 December 1999, Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana v. Namibia), judgment, paras. 74-75). 
611 See ICJ, 15 June 1962, Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), judgment, p. 23. On the role 
played by acquiescence to other parties’ conduct in treaty law and, in particular, with regard its relevance for 
the purpose of determining the legal status of the OECD Commentary, see H. Thirlway, “The Role of 
International Law Concepts of Acquiescence and Estoppel”, in S. Douma and F. Engelen (eds.), The Legal 
Status of the OECD Commentaries (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2008), 29 et seq. 
612 See, for instance, WTO Appellate Body, 4 October 1996, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, AB-1996-
2, (WT/DS8-10-11/AB/R), pp. 12-13.  
613 See Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. 
614 See Arbitral Tribunal, 17 July 1965, Italy-USA Air Transport Arbitration, 45 International Law Reports 
(1972), 393 et seq., at 419. 
615 See R. Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 241-242 and the case-
law cited therein. 
616 That holds especially true where the parties contributed to the development of the model. 
617 E.g. Court of Appeal of England and Wales (United Kingdom), 23 July 1999, Regina v. Secretary of State 
for the Home Department, ex parte Adan, [1999] 3 WLR 1274, at 1296; Arbitral Tribunal, 10 April 2001, Pope 
& Talbot Inc v. Canada, award on merit s of phase 2, paras. 110 et seq. and Arbitral Tribunal, 31 May 2002, 
Pope & Talbot Inc v. Canada, award in respect of damages, para. 62 (available on the NAFTA website).  
618 See R. Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 235, 282-284. 
619 United States Supreme Court, 7 January 1918, Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418 (1918), p. 425 per Justice 
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Treaties are agreements concluded in a given international legal environment. For the 
purpose of interpreting treaties it is therefore important to understand such legal 
environment, which constitutes the background against which the treaties must be read.  
The relevance for treaty interpretation of such an international legal environment 
was already recognized before the conclusion of the VCLT.620 Article 1(1) of the 1956 
Resolution of the Institute of International Law read: “[…] Les termes des dispositions 
du traité doivent être interprétés dans le contexte entier, selon la bonne foi et à la lumière 
des principes du droit international.”621 Similarly, in the case Right of Passage over 
Indian Territory (Portugal v. India), the ICJ stated that it “is a rule of interpretation that 
a text emanating from a Government must, in principle, be interpreted as producing and 
as intended to produce effects in accordance with existing law and not in violation of 
it.”622  
 
Such a principle has been incorporated in the VCLT as a part of the general rule of 
interpretation. According to Article 31(3)(c) VCLT, in fact, the interpreter must take into 
account “any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the 
parties”. This provision presents two fundamental issues that require discussion:623  
(i) which are the relevant rules of international law to be taken into account under 
Article 31(3)(c);  
(ii) whether such rules are those in force at the time of the conclusion of the 
treaties, or those at the time of the application thereof. 
 
With reference to the first issue, the following should be noted. 
In light of the history of the provision,624 its wording and context, it seems that 
the following types of rules of international law are to be considered covered by Article 
31(3)(c) VCLT:625  
(i) general rules and principles of international law, including customary international 
law;626  
                                                                                                                                  
Holmes. 
620 See also the position expressed by Lauterpacht on this issue in H. Lauterpacht, The development of 
International law by the International Court (London: Stevens & Sons Limited, 1958), pp. 27-29. 
621 Institute of International Law, 46 Annuaire de l’Institut de Droit International (1956), 364 et seq., at 364. 
622 ICJ, 26 November 1957, Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v. India), judgment, p. 142. 
623 On such issues see, in general, D. French, “Treaty Interpretation and the Incorporation of Extraneous Legal 
Rules”, 55 International and comparative law quarterly (2006), 281 et seq. 
624 See, in particular, YBILC 1964-I, p. 319, paras. 10, 11 and 13; YBILC 1966-I (part II), p. 267, para. 90. 
625 These rules substantially coincide with the sources of interpretation that the ICJ has to apply according to 
Article 38(1)(a), (b) and (c) of its Statute. 
626 See WTO Panel, 29 September 2006, European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and 
Marketing of Biotech Products, (WT/DS291-292-293/R), Chapter VII, para. 7.67. Note that customary 
international law may be formed according to the practice of States in concluding similar treaties or treaties 
based on a common model. See, for example, Arbitral Tribunal, 31 May 2002, Pope & Talbot Inc v. Canada, 
award in respect of damages, para. 64. With reference to the relation between tax treaties and customary 
international law, see R. S. Avi-Yonah, “Tax Competition, Tax Arbitrage and the International Tax Regime”, 
61 Bulletin for international taxation (2007), 130 et seq. 
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(ii) general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;627  
(iii) regional or local rules of international law applicable in the relations between the 
parties (e.g. European law principles between two States member of the European 
Union);  
(iv) other treaties in force between all the parties (both earlier and later treaties). 
In general, it does not seem that treaties (a) between only some of the parties, (b) 
between some of the parties and third States and (c) just between third States may fit in 
the provision of Article 31(3)(c), since such treaties are not “applicable in the relations 
between the parties”.628 A contextual interpretation of the term “the parties”, in fact, 
leads to the conclusion that its ordinary meaning is “the parties as a whole”, since that is 
the meaning that such a term assumes in the other provisions of Article 31 VCLT.629  
That conclusion, of course, does not hold true where such treaties express 
customary international law, or general rules of international law, which are in any case 
applicable between the parties. Moreover, that conclusion does not mean that such 
treaties are not at any rate available means of interpretation. On the one hand, where the 
compatibility of the provision of the treaty to be interpreted with another treaty is at 
stake, the existence of an obligation under the latter treaty may be clearly taken into 
                                                     
627 See Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the ICJ. Such general principles include both general principles of law 
derived from municipal jurisprudence (mainly relating to jurisdiction, burden of proof, procedure, etc.) and 
general principles of international law (such as the rules of consensus, good faith, reciprocity, etc.). See I. 
Brownlie, Principles of public international law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 18. Article 38 of 
the ICJ Statute was cited in relation to Article 31(3)(c) VCLT by the Arbitral Tribunal in the Pope & Talbot 
case (Arbitral Tribunal, 31 May 2002, Pope & Talbot Inc v. Canada, award in respect of damages, para. 46).  
628 On the issue of the scope of Article 31(3)(c) VCLT see the recent study of C. McLachlan, “The Principle of 
Systematic Integration and Art. 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention”, 54 International and comparative law 
quarterly (2005), 279 et seq. See also U. Linderfalk, “Who Are ‘The Parties’? Article 31, Paragraph 3(c) of the 
1969 Vienna Convention and the ‘Principle of Systemic Integration’ Revisited”, 55 Netherlands International 
Law Review (2008), 343 et seq.; A. Orakhelashvili, The Interpretation of Acts and Rules in Public 
International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 368 et seq.; D. French, “Treaty Interpretation 
and the Incorporation of Extraneous Legal Rules”, 55 International and comparative law quarterly (2006), 281 
et seq., at 307. 
Contra this conclusion, see, however, the 2006 Report of the Study Group of the ILC finalized by M. 
Koskenniemi, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and 
Expansion of International Law, available at the following URL: http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/1_9.htm, in 
particular, para. 472 thereof. 
629 See previous sections with regard to the evidence supporting this conclusion. See, accordingly, the position 
expressed by the German representative at the Committee of the Whole of the Vienna Conference (UNCLT-1st, 
pp. 172-173, paras. 10-12). See also WTO Panel, 29 September 2006, European Communities – Measures 
Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, (WT/DS291-292-293/R), Chapter VII, para. 7.68 
and footnote 242 thereto; GATT panel, 16 June 1994, United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna 
(DS29/R), para. 5.19 (available on-line at the following url: 
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/gattpanels/tunadolphinII.pdf). Among scholars, see, for instance, U. 
Linderfalk, “Who Are ‘The Parties’? Article 31, Paragraph 3(c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention and the 
‘Principle of Systemic Integration’ Revisited”, 55 Netherlands International Law Review (2008), 343 et seq.; 
F. Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2004), p. 
253. 
However, the recent Report of the ILC Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the 
Diversification and Expansion of International Law (para. 472) seems to also permit reference to treaties 
concluded among only some of the parties, “provided that the parties in dispute are also parties to that other 
treaty”. 
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account as a supplementary means of interpretation, even where the latter treaty is not in 
force between all the parties to the former treaty.630 On the other hand, where the issue at 
stake is the attribution to a treaty term of its ordinary (or special) meaning, such other 
treaties represent a primary means of interpretation so far as they may shed light on such 
an ordinary (or special) meaning, e.g. where they concern the same subject matter or 
deal with a related topic and are of a widespread application, as well as where they are 
based on a common model.631  
A related issue concerns whether non-binding international instruments are within 
the rules of international law referred to in Article 31(3)(c) VCLT.632 In that respect, the 
use of the term “rules” seems to suggest a negative answer.633 However, in some of its 
decisions, the ECtHR has referred to instruments not binding as such, though they may 
appear to have become part of customary international law or otherwise relevant for 
interpretative purposes under other provision of the VCLT.634 
Finally, the rules of international law must be “relevant”, i.e. significant in order 
to interpret the treaty. This condition should be regarded as a loose one: it is not 
necessary that the treaty to be interpreted incorporates a term or concept that is clarified 
by the rule of international law to be applied, or is directly linked to such a rule; 
whenever a rule of international law may have a bearing on the treaty and is potentially 
relevant for its interpretation, its use is allowed by Article 31(3)(c).635 
 
With regard to the second issue, which is generally referred to as the “inter-temporal 
law” issue, the following observations can be made.   
 The modifications (or additions) over time of the relevant rules of international 
law may affect the interpretation and the application of treaties: on the one hand, they 
may affect the meaning to be attributed to a treaty term, since the treaty to be interpreted 
may include a term that is a state-of-the-art term in public international law, or in a 
specific branch thereof; on the other hand, they may affect the scope of the treaty, 
                                                     
630 See F. Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 
2004), p. 253. 
631 See the Conclusions of the work of the Study Group on the Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties 
arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, adopted by the ILC at its Fifty- eighth 
session (ILC 2006 Report, pp. 414-415, para. 21). See also R. Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), pp. 281 et seq. For a similar conclusion, see ICJ, 11 September 1992, Land, Island 
and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador v. Honduras), judgment, para. 380; WTO Appellate Body, 14 
January 2002, United States – Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales Corporations”, AB-2001-8 
(WT/DS108/AB/RW), paras. 141-145 (including the footnotes to such paragraphs) and 185; Arbitral Tribunal, 
10 April 2001, Pope & Talbot Inc v. Canada, award on merits of phase 2, paras. 110 et seq. and Arbitral 
Tribunal, 31 May 2002, Pope & Talbot Inc v. Canada, award in respect of damages, para. 62 (available on-line 
on the Nafta web site - www.naftaclaims.com). 
632 See R. Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 268 et seq. 
633 See, in the same sense, WTO Panel, 29 September 2006, European Communities – Measures Affecting the 
Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, (WT/DS291-292-293/R), Chapter VII, para. 7.67. 
634 See R. Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 269. For some examples 
of the instruments referred to by the ECtHR, see House of Lords (United Kingdom), 16 December 2004, A and 
others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2004] UKHL 56, para. 29. 
635 See, accordingly, F. Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law (Amsterdam: IBFD 
Publications, 2004), p. 254. 
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especially where later treaties or customary international law embody rules that conflict 
with those of the treaty. 
From a historical perspective,636 the inter-temporal law issue was 
comprehensively dealt with for the first time in the arbitral decision delivered in the case 
Island of Palmas, where Judge Huber (the sole arbitrator) stated that, as regards the 
question of which of different legal systems prevailing at successive periods is to be 
applied in a particular case, a distinction must be drawn between the creation of rights 
and the existence of rights.637 According to Judge Huber, (i) a juridical fact must be 
appreciated in light of the law contemporary with it, and not of the law in force at the 
time when a dispute in regard to it arises or falls to be settled,638 while (ii) the existence 
of the right, in other words its continued manifestation, has to follow the conditions 
required by the evolution of law.639 Propositions (i) and (ii) are commonly referred to as 
the “first branch” and “second branch”, respectively, of the inter-temporal law principle.  
The ILC, after a long and acute debate640 on whether subsequent developments of 
international law could be taken into account for the purpose of interpreting previously 
concluded treaties, upheld the position expressed by Sir Humphrey Waldock that, in the 
circumstances of the case, the only reasonable conclusion was for the ILC to abandon 
the idea of solving the issue of inter-temporal law in the draft convention and to confine 
the text thereof to a limited reference to “rules of international law”.641 ILC’s Drafting 
Committee consequently inserted a reference to “any relevant rule of international law 
applicable in the relations between the parties” in the draft of (then) Article 69(3)(c),642 
which was then adopted without amendments by the ILC and included in the 1966 Draft 
as Article 27(3)(c). It later became Article 31(3)(c) VCLT.  
According to the commentary to the 1966 Draft, the relevance of rules of 
international law for the interpretation of treaties in any given case is dependent on the 
intentions of the parties and the correct application of the temporal element is normally 
indicated by interpretation of the treaty terms in good faith.643 
This position has been substantially restated in the conclusions reached by the 
                                                     
636 For an exhaustive analysis of the history of Article 31(3)(c) VCLT, see F. Engelen, Interpretation of Tax 
Treaties under International Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2004), pp. 257-285. 
637 See Arbitral Tribunal, 4 April 1928, Island of Palmas (Netherlands v. USA), 2 Reports of International 
Arbitral Awards, 829 et seq., at 845 et seq. 
638 See with the similar position taken by the ICJ, with regard to the validity of a treaty concluded in 
accordance with the conditions and practice at that time prevailing, in ICJ, 12 April 1960, Right of Passage 
over Indian Territory (Portugal v. India), judgment, p. 37. 
639 For instance, with reference to treaties, the issue arises where certain provisions of a treaty conflict with 
later ius cogens. 
640 See the Third Report on the Law of Treaties prepared by Sir Humphrey Waldock (YBILC 1964-II, pp. 8-
10); the discussion that took place in the course of the 728th and 729th ILC’s meetings (in particular, YBILC 
1964-I, p. 33, para. 6; p. 34, para. 10-13) and the revised draft articles subsequently prepared by the Special 
Rapporteur (in particular, YBILC 1964-II, pp. 52-53; p. 56, para. 12; p. 61, para. 32); the debate that took place 
in the course of the 765th, 769th and 770th ILC’s meetings and the outcome thereof (in particular, YBILC 1964-
I, p. 297, para. 46; YBILC 1964-II, pp. 202-203, para. 11); the Sixth Report on the Law of Treaties prepared by 
Sir Humphrey Waldock (in particular, YBILC 1966-II, p. 96, para. 7; p. 97, paras. 12-13; p. 101, para. 25). 
641 See YBILC 1966-I (vol. II), p. 199, para. 10. 
642 YBILC 1966-I (vol. II), p. 267, para. 90. 
643 See YBILC 1966-II, p. 222, para. 16. 
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ILC in its recent work on the fragmentation of international law, which has also touched 
upon the issue of inter-temporal law. In that respect, the Summary included in the 2006 
ILC’s Report to the General Assembly states the following: “International law is a 
dynamic legal system.  A treaty may convey whether in applying Article 31(3)(c) the 
interpreter should refer only to rules of international law in force at the time of the 
conclusion of the treaty or may also take into account subsequent changes in the law.  
Moreover, the meaning of a treaty provision may also be affected by subsequent 
developments, especially where there are subsequent developments in customary law 
and general principles of law.”644 
The conclusion reached by the ILC appears in line with the position taken by the 
ICJ in its case law, where the Court seems to attribute paramount relevance to the 
original intention of the parties, as emerging from the analysis of the text, nature and 
structure of the treaty, as well as from its object and purpose, in order to solve the issues 
of inter-temporal law at stake in the specific cases. In this sense, the ICJ appears to solve 
the question of the impact of subsequent rules of international law on the interpretation 
of previous treaties by applying the general principle of good faith.645 
Moreover, the analysis of international case law has shown that other courts and 
tribunals also tend to follow such an approach, especially where the treaties to be 
interpreted deal with human rights and fundamental freedoms.646 
The same conclusions appear to be shared as well among scholars. For instance, 
Article 4 of the 1975 Resolution of the Institute of International Law concerning the 
Intertemporal Problem in Public International Law states that, “[l]orsqu'une disposition 
conventionnelle se réfère à une notion juridique ou autre sans la définir, il convient de 
recourir aux méthodes habituelles d'interprétation pour déterminer si cette notion doit 
être comprise dans son acception au moment de l'établissement de la disposition ou dans 
son acception au moment de l'application.”647 Similarly, Higgins states that, even with 
regard to the inter-temporal law issue,  in “the law of treaties […] the intention of the 
parties is really the key” and that there is a “wider principle – intention of the parties, 
                                                     
644 See ILC 2006 Report, p. 415, para. 22. 
645 See ICJ, 19 December 1978, Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turkey), judgment, para. 77 (where 
the Court also distinguished between the case under review and that decided in Arbitral Tribunal, Petroleum 
Development Ltd. v. Sheikh of Abu Dhabi, 18 International Law Reports (1951), 144 et seq., at 152); ICJ, 13 
December 1999, Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana v. Namibia), judgment, para. 2 of Judge Higgins’ Separate 
Opinion; ICJ, 25 September 1997, Gabčikovo–Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), judgment, para. 140; 
ICJ, 21 June 1971, Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia 
(South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), advisory opinion, para. 53; ICJ, 
18 July 1966, South West Africa (Ethiopia/Liberia v. South Africa), judgment, para. 235 of Judge Tanaka’s 
dissenting opinion. See also the similar reasoning followed by the ECJ, dealing with the inter-temporal law 
issue in relation to the temporary fishing limits under Council Regulation 170/83 EEC (see ECJ, 9 July 1991, 
Case C-146/89, Commission v. United Kingdom, paras. 21-25). 
646 See R. Higgins, “Some Observations on the Inter-Temporal Rule in International Law”, in: J. Makarczyk 
(ed.), Theory of International Law at the Threshold of the 21st Century, Essays in honour of Krzysztof 
Skubiszewski (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1996), 173 et seq. See, for instance, ECtHR, 25 April 
1978, Tyrer v. United Kingdom (Application no. 5856/72), para. 31. 
647 Institute of International Law, “Résolution of 11 août 1975: Le problème intertemporel en droit 
international public”, 55 Annuaire de l’Institut de Droit International (1975), 536 et seq., at 538. 
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reflected by reference to object and purpose – that guides the law of treaties.”648 Sinclair, 
after having pointed out that the interpreter has to take into account the historical context 
in which treaty provisions have been negotiated, which necessarily embraces the status 
of international law at that time, admits that “there is scope for the narrow and limited 
proposition that the evolution and development of the law can be taken into account in 
interpreting certain terms in a treaty which are by their very nature expressed in such 
general terms as to lend themselves to an evolutionary interpretation. […] this must 
always be on condition that such an evolutionary interpretation does not conflict with the 
intentions and expectations of the parties as they may have been expressed during the 
negotiations preceding the conclusion of the treaty.”649 
 
Finally, tackling the issue from a broader perspective, the general question that the 
interpreter must answer is how later changes in circumstances (such as changes in 
linguistic usage, technological progress, development of new fields of law, evolution of 
rules of international law, changes in the domestic law of the parties, changes in policy 
and practice) should be assessed for the purpose of interpreting and applying previous 
treaties. In that respect, the following conclusions may be drawn: 
(i) where the changes determine the formation of a new rule of ius cogens in 
conflict with the treaty, the latter must be considered become void or implicitly 
modified;650  
(ii) where an unforeseen fundamental change of circumstances takes place, it is 
(also) possible to invoke it as a ground for terminating, suspending or 
withdrawing from the treaty;651  
(iii) in all other cases, the impact of the changes will depend on the language used 
in the treaty,652 the context in which such language is used, the object and purpose 
                                                     
648 R. Higgins, “Some Observations on the Inter-Temporal Rule in International Law”, in: J. Makarczyk (ed.), 
Theory of International Law at the Threshold of the 21st Century, Essays in honour of Krzysztof Skubiszewski 
(The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1996), 173 et seq., at 181. See, similarly, F. Engelen, Interpretation of 
Tax Treaties under International Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2004), pp. 290-291. See also the 
substantially similar conclusions reached by Linderfalk, although supported by (partially different) arguments 
based on a semantic analysis, in U. Linderfalk, “Doing the Right Thing for the Right Reason – Why Dynamic 
or Static Approaches Should be Taken in the Interpretation of Treaties”, 10 International Community Law 
Review (2008), 109 et seq., in particular at 134 et seq. 
For an analysis of how the inter-temporal law issue may impact tax treaty interpretation and the reasons why 
certain tax treaty terms could (and should) be interpreted in light of the relevant evolutions subsequent to the 
treaty conclusion, especially where those terms concern areas that are themselves likely to evolve (such as 
entertaining, athletics, technology and finance), see M. Edwardes-Ker, Tax Treaty Interpretation. The 
International Tax Treaties Service (Dublin: In-Depth, 1994 – loose-leaf), at 9.03 and 9.06-9.09, who refers to 
the “evolutionary approach to the meaning of tax treaty terms”. 
649 I. Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1984), p. 140. 
650 See Article 64 VCLT and the Commentary to Article 61 of the 1966 Draft (YBILC 1966-II, p. 261, para. 3) 
651 However, according to Article 62 VCLT, this is possible only in so far as (i) the existence of the original 
circumstances constituted an essential basis of the consent to be bound by the treaty and (ii) the effect of the 
change is to radically modify the extent of the obligations still to be performed under the treaty. 
652 For instance, the fact that general legal terms apt to change their meaning over time have been used rather 
than specific terms not apt to evolutionary interpretation. 
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of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion: all these elements will be 
taken into account, reciprocally weighted and assessed in good faith.653  
 
 
2.3.4. Special meaning 
 
It is generally recognized that the expression “special meaning”, in the context of Article 
31(4) VCLT, should be construed as denoting any meaning that could not be ordinarily 
attributed to the relevant treaty term, but in favor of which there is strong evidence of the 
intention of the parties.654 Thus, the term “special meaning” should not normally include 
the meaning(s) attributed to the interpreted terms in the jargon of the field of knowledge 
dealt with in the treaty, such technical meaning(s) being normally regarded as the 
ordinary meaning(s) in the treaty context.  
 As a matter of fact, however, the borderline between ordinary and special 
meanings proves to be blurred in the vast majority of cases. While this does not create 
problems from a substantive standpoint (the task of the interpreter remaining that of 
establishing the meaning agreed upon by the parties), it may lead to procedural 
uncertainties, since the burden of proving that some unusual or exceptional meaning is to 
be attributed to the interpreted term should theoretically rest with the person alleging 
it.655 In this respect, the complexity of ascertaining the dividing line between ordinary 
and special meanings may render meaningless the proposition that the burden of proof 
lies on the party supporting the special meaning.656 
 
The main issue that the ILC and scholars have debated, with regard to Article 31(4) 
VCLT, concerns the means of interpretation that the interpreter should use in order 
                                                     
653 A classic example, in this respect, is represented by the decision of the Arbitral Tribunal in the Iron Rhine 
case, where it was stated that new scientific insights, new norms and standards with respect to the protection of 
the environment had to be taken into account for the purpose of interpreting and applying a 1839 Treaty 
between Belgium and the Netherlands (see Arbitral Tribunal, 24 May 2005, Award in the Arbitration 
regarding the Iron Rhine (“Ijzeren Rijn”) Railway between the Kingdom of Belgium and the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands, 27 Reports of International Arbitral Awards, 35 et seq., para. 140. See also WTO Panel, 29 
September 2006, European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech 
Products, (WT/DS291-292-293/R), Chapter VII, para. 7.68. 
654 According to Gardiner, Article 31(4) VCLT is mainly apt to cover cases of “a particular meaning given by 
someone using a term that differs from the more common meaning or meanings” (R. Gardiner, Treaty 
Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 291). Sinclair defines it as the “converse of the 
‘ordinary meaning’” (see I. Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1984), p. 126). 
655 See commentary to Article 27 of the 1966 Draft (YBILC 1966-II, p. 222, para. 17). See also PCIJ, 5 
September 1933, Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Denmark v. Norway), judgment, pp. 49-50. 
656 See, for example, the difficulties faced by the ICJ in determining the ordinary meaning of the expression “to 
determine the legal situation of the (…) maritime spaces” used in Article 2 of the 1986 Special Agreement 
Between El Salvador and Honduras to Submit to the Decision of the International Court of Justice the Land, 
Island ad Maritime Boundary Dispute Existing Between the Two States in the course of the case Land, Island 
and Maritime Frontier Dispute (see ICJ, 11 September 1992, Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El 
Salvador v. Honduras), judgment, paras. 377 of the decision and 193 of Judge Torres Bernárdez’s separate 
opinion).  
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establish and argue for the “special meaning” that the parties intended to attach to the 
relevant treaty term.  
 For instance, even during the ILC’s eighteenth session, the members of the 
Commission did not agree on whether recourse to supplementary means of interpretation 
was allowed for the purpose of determining the special meaning to be attributed to the 
treaty terms.657 Similarly, in the course of the Vienna Conference, some comments put 
forward by the delegations focused on the relation between the parties’ intention to 
attach a special meaning to a treaty terms and the travaux préparatoires.658 In this 
respect, Sir Humphrey Waldock, in his capacity of Expert Consultant, replied to such 
comments by pointing out that he could not share the view of those representatives who 
considered that in most cases the special meaning could be found only by recourse to the 
travaux préparatoires, since the comparatively few cases where a “special meaning” had 
been pleaded did not support that view, but, on the contrary, mainly pointed to the text 
and context of the treaty.659 
Similarly, certain scholars have submitted that the analysis of the travaux 
préparatoires of the VCLT seems to indicate that evidence of the parties’ intention to 
attach a special meaning to a treaty term should be derived mainly through the means of 
interpretation provided for in Article 31 VCLT, reliance on supplementary means of 
interpretation being permissible only in the cases specifically provided for in Article 32 
VCLT.660 This conclusion does not do more than restate the subordinate relevance of the 
supplementary means of interpretation within the system of interpretation designed by 
the VCLT and implicitly affirms the procedural nature of Article 31(4) VCLT.661 The 
meaning of any treaty term must always be established on the basis of all elements and 
items of evidence that may be reasonably regarded as reflecting the common intention of 
the parties, no special derogation being provided for in cases where the parties might 
have intended to attach a “special meaning” to the relevant treaty term. In the described 
process of interpretation, travaux préparatoires are generally regarded as supplementary 
means of interpretation because of their uncertain reliability. However, where evidence 
exists that an agreement reached during the travaux préparatoires was still valid at the 
time of the treaty conclusion, that agreement is part of the context and counts as such for 
the purpose of interpretation, notwithstanding whether the agreed meaning is labeled 
ordinary or special.662  
                                                     
657 See, for instance, YBILC 1966-I (vol. II), p. 205, para. 24. 
658 See the written statement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (UNdoc. A/Conf. 
39.7/Add. 1, pp. 14-15); the comments from the United States delegation (UNCLT-1st, p. 168, para. 47). See 
also the comments from the Austrian  delegation (UNCLT-1st, p. 178, para. 14); the comments from the 
Ghanian delegation (UNCLT-1st, p. 171, para. 70); the comments from the Vietnamese delegation (UNCLT-1st, 
p. 168, para. 51). 
659 See UNCLT-1st, p. 184, paras. 70-71. 
660 See, for instance, R. Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 294. 
661 Apparently in agreement Engelen, who highlights that Article 31(4) VCLT does not provide for an 
alternative, more subjective, process of treaty interpretation (see F. Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties 
under International Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2004), p. 164). 
662 See R. Bernhardt, “Interpretation and Implied (Tacit) Modification of Treaties. Comments on Arts. 27, 28, 
29 and 38 of the ILC’s 1966 Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties”, 27 Zeitschrift für Ausländisches 
Öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (1967), 491 et seq., at 501 and F. G. Jacobs, “Varieties of Approach to 
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For instance, a case where the “special meaning” may be established on the basis 
of the sole textual analysis is represented by the inclusion of a term expressed in one 
(authentic) language within a sentence written in a different (authentic) language.663 
Such a practice is often adopted where the “foreign language” term used is a technical 
one, which is associated with a concept that cannot be expressed at any rate by terms of 
the language used in the reminder of the sentence to be interpreted, or where the “foreign 
language” term better expresses the meaning that the parties decided to attach to the 
corresponding term of the language used in the sentence to be interpreted.664  
 
 
2.3.5. Supplementary means of interpretation 
 
“[I]n no circumstances ought preparatory work to be excluded on the ground that the 
treaty is clear in itself. Nothing is absolutely clear in itself” 665 
  
According to Sinclair, the use of supplementary means of interpretation (such as the 
travaux préparatoires, the circumstances of the conclusion of the treaty and the like) has 
“often been regarded as the touchstone which serves to distinguish the adherents of the 
‘textual’ approach from the adherents of the ‘intentions’ approach”.666 The distinction is 
not so much one of whether using or not such means of interpretation, but how to use 
them and what the object and purpose of treaty interpretation is. 
In the VCLT, the travaux préparatoires and the means of interpretation other 
than those referred to in Article 31 VCLT have been classified as supplementary means 
of interpretation. As such, under Article 32 VCLT, their use is limited to (i) confirming 
the meaning resulting from the application of Article 31 VCLT and (ii) determining the 
                                                                                                                                  
Treaty Interpretation: With Special reference to the Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties Before the 
Vienna Diplomatic Conference”, 18 International and comparative law quarterly (1969), 318 et seq., at 327. 
Contra, F. Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 
2004), pp. 164-166. 
663 That practice consists of inserting a term expressed in the “foreign” language (i.e. the language other than 
that used in the remainder of the sentence to be interpreted) instead of a term expressed in the language used in 
the remainder of the sentence to be interpreted, or adding the term in the “foreign” language in brackets (or 
similar) after the corresponding term expressed in the language used in the remainder of the sentence to be 
interpreted. 
664 E.g. the English authentic text of Article 33 of the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees provides that “[n]o contracting state shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee”. Surprisingly, in 
interpreting such a provision, Lord Bingham of the United Kingdom House of Lords found that the verb 
“refouler” was the subject of a stipulative definition and, therefore, it had to be understood as having a 
meaning corresponding to that of the English verb “return” (House of Lords (United Kingdom), 9 December 
2004, Regina v. Immigration Officer at Prague Airport and another ex parte European Roma Rights Centre 
and others, [2004] UKHL 55, para. 15). See, however, the different opinion expressed by D. Shelton, 
“Reconcilable Differences? The Interpretation of Multilingual Treaties”, 20 Hastings International and 
Comparative Law Review (2007), 611 et seq., at 623. 
665 H. Lauterpacht, “Some Observations on Preparatory Work in the Interpretation of Treaties”, 48 Harvard 
Law Review (1935), 549 et seq., at 571.  
666 See I. Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1984), p. 116. 
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meaning of an otherwise ambiguous, obscure, manifestly absurd or unreasonable 
provision. 
In the Commentary to the 1966 Draft, however, it was made clear that, 
notwithstanding that the various means of interpretation had been divided into two 
separate articles and could be used to a different extent and purpose, the ILC did not 
intend to preclude recourse to a supplementary means of interpretation, such as travaux 
préparatoires, until after the application of the other means has disclosed no clear or 
reasonable meaning.667 The process of treaty interpretation, in fact, was to be seen as a 
single process. 
As Mr Rosenne noted in the course of the ILC’s debate, in fact, “[i]t was true that 
there existed a number of apparently consistent pronouncements by the International 
Court of Justice and arbitral tribunals to the effect that travaux préparatoires had only 
been used to confirm what had been found to be the clear meaning of the text of a treaty. 
However, that case-law would be much more convincing if from the outset the Court or 
tribunal had refused to admit consideration of travaux préparatoires until it had first 
established whether or not the text was clear, but in fact, what had happened was that on 
all those occasions the travaux préparatoires had been fully and extensively placed 
before the Court or arbitral tribunal by one or other of the parties, if not by both. In the 
circumstances, to state that the travaux préparatoires had been used only to confirm an 
opinion already arrived at on the basis of the text of the treaty was coming close to a 
legal fiction. It was impossible to know by what processes judges reached their decisions 
and it was particularly difficult to accept the proposition that the travaux préparatoires 
had not actually contributed to form their opinion as to the meaning of a treaty which, 
nevertheless, they stated to be clear from its text, but which, as the pleadings in fact 
showed, was not so. At all events, it could be supposed that all practitioners of 
international law were free in their use of travaux préparatoires.”668 
 Such a discrepancy between the principle affirmed and the approach actually 
followed also characterizes the case law of the World Court. On the one hand, the Court 
maintained “that the first duty of a tribunal which is called upon to interpret and apply 
the provisions of a treaty, is to endeavour to give effect to them in their natural and 
ordinary meaning in the context in which they occur. If the relevant words in their 
natural and ordinary meaning make sense in their context, that is an end of the matter. If, 
on the other hand, the words in their natural and ordinary meaning are ambiguous or lead 
to an unreasonable result, then, and then only, must the Court, by resort to other methods 
of interpretation, seek to ascertain what the parties really did mean when they used these 
words.”669 On the other hand, however, the Court has often referred to the travaux 
                                                     
667 See YBILC 1966-II, p. 223, para.18. 
668 YBILC 1964-I, p. 283, para. 17. 
669 ICJ, 3 March 1950, Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations, 
advisory opinion, p. 8. See, similarly among many other cases, PCIJ, 16 May 1925, Polish Postal Service in 
Danzig, advisory opinion, p. 39; PCIJ, 7 September 1927, S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey), judgment, p. 16; PCIJ, 
8 December 1927, Jurisdiction of the European Commission of the Danube Between Galatz and Braila, 
advisory opinion, p. 28; See ICJ, 28 May 1948, Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership In the 
United Nations (Article 4 of the Charter), advisory opinion, p. 63. See also G. Fitzmaurice, The Law and 
Procedure of the International Court of Justice. Volume I (Cambridge: Grotious Publications Limited, 1986), 
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préparatoires or other extraneous means of interpretation even when the meaning of the 
treaty text appeared to be (in the Court’s words) clear and reasonable. Both the PCIJ and 
the ICJ referred to such means of interpretation both as a background and in order to 
confirm the meaning based on the ordinary meaning of its terms.670   
 
In this regard, the analysis of the case law of international courts and tribunals, as well as 
of scholarly writings, suggests the following observations. 
First, treaty interpretation is a whole, single process. The interpreter may have 
recourse to the supplementary means of interpretation from the outset of the 
interpretative process, since there is no temporal limitation on the use of such means.671 
Second, the difference between the means of interpretation included in Article 31 
VCLT and those provided for in Article 32 VCLT is:  
(i) one of evidence and reliability: the former generally give a clear and definite 
proof of the agreement reached by the parties, while the latter, often being 
incomplete and partial, may generally just shed some light on the possible 
agreement;  
(ii) one of scope: the former are to be used in order to determine the meaning of 
the treaty, while the latter only to confirm such a meaning, or determine it in 
certain specific situations. 
Third, where the result arrived at by applying Article 31 VCLT leaves the meaning 
ambiguous or obscure, the meaning determined by applying the supplementary means of 
interpretation is generally one of the possible alternative meanings under Article 31 
VCLT, or, at least, one that does not conflict with (some of) such meanings.672 
Fourth, where the result arrived at by applying Article 31 VCLT, although clear, 
is manifestly unreasonable or absurd, the meaning determined on the basis on the 
supplementary means of interpretation is generally different from all the possible 
alternative meanings determined by applying the general rule of interpretation.673 
                                                                                                                                  
p. 48. 
670 See, among other cases, PCIJ, 15 November 1932, Interpretation of the Convention of 1919 concerning 
Employment of Women during the Night, advisory opinion, pp. 378 et seq.; ICJ, 27 August 1952, Rights of 
Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco (France v. United States of America), judgment, pp. 209 
et seq. 
671 See ICJ, 11 September 1992, Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador v. Honduras), 
judgment, para. 191 of Judge Torres Bernárdez’s separate opinion. 
672 This is the case, for instance, where there are no actual alternative meanings emerging as result of the 
application of the interpretative rule put forward in Article 31 VCLT, i.e. whenever the meaning of the treaty 
provision is obscure. 
673 In fact, where (at least) a reasonable and logical interpretation of the treaty text was possible, such an 
interpretation would overrule any manifestly absurd or unreasonable interpretation of the very same text; any 
other solution would contradict the postulate that the interpretation of the treaty text must be performed in good 
faith and in light of the object and purpose of the treaty. If such a reasonable and logical interpretation existed, 
the interpreter would face a situation in which either such interpretation, if unambiguous, might just be 
confirmed by using supplementary means of interpretation, or such means might be used in order to choose 
among alternative sound interpretations. See, for a seemingly different opinion, F. Engelen, Interpretation of 
Tax Treaties under International Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2004), p. 330. 
In this regard, it may be recalled that Sir Humphrey Waldock, in replying to the criticisms raised on such a 
matter by some of the ILC’s members, gave as an example of a case in which the result of the interpretation 
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Fifth, travaux préparatoires, as well as subsequent practice, do not have an 
absolute value. Their relevance for interpretative purposes varies according to their 
aptitude to prove the agreement of the parties on the interpretation of the treaty. In this 
respect, subsequent unilateral practice and travaux préparatoires are considered, in most 
cases, to be supplementary means of interpretation. However, (i) concordant and 
consistent subsequent practice, (ii) consistent subsequent practice of some parties only, 
coupled with the tacit agreement (acquiescence) of the other parties and (iii) travaux 
préparatoires recording the final interpretative agreement of the parties must be 
considered authentic means of interpretation. 
Sixth, a difficult issue arises where, though the meaning of a treaty provision 
appears to be clearly and reasonably identified as a result of the application of the means 
of interpretation provided for in Article 31 VCLT, the supplementary means of 
interpretation point towards a different meaning.674 In such a case, good faith requires 
the interpreter to carefully review once again all available elements and items of 
evidence. Where the supplementary means of interpretation means appear (i) clear and 
reliable in the specific case and (ii) pointing to a meaning that seems to be one of those 
acceptable according to the wording of the treaty, as re-interpreted in accordance with 
the general rule of interpretation laid down in Article 31 VCLT, the meaning arrived at 
through the supplementary means of interpretation should be adopted.675 On the 
contrary, where a review of the interpretation previously made in accordance with 
Article 31 VCLT shows that the original result of the interpretive process is the only one 
that may be reasonably arrived at on the basis of the text and the other primary means of 
interpretation and that such a meaning is not manifestly absurd or unreasonable, that 
meaning should prevail over the one resulting from the supplementary means of 
interpretation.676 The latter type of conflict, however, hardly occurs in practice since 
                                                                                                                                  
could be absurd or unreasonable that of a drafting error (YBILC 1966-I (vol. II), p. 206, para. 39). 
674 See instance, the point made by the Portuguese delegation at the Vienna Conference (UNCLT-1st, p. 183, 
para. 56). 
675 In the Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain case, Judge Schwebel 
(dissenting) pointed out that the interpretation of the treaty at stake (the Doha Minutes) given by the majority 
of the ICJ was hard to reconcile with the interpretation of a treaty in good faith, which he considered to be the 
“cardinal injunction” of the VCLT rules of interpretation. In his view, the decision of the majority of the Court 
did not give the required weight to the clear evidence of the intention of the parties stemming from the travaux 
préparatoires, resulting, “if not in an unreasonable interpretation of the treaty itself, in an interpretation of the 
preparatory work” which was “manifestly … unreasonable.” In addition, Judge Schwebel opined that the 
interpretation put forward by the Court could not be regarded as an acceptable interpretation under the rules 
established by the VCLT, since the meaning of the actual terms used in the Doha Minutes was not “clear“ at 
all. In particular, the expression “al-tarafan“, however translated, was “quintessentially unclear” and, as the 
Court itself acknowledged, was capable of being construed in different ways. The term was therefore 
“inherently ambiguous” and should have been interpreted through the decisive aid of the clearer travaux  
préparatoires (see ICJ, 15 February 1995, Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and 
Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), judgment, paras. 30-41 of Judge Schwebel’s dissenting opinion). See also, S. M. 
Schwebel, “May Preparatory Work be Used to Correct Rather Than Confirm the “Clear” Meaning of a Treaty 
Provision?”, in J. Makarczyk (ed.), Theory of International Law at the Threshold of the 21st Century, Essays in 
honour of Krzysztof Skubiszewski (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1996), 541 et seq. 
676 See S. Torres Bernárdez, “Interpretation of treaties by the International Court of Justice following the 
adoption of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties”, in G. Hafner et al. (eds.), Liber Amicorum 
Professor Seidl-Hohenvelder – in honour of his 80th birthday (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998), 
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Article 31 VCLT is a very flexible tool, which generally allows for more than one 
meaning to be reasonably attributed to a certain treaty provision.  
Seventh, the absurdity or unreasonableness of the interpretation arrived at by 
applying the rule provided for in Article 31 VCLT must be manifest. The commentary to 
the 1966 Draft highlights that cases where international tribunals have reached such a 
conclusion are comparatively rare and that, therefore, the application of this exception 
should be strictly limited, to not unduly weaken the authority of the ordinary meaning of 
the treaty terms.677 Not every clear interpretation that might appear in contrast with the 
object and purpose of the treaty or that does not perfectly fit in the context of the treaty 
as a whole is to be regarded as “manifestly absurd or unreasonable”: this would be the 
case only where, in the particular context, it appears obvious that the resulting meaning 
cannot be what the parties intended to agree upon.678  
 Last, all means of interpretation not included in Article 31 VCLT should be 
considered to be covered by the provision of Article 32 VCLT, as long as they (may) 
help to shed some light on the meaning of the treaty.679 In this sense, also unilateral 
documents and positions are potentially relevant, since they may give a hint of the 
practice followed by a party, or of the treaty meaning according to a party; where the 
other parties were informed about such documents and positions and did not object 
thereto, they might even be considered to have been tacitly agreed upon. Such a broad 
definition of the supplementary means of interpretation is in line with the position taken 
by the ILC with regard to the travaux préparatoires, in relation to which the 
commentary to the 1966 Draft maintains that the “Commission did not think that 
anything would be gained by trying to define travaux préparatoires; indeed, to do so 
might only lead to the possible exclusion of relevant evidence.”680 This conclusion is 
also upheld by the vast majority of scholars.681 
 
3. Assessment of the rules enshrined in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT in light of the 
author’s normative theory of treaty interpretation   
 
In section 1 of Chapter 3 of Part I the author concluded that (i) treaty provisions are 
inherently characterized by ambiguity and vagueness and (ii) their effectiveness largely 
depends on how the parties take into account the overall context when drafting them. In 
turn, point (ii) presupposes that the addressees (interpreters) of the treaty integrate its 
underspecified provisions, in order to reduce their vagueness and ambiguity, by using the 
overall context. The fact that both the parties and the interpreters heavily rely on the 
                                                                                                                                  
721 et seq., at 739. 
677 See YBILC 1966-II, p. 223, para. 19. 
678 See F. Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 
2004), pp. 331-332. 
679 See I. Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1984), p. 116. 
680 See YBILC 1966-II, p. 223, para. 20. 
681 See F. Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 
2004), pp. 334-339 and the references included there. 
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overall context constitutes a praxis of the international community (one of its underlying 
cooperative principles). This allows for the possibility of implicatures, i.e. meanings that 
are not explicitly conveyed by the treaty provisions, but that are nonetheless inferred 
from the overall context. 
 On such a basis, the author further concluded that the treaty interpretative process 
has as its only possible goal the utterance meaning, i.e. the meaning(s) that any 
reasonable interpreter would assign to the treaty text, as expression of the intention of 
the parties, given:  
(a) the various meanings that the grammar and the semantic specifications of the 
terms used in the treaty allow it to have and  
(b) the interpreter’s analysis of and inferences from the overall context.  
That excludes the relevance of any meaning other than the utterance meaning for 
interpretative purposes. Such “other” meanings, not being utterance meanings, are 
indeed not “meanings” of the treaty.   
 The author considered the overall context to include all those elements and items 
of evidence that are helpful for the purpose of determining and arguing for the utterance 
meaning of the relevant treaty provision. In particular, it incorporates: 
(a) the subject matter of the treaty and its object and purpose [world spoken of]; 
(b) the international legal context of which the treaty is part, the legal systems of 
the States concluding the treaty, the encyclopedic (legal) knowledge of the 
persons involved in its drafting, the expected encyclopedic (legal) knowledge 
of the addressees of the treaty, the commonly accepted principles of behavior 
in the international community (including any cooperative principle of 
communication), every reasonable inference that the drafters and the 
addresses might be expected to derive from the above [common ground]; 
(c) the text that precedes and succeeds the provision to be interpreted [co-text]. 
Furthermore, the author elucidated a few other principles of treaty interpretation derived 
as corollaries from the above fundamental principles. 
 
The positive analysis carried out in section 2 of this chapter shows that the rules and 
principles of treaty interpretation enshrined in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT, as generally 
construed by international law scholars and applied by (international) courts and 
tribunals, do not significantly depart from the principles of interpretation established by 
the author on the basis of his semantics-based normative analysis.682  On the contrary, 
                                                     
682 See U. Linderfalk, On the Interpretation of Treaties. The Modern International Law as Expressed in the 
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Dordrecht: Springer-Verlag, 2007), pp. 48-49, who maintains 
that, according to modern linguistic theories (in particular the “inferential model”), “in order to distinguish 
between correct and incorrect interpretation results, we would have to single out some contextual assumptions 
as being acceptable and some as unacceptable. If we examine Articles 31-33 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, the idea is expressed somehow differently. The provisions of the convention do not address so 
much the idea of acceptable and unacceptable contextual assumption; rather, they address the idea of 
acceptable and unacceptable means of interpretation. However, on closer inspection, this must be seen to 
amount to very much the same thing. […] All things considered, it is apparent that when the Vienna 
Convention categorises means of interpretation as either acceptable or unacceptable, this can be seen indirectly 
to imply a corresponding categorization of contextual assumptions. Of all those contextual assumptions that 
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the latter principles may be usefully employed by the interpreter as a compass in order to 
choose among the various (sometimes conflicting) solutions that scholars, courts and 
tribunals have arrived at in the application of Articles 31 and 32 VCLT. 
 In particular, Articles 31 and 32 VCLT appear to spell out the most significant 
part of the overall context that the cooperative principle of the international community 
requires the community members to take into account when drafting and interpreting 
treaty provisions. Certainly, the overall context is not limited to the means and rules of 
interpretation enshrined in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT, the former including, for instance, 
generally accepted principles of logic and good sense.683 However, Articles 31 and 32 
VCLT specify the most relevant part of what has to be taken into account in order to 
make the treaty effective by means of interpretation. 
This implies that no utterance meaning, i.e. no meaning of a specific treaty 
provision, may be said to exist before the interpreter has gone through the unitary 
process of construing the relevant text in light of the overall context and, in particular, of 
the rules and means of interpretation enshrined in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT (as 
illustrated by the metaphor of the crucible).684 Any “meaning” arrived at without going 
through such a process is not a meaning; it is just an illusion of a meaning, a mere guess. 
It is, thus, the formal process of reasonably arguing and supporting the interpretation of a 
treaty provision on the basis of its overall context that divides (utterance) meanings from 
mere guesses of the speaker’s meaning. Since no single “true” meaning exists, which is 
inherently due to the fact that the meaning we look for is the utterance meaning, what 
really matters is not the result of the enquiry, but the process followed to support it. That 
is a matter of epistemology.685  
 
If the focus of the comparison between those two sets of principles (the principles 
stemming from the author’s normative analysis and those resulting from the positive 
analysis carried out in section 2 of this chapter) is moved to a major level of detail, the 
following comments can be made. 
 The author’s principle (i), i.e. the interpretation is an a posteriori analytical 
argument, is implicit in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT, in the sense that under those articles 
any interpretation put forward by the interpreter must appear fair and reasonable (in 
good faith) where assessed in light of all arguments that may be built up on the elements 
                                                                                                                                  
can possibly be made by appliers with regard to the relationship held between an interpreted treaty provision 
and the world in general, the only ones that may be used, according to the convention, are those regarding the 
relationship held between the provision and the means of interpretation recognized as acceptable”. 
683 Such as, for instance, (i) the logical principles of inference and (ii) the principles and maxims of treaty 
interpretation not codified in the VCLT, since considered by the ILC as principles of logic and good sense of 
non-binding character (see commentary on Articles 27-28 of the 1966 Draft - YBILC 1966-II, p. 218, para. 4). 
684 As Lauterpacht put it, “The controversial expression becomes scientifically clear only after we have caused 
to pass through it the “galvanic current” – to use Mr Justice Holmes’ phrase – not only of the whole document 
but of all the evidence available” (see H. Lauterpacht, “Some Observations on Preparatory Work in the 
Interpretation of Treaties”, 48 Harvard Law Review (1935), 549 et seq., at 572). 
685 The author finds relevant, in that respect, to draw a parallelism with epistemological approach (in “pure” 
science) professed by Popper, as mainly depicted in K. Popper, The logic of scientific discovery (London: 
Routledhe, 2002) and K. Popper, Conjectures and refutations: the growth of scientific knowledge (London: 
Routledhe, 1991).  
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and items of evidence provided for by the same articles.  
 The author’s principles (ii) and (iii), i.e. the quest of the interpreter is directed at 
establishing the intention of the parties by determining the utterance meaning of the 
treaty text, overlap with the rule of interpretation provided for by Articles 31 and 32 
VCLT, according to which the primary duty of the interpreter is to reasonably elucidate 
the meaning of the treaty text, which is presumed to represent the authentic expression of 
the parties’ intention, by construing it on the basis of all elements and items of evidence 
provided for by those articles.  
 With reference to author’s principle (iv), it has been already mentioned that 
Articles 31 and 32 VCLT appear to spell out the most significant part of the overall 
context. 
 The author’s principle (v), i.e. none of the elements of the overall context is 
inherently superior to the others and the weight that any of such elements should be 
given for the purpose of establishing the utterance meaning depends on the 
circumstances of the case, corresponds to the principle stemming from the hierarchical 
structure of Articles 31 and 32 VCLT. Under the latter, the various means of 
interpretation encompassed in Article 31 VCLT are all of an equal status, while those 
referred to in Article 32 VCLT play a subsidiary role because experience shows that they 
are generally less reliable and more ambiguous and vague hints of the intention of the 
parties. Nonetheless, where the supplementary means of interpretation contribute to 
reasonably establish the agreement of the parties with regard to the interpretation of the 
treaty, such an agreement must be taken into account as a primary means of 
interpretation under Article 31 VCLT. 
The author’s principle (vi), i.e. the treaty text should be construed on the basis of 
all implicatures that may be derived from the text and the overall context, is implicit in 
the principle of good faith referred to in Article 31 VCLT, which rejects a mere literal 
approach and requires the treaty to be construed reasonably, honestly and fairly, thus 
allowing the interpreter to read terms into the treaty for the purpose of giving efficacy to 
the intention of the parties that may be inferred from the express provisions of the treaty. 
 The author’s principle (vii), i.e. the relevance of the treaty text must not be 
overestimated since such text is inherently characterized by ambiguity and vagueness 
and is made of underspecified clauses that need to be expanded by semantic and 
pragmatic inferences, underlies both Articles 31 and 32 VCLT. This is evidenced by: 
(a) the preeminent role played by the extra-textual and co-textual (broad context) 
means of interpretation, provided for in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT, for the 
purpose of establishing the ordinary meaning of the treaty terms;  
(b) the express recognition of the possibility that the parties intended to attribute 
an unusual meaning to some of the treaty terms;  
(c) the fact that good faith rejects a mere literal approach and requires the 
interpreter to discharge those meanings that appear manifestly absurd or 
unreasonable in light of the particular circumstances of the case. 
The same holds true with regard to the author’s principle (viii), i.e. the relevance of 
grammatical constraints must not be overestimated. 
 The author’s principle (ix), i.e. there is a plausible presumption that the parties 
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intended to attribute to the treaty terms their jargon meanings whenever a particular 
jargon has been used in drafting the treaty, is implicit in the concept of ordinary meaning 
referred to in Article 31 VCLT, according to which, where a term is used in a technical 
context, its ordinary meaning should be generally considered to coincide with the 
meaning attributed to that term in the relevant technical jargon.  
 The author’s principle (x), i.e. the interpreter should consider that the contracting 
States’ representatives in most cases choose the terms to be employed in the treaty on the 
basis of the approximate overlapping between the prototypical items denoted by those 
terms and the items that they intended to be covered by those terms, may be seen as 
underlying Articles 31 and 32 VCLT, in particular as underlying:  
(a) the requirement that the treaty terms  must be given the ordinary meaning 
that best fits in their context and suits the object and purpose of the treaty; 
(b) the possibility that, in certain cases, a special meaning should be attributed to 
treaty terms; 
(c) the fact that good faith rejects a mere literal approach and requires the 
interpreter to discharge the meanings that appear manifestly absurd or 
unreasonable in light of the context and the treaty object and purpose. 
The author’s principle (xi), in particular the need to assess whether the parties intended 
treaty terms to be attributed a uniform meaning by all contracting States, or whether they 
intended each State to interpret those terms on the basis of its own (legal) concepts, is 
not explicitly dealt with in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT. It is however obvious that:  
(a) both the ordinary and the special meanings to be determined under Article 31 
VCLT may be either uniform (and autonomous) international meanings, or 
specific national meanings; and that  
(b) it is for the interpreter to establish, on the basis of the means of interpretation 
provided for in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT, whether the parties intended a 
uniform international meaning or a specific national meaning to be attributed 
to the treaty terms. 
The author’s principle (xii), i.e. the interpreter should take into account any subsequent 
act of the parties that directly or indirectly may shed light on the meaning that they 
attribute to the treaty, is explicitly recognized by Article 31(3) VCLT. 
 
Since the above principles of interpretation have proved not to conflict with the rules and 
principles of interpretation enshrined in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT, on the basis of the 
former, read in conjunction with the latter, the author will endeavor to answer the 
research questions concerning the interpretation of multilingual (tax) treaties in the next 
two chapters. To put it differently, based on the combined reading of those rules and 
principles, the author will set up his normative legal theory on the interpretation of 
multilingual tax treaties. 
 
 




CHAPTER 4 – INTERPRETATION OF MULTILINGUAL TREATIES  
 
1. Introduction: the relevance of Article 33 VCLT and the structure of this 
chapter 
 
The idea that some rules dealing with the interpretation of multilingual treaties had to be 
codified dates back to the beginning of the last century.686  
 In 1926, Mr Rundstein, a member of the Committee of Experts for the 
Progressive Codification of International Law set up under the auspices of the League of 
Nations, expressed the view that one of the issues that the Committee should have 
examined and solved was that concerning the difficulties of interpretation arising in the 
case of treaties drawn up in more than one language.687  
 A few years later, the Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties with Comments, 
prepared by the Harvard Research in International Law and published in 1935, included 
an article dealing with the interpretation of multilingual treaties.688  
 The following step was taken by the ILC in the course of the sixties and led to the 
codification of some general rules concerning the interpretation of multilingual treaties 
in Article 33 VCLT.  
 
For the purpose of the present study, an analysis of the purpose, content and scope of the 
rules enshrined in Article 33 VCLT is unavoidable for two reasons. 
 
First, most international courts and tribunals regard Article 33 VCLT as a codification of 
rules of customary international law concerning the interpretation of multilingual 
treaties689 and, therefore, consider themselves bound to apply such rules in order to 
construe multilingual treaties, regardless of whether these treaties were concluded before 
                                                     
686 For an exhaustive list of the efforts spent in codifying rules on interpretations dealing with multilingual 
treaties before the VCLT, see M. Tabory, Multilingualism In International Law and Institutions (Alphen aan 
den Rijn: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1980), pp. 185-186, footnote 1. 
687 League of Nations, Committee of Experts for the progressive codification of International Law [1925-
1928], vol. 2: Documents (Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications, 1972), pp. 131-141. 
688 Research in International Law, “Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties with Comments”, 29 American 
Journal of International Law - Supplement (1935), 653 et seq. Art. 19b of the Draft Convention on the Law of 
Treaties with Comments reads as follows: 
“When the text of a treaty is embodied in versions in different languages, and when it is not stipulated that the 
version in one of the languages shall prevail, the treaty is to be interpreted with a view to giving to 
corresponding provisions in the different versions a common meaning which will effect the general purpose 
which the treaty is intended to serve”. 
689 See, for instance, S. Torres Bernárdez, “Interpretation of treaties by the International Court of Justice 
following the adoption of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties”, in G. Hafner et al. (eds.), Liber 
Amicorum Professor Seidl-Hohenvelder – in honour of his 80th birthday (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 1998), 721 et seq., at 737. 
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the entry into force of the VCLT, or whether their parties include States that did not sign 
or ratify the VCLT.  
 Even the ICJ has recently stated that, in cases of a divergence between the equally 
authentic texts of a treaty and where the latter does not indicate how to proceed, it is 
appropriate to refer to Article 33(4) VCLT, which “in the view of the Court again 
reflects customary international law”.690 In this respect, it is interesting to note that (i) 
the specific issue faced by the ICJ in that case691 concerned the interpretation of Article 
41 of the Court’s Statute, which predates the adoption of the VCLT and (ii) that case 
related to a conflict between Germany and the United States of America, the latter not 
being party to the VCLT at the time of the facts, nor at the time of the legal proceedings 
and of the judgment.  
 
Second, since the rules of interpretation enshrined in Article 33 VCLT are generally 
accepted (i.e. customary) rules of international law, they must also be considered part of 
the common ground692 of treaty negotiators and interpreters. As such, they are expected 
to be properly taken into account by such negotiators and interpreters, when drafting and 
construing multilingual treaties, under the cooperative principles operating within the 
international community of States.693 This implies that, whenever an interpreter 
construes a multilingual treaty by means of implicatures, such implicatures must (also) 
reflect the rules of interpretation provided for in Article 33 VCLT. 
 
For the reasons outlined above, the present chapter will analyse the content of Article 33 
VCLT and examine the relation, in any, existing between the rules of interpretation 
enshrined therein and the semantics-based principles of interpretation established by the 
author in section 2 of Chapter 3 of Part I. 
 More precisely, section 2 will describe the historical background to and the 
preparatory work on Article 33 VCLT. 
 Section 3 will examine which rules of interpretation may be (and have been) 
construed on the basis of Article 33 VCLT and compare them with the fundamental 
principles of interpretation established by the author in Part I. 
 Section 4 will deal with the specific interpretative issues emerging where the 
multilingual treaty employs legal jargon terms. 
 Section 5 will present a brief excursus on the legal maxims that scholars, courts 
and tribunals have sometimes advocated for the purpose of construing multilingual 
treaties and will discuss their status under current international law. 
 Finally, section 6 will draw some general conclusions.  
 
                                                     
690 See ICJ, 27 June 2001, LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), judgment, para. 101. For a 
previous explicit reference by the ICJ to the relevance of Article 33 VCLT, although without an express 
recognition thereof as customary international law, see ICJ, 13 December 1999, Kasikili/Sedudu Island 
(Botswana v. Namibia), judgment, para. 25.  
691 ICJ, 27 June 2001, LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), judgment, paras. 92 et seq., concerning 
Germany’s third submission.  
692 See section 4.2.1 of Chapter 2 of Part I. 
693 See section 4.2.2 of Chapter 2 of Part I. 
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2. Historical background to and preparatory work on Article 33 VCLT 
2.1. The Third Report on the Law of Treaties prepared by Sir Humphrey Waldock 
 
Although the topic of the Law of Treaties had been addressed by the ILC since 1962,694 
the sub-topic of treaty interpretation was considered only during the sixteenth session of 
the ILC in 1964. On 7 July of that year, Sir Humphrey Waldock submitted to the ILC its 
third addendum to his Third Report on the Law of Treaties, which included six articles 
on the interpretation of treaties.  
 Among these, Articles 74 and 75 of the draft convention on the Law of Treaties 
dealt with the issue of treaties drawn up in two or more languages. The text thereof is 
reproduced below.695 
 
 Article 74 — Treaties drawn up in two or more languages  
1. When the text of a treaty has been authenticated in accordance with the provisions of 
article 7 in two or more languages, the texts of the treaty are authoritative in each language 
except in so far as a different rule may be laid down in the treaty.  
2. A version drawn up in a language other than one in which the text of the treaty was 
authenticated shall also be considered an authentic text and be authoritative if —  
  (a) the treaty so provides or the parties so agree; or  
(b) an organ of an international organization so prescribes with respect to a treaty 
drawn up within the organization.  
 
 Article 75. — Interpretation of treaties having two or more texts or versions  
1. The expression of the terms of a treaty is of equal authority in each authentic text, 
subject to the provisions of the present article. The terms are to be presumed to be intended 
to have the same meaning in each text and their interpretation is governed by articles 70-
73. 
2. When a comparison between two or more authentic texts discloses a difference in the 
expression of a term and any resulting ambiguity or obscurity as to the meaning of the term 
is not removed by the application of articles 70-73, the rules contained in paragraphs 3-5 
apply, unless the treaty itself provides that, in the event of divergence, a particular text or 
method of interpretation is to prevail.  
3. If in each of two or more authentic texts a term is capable of being given more than one 
meaning compatible with the objects and purposes of the treaty, a meaning which is 
common to both or all the texts is to be adopted.  
4. If in one authentic text the natural and ordinary meaning of a term is clear and 
compatible with the objects and purposes of the treaty, whereas in another it is uncertain 
owing to the obscurity of the term, the meaning of the term in the former text is to be 
adopted.  
5. If the application of the foregoing rules leaves the meaning of a term, as expressed in the 
                                                     
694 See the first provisional draft articles on the Law of Treaties adopted by the ILC at its fourteenth session, 
dealing with the conclusion, entry into force and registration of treaties, which was based on the First Report 
on the Law of Treaties prepared by Sir Humphrey Waldock, acting as Special Rapporteur (YBILC 1962-II, pp. 
159 et seq.). Previously, the topic had been addressed solely in the reports prepared by the Special Rapporteurs, 
but not discussed in the course of the ILC meetings.  
695 See YBILC 1964-II, p. 62. 
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authentic text or texts, ambiguous or obscure, reference may be made to a text or version 
which is not authentic in so far as it may throw light on the intentions of the parties with 
respect to the term in question.  
 
The commentary to these two articles696 pointed out that the phenomenon of treaties 
drawn up in two or more languages had become increasingly familiar since the end of 
the First World War and, with the advent of the United Nations, the practice of 
concluding multilateral treaties in five different languages had become common. The 
commentary drew a clear distinction between “authentic texts” and “official texts”, the 
latter being those signed by the negotiating States but not accepted as authoritative 
thereby. In addition, the commentary recognized the need to distinguish “official 
translations” from “official texts”, the former being translations of the authentic texts 
prepared by the parties, an individual Government, or an organ of an international 
organization. The commentary pointed out that, whenever two or more texts are 
available, issues arise regarding (i) the effect of a plurality of authentic texts on the 
process of treaty interpretation and (ii) what recourse may be had to official texts and 
translations as tools for interpreting the authentic texts of the treaty.  
 
In this respect, the commentary made clear that the purpose of Article 74 was to clarify 
the rules to be used for the purpose of distinguishing “authentic texts” from other texts.  
The basic principle stated by Article 74 was that the only “authenticated texts” 
must be considered authoritative for the purpose of treaty interpretation. The following 
article, Article 75, clarified that the authority of the texts was “equal” in each “authentic 
text”. From a combined reading of Articles 74 and 75, it appears that the terms 
“authentic” and “authoritative” were attributed the same meaning with reference to the 
relevance of a text for the purpose of treaty interpretation. The reference in Article 74(1) 
to “authenticated” texts was purported to achieve coordination with the provisions of 
Article 7 of the draft convention, according to which the “authentication of the text” 
consisted in an autonomous procedural step in the conclusion of a treaty.697 According to 
the commentary to Article 7 of the draft convention,698 the authentication of the text(s) of 
a treaty was necessary in order for negotiating States to know finally and definitely what 
the content of the treaty was to which they might decide to become party. Authentication 
                                                     
696 See YBILC 1964-II, pp. 62-65. 
697 The text of Article 7 of the draft convention read as follows (See YBILC 1962-II, p. 167): 
Article 7  
Authentication of the text  
1. Unless another procedure has been prescribed in the text or otherwise agreed upon by States participating in the 
adoption of the text of the treaty, authentication of the text may take place in any of the following ways:  
(a) Initialling of the text by the representatives of the States concerned;  
(b) Incorporation of the text in the final act of the conference in which it was adopted;  
(c) Incorporation of the text in a resolution of an international organization in which it was adopted or in any other 
form employed in the organization concerned.  
2. In addition, signature of the text, whether a full signature or signature ad referendum, shall automatically 
constitute an authentication of the text of a proposed treaty, if the text has not been previously authenticated in 
another form under the provisions of paragraph 1 above.  
3. On authentication in accordance with the foregoing provisions of the present article, the text shall become the 
definitive text of the treaty.  
698 See YBILC 1962-II, p. 167. 
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consisted in some acts and/or procedures that certified the text(s) as the final and correct 
one(s). For the purpose of the present study, it must be pointed out that Article 7 of the 
draft convention recognized as authentic texts those initialled by the representatives of 
the States concerned, as well as those signed by the contracting parties (either by full 
signature or signature ad referendum).699   
 
The general rule that equated “authenticated” texts to texts equally authoritative for the 
purpose of interpretation was subject to two exceptions.  
On the one hand, Article 74 provided that such an equation held true “except in so 
far as a different rule may be laid down in the treaty”. The commentary explained that 
such an exception was necessary for two reasons. First, some treaties specify that only 
certain authenticated texts are authoritative for the purpose of interpreting and applying 
the treaty, i.e. only certain authenticated texts are “authentic” texts.700 Second, some 
treaties provide that, in the event of divergence between texts, a specified text is to 
prevail. The commentary made explicit reference to the case of a bilateral treaty where 
the two contracting parties designate a text in a third language as authentic and make it 
authoritative in the case of divergence. This is a very common practice in the tax treaty 
field, indeed. The commentary also recalled the case of the Peace Treaties of St. 
Germain, Neuilly and Trianon, which were drawn up in French, English and Italian and 
which provided that in the case of divergence the French text should prevail, except with 
regard to Parts I and XII, containing the Covenant of the Legue of Nations and the 
articles concerning the International Labour Organisation, respectively. The case appears 
interesting since it represents a clear example of how States may be willing to solve 
apparent divergences between authentic texts in different ways depending on the subject 
matter concerned and the drafting procedure actually adopted.   
On the other hand, Article 74 recognized that a text that had not been 
authenticated might nonetheless be attributed by the parties an authoritative status for the 
purpose of the interpretation and application of the treaty.701  
 
Article 75, instead, dealt with the different issues arising in connection with the 
interpretation of treaties having two or more authentic texts.  
Paragraph 1 thereof, in addition to stating the principle of equal authority of all 
authentic texts, made clear that a general presumption existed that the parties to a treaty 
intended to attribute to the treaty terms the same meanings in each authentic text.  
In addition, Article 75 provided that, in principle, the general rules of 
                                                     
699 With reference to the authentication of the text as a step of the procedure leading to the conclusion (and 
entry into force) of a treaty, see Article 10 of the VCLT, as well as R. Jennings and A. Watts (eds.), 
Oppenheim’s International Law. Volume I. Peace (London: Longman, 1992), pp. 1223-1224 and the 
references cited therein. Although the text of Article 7 of the draft conventions was later modified and the 
corresponding article of the VCLT (Article 10) does appear significantly different, the purpose of the 
authentication step in the procedure of treaty conclusion has remained unchanged. 
700 The commentary also referred to a case where one text had been made authentic between some parties and a 
different text between others, i.e. Article 13 of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, executed on 3 March 1918 (see 
YBILC 1964-II, p. 63, para. 3, where reference is erroneously made to Article 10 of the treaty). 
701 See Article 74(2)(a) of the draft convention.  
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interpretation enshrined in Articles 70-73 of the draft convention were to be applied to 
solve apparent divergences between authentic texts.702 According to the commentary, 
such an approach was the direct, inevitable consequence of the fact that, notwithstanding 
the plurality of authentic texts, in law there is only one treaty, i.e. one set of terms 
accepted by the parties and one common intention with respect to those terms.703  
The commentary recognized in this respect that few multilingual treaties have no 
discrepancies in the texts and that this is mainly due to the different genius of the 
languages, the absence of a complete consensus ad idem, the lack of sufficient time to 
co-ordinate the texts or unskillful drafting. It concluded that, for those reasons, the 
plurality of the texts might be a serious additional source of ambiguity or obscurity in the 
terms of the treaty. However, the commentary also acknowledged that, in cases where 
the meaning of terms is ambiguous or obscure in one authentic text, but it is clear and 
convincing as to the intentions of the parties in another, “the plurilingual character of the 
treaty facilitates interpretation”.704  
Finally, with reference to the application of the rules of interpretation provided 
for in Articles 70-73 of the draft convention, the commentary pointed out that the 
plurilingual form of the treaty does not justify the interpreter in simply preferring one 
text to another and discarding the normal means of resolving an ambiguity or obscurity 
on the basis of the objects and purposes of the treaty, travaux preparatoires, the 
surrounding circumstances and subsequent practice; on the contrary, the equality of the 
texts requires that “every effort should first be made to reconcile the texts and to 
ascertain the intention of the parties by recourse to the normal means of 
interpretation”.705 
 
Article 75(2), as clarified by the commentary,706 recognized that parties might decide to 
solve the divergences between authentic texts by providing in the treaty that a particular 
text or method is to prevail. In this respect, the commentary pointed out that an issue 
might exist as to the exact point in the interpretation process at which the prevailing text 
or method should be resorted to, i.e. whether such a text or method is to be applied as 
soon as a prima facie divergence appears, or only in so far as the divergence may not be 
removed by the application of the general rules of interpretation. The commentary noted 
that the jurisprudence of international tribunals was uncertain in this regard, since, in 
some cases, the competent tribunal had applied the prevailing text without going into the 
question whether there was an actual divergence,707 while, in other cases, it had carried 
on a comparison between the divergent texts for the purpose of ascertaining the intention 
of the parties.708 It, however, recognized that the question is essentially one of intention 
                                                     
702 See the combined reading of paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 75 of the draft convention. 
703 See YBILC 1964-II, p. 63, paras. 5 and 6. 
704 See YBILC 1964-II, p. 63, para. 5. 
705 See YBILC 1964-II, p. 64, para. 6. 
706 See YBILC 1964-II, p. 64, para. 7. 
707 The commentary made reference to the decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice in the 
Treaty of Neuilly case (PCIJ, 12 September 1924, Interpretation of Paragraph 4 of the Annex following Article 
179 of the Treaty of Neuilly (Bulgaria v. Greece), judgment, pp. 5-6).  
708 The Commentary made reference to the decision of the Supreme Court of Poland in the case of the 
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of the parties, the latter being at liberty to agree that a specific text is to prevail either as 
soon as a divergence appears, or only where such a divergence is not removed by the 
application of the general rules of interpretation. The Special Rapporteur, therefore, 
doubted whether it would have been appropriate for the ILC to try to resolve the issue in 
the context of the formulation of the general rules of interpretation.709  
 
Moreover, where the parties did not agree on a particular text to prevail and the general 
rules of interpretation enshrined in Articles 70-73 could not remove the divergence 
between authentic texts, Article 75 provided for two cases in which a specific text was to 
prevail according to the nature and characteristics of the divergence. In particular, (i) 
where more than one meaning compatible with the objects and purposes of the treaty 
existed, the meaning common to all the authentic texts was to be adopted, while (ii) 
where one authentic text was clear and the others were uncertain and obscure, the former 
was to be adopted.  
With reference to the first case, which was dealt with in Article 75(3), the 
commentary clarified that the suggested provision was not to be confused with the 
interpretation given by certain jurists of the decision delivered by the PCIJ in the 
Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions case,710 according to which the more limited 
(restrictive) interpretation which can be made to harmonize both authentic texts is the 
one which must always be adopted.711 In analytical terms, this interpretation provides 
that, if (i) one authentic text may be interpreted as meaning A and the other authentic 
text as meaning B and (ii) the denotata of B constitute a subset of the denotata of A, then 
meaning B is to be adopted. The commentary, on the one hand, explained that the 
provision of Article 75(3) gave effect to the rule of the equality of the texts in cases of 
ambiguity and that it was effective as long as such an ambiguity did not take the same 
form in each authentic text. In analytical terms, it could be said that, under Article 75(3), 
where one authentic text may be interpreted as meaning either A or B and the other 
authentic text as meaning either B or C, meaning B is to be adopted. On the other hand, 
the commentary pointed out that the above-mentioned interpretation of the decision 
given by the PCIJ in the Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions case was erroneous since 
(i) whether a restrictive interpretation is to be adopted depends upon the nature of the 
                                                                                                                                  
Archdukes of the Habsburg-Lorraine House v. The Polish State Treasury (see Supreme Court (Poland), 16 
June 1930, Archdukes of the Habsburg-Lorraine House v. The Polish State Treasury, 5 Annual digest of public 
international law cases (1929-1930), 365 et seq. [Case No. 235]) and the decision of the Italian-Bulgarian 
Mixed Arbitral Tribunal , 8 January 1925, De Paoli v. Bulgarian State, 6 Recueil des décisions des tribunaux 
arbitraux mixtes institués par les traités de paix (1927), 451 et seq., at  456.  
709 See YBILC 1964-II, p. 64, para. 7. 
710 See PCIJ, 30 August 1924, The Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. Britain), judgment, p. 19, 
where the following was stated: 
“The Court is of opinion that, where two versions possessing equal authority exist, one of which appears to have a 
wider bearing than the other, it is bound to adopt the more limited interpretation which can be made to harmonize 
with both versions and which, as far as it goes, is doubtless in accordance with the common intention of the parties. 
In the present case this conclusion is indicated with especial force because the question concerns an instrument 
laying down the obligations of Great Britain in her capacity of Mandatory for Palestine and because the original draft 
of this instrument was probably made in English”. 
711 See YBILC 1964-II, pp. 64-65, para. 8. 
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treaty and the particular context where the ambiguous term occurs and (ii) in the specific 
situation dealt with in that case, a restrictive interpretation was appropriate also in light 
of the nature of the treaty (i.e. an “instrument laying down the obligations of Great 
Britain in her capacity of Mandatory for Palestine”) and the context and circumstances 
thereof (e.g. “the original draft of this instrument was probably made in English”).712 
According to the commentary, the only conclusion that might be drawn from the 
Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions decision was that it gave strong support to the 
principle of harmonizing the texts, while it did not call for a general rule laying down a 
presumption in favor of restrictive interpretation in the case of an ambiguity in 
plurilingual texts.713  
With reference to the second case, which was dealt with in Article 75(4), the 
commentary clarified that, according to the Special Rapporteur, a presumption in favor 
of clear, as opposed to an obscure, text was mainly a matter of common sense and, as 
such, it was not an absolute rule and might also conflict with the principle of equality of 
the texts, especially where reference to the travaux préparatoires and other extrinsic 
means of interpretation clarified the meaning of the prima facie obscure text. However, 
it also recognized that, if after the application of the general rules of interpretation (i.e. 
those encompassed in Articles 70-73 of the draft convention) the meaning of one 
authentic text was still obscure, it was legitimate to make a presumption in favor of the 
clearer text.714  
 
Finally, Article 75(5) established that, for the purpose of treaty interpretation, non-
authentic texts might only be used as subsidiary evidence of the intention of the parties 
in the last resort, in particular only where the application of all the other rules of 
interpretation left the meaning of a term, as expressed in the authentic texts, ambiguous 
or obscure.715  
The reference to the “application of the foregoing rules” in paragraph 5 seems to 
suggest that, in the system of the draft convention, recourse to the non-authentic texts 
was subject to the unfruitful application of the provisions of paragraphs 3 and 4. Such a 
conclusion, however, appears at odds with the logical premise of such paragraphs, which 
were to be applied only where the application of the general rules of interpretation 
enshrined in Articles 70-73 might not remove the divergence between, or the ambiguity 
of, the texts. In fact, those general rules encompassed the recourse to supplementary 
means of interpretation (“other evidence or indications of the intentions of the 
parties”),716 which could be reasonably regarded as also including the non-authentic texts 
of the treaty, such as “official texts” and “official translations”. Nevertheless, the above 
conclusion seems confirmed by the reference to the “rules contained in paragraphs 3-5” 
found in Article 75(2), which made the recourse to Article 75(5) subject to the 
                                                     
712 See, similarly, J. Hardy, “The Interpretation of Plurilingual Treaties by International Courts and Tribunals”, 
37 British Yearbook of International Law (1961), 72 et seq., at 80.  
713 See YBILC 1964-II, p. 65, para. 8. 
714 See YBILC 1964-II, p. 65, para. 9. 
715 See also YBILC 1964-II, p. 65, para. 10. 
716 See Article 71(2) of the draft convention (YBILC 1964-II, p. 52). 
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unsuccessful application of the general rules provided for in Articles 70-73, hence 
indirectly ruling out that non-authentic texts could be included among the “other 
evidence or indications of the intentions of the parties” referred to in Article 71(2) of the 
draft convention.  
It seems to the author that the solution adopted by the Special Rapporteur was not 
fully coherent where it drew a line between the non-authentic texts, such as “official 
texts” and “official translations”, and the supplementary means of interpretation 
considered in Article 71(2), without giving any explanation of the reasons of the 
different weights attributed thereto for the purpose of treaty interpretation. The different 
weights to be attributed to supplementary means of interpretation should not be fixed a 
priori, but vary according to the facts and circumstances of the case. In this respect, the 
provision encompassed in Article 75(5) of the draft convention seems to contradict the 
idea of treaty interpretation as a unique process whereby all available elements and items 
of evidence are thrown in the crucible in order to determine a reasonable meaning (i.e. 
the utterance meaning) of the expressions to be interpreted.717 Hence, the author 
applauds the fact that such paragraph was subsequently removed by the ILC.  
 
2.2. The sixteenth session of the ILC and the 1964 Draft 
 
The ILC analysed and discussed the draft articles on treaty interpretation, included by Sir 
Humphrey Waldock in his Third Report on the Law of Treaties, in the course of its 
sixteenth session, starting at the 765th meeting.  
 
The first issue to be addressed was whether the draft convention should contain some 
articles on treaty interpretation. The great majority of the ILC explicitly endorsed the 
view that some rules on treaty interpretation were to be included in the draft convention.  
In this respect, Mr Paredes stated that rules on interpretation were indispensable 
for the purpose of treaty application.718  
Mr Briggs agreed and added that the task of isolating and codifying the 
comparatively few rules that appeared to constitute the strictly legal basis of treaty 
interpretation was one of the functions provided for in Article 15 of the ILC Statute.719  
Both Mr de Luna and Mr Castrén said that, even if at the beginning they had been 
skeptical as to the possibility to draft rules for the interpretation of treaties, they were 
positively impressed by the work of the Special Rapporteur and, therefore, they were 
favorable for the ILC to submit a preliminary draft thereof to Governments for 
comments.720  
                                                     
717 For instance, where strictly applied, Article 75(5) could lead to the application of the presumption in favor 
of the “clear” text (Article 75(4)), even where the reading of an official text might shed some light on the 
meaning of the “obscure” text, thus making such presumption inoperative and perhaps suggesting a different 
meaning to be attributed to the treaty provision.     
718 See YBILC 1964-I, p. 275, para. 5. 
719 See YBILC 1964-I, p. 275, paras. 8 and 9. 
720 See YBILC 1964-I, p. 276, paras. 15 and 20. 
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Mr Ruda expressed the view that, at the current stage of development of 
international law, there were not as yet any obligatory rules for States on treaty 
interpretation, except the rule in claris non fit interpretatio.721 He stressed that, as a 
consequence, any rule on interpretation inserted in the draft convention would not 
constitute a codification of existing customary law, but, on the contrary, it would 
represent a proposal for the progressive development of international law.722  
Mr Tunkin said that he favored the codification of the rules on the interpretation 
of treaties, particularly since there was already a substantial body of precedents and State 
practice on the subject.723  
Mr Yassen agreed on the necessity to include in the draft convention some 
articles on interpretation, which made it possible to determine the exact meaning of a 
treaty. However, he also pointed out that excessive detail should be avoided and the ILC 
should confine itself to the leading principles governing interpretation.724  
Mr Verdross stated that States that had concluded a treaty would not be bound by 
the rules in question, for they were at liberty to choose other means of interpretation.725 
Such conclusion was further clarified by Mr Ago (the Chairman), who affirmed that the 
ILC, by drafting the rules on treaty interpretation, was not creating jus cogens. There 
was nothing preventing the parties to a treaty from agreeing to interpret it in another 
way. However, according to Mr Ago, that would occur rarely, for the draft rules were 
eminently reasonable.726    
 
At the 767th meeting the ILC specifically addressed the draft articles concerning the 
interpretation of treaties drawn up in two or more languages.  
Sir Humphrey Waldock introduced the topic by making reference to the 
commentary to Articles 74 and 75. With regard to Article 74, he pointed out that the only 
issue that caused him some difficulty was that of the language version(s) drawn up 
within an international organization.727 It may therefore be derived that he was satisfied 
with the remainder of the proposed text (more relevant for the purpose of the present 
study).  
Mr Castrén agreed with the formulation of Article 74 and proposed adding the 
words “or in so far as the parties agree otherwise” at the end of paragraph 1, to 
coordinate this paragraph with the wording used in paragraph 2(a).728  
Mr Rosenne and Mr Tunkin stated their general agreement with the provisions of 
Articles 74 and 75 and, at the same time, shared the concern of the Special Rapporteur 
                                                     
721 An excessive reliance on the maxim in claris non fit interpretatio was damped by Mr Ago, who recalled 
cases where two States found a treaty perfectly clear, but interpreted it in two different ways. See YBILC 
1964-I, p. 280, para. 79. 
722 See YBILC 1964-I, p. 277, paras. 33 and 35. 
723 See YBILC 1964-I, p. 278, para. 47. 
724 See YBILC 1964-I, p. 279, para. 55.  
725 See YBILC 1964-I, p. 279, para. 61. 
726 See YBILC 1964-I, p. 280, para. 78. 
727 See YBILC 1964-I, p. 298, para. 60. 
728 See YBILC 1964-I, p. 298, para. 61. 
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with reference to the case of treaties drawn up within an international organization.729  
Mr Briggs, while favoring the inclusion of draft articles dealing specifically with 
treaties drawn up in two or more languages, such as those proposed by the Special 
Rapporteur, pointed out that he did not agree with the position expressed in paragraph 5 
of the commentary on Article 74, where reference was made to the fact that “in law there 
is only one treaty (…) even when the two authentic texts appear to diverge”. According 
to Mr Briggs, it would have been better to state that each treaty has only one text, 
although there may be different language versions of such a text.730 Similarly, he 
proposed to reword Article 74 by replacing the reference to two or more authentic texts 
with that to “two or more language versions of the same treaty”.731  
Finally, Mr Bartos brought to the attention of the ILC the fact that it had become 
common to have treaties concluded in the languages of each contracting party. In these 
cases, a translation in a third “authoritative” language was often annexed for the purpose 
of facilitating the understanding and interpretation of the treaty. According to Mr Bartos, 
such an innovation in the States’ practice was not considered in the draft and a reference 
thereto should have been made at least in the commentary.732 However, both Mr Tunkin 
and Mr Ago (Chairman) made clear that Article 74(1) covered those cases.733  
In closing the meeting, Mr Ago (Chairman) suggested to refer Articles 74 and 75 
to the Drafting Committee, with the comments made during the discussion.734  
 
The discussion was resumed at the 770th meeting, held on 20 July 1964. Mr Ago 
(Chairman) invited the ILC to consider the text of Article 74 as proposed by the Drafting 
Committee, which read: 
 
 Article 74 — Treaties drawn up in two or more languages 
1. When the text of a treaty has been authenticated in accordance with the provisions of 
article 7 in two or more languages, the text is authoritative in each language, except in so 
far as a different rule may be agreed upon by the parties.  
2. A version drawn up in a language other than one in which the text of the treaty was 
authenticated shall also be authoritative, and considered as an authentic text if —  
(a) the parties so agree; or  
(b) the established rules of an international organization so provide.735 
 
The text proposed by the Drafting Committee took in due consideration the observation 
made by Mr Castrén and, at least in part, that made by Mr Briggs during the 767th 
meeting. The text was amended to incorporate two minor improvements in wording 
proposed by Sir. Humphrey Waldock and then adopted unanimously.736    
                                                     
729 See YBILC 1964-I, p. 298, paras. 63 et seq. and p. 299, para. 66. 
730 See YBILC 1964-I, p. 299, para. 69.  
731 See YBILC 1964-I, p. 299, para. 70. 
732 See YBILC 1964-I, p. 299, para. 71. 
733 See YBILC 1964-I, p. 299, paras. 73 and 74. 
734 See YBILC 1964-I, p. 299, para. 75. 
735 YBILC 1964-I, p. 318, para. 54. 
736 See YBILC 1964-I, p. 318, para. 55. No significant change had been made in the commentary by the Draft 
PART II: CHAPTER 4 
 206 
 
Afterwards, Mr Ago (Chairman) invited the ILC to consider the text of Article 75 as 
proposed by the Drafting Committee, which read: 
  
 Article 75. — Interpretation of treaties having two or more texts or versions  
1. The expression of the terms of a treaty is of equal authority in each authentic text, unless 
the treaty itself provides that, in the event of divergence, a particular text or method of 
interpretation shall prevail.  
2. The terms of a treaty are presumed to have the same meaning in each text. Except in the 
case referred to in paragraph 1, when a comparison between two or more authentic texts 
discloses a difference in the expression of a term and any resulting ambiguity or obscurity 
is not removed by the application of articles 70-74, a meaning which is common to both or 
all the texts shall be preferred. 
 
As Sir Humphrey Waldock pointed out, the Drafting Committee had significantly 
shortened the text of the article. In particular, paragraph 4 of the original draft, according 
to which, in cases where the meaning of one text was clear and that of the other was not, 
the former would be adopted, had been dropped. That was decided since the solution 
proposed in the former paragraph 4, although a matter of common sense, might not 
always be the correct one and the Drafting Committee had preferred to leave the matter 
for interpretation to the States concerned or to the competent tribunals. Similarly, 
paragraph 5 of the original draft, dealing with the possible use of non-authentic texts, 
had been dropped on the grounds that it could have too much opened the door to the use 
of non-authentic versions of a treaty for the purpose of its interpretation.737  
Then, replying to an issue of clarity raised by Mr Ago, Sir Humphrey Waldock 
proposed redrafting the incipit of paragraph 1 as “The text of the treaty is of equal 
authority in each language, unless etc.”738 He also suggested removing the words “or 
versions” from the title of Article 75 and those “or method of interpretation” from 
paragraph 1 thereof.739  
With regard to paragraph 2, Mr Paredes pointed to an issue that, even today, 
constitutes one of the most debated matters in the field of interpretation of multilingual 
treaties. According to Mr Parades, Article 75(2) was unclear and contradictory, since, on 
the one hand, it dealt with cases where the comparison of two language versions 
discloses that the use of different terms led to some ambiguity or obscurity, while, on the 
other hand, it proposed that a meaning common to both or all language versions should 
be preferred for the purpose of solving such ambiguity or obscurity.740 To reduce 
                                                                                                                                  
Committee. See, to this extent, the version of the commentary transmitted to the Governments for comments at 
the end of the ILC’s sixteenth session (YBILC 1964-II, pp. 206-207, paras. 2-4). 
737 See YBILC 1964-I, p. 319, para. 57. It is just the case to note that, except the above-mentioned elimination 
of paragraphs 4 and 5 and that of paragraph 3, which, however, was not commented on by the ILC’s members, 
the changes undergone by Article 75 in the version proposed by the Drafting Committee were almost 
exclusively of a formal nature and did not modify the substance of the rules of interpretation encompassed in 
the original draft prepared by Sir Humphrey Waldock.  
738 See YBILC 1964-I, p. 319, para. 60. 
739 See YBILC 1964-I, p. 319, para. 61. 
740 See YBILC 1964-I, p. 319, para. 63. 
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uncertainty in that respect, Sir Humphrey Waldock proposed replacing the words “is 
common to both or all the texts shall be preferred” with the words “so far as possible 
reconciles the different texts shall be adopted”.741 Mr Bartos, however, observed that the 
reconciliation of the different texts raised a very special difficulty, since in some cases 
no meaning common to the different texts could be found. In illustrating this point, he 
made reference to the Agreement on Reparations from Germany,742 which had been 
drawn up in English and French, both being authentic languages. That treaty referred to 
assets placed under enemy “control”, in English, and “contrôle”, in French. In that 
respect, Mr Bartos pointed out that France had attributed to the term “contrôle” the 
meaning it has in French, i.e. that of the term “surveillance”, while Great Britain had 
attributed to the term “control” the meaning it has in English, i.e. that of the term 
“management”. According to Mr Bartos, in that case it was not possible to find out a 
meaning common to both language versions.743  
At the end of the discussion, Mr Ago (Chairman) proposed to the ILC the 
following text, which was approved unanimously:  
  
 Article 75. — Interpretation of treaties having two or more texts or versions  
1. The different authentic texts of a treaty are equally authoritative in each language unless 
the treaty itself provides that, in the event of divergence, a particular text shall prevail.  
2. The terms of the treaty are presumed to have the same meaning in each text. Except in 
the case referred to in paragraph 1, when a comparison between two or more authentic 
texts discloses a difference in the expression of a term and any resulting ambiguity or 
obscurity is not removed by the application of articles 70-74, a meaning which so far as 
possible reconciles the different texts shall be adopted.744  
 
The ILC, in accordance with Articles 16 and 21 of its Statute, transmitted the above two 
articles and the commentaries thereon745 to the Governments for observations, together 
with the other articles constituting part III of the draft convention on the law of treaties, 
which concerned the effects, application, modifications and interpretation of treaties.746 
In the process of drafting the “Report of the International Law Commission covering the 
work of its sixteenth session, 11 May — 24 July 1964”,747 which contained the version 
of part III of the ILC’s draft on the law of treaties sent to Governments, Articles 74 and 
75 were renumbered as 72 and 73 and their text changed accordingly. Their respective 
titles were also modified. Here below is the text of Articles 72 and 73, as transmitted to 
                                                     
741 See YBILC 1964-I, p. 319, para. 64. 
742 Agreement on reparation from Germany, on the establishment of an inter-allied reparation agency and on 
the restitution of monetary gold, concluded in Paris on 14 January 1946. 
743 See YBILC 1964-I, p. 319, para. 65. 
744 YBILC 1964-I, p. 319, para. 66. 
745 The part of the commentary dealing with the interpretation of multilingual treaties was modified, as 
compared to the previous version prepared by Sir Humphrey Waldock, for the purpose of taking into account 
and explaining the reason of the changes made in Article 75. No other significant changes were made. See, to 
this extent, the version of the commentary transmitted to the Governments for comments at the end of the 
ILC’s sixteenth session (YBILC 1964-II, p. 207, paras. 5-9). 
746 YBILC 1964-II, p. 175, para. 16. 
747 Document A/5809 (Official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Supplement No. 9). 




 Article 72. Treaties drawn up in two or more languages  
1. When the text of a treaty has been authenticated in accordance with the provisions of 
article 7 in two or more languages, the text is authoritative in each language, except in so 
far as a different rule may be agreed upon by the parties.  
2. A version drawn up in a language other than one of those in which the text of the treaty 
was authenticated shall also be authoritative and be considered as an authentic text if:  
(a) The parties so agree; or  
(b) The established rules of an international organization so provide.  
 
 Article 73. Interpretation of treaties having two or more texts  
1. The different authentic texts of a treaty are equally authoritative in each language, unless 
the treaty itself provides that, in the event of divergence, a particular text shall prevail.  
2. The terms of a treaty are presumed to have the same meaning in each text. Except in the 
case referred to in paragraph 1, when a comparison between two or more authentic texts 
discloses a difference in the expression of a term and any resulting ambiguity or obscurity 
is not removed by the application of articles 69-72, a meaning which so far as possible 
reconciles the different texts shall be adopted.748  
 
2.3. Governments’ comments on the 1964 Draft 
 
Twenty-seven governments transmitted their comments on part III of the draft 
convention. However, only eleven dealt with articles on treaty interpretation.749 A 
reading of the governments’ comments clearly shows that the effort of the ILC to codify 
solely the main and basic principles of interpretation was approved by most of the States; 
the content of the articles dealing with treaty interpretation was also generally agreed 
upon. That notwithstanding, many governments declared that they reserved the right to 
express their views on the final version of the draft.750 
 
Five governments specifically commented on Articles 72 and 73. The Finnish 
Government considered the draft rules concerning the interpretation of treaties useful 
and appropriate.751  
The Israeli government suggested inserting the comparison between two or more 
authentic versions of the treaty in Article 69, as part of the general rule of interpretation. 
According to that government, in fact, such a comparison was a normal practice in the 
process of treaty interpretation and its importance was not limited to the case dealt with 
in Article 73 (i.e. the case where the comparison disclosed a difference), as it frequently 
assisted the interpreter in determining the meaning of the text and the intention of the 
                                                     
748 YBILC 1964-II, p. 206. 
749 See YBILC 1966-II, pp. 279 et seq. 
750 That was an approach common to both the States that commented on the articles dealing with treaty 
interpretation and those that did not. See, for example, the statements made by Afghanistan, Cyprus, 
Czechoslovak and U.S.S.R.  (YBILC 1966-II, pp. 279, 285, 286-287 and 343, respectively).  
751 See YBILC 1966-II, p. 293. 
PART II: CHAPTER 4            
 
 209 
parties. The Israeli government also emphasized the need to collect more information 
regarding the drafting practices for multilingual instruments and proposed to make 
Article 73 more consistent with Article 72 by substituting the word “versions” for the 
word “texts” whenever they appear.752  
The need to modify the use of the word “texts” in Article 73 was also pointed out 
by the United States government, which, upholding the position taken in that respect by 
Mr Briggs during the 767th ILC’s meeting, stressed that each treaty should be conceived 
as a unit, consisting of a single text. Therefore, according to that government, where the 
text is expressed in two or more languages, the several language versions are an integral 
part of and constitute a single text. In contrast, the use of the word “texts” in Article 73 
seemed to derogate from the unity of the treaty as a single document. The United States 
government also suggested an alternative version of Article 73, whose wording took into 
account such comments.753 With reference to Article 72, the United States government, 
on the one hand, recognized that paragraph 1 reproduced a widely accepted rule and, on 
the other hand, criticized the content of paragraph 2(b), emphasizing that if a non-
authenticated version of a treaty was to be considered authentic for the purpose of 
interpretation, it should be made so only by a provision of that very same treaty or by a 
supplementary agreement between the parties. Therefore, it recommended that the entire 
paragraph 2(b), which referred to the “established rules of an international organization” 
as source of authenticity, be deleted.754   
The Portuguese government commented on both Articles 72 and 73. With 
reference to the former, it stated its general agreement thereon and wondered if it would 
have not been appropriate to include an additional subparagraph recognizing the 
authentic status of a non-authentic language version also in cases where the subsequent 
practice of the parties showed in an unequivocal manner their will to confer authority on 
such a version, by analogy with the approach taken in Article 69(3) in respect of the 
general rule of interpretation. No particular remark was made with reference to Article 
73.755  
Finally, the Yugoslavian government noted that consideration “must also be 
given to the case where an international instrument is the work of several States having 
different legal systems and conceptions and where the interpretation of a solution must 
be in conformity with the juridical conceptions of all the contracting parties”.756 This 
was a clear reference to the issue of multijuralism, which comes into play where the 
corresponding terms used in the various authentic texts of a treaty denotate different 
legal concepts in the various legal systems where such terms are used. This issue is 
discussed in section 4 of this chapter.  
 
                                                     
752 See YBILC 1966-II, p. 301. 
753 See YBILC 1966-II, p. 359. 
754 See YBILC 1966-II, p. 359. 
755 See YBILC 1966-II, pp. 336-337. 
756 See YBILC 1966-II, p. 361. 
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2.4. The Sixth Report on the Law of Treaties prepared by Sir Humphrey Waldock 
 
On the basis of the comments transmitted by the governments and those provided by the 
Sixth Committee of the General Assembly,757 Sir Humphrey Waldock prepared his Sixth 
Report on the Law of Treaties, where he also extensively analysed such comments. 
 
In replying to the comments concerning Article 69, Sir Humphrey Waldock dealt with 
the proposal made by the Israeli government of including a reference to the comparison 
of the authentic texts among the principal means of interpretation.  
In that respect, he observed that such a proposal was not one that the ILC should 
have adopted without very careful consideration of its implications. The legal relation 
between authentic language versions of a treaty was a question of some delicacy, as well 
shown by the ILC’s analysis contained in the commentary to Articles 72 and 73.  
According to the Special Rapporteur, while the interaction between two (or more) 
authentic texts, each of which interpreted in accordance with its own genius, was 
certainly useful in order to solve apparent divergences between them or to clarify the 
ambiguities of one text, the insertion of the "comparison of authentic versions" among 
the general elements of interpretation (Article 69) might have far-reaching implications 
by undermining the security of the individual texts. This conclusion was based on the 
recognition that each language has its own genius and it is not always possible to express 
the same idea in identical phraseology or syntax in different languages. In Sir Humphrey 
Waldock’s view, attributing legal value to a comparison for the purpose of determining 
the ordinary meaning of the terms in the context of the treaty could have encouraged 
attempts to transplant concepts of one language into the interpretation of a text in another 
language with a resultant distortion of the meaning of the treaty. Pending the 
examination by the ILC of the Israeli government’s proposal, the Special Rapporteur 
preferred to confine himself to the above preliminary observations on the matter.758   
 
With regard to the comments concerning Articles 72 and 73, Sir Humphrey Waldock 
                                                     
757 The Sixth Committee of the General Assembly considered the topic of the draft articles prepared by the ILC 
from its 839th through its 853rd meetings, held from 29 September to 15 October 1965. The topic had been 
allocated to the Sixth Committee by the General Assembly at its 1336th plenary meeting, held on 24 September 
1965. The Sixth Committee issued a Report that summarized the results of its analysis (see Document A/6090, 
Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Annexes, agenda item 87, Report of the Sixth 
Committee of 4 November 1965, paras. 51-52), from which it appears that the great majority of the delegates 
regarded the draft articles as generally reflecting existing international law and practice and considered as 
positive the process of codifying some rules on treaty interpretation, especially for the purpose of reducing 
potential disputes between the contracting States regarding the application of treaties. However, no relevant 
comments on the specific topic of interpretation of multilingual treaties had been put forward in the Report. 
During the discussions held at the Sixth Committee, the only two delegations that made new comments were 
the Kenyan and Romanian ones, both expressing the view that paragraph 2(b) of Article 72 should have been 
deleted (see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Sixth Committee, 850th meeting, 
para. 41 and 842nd meeting, para. 16 respectively). For a brief analysis of the content of the Report with 
reference to the topic of treaty interpretation, see F. Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International 
Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2004), p. 71. 
758 See YBILC 1966-II, p. 100, para. 23. 
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first faced the issue, raised by both the Israeli and the United States governments, of the 
usage of the terms “texts” and “versions” in those articles. In replying to the suggestion 
put forward by the former government, the Special Rapporteur explained that using 
“versions” instead of “texts” throughout Article 73 would have made such an article 
inconsistent with Article 72(2), where a reference to a(n authentic) text was also made.759  
With reference to the more articulate observation submitted by the United States 
government, Sir Humphrey Waldock noted that its statement, conceding that the usage 
of the term “texts” was becoming more frequent, represented a “serious underestimate of 
the treaty practice in the matter”. According to the Special Rapporteur, in fact, the 
general practice had always been to speak of authentic “texts” and not authentic 
“versions” of a treaty.760 He added that the doctrinal basis of the United States 
government’s observation appeared to be open to question. In fact, he found that the use 
of the term “texts” did not derogate from the concept of “treaty as a unity” more than the 
use of term “versions” would have. Where recourse had been to the fiction that only one 
text exists, which is drawn up in multiple language “versions”, the same element of 
multiplicity would have been introduced as in the case where the term “texts” had been 
used, “text” becoming just another name for “treaty” and “version” just another name for 
“text”. The substance of the matter would have not changed. In addition, Sir Humphrey 
Waldock noted that, so far as the English language was concerned, the word “versions” 
was more indicative of difference than the word “texts”.761  
He then turned to the actual usage of the terms “text” and “version” in draft 
Articles 72 and 73. The Special Rapporteur explained that, on the one hand, the word 
“version”, not being a term of art but just a word of entirely general meaning, had been 
carefully chosen by the ILC to indicate those renderings of a treaty drawn up in 
languages different from the authentic ones, i.e. those non-authoritative for interpretation 
purposes;762 on the other hand, the word “text” had been used only with reference to the 
language versions recognized as authentic and considered authoritative for the purpose 
of treaty interpretation. In the system of Article 72 and 73, the metamorphosis of a 
language “version” into an authoritative “text” took place as a consequence of the 
recognition of its authentic status. According to Sir Humphrey Waldock, the distinct 
reference to “texts” and “versions” in Article 72(2) as well as in the treaty practice 
helped to clarify and sharpen the fundamental distinction between “authentic texts” 
(authoritative for interpretation purposes) and “official versions” and “translations” 
                                                     
759 See YBILC 1966-II, p. 102, para. 2. 
760 See YBILC 1966-II, p. 102, para. 3 and references and practices there quoted. The existence of such a 
general practice, both before and after 1966, is also confirmed with regard to the specific field of tax treaties, 
as it clearly emerges from the analysis of the final clauses of the treaties included in the IBFD Tax Treaty 
Database (www.ibfd.org), almost all of which use the term “texts” and not “versions” in their English authentic 
text (if any). 
761 YBILC 1966-II, p. 102, para. 4. 
762 In this respect, the Special Rapporteur gave the case of the European Convention of Human Rights as an 
example. That Convention, in fact, is drawn up in two authentic languages, English and French, but it has been 
translated by some contracting States in their own languages for internal purposes. According to the Special 
Rapporteur, such official translations could be properly indicated as Convention’s language “versions”, but not 
as Convention’s authentic “texts” (YBILC 1966-II, p. 102, para. 5). 
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(non-authoritative for interpretation purposes).763  
 
With regard to the matter of the elimination of paragraph 2(b) from Article 72, the 
Special Rapporteur noted that the more general issue, concerning the applicability of the 
draft articles as a whole to treaties drawn up within an international organization, had 
already been addressed by the ILC through the insertion of Article 3(bis) among the 
“General Provisions”.764 For that reason, there was no need to maintain a specific 
paragraph dealing with that same subject matter in the corpus of Article 72.765  
 
Finally, in addition to some minor drafting amendments, Sir Humphrey Waldock 
suggested combining Articles 72 and 73 in a single article. According to the Special 
Rapporteur, such a solution (i) would have permitted showing more clearly the 
connection existing between Article 72 and the first paragraph of Article 73 and (ii) 
would have helped to avoid any appearance of over-emphasizing the significance of the 
multilingual character of a treaty as an element of interpretation. The following is the 
new text of Article 72, as suggested by the Special Rapporteur:766     
 
  
 Article 72  
 Interpretation of treaties drawn up in two or more languages  
1. When the text of a treaty has been authenticated in accordance with the provisions of 
article 7 in two or more languages, the text is authoritative in each language, unless the 
treaty otherwise provides.  
2. A version of the treaty drawn up in a language other than one of those in which the text 
was authenticated shall also be considered as an authentic text and authoritative if the 
treaty so provides or the parties so agree.  
3. Authentic texts are equally authoritative in each language unless the treaty provides that, 
in the event of divergence, a particular text shall prevail.  
4. The terms of the treaty are presumed to have the same meaning in each authentic text. 
Except in the case mentioned in paragraph 1,767 when a comparison of the texts discloses a 
difference in the expression of the treaty and any resulting ambiguity or obscurity is not 
removed by the application of article 69-70, a meaning which as far as possible reconciles 
the texts shall be adopted.  
 
                                                     
763 See YBILC 1966-II, p. 102, para. 5. However, the Special Rapporteur conceded that the term “different” in 
Article 73(1) was not well chosen, since the emphasis of that paragraph was on similarity and equality and not 
on differences (YBILC 1966-II, p. 103, para. 10). 
764 Article 3(bis), which was directly derived from previous Article 48, read as follow (YBILC 1965-II, p. 160): 
Article 3 bis. Treaties which are constituent instruments of international organizations or which have been drawn up 
within international organizations  
The application of the present articles to treaties which are constituent instruments of an international organization or 
have been drawn up within an international organization shall be subject to the rules of the organization in question.  
765 See YBILC 1966-II, p. 103, para. 8. 
766 YBILC 1966-II, p. 103, paras. 9 and 11. 
767 Note that, in the text of Article 72 reported as materially used for discussion by the ILC during its 
eighteenth session, the reference to “paragraph 1” is replaced by a reference to “paragraph 3”. See YBILC 
1966-I (part II), p. 208, para. 1. 
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2.5. The eighteenth session of the ILC and the 1966 Draft 
 
The ILC resumed the discussion on the interpretation of plurilingual treaties during its 
eighteenth session, held in 1966. For the purpose of the discussion, the ILC took into 
account the feedback received from the governments and the Sixth Committee of the 
United Nations General Assembly, as well as the input given by Sir Humphrey Waldock 
in his Sixth Report on the Law of Treaties.  
 
The topic was taken up again at the ILC’s 874th meeting, held on 21 June 1966. The 
Chairman, Mr Yasseen, invited the ILC to consider the new combined text of Articles 72 
and 73 proposed by the Special Rapporteur, who, in turn, explained the main changes as 
compared to the previous draft and the reasons therefor.768  
Mr Verdross made the first intervention and said that, although he generally 
agreed with the content and structure of the new article, he thought it was desirable to 
add a final provision to paragraph 4, according to which where it was impossible to find 
a meaning which reconciled the texts, the language to be considered should be that in 
which the treaty had been drawn up.769 In the event his proposal was not accepted by the 
ILC, his alternative suggestion was to delete the words “as far as possible” from 
paragraph 4, in order to exclude the application of paragraph 4, second sentence, in cases 
where a meaning reconciling the texts could not be found.770  
Mr Rosenne pointed out that, on the one hand, he was satisfied by the reply given 
by the Special Rapporteur in respect of the issue concerning the usage of the terms 
“texts” and “versions” in the draft article(s), but, on the other hand, he thought that the 
emphasis placed on the equality of authentic texts raised the question of whether 
comparison of authentic texts should be included among the elements of interpretation 
listed in the article dealing with the general rule of interpretation (at that time, Article 
69).771  
In this respect, Mr Rosenne’s opinion differed from that of Sir Humphrey 
Waldock. As previously mentioned, the latter analysed the issue in his Sixth Report772 
and concluded that such an inclusion was not one that the ILC should adopt without very 
careful consideration of its implications.  
In contrast, Mr Rosenne was in favor of such an inclusion. In supporting his 
position, he referred to doctrine,773 normal practice and principle; in particular, he quoted 
the position taken by the American Law Institute, which included “the comparison of 
texts in the different languages in which the agreement was concluded” among the 
                                                     
768 See YBILC 1966-I (part II), p. 208, paras. 1-4. 
769 See YBILC 1966-I (part II), p. 208, para. 5. 
770 See YBILC 1966-I (part II), p. 211, para. 37. 
771 See YBILC 1966-I (part II), pp. 208-209., paras. 7 et seq. 
772 See YBILC 1966-II, p. 100, para. 23. 
773 See YBILC 1966-I (part II), p. 209, para. 8, where there are quotations (among others) of the Research in 
International Law, “Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties with Comments”, 29 American Journal of 
International Law - Supplement (1935), 653 et seq., at 971; C. E. Rousseau, Principes généraux du droit 
international public. Tome I (Paris: Pedone, 1944), p. 721; A. D. McNair, The Law of Treaties (Oxford; The 
Clarendon Press,1961), p. 433. 
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factors to be considered for the purpose of treaty interpretation,774 and the statement 
made by Kiss, according to which “(l)orsque des textes en plusieurs langues font 
également foi, il convient d’utiliser l’ensemble des textes pour déterminer le sens 
véritable du traité”.775 Mr Rosenne was also of the opinion that a good practitioner 
would have almost automatically compared the different language versions before 
commencing any process of interpretation and that, in the view of such practice, it would 
have been misleading to place the comparison of different texts in a “secondary 
position” in Article 72.776  
On the basis of those arguments, Mr Rosenne believed that all language versions 
should be analysed together for the purpose of treaty interpretation and that it was 
preferable not to leave that point to be decided by the interpreter and to discourage any 
tendency to base the interpretation of a treaty on a single language version, since such a 
tendency would have seriously impaired the fundamental concept of the treaty as a 
single unit.777 A reference to the comparison of authentic texts should have therefore 
been included in the article dealing with the general rule of interpretation (i.e. draft 
Article 69).778  
As a last point, Mr Rosenne noted the need to clarify the relevance of the travaux 
préparatoires for the purpose of interpreting multilingual treaties and, in that respect, he 
made reference by analogy to the reasons put forward by the Special Rapporteur for 
transferring the content of Article 71 (dealing with terms having a special meaning) into 
Article 69.779 According to Mr Rosenne, as the transfer of the provision dealing with 
special meaning to Article 69 made it possible to have recourse to the travaux 
préparatoires (referred to in Article 70) for the purpose of verifying or determining the 
cases where a special meaning had to be attributed to a certain term, so the inclusion of a 
reference to the comparison of authentic texts in Article 69 would have made clearer that 
the recourse to the travaux préparatoires was allowed for the purpose of solving 
apparent divergences between authentic texts.780  
Mr Castrén proposed adding the words “or the parties have otherwise agreed” 
after the words “otherwise provides” in paragraph 1 of Article 72, in order to coordinate 
this expression with that used in paragraph 2. He also proposed deleting the words “and 
authoritative” in paragraph 2, since the reference to “authentic text” was sufficient to 
made clear the status of the language version.781  
Mr Ago pointed out that, although the proposed Article 72 was acceptable as far 
as substance was concerned, it could be simplified in its structure and made clearer. In 
particular, he suggested that paragraph 3 was redundant, since the case contemplated 
                                                     
774 American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law, Second: Foreign Relations Law of the United States (St. 
Paul: American Law Institute, 1965), §147, p. 451. 
775 A. C. Kiss, Répertoire de la pratique française en matière de droit international public. Tome I (Paris: 
Centre national de la recherche scientifique, 1962), p. 465.  
776 See YBILC 1966-I (part II), p. 209, para. 11. 
777 See YBILC 1966-I (part II), p. 209, para. 12. 
778 YBILC 1966-I (part II), p. 210, para. 16. 
779 See YBILC 1966-II, p. 100, para. 22. 
780 See YBILC 1966-I (part II), p. 209, para. 15. 
781 See YBILC 1966-I (part II), p. 210, paras. 17-18. 
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therein was already covered by the expression of paragraph 1 “unless the treaty 
otherwise provides”.782 With reference to the comment made by Mr Verdross, Mr Ago 
said that the issue concerning the weight to be attributed to the language in which the 
treaty had been drawn up in cases of irreconcilable texts could have been solved by 
referring to the travaux préparatoires and the circumstances of the conclusion of the 
treaty, as explicitly allowed by Article 70. This would have led to the discoverery that 
the treaty had been originally drawn up in a certain language and such an element should 
have been taken in due account for interpretation purposes. In addition, the solution 
adopted in the draft did not present the inconvenience of being too rigid, as it would 
have been a system attributing a “premium” to the original language version, 
independently of the reasons why that specific language had been chosen for such a 
purpose.783  
Mr Briggs supported the suggestion made by Mr Ago with regard to the 
elimination of paragraph 3 and added, in that respect, that the word “equally” could be 
added between the expressions “the text is” and “authoritative in each language”.784 He 
considered that the first part of paragraph 4 was redundant as well, since the fact that the 
terms of the treaty were presumed to have the same meaning in each authentic text was 
already implicit in the (re)formulation of paragraph 1.785 With regard to paragraph 2, he 
doubted whether a non-authenticated version of a treaty could be put at the same level as 
an authenticated one.786  
 
Ultimately, Sir Humphrey Waldock took the floor and replied to the comments put 
forward by the other members of the ILC. With reference to the last suggestion proposed 
by Mr Briggs, he said that the ILC could not adopt any provision that would disregard 
the express provision of the parties and, where a treaty explicitly provided for putting a 
non-authenticated version and the authenticated versions on the same level, such a will 
should prevail.787  
On the contrary, he substantially agreed with Mr Ago’s proposal to delete 
paragraph 3, provided that paragraph 1 was accordingly modified.788  
In respect of the issue raised by Mr Verdross, the Special Rapporteur recalled the 
ILC that the matter had already been subject of debate during its sixteenth session in 
1964 and that, at that time, the ILC had reached the conclusion that it was not acceptable 
to go any further than was done in (then) Article 73.789 It was inadvisable to go beyond 
                                                     
782 See YBILC 1966-I (part II), p. 210, paras. 20-21. 
783 See YBILC 1966-I (part II), p. 210, para. 22. Also Mr Rosenne seemed to attach particular relevance to the 
language in which the treaty had originally been drawn up. See, in that respect, his statement that, for the 
purpose of treaty interpretation, it was essential to refer to the comparison of authentic texts, or at least of those 
texts in which the treaty had been drawn up by the parties at the negotiating stage (YBILC 1966-I (part II), p. 
209, para. 8). 
784 See YBILC 1966-I (part II), p. 210, para. 26. 
785 See YBILC 1966-I (part II), p. 210, para. 28. 
786 See YBILC 1966-I (part II), p. 210, para. 29. 
787 See YBILC 1966-I (part II), p. 210, para. 30. 
788 See YBILC 1966-I (part II), p. 210, para. 32. 
789 YBILC 1966-I (part II), p. 210, para. 33. 
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that and, where no reconciliation of the texts was possible and the recourse to the 
travaux préparatoires and the circumstances of the conclusion of the treaty did not 
remove the uncertainty, the interpreter was to be left free to decide the meaning to be 
attributed to a certain provision in light of all the circumstances.790  
Finally, with reference to the proposal made by Mr Rosenne of including a 
reference to the comparison of the texts among the general rules of interpretation, he 
observed that, although it was true that interpreters normally undertook such a 
comparison, the suggested inclusion would have implied that it was no longer possible to 
rely on a single text as an expression of the will of the parties until a difficulty arose and 
that it was always necessary to consult all the authentic texts for interpretation purposes. 
According to the Special Rapporteur, that solution had a number of drawbacks: in 
particular, it would have led to practical difficulties for the legal advisers of the newly 
independent States, who did not always have staff familiar with the many languages used 
in drafting international treaties.791 His conclusion was further upheld by Mr El-Erian.792 
 
Sir Humphrey Waldock then proposed to refer the article dealing with the interpretation 
of plurilingual treaties to the Drafting Committee for consideration in light of the 
discussion and the ILC so decided. 
 
Mr Briggs, in his quality of Chairman of the Drafting Committee, presented to the ILC 
the new text of Article 72 at the 884th meeting, held on 5 July 1966. The proposed text 
was as follows:793 
 
 Article 72 
 Interpretation of treaties expressed in two or more languages  
1. When a treaty has been authenticated in two or more languages, the text is equally 
authoritative in each language, unless the treaty provides or the parties agree that, in case 
of divergence, a particular text shall prevail.  
2. A version of the treaty expressed in a language other than one of those in which the text 
was authenticated shall be considered an authentic text only if the treaty so provide or the 
parties so agree.  
3. The terms of the treaty are presumed to have the same meaning in each authentic text. 
Except in the case mentioned in paragraph 1, when a comparison of the texts discloses a 
difference of meaning which the application of articles 69 and 70 does not remove, a 
meaning which as far as possible reconciles the texts shall be adopted. 
 
At the outset, Mr Briggs explained that the main difference between the proposed text 
and that prepared by Sir Humphrey Waldock as part of his Sixth Report on the Law of 
Treaties was that the substance of previous paragraph 3 had been incorporated in the new 
text of paragraph 1.794 Mr Verdross reverted to his disagreement on the current wording 
                                                     
790 See YBILC 1966-I (part II), pp. 210-211, paras. 33-34. 
791 See YBILC 1966-I (part II), p. 211, para. 35.  
792 See YBILC 1966-I (part II), p. 211, para. 42. 
793 See YBILC 1966-I (part II), pp. 270-271, para. 42. 
794 See YBILC 1966-I (part II), p. 271, para. 43. 
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of (now) Article 3, as already expressed during the 874th meeting.795 After some minor 
comments were made, Mr Briggs (Chairman) put Article 72 to vote and the ILC adopted 
it. 
 
At its 892nd meeting, the ILC decided to recommend, in conformity with Article 23(1)(d) 
of its Statute, that the General Assembly convoke an international conference of 
plenipotentiaries to study the Commission’s draft articles on the law of treaties and to 
conclude a convention on the subject.796 From that very same meeting the ILC started 
working on the final text of the articles to be submitted to the General Assembly.     
 
The topic was again made subject to discussion at the 893rd meeting, held on 18 July 
1966. The draft article, which had been renumbered as 29 and moved to Part III, Section 
3 – Interpretation of Treaties, was discussed with regard to the usage of the term 
“expressed” in both the title and paragraph 2. In accordance with the final proposal put 
forward by Mr Ago and Sir Humphrey Waldock, the term “expressed” was deleted from 
paragraph 2 and replaced by the term “established” in the title.797 The ILC adopted the 
amended article.  
 
Finally, during its 894th meeting, held on 19 July 1966, the ILC made some minor 
amendments to the commentary on Article 29 and approved its final version.798 
 
The following version of Article 29, dealing the interpretation of multilingual treaties, 
was submitted to the General Assembly:799 
 
 Article 29.  
 Interpretation of treaties in two or more languages800  
1. When a treaty has been authenticated in two or more languages, the text is equally 
authoritative in each language, unless the treaty provides or the parties agree that, in case 
of divergence, a particular text shall prevail.  
2. A version of the treaty in a language other than one of those in which the text was 
authenticated shall be considered an authentic text only if the treaty so provides or the 
parties so agree.  
3. The terms of the treaty are presumed to have the same meaning in each authentic text. 
Except in the case mentioned in paragraph 1, when a comparison of the texts discloses a 
difference of meaning which the application of articles 27 and 28 does not remove, a 
meaning which as far as possible reconciles the texts shall be adopted.  
 
                                                     
795 See YBILC 1966-I (part II), p. 271, para. 44. 
796 See YBILC 1966-I (part II), p. 322, paras. 17-18. 
797 See YBILC 1966-I (part II), p. 328, paras. 42-43. 
798 See YBILC 1966-I (part II), pp. 341-342, paras. 87 et seq. 
799 YBILC 1966-II, p. 224. 
800 It is not clear why the title did not contain the word “established” before the words “in two or more 
languages”, as decided by the ILC at its 893rd meeting (see YBILC 1966-I (part II), p. 328, paras. 42-43). Also, 
the French version of the article did not contain the proposed word “établi” in the title (see Annuaire de la 
Commission de Droit International, vol. II, part II, p. 244).  
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2.6. The United Nations conference on the Law of Treaties 
 
Following the recommendation of the ILC, the General Assembly, at its 1484th meeting, 
held on 5 December 1966, adopted the Resolution 2166 (XXI) requesting the Secretary-
General to convoke an international conference of plenipotentiaries for the purpose of 
considering the law of treaties and embodying the result of its work in an international 
convention and such other instruments as it might deem appropriate. The conference was 
to be held in two sessions, the first in early 1968 and the second in early 1969. 
According to point 9 of the Resolution, Member States, the Secretary-General and the 
Directors-General of those specialized agencies that acted as depositaries of treaties were 
invited to submit their written comments and observations on the 1966 Draft no later 
than 1 July 1967.  
 
The General Assembly, at its 1564th meeting held 23 September 1967, allocated to its 
Sixth Committee the agenda item “Law of Treaties”. Accordingly, the Sixth Committee 
discussed such a topic at its meetings held from 9 to 26 October 1967, where it also 
analysed the comments and observation in the meantime submitted by some Member 
States and specialized agencies.801 
 
At its 1621st meeting, held on 6 December 1967, the General Assembly adopted a second 
resolution concerning the conference on the Law of Treaties, by which it decided that the 
first session of such conference would have been held in Vienna on March 1968 and 
invited participating States to submit to the Secretary-General, no later than 15 February 
1968, any additional comments and draft amendments for circulation to Governments.802 
 
During the first session of the United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties 
(hereafter the “Conference”),803 the Committee of the Whole of the United Nations 
Conference on the Law of Treaties (hereafter “Committee of the Whole”) considered 
both the articles on treaty interpretation encompassed in the 1966 Draft and the 
amendments proposed by participating States.804 At its 34th meeting, held on 23 April 
1968, the Committee of the Whole specifically discussed possible amendments to Article 
29.  
 
In this respect, the United States805 suggested three main changes to the draft article.  
 First, it proposed to substitute the words “language version” for the word “text” in 
the last part of paragraph 1.  
                                                     
801 See the Report of the Sixth Committee on the Law of Treaties of 24 November 1967 (Document A/6913). 
802 See the Resolution of the United Nations General Assembly n. 2287 (XXII) of 6 December 1967. 
803 The topic of treaty interpretation was considered by the Committee of the Whole at its 31st through 34th 
meetings, held in Vienna on 19, 20, 22 and 23 April 1968 (UNCLT-1st, pp. 166 et seq.). 
804 The following States proposed amendments to the draft articles: Australia, Ceylon, Federal Republic of 
Germany, Pakistan, Philippines, Romania, Republic of Vietnam, Spain, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, 
United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America (see UNCLT-Doc, pp. 149-151). 
805 With reference to the proposals put forward by the United States, see UNCLT-Doc, p. 151. 
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Second, it recommended moving the second sentence of paragraph 3 to a new 
paragraph 4. The remainder paragraph 3 was to be reworded to read “The terms of the 
treaty are presumed to have the same meaning in each authentic language version”, i.e. 
the term “language version” was to be used instead of term “text”.  
Third, new paragraph 4 (former paragraph 3, second sentence) was to be modified 
as follows: “Except in the case mentioned in paragraph 1, when a comparison of the 
several language versions discloses a difference of meaning which the application of 
Article 27 does not remove, a meaning shall be adopted which is most consonant with 
the object and purpose of the treaty”.  
The third proposal was the most innovative, as well as the most substantive of the 
three. In fact, apart from the suggested substitution of the words “several language 
versions” for the word “texts”806 and the elimination of the reference to Article 28 for the 
purpose of removing the difference, the proposal had as its main objective to introduce a 
new yardstick to resolve the discordances between the various language versions, i.e. the 
objective and purpose of the treaty. The proposed change was of tremendous impact, 
since in cases of persistent differences between the various language versions of a treaty, 
not a meaning that as far as possible reconciled the texts, but the meaning most 
consonant with the object and purpose of the treaty had to be adopted. Such a pragmatic 
solution, recognizing the eventuality that in certain cases the reconciliation of the 
different language versions was impossible, detached the investigation of the appropriate 
meaning from the ordinary sense of the contrasting language versions807 and attached it 
exclusively to a partially non-textual element, such as the object and purpose of the 
treaty.  
The United States representative, in introducing the above third proposal, 
strongly criticized the provision laid down in paragraph 3, second sentence, of Article 
29, which did not give any indication of the guiding criteria to be followed for the 
purpose of reconciling the different language versions, i.e. for the purpose of effecting 
“some sort of compromise”, in the words of the United States representative.808  
In addition, he stressed that reconciliation of the different language versions was 
sometimes impossible and this was especially true where a problem of multijuralism 
occurred, that is where the treaty dealt with legal issues and two or more systems of law 
were involved. According to the United States representative, in such cases it often 
happened that there was no legal concept in one system that exactly corresponded to a 
certain legal concept in the other system. Therefore, even if two “equivalent” terms were 
used, the legal concepts underlying and expressed by them could be non-reconcilable.809  
 
                                                     
806 It is interesting to note that, in all the three changes proposed by the United States, the position previously 
expressed by Mr Briggs during the ILC’s proceedings with regard to the need to substitute the term “language 
version” for the term “treaty” was upheld. 
807 Since they were regarded as non-reconciliable. 
808 See UNCLT-1st,, pp. 188-189, paras. 39-40. 
809 See UNCLT-1st,, p. 189, para. 41. See, in this respect, also the comment on Part III of the 1964 Draft 
submitted by the Yugoslavian government (see YBILC 1966-II, p. 361).   
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A similar approach was taken by the Republic of Vietnam,810 which proposed dropping 
the reference to Article 28 in paragraph 3 and to replace the words “a meaning which as 
far as possible reconciles the texts” with the words “the meaning which comes closest to 
the object and purpose of the treaty” in the same paragraph. In this respect, the 
Vietnamese representative pointed out that it was the object and purpose of the treaty 
which could serve as a basis for a compromise, since they were “essential reference 
elements which could be of great help in overcoming difficulties of interpretation where 
a treaty itself provided no precise solution”.811 
 
Australia suggested some amendments to the new paragraph 4 proposed by the United 
States.812 First, it recommended reintroducing the reference to Article 28 for the purpose 
of removing the apparent difference of meaning.  
Second, it proposed dropping the word “most” before the expression “consonant 
with the object and purpose of the treaty”.  
Third and most important, Australia suggested adding the words “and which best 
reconciles the versions” at the end of that paragraph. The Australian representative 
explained that, although Australia shared the criticism expressed by the United States 
and Vietnam with regard to the current wording of Article 29(3) and also endorsed their 
proposal that the meaning most consonant with the object and purpose of the treaty 
should be adopted in the case of apparent difference of meaning, it was also of the 
opinion that the original idea of making every reasonable effort for the purpose of 
reconciling the various texts should be preserved.813 
 
The opposite view was expressed by the representatives of the USSR, Israel and 
Trinidad and Tobago. The representative of the USSR found that the text proposed by 
the ILC was more satisfactory than the ones proposed by the United States, Australia and 
the Republic of Vietnam;814 the representative of Israel doubted whether the object and 
purpose of the treaty could be of any help in cases where the various authentic texts were 
still non-reconcilable after the application of the general rule of interpretation enshrined 
in Article 27 of the draft;815 similarly, the representative of Trinidad and Tobago argued 
that the interpretation of a treaty by recourse to its object and purpose was already 
covered by Article 29 by means of the reference to Articles 27 and 28 contained 
therein.816  
 
From the discussion in the Committee of the Whole, however, it appears that the 
majority of the representatives supported the amendments suggested by Australia. On the 
basis of that discussion, the Drafting Committee of the Conference (hereafter “Drafting 
                                                     
810 With reference to the proposals put forward by the Republic of Vietnam, see UNCLT-Doc, p. 151. 
811 See UNCLT-1st,, p. 189, para. 45. 
812 With reference to the proposals put forward by the Australia, see UNCLT-Doc, p. 151. 
813 See UNCLT-1st,, p. 189, paras. 52-53. 
814 See UNCLT-1st,, p. 190, para. 64. 
815 See UNCLT-1st,, p. 190, para. 66. 
816 See UNCLT-1st,, p. 190, para. 68. 
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Committee”) started working on an updated version of Article 29.   
 
The Chairman of the Drafting Committee, Mr Yasseen, presented such an updated 
version of Article 29 to the Committee of the Whole at its 74th meeting, held on 16 May 
1968. The new text was as follows:817  
 
 Article 29.  
 Interpretation of treaties in two or more languages 
1. When a treaty has been authenticated in two or more languages, the text is equally 
authoritative in each language, unless the treaty provides or the parties agree that, in case 
of divergence, a particular text shall prevail.  
2. A version of the treaty in a language other than one of those in which the text was 
authenticated shall be considered an authentic text only if the treaty so provides or the 
parties so agree.  
 3. The terms of the treaty are presumed to have the same meaning in each authentic text.  
4. Except in the case mentioned in paragraph 1, when a comparison of the authentic texts 
discloses a difference of meaning which the application of articles 27 and 28 does not 
remove, a meaning which best reconciles the texts, having regard to the object and purpose 
of the treaty, shall be adopted.  
 
Mr Yasseen, in his capacity of Chairman of the Drafting Committee, described to the 
Committee of the Whole the changes made in the text of Article 29 and the reasons 
therefor. He first pointed out that the proposal advanced by the United States to divide 
former paragraph 3 into two paragraphs had been endorsed, since the idea stated in the 
first sentence of that paragraph (the sole sentence of new paragraph 3) was quite 
different from that expressed in the second sentence (constituting the basis of new 
paragraph 4). Such a split determined the need to specify, in new paragraph 4, that the 
texts subject to comparison were “authentic” texts.818 He then explained that the Drafting 
Committee decided to embrace the idea underlying the United States suggestion of 
adopting the meaning closest to the object and purpose of the treaty for the purpose of 
reconciling the different texts.819 In this respect, the position taken by the Drafting 
Committee seemed to be largely influenced by the compromise proposal put forward by 
Australia. The new text proposed by the Drafting Committee was approved without 
formal vote and recommended to the Conference for adoption.820 
 
At the 13th plenary meeting of the second session of the Conference, held on 6 May 
1969, the Chairman of the Drafting Committee, Mr Yasseen, illustrated the text of 
Article 29 to the Conference and pointed out that, as compared to the text approved by 
the Committee of the Whole, two minor changes had been made. First, the word 
“authenticated” had been inserted in the title after the word “treaties” in order to make 
clear that the words “in two or more languages” related to the word “treaties” and not to 
                                                     
817 See UNCLT-1st, p. 442. para. 35. 
818 See UNCLT-1st, pp. 442-443. paras. 36-37. 
819 See UNCLT-1st, p. 443, para. 38. 
820 See UNCLT-1st, p. 443, para. 38. 
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the word “interpretation”.821 Second, the incipit of paragraph 4 was amended to read 
“Except where a particular text prevails in accordance with paragraph 1” in order to 
make clear that the reference to paragraph 1 related to the second part and not to the first 
part.822 The Conference adopted the so amended Article by 101 votes to none.823 Article 
29 was renumbered as Article 33 in the final arrangements of the Vienna Convention. 
The final text reads as follows: 
 
 Article 33.  
 Interpretation of treaties authenticated in two or more languages 
1. When a treaty has been authenticated in two or more languages, the text is equally 
authoritative in each language, unless the treaty provides or the parties agree that, in case 
of divergence, a particular text shall prevail.  
2. A version of the treaty in a language other than one of those in which the text was 
authenticated shall be considered an authentic text only if the treaty so provides or the 
parties so agree.  
 3. The terms of the treaty are presumed to have the same meaning in each authentic text.  
4. Except where a particular text prevails in accordance with paragraph 1, when a 
comparison of the authentic texts discloses a difference of meaning which the application 
of articles 31 and 32 does not remove, the824 meaning which best reconciles the texts, 
having regard to the object and purpose of the treaty, shall be adopted.  
 
3. The construction of multilingual treaties under the rules of interpretation 
enshrined in Article 33 VCLT and the fundamental principles of 
interpretation established by the author in Part I 
3.1. Introduction  
 
Article 33 VCLT only provides broad guidelines for solving interpretative issues arising 
in the context of multilingual treaties, in particular those concerning the potential 
discrepancies in meaning among the various authentic texts.825 The ILC considered 
whether to codify additional and more specific rules for the interpretation of multilingual 
treaties, such as the recognition of a legal presumption in favor of the authentic text with 
a clear(er) meaning, or in favor of the authentic text originally drafted in the course of 
the negotiations. The Commission, however, rejected such ideas, since it considered that 
                                                     
821 See UNCLT-2nd, p. 57, para. 61. 
822 See UNCLT-2nd, p. 57, para. 63. 
823 See UNCLT-2nd, p. 59, para. 76. 
824 Note that article “a”, present in the draft version adopted by the Drafting Committee of the Conference, is 
replaced by article “the” in the final version.  
825 In that respect, O’Connell criticized the provisions of the VCLT dealing with treaty interpretation since (i) 
they did not clearly indicate the priority in the application of the rules of interpretation and (ii) the rules 
themselves were in part so general that they made necessary a review of traditional methods of interpretation 
(i.e. non-codified principles and maxims) whenever a treaty is being interpreted. According to O’Connell, 
“[m]ore controversy is likely to be aroused by them than allayed” (see D. P. O’Connell, International Law 
(London: Stevens & Sons, 1970), p. 253). 
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“much might depend on the circumstances of each case and the evidence of the intention 
of the parties”.826  
 
Moreover, the provisions encompassed in Article 33 VCLT are the heterogeneous in 
nature and are ontologically different from those included in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT. 
While the latter, for the most part, are limited to highlight which elements and items of 
evidence are to be taken into account for the purpose of treaty interpretation and to 
illustrate the different weight that the interpreter should typically attribute thereto due to 
their different intrinsic attitudes to convey the final agreement of the parties, the 
provisions of Article 33 VCLT perform different tasks.  
 On the one hand, the provisions of the first two paragraphs of Article 33 VCLT 
establish the rule of legal effectiveness of the treaty language versions; therefore, they 
are not actually concerned with treaty interpretation, but constitute a logical prerequisite 
to such an activity since they provide the rule for determining which texts must be 
interpreted and which (language) versions are to be disregarded.  
 On the other hand, the last two paragraphs of Article 33 VCLT establish two 
proper rules of interpretation,827 which can be entirely inferred neither from Articles 31 
and 32 VCLT, nor from the first two paragraphs of Article 33 VCLT:  
(a) Article 33(3) VCLT establishes that all authentic texts are presumed to have 
the same meaning;  
(b) Article 33(4) VCLT establishes that, unless the treaty provides for a particular 
text to prevail in the case of divergence, the prima facie discrepancies among the 
various authentic texts must be removed by means of the ordinary interpretation 
process and, where that procedure does not succeed, the interpreter must adopt 
the meaning that best reconciles the various authentic texts, having regard to the 
object and purpose of the treaty.  
 
The following sections are aimed at clarifying: 
(i) how those provisions of Article 33 VCLT have been construed by scholars, courts 
and tribunals (positive analysis); 
(ii) whether the rules enshrined in Article 33 VCLT, as resulting from the above 
positive analysis, significantly depart from the normative and semantics-based 
principles of interpretation established by the author in section 2 of Chapter 3 of 
Part I, or, in contrast, whether such rules and principles may be regarded as 
together forming a coherent system. 
 
Such an analysis, however, is not carried out by author in the abstract, but with a view to 
answering the most fundamental questions of this study. Therefore, from a structural 
perspective, the analysis of above points (i) and (ii) is broken down into clusters, which 
                                                     
826 See YBILC 1966-II, p. 226, para. 9. 
827 I.e. rules that are not limited to highlight which elements and items of evidence are to be taken into account 
for the purpose of treaty interpretation and to illustrate the different weight that the interpreter should typically 
attribute to them, but which prescribe, under certain conditions, the meaning that must be attributed to the 
authentic treaty texts. 
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are dealt with in relation to the single questions to which they are relevant. 
As already mentioned in the Introduction, the research questions that are 
discussed in this chapter are the following: 
 
a) Must all authentic texts be given the same status for the purpose of interpreting 
multilingual treaties? 
 
b) What is the relevance of non-authentic texts for the purpose of construing 
(multilingual) treaties? 
 
c) Is there an obligation to perform a comparison of the different authentic texts 
anytime a multilingual treaty is interpreted (i.e. independently of the awareness 
of the existence of an error, or of a potential divergence of meanings, as well as 
from the perceived clarity of the authentic text analysed)? 
 
d) If the previous question is answered in the negative, when does an obligation to 
compare the different authentic texts arise? 
 
e) How should the interpreter solve the prima facie discrepancies among the 
various authentic texts emerging from the comparison? 
 
f) What should the interpreter do where the prima facie discrepancies could not be 
removed by means of (ordinary) interpretation? 
 
g) Where the treaty provides that a certain authentic text is to prevail in the case of 
divergences: 
i. At which point in the interpretative process there must be recourse to 
such a prevailing text? 
ii. What if the prevailing text is ambiguous or obscure? 
iii. What about the contrast between the prevailing text and the other 
authentic texts, if the latter are coherent among themselves?828 
 
h) What is the impact on the answers to be given to the previous questions of the 
fact that legal jargon terms are employed in the treaty texts?  
 
Questions a) and b) are mainly dealt with in subsection 3.2.829  
Questions c) and d) are dealt with in subsection 3.3. 
Question e) is dealt with in subsection 3.4. 
                                                     
828 This is an issue that arises more frequently with reference to multilateral treaties (see M. Tabory, 
Multilingualism In International Law and Institutions (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1980), p. 
219, note 7 to Chapter 4). 
829 To a certain extent, the relevance of some authentic texts (e.g. the text that is to prevail in cases of 
divergences of meaning) for the purpose of the interpretation of multilingual treaties is also analysed in other 
subsections. 
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Question f) is dealt with in subsection 3.5. 
Questions g-i) through g-iii) are dealt with in subsection 3.6. 
 
Question h) is separately dealt with in section 4 of this chapter. 
 
3.2. Status of the various authentic texts and relevance of non-authentic versions  
 
“The affairs of sovereign States cannot, and should not, be influenced by the fortuitous 
choice of words selected by a nameless translator”830  
 
3.2.1. Research questions addressed in this section  
 
The present section is aimed at tackling the following two research questions, here 
briefly illustrated by means of examples. 
 
a) Must all authentic texts be given the same status for the purpose of interpreting 
multilingual treaties? 
 
Consider Article 41 of the ICJ Statute, which in its English and French authentic texts 
reads as follows (italics by the author): 
 
1. The Court shall have the power to indicate, if it considers that circumstances so require, any provisional 
measures which ought to be taken to preserve the respective rights of either party. 
2. Pending the final decision, notice of the measures suggested shall forthwith be given to the parties and to the 
Security Council. 
--- 
1. La Cour a le pouvoir d'indiquer, si elle estime que les circonstances l'exigent, quelles mesures conservatoires 
du droit de chacun doivent être prises à titre provisoire. 
2. En attendant l'arrêt définitif, l'indication de ces mesures est immédiatement notifiée aux parties et au Conseil 
de sécurité. 
 
Assume that the question to be answered by the interpreter is whether the provisional 
measures indicated by the ICJ pursuant to Article 41 of its Statute must be considered (or 
not) to be binding orders. The French expression “doivent être prises” appears 
imperative in character. However, the English text, in particular the use of “indicate” 
instead of “order”, of “ought” instead of “must” or “shall”, and of “suggested” instead of 
“ordered”, seems to suggest that the ICJ’s decisions under Article 41 of its Statute lack 
mandatory effect.  
 In this case, may (or should) the interpreter rely exclusively or predominantly on 
one of these two authentic texts for the purpose of construing Article 41 of the ICJ 
Statute and, therefore, answering the above question? If so, on the basis of which 
                                                     
830 See Arbitral Tribunal for the Agreement on German External Debts, 16 May 1980, The Kingdom of Belgium 
et al. v. the Federal Republic of Germany (Young Loan), 59 International Law Reports (1980), 494 et seq, 
dissenting opinion of Messrs. Robinson, Bathurst and Monguilan, at 584-585, para. 40. 
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arguments might he justify his choice in that respect? 
 More specifically, supposing the interpreter knows that the ICJ Statute was 
originally drafted in French and that the English text is a subsequent translation based on 
the former, might (or should) he decide that the provisional measures indicated by ICJ 
under Article 41 are binding (also) on the basis of the drafting history of that article, 
which may support the conclusion that the French text should be given more 
interpretative weight?831 
 
Subsections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 deal with research question a). 
 
b) What is the relevance of non-authentic texts for the purpose of construing 
(multilingual) treaties? 
 
Consider a bilateral treaty authenticated only in French, which uses the expression 
“propriété ou contrôle public”, for instance in the following provision of a bilateral 
treaty: 
 
L’administration aura pleins pouvoirs pour décider quant à la propriété ou contrôle public de toutes les 
ressources naturelles du pays, ou des travaux et services d'utilité publique déjà établis ou à  établir.832 
 
In that context, the French expression “propriété ou contrôle public” is ambiguous, since 
it may be regarded as limited to the various methods whereby the public administration 
might take over (or dictate the policy of) undertakings not publicly owned, or as 
including also every form of supervision that the administration might exercise either on 
the development of the natural resources of the country or over public works, services 
and utilities. Assume in that respect that, in French, the latter construction appears to 
flow more naturally from the text.  
 Imagine that a non-official version of the treaty exists, which has been drafted by 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of one of the contracting States as an official translation 
in its own official language, say English. In such a translation, the expression “public 
ownership or control” is used, which appears to point towards the former of the above-
mentioned possible constructions. 
 Might or should the interpreter take into account such a translation for the 
purpose of determining the meaning of the authentic treaty text and rely thereon in order 
to support his construction? Is it in that respect relevant for him to know that the 
translation has been drafted by the very same negotiators of the treaty, or, on the 
contrary, by the translation bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs? Should the 
interpreter change his perspective if the other contracting State had also translated the 
treaty in its own official language and that official translation points towards the same 
meaning of the English non-official version?    
                                                     
831 The example is derived from ICJ, 27 June 2001, LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), 
judgment. 
832 The example is derived (with significant deviations) from PCIJ, 30 August 1924, The Mavrommatis 
Palestine Concessions (Greece v. Britain), judgment. 




Subsection 3.2.4. deals with research question b). 
 
 
3.2.2. The possible classifications of the authentic texts of a multilingual treaties 
 
Authentic texts may be divided and classified according to three main criteria. In 
particular, authentic texts may be classified according to the following dichotomies:833 
(i) working language v. official language texts; (ii) drafted v. translated texts; (iii) 
authentic texts produced at the time of signature v. authentic texts produced thereafter.  
 
In the first dichotomy, “working language” and official language” are technical terms 
generally used in the charters of international organizations and in multilateral 
conferences.834 Thus, this subdivision does not appear particularly relevant for the 
purpose of the present study, which concerns bilateral tax treaties. 
 
Under the second dichotomy, the expression “drafted texts” indicates those texts 
discussed during the negotiations and eventually drafted as result thereof.835  
In this context, “translated texts” are all the authentic texts other than the drafted 
one(s), i.e. those authentic texts drafted after the conclusion of the negotiating process 
(generally after the initialling of the drafted texts). Translated texts may be broadly 
divided into three main categories: (a) authentic texts translated and verified by the 
States’ representatives involved in the negotiating process;836 (b) authentic texts 
translated and verified by people having both linguistic and technical-juridical skills, but 
not involved in the negotiating process; (c) authentic texts translated and verified by 
people having just linguistic skills and not involved in the negotiating process.  
Due to the multilateral scope of treaties, it appears possible that the very same 
authentic text falls within different categories depending on which contracting State’s 
conduct is being analysed. Consider the following instance. State A’s and State B’s 
                                                     
833 These subdivisions originate from those proposed by Tabory (see M. Tabory, Multilingualism In 
International Law and Institutions (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1980) p. 193), but then 
significantly depart from the latter. 
834 With reference to the distinction between “working” and “official” languages, as well as with regard to the 
relevance of such a distinction for interpretative purposes, see M. Tabory, Multilingualism In International 
Law and Institutions (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1980), p. 193. In her work, the author 
recalled the position expressed on such an issue by Pollux who, with reference to the authentic texts of the 
United Nations Charter, concluded that, although the Charter had (then) five authentic texts, “English and 
French being the working languages, the versions in these languages carry more weight than the remaining 
three” for the purpose of interpretation (see M. Tabory, Multilingualism In International Law and Institutions 
(Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1980), p. 193; Pollux, “The interpretation of the Charter”, 23 
British Yearbook of International Law (1946), 54 et seq., at 79). 
835 See M. Tabory, Multilingualism In International Law and Institutions (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & 
Noordhoff, 1980), pp. 193-194.  
836 I.e. by people aware of the intentions of the parties, as expressed in the course of the negotiations. In this 
respect, where all contracting States put in place such process of translation and verification, it appears difficult 
to distinguish translated texts from drafted texts for interpretative purposes. 
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representatives negotiate a bilateral treaty in language X and, at the end of the 
negotiation, draft and initial a text in such a language, which later will become an 
authentic text of the treaty. State A’s representatives, who participated to the 
negotiations, prepare a translated text in language Y, which is then verified by a 
professional translator, lacking of the relevant technical-juridical knowledge in the 
specific field of the initialed treaty, on behalf of State B. This translated text will then 
become an authentic text. The translated text could be classified in subgroup (a), with 
regard to the process carried out on behalf of State A, and in subgroup (c), with regard to 
the process carried out on behalf of State B. Such an ineludible consequence of the 
multilateral nature of treaties partially blurs the above classification and makes an 
accurate application thereof all the more necessary.  
Notwithstanding the above, the dichotomy between drafted and translated texts is 
of great importance for interpretative purposes since the drafted texts, as well as the 
translated texts that may be classified in subgroup (a), directly reflect the intention of the 
parties and thus, together with the travaux préparatoires, may play a decisive role in 
determining the utterance meaning of the treaty provisions.837  
 
The third dichotomy concerns authentic texts that are produced after the signing of the 
treaty. In this respect there are two main scenarios where such an instance may occur: (a) 
where the treaty itself provides for this possibility; (b) where there is a new party to the 
treaty, whose official language(s) is given the status of authentic language for the 
purpose of that treaty. 
According to Tabory, the authentic texts produced after the signing of the treaty 
are generally of a lesser interpretative value, since they could introduce and perpetuate 
possible “incorrect” meanings.838   
In any case, this dichotomy does not appear useful for the purpose of the present 
study, since the authentic texts of bilateral tax treaties are generally all signed at the 
same time and their bilateral nature excludes the need to integrate the original authentic 




3.2.3. The status of the various authentic texts for the purpose of construing 
                                                     
837 See, substantially in accordance, M. Tabory, Multilingualism In International Law and Institutions (Alphen 
aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1980), p. 194. 
838 See M. Tabory, Multilingualism In International Law and Institutions (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & 
Noordhoff, 1980), pp. 194-195, who gives as examples the addition of English as authentic language of the 
EEC Treaty and the addition of the French and Spanish authentic texts to the original English text of the 
Convention on International Civil Aviation Organization, concluded in Chicago on 7 December 1944.  
839 It may certainly be the case that, in the event of the creation of a new recognized State, the latter inherits the 
subjective legal positions of the State of which it was previously part, among which the quality of party to a 
bilateral tax treaty (see, for, instance, the cases concerning the tax treaty network of former USSR), and that it 
is willing to add an authentic text in its new official language to such a treaty. However, such a hypothesis 
appears remote enough not to call for an in-depth analysis of the third dichotomy in the course of the present 
study.   
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multilingual treaties  
3.2.3.1. The narrow interpretation of Article 33(1) VCLT in the majority opinion 
delivered in the Young Loan arbitration 
 
With regard to the second dichotomy, which appears the only relevant for the present 
study, a first reading of Article 33(1) VCLT would seem to exclude the possibility of 
attributing more importance to some authentic texts, as compared to others, in order to 
interpret a multilingual treaty.840  
 
This construction of Article 33 VCLT was upheld in the majority opinion delivered by 
the Arbitral Tribunal for the Agreement on German External Debts in the Young Loan 
arbitration.841 The case concerned the interpretation of Article 2(e) of Annex 1 of the 
London Agreement on German External Debts842 (hereafter “LDA”), according to 
which: 
 
(e) The amounts due in respect of the various issues of the 51/2 percent International Loan 
1930 [ed.’s note: the Young Loan] are payable only in the currency of the country in which 
the issue was made. In view of the present economic and financial position in Germany, it 
is agreed that the basis for calculating the amount of currency so payable shall be the 
amount in US dollars to which the payment due in the currency of the country in which the 
issue was made would have been equivalent at the rates of exchange ruling when the Loan 
was issued. The nominal amount in US dollars so arrived at will then be reconverted into 
the respective currencies at the rate of exchange current on 1 August 1952. 
 
Should the rates of exchange ruling any of the currencies of issue on 1 August 1952 alter 
thereafter by 5 per cent or more, the instalments due after that date, while still being made 
in the currency of the country of issue, shall be calculated on the basis of the least 
depreciated currency (in relation to the rate of exchange current on 1 August 1952) 
reconverted into the currency of issue at the rate of exchange current when the payment in 
question becomes due. 
 
The issue at stake mainly concerned the interpretation of the second part of Article 2(e), 
which in the authentic German and French texts read as follows:843 
 
Sollte sich der am 1. August 1952 für eine der Emissionswährungen maßgebende 
Wechselkurs später um 5.v.H. oder mehr ändern, so sind die nach diesem Zeitpunkt 
fälligen Raten zwar nach wie vor in der Währung des Emissionslandes zu leisten; sie sind 
jedoch auf der Grundlage der Währung mit der geringsten Abwertung (im Verhältnis zu 
                                                     
840 Unless a specific provision to this effect exists in the relevant treaty. 
841 Arbitral Tribunal for the Agreement on German External Debts, 16 May 1980, The Kingdom of Belgium et 
al. v. the Federal Republic of Germany (Young Loan), 59 International Law Reports (1980), 494 et seq.  
842 Agreement concluded in London on 27 February 1953 and entered into force on 16 September 1953.  
843 For a comparison of the three authentic texts, see Arbitral Tribunal for the Agreement on German External 
Debts, 16 May 1980, The Kingdom of Belgium et al. v. the Federal Republic of Germany (Young Loan), 59 
International Law Reports (1980), 494 et seq., at 514. 
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dem Wechselkurs vom 1. August 1952) zu berechnen und zu dem im Zeitpunkt der 
Fälligkeit der betreffenden Zahlung maßgebenden Wechselkurs wie der in die 
Emissionswährung umzurechnen.  
 
Au cas où les taux de change en vigueur le 1er août 1952 entre deux ou plusieurs monnaies 
d'émission subiraient par la suite une modification égale ou supérieure à 5 %, les 
versements exigibles après cette date, tout en continuant à être effectués dans la monnaie 
du pays d'émission, seront calculés sur la base de la devise la moins dépréciée par rapport 
au taux de change en vigueur au 1er août 1952, puis reconvertis dans la monnaie 
d'émission sur la base du taux de change en vigueur lors de l'échéance du paiement. 
 
Article 2(e) of Annex 1 provided protection against currency fluctuation for the benefit 
of the creditors of the German external debts regulated in the LDA. In particular, the 
second part thereof required the installment payments to be made in the currency of the 
country of issue, but for a value recomputed on the basis of the least depreciated 
currency in relation to the original rate of exchange (fixed on 1 August 1952).  
The issue arose in the context of a system of fixed currency exchange rates (the 
Bretton Woods system) and in relation to the conversion bonds issued by Germany, 
under the provisions of section A of Annex 1 of the LDA (which included Article 2(e) of 
Annex 1), for the settlement of the obligations towards the holders of the Young Loan 
bonds. The clause enshrined in the second part of Article 2(e) of Annex 1 of the LDA 
was thus applicable to the new conversion bonds. In 1961 and 1969, the German mark 
was revaluated, but Germany refused to make installment payments on the basis of the 
new par value; according to Germany, no currency depreciation (but merely a 
revaluation) had occurred and, therefore, the provision of Article 2(e) was not applicable 
in the specific case.844 Some of the other States party to the LDA did not agree with the 
interpretation of the relevant clause put forward by Germany and, considering Article 
2(e) applicable also in the case of currency revaluation, tried to achieve an agreement; 
after negotiations had proved fruitless, they referred the matter to the Arbitral Tribunal 
established under the provision of the LDA.  
 
As the Tribunal pointed out, the decision in the Young Loan arbitration depended on the 
meaning attributed to the expressions “Währung mit der geringsten Abwertung“, “devise 
la moins dépréciée” and “least depreciated currency” used in Article 2(e) of Annex 1 of 
the LDA and, in particular, on whether these expressions referred only to “devaluation” 
in the strict sense, i.e. to cases where the par value of the currency concerned had been 
reduced as a result of governmental action, or also to cases where the currency in 
question was "depreciated" in relation to another currency of issue owing to the 
revaluation of the latter.845  
                                                     
844 See Germany’s argument in the Young Loan arbitration (Arbitral Tribunal for the Agreement on German 
External Debts, 16 May 1980, The Kingdom of Belgium et al. v. the Federal Republic of Germany (Young 
Loan), 59 International Law Reports (1980), 494 et seq., at 522-523). 
845 See Arbitral Tribunal for the Agreement on German External Debts, 16 May 1980, The Kingdom of Belgium 
et al. v. the Federal Republic of Germany (Young Loan), 59 International Law Reports (1980), 494 et seq., at 
528-529, para. 15. 
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 The arbiters, in the majority opinion, stated that it might be directly inferred from 
Article 33(1) VCLT in conjunction with the final clause of the LDA, according to which 
the three texts of the treaty (German, French and English) were all equally authoritative, 
that the English authentic text carried no special interpretative weight merely because the 
treaty was largely and undisputedly drafted in that language and discussed in English by 
the relevant committees on the basis of the English text.846 In this respect, the Tribunal 
found that the habit occasionally found in earlier international practice of referring to the 
drafted text as an aid to interpretation was, as a general rule, incompatible with the 
principle of the equal status of all authentic texts incorporated in Article 33(1) VCLT. 
According to the majority of the Arbitral Tribunal, attributing special importance or 
precedence to the drafted text would relegate the other authentic texts to the status of 
subordinated translations, thus conflicting with the provisions of the VCLT.847  
 
3.2.3.2. The possible alternative interpretation of Article 33(1) VCLT: scholarly 
writings  
 
However, it would seem illogical, unreasonable and unfair848 not to attribute due weight, 
as part of the overall context, to the fact that the parties originally discussed and agreed 
upon one (or more) drafted text(s) and that the other authentic texts were translations of 
these texts.849 In this perspective, the drafted text would be relevant (i) as a proxy of the 
travaux préparatoires, where the latter were not fully available, and (ii) in order to 
corroborate the evidence emerging from other means of interpretation.850 Thus, the 
drafted text (as such) should be thrown in the crucible and used, according to Articles 
31-33 VCLT, in order to resolve prima facie divergences of meaning among the various 
authentic texts and, according to Articles 31 and 32 VCLT, in order to determine the 
meaning to be reasonably attributed to the relevant treaty terms, as well as the object and 
                                                     
846 See Arbitral Tribunal for the Agreement on German External Debts, 16 May 1980, The Kingdom of Belgium 
et al. v. the Federal Republic of Germany (Young Loan), 59 International Law Reports (1980), 494 et seq., at 
529, para. 17. 
847 See Arbitral Tribunal for the Agreement on German External Debts, 16 May 1980, The Kingdom of Belgium 
et al. v. the Federal Republic of Germany (Young Loan), 59 International Law Reports (1980), 494 et seq., at 
529, para. 17, where the Tribunal made also reference to M. Hilf, Die Auslegung mehrsprachiger Verträge. 
Eine Untersuchung zum Völkerrecht und zum Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Berlin: Springer-
Verlag, 1973), pp. 78 et seq. 
848 I.e. contrary to an interpretation in good faith of the treaty. 
849 According to Rosenne there is “all the difference in the world between a negotiated version and one 
produced mechanically by some translation service, however competent” (see S. Rosenne, “On Multilingual 
Interpretation”, in S. Rosenne, Essays on International Law and Practice (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff  Publisher, 
2007), 449 et seq., at 450. On the different issue of the problems arising from the use of just one or few 
languages in the course of the negotiations and, in particular, that undisclosed differences in the semantics of 
the mother-tongue languages of the negotiators may conceal misunderstandings in respect of the treaty, see R. 
Cohen, “Meaning, Interpretation and International Negotiation”, 14 Global Society (2000), 317 et seq.   
850 On the relevance of the history of multilingual treaties in order to establish the actual interrelationship 
among the various authentic texts and, thus, better understand the common intention of the parties, see S. 
Rosenne, “On Multilingual Interpretation”, in S. Rosenne, Essays on International Law and Practice (Leiden: 
Martinus Nijhoff  Publisher, 2007), 449 et seq., at 451-452. 
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purpose of the treaty or of a clause thereof.851 
 
In this respect, it is interesting to note what Tabory, quoting Rosenne, concluded with 
regard to the availability of the evidence of the common intention of the parties to a 
multilingual treaty. According to the author, “[t]he basic reason for the absence of a 
reference to the intention of the parties from the formulation in the Vienna Convention, 
although it may be included in or implied from the object and purpose of the treaty, may 
be attributed at least in part to the effect of multilingualism on the process of 
interpretation. As pointed out earlier by Rosenne, the intention of the parties, which may 
perhaps be ascertain for bilateral, or bilingual multilateral treaties, is very difficult to 
find out in the case of plurilingual multilateral treaties, because in the latter instance, 
‘some of the texts designated ‘authentic’ are in fact not the fruit of negotiation, but the 
product of a technical service supplied by an international secretariat operating virtually 
independently of the contracting parties.’ ”852   
The author submits that, in many instances, also some of the authentic texts of 
bilateral treaties (such as tax treaties)853 “are in fact not the fruit of negotiation”, but 
mere translations prepared (at best) without full involvement of both contracting States’ 
negotiators. In such cases, it is the author’s opinion that the intention of the parties, 
including the object and purpose of the treaty, should be derived primarily from the 
drafted texts and the supplementary means of interpretation, in particular the travaux 
préparatoires, where available.  
 
Scholars have admitted this recourse to the drafted texts for interpretative purposes, also 
on the basis of the relevant practice of courts and tribunals.  
In 1935, the Harvard Research in International Law recognized that, although 
generally all authentic texts are authoritative, “where a treaty has been drafted in one 
language and later translated into several versions of equal authority Courts have shown 
a tendency to resort to the ‘basic’ language when confronted with a divergence.”854 
According to McNair, “tribunals dealing with a treaty written in two or more 
languages of equal authority will sometimes seek to ascertain the ‘basic language’, that 
is, the working language in which the treaty was negotiated and drafted and regard that 
                                                     
851 On the different issue of the weight that should be attributed to the various working language versions of a 
UN Resolution, see M. Tabory, Multilingualism In International Law and Institutions (Alphen aan den Rijn: 
Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1980), p. 212. 
852 See M. Tabory, Multilingualism In International Law and Institutions (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & 
Noordhoff, 1980), p. 215 (emphasis added); the inner quotation is from S. Rosenne, “United Nations treaty 
practice”, 86 RCADI (1954), 275 et seq., at 384. See also M. Tabory, Multilingualism In International Law and 
Institutions (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1980), p. 191. 
853 See, for instance with reference to the Italian tax treaty practice, A. Parolini, “Italy”, in G. Maisto (ed.), 
Multilingual Texts and Interpretation of Tax Treaties and EC Tax Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2005), 
245 et seq., at 246, according to whom “[u]sually, the treaty text that is initialed by the treaty negotiators is 
drafted exclusively in the language that has been used in the course of the negotiation”, the other authentic 
texts being just later translation thereof. 
854 Research in International Law, “Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties with Comments”, 29 American 
Journal of International Law - Supplement (1935), 653 et seq., at 972. 
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as the more important.”855 
Similarly, Hardy noted that “[if] the texts prove incompatible […] [a] choice must 
then be made between incompatible texts; and it is only normal that the presumption 
should be in favour of the original version, because that was the basis on which the 
negotiators in fact first reached agreement and the authoritative value of the other texts is 
subordinated to their equivalence to the original. The strength of the presumption in 
favour of the original version depends on the circumstances in which the other versions 
were drawn up. It will be weak if the negotiators all participated directly in the 
elaboration of those texts; stronger if they only exercised partial control over it, as, for 
example, by entrusting the task to a small drafting committee; and decisive if they left 
the entire job of drawing up those texts to one of the parties or to some specified body. 
[…] [The judge] may concurrently resort, as did Umpire Ralston in the Guastini case, 
both to the conciliation method [ed.’s note: of the authentic texts] and to the method of 
referring to the original text”.856 
 
Such recourse to the drafted texts was upheld even after the conclusion of the VCLT.  
Germer, for example, although asserting that the drafted text could not play, as 
such and per se, a decisive role in solving divergences between authentic texts, since 
there would be a clear violation of the principle established by Article 33(1) VCLT if the 
interpreter considered the drafted text to be superior to the other authentic texts, 
recognized that an “examination of the preparatory work of a treaty and the 
circumstances of its conclusion857 may, however, display the causes of a divergence 
between the different language versions and thus help to establish the meaning intended 
by the parties to be attached to the provision in question.”858  
Likewise, according to Hilf, where only one authentic text has been negotiated 
while the drafting of the other authentic texts have been left to the single parties or to 
specific groups of translators, if the other rules of interpretation fail to remove the 
apparent difference of meaning, the drafted text as such might be considered and play a 
relevant role for interpretative purposes.859 
Shelton expressed substantially the same opinion by stating that, where there is 
no common meaning between the various authentic texts and the treaty negotiations are 
conducted in only some languages, greater recourse should be had to the drafted text(s) 
to reconcile differences between authentic texts. To that extent, Article 33(4) VCLT does 
                                                     
855 See A. D. McNair, The Law of Treaties (Oxford; The Clarendon Press,1961), p. 434 and the case law cited 
in footnote 2 therein. 
856 See J. Hardy, “The Interpretation of Plurilingual Treaties by International Courts and Tribunals”, 37 British 
Yearbook of International Law (1961), 72 et seq., at 105-106 and note 1 at 106. Similarly, with reference to the 
interpretation of uniform law conventions, see A. Malintoppi, “Mesures tendant à prévenir les divergences 
dans l'interprétation des règles de droit uniforme”, L’Unification de Droit. Annuaire (1959), 249 et seq., at 266.  
857 As previously stated, the drafted text is to be considered, as such, part of the supplementary means of 
interpretation and strictly interconnected with the travaux préparatoires.   
858 See P. Germer, “Interpretation of Plurilingual Treaties: A Study of Article 33 of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties”, 11 Harvard International Law Journal (1970), 400 et seq., at 418. 
859 See M. Hilf, Die Auslegung mehrsprachiger Verträge. Eine Untersuchung zum Völkerrecht und zum 
Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1973), pp. 93-94. 
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not exclude recourse to the history of the negotiations, as a supplementary means of 
interpretation, in order to find out in which languages the negotiation has been carried on 
and the final agreement reached. Thus, where the equality of authentic texts is 
proclaimed, but the result of a comparison of them reveals an absurd or irreconcilable 
difference, it is only normal that the drafted text is favored, as it constitutes the basis on 
which the negotiators in fact first reached agreement.860 
Engelen affirmed that the VCLT does not altogether exclude the possibility of 
giving preference to the drafted text, but merely rejects it as an automatic solution for the 
case in which two or more authentic texts could not be reconciled.861 
Sinclair recognized that some weight should be given to the drafted text where it 
is apparent from the travaux préparatoires that the other authentic texts are mere 
translations and warned that automatic and unthinking reliance on the principle of equal 
authenticity of the texts could lead to a failure to give effect to the common intentions of 
the parties in such a case. He concluded that the common intentions of the parties are 
reflected in the drafted text and, therefore, there should be a presumption in favor of 
such text, the strength of the presumption depending upon the circumstances in which 
the various authentic texts were drawn up.862  
According to Aust, not every authentic text carries the same weight for treaty 
interpretation purposes, since if “the treaty was negotiated and drafted in only one of the 
authentic languages, it is natural to put more reliance on that text”.863 
Finally, according to Haraszti, an authentic text that was not discussed during the 
debate and was subsequently produced as a translation could hardly be consulted to shed 
light on the true intention of the parties.864 
 
3.2.3.3. The possible alternative interpretation of Article 33(1) VCLT: the travaux 
préparatoires of the VCLT  
 
The travaux préparatoires of the VCLT appear to support the above use of the drafted 
texts for interpretative purposes.  
 
As previously mentioned, in the course of the ILC’s 874th meeting, held on 21 June 
                                                     
860 See D. Shelton, “Reconcilable Differences? The Interpretation of Multilingual Treaties”, 20 Hastings 
International and Comparative Law Review (2007), 611 et seq., at 634-636. 
861 See F. Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 
2004), pp. 399-400. See also T. Bender and F. Engelen, “The final clause of the 1987 Netherlands Model Tax 
Convention and the interpretation of plurilingual tax treaties”, in H. van Arendonk, F. Engelen and S. Jansen 
(eds.), A Tax Globalist. Essays in honour of Maarten J. Ellis (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2005), 12 et 
seq., at 25-26. 
862 See I. Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1984), p. 152.  
863 See A. Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), at 254. 
864 See G. Haraszti, Some fundamental problems of the law of treaties (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1973), pp. 
182 et seq. (in particular p. 184), where the author discussed the relevance of the Chinese authentic text for the 
purpose of interpreting the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (concluded in Vienna on 24 April 1963). 
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1966, Mr Verdross stated that, although he generally agreed with the content and 
structure of Article 72 of the Sixth Report on the Law of Treaties prepared by Sir 
Humphrey Waldock, which dealt with the interpretation of multilingual treaties, he 
thought it was desirable to add a final provision according to which, where it was 
impossible to find a meaning which reconciled the authentic texts, the language to be 
considered should be that in which the treaty had been drawn up.865  
 
With reference to such a comment, Mr Ago affirmed that the issue concerning the 
weight to be attributed to the language in which the treaty had been drawn up in cases of 
irreconcilable texts could be solved by referring to the travaux préparatoires and the 
circumstances of the conclusion of the treaty, as explicitly allowed by Article 70. This 
would have led to the discovery that the treaty had been originally drawn up in a certain 
language and such an element should have been taken in due account for interpretation 
purposes. In addition, according to Mr Ago, the solution adopted in the article included 
in the Sixth Report on the Law of Treaties was not overly rigid, as it would have been a 
system attributing a “premium” to the original language version, independently from the 
reasons why the that specific language had been chosen for such a purpose.866  
 
The Special Rapporteur, in turn, recalled that the matter had already been the subject of 
debate during the ILC’s sixteenth session in 1964 and that, at that time, the Commission 
had reached the conclusion that it was not acceptable to go any further. He believed that 
such a decision was correct. He found that it was impossible to say in advance that the 
text in which the treaty had been drafted should necessarily prevail in the case of 
divergence, for the defects of that text might be the source of the difficulty. Thus, 
although he appreciated the point raised by Mr Verdross, he preferred to maintain the 
current solution, according to which, where no reconciliation of the texts was possible 
and the recourse to the travaux préparatoires and the circumstances of the conclusion of 
the treaty did not remove the uncertainty, the interpreter was free to decide the meaning 
to be attributed to a certain provision in light of all the circumstances.867  
 
Ultimately, Mr Verdross’s proposal of inserting a special provision giving precedence 
over the drafted text in the case of irreconcilable differences among the authentic texts 
was rejected.   
 
It seems to the author that the part of the VCLT travaux préparatoires just recalled 
clearly shows, on the one hand, that the ILC agreed on the point that an automatic 
mechanism giving precedence to the drafted text in the case of irreconcilable differences 
                                                     
865 See YBILC 1966-I (part II), p. 208, para. 5. Also Mr Rosenne seemed to attach particular relevance to the 
language in which the treaty had been originally drawn up. See, in that respect, his statement that, for the 
purpose of treaty interpretation, it was essential to refer to the comparison of authentic texts, or at least of those 
texts in which the treaty had been drawn up by the parties at the negotiating stage (YBILC 1966-I (part II), p. 
209, para. 8). 
866 See YBILC 1966-I (part II), p. 210, para. 22.  
867 See YBILC 1966-I (part II), pp. 210-211, paras. 33-34. 
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among authentic texts was undesirable and, on the other hand, that it was generally 
recognized within the Commission that:  
(i) the fact that the treaty negotiation had been carried on in a certain language 
and the final agreement had been reached on a text drafted in that language had an 
undeniable weight for interpretative purposes and  
(ii) such a fact should be accordingly taken into account in the interpretative 
process as part of the supplementary means of interpretation and balanced with 
the other elements and items of evidence in order to find out the utterance 
meaning to be attributed to the treaty provision at stake.  
 
3.2.3.4. The possible alternative interpretation of Article 33(1) VCLT: case law  
 
The case law of international courts and tribunals, as well as that of national courts 
dealing with the interpretation of treaties, shows many instances of the above-mentioned 
use of the drafted texts, even within the framework of Articles 31-33 VCLT. 
 
In the Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions case,868 the PCIJ was confronted with the 
apparent difference of meaning between the authentic English and French texts of 
Article 11 of the British Mandate for Palestine,869 according to which the Administration 
of Palestine  
 
“shall have full power to provide for public ownership or control of any of the natural resources of the 
country or of the public works, services and utilities established or to be established therein” 
 
“aura pleins pouvoirs pour décider quant à la propriété ou contrôle public de toutes les ressources 
naturelles du pays, ou des travaux et services d'utilité  publique déjà établis ou à  établir”. 
 
The Court found that the French expression “propriété ou contrôle public” had a wider 
bearing than the correspondent English expression “public ownership or control”, since 
the former included every form of supervision that the Administration might exercise 
either on the development of the natural resources of the country or over public works, 
services and utilities, while in the latter the reference to “control” appeared limited to the 
various methods whereby the public administration might take over, or dictate the policy 
of, undertakings not publicly owned.870  
In adopting the more limited interpretation resulting from the English text, which 
could harmonize both authentic texts and which resulted in accordance with the common 
intention of the parties, the PCIJ affirmed that such a conclusion was indicated with 
special force because the question concerned an instrument laying down the obligations 
of Great Britain in her capacity of Mandatory for Palestine and “because the original 
                                                     
868 PCIJ, 30 August 1924, The Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. Britain), judgment. 
869 Mandate conferred by the League of Nation on Great Britain on 24 July 1924.   
870 See PCIJ, 30 August 1924, The Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. Britain), judgment, pp. 18-
19. 
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draft of this instrument was probably made in English”.871 
 
In the Guastini case,872 the Umpire of the Italian-Venezuelan Mixed Claims 
Commission,873 in dealing with the possible different meanings attributable to the terms 
“injury” and “danni”, used in the English and Italian authentic texts of the Protocol of 13 
February 1903,874 stated that (i) the text of the protocol was the result of long 
negotiations between the representatives of England, Germany, and Italy, on the one 
hand, and Mr Bowen, the Venezuela's representative, on the other; (ii) such negotiations 
were carried on almost altogether in English and the draft texts (afterwards becoming 
protocols) were in English; (iii) it was therefore evident that the basic language was 
English and in the case of differences of translation resort should be had to it.875 
 
The Strasburg Civil Tribunal, in interpreting Article 311 of the Treaty of Versailles,876 
noted that such a provision had been originally drawn up in the English language and, 
therefore, the English authentic text was to be given more weight than the French 
authentic text in order to interpret it.877  
 
After the conclusion of the VCLT, the ICJ made explicit reference to the drafted text of 
the relevant treaty in the LaGrand case,878 which concerned the interpretation of Article 
41 of its Statute and, in particular, whether the provisional measures indicated by the ICJ 
                                                     
871 See PCIJ, 30 August 1924, The Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. Britain), judgment, p. 19. 
For another advisory opinion in which the PCIJ seems to attribute a relevant weight to the drafted text, see 
PCIJ, 15 November 1932, Interpretation of the Convention of 1919 concerning Employment of Women during 
the Night, advisory opinion, p. 379; more loosely, PCIJ, 12 August 1922, Competence of the International 
Labour  Organization in Regard to International Regulation of the Conditions of Labour of Persons Employed 
in Agriculture, advisory opinion.  
872 Italian-Venezuelan Mixed Claims Commission, Guastini Case, 10 Reports of International Arbitral Awards 
(1903), 561 et seq. 
873 Mixed commission constituted under the Protocols between Italy and Venezuela of 13 February and 7 May 
1903, dealing with certain differences arisen between Italy and the United States of Venezuela in connection 
with the Italian claims against the Venezuelan Government. 
874 See 10 Reports of International Arbitral Awards (1903), 561 et seq., at 479-481. 
875 See Italian-Venezuelan Mixed Claims Commission, Guastini Case, 10 Reports of International Arbitral 
Awards (1903), 561 et seq., at 579. 
876 Treaty concluded in Versailles on 28 June 1919 by Germany, on the one side, and the Allied Powers, on the 
other. 
877 See Tribunal Civil de Strasbourg, 21 July 1927, Société Audiffren-Singrun v. Liquidation Morlang, Binger 
et Société Atlas, 55 Journal du Droit International (1928), 732 et seq., at 734. A similar reasoning was put 
forward by the Yugoslavian arbitrator in his dissenting opinion to the decision of the Hungarian-Serbian-
Croatian-Slovenian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal in the case Archduke Frederick of Habsburg-Lorraine v. Serbian-
Croatian-Slovenian State, where he stated that, for the purpose of interpreting Article 191 of the Treaty of 
Trianon (treaty concluded in Versailles on 4 June 1920 by Hungary, on the one side, and the Allied Powers, on 
the other), the English authentic text was to be given a special relevance, since the draft of the treaty had been 
prepared by English jurists and therefore the English text was the “original” (drafted) text (see Hungarian-
Serbian-Croatian-Slovenian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, 1 October 1929, Archduke Frederick of Habsburg-
Lorraine v. Serbian-Croatian-Slovenian State, 9 Recueil des décisions des tribunaux arbitraux mixtes institués 
par les traités de paix (1930), 285 et seq., separate opinion of the Yugoslavian arbitrator, at 390).  
878 See ICJ, 27 June 2001, LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), judgment. 
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pursuant to that article were to be considered to be binding orders.879  
Article 41 of the ICJ Statute, in its English and French authentic texts,880 reads as 
follows (italics by the author): 
 
1. The Court shall have the power to indicate, if it considers that circumstances so 
require, any provisional measures which ought to be taken to preserve the respective rights 
of either party. 
2. Pending the final decision, notice of the measures suggested shall forthwith be 
given to the parties and to the Security Council. 
 
1. La Cour a le pouvoir d'indiquer, si elle estime que les circonstances l'exigent, 
quelles mesures conservatoires du droit de chacun doivent être prises à titre provisoire. 
2. En attendant l'arrêt définitif, l'indication de ces mesures est immédiatement 
notifiée aux parties et au Conseil de sécurité. 
 
In this respect, the ICJ noted that, while the terms “indiquer” and “indication” in the 
French authentic text might be deemed neutral as to the mandatory character of the 
measure concerned, the expression “doivent être prises” had an imperative character. 
Then, in response to the submission made by the United States of America, according to 
which the use in the English authentic language of “indicate” instead of “order”, of 
“ought” instead of “must” or “shall”, and of “suggested” instead of “ordered” was to be 
understood as implying that ICJ’s decisions under Article 41 of its Statute lacked 
mandatory effect, the Court noted that it might be argued, “having regard to the fact that 
[…] the French text was the original version,881 that such terms as “indicate” and 
“ought” [had] a meaning equivalent to “order” and “must” or “shall””.882 
Thereafter, the ICJ supported its construction of the “original” French text by 
referring to the object and purpose of its Statute, the context of Article 41 thereof and the 
relevant travaux préparatoires.  
It first analysed the object and purpose of its Statute as a whole, as well as that of 
Article 41,883 and concluded, on the basis of such object and purpose and of the terms of 
Article 41 when read in their context, that its power to indicate provisional measures 
entailed that such measures had to be binding, inasmuch as the power in question was 
based on the necessity, when the circumstances call for it, to safeguard and to avoid 
prejudice to the rights of the parties as determined by its final judgment.884 
The Court then pointed out that the travaux préparatoires did not preclude such 
an interpretation. In particular, the ICJ noted that the travaux préparatoires clearly 
                                                     
879 ICJ, 27 June 2001, LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), judgment, paras. 98-99. 
880 The ICJ Statute has five authentic texts, namely in the English, French, Chinese, Spanish and Russian 
languages. 
881 It was, in fact, the originally drafted version of the corresponding article of the Statute of the PCIJ, which 
had been then transposed without substantial modifications, in the Statute of the ICJ (see, to that extent, ICJ, 27 
June 2001, LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), judgment, paras. 105-106).  
882 ICJ, 27 June 2001, LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), judgment, para. 100. 
883 Literally the “context in which Article 41 has to be seen within the Statute” (see ICJ, 27 June 2001, 
LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), judgment, para. 102).   
884 See ICJ, 27 June 2001, LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), judgment, para. 102. 
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showed, on the one hand, that the text of Article 41 of its Statute derived from the 
proposal presented by the Brazilian jurist Raul Fernandes to the Committee in charge for 
the drafting of the PCIJ’s Statute and that such a proposal was in the French language885 
and, on the other hand, that the use in the French authentic text of the term ”indiquer” 
instead of “ordonner” was solely motivated by the consideration that the Court did not 
have the means to assure the execution of its decisions and was not intended to deny the 
binding character thereof.886 
 
In the very same Young Loan arbitration, the dissenting opinion of three arbiters (against 
the four of the majority) affirmed that the method to be followed, in order to decide that 
case, consisted in ascertaining “the true object and purpose of the clause from the 
original language in which its travaux préparatoires were drafted” and that the “practice 
of resorting to the original language in which the negotiations were conducted has been 
adopted by international tribunals as an aid to the ascertainment of the true intent of the 
parties”.887  
The dissenting arbiters noted that only the English language had been employed 
during the negotiating process and that the draft text used for the discussion was written 
in English. In addition, they pointed out that the glossaries entitled "Consultations on 
German Debts Vocabulary English-French-German (Unofficial)" had been prepared by 
the secretariat for its own use and, in particular, as an aid for the translation of the 
English text in the German and French languages. In this respect, it had been testified 
that, although not being official documents, these glossaries were in constant use by the 
translation section for the purpose of translating technical terms between English, French 
and German. They noted that the German section of such a glossary made no distinction 
between an “Abwertung”888 and an “Entwertung”,889 both being equated to the English 
term “depreciation” and to the French term “dépréciation”.890  
In light of the above, the dissenting arbiters stated the following: “What is 
significant is that the strength of the presumption in favour of the original English use of 
‘depreciated’ is particularly great because here the negotiators did not participate in the 
translation process. On the contrary, the entire task of drafting the authentic non-English 
texts was left to the translation section, which in turn could rely on the glossaries 
prepared by it for use in translating. […] But it cannot be responsibly contended that 
simply because one language is as authentic as another, no argument can be entertained 
which seeks to show that it does not correctly reflect the meaning of the other, 
particularly when the other was the basic language in the negotiations. The affairs of 
                                                     
885 See ICJ, 27 June 2001, LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), judgment, para. 105. 
886 See ICJ, 27 June 2001, LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), judgment, para. 107. 
887 See Arbitral Tribunal for the Agreement on German External Debts, 16 May 1980, The Kingdom of Belgium 
et al. v. the Federal Republic of Germany (Young Loan), 59 International Law Reports (1980), 494 et seq., 
dissenting opinion of Messrs. Robinson, Bathurst and Monguilan, at 580, para. 38. 
888 Which might be considered to be technically equivalent to the English term “devaluation”. 
889 Which might be considered to be technically equivalent to the broader English term “depreciation”. 
890 See Arbitral Tribunal for the Agreement on German External Debts, 16 May 1980, The Kingdom of Belgium 
et al. v. the Federal Republic of Germany (Young Loan), 59 International Law Reports (1980), 494 et seq., 
dissenting opinion of Messrs. Robinson, Bathurst and Monguilan, at 583-584, para. 40. 
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sovereign States cannot, and should not, be influenced by the fortuitous choice of words 
selected by a nameless translator”.891  
They accordingly concluded that, under the circumstances of the case, resort to 
the preliminary work had to be made and special weight might be given to the drafted 
text, so that the meaning of the term “depreciated”, as used in the drafted text (English), 
should be given preeminence.892 
 
The Supreme Administrative Court of Sweden893 paid particular attention to the English 
authentic text of Articles II(2) and XII(3) of the 1960 Sweden-United Kingdom tax 
treaty, as modified by the 1968 Protocol, in order to construe them. The Court, although 
the English and Swedish texts of the treaty were equally authentic, noted that the 1968 
Protocol had been negotiated in English and thus the English text might, in certain cases, 
be regarded as expressing more accurately the common intention of the parties. 
 
Finally, the relevance of the drafted text was explicitly considered by the High Court of 
Justice of England and Wales in the case Federation of Tour Operators and al.,894 which 
concerned the interpretation of the last sentence of Article 15 of the Chicago Convention 
on International Civil Aviation.895 In particular, the High Court had to decide whether 
the imposition of a certain air passenger duty by the United Kingdom fell within the 
scope of the prohibition to impose “fees, dues or other charges”, in respect solely of the 
right of transit over or entry into or exit from the territory of any contracting State, 
provided for by the above-mentioned Article 15.  
In supporting his decision, Justice Burton affirmed that it was right to give some 
primacy to the English text, not because it was more authentic than the other texts,896 but 
because the travaux préparatoires were in English and reference to them necessarily 
involved reference to the English authentic text. In this respect, he also noted that the 
other authentic texts were translations from the English and, therefore, they could not 
have been intended to change the meaning of the English text.897  
  
                                                     
891 See Arbitral Tribunal for the Agreement on German External Debts, 16 May 1980, The Kingdom of Belgium 
et al. v. the Federal Republic of Germany (Young Loan), 59 International Law Reports (1980), 494 et seq., 
dissenting opinion of Messrs. Robinson, Bathurst and Monguilan, at 584-585, para. 40. 
892 See Arbitral Tribunal for the Agreement on German External Debts, 16 May 1980, The Kingdom of Belgium 
et al. v. the Federal Republic of Germany (Young Loan), 59 International Law Reports (1980), 494 et seq., 
dissenting opinion of Messrs. Robinson, Bathurst and Monguilan, at 585, para. 41. 
893 Supreme Administrative Court (Sweden), 23 December 1987, case RÅ 1987 ref. 162, Regeringsrättens 
årsbok (1987) (also reported in summary in IBFD Tax Treaty Case Law Database). The decision was taken by 
a majority of three to two judges. See also, M. Edwardes-Ker, Tax Treaty Interpretation. The International Tax 
Treaties Service (Dublin: In-Depth, 1994 – loose-leaf), 20.04 and 20.05 and P. Sundgren, “Interpretation of 
Tax Treaties – A Case Study”, British Tax Review (1990), 286 et seq., at 300. 
894 High Court of Justice of England and Wales, 4 September 2007, Federation of Tour Operators and al. v. 
Her Majesty’s Treasury et al., [2007] EWHC 2062 (Admin). 
895 Concluded in Chicago on 7 December 1944. 
896 The Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation has been authenticated in the English, French, 
Russian and Spanish languages.  
897 See High Court of Justice of England and Wales, 4 September 2007, Federation of Tour Operators and al. 
v. Her Majesty’s Treasury et al., [2007] EWHC 2062 (Admin), para. 80. 
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3.2.3.5. Conclusions on research question a) 
 
Under Article 33(1) VCLT, all authentic texts are equally authoritative for treaty 
interpretation purposes, in the sense that each of them may be (autonomously) relied 
upon in order to construe the treaty.  
 However, the preceding positive analysis shows that the drafted text (i.e. the text 
that has been discussed upon during the negotiations and eventually drafted as result 
thereof) may sometimes be given more weight than the other texts for the purpose of 
construing the treaty, since there is a reasonable presumption that it may reflect more 
accurately the common intention of the parties, in particular where the treaty negotiators 
were not involved in the subsequent drafting and examination of the other authentic 
texts. In this perspective, the drafted text appears relevant (i) as a proxy of the travaux 
préparatoires, where the latter are not fully available, and (ii) in order to corroborate the 
evidence emerging from other means of interpretation. Thus, the interpreter should 
throw the drafted text (as such) in the crucible and use it, according to Articles 31-33 
VCLT, in order to compose prima facie divergences of meaning among the various 
authentic texts and, according to Articles 31 and 32 VCLT, in order to determine the 
meaning to be reasonably attributed to the relevant treaty terms and the object and 
purpose of the treaty. 
 Nothing in the VCLT precludes the interpreter taking into account the drafted text 
of a treaty as previously described. On the contrary, good faith seems to impose on the 
interpreter the duty to attribute the appropriate weight to it for the purpose of construing 
multilingual treaties.   
 
Those conclusions are substantially in line with principle (vi) established by the author 
in section 2 of Chapter 3 of Part I, according to which, since the quest of the interpreter 
is directed at establishing the common intention of parties, it is reasonable for him to 
attribute, in the case of a prima facie discrepancy in meaning among the authentic treaty 
texts, a particular relevance to the text that was originally drafted by the contracting 
States’ representatives and on which the consensus among them was formed, for the 
purpose of removing that prima facie discrepancy.  
 
 
3.2.4. The relevance of non-authentic language versions: conclusions on research 
question b) 
 
In the system of the VCLT, no explicit relevance is attached to non-authentic language 
versions.  
 The original draft articles prepared by Sir Humphrey Waldock and included in his 
Third Report on the Law of Treaties overtly dealt with the relevance of such language 
versions for the purpose of treaty interpretation. In particular, Article 75(5) of his Third 
Report established that non-authentic language versions could be used as subsidiary 
evidence of the intention of the parties where the application of all the other rules of 
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interpretation left the meaning of a term, as expressed in the authentic text(s), ambiguous 
or obscure.898 
 Then, in the course of its sixteenth session, the ILC decided to drop that provision 
on the grounds that it could have opened the door too much to the use of non-authentic 
versions of a treaty for the purpose of its interpretation. 
 
That said, however, nothing in the text or in the travaux préparatoires of the VCLT 
seems to prevent the interpreter from taking non-authentic language versions into 
account as supplementary means of interpretation,899 attributing to them an interpretative 
weight that may vary depending on the available evidence that such language versions 
may contribute to determine the common intention of the parties. Quite the opposite, 
since the supplementary means of interpretation covered by Article 32 VCLT are 
generally regarded as including all means of interpretation (other than those referred to 
in Article 31 VCLT) that may shed some light on the meaning of the treaty,900 it is 
reasonable to conclude that non-authentic language versions may be considered within 
the scope of Article 32 VCLT, and accordingly used, depending on the circumstances of 
the case.901 
For instance, unilateral documents such as the treaty official translations 
produced by the contracting States are potentially relevant, since they may give a hint of 
the practice followed by a party, or of the treaty meaning according to a party;902 where 
the other parties were informed about such documents and positions and did not object 
thereto, they might even be considered to have been tacitly agreed upon. The same holds 
true, mutatis mutandis, with regard to multilateral documents such as treaty official texts. 
 
In a slightly different perspective, non-authentic language versions may come into play 
as documents on which the subsequent practice of the parties is based. In particular, 
where non-authentic language versions have been put into public circulation and relied 
upon by the parties for the purpose of applying the relevant treaty, they could give rise to 
issues of possible (i) estoppel and acquiescence, (ii) establishment by practice of a 
common interpretation of the treaty, or (iii) amendment by practice of the treaty.903 
In this respect, it is interesting to make a reference to the Taba Arbitration,904 
where the Arbitral Tribunal had to decide upon the exact location of part of the border 
                                                     
898 See also YBILC 1964-II, p. 65, para. 10. 
899 See YBILC 1966-II, p. 223, para. 20. 
900 See I. Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1984), p. 116. See also F. Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law (Amsterdam: IBFD 
Publications, 2004), pp. 334-339 and the references included there. 
901 See, in this respect, YBILC 1966-II, p. 226, para. 9; M. Hilf, Die Auslegung mehrsprachiger Verträge. Eine 
Untersuchung zum Völkerrecht und zum Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Berlin: Springer-
Verlag, 1973), pp. 105-108; F. Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law (Amsterdam: 
IBFD Publications, 2004), p. 398.  
902 See, however, Italian-United States Conciliation Commission, 20 September 1958, Flegenheimer case – 
decision No. 182, 14 Reports of International Arbitral Awards, 327 et seq., para. 66, letter a). 
903 See, similarly, R. Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 363.  
904 Arbitral Tribunal, 29 September 1988, Case concerning the location of boundary markers in Taba between 
Egypt and Israel, 20 Reports of International Arbitral Awards, 1 et seq. 
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between Egypt and Israel (also) on the basis of a treaty concluded in 1906 between the 
former Turkish Sultanate and the Khedivate of Egypt. This treaty had been drafted in the 
Turkish language only; however, the treaty was then translated into Arabic and from 
Arabic into English. The tribunal noted that the “English translations were printed in a 
number of official sources and apparently were relied on thereafter” and that “it 
transpired that […] no authorities since before the First World War had ever consulted 
the authentic Turkish text, not even the Parties to this dispute.”905 The tribunal concluded 
that, for interpretative purposes, it would have followed the general practice of the 
parties and thus referred to the English translation and not to the authentic Turkish 
text.906  As fairly pointed out by Gardiner, the decision of the tribunal to rely mainly on 
the English translation for the purpose of construing the 1906 treaty must be seen as 
“coloured by the greater significance to be attached to how the treaty had been 
implemented in practice”.907 
 
Finally, the above conclusions appear coherent with principle (vii) established by the 
author in section 2 of Chapter 3 of Part I, according to which the interpreter may take 
into account the non-authentic language versions of a treaty for the purpose of 
construing the latter, the interpretative weight attributable to such language versions 
depending on the available evidence that they may contribute to ascertain the common 
intention of the parties.908 
 
3.3. Presumption of similar meaning: the right to rely on one single text 
 
3.3.1. Research questions addressed in this section  
 
                                                     
905 See Arbitral Tribunal, 29 September 1988, Case concerning the location of boundary markers in Taba 
between Egypt and Israel, 20 Reports of International Arbitral Awards, 1 et seq., para. 45.  
906 See Arbitral Tribunal, 29 September 1988, Case concerning the location of boundary markers in Taba 
between Egypt and Israel, 20 Reports of International Arbitral Awards, 1 et seq., para. 45. 
907 See R. Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 362. It must be noted, 
however, that the above-mentioned statement of the tribunal has to be read against its proper background, i.e. 
taking into account that the establishment of frontiers is a field of international law where it is customarily 
accepted that the subsequent practice of the parties plays a major role for the purpose of interpreting the 
relevant treaties. In this respect, the arbitral tribunal had the chance to deal with the issue of the possible 
divergence between the meaning reasonably attributable to the text of the treaty and the practice followed by 
the parties; in paragraph 210 of its award it made reference to the ICJ decision in the Temple of Preah Vihear 
case (ICJ, 15 June 1962, Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), judgment) and stated the following: 
“If a boundary line is once demarcated jointly by the parties concerned, the demarcation is considered as an 
authentic interpretation of the boundary agreement even if deviations may have occurred or if there are some 
inconsistencies with maps. This has been confirmed in practice and legal doctrine, especially for the case that a 
long time has elapsed since demarcation. […] It is therefore to be concluded that the demarcated boundary line 
would prevail over the Agreement if a contradiction could be detected.”  
908 For instance, the fact that both official translations produced by the contracting States of a bilateral treaty 
seem to suggest the same construction of a certain treaty provision, which appears on the contrary ambiguous 
on the basis of the sole authentic text, may reasonably lead the interpreter to construe the treaty in accordance 
with such official translations. 
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The present section is aimed at tackling the following two research questions, here 
briefly illustrated by means of examples. 
 
c) Is there any obligation to perform a comparison of the different authentic texts 
anytime a multilingual treaty is interpreted? 
 
This issue may be briefly illustrated with reference to Article 5(1)(e) of the ECHR, 
which allows the lawful detention “of persons of unsound minds, alcoholics or drug 
addicts or vagrants”.  
 In order to construe that article, in particular for the purpose of determining 
whether it allows the lawful detention of non-alcohol-addicted drunk persons, may the 
interpreter rely solely on the English authentic text of the ECHR, or is he obliged to 
compare the latter with its French authentic text?909  
 
d) If the previous question is answered in the negative, when does an obligation to 
compare the different authentic texts arise? 
 
In the example given with reference to question c), the term “alcoholics” appears prima 
facie ambiguous since, on the one hand, in its common usage it denotes persons addicted 
to alcohol, but, on the other hand, such meaning does not seems to fit well in the context 
of Article 5(1)(e) of the ECHR, the meaning corresponding to the expression “drunk 
persons” appearing to fit better.  
 The question thus arises of whether the interpreter should be obliged to compare 
the English with the French authentic text from the outset, in order to solve the prima 
facie ambiguity of the former, or whether he should be entitled to rely on other available 
means of interpretation (elements and items of evidence) before reverting to the 
comparison of the authentic texts. Moreover, where the latter question is answered in the 
affirmative, uncertainty could exist on whether the interpreter should be also entitled to 
rely on supplementary means of interpretation (for instance, the treaty travaux 
préparatoires of the ECHR) in order to solve the apparent ambiguity of the English 
authentic text, before being required to compare the latter with the French text. 
 
 
3.3.2. The absence of an obligation for the interpreter to always compare the 
authentic treaty texts  
3.3.2.1. The combined interpretation of Article 33(1) and 33(3) VCLT 
 
Under the VCLT, there is no obligation for the interpreter to analyse from the outset all 
the authentic texts of a treaty in order to interpret and apply it. 
 
Article 33(1) VCLT states that the text is equally authoritative (for interpretative 
                                                     
909 The example is derived from ECtHR, 4 April 2000, Witold Litwa v. Poland (Application no. 26629/95). 
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purposes) in each authentic language, unless an agreement to the contrary exists. 
Furthermore, according to Article 33(3) VCLT, the terms of a treaty are presumed 
to have the same meaning in each authentic text. 
 
The combination of these two provisions, read in their context, establishes the following:  
(i) a rule of law according to which every treaty provision has just a single 
meaning, which is equally expressed by each of its authentic texts;  
(ii) a rebuttable presumption that each authentic text is accurate enough to 
guarantee that the interpretation of the treaty based solely on it leads to the same 
utterance meaning that could be derived through an interpretation based on any of 
the other authentic texts.  
 
The first part of the present study has shown that the attribution of meaning to a 
language expression is a complex matter and that many variables are involved, so that 
different meanings may be attributed to the same utterance due to the different weight 
attached to and roles played by the various elements of its overall context. This 
uncertainty is compounded when the speaker conveys a single message by means of a 
plurality of equivalent (in the speaker’s intention and representation) utterances. The 
above distinction between (i) and (ii) is to be seen in such a framework.  
 The combined reading of Articles 33(1) and 33(3) VCLT establishes the rule 
according to which (i) the speaker intends to convey a single message (the treaty 
meaning) by means of a plurality of equivalent utterances (the authentic texts).910 This 
rule, as such, is not subject to any condition, nor does it need any corroboration. This 
means that the various authentic texts must always be attributed the same utterance 
meaning, since it is established by the rule of law that they have the same meaning. 
Thus, from a logical perspective, referring to a divergence in meaning between the 
various authentic texts is erroneous since such texts cannot have different meanings;911 it 
would be more correct to speak of a divergence between the meanings provisionally 
attributed to the various authentic texts (construed in isolation from each other), or of a 
prima facie apparent (not real) divergence of meanings.912 
At the same time, a combined reading of Articles 33(1) and 33(3) VCLT 
establishes the rebuttable presumption (ii) that the meaning provisionally attributed to 
any of the authentic texts, taken in isolation, is the utterance meaning of the treaty.913 
                                                     
910 This rule may be departed from if the parties so agree, as explicitly admitted by Article 33(1) VCLT.  
911 See commentary to Article 29 of the 1966 Draft, in which it is stressed that “in law there is only one treaty - 
one set of terms accepted by the parties and one common intention with respect to those terms - even when two 
authentic texts appear to diverge” (YBILC 1966-II, p. 225, paras. 6); see also YBILC 1966-II, p. 225, paras. 7.  
912 It is here submitted that Engelen concluded the same, as a matter of substance, although through different 
linguistic expressions: “However, even then [ed.’s note: when it is “established that the terms of the treaty 
actually do not have the same meaning in each text”] it must be assumed that the different authentic texts were 
always intended to mean the same, despite the failure of the parties to accurately express their common 
intention in each text, and the interpreter should bear this in mind when reconciling the different texts in 
accordance with the principles of Article 33(4) VCLT” (see F. Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under 
International Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2004), p. 394). 
913 The position of most scholars is confusing (and confused) on this point, a widespread conclusion being that 
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3.3.2.2. Evidence from the travaux préparatoires of the VCLT 
 
The above conclusions are also supported by an analysis of the travaux préparatoires of 
the VCLT.   
 
As previously mentioned, following the transmission by the ILC of its 1964 Draft to the 
governments for observations, the Israeli government suggested introducing, within the 
general rule of interpretation, a provision requiring the comparison between the authentic 
texts of the treaty. In the view of that government, such a comparison was a normal 
practice in the process of treaty interpretation and its importance was not limited to the 
case of prima facie divergence of meanings among the authentic texts, as it frequently 
assisted the interpreter in determining the meaning of the various texts and the intention 
of the parties to the treaty.914  
 
In his Sixth Report on the Law of Treaties, Sir Humphrey Waldock replied to the Israeli 
government’s proposal by stating that the latter was not one that the ILC should have 
adopted without very careful consideration of its implications. According to the Special 
Rapporteur, while interaction between two (or more) authentic texts was certainly useful 
in order to solve apparent divergences of meanings or to clarify the ambiguities of one 
                                                                                                                                  
upon the discovery of a prima facie divergence between the authentic texts, the presumption of Article 33(3) 
VCLT that the terms of the treaty have the same meaning in each text is rebutted and ceases to hold true (to 
this extent, see F. Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law (Amsterdam: IBFD 
Publications, 2004), pp. 391-392). Tabory, for instance, affirmed that upon discovery on an unclear passage, a 
textual divergence or a difference of opinion, “the presumption in Article 33(3) VCLT ceases to hold” (see M. 
Tabory, Multilingualism In International Law and Institutions (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 
1980), p. 198). Similarly, Germer attributed to Article 33(3) VCLT a limited function and stated that the latter 
was a consequence of the very nature of the presumption, which was acknowledged by Sir Humphrey Waldock 
(at the ILC 874th meeting); he concluded that when an international adjudicator is confronted with a divergence 
between the different authentic texts of a treaty, the presumption of Article 33(3) VCLT does not give him any 
guidance, so that he has to resort to the rules set forth in Article 33(4) VCLT (see P. Germer, “Interpretation of 
Plurilingual Treaties: A Study of Article 33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties”, 11 Harvard 
International Law Journal (1970), 400 et seq., at 414). However, the author submits that (i) the Special 
Rapporteur, in the course of the ILC 874th meeting, had never referred to such a limited presumption of equal 
meaning of the authentic texts (he had never used the word “presumption” at all, indeed), but had simply 
discussed of the right to rely on a single authentic text (see, similarly, F. Engelen, Interpretation of Tax 
Treaties under International Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2004), pp. 393-394); (ii) the right to rely on 
a single text is a strict consequence of the presumption that each authentic text is accurate enough to guarantee 
that the interpretation of the treaty based solely thereon leads to the same utterance meaning that could be 
determined through an interpretation based on any of the other authentic texts, and not of the rule (non-
rebuttable presumption) that all authentic texts have the same meaning; (iii) Article 33(4) VCLT does not set 
aside Article 33(3) VCLT, but, on the contrary, it is built thereon: in fact, it requires the interpreter to 
determine the common meaning of the various authentic texts by applying the rules of interpretation enshrined 
in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT and, where this is not possible, to adopt the meaning that best reconciles the texts 
(both provisions supporting the idea of the treaty unity and of the interconnected equality of meaning of the 
various authentic texts).   
914 See YBILC 1966-II, p. 301. 
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text, the insertion of the "comparison of authentic versions" in the general rule of 
interpretation could have far-reaching implications by undermining the security of the 
individual texts and encouraging attempts to transplant concepts of one language into the 
interpretation of a text in another language with a resultant distortion of the meaning of 
the treaty.915   
 
When the ILC later discussed the issue, Mr Rosenne restated the proposal of the Israeli 
government and supported it by quoting prevailing opinion, normal practice and 
principles. He considered that all authentic texts had to be analysed together for the 
purpose of treaty interpretation and that it was preferable to discourage any tendency to 
base the construction of a treaty on a single text, since such a tendency would have 
seriously impaired the fundamental concept of the treaty as a single unit.916  
Sir Humphrey Waldock, in turn, replied that the suggested provision implied that 
it was always necessary to consult all the authentic texts for interpretation purposes. He 
found that such a solution had a number of drawbacks and would have caused practical 
difficulties for the legal advisers of newly independent States, who did not always have 
staff familiar with the many languages used in drafting international treaties.917 His 
position was supported by Mr El-Erian.918 
 
Ultimately, the ILC opted for not including the provision suggested by the Israeli 
government and upheld by Mr Rosenne, thus indirectly giving support to the reasons put 
forward by the Special Rapporteur. The text finally adopted by the Vienna Conference 
does not differ, in this respect, from the one provisionally approved by the ILC.  
 
3.3.2.3. The position(s) taken by scholars 
 
Scholars have generally supported the above conclusions as well.919  
 
According to Hilf, each authentic text is as binding as all the other texts, so that, 
according to the intention of the contracting parties, the content of the agreement is fully 
                                                     
915 See YBILC 1966-II, p. 100, para. 23. 
916 See YBILC 1966-I (part II), p. 209, para. 12. 
917 See YBILC 1966-I (part II), p. 211, para. 35. In this respect, Kuner pointed out that “[t]here can be no doubt 
that comparison of language versions often requires library resources and multilingual legal personnel that are 
quite rare even in richest Western democracies, not to mention the Third World.” (C. B. Kuner, “The 
Interpretation of Multilingual Treaties: Comparison of Texts versus the Presumption of Similar Meaning”, 40 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1991), 953 et seq., at 962); see also F. Engelen, Interpretation 
of Tax Treaties under International Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2004), p. 387. 
918 See YBILC 1966-I (part II), p. 211, para. 42. 
919 In addition to the authors cited above, see also T. Bender and F. Engelen, “The final clause of the 1987 
Netherlands Model Tax Convention and the interpretation of plurilingual tax treaties”, in H. van Arendonk, F. 
Engelen and S. Jansen (eds.), A Tax Globalist. Essays in honour of Maarten J. Ellis (Amsterdam: IBFD 
Publications, 2005), 12 et seq., at 19 et seq. and F. Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International 
Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2004), pp. 384 et seq. and references therein. 
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embodied in each text. Therefore, each authentic text may serve, taken in isolation, as 
the basis for interpretation unless a lack of clarity or an apparent divergence in meaning 
is discovered.920  
 Hilf considered such a conclusion cogent also in light of pragmatic considerations 
on the (non-) feasibility of consulting all authentic versions during routine interpretation 
of treaties and maintained that it reflected the actual practice in the application of 
treaties, since practitioners and tribunals used not to carry on a comparison of the various 
authentic texts unless specific issues arose.921 
 
Germer recognized that an “international adjudicator interpreting a plurilingual treaty 
does not always have to consult all the authentic texts of the treaty, but can rely on a 
single text until he is confronted with an alleged divergence between the different 
authentic language versions of the treaty”.922 In this respect, the author submitted that 
such a legitimate practice had often allowed avoidance of needless complications of the 
interpretation process.923 
 
Kuner pointed out that, under Article 33 VCLT, it is unnecessary to compare the various 
authentic texts on a routine basis, i.e. when no allegation of an ambiguity in one text or a 
difference among texts has been made.  
 The author also made reference, in this respect, to the Restatement of the Law of 
the American Law Institute,924 according to which “[a]n international tribunal, therefore, 
may consider any convenient text unless an argument is addressed to some other text”.925 
 
Similarly, according to Gardiner, the interpreter may legitimately use a single authentic 
text for “routine” interpretation. However, where there is reason to believe that there 
might be an issue affected by the choice of the authentic text used for interpretative 
purposes, or where a difference or dispute over interpretation is being presented to a 
court or tribunal, comparison of texts is likely to be essential.926 
                                                     
920 See M. Hilf, Die Auslegung mehrsprachiger Verträge. Eine Untersuchung zum Völkerrecht und zum 
Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1973), pp. 54 and 72-73. 
921 See M. Hilf, Die Auslegung mehrsprachiger Verträge. Eine Untersuchung zum Völkerrecht und zum 
Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1973), p. 75. According to Tabory, Hilf, 
while upholding the above-mentioned conclusions for practical reasons, would have conceded that Rosenne’s 
approach was the ideal one from a doctrinal viewpoint (see M. Tabory, Multilingualism In International Law 
and Institutions (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1980), p. 198). It does not seem to the author that 
Hilf expressed such a clear “doctrinal” support for Rosenne’s approach to the subject matter.    
922 See P. Germer, “Interpretation of Plurilingual Treaties: A Study of Article 33 of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties”, 11 Harvard International Law Journal (1970), 400 et seq., at 412. 
923 See P. Germer, “Interpretation of Plurilingual Treaties: A Study of Article 33 of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties”, 11 Harvard International Law Journal (1970), 400 et seq., at 412. 
924 See American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law, Third: Foreign Relations Law of the United States (St. 
Paul: American Law Institute, 1987), §147, p. 451. 
§ 325 reporter’s note 2 (1987). 
925 See C. B. Kuner, “The Interpretation of Multilingual Treaties: Comparison of Texts versus the Presumption 
of Similar Meaning”, 40 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1991), 953 et seq., at 954; in 
particular footnote 6. 
926 See R. Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 360-361. 




Even Tabory, although considering that from a theoretical perspective only the reference 
to more than one authentic text would ensure the accuracy of interpretation, due to the 
lack of precision and the nuances that characterize human languages, recognized that 
Article 33 VCLT creates a right to rely on a single authentic text until a difference in 
meaning is disclosed.927  
 However, she believed that the absence of any legal obligation to compare the 
various authentic texts was an adjustment of the law to practical considerations, based on 
the inability of practitioners to master several languages and that it was an innovation 
introduced by the VCLT, and thus not representing pre-existing customary international 
law.928 
 
Finally, the very same Rosenne who had strongly criticized Article 29(3) of the 1966 
Draft “for failing to pose squarely as a primary element of interpretation the comparison 
of authentic multilingual versions” acknowledged that under such a provision no 
obligation to carry out a comparison of the various authentic texts existed and limited the 
scope of his analysis de lege ferenda, blaming the ILC for having confused the technical 
aspect of determining the authoritativeness of the different authentic texts of a treaty 
with the interpretative process thereof, in which the comparison of the various authentic 
texts should play a role.929  
 
3.3.2.4. The case law of national and international courts and tribunals 
 
The practice of courts and tribunals to consider only one, or few, of the authentic texts 
when interpreting a multilingual treaty is manifest. For a (long) list of case law that gives 
evidence of such a practice, it is enough here to refer to the surveys carried out by 
Hardy, before the adoption of the VCLT,930 and to the references made by Kuner to 
decisions of both domestic and international courts and tribunals.931  
 
The case law points to an unambiguous direction, which is probably self evident to all 
practitioners that, in different fields of law, had the chance to routinely deal with the 
interpretation and application of multilingual treaties:  
                                                     
927 See M. Tabory, Multilingualism In International Law and Institutions (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & 
Noordhoff, 1980), pp. 198-200. 
928 See M. Tabory, Multilingualism In International Law and Institutions (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & 
Noordhoff, 1980), p. 199; in particular, the expression in brackets “(once the Vienna Convention entered into 
force)” referred to the absence of a legal obligation to compare the various authentic texts under the VCLT. 
929 See S. Rosenne, “Interpretation of Treaties in the Restatement and the International Law Commission’s 
Draft Articles: A Comparison”, 5 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (1966), 205 et seq., at 224. 
930 See J. Hardy, “The Interpretation of Plurilingual Treaties by International Courts and Tribunals”, 37 British 
Yearbook of International Law (1961), 72 et seq., at 139 et seq. 
931 C. B. Kuner, “The Interpretation of Multilingual Treaties: Comparison of Texts versus the Presumption of 
Similar Meaning”, 40 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1991), 953 et seq., at 956-957, in 
particular footnotes 20 through 30. 
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(i) domestic courts tend to rely exclusively on the authentic text in their official 
languages, as long as no issue of differences in meaning is put forward by the 
parties;  
(ii) international courts and tribunals tend to rely exclusively on the authentic 
texts in their working (official) languages, or in the language of the case 
discussed before them, unless an issue of differences in meaning is raised before 
them. 
Moreover, where issues of potential divergences between certain authentic texts of the 
treaty are raised before such courts and tribunals, it is not uncommon that the latter carry 
out only the comparison of the texts in relation to which the potential divergence has 
been alleged, notwithstanding the existence of other authentic texts of the treaty to be 
interpreted.932 
 
A final remark concerns the fact that, in respect of any treaty to be interpreted, those 
courts and tribunals operate either as organs of the contracting States, or as entities 
empowered by such contracting States to decide on the application of the treaty. Such 
States, in turn, may be either (i) parties to the VCLT, or (ii) not.  
 In case (i), the decisions of the above-mentioned courts and tribunals constitute a 
subsequent practice in the application of the VCLT. As that subsequent practice is 
continuous and homogeneous in the use of only one, or few, of the authentic treaty texts 
for interpretative purposes, it constitutes a subsequent practice in the application of the 
VCLT that establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation,933 which 
confirms the thesis that Article 33 VCLT allows the interpreters to rely solely on one 
authentic text, as long as a prima facie divergence in meaning or an interpretative issue 
is put forward.  
 With reference to case (ii), it must be noted that such a practice is so continuous 
and homogeneous that it appears to reach the threshold of the general practice necessary 
for the formation of customary international law; moreover, the nature of the organs 
putting in place that practice (the judiciary) and, in particular, the fact that at least some 
of those courts and tribunals are bound to respect and apply customary international 
law,934 reasonably confirm that the right to rely on a single authentic text, unless an 
apparent divergence in meaning or an interpretative issue arise, is regarded by States as 
law. It may therefore be concluded that such a right, at the present stage, constitutes 
customary international law. 
 
3.3.2.5. Conclusions on research question c) 
 
The preceding analysis has shown that no reasonable doubt exists on the fact that, under 
                                                     
932 See, for instance, ICJ, 26 November 1984, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua 
(Nicaragua v. United States of America), judgment, paras. 24-47; ICJ, 27 June 2001, LaGrand (Germany v. 
United States of America), judgment, paras. 99-109. 
933 See Article 31(3)(b) VCLT, which represents customary international law. 
934 See, for example, Article 38(1)(b) of the ICJ Statute. 
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the VCLT, the interpreter is under no obligation to take into account more than one 
authentic text whenever construing and applying a multilingual treaty. Except for the 
cases pinpointed in the following section, the interpreter has the right to rely on any 
single authentic text in order to determine the utterance meaning of the relevant treaty 
provision, which is to be ascertained on the basis of the rules of interpretation provided 
for in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT.935  
 As previously noted, the interpreter of course remains free to take into account 
more than one authentic text in his quest for the utterance meaning of the treaty. 
 
These conclusions appear in line with principles (i), (ii) and (iii) established by the 
author in section 2 of Chapter 3 of Part I, according to which: 
(i) for the purpose of interpreting one authentic text of a multilingual treaty, the 
other authentic texts are part of the overall context and, therefore, may be used in 
order to construe the former;  
(ii) since the relevance of the treaty text(s) must not be overestimated, where the 
parties have agreed that more than one treaty text is authentic, it is reasonable to 
infer that those parties intended to allow treaty interpretation to be based on any 
of such authentic texts, taken in isolation, together with the elements of the 
overall context other than the other authentic texts; and 
(iii) the interpretation of a multilingual treaty on the basis of just one of its 
authentic texts is not different from the interpretation of a monolingual treaty and 
therefore the principles applicable to the interpretation of the latter apply to the 
interpretation of the former.  
 
 
3.3.3. The obligation for the interpreter to compare the authentic treaty texts 
whenever an alleged difference of meaning is put forward  
 
It is generally recognized that the interpreter (in particular, any adjudicator) must take 
into account all the relevant authentic texts whenever one of the parties puts forward a 
prima facie divergence of meaning among them.936  
 It is submitted, in this respect, that a different approach would breach both the 
                                                     
935 See I. Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1984), pp. 148-149; Commentary to Article 29 of the 1966 Draft (YBILC 1966-II, p. 225, para. 7). On the 
(low) frequency of having recourse, by the ICJ, to the rules of interpretation provided for by Article 33 VCLT, 
as compared to those enshrined in Articles 31-32 VCLT, see R. Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 16-17 and 33 (footnote 93). 
936 To this extent, see M. Tabory, Multilingualism In International Law and Institutions (Alphen aan den Rijn: 
Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1980), pp. 197-199; P. Germer, “Interpretation of Plurilingual Treaties: A Study of 
Article 33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties”, 11 Harvard International Law Journal (1970), 
400 et seq., at 414; R. Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 360; T. 
Bender and F. Engelen, “The final clause of the 1987 Netherlands Model Tax Convention and the 
interpretation of plurilingual tax treaties”, in H. van Arendonk, F. Engelen and S. Jansen (eds.), A Tax 
Globalist. Essays in honour of Maarten J. Ellis (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2005), 12 et seq., at 24. See 
also the further references included in section 3.3.2.3 of this chapter. 
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obligation to interpret the treaty in good faith, as provided for under Article 31 VCLT, 
and the requirement to remove any prima facie difference of meanings according to 
Article 33(4) VCLT. 
 
 
3.3.4. On whether an obligation exists to compare the authentic treaty texts whenever 
the interpreted text appears prima facie ambiguous, obscure, or unreasonable 
3.3.4.1. In general 
 
Where the interpretation is based on an authentic text whose meaning is prima facie 
ambiguous, obscure or unreasonable, the question arises of whether the interpreter is 
obliged to refer to the other authentic texts as soon as the ambiguity, obscurity, or 
unreasonableness appears, or exclusively after the application of the interpretative rules 
of Articles 31 and 32 VCLT has failed to solve the issue.  
 
According to Tabory, the VCLT did not clarify at which point of the interpretative 
process the comparison of the various authentic texts is to be undertaken.937 Although 
Tabory believed that the comparison of the authentic texts should be theoretically carried 
out whenever a problem or lack of clarity arises in interpreting a treaty on the basis of a 
single authentic text,938 she could not find in the VCLT system any clear indication 
whether the “problem” or “lack of clarity” should be regarded as existing solely at the 
end of the interpretative process provided for in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT, or at their 
first-sight appearance.  
 
3.3.4.2. The restrictive position upheld by Hilf 
 
Hilf noted that, where uncertainty in determining the utterance meaning of one authentic 
treaty text shows up, the normal practice would probably be to consult the various 
authentic texts; in fact, as explicitly recognized by the ILC in the Commentary to Article 
29 of the 1966 Draft,939 when the meaning of terms is ambiguous or obscure in one 
language but it is clear and convincing as to the intentions of the parties in another, the 
comparison of the authentic texts facilitates interpretation of the text the meaning of 
which is doubtful.940  
 In a subsequent statement, he concluded that upon discovery of an unclear 
provision941 the presumption of Article 33(3) VCLT ceases to hold and the comparison 
                                                     
937 See M. Tabory, Multilingualism In International Law and Institutions (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & 
Noordhoff, 1980), p. 199. 
938 See her drawing of the interpretation pyramid at p. 177. 
939 See YBILC 1966-II, p. 225, para. 6. 
940 See M. Hilf, Die Auslegung mehrsprachiger Verträge. Eine Untersuchung zum Völkerrecht und zum 
Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1973), pp. 72 and 75. 
941 As well as in the case of a prima facie divergence in meaning among the authentic texts. 
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of the texts under Article 33(4) must take place.942 However, the issue remains of when a 
provision should be considered “unclear”: at the first-sight vagueness or ambiguity 
thereof, after the unfruitful application of the rule of interpretation provided for under 
Article 31 VCLT, or after the unfruitful use of the relevant supplementary means of 
interpretation?943  
 
Hilf resolved this issue by linking it to the question of whether reliance on a single text 
for the purpose of routine interpretation could entail the State’s international 
responsibility where it was afterwards established, by the competent judiciary, that the 
authentic text that State relied upon actually contradicted the meaning intended by the 
parties, which would have been discovered had the other authentic texts been consulted 
as well.944  
 That author found that a State might violate its treaty obligations where it relied 
on a single authentic text for interpretation purposes and thereafter it emerged that such a 
text did not properly express the treaty meaning. Therefore, he concluded that, where 
during the course of routine interpretation of a treaty a difficulty arose, any State 
continuing to rely on a single authentic text would deliberately assume the risk of an 
incorrect application of the treaty that could cause its international responsibility. The 
comparison of the authentic texts for interpretation purposes would thus be necessary as 
soon as any evidence of unclearness or ambiguity of the authentic text used appeared in 
order to avoid the risk of incurring international responsibility. 
 
Hilf’s analysis appears correct, but incomplete. 
 
It is certainly true that a “wrong” interpretation (i.e. the interpretation regarded as such 
by the competent judiciary) of a treaty by a State’s organs may lead these organs to 
behave in such a way as to violate the obligations stemming from that treaty, i.e. to 
commit an internationally wrongful act on behalf of their State.945 It is also generally 
                                                     
942 See M. Hilf, Die Auslegung mehrsprachiger Verträge. Eine Untersuchung zum Völkerrecht und zum 
Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1973), p. 77. 
943 The author, in this respect, submits that the segregation of the rule of interpretation provided for under 
Article 31 VCLT from the supplementary means of interpretation of Article 32 VCLT, for the purpose of 
determining where a provision is “unclear”, should be rejected since it conflicts with the unity of the process of 
interpretation that characterizes the VCLT system. The point is further analysed in section 3.3.4.5 of this 
chapter.   
944 See M. Hilf, Die Auslegung mehrsprachiger Verträge. Eine Untersuchung zum Völkerrecht und zum 
Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1973), pp. 78-83. In this respect, 
Tabory put forward that the VCLT did not clarify which legal consequences for the contracting States could be 
derived from the use of a single authentic text for interpretation purposes, where the construction so derived 
overlooked a different meaning expressed in the authentic texts not consulted (see M. Tabory, Multilingualism 
In International Law and Institutions (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1980), p. 199). The 
relevance of customary international law on State responsibility in tax matters, including tax treaty matters, is 
broadly analysed in H. Pijl, “State Responsibility in Taxation Matters”, 60 Bulletin for international taxation 
(2006), 38 et seq. 
945 See Articles 2 and 4 of the ILC 2001 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts (hereafter “ILC Draft on States’ Responsibility”), available in the annex to General Assembly resolution 
56/83 of 12 December 2001 and corrected by document A/56/49(Vol. I)/Corr.4. 
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recognized that every internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international 
responsibility therefor.946 
However, the same holds true where the interpretation by the State’s organs is 
based on more than one authentic text and on the comparison thereof. In fact, the breach 
of the treaty obligations consists in the conduct of the State’s organs being in violation of 
relevant treaty provisions, as interpreted by the court, tribunal, or other organization 
called to assess the (in)correct application of the treaty by that State. The fact that the 
State’s organs have based their (mis)application of the relevant treaty provisions on an 
interpretation of it that took into account just one or all of the authentic texts of such a 
treaty is immaterial with respect of the existence of a breach. 
One could perhaps wonder whether an interpretation based on the comparison of 
all the authentic texts might more probably conform to the decision of the adjudicator. In 
this respect, the author does not have an answer. Not being a wizard, he merely 
respectfully submits that where the State’s organ applying the treaty has construed the 
chosen authentic text in accordance with the rules of interpretation enshrined in Articles 
31 and 32 VCLT and, in good faith, has arrived at a reasonable, clear and unambiguous 
utterance meaning, without any of the interested parties having raised any issue of 
potential textual divergence, the possibility that an independent adjudicator will decide 
differently solely (or mainly) on the basis of the comparison with the other authentic 
texts appears remote. 
 
Obviously, the fact that the State’s organs have based their “wrong” interpretation of the 
treaty on the comparison of various (or all) authentic texts, following a prima facie 
ambiguity or lack of clarity of the first text consulted, may be taken into account, 
together with other items of evidence, in order to assess the behaviour of that State. This 
assessment could even lead to the conclusion that the State, in the specific case, 
interpreted and applied the treaty in good faith and without any negligent action or 
omission, which could be relevant for the purpose of determining the reparation for the 
injury caused by the internationally wrongful act.947  
 Nonetheless, it is submitted that, in the absence of any potential textual 
divergence raised by the contracting States, their organs, or other persons entitled to the 
benefits of the treaty, which could have been reasonably known by the State’s organs 
(mis)applying the treaty, the fact that such organs have interpreted the treaty fairly, in 
accordance with the provisions of Articles 31 and 32 VCLT, on the basis of a single 
authentic text as implicitly allowed by Article 33(1) and (3) VCLT and have thus arrived 
at a reasonable, unambiguous meaning, would likewise be probably assessed as evidence 
of the State’s good faith in the interpretation and application of the treaty and of the 
absence of any negligent action or omission on its part.  
 
Thus, all in all, it does not seem that the arguments put forward by Hilf definitely set 
aside the issue of whether the interpreter is obliged to refer to the other authentic texts: 
                                                     
946 See Article 1 of the ILC Draft on States’ Responsibility. 
947 See Article 39 and, more generally, Chapter II of the ILC Draft on States’ Responsibility. 
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(i) as soon as the construction based on a single text appears prima facie 
ambiguous, obscure or absurd, or  
(ii) exclusively after the unfruitful application of the rules of interpretation 
enshrined in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT. 
 
3.3.4.3. Evidence from the travaux préparatoires of the VCLT 
 
One could rely on the VCLT travaux préparatoires in order to support solution (i) 
above.  
 
In replying to the Israeli government’s observations on the 1964 draft, the Special 
Rapporteur admitted the “interaction between two versions when each has been 
interpreted in accordance with its own genius and a divergence has appeared between 
them or an ambiguity in one of them”.948 
Moreover, responding to the comments put forward by Mr Rosenne in the course 
of the ILC’s 874th meeting, the Special Rapporteur affirmed that “[t]o erect comparison 
into one of the means of legal interpretation set out in Article 69 would imply that it was 
no longer possible to rely on a single text as an expression of the will of the parties until 
a difficulty arose and that it was necessary to consult all the authentic texts for that 
purpose”.949  
 
Such statements, especially the second one, could be interpreted as evidence that, 
according to Sir Humphrey Waldock, comparison of the authentic texts should have 
been carried out as soon as any difficulty or ambiguity in the interpretation of one text 
emerged.  
 However, the author believes this would be to read too much into two sentences 
whose main purpose was to counteract the proposal to erect the comparison of authentic 
texts as one of the means of interpretation set out in (now) Article 31 VCLT.950  
In addition, this reading would run against the principles of the unity of the 
interpretative process which underlies Articles 31-33 VCLT, and of the right to rely on 
any authentic text for the purpose of construing the treaty. These two principles seem to 
point to the contrary conclusion that (i) ambiguity, lack of clarity, or unreasonableness of 
meaning may be said to exist only as final results of the unitary interpretative process 
encompassing the application of both Articles 31 and 32 VCLT and (ii) the interpreter 
has the right to carry out such a unitary interpretative process on the basis of a single 
authentic text, without any obligation to carry out a textual comparison due to the prima 
facie ambiguity, lack of clarity, or unreasonableness of meaning of that text. 
 
                                                     
948 See YBILC 1966-I (part II), p. 100, para. 23 (emphasis added). 
949 See YBILC 1966-II, p. 211, para. 35 (emphasis added).  
950 See, similarly, F. Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law (Amsterdam: IBFD 
Publications, 2004), pp. 393-394.  
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3.3.4.4. The case law of national and international courts and tribunals 
 
The most prominent evidence in favor of considering the interpreter obliged to refer to 
the other authentic texts exclusively after the unfruitful application of the rules of 
interpretation enshrined in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT is represented by the case law of 
national and international courts and tribunals, which generally rely just on one or two 
authentic texts in order to settle controversies concerning the interpretation of treaties, 
i.e. controversies concerning the meaning to be attributed to certain treaty provisions 
where prima facie ambiguities or lack of clarity exists.951 
 
A clear instance of this is the ICJ’s decision in the Territorial Dispute case,952 where the 
Court had to construe Article 3 of the Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighbourliness 
between France and Libya953 and Annex I thereto.  
The ICJ pointed out that its initial task consisted in interpreting the relevant 
provisions of the treaty, on which the parties had taken divergent positions.954 It then 
stated the following: 
“The Treaty was concluded in French and Arabic, both texts being authentic; the Parties in 
this case have not suggested that there is any divergence between the French and Arabic 
texts, save that the words in Arabic corresponding to ‘sont celles qui résultent’ (are those 
that result) might rather be rendered ‘sont les frontières qui résultent’ (are the frontiers that 
result). The Court will base its interpretation of the Treaty on the authoritative French 
text.”955 
Ultimately, the Court recalled that (i) in accordance with customary international law, as 
reflected in Article 31 VCLT, a treaty must be interpreted in good faith in accordance 
with the ordinary meaning to be given to its terms in their context and in light of its 
object and purpose, (ii) interpretation must be based above all upon the text of the treaty 
and (iii) recourse may be had to means of interpretation such as the travaux 
préparatoires of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, as supplementary 
means of interpretation.956 The ICJ interpreted the ambiguous (for the parties) French 
authentic text of the treaty accordingly.  
 
3.3.4.5. On whether the interpreter is entitled to use supplementary means of 
interpretation to solve the prima facie ambiguity, obscurity, or 
unreasonableness of the interpreted text before resorting to a comparison with 
the other authentic texts 
 
Similarly, it would seem that the distinction between the primary means of interpretation 
                                                     
951 See the references in section 3.3.2.4 of this chapter. 
952 ICJ, 3 February 1994, Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Chad), judgment. 
953 Treaty concluded in Tripoli by the French Republic and the United Kingdom of Libya on 10 August 1955. 
954 ICJ, 3 February 1994, Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Chad), judgment, para. 38.  
955 ICJ, 3 February 1994, Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Chad), judgment, para. 39. 
956 ICJ, 3 February 1994, Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Chad), judgment, para. 41. 
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referred to in Article 31 VCLT and the supplementary means of interpretation referred to 
in Article 32 is not relevant in order to differentiate between cases where the interpreter 
is obliged and cases where he is not obliged to carry out a comparison of the authentic 
treaty texts. Where the interpreter is capable of removing the prima facie ambiguity, 
obscurity, or unreasonableness of meaning by having recourse to the means of 
interpretation provided for in Article 32 VCLT, no obligation should exist for him to 
compare the various authentic texts, exactly as no obligation should exist in cases where 
such a result is achieved on the basis solely of the primary means of interpretation.  
 
In this regard, the author does not agree with Engelen, who submitted that, “when the 
interpretation of any one authentic text in accordance with Article 31 VCLT leaves the 
meaning ambiguous or obscure or leads to a manifestly absurd or unreasonable result, 
the Vienna Convention system of interpretation and, in particular, the principle of good 
faith requires the interpreter to first have recourse to the other authentic texts in order to 
determine the meaning before recourse is had for this purpose to the supplementary 
means of interpretation mentioned in Article 32 VCLT.”957  
Engelen’s conclusion appears to impair the original assumptions (and its 
corollaries of legal certainty and ease of administration) that the various authentic texts 
are equally authoritative and have the same meaning, as well as the principle of unity of 
the interpretative process. As mentioned earlier, Article 33(3) establishes the 
presumption that the meaning attributed to any of the authentic texts, construed in 
isolation, is the utterance meaning of the treaty; as long as this presumption holds true, 
that is until a potential divergence is shown, the clear, reasonable and unambiguous 
meaning inferred from the interpretation of a single authentic text and supported by the 
application of the rules provided for in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT must be seen as 
expressing the “true” agreement of the parties.958   
 
 
3.3.5. The consequences of limiting the obligation to compare the authentic treaty 
texts to cases where an alleged difference of meaning is put forward 
3.3.5.1. The criticism raised by certain scholars 
 
The conclusion that, under the VCLT system, the interpreter is not obliged to carry out 
                                                     
957 See F. Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 
2004), p. 390. See also T. Bender and F. Engelen, “The final clause of the 1987 Netherlands Model Tax 
Convention and the interpretation of plurilingual tax treaties”, in H. van Arendonk, F. Engelen and S. Jansen 
(eds.), A Tax Globalist. Essays in honour of Maarten J. Ellis (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2005), 12 et 
seq., at 23-24. 
958 See P. Germer, “Interpretation of Plurilingual Treaties: A Study of Article 33 of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties”, 11 Harvard International Law Journal (1970), 400 et seq., at 412-413, who affirmed that 
an international adjudicator interpreting a multilingual treaty may rely on any of the authentic texts until he is 
confronted with an alleged divergence between them and referred to the ordinary interpretative practice of the 
ICJ to support that conclusion. See also J. Hardy, “The Interpretation of Plurilingual Treaties by International 
Courts and Tribunals”, 37 British Yearbook of International Law (1961), 72 et seq., at 141 
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any comparison of the authentic treaty texts until an alleged difference of meanings is 
put forward has been criticized by more than one scholar. 
 
Tabory, for instance, mentioned that nothing guarantees that the existence of a 
discrepancy between the various authentic texts is brought to the attention of the 
adjudicator. Absent a legal obligation on the interpreter to compare the various authentic 
texts unless a potential divergence of meanings is put forward by the interested parties, 
the adjudicator “may find itself interpreting a text on the faulty assumption that it reflects 
the meaning of the treaty as a whole, when in fact it contradicts the intended 
meaning”.959  
 From the need to avoid such undesirable result Tabory infers the necessity to 
recognize the usefulness and desirability of the comparison of the different authentic 
texts for the purpose of interpretation, despite the absence of a firm legal obligation to do 
so.960 
 
Similarly, Mössner affirmed that only an interpretation based on all the authentic treaty 
texts is capable of showing the existence of a possible difference of meanings.961  
 
These statements by Tabory and Mössner highlight the obvious: no one may know that 
two different utterance meanings could be derived from two authentic texts before both 
of them have been interpreted and the respective results compared.962  
 Nonetheless, they do not seem to have any significant bearing on the existence of 
a legal obligation to perform a comparison of the authentic texts from the outset of the 
interpretative process.  
 Moreover, if one moves from the basic consideration that treaties are legal 
instruments purported to regulate potential conflicts between persons or group of persons 
and critically analyses the international and domestic case law concerning the 
interpretation of treaties, showing that parties in litigation commonly base their 
arguments on all elements and items of evidence available, the conclusion may be 
                                                     
959 See M. Tabory, Multilingualism In International Law and Institutions (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & 
Noordhoff, 1980), p. 199. See also M. Hilf, Die Auslegung mehrsprachiger Verträge. Eine Untersuchung zum 
Völkerrecht und zum Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1973), pp. 77-78.  
960 See M. Tabory, Multilingualism In International Law and Institutions (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & 
Noordhoff, 1980), pp. 199-200. 
961 See J. M. Mössner, “Die Auslegung mehrsprachiger Staatsverträge, Bemerkungen zu Artikel 33 der Wiener 
Konvention über das Recht der Verträge vom 23. Mai 1969”, 15 Archiv des Völkerrechts (1972), 273 et seq., at 
301. 
962However, the second statement made by Tabory, according to which the adjudicator “may find itself 
interpreting a text on the faulty assumption that it reflects the meaning of the treaty as a whole, when in fact it 
contradicts the intended meaning” is more open to critical comments: for instance, (i) one might wonder who is 
to decide which is the intended meaning, if not the very same adjudicator; (ii) meaning is not something 
hanging in the air and capable of being objectively perceived by everybody – if anything exists that may be 
objectively perceived by everybody; (iii) it is as well possible that the “intended meaning” is derived by a 
different adjudicator on the basis of the very same authentic text; (iv) if the adjudicator found that his 
interpretation led to a clear, unambiguous and reasonable meaning in light of all elements and items of 
evidence available (except the other authentic texts), it could be argued that it is extremely difficult to imagine 
that he might overturn his interpretation solely on the basis of the other authentic texts.   
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reasonably arrived at that if a potential difference in meaning exists between the various 
authentic texts, one of the parties will try to use it in order to support his construction of 
the treaty, notwithstanding that the other party is not aware of or interested in it.  
 Therefore, where in the course of litigation none of the parties refers to a potential 
difference in meaning among the authentic treaty texts, this generally means either that 
no such a potential difference exists, or that no party is interested in it, and therefore 
there is no any need for the subject matter under litigation to be regulated by a rule of 
law different from that which may be reasonably derived from the authentic text used in 
the proceedings.  
 
In a similar vein, Kuner affirmed that Article 33 VCLT, by providing a legal foundation 
for treaty constructions based solely on one authentic text, legitimates a state of affairs in 
which parties may reach different interpretations based on divergent texts and not be 
aware of the differences.963 According to that author, since differences in meaning 
between the various authentic texts are not only possible, but inevitable,964 “an obvious 
defect of [article 33(3) VCLT] presumption is that it works as a rule of enforced 
ignorance which allows such differences to go undetected”.965  
That finding would not be challenged by the fact that the right to rely exclusively 
on one authentic text ceases to be effective as soon as a difference in meaning is 
contended, since, as a matter of fact, few such contentions are ever made in reality and, 
in their absence, there is little chance that a court or tribunal will consult any version but 
the one in the language or languages in which it normally conducts business.966 
In light of the above reasoning, Kuner concluded that, with regard to multilingual 
treaties, it would be better for the interpreter to rely “not solely on a single language text, 
but instead compare several of them”, since “comparison of texts is much more 
compatible with the nature of multilingual treaty texts as containing inevitable 
divergences than is the presumption of similar meaning”.967  
 
The propositions put forward by Kuner may be commented from a twofold perspective. 
On the one hand, if such propositions are regarded as referring to prima facie 
differences in meaning among the authentic texts, they are meaningless since the only 
relevant interpretation for the parties is that resulting at the end of the interpretative 
process based on Articles 31 and 32 VCLT.  
On the other hand, if they are regarded as referring to the potential divergences 
remaining between the clear, unambiguous and reasonable meanings established by 
                                                     
963 See C. B. Kuner, “The Interpretation of Multilingual Treaties: Comparison of Texts versus the Presumption 
of Similar Meaning”, 40 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1991), 953 et seq., at 962.  
964 The author made reference in this respect to paragraph 6 of the Commentary to Article 29 of the 1966 Draft  
(see YBILC 1966-II, p. 225, para. 6). 
965 See C. B. Kuner, “The Interpretation of Multilingual Treaties: Comparison of Texts versus the Presumption 
of Similar Meaning”, 40 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1991), 953 et seq., at 958.  
966 See C. B. Kuner, “The Interpretation of Multilingual Treaties: Comparison of Texts versus the Presumption 
of Similar Meaning”, 40 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1991), 953 et seq., at 958.  
967 See C. B. Kuner, “The Interpretation of Multilingual Treaties: Comparison of Texts versus the Presumption 
of Similar Meaning”, 40 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1991), 953 et seq., at 958-959. 
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construing the various authentic texts, taken in isolation, in accordance with the rules of 
interpretation enshrined in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT, Kuner’s propositions are true. 
However, such cases are much less frequent than Kuner seems to believe. In fact, where 
one single authentic text is construed in isolation by taking into account the overall 
context, i.e. on the basis of all the available elements and items of evidence provided for 
in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT, the author submits that either (i) its meaning remains 
ambiguous or unclear, therefore calling for the comparison with the other authentic texts, 
or (ii) it is so solidly built on such a plurality of elements and items of evidence that, 
absent any indication by the parties of a potential divergence of meanings, it is highly 
probable that the same meaning would be attributed by the very same interpreter to all 
the (other) authentic texts.968  
 
3.3.5.2. An illustrative example: the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in 
the cases Foster v. Neilson and United States v. Percheman  
 
The above conclusion reached by the author is well illustrated by the case law of the US 
Supreme Court that Kuner cited in support of his arguments. 
 
According to Kuner, in the case Foster v. Neilson969 the US Supreme Court consulted 
only the English authentic text of the Adams–Onís treaty970 and concluded that it was not 
a self-executing treaty; four years later,971 the same Court “was forced to reverse itself 
when a discrepancy in the two language versions [i.e. the English and Spanish authentic 
texts] was brought to its attention”.972 
 
However, a close analysis of these two decisions shows that the English authentic text of 
the Adams–Onís treaty, where taken in isolation and properly construed in its overall 
context, could have been reasonably interpreted in two conflicting ways;973 therefore the 
US Supreme Court should also have taken into account the Spanish authentic text in 
order to resolve such an ambiguity. Moreover, it seems to the author that the Spanish 
authentic text could have been construed in accordance with the decision delivered in the 
Foster v. Neilson case, had the overall context pointed in that direction.   
 
                                                     
968 Once more, this conclusion finds its main support in the very limited number of cases where the parties 
have raised the issue of the potential divergence in meaning among the various authentic texts, or where 
different texts have been actually used by the competent courts and tribunals in order to settle the dispute. 
969 Supreme Court (United States), Foster & Elam v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253 (1829).  
970 Treaty of Amity, Settlement, and Limits between the United States of America and Spain, concluded at 
Washington on 22 February 1819. 
971 See Supreme Court (United States), United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. 51 (1832). 
972 See C. B. Kuner, “The Interpretation of Multilingual Treaties: Comparison of Texts versus the Presumption 
of Similar Meaning”, 40 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1991), 953 et seq., at 958. 
973 Even more, the interpretation upheld by the US Supreme Court in the case United States v. Percheman 
appears to the author the one to be preferred in light of the overall context of the construed provision, even 
when only the English authentic text is considered. 
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In both cases, the provision of the Adams–Onís treaty that the Court had to interpret is 
the following: 
 
"All the grants of land made before the 24th of January 1818, by His Catholic Majesty […] 
shall be ratified and confirmed to the persons in possession of the lands to the same extent 
that the same grants would be valid if the territories had remained under the dominion of 
His Catholic Majesty"  
 
“Todas las concesiones de terrenos hechas por su Majestad católica […] antes del 24 de 
enero de 1818 […] quedarán ratificadas y reconocidas á las personas que estén en posesión 
de ellas, del mismo modo que lo serían si su Majestad hubiera continuado en el dominio de 
estos territorios”  
 
The disputes concerned whether the grants of lands made by the King of Spain before 24 
January 1818, within certain territories that had been later transferred by Spain to the 
United States, had to be recognized by the United States even in the absence of a 
domestic act providing the confirmation thereof, i.e. on the basis of the sole Adams–Onís 
treaty.974 
 
In the Foster v. Neilson case, the US Supreme Court found that the above treaty 
provision, in the authentic English text, did not say that such grants were confirmed by 
the treaty.  
 On the contrary, it considered that the language of that provision seemed to be the 
language of contract and, accordingly, the provision was to be intended as a promise of 
ratification and confirmation of those grants by means of the act of the legislature.  
 The Court thus concluded that, until such act was passed, it was not at liberty to 
disregard the existing laws on the subject and to apply the treaty directly.975 
 
Four years later, in the United States v. Percheman case, the Court took a completely 
different approach.  
At the outset, it depicted the framework of the provision at stake. It empahsized 
that, in the practice of the whole civilized world, the cession of a territory by a State was 
never understood to be a cession of the property belonging to its inhabitants; therefore, 
since neither treaty party could have considered that it was attempting to wrong 
individuals, the cession of the territory from Spain to the United States was to be 
necessarily understood as a passing over of the sovereignty only and not as interfering 
with private property.976 
The Court then moved to the analysis of the provision to be interpreted and found 
that it had been apparently introduced on the part of Spain and it had to be intended to 
provide expressly for the security to private property that the laws and usage of nations 
                                                     
974 It must be noted that the Adams–Onís treaty was duly in force and given direct effect in the United States 
under its constitution (see Supreme Court (United States), Foster & Elam v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253 (1829), p. 
314). 
975 See Supreme Court (United States), Foster & Elam v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253 (1829), pp. 314-315. 
976 See Supreme Court (United States), United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. 51 (1832), p. 87. 
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would, without express stipulation, have conferred. On such a basis, it concluded that no 
construction impairing such security further than what the positive words of the 
provision require would have seemed to be admissible, since without that provision the 
titles of individuals would have remained as valid under the new government as they 
were under the old.  
This interpretation was confirmed by the Spanish authentic text of the provision, 
which conformed exactly to the above illustrated universally received doctrine of the law 
of nations. According to the Court, considering that (i) the English and the Spanish texts 
could, without violence, be made to agree, (ii) the security of private property was the 
purpose of the provision as intended by the parties and (iii) such security would have 
been complete even without that treaty provision, the United States had no motive for 
insisting on the interposition of government in order to give validity to titles that, 
according to the usage of the civilized world, were already valid.977  
Finally, the Court noted that the words “shall be ratified and confirmed”, 
although being properly words of contract providing for some future legislative act, were 
not necessarily so. They might import that the grants were “ratified and confirmed” by 
force of the instrument itself. The Court then observed that, since in the Spanish 
authentic texts the corresponding words were used in that sense, such a construction was 
to be regarded as a proper one, if not unavoidable. Ultimately, it made reference to 
Foster v. Neilson and stated that in that case the Spanish text had not been brought to its 
attention and, had it been so brought, the Court believed that it would have produced the 
same construction as in the current case.978  
 
 
3.3.6. Conclusions on research question d)  
 
On the basis of the analysis carried out in the present section, the author submits the 
following. 
 
First, under Article 33 VCLT, any authentic text may be construed by the interpreter in 
isolation, on the basis of the rules of interpretation enshrined in Articles 31 and 32 
VCLT.979 The result of such a construction is the provisional utterance meaning of the 
treaty. 
This implies that no utterance meaning exists before one text has been properly 
construed on the basis of the rules of interpretation enshrined in Articles 31 and 32 
VCLT; therefore, no unclearness, ambiguity, unreasonableness may be said to exist 
before that interpretative process has been brought to its end.  
This further implicates that, even where a prima facie unclearness, ambiguity or 
                                                     
977 See Supreme Court (United States), United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. 51 (1832), pp. 88-89. 
978 See Supreme Court (United States), United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. 51 (1832), p. 89. 
979 It must be noted that the interpreter, in case he gets to know through the analysis of the travaux 
préparatoires or otherwise which is the drafted text and that the other authentic texts are mere translations 
thereof, should have recourse to the analysis of and the comparison with that drafted text for the reasons 
discussed in section 3.2 of this chapter. 
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unreasonableness of the construed text arises, the interpreter continues to be entitled to 
base its interpretation on one single text, taken in isolation. Only where the ambiguity, 
unclearness or unreasonableness results at the end of the interpretative process, the 
interpreter is compelled to compare the various texts as an aid to solving such an 
interpretative issue. 
 
Second, where none of the interested parties has put forward an alleged discrepancy in 
meanings between some of the authentic texts and the interpretation based on a single 
text, taken in isolation, has led to a clear unambiguous and reasonable meaning, the 
provisional utterance meaning may be considered the real common utterance meaning of 
the treaty. 
 
Third, where one of the interested parties puts forward an alleged discrepancy in 
meanings between some of the authentic texts, the interpreter is obliged to compare the 
apparently divergent texts and interpret them in light of that comparison, by applying the 
rules of interpretation enshrined in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT,980 in order to determine 
their real common utterance meaning.981 
 Similarly to what is mentioned in section 3.2 of this chapter, it is possible that, 
where interpreted in isolation, different authentic texts are attributed by the same 
interpreter diverging provisional utterance meanings; however, since the treaty is a 
single instrument by means of which the parties intended to convey a single message 
(independently from the number of its authentic texts), the discrepancy among those 
provisional utterance meanings is just apparent and must be removed by the interpreter 
in order to establish the real common utterance meaning of the various authentic texts.  
  
From a procedural standpoint, the above conclusions imply that each interested party 
may legally rely on a single authentic text until the application of the treaty gives rise to 
a dispute based on the apparent diverging meanings of some of the authentic treaty 
texts.982 
It goes without saying that an a contrario reading of such a conclusion does not 
hold true; the interpreter remains free to analyse each authentic text and to compare such 
texts with each other whenever he considers it helpful to do so. 
 
The above conclusions appear supported by principles (ii), (iv) and (v) established by the 
author in section 2 of Chapter 3 of Part I.  
 In particular, according to principle (ii), where the parties have agreed that more 
                                                     
980 Where one unambiguous, clear and reasonable meaning (the utterance meaning) cannot be attributed to all 
the texts by applying the rules of interpretation enshrined in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT, the utterance meaning 
to be adopted under Article 33(4) VCLT is the one that best reconciles the texts, having regard to the object 
and purpose of the treaty. This solution provided for by Article 33(4) VCLT is analysed in section 3.5 of this 
chapter. 
981 See the reference to the application of Articles 31 and 32 VCLT in Article 33(4), first part, VCLT.  
982 See similarly W. Rudolf, Die Spreche in der Diplomatie und internationalen Verträgen (Frankfurt: 
Athenäum Verlag, 1972), p. 61. 
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than one treaty text is authentic, it is reasonable to infer that those parties intended to 
allow treaty interpretation to be based on any of such authentic texts, taken in isolation, 
together with the elements of the overall context other than the other authentic texts. 
Thus, in order to establish the utterance meaning of a treaty text, the interpreter is 
allowed to use the entire overall context, any segregation of the latter in elements that 
can be used and elements that cannot be used for that purpose being wholly artificial. 
The utterance meaning is the result of a single complex interpretative process and only at 
the end of such a process, taken as a whole, may an utterance meaning be said to exist. 
This principle should direct the interpreter to reject the solution, proposed by some 
scholars, of considering the textual comparison compulsory whenever the meaning of a 
certain authentic text is still unclear, ambiguous or unreasonable where interpreted under 
Article 31 VCLT, but before duly taking into account the supplementary means of 
interpretation of Article 32 VCLT. Except for cases of alleged differences of meaning 
among some of the authentic texts, textual comparison becomes compulsory only where 
the utterance meaning, i.e. the meaning of the interpreted text as established on the basis 
of the entire overall context, is unclear, ambiguous or unreasonable. 
 According to principle (iv) any alleged discrepancy in meaning among the 
authentic texts of a treaty is merely apparent, since the treaty is an instrument for the 
parties to convey a single message and, therefore, it must always be attributed a single 
utterance meaning, notwithstanding the number of authentic texts. As a consequence, 
under principle (v), the interpreter must remove such alleged discrepancies by 
establishing the single utterance meaning of all authentic texts. These principles confirm 
the generally accepted conclusion that the interpreter must take into account all the 
relevant authentic texts whenever a prima facie divergence of meaning among them is 
put forward and must remove such a divergence by establishing the single utterance 
meaning of it. 
 
3.4. Solution to the apparent divergences and discrepancies by means of Articles 31 
and 32 VCLT 
 
3.4.1. Research question addressed in this section  
 
The present section is aimed at tackling the following two research questions, here 
briefly illustrated by means of an example. 
 
e) How should the interpreter solve the prima facie discrepancies among the 
various authentic texts emerging from the comparison? 
 
Consider a case where the application of Article 8(1) of the ECHR is at stake. The latter, 
in its English and French authentic texts, reads as follows (italics by the author):  
 
Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. […] 
--- 
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Toute personne a droit au respect de sa vie privée et familiale, de son domicile et de sa correspondance. […] 
 
The English term “home” generally denotes solely the private dwelling of an individual, 
while the corresponding French term “domicile” has broader intension and may be 
regarded as denoting also business and professional premises.  
 In order to reconcile such a prima facie discrepancy, which elements should the 
interpreter take into account and which arguments should he use? Should his analysis be 
limited to a textual comparison? Should he give preference to one meaning over the 
other exclusively on the basis of the former appearing more in line with the treaty’s 
object and purpose?983 
 
 
3.4.2. Introduction  
 
The analysis of national and international case law shows that, in the vast majority of 
cases, where prima facie divergences of meanings between the various authentic texts 
are put forward by one of the parties, such divergences are removed by the comparison 
and the interpretation of those texts in accordance with Articles 31 and 32 VCLT. 
It seems that the above conclusion is not seriously disputed among scholars. 
Germer, for example, concluded that many of the problems faced by an interpreter of a 
plurilingual treaty can be solved by applying the rules of interpretation provided for in 
Articles 31 and 32 VCLT;984 similar propositions have been expressed by Linderfalk,985 
Hilf,986 Mössner987 and Engelen.988  
 
Thus, in most cases, the interpreter does not solve the apparent divergence of meanings 
by simply selecting the construction most consonant with the object and purpose of the 
treaty,989 but determines in accordance with Articles 31 and 32 VCLT the clear, 
unambiguous and reasonable meaning that may be fairly attributed to all the authentic 
texts being compared.990  
                                                     
983 The example is derived from ECtHR, 16 December 1992, Niemietz v. Germany (Application no. 13710/88). 
984 See P. Germer, “Interpretation of Plurilingual Treaties: A Study of Article 33 of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties”, 11 Harvard International Law Journal (1970), 400 et seq., at 423. 
985 See U. Linderfalk, On the Interpretation of Treaties. The Modern International Law as Expressed in the 
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Dordrecht: Springer-Verlag, 2007), p. 358. 
986 See M. Hilf, Die Auslegung mehrsprachiger Verträge. Eine Untersuchung zum Völkerrecht und zum 
Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1973), p. 102, footnote 436. 
987 See J. M. Mössner, “Die Auslegung mehrsprachiger Staatsverträge, Bemerkungen zu Artikel 33 der Wiener 
Konvention über das Recht der Verträge vom 23. Mai 1969”, 15 Archiv des Völkerrechts (1972), 273 et seq., at 
310. 
988 See F. Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 
2004), p. 395. 
989 As he would be compelled to do, under Article 33(4) VCLT, where the application of the rules of 
interpretation enshrined in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT failed to remove the apparent divergence of meanings 
between the authentic texts. 
990 See similarly M. Tabory, Multilingualism In International Law and Institutions (Alphen aan den Rijn: 
Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1980), p. 200. 
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In this respect, according to the ILC, “[t]he unity of the treaty and of each of its 
terms is of fundamental importance in the interpretation of plurilingual treaties and it is 
safeguarded by combining with the principle of the equal authority of authentic texts the 
presumption that the terms are intended to have the same meaning in each text. This 
presumption requires that every effort should be made to find a common meaning for the 
texts before preferring one to another. […] the first rule for the interpreter is to look for 
the meaning intended by the parties to be attached to the term by applying the standard 
rules for the interpretation of treaties. The plurilingual form of the treaty does not justify 
the interpreter in simply preferring one text to another and discarding the normal means 
of resolving an ambiguity or obscurity on the basis of the objects and purposes of the 
treaty, travaux préparatoires, the surrounding circumstances, subsequent practice, etc. 
On the contrary, the equality of the texts means that every reasonable effort should first 
be made to reconcile the texts and to ascertain the intention of the parties by recourse to 
the normal means of interpretation.”991  
 
 
3.4.3. Judicial instances of the application of Articles 31 and 32 VCLT in order to 
remove the prima facie discrepancies in meaning among the authentic texts 
 
That said, the author considers that the best way to illustrate how an interpretation based 
on the overall context may lead the interpreter to remove the alleged divergences of 
meaning among the authentic treaty texts is to make reference to the arguments actually 
employed by international courts and tribunals to support their chosen construction of 
the relevant treaty provisions.  
 To this end, the author has selected the most comprehensive decisions that tackle 
the issue of the prima facie discrepancies in meaning among authentic treaty texts and 
has highlighted the relevant arguments employed by those courts and tribunals, in the 
context of the pertinent decisions, in the following subsections.992 
 
                                                     
991 See paragraph 7 of the commentary to Article 29 of the 1966 Draft (YBILC 1966-II, p. 225, para. 7). 
992 Other cases, not discussed in the remainder of this section, in which the competent courts and tribunals had 
solved the potential divergences of meanings among the various authentic texts by applying the principles of 
interpretation substantially enshrined in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT (although most of them had been decided 
before the conclusion of the VCLT) are the following: Arbitral Tribunal, Venezuelan Bond cases, 4 
International arbitrations to which the United States has been a party (1898), 3616 et seq., at 3623 et seq.; 
Arbitrator, 20 February 1953, Gold Looted by Germany from Rome, 20 International Law Reports (1953), 441 
et seq., at 473 et seq.; Arbitration Tribunal, 5 August 1926, Deutsche Amerikanische Petroleum Gesellschaft 
Oil Tankers, 2 Reports of International Arbitral Awards, 777 et seq., at 791-795; French-Italian Conciliation 
Commission, 29 August 1949, Différend Impôts extraordinaires sur le patrimoine institués en Italie  - décision 
No. 32, 13 Reports of International Arbitral Awards, 108 et seq., at 111 et seq.; Corte Suprema di Cassazione 
(Italy), 9 December 1974, Ministry of Defence v. Neapolitan Tagboat Company, 77 International Law Reports, 
567 et seq., at 569-570.  
For an example of how treaty interpretation in accordance with Articles 31 and 32 VCLT might remove a 
prima facie discrepancy existing between the meanings of the various authentic texts that is caused by the 
different punctuation therein, see WTO Appellate Body, 7 April 2005, United States – Measures affecting the 
cross-border supply of gambling and betting services, AB-2005-1 (WT/DS285/AB/R), in particular paragraphs 
242 et seq. 
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3.4.3.1. The ICJ decision in the LaGrand case 
 
The LaGrand case,993 although generally presented as a case where the ICJ looked for a 
meaning reconciling the text having regard to the object and purpose of the treaty, is in 
fact a case where the Court removed the prima facie divergence of meanings between 
the various authentic texts by applying Articles 31 and 32 VCLT.994 
 
As previously submitted,995 that case concerned the interpretation of Article 41 of the 
ICJ Statute and, in particular, whether the provisional measures indicated by the ICJ 
pursuant to that article were to be considered to be binding orders.996 In this respect, the 
United States had put forward a prima facie divergence of meanings between the English 
and the French authentic texts of Article 41.  
 
The Court, finding itself faced with two texts potentially not in total harmony, stated that 
in cases of divergence between the equally authentic texts of its Statute, in relation to 
which neither the Statute nor the UN Charter indicated how to proceed, it was 
appropriate to refer to the rule of customary international law reflected in Article 33(4) 
VCLT, according to which “when a comparison of the authentic texts discloses a 
difference of meaning which the application of Articles 31 and 32 does not remove the 
meaning which best reconciles the texts, having regard to the object and purpose of the 
treaty, shall be adopted”.997  
Thus, the ICJ substantially quoted the entire text of Article 33(4) VCLT, 
including the reference to Articles 31 and 32 VCLT, and did not merely recall the last 
sentence thereof, which requires the interpreter to remove any residual difference by 
adopting the meaning that best reconciles the authentic texts having regard to the object 
and purpose of the treaty. Indeed, the Court first affirmed the need to consider the object 
and purpose of its Statute together with the context of Article 41 for the purpose of 
removing the prima facie divergence of meaning998 and then actually removed it by 
means of an interpretation of the English and French authentic texts based on (i) the fact 
that the French text was the drafted text,999 (ii) the object and purpose of its Statute taken 
as a whole, as well as the context and the purpose of Article 41,1000 (iii) the relevant rules 
of international law applicable in the relations between the parties to its Statute1001 and 
                                                     
993 See ICJ, 27 June 2001, LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), judgment. 
994 See ICJ, 27 June 2001, LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), judgment, paras. 101-109. 
995 See section 3.2.3.4 of this chapter, where a more extensive analysis of the case and the reasoning of the 
Court is made. 
996 See ICJ, 27 June 2001, LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), judgment, paras. 98-99. 
997 See ICJ, 27 June 2001, LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), judgment, para. 101. 
998 See ICJ, 27 June 2001, LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), judgment, para. 101. 
999 See ICJ, 27 June 2001, LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), judgment, para. 100. 
1000 See ICJ, 27 June 2001, LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), judgment, para. 102.   
1001 The Court, in particular, made reference to the “principle universally accepted by international tribunals 
and likewise laid down in many conventions […] to the effect that the parties to a case must abstain from any 
measure capable of exercising a prejudicial effect in regard to the execution of the decision to be given, and, in 
general, not allow any step of any kind to be taken which might aggravate or extend the dispute” (see ICJ, 27 
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(iv) the travaux préparatoires of its Statute.1002  
All in all, the ICJ removed the potential divergence of meaning between the 
various authentic texts by construing them on the basis of the interpretative rules 
enshrined in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT. 
 
3.4.3.2. The ICJ decision in the case Military and paramilitary activities in and against 
Nicaragua: the majority opinion  
 
In the Military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua case,1003 which 
concerned a dispute between Nicaragua and the United States of America arising out of 
military and paramilitary activities in Nicaragua, the responsibility for which was 
attributed by the former to the latter State, the ICJ had to decide on its jurisdiction to 
consider and pronounce upon this dispute, as well as on the admissibility of Nicaragua's 
application referring it to the Court. 
 
In order to establish the jurisdiction of the Court, Nicaragua relied, in particular, on 
Article 36(2) of the Statute of the ICJ, which provides that the States parties thereto may 
at any time declare that they recognize the jurisdiction of the ICJ as compulsory ipso 
facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other State accepting the same 
obligation. While the United States made such a declaration on 14 August 1946, 
Nicaragua never made one. However, Nicaragua relied on the provision of Article 36(5) 
of the Statute of the ICJ, according to which "[d]eclarations made under Article 36 of the 
Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice and which are still in force shall 
be deemed, as between the parties to the present Statute, to be acceptances of the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice for the period which they 
still have to run and in accordance with their terms."1004 
Under Article 36 of the Statute of the PCIJ, the "Members of the League of 
Nations […] may, either when signing or ratifying the Protocol [of Signature] to which 
the present Statute is adjoined, or at a later moment, declare that they recognize as 
compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other Member or 
State accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court". It is relevant to note 
that a State member of the League of Nations became a party to the Statute of the PCIJ 
only where it acceded to the Protocol of Signature of the Statute of that Court. The 
Protocol, in this respect, provided that, in order to accede thereto, it was necessary for a 
State not only to sign and ratify the Protocol, but also to send the instrument of 
ratification to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations. 
                                                                                                                                  
June 2001, LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), judgment, para. 103, where the Court also 
referred to the decision of the PCIJ in the case Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria (see PCIJ, 5 
December 1939, Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria, order, p. 199)). 
1002 See ICJ, 27 June 2001, LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), judgment, paras. 104-107. 
1003 ICJ, 26 November 1984, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. 
United States of America), judgment.  
1004 Emphasis added. 
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On 24 September 1929, as a member of the League of Nations, Nicaragua signed 
the Protocol of Signature of the Statute of the PCIJ and deposited with the Secretary-
General of the League of Nations a declaration recognizing as unconditionally 
compulsory the jurisdiction of the PCIJ.  
In 1935, the national authorities of Nicaragua authorized the ratification of the 
Protocol of Signature and the Statute of the PCIJ; on 29 November 1939, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Nicaragua sent a telegram to the Secretary-General of the League of 
Nations advising it of the dispatch of the instrument of ratification. The files of the 
League, however, contained no record of an instrument of ratification ever having been 
received and no evidence had been adduced to show that such an instrument of 
ratification was ever dispatched to Geneva.  
After the Second World War, Nicaragua became an original Member of the 
United Nations, having ratified the Charter on 6 September 1945; on 24 October 1945 
the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which is an integral part of the Charter, 
came into force (also for Nicaragua).  
On the basis of the above, the United States contended that Nicaragua never 
became a party to the Statute of the PCIJ and, thus, its 1929 declaration was not "still in 
force" within the meaning of the English text of Article 36(5) of the Statute of the ICJ, 
since it never entered into force. 
 
The ICJ pointed out that,1005 in order to determine whether the provisions of Article 
36(5) of its Statute could have applied to Nicaragua's declaration of 1929, it had first (i) 
to establish the legal characteristics of that declaration and then (ii) to compare them 
with the conditions laid down by the text of the above-mentioned article.1006 
 
With regard to point (i), the ICJ noted that, at the time its Statute entered into force, 
Nicaragua’s 1929 declaration was certainly valid, since under Article 36 of the PCIJ 
Statute a declaration was valid on condition that it had been made by a State either when 
signing or ratifying the Protocol of Signature (or at a later moment) and Nicaragua 
actually signed that Protocol. However, the Court also recognized that declaration, 
although valid, had not become binding under the Statute of the PCIJ, since Nicaragua 
had not been able to prove that it accomplished the indispensable step of sending its 
instrument of ratification to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations.1007  
From such a premise the Court inferred that Nicaragua’s 1929 declaration could 
unquestionably have acquired binding force at least till the ICJ came into existence; in 
fact, since that declaration had been made “unconditionally”, its potential legal effect, 
i.e. its validity, could be maintained indefinitely.  
 
                                                     
1005 See ICJ, 26 November 1984, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. 
United States of America), judgment, para. 24. 
1006 I.e. the legal characteristics that a declaration must have to be relevant for the application of Article 36(5) 
of the ICJ Statute. 
1007 See ICJ, 26 November 1984, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. 
United States of America), udgment, para. 25. 
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With regard to point (ii), the parties raised the issue before the Court that the English and 
French authentic texts of Article 36(5) of its Statute could potentially be attributed 
diverging meanings.1008 The relevant French text read as follows: “[l]es déclarations 
faites en application de l'Article 36 du Statut de la Cour permanente de Justice 
internationale pour une durée qui n'est pas encore expirée seront considérées, dans les 
rapports entre parties au présent Statut, comme comportant acceptation de la juridiction 
obligatoire de la Cour internationale de Justice pour la durée restant à courir d'après ces 
déclarations et conformément à leurs termes.”1009  
 The Court was thus confronted with the task of determining the (common) 
meaning to be attributed to the corresponding expressions “which are still in force” and 
“faites […] pour une durée qui n'est pas encore expirée”, in order to conclude whether a 
declaration such as that made by Nicaragua in 1929, which was valid, although not 
legally binding, under the PCIJ system, satisfied the conditions established by Article 
36(5) of the ICJ Statute for it to be regarded as an acceptance of the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the ICJ.  
The Court found that the above two expressions had the same meaning and they 
did not require a declaration made under the system of the PCIJ to be binding, in order to 
be regarded as an acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ under Article 
36(5) of its Statute, the existence of a valid declaration sufficing for that purpose. The 
Court reached such a conclusion by construing the two texts on the basis of the rules of 
interpretation enshrined in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT, although without making explicit 
references to them. In fact, it determined the meaning of the above-mentioned 
expressions taking into account (i) their context, (ii) the travaux préparatoires and the 
circumstances of the conclusion of the ICJ Statute, (iii) the object and purpose of the ICJ 
Statute and, in particular, that of Article 36(5) thereof and (iv) the subsequent practice of 
the parties to that Statute.   
With regard to the context of the interpreted expressions, the Court noted that 
Article 36(5) refrains from stipulating that declarations had to be made by States parties 
to the PCIJ Statute, which would have indirectly required the declaration to be binding; 
on the contrary, it only stipulates that the declaration had to be made “under" (in French, 
"en application de") Article 36 of the PCIJ Statute. In this respect, the Court considered 
that, since the drafters of Article 36(5) of the ICJ Statute were aware that under Article 
36 of the PCIJ Statute a State could have made a declaration even without being a part of 
the Statute (i.e. before ratifying its Protocol of Signature), it was natural to conclude that 
the chosen expressions “[d]eclarations made under article 36” and “déclarations faites en 
application de l'Article 36” covered a declaration such as that made by Nicaragua.1010  
With regard to the travaux préparatoires and the circumstances of the conclusion 
of the ICJ Statute, the Court, after highlighting that neither the English nor the French 
authentic texts include the term “binding”, as qualifier of the term “declaration”, noted 
                                                     
1008 The ICJ Statute has five equally binding authentic texts, i.e. in the English, French, Spanish, Russian and 
Chinese languages.  
1009 Emphasis added. 
1010 See ICJ, 26 November 1984, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. 
United States of America), judgment, para. 28. 
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that pursuant to the travaux préparatoires the word "binding" had never been suggested 
and, had it been suggested for the English text, there was no doubt that the drafters 
would have never let the French text stand as finally worded. In fact, according to the 
Court, the French expression “une durée qui n'est pas encore expirée” did not imply a 
commitment of a binding character: while it might be granted that, for a period to 
continue or expire, it is necessary for some legal effect to have come into existence, such 
effect does not necessarily have to be of a binding nature. In particular, a declaration 
made under Article 36 of PCIJ Statute had a certain validity that could be preserved or 
destroyed and it was perfectly possible to read the French text as implying only this 
validity.1011 
In addition, the ICJ pointed out that the French Delegation at the San Francisco 
Conference called for the English expression "still in force" to be translated, not by the 
French expression “encore en vigueur”, but by the different “pour une durée qui n'est pas 
encore expirée”. The Court concluded, in view of the excellent equivalence of the 
expressions “encore en vigueur” and “still in force”, that the deliberate choice of the 
expression “pour une durée qui n'est pas encore expirée” seemed to denote the intention 
to widen the scope of Article 36(5) of the ICJ Statute so as to cover declarations which 
have not acquired binding force. Ultimately, the Court submitted that such a construction 
of the French text was in conformity with the English text as well, the latter requiring the 
declarations concerned neither to have been made by States parties to the PCIJ Statute 
nor (expressly) to be of a binding character.1012  
With regard to the object and purpose of the interpreted provision, the Court 
affirmed that, in its interpretative process, it had to examine to what extent the general 
considerations governing the transfer of the powers of the PCIJ to the ICJ, and thus 
serving to define the object and the purpose of the provisions adopted in the latter’s 
Statute, threw light upon the correct construction of Article 36(5) thereof. The ICJ 
recalled1013 that the primary concern of those who drafted its Statute was to maintain the 
greatest possible continuity between the two courts and, with specific reference to 
Article 36(5), to preserve existing acceptances and to avoid that the creation of a new 
court should frustrate progress already achieved.1014 
                                                     
1011 See ICJ, 26 November 1984, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. 
United States of America), judgment, para. 30. 
1012 See ICJ, 26 November 1984, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. 
United States of America), judgment, para. 31. 
1013 See ICJ, 26 November 1984, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. 
United States of America), judgment, para. 32. 
1014 In this respect, it is interesting to note that the conclusions reached by the Court on the object and purpose 
of its Statute and, in particular, Article 36(5) thereof were largely based on its travaux préparatoires and the 
circumstances of its conclusion. To this extent, see also ICJ, 26 May 1959, Aerial Incident of 27 July 1955 
(Israel v. Bulgaria), judgment, p. 145. In addition, see the reference made by the ICJ to the report of the 
Chairman of the New Zealand delegation to the San Francisco Conference to his Government, where he 
stressed that the primary concern had been "to maintain so far as possible the progress towards compulsory 
jurisdiction"; the statement of the ICJ that “[i]f, for a number of circumstantial reasons, it seemed necessary to 
abolish the former Court and to put the new one in its place, at least the delegates to the San Francisco 
Conference were determined to see that this operation should not result in a step backwards in relation to the 
progress accomplished towards adopting a system of compulsory jurisdiction” (see ICJ, 26 November 1984, 
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In this respect, the Court found it undeniable that a declaration such as the 
Nicaragua’s 1929 declaration constituted a certain progress towards extending to the 
world in general the system of compulsory judicial settlement of international disputes, 
notwithstanding the fact that it had not taken the concrete form of a commitment having 
binding force under the PCIJ system. It thus concluded that there were no grounds for 
maintaining that the drafters of the ICJ Statute meant to go back on this progress and 
place it in a category in opposition to the progress achieved by declarations having 
binding force. In fact, although no doubt existed that their main aim was to safeguard the 
latter declarations, the intention to wipe out the progress evidenced by a declaration such 
as that of Nicaragua would have certainly not squared well with their general concern. 
The ICJ added that, in light of the above, it was fair to presume that, if the highly 
experienced drafters of the Statute had had a restrictive intention on this point, in 
contrast to their overall concern, they would certainly have translated it into a very 
different formula from the one they in fact adopted.1015 
Therefore, according to Court, the logic of a system substituting the ICJ for the 
PCIJ without producing any detriment to the cause of compulsory jurisdiction implied 
that the ratification of the ICJ Statute must have exactly the same effects as the 
ratification of the Protocol of Signature of the PCIJ: in the case of Nicaragua, this had 
converted a potential commitment into an effective one.1016  
Finally, with regard to the subsequent practice of the parties to ICJ Statute, the 
Court stated that particular weight had to be ascribed to certain official publications, 
namely the ICJ Yearbook, the Reports of the ICJ to the UN General Assembly and the 
annually published collection of Signatures, Ratifications, Acceptances, Accessions, etc., 
concerning the Multilateral Conventions and Agreements in respect of which the 
Secretary-General acts as Depositary. The Court noted that, ever since they first 
appeared, all these publications had regularly placed Nicaragua on the list of those States 
that have recognized the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ by virtue of Article 36(5) of 
its Statute.1017  
The Court affirmed that such publications attested to a certain interpretation of 
Article 36(5), whereby that provision would cover the declaration of Nicaragua, and the 
rejection of an opposite interpretation, which would refuse to classify Nicaragua among 
the States covered by that article. Moreover, the inclusion of Nicaragua in the list of 
States that have recognized the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ visibly contrasted with 
its exclusion from the corresponding list issued in the last Report of the PCIJ.1018 
The Court further submitted that the importance of those publications did not lie 
                                                                                                                                  
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), 
judgment, para. 33). 
1015 See ICJ, 26 November 1984, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. 
United States of America), judgment, para. 34. 
1016 See ICJ, 26 November 1984, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. 
United States of America), judgment, para. 35. 
1017 See ICJ, 26 November 1984, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. 
United States of America), judgment, para. 36. 
1018 See ICJ, 26 November 1984, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. 
United States of America), judgment, para. 37. 
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in their content as such, but in the fact that they amounted over a period of nearly 40 
years to a series of identical attestations, which were entirely official, public and 
extremely numerous; and, even more significantly, in the corollary that the States 
concerned - first and foremost Nicaragua - had had every opportunity of accepting or 
rejecting the thus-proclaimed applicability of Article 36(5) of the ICJ Statute to the 
Nicaragua’s 1929 Declaration.1019  
However, as the Court actually noted, Nicaragua had at no moment either 
explicitly recognized, or denied that it was bound by its recognition of the ICJ’s 
compulsory jurisdiction. According to the Court, against the background of the above-
mentioned publications, the silence of the Nicaraguan Government could only be 
interpreted as an acceptance of the classification thus assigned to it; in the wording of the 
ICJ, it could not be supposed that “that Government could have believed that its silence 
could be tantamount to anything other than acquiescence”.1020 
The Court additionally mentioned that States other than Nicaragua had never 
challenged the interpretation to which the publications of the United Nations bore 
witness and, on the contrary, had included Nicaragua in their own lists of States bound 
by the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ. Although the Court recognized that such 
national publications simply reproduced those of the United Nations, it also found that it 
would have been difficult to interpret such reproductions as signifying an objection to 
the above interpretation; vice-versa they contributed to confirming the acceptance by 
such States of the applicability to Nicaragua of Article 36(5) of the ICJ Statute.1021  
 On the basis of the above-mentioned analysis, the Court concluded that the 
subsequent conduct of the parties to the ICJ Statute confirmed the interpretation whereby 
Article 36(5) of that Statute covered a declaration such as the one made by Nicaragua in 
1929.1022  
 
3.4.3.3. The ICJ decision in the Military and paramilitary activities in and against 
Nicaragua case: the separate opinion of Sir Robert Jennings  
 
From the author’s perspective, it is extremely interesting to note how Sir Robert 
Jennings,1023 in his separate opinion in the Military and paramilitary activities in and 
against Nicaragua case, arrived at conclusion opposite to the one taken by the majority 
of the judges with regard to the meaning attributable to Article 36(5) of the ICJ Statute. 
Sir Robert Jennings argued for his interpretation of Article 36(5) of the ICJ Statute on 
                                                     
1019 See ICJ, 26 November 1984, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. 
United States of America), judgment, para. 38. 
1020 See ICJ, 26 November 1984, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. 
United States of America), judgment, para. 39. 
1021 See ICJ, 26 November 1984, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. 
United States of America), judgment, para. 40. 
1022 See ICJ, 26 November 1984, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. 
United States of America), judgment, para. 42; see also para. 47 of the same judgment. 
1023 ICJ, 26 November 1984, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. 
United States of America), judgment, separate opinion of Judge Sir Robert Jennings, pp. 533-557. 
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the basis of: 
(a) a different allocation, as compared to the majority, of persuasive weight 
among the common items of evidence and  
(b) a different construction, as compared to the majority, of certain available 
elements in order to derive the relevant evidence.  
This constitutes another instance confirming that:  
(i) the process of interpretation, under the VCLT system, is much less “textual” 
than scholars generally pretend it to be and  
(ii) legal practitioners arrive at their own interpretation on the basis of an intuitive 
process that is influenced by their cultural and political backgrounds and then 
justify such an interpretation on the basis of the ascending and descending 
arguments that may be reasonably construed as supporting the chosen 
interpretation.  
 
At first, Sir Robert Jennings noted that that the Nicaragua’s 1929 Declaration could not 
be covered by Article 36(5) of the ICJ Statute since the latter required, according to its 
English text, that declarations had to be “still in force”, while the Nicaragua’s 1929 
Declaration had never been “in force” in respect of the PCIJ.1024 Hence, although not 
explicitly recalling the distinction drew by the majority between valid and compulsory 
declarations, he seemed to consider that for a self-binding declaration1025 to “be in 
force”, it is necessary that it legally binds the declaring State to the conduct provided 
therein, its mere validity1026 not sufficing for that purpose.   
 
Secondly, Sir Robert Jennings found such an interpretation to be in conformity with 
what the travaux préparatoires showed to have been the purpose of that provision. In 
this respect, he recalled that Article 36(5) of the ICJ Statute was the result of a British 
proposal made in, and accepted by, a subcommittee of the Committee of Jurists which 
met in Washington in 1945; he also noted that it was the subcommittee’s opinion that, 
since many States had previously accepted compulsory jurisdiction under the PCIJ 
Statute, provision should have been made at the San Francisco Conference “for a special 
agreement for continuing these acceptances in force” for the purpose of the ICJ Statute. 
According to Sir Robert Jennings, thus, the proposal was to achieve the continuity of 
existing obligations and certainly not to create a new obligation where none existed 
before.1027  
 
Thirdly, he mentioned that, from a linguistic standpoint the other authentic texts of 
Article 36(5) of the ICJ Statute (i.e. the Chinese, Russian and Spanish texts) apparently 
translated the formulation of the criterion of continuity expressed by the English term 
                                                     
1024 See ICJ, 26 November 1984, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. 
United States of America), judgment, separate opinion of Judge Sir Robert Jennings, p. 536. 
1025 Such as the one provided for under Article 36 of the PCIJ Statute. 
1026 I.e. its capability to acquire binding force at the occurrence of a certain event. 
1027 See ICJ, 26 November 1984, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. 
United States of America), judgment, separate opinion of Judge Sir Robert Jennings, p. 536. 
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“which are still in force”.  
He also noted that the final French version of that article was proposed by the 
French delegation at the San Francisco Conference, who conversely did not suggest any 
change to the corresponding English text. The proposal, in fact, was limited to replacing 
the expression “pour une durée qui n'est pas encore expiree” for the former “encore en 
vigueur”, which corresponded to the English “still in force”. In this respect, Sir Robert 
Jennings mentioned that, according to the official report of the meeting, the “French 
Representative stated that the changes suggested by him […] were not substantive ones, 
but were intended to improve the phraseology."1028  
He then recalled that, under the provision of Article 33(4) VCLT, where two 
authentic texts were capable of different meanings, the interpreter was required to adopt 
the meaning best reconciling the texts, having regard to the object and purpose of the 
treaty. In his opinion, that requirement banned any solution seeking to give a special 
meaning to the French text, which could not be seen in the Chinese, English, Russian 
and Spanish either.1029  
 Based on these premises, he went on in quest of a common meaning to be 
attributed to all authentic texts. He noted that, in Article 36(5) of the ICJ Statute, the 
word “still” seemed to convey the idea of something which was in force for the PCIJ and 
was therefore to be deemed "still in force" for the ICJ; in that sense, there was an 
important difference between being simply “in force” and being “still in force”. Against 
this background and taking into account that the French Delegation, on the one hand, did 
not propose any change to the English text and, on the other hand, affirmed that the 
proposal to modify the French text was intended solely to improve the phraseology, Sir 
Robert Jennings concluded that the only reasonable explanation to such a proposed 
change was that the French Delegation considered the alternative French text capable of 
conveying more clearly the meaning and purpose of the English expression “still in 
force”. Therefore, the final French text seized upon the notion of continuity as the 
essential criterion of the declarations: what did matter was not only that a declaration 
was “in force” in its terms, but that it had been in force for the PCIJ and had been 
expressed for a period that continued and was still not expired. That interpretation of the 
French text was confirmed by the fact that it retained the important qualifying adverb 
“encore”.1030  
 Ultimately, Sir Robert Jennings expressed the view that (i) it was doubtful that 
there was any material difference between the meanings of the various authentic texts 
and, in any case, (ii) if such a difference existed, he was bound to adopt the meaning that 
best reconciled all the five language versions.  
He submitted that a declaration of acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction, which 
had never come into operation under the PCIJ Statute, certainly could not be said to be 
                                                     
1028 See ICJ, 26 November 1984, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. 
United States of America), judgment, separate opinion of Judge Sir Robert Jennings, p. 537. 
1029 See ICJ, 26 November 1984, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. 
United States of America), judgment, separate opinion of Judge Sir Robert Jennings, p. 537. 
1030 See ICJ, 26 November 1984, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. 
United States of America), judgment, separate opinion of Judge Sir Robert Jennings, p. 538. 
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“still in force” under the ICJ Statute, that being the requirement clearly established by 
four authentic texts of the very same Statute (in the English, Chinese, Spanish and 
Russian languages); that interpretation was consistent with the object and purpose of 
Article 36(5) of the ICJ Statute, i.e. the carry-over to the ICJ of obligations created in 
respect of the PCIJ.   
Moreover, he found there was no difficulty in attributing the same meaning to the 
French authentic text, which, by means of the expression “pour une durée qui n'est pas 
encore expirée”, certainly referred to a declaration by which the compulsory jurisdiction 
of the PCIJ was actually established; in fact, a declaration to which no date of 
commencement of the obligation in respect of the PCIJ could be assigned, owing to the 
failure to ratify the Protocol of Signature, could not be said to be “pour une durée qui 
n'est pas encore expirée”, for what had never begun could not be said to have had a 
duration at all.1031  
 
3.4.3.4. The ICJ decision in the Elettronica Sicula case 
 
In the Elettronica Sicula case,1032 the ICJ had to interpret the 1948 Treaty of Friendship, 
Commerce and Navigation between Italy and the United States of America1033 and the 
1951 Supplementary agreement thereto,1034 for the purpose of deciding on their alleged 
violation by Italy. Among other issues, the Court was called upon to decide whether the 
fact that two US corporations wholly owned the capital of an Italian corporation, which 
in turn owned immovable property in Italy, could be regarded as entailing that those two 
US corporations owned “immovable property or interests therein” in Italy, as provided 
for in Article VII(1) of the 1948 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation 
between Italy and the United States of America.  
 
Italy relied on the Italian text of the treaty, which was one of the two authentic texts 
thereof together with the English text, for the purpose of denying such an entailment. 
The Italian text of Article VII(1) made reference to the owning “di beni immobili o di 
altri diritti reali”. According to Italy, the provision at stake did not apply to the two US 
corporations since their own property rights (“diritti reali”) were limited to shares in the 
Italian corporation, while the immovable property (“bene immobile”) was exclusively 
owned by the latter.  
 The United States, however, contended that the English expression "immovable 
property or interests therein" was sufficiently broad to include indirect ownership of 
property rights held through an Italian subsidiary.  
 In this regard, both parties had dealt with the potential divergence in meaning 
between the Italian and English expressions to support their respective positions. 
                                                     
1031 See ICJ, 26 November 1984, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. 
United States of America), judgment, separate opinion of Judge Sir Robert Jennings, pp. 538-539. 
1032 ICJ, 20 July 1989, Case concerning Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (United States of America v. Italy), judgment. 
1033 Treaty concluded in Rome on 2 February 1948. 
1034 Agreement concluded in Washington on 26 September 1951.  




Ultimately, the Court found that, although no doubt having several possible meanings, 
the term “interest” in English usage was commonly used to denote different kinds of 
rights in land. Hence, it concluded that it was possible to interpret the English and Italian 
authentic texts of Article VII as meaning much the same thing, i.e. as converging toward 
the more restrictive “Italian” meaning, especially as the clause in question was in any 
event limited to immovable property. That said, however, the Court stated that it had 
some sympathy with the contention of the United States, as being more in accord with 
the object and purpose of the treaty.1035  
 
Although the ICJ did not have to solve the above interpretative issue in order to decide 
the case,1036 its reasoning shows how far a court might be led by the object and purpose 
of the treaty in its attempt to determine the common meaning of two or more authentic 
texts.  
 
3.4.3.5. The decision of the Italian-United States Conciliation Commission in the 
Flegenheimer case 
 
In the Flegenheimer case,1037 the Italian-United States Conciliation Commission1038 had 
to interpret Article 78(9)(a)(2) of the 1947 Peace Treaty between Italy the Allied and 
Associated Powers (hereafter “1947 Peace Treaty”)1039 in order to decide whether Mr 
Flegenheimer could be considered a “United Nations national” for the purpose of the 
same Article 78 and, as such, enjoy the legal protection provided for therein. 
 
The case originated from the request made by the Government of the United States of 
cancellation of the sale of shares in an Italian company concluded by Mr Flegenheimer 
in 1941 at a price significantly lower than the market price. The United States petition 
was argued on the basis that Mr Flegenheimer, of the Jewish faith, fearing that the anti-
Semitic legislation enacted in Italy in 1938 might be applied to him, concluded such an 
unfavorable sale contract under conditions of force or duress, so that the contract was 
void ab initio and Mr Flegenheimer had the right to be restored under Article 78(3) of 
the above-mentioned 1947 Peace Treaty,1040 which in the English authentic text reads as 
                                                     
1035 See ICJ, 20 July 1989, Case concerning Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (United States of America v. Italy), 
judgment, para. 132. 
1036 See ICJ, 20 July 1989, Case concerning Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (United States of America v. Italy), 
judgment, paras. 133-136. 
1037 Italian-United States Conciliation Commission, 20 September 1958, Flegenheimer case – decision No. 182, 
14 Reports of International Arbitral Awards, 327 et seq. 
1038 Italian-United States Conciliation Commission, established under Article 83 of the Treaty of Peace between 
the Allied and Associated Powers and Italy, concluded in Paris on 10 February 1947. 
1039 Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Italy, concluded in Paris on 10 February 
1947. 
1040 See Italian-United States Conciliation Commission, 20 September 1958, Flegenheimer case – decision No. 
182, 14 Reports of International Arbitral Awards, 327 et seq., para. 1.  




The Italian Government shall invalidate transfers involving property, rights and interests of 
any description belonging to United Nations nationals, where such transfers resulted from 
force or duress exerted by Axis Governments or their agencies during the war. 
 
The right to restoration, however, was subject to the condition that Mr Flegenheimer 
might be considered a “United Nations national”. This, in turn, raised the issue of the 
interpretation of Article 78(9)(a)(2) of the 1947 Peace Treaty, which in the English 
authentic text reads as follows:  
 
“United Nations nationals” also includes all individuals, corporations or associations which, 
under the laws in force in Italy during the war, have been treated as enemy. 
 
The Government of the United States contended that Article 78(9)(a)(2) had the effect of 
including in the expression “United Nations nationals” all individuals, who were not 
necessarily “treated” as enemies, but “considered” to be such under the legislation in 
force in Italy during the war.  
 It based its interpretation on the Russian authentic text1041 of that article, where 
the term “rassmatrivat” was used. According to the United States Government, 
“rassmatrivat” was an unambiguous term and could only be given the same meaning of 
the English term “considered”, while the term “treated” could be translated in Russian by 
the different terms “obchoditsia” and “podvergnut dejstwiyu”, which, however, had not 
been adopted in the treaty text.  
 Since under Article 90 of the 1947 Peace Treaty the English, French and Russian 
texts were equally authentic, the Russian text had to be taken into account in order to 
interpret Article 78(9)(a)(2); in this respect, the United States Government referred to 
decision No. 32 of the French – Italian Conciliation Commission, according to which 
“[q]uelle que soit la genèse des deux textes il n'est pas licite de s'en tenir exclusivement à 
l'un des deux; l'interprète doit plutôt s'efforcer d'éclairer l'un en se servant de l'autre”.1042  
That Government, moreover, argued that in the specific case preference was to be 
given to the authentic Russian text since the term “rassmatrivat” exactly corresponded to 
the term “considerate”, which was used in the Italian translation of the 1947 Peace 
Treaty. Although such a translation did not have the value of an authenticated text, the 
United States Government contended that it could be opposed to the Italian Government 
in the case at stake, since it expressed in a clear and unequivocal manner the meaning 
attached by Italy to Article 78(9)(a)(2). Therefore, since the contracting parties, Italy in 
particular, had originally attributed to the terms “treated”, “traités” and “rassmatrivat”1043 
                                                     
1041 The 1947 Peace Treaty was concluded in three authentic languages, those being English, French and 
Russian; in addition, a translation in the Italian language had been prepared as well in the course of the 
negotiations (see Article 90 of the 1947 Peace Treaty). 
1042 French-Italian Conciliation Commission, 29 August 1949, Différend Impôts extraordinaires sur le 
patrimoine institués en Italie  - décision No. 32, 13 Reports of International Arbitral Awards, 108 et seq., at 
112. 
1043 I.e. the corresponding terms used in the English, French and Russian authentic texts of Article 78(9)(a)(2). 
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the meaning corresponding to the English term “considered” and the Italian term 
“considerate”, Italy was no longer allowed, by virtue of the doctrine of estoppel, to give 
such terms another meaning in order to modify the extent of its obligations.1044  
 
The Italian Government, on the other hand, denied the correctness of the United States’s 
arguments, contending that the mere possibility of being “considered” as enemy was not 
sufficient to entitle a person to the restitution and restoration imposed by the 1947 Peace 
Treaty on Italy and that, for such a purpose, it was necessary that he had been actually 
“treated” as enemy.1045  
 
The Italian-United States Conciliation Commission rejected the arguments put forward 
by the United States. 
It recognized, at the outset, that the interpreter should make all possible efforts in 
order to reconcile the three authentic texts, while he was not entitled to use the Italian 
translation for the purpose of corroborating the interpretation of some of them because of 
its unauthentic status. In this respect, it stated that “the interpretation of the text of a 
treaty [could] be made only by using the versions that have been declared to be 
authenticated originals by the Treaty itself”.1046  
With regard to the terms “treated” and “traités”, used in the English and French 
authentic texts, respectively, the Commission found, on the basis of dictionaries analysis, 
that their usual and natural meaning was conveyed by the expression “to act towards a 
person in such and such a manner”; it also found that, since it was universally admitted 
in international law that the natural meaning of the terms used had to be taken as the 
starting point of the process of treaty interpretation, such a meaning had to be given a 
significant weight for the purpose of construing Article 78(9)(a)(2) of the 1947 Peace 
Treaty, especially where compared to other, unusual meanings that those two terms 
might have in the respective languages.1047  
It then pointed out that the Russian authentic text could not be exactly reconciled 
with the English and French texts, as interpreted in their natural and usual manner. In 
such a situation, the Commission believed that, according to the teachings of 
international law, “that adjustment should be made on the basis of a “common 
denominator which answer[ed] the meaning of all the [authentic] texts”.1048 It is 
interesting to note, however, that the Commission, right after such a statement, went on 
to say that it was “universally admitted that treaties [could] confer rights and impose 
obligations on the contracting States only within the limits within which the intent of 
                                                     
1044 See Italian-United States Conciliation Commission, 20 September 1958, Flegenheimer case – decision No. 
182, 14 Reports of International Arbitral Awards, 327 et seq., para. 65. 
1045 See Italian-United States Conciliation Commission, 20 September 1958, Flegenheimer case – decision No. 
182, 14 Reports of International Arbitral Awards, 327 et seq., para. 65. 
1046 See Italian-United States Conciliation Commission, 20 September 1958, Flegenheimer case – decision No. 
182, 14 Reports of International Arbitral Awards, 327 et seq., para. 66, letter a). 
1047 See Italian-United States Conciliation Commission, 20 September 1958, Flegenheimer case – decision No. 
182, 14 Reports of International Arbitral Awards, 327 et seq., para. 66, letter a). 
1048 See Italian-United States Conciliation Commission, 20 September 1958, Flegenheimer case – decision No. 
182, 14 Reports of International Arbitral Awards, 327 et seq., para. 66, letter b). 
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these States became manifest in a concordant manner.” The Commission then concluded 
that it was clear that the meaning of the term “rassmatrivat” in the Russian text, where 
interpreted as a synonym of the English “considered”, included the natural and usual 
meaning of the English and French terms “treated” and “traités”, for a person treated as 
enemy by the Italian Government have had forcibly been first considered to be enemy by 
the very same Government, whereas the reverse proposition did not hold true. Thus, it 
might be reasonably argued that the plea of the Commission for a “common 
denominator” interpretation was in fact a defense of the interpretation imposing treaty 
obligations on the contracting States (in this case Italy) only in so far it was manifest that 
all parties agreed thereupon, i.e. that no obligation could be imposed on a contracting 
State that had never agreed to it, that being in accordance with the basic principles of 
equality and sovereignty of States. Similarly, one might have good arguments to 
conclude that the Commission would have not similarly upheld a “common 
denominator” interpretation, where it had resulted in adopting the meaning imposing the 
more burdensome obligations on the contracting States.1049 
Another argument that could be used to dull the emphasis on the supposed 
“common denominator” nature of the interpretation endorsed by the Commission is 
represented by the fact that the latter justified its interpretation of Article 78(9)(a)(2) on 
the basis of a contextual analysis, as well as in light of the object and purpose of the 
treaty.  
At first, the Commission explicitly stated that the “true and proper meaning of all 
international treaties should always be found in the purpose aimed at by the Parties”.1050 
In this respect, it noted that the Russian authentic text of Article 78(9)(a)(2), as 
interpreted by the United States Government, did not seem to answer the intent of the 
contracting Parties, at the time they drew up the Part VII of the 1947 Peace Treaty, 
which contained Article 78. In particular, the Commission found that the US 
interpretation appeared in conflict with the aim of paragraphs 1 through 4 of that very 
same article, which were purported to assure restoration to persons injured by 
exceptional war measures introduced in the Italian legislation. According to the 
Commission, a restoration of property, rights and interests was not conceivable unless 
these were previously injured in such a manner as to engage the responsibility of the 
Italian State. This conclusion was forcefully supported by the above-quoted text of 
Article 78(3). However, a person could be considered an enemy without any injury 
resulting thereby either to himself or to his property, rights or interests; for such an 
injury to materialize, a concrete course of action by the State authorities was necessary, 
having prejudicial consequences for the person against whom such course of action was 
taken. The Commission found that the treaty negotiators did not aim at creating an 
“enemy status” for the purpose of Article 78, whereby it would have been sufficient for 
the relevant conditions to materialize under Italian law to make the provisions of the 
                                                     
1049 This may be taken as a further instance of the facts that generally courts and tribunals, when opting for a 
“restrictive” or “common denominator” interpretation, do this in light of the overall context. See YBILC 1964-
II, p. 65, para. 8. 
1050 See Italian-United States Conciliation Commission, 20 September 1958, Flegenheimer case – decision No. 
182, 14 Reports of International Arbitral Awards, 327 et seq., para. 66, letter c). 
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1947 Peace Treaty applicable. On the contrary, the meaning to be given to the terms 
under interpretation was one of concrete, effective treatment, meted out to a person by 
reason of his enemy status, and not one of abstract possibility of subjecting a person to a 
course of action capable of causing injury, on the grounds that such a person fulfilled the 
conditions for being considered, under a legal provision of municipal law, to be an 
enemy person.1051 
Moreover, the Commission considered that the provision of Article 78(9)(a)(2), 
introducing a rule of an exceptional character in that it extended the diplomatic 
protection of the United Nations to persons who were not their nationals, had to be 
interpreted in a restrictive sense, since it deviated from the general rules of the Law of 
Nations on that point. Thus, the Commission found that, also in this respect, its 
interpretation of Article 78(9)(a)(2) was to be preferred to the one put forward by the 
United States.1052  
Finally, the Commission touched upon the issue of whether Italy was precluded 
from relying on an interpretation of Article 78(9)(a)(2) different from the one that could 
be derived from the natural reading of the Italian translation thereof. It rejected the 
argument that the Italian Government was bound by the Italian translation on the 
grounds that the latter was an indication of the manner in which Italy had understood its 
obligations arising out of the 1947 Peace Treaty. In this respect, the Commission held 
that the principle of estoppel could be opposed to Italy only where the latter, by explicit 
declaration, by conclusive acts, or even by an attitude regularly taken towards the other 
contracting States, had appeared to attribute to Article 78(9)(a)(2) the meaning that the 
United States attached to the Russian text thereof. However, the existence of a 
translation devoid of authentic value was not sufficient to that purpose, a translation 
which, according to the allegations the Italian Government, was in fact the collective 
work of all contracting States, who purposely refused to give it any character of 
authenticity; such a translation lacked any international legal significance and it was not 
proved that Italy had ever accepted the meaning that the United States considered to 
result from the Russian text.1053  
 
3.4.3.6. The decision of the WTO Appellate Body in the US – Softwood Lumber from 
Canada case 
  
In the case US – Softwood Lumber from Canada,1054 the WTO Appellate Body had to 
                                                     
1051 See Italian-United States Conciliation Commission, 20 September 1958, Flegenheimer case – decision No. 
182, 14 Reports of International Arbitral Awards, 327 et seq., para. 66, letter c). 
1052 See Italian-United States Conciliation Commission, 20 September 1958, Flegenheimer case – decision No. 
182, 14 Reports of International Arbitral Awards, 327 et seq., para. 66, letter d). 
1053 See Italian-United States Conciliation Commission, 20 September 1958, Flegenheimer case – decision No. 
182, 14 Reports of International Arbitral Awards, 327 et seq., para. 66, letter a). 
1054 WTO Appellate Body, 19 January 2004, United States – Final Countervailing Duty Determination with 
Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, AB-2003-6 (WT/DS257/AB/R); see also WTO Appellate 
Body, 23 September 2002, Chile – Price Band System and Safeguard Measures Relating to Certain 
Agricultural Products, AB-2002-2 (WT/DS207/AB/R), paras. 264-280. 
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interpret Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii) of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures in order to decide whether standing timbers attached to the land fell within the 
meaning of the term "goods", as used in that Article provision: “[f]or the purpose of this 
Agreement, a subsidy shall be deemed to exist if […] a government provides goods or 
services other than general infrastructure". 
 
The WTO Panel had previously adopted a narrow definition of the term “goods”, drawn 
from Black's Law Dictionary, suggesting the exclusion of immovable property (in the 
case at stake, the standing timbers attached to the land) from the scope of the term.1055 
 
The Appellate Body, making reference to Article 31 VCLT, first stated that the meaning 
of a treaty provision, properly construed, is rooted in the ordinary meaning of the terms 
used.  It observed, in this respect, that the dictionary meaning of a term is generally 
ambiguous; for instance, the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary offered a more general 
definition of the term “goods” than the one adopted by the Panel, which included 
“property or possessions” especially - but not exclusively - movable 
property”. Therefore, although recognizing that dictionary definitions offer a useful 
starting point for discerning the ordinary meaning of a term, the Appellate Body noted, 
however, that such definitions have their limitations in revealing the ordinary meaning 
thereof, in the sense of Article 31 VCLT. According to the Appellate Body, this was 
especially true where the meanings of the terms used in the different authentic texts of 
the treaty are susceptible to differences in scope.1056   
With regard to the case at stake, the Appellate Body noted that the French 
authentic text of Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii) used the term “biens”, as corresponding to the 
English “goods”, while the Spanish authentic text used the term “bienes”. According to 
the dictionaries consulted, the French and Spanish terms denoted a wide range of 
property, including immovable property; as such, they corresponded more closely to a 
broad definition of “goods”, which included “property or possessions” in general, than to 
the more limited definition adopted by the Panel.1057   
The Appellate Body, then, observed that under the customary rule of treaty 
interpretation reflected in Article 33(3) VCLT the terms of a treaty authenticated in more 
than one language are presumed to have the same meaning in each authentic text and 
concluded that such a rule implied that the treaty interpreter should seek the meaning 
giving effect, simultaneously, to all the terms of the treaty, as they are used in each 
authentic text. In this respect, the Appellate Body made reference both to the 
commentary to the 1966 Draft, according to which the presumption of equal meaning of 
each authentic text requires that every effort be made in order to find a common meaning 
for the texts before preferring one to another, and to the ICJ’s decision in the Elettronica 
                                                     
1055 See WTO Appellate Body, 19 January 2004, United States – Final Countervailing Duty Determination with 
Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, AB-2003-6 (WT/DS257/AB/R), paras. 57-58. 
1056 See WTO Appellate Body, 19 January 2004, United States – Final Countervailing Duty Determination with 
Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, AB-2003-6 (WT/DS257/AB/R), paras. 58-59. 
1057 See WTO Appellate Body, 19 January 2004, United States – Final Countervailing Duty Determination with 
Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, AB-2003-6 (WT/DS257/AB/R), para. 59. 
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Sicula case described above.1058    
In light of the above, the Appellate Body concluded that the ordinary meaning of 
the term “goods” in the English authentic text of Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii) of the WTO 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures should not be read so as to 
exclude tangible items of property, like trees, that are severable from land.1059  
 
The interpretation put forward by the Appellate Body, however, was not based solely on 
a comparative linguistic analysis. 
First, the Appellate Body found that a contextual analysis supported such a 
construction. The analysis of the terms accompanying the word "goods" in Article 
1.1(a)(1)(iii), such as “general infrastructure”, led to the very same conclusion that all 
goods that might be used by an enterprise to its benefit - including even goods that might 
be considered infrastructure - were to be considered “goods” within the meaning of the 
interpreted provision, unless they were infrastructure of a general nature.1060 Such a 
conclusion was not overturned by the analysis of the meaning attributable to the term 
“goods”, as used in other articles of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures and in the Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods (Annex 
1A of the WTO Agreement), since: 
(a) the scope and purpose of those articles and agreement was different from that 
of Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii) of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures and  
(b) the term “goods” was differently qualified therein by the accompanying words 
“imported”, “exported” and “trade”, which were not present in Article 
1.1(a)(1)(iii).  
Similarly, the interpretation put forward by the Appellate Body was not prejudiced by 
the (different) meaning attributable to the term "products" used in Article II of the 1994 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GAAT), “goods” and “products” being 
different words that did not need necessarily to have the same meanings in the different 
contexts in which they were used.1061   
Second, the Appellate Body submitted that a narrow interpretation of the term 
“goods” would have undermined the object and purpose of the WTO Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, which was to strengthen and improve GATT 
disciplines relating to the use of both subsidies and countervailing measures. According 
to the Appellate Body, it was in furtherance of that object and purpose that 
Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii) recognized that subsidies might be conferred, not only through 
monetary transfers, but also by the provision of non-monetary input; therefore, a narrow 
                                                     
1058 See WTO Appellate Body, 19 January 2004, United States – Final Countervailing Duty Determination 
with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, AB-2003-6 (WT/DS257/AB/R), para. 59 and, in 
particular footnote 50 therein. 
1059 WTO Appellate Body, 19 January 2004, United States – Final Countervailing Duty Determination with 
Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, AB-2003-6 (WT/DS257/AB/R), para. 59. 
1060 See WTO Appellate Body, 19 January 2004, United States – Final Countervailing Duty Determination with 
Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, AB-2003-6 (WT/DS257/AB/R), para. 60. 
1061 See WTO Appellate Body, 19 January 2004, United States – Final Countervailing Duty Determination with 
Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, AB-2003-6 (WT/DS257/AB/R), paras. 62-63. 
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interpretation of the term "goods" in Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii) would have permitted the 
circumvention of subsidy disciplines in cases of financial contributions granted in a form 
other than money, such as through the provision of standing timber for the sole purpose 
of severing it from land and processing it.1062 
Third, the Appellate Body rejected an interpretation of the term “goods” based on 
the municipal law of one of the WTO Member States. In this respect, Canada had 
contended that standing timbers were not “goods”, since they were neither "personal 
property" nor an "identified thing to be severed from real property". The Appellate 
Body, after having noted that the concepts of “personal” and “real” property, as referred 
to by Canada, are creatures of municipal law not reflected in Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii), 
submitted that the manner in which the municipal law of a WTO Member classifies an 
item cannot, in itself, be determinative of the interpretation of provisions of the WTO 
agreements.1063   
 
3.4.3.7. The decision of the ECtHR in the Niemietz case  
 
In the Niemietz case,1064 the ECtHR was confronted with the issue of whether the search 
of an office made on behalf of the public prosecutor could give rise to a breach of Article 
8(1) of the ECHR, which in its English and French authentic texts reads as follows 
(italics by the author): 
 
Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence. […] 
 
Toute personne a droit au respect de sa vie privée et familiale, de son domicile et de sa 
correspondance. […] 
 
The Court considered that the term “home”, in the English authentic text, should not be 
construed narrowly; on the contrary, it should be regarded as denoting also business and 
professional premises. It pointed out that this conclusion was fully consonant with the 
French authentic text, the term “domicile” having a broader intension than the term 
“home”, capable of being extended to a professional person’s office as well.1065  
 
The attribution to the term “home” of such a special meaning, however,1066 was not 
based solely on the comparison with its corresponding French term; quite the contrary, 
                                                     
1062 See WTO Appellate Body, 19 January 2004, United States – Final Countervailing Duty Determination with 
Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, AB-2003-6 (WT/DS257/AB/R), para. 64. 
1063 See WTO Appellate Body, 19 January 2004, United States – Final Countervailing Duty Determination with 
Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, AB-2003-6 (WT/DS257/AB/R), para. 65. 
1064 ECtHR, 16 December 1992, Niemietz v. Germany (Application no. 13710/88). 
1065 See ECtHR, 16 December 1992, Niemietz v. Germany (Application no. 13710/88), para. 30. 
1066 This meaning is “special” under Article 31 VCLT if one takes the view that such wide meaning is not 
“ordinary” for the term “home”, which however is not a straightforward conclusion (see the entries for “home” 
at the Dictionary.com Unabridged. Random House, Inc. (accessed 7 Oct. 2010), in particular entry no. 9). 
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the Court found support thereto in the context of that term and in the object and purpose 
of Article 8 of the ECHR, as well as in the subsequent practice of certain contracting 
States.  
In this respect, the Court noted that the term “home” had been interpreted as 
extending to business premises in some contracting parties, among which Germany, the 
latter being the State charged of breaching Article 8 of the ECHR in the case at stake.1067 
It also submitted that it was not always possible to draw precise distinctions 
between private and business premises, since activities related to a profession or 
business could well be conducted from a person’s private residence, while activities not 
so related could well be carried on in offices or commercial premises. Thus, a narrow 
interpretation of the terms “home” and “domicile” could give rise to a risk of unequal 
treatment of persons being in substantially comparable situations.1068 
Furthermore, the ECtHR linked the term “home” to the previous term “private 
life” used in Article 8. It considered that it would have been too restrictive to limit the 
meaning of the latter term to the notion of an “inner circle” in which the individual might 
live his own personal life as he chooses and to exclude therefrom entirely the outside 
world not encompassed within that circle; respect for private life also had to comprise, at 
least to a certain degree, the right to establish and develop relationships with other 
human beings. In this regard, there was no apparent reason to exclude, from the 
intension of the term “private life”, activities of a professional or business nature since it 
was, after all, in the course of their working lives that the majority of people had a 
significant, if not the greatest, opportunity of developing relationships with the outside 
world. This view was supported by the fact that, as similarly mentioned in relation to the 
meaning of the term “home”, it was not always possible to clearly distinguish which of 
an individual’s activities formed part of his professional or business life and which did 
not. Therefore, to deny the protection of Article 8 to professional activities could lead to 
an inequality of treatment, in that such protection would remain available to persons 
whose professional and non-professional activities were so intermingled that there was 
no means of distinguishing between them.1069  
Finally, the Court found that interpreting the terms “home” and “private life” as 
including certain professional or business activities or premises was consonant with the 
essential object and purpose of Article 8, i.e. to protect the individual against arbitrary 
interference by the public authorities. At the same time, it emphasized that such an 
interpretation would not unduly hamper the contracting States, for they would in any 
case retain their entitlement to “interfere” with people’s “private life” and search their 
“home” to the extent permitted by paragraph 2 of the very same Article 8 of the 
ECHR.1070 
 
3.4.3.8. The decision of the Arbitral Tribunal for the Agreement on German External 
                                                     
1067 See ECtHR, 16 December 1992, Niemietz v. Germany (Application no. 13710/88), paras. 18 and 30. 
1068 See ECtHR, 16 December 1992, Niemietz v. Germany (Application no. 13710/88), para. 30. 
1069 See ECtHR, 16 December 1992, Niemietz v. Germany (Application no. 13710/88), para. 29. 
1070 See ECtHR, 16 December 1992, Niemietz v. Germany (Application no. 13710/88), para. 31. 
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Debts in the Young Loan arbitration  
 
In the Young Loan arbitration case,1071 the majority of the Arbitral Tribunal concluded 
that “[the] interpretation of the clause merely in the terms of Article 31(1) of the [VCLT] 
already proves the Applicants' claim to be unfounded. Any possible discrepancy between 
the texts, when the wordings of the three authentic versions of the disputed clause are 
compared, is resolved if the clause is interpreted in the context of the treaty and against 
the background of the ‘object and purpose’ of the LDA”.1072  
 It further maintained that “the travaux préparatoires confirms the conclusion to 
which the interpretation of the wording of the clause in dispute in accordance with 
Article 31(1) of the [VCLT] has already led.”1073  
 
As previously noted, the main issue at stake in the case was the interpretation of the 
expressions “Währung mit der geringsten Abwertung“, “devise la moins dépréciée” and 
“least depreciated currency” used in the German, French and English authentic texts of 
Article 2(e) of Annex 1 of the LDA. In particular, the question to be answered by the 
Tribunal was whether such expressions related only to devaluation in the strict sense, i.e. 
to cases where the par value of the currency concerned had been reduced as a result of a 
governmental action, or it applied as well to cases where the currency in question was 
“depreciated” in relation to another currency of issue of the bonds owing to the 
revaluation of the latter.1074 
 
At the outset, the Tribunal noted that if it had proceeded on terminology alone and taken 
the words in their ordinary, everyday sense in the language concerned, it was at least not 
excluded that the German text would have provided one answer to the original query, 
and the French and English texts a different one.  
 In German, on the one hand, the term “Abwertung”, where used in technical 
jargon, meant a reduction in the external value of a currency - in relation to a fixed 
yardstick, e.g. gold - by an act of government. On the contrary, in the everyday usage, 
the expression “formal devaluation” (“formelle Abwertung”) tended to be used to 
describe the devaluation of a currency by governmental act, as distinguished from the far 
more common economic phenomenon of the depreciation of a currency.  
 In English and French, on the other hand, the terms “depreciation” and 
                                                     
1071 Arbitral Tribunal for the Agreement on German External Debts, 16 May 1980, The Kingdom of Belgium et 
al. v. the Federal Republic of Germany (Young Loan), 59 International Law Reports (1980), 494 et seq.  For an 
analysis of the issue at stake in the Young Loan case, see section 3.2.3.1 of this chapter. 
1072 See Arbitral Tribunal for the Agreement on German External Debts, 16 May 1980, The Kingdom of 
Belgium et al. v. the Federal Republic of Germany (Young Loan), 59 International Law Reports (1980), 494 et 
seq., at 548, para. 38. 
1073 See Arbitral Tribunal for the Agreement on German External Debts, 16 May 1980, The Kingdom of 
Belgium et al. v. the Federal Republic of Germany (Young Loan), 59 International Law Reports (1980), 494 et 
seq., at 548, para. 37. 
1074 See Arbitral Tribunal for the Agreement on German External Debts, 16 May 1980, The Kingdom of 
Belgium et al. v. the Federal Republic of Germany (Young Loan), 59 International Law Reports (1980), 494 et 
seq., at 529, para. 15. 
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“dépréciation” were normally used to describe the economic phenomenon of 
depreciation of a currency, while formal devaluation was usually denoted by the terms 
“devaluation” and “dévaluation”, respectively. However, although the pairs 
“depreciation” – “depreciation” and “devaluation” – “devaluation” were theoretically 
distinguishable in both English and French, the Tribunal found, mainly on the basis of 
the analysis of contemporary writings, that as a matter of fact they were used 
interchangeably to describe the same processes. Hence, the Tribunal concluded that the 
possibility that the German, English and French authentic texts of the disputed clause 
had different meanings could not be ruled out on the basis of the mere analysis of their 
wordings.1075  
 
Thus, in order to solve the potential conflict of meanings between the three authentic 
texts, the Tribunal had recourse to the various means of interpretation provided for in 
Articles 31 and 32 VCLT, i.e. construed the above-mentioned expressions in light of the 
overall context. 
 
First, the Tribunal considered that the LDA and, in particular, the provision under 
discussion, had to be construed in the context of the Bretton Woods system, which 
governed the international monetary relations at the time of the LDA’s conclusion and 
which had continued to play such a role for approximately the following twenty 
years.1076 The Bretton Woods system was based on the fixed par value agreed between 
the International Monetary Fund (hereafter also “IMF”) and the single States for almost 
every currency and expressed in terms of gold or US dollars, pursuant to Article IV(1)(a) 
of the IMF Agreement.1077  
 According to the Tribunal, the incorporation of the LDA into the Bretton Woods 
system had a concrete bearing on the essential meaning of the terms “Abwertung”, 
“depreciated” and “dépréciée”, since it constituted relevant evidence against the view 
that the revaluation of one of the currencies of the LDA contracting States automatically 
meant a depreciation (“Abwertung”, “depreciation”) of all other currencies.  
 In this respect, the Tribunal noted that, although it was true that the revaluation of 
one currency (A) determined that a person purchasing it had to spend more of another 
currency (B) than he had had to spend before the revaluation, the par value of the latter 
currency (B) as agreed with the IMF had not changed due to such a revaluation. 
Therefore, it was not possible to maintain that the latter currency (B) had depreciated 
(“abgewertet“, “dépréciée”) in the sense of Article 2(e) of Annex 1 of the LDA. In fact, 
                                                     
1075 See Arbitral Tribunal for the Agreement on German External Debts, 16 May 1980, The Kingdom of 
Belgium et al. v. the Federal Republic of Germany (Young Loan), 59 International Law Reports (1980), 494 et 
seq., at 530-532, paras. 18 and 20. 
1076 Since the Bretton Woods system, regulated by the IMF Agreement, was in force for all the LDA 
contracting States, except Switzerland, and regulated the relations between the values of their respective 
currencies, the reference to such a system by the Arbitral Tribunal might be regarded as based on Article 
31(3)(c) VCLT, or, at least, on Article 32 VCLT (i.e. as a relevant element of the legal and political framework 
in which the LDA had been concluded).  
1077 Agreement adopted at the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference, Bretton Woods, New 
Hampshire, on 22 July 1944 (in its original text). 
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in the Bretton Woods system, the counter-value of the latter currency (B) expressed in 
terms of gold or US dollars had remained unchanged, as the purchasing power of that 
currency on its home market and the external value thereof in relation to all other 
currencies except the revalued one had remained unchanged.  
 According to the Tribunal, the position of persons owning currency (B) would 
have changed only if that currency had been devalued in the formal sense, since under 
the Bretton Woods system “revaluation and devaluation were both bilateral “deals” 
between the IMF and the States concerned in each case”.1078  
 
Second, the Tribunal fund that such a conclusion was supported by the structure and 
wording of Article 13 of the LDA, which, with reference to the cases under litigation, 
would have required computing the new amounts of the installments to be paid on the 
basis of the par values of the various currencies agreed with the IMF, which, however, 
had not changed as a result of the revaluation of the German mark.1079  
 
Third, it considered the bearing of Article 8 of the LDA on the construction of the terms 
to be interpreted.1080  
 Article 8 of the LDA obliged the Federal Republic of Germany not to permit any 
discrimination or preferential treatment among the different categories of debts or as 
regards the currencies in which debts were to be paid or in any other respect, unless such 
difference was the result of settlement in accordance with the Agreement itself.  
 In this respect, the Tribunal recognized that, as a matter of fact, the holders of 
bonds expressed in German mark would have received more than the other creditors as a 
result of the revaluations of the German mark in 1961 and 1969. However, it found that 
such disparity of treatment, being the result of the application of the method of 
computation provided for in Article 13 of the LDA, was to be regarded as “in accordance 
with the Agreement itself” and thus allowed by Article 8 thereof.  
 Moreover, the Tribunal also noted that the prohibition of discrimination in Article 
8 of the LDA had to be construed in its context, where it appeared to have no bearing 
beyond that of a pari passu clause,1081 whose customary function in loan contracts was, 
in the interest of the bondholders, to simply prevent the borrower from entering into 
                                                     
1078 See Arbitral Tribunal for the Agreement on German External Debts, 16 May 1980, The Kingdom of 
Belgium et al. v. the Federal Republic of Germany (Young Loan), 59 International Law Reports (1980), 494 et 
seq., at 535, para. 24, and at 538, para 27. 
1079 See Arbitral Tribunal for the Agreement on German External Debts, 16 May 1980, The Kingdom of 
Belgium et al. v. the Federal Republic of Germany (Young Loan), 59 International Law Reports (1980), 494 et 
seq., at 535-536, paras. 24 and 25. 
1080 The Tribunal also made reference to Article V(2)(b) of Annex II and Article 7(3) of Annex IV to the LDA 
in order to support its findings (see Arbitral Tribunal for the Agreement on German External Debts, 16 May 
1980, The Kingdom of Belgium et al. v. the Federal Republic of Germany (Young Loan), 59 International Law 
Reports (1980), 494 et seq., at 540, para. 28); such arguments, however, seem of a lesser relevance in the 
whole argument developed by the Tribunal.  
1081 The Tribunal stated that such a pari passu clause was, in fact, included in Article II of the original 
Agreement between the Government of the German Reich, as debtor, and the Bank for International 
Settlements acting as trustee for the holders of the (then) outstanding bonds (agreement concluded in Paris on 
10 June 1930). 
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new, additional obligations which then would rank before the bonded debt itself, i.e. to 
guarantee an equal ranking for loans furnished with such a clause (and subsequent 
loans), and not to prevent any type of different treatment of the bondholders, in 
particular unequally high redemption payments.1082  
 
The Tribunal then analysed the object and purpose of the LDA, which substantially 
consisted in the settlement of German external debts at the end of the Second World 
War.  
 In this respect, the LDA was purported to achieve a compromise, in the interests 
of all parties concerned, between the liabilities of the Federal Republic of Germany and 
its actual economic capacity. According to the Tribunal, a prerequisite of the fullest 
possible settlement of such debts was the recovery of the German economy, in the sense 
that the LDA's object and purpose could be achieved only if foreign creditors were 
prepared to waive a substantial part of their claims and to come to terms with the 
German debtors on conditions for payment of what remained.  
 Thus, when construing the individual provisions of the LDA, the interpreter had 
always to take into account the particular concern of the contracting parties, while 
formulating the LDA, with maintaining in all parts the delicate balance between, on the 
one hand, the justified aim for adequate satisfaction of the creditors and, on the other, a 
desire not to burden the debtors with an economically intolerable load, which could have 
jeopardized the successful implementation of the settlement.  
 In light of the analysis of the object and purpose of the LDA, the Tribunal 
concluded that the clause at stake, where interpreted as applying only in cases of formal 
devaluations, undoubtedly constituted an attempt by the parties to find a sensible middle 
way between the desirable and the possible, at least as far as they could see it in 1952 
(i.e. when the LDS was concluded). On the other hand, the broader interpretation 
suggested by the applicants could not be regarded as justified simply because the 
Germany economy in the fifties and sixties of the twentieth century proved capable of 
recovering more rapidly and strongly than originally expected.1083 
 
The majority of the arbitrators also took into account the subsequent practice of the 
contracting States and found that at least some of the comments made immediately after 
the conclusion of the LDA by spokesmen of the Applicants might be clearly interpreted 
as indicating that the clause in dispute should have been regarded exclusively as a 
protective provision against devaluation.  
 Similarly, the German interpretation of the disputed clause, as evidenced in public 
statements and documents, appeared from the start restricted to the case of devaluation.  
 The Tribunal, however, concluded that, all in all, the analysis of the period 
                                                     
1082 See Arbitral Tribunal for the Agreement on German External Debts, 16 May 1980, The Kingdom of 
Belgium et al. v. the Federal Republic of Germany (Young Loan), 59 International Law Reports (1980), 494 et 
seq., at 538-539, para. 28. 
1083 See Arbitral Tribunal for the Agreement on German External Debts, 16 May 1980, The Kingdom of 
Belgium et al. v. the Federal Republic of Germany (Young Loan), 59 International Law Reports (1980), 494 et 
seq., at 540-541, para. 30. 
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between the signing of the LDA in 1952 and the first revaluation of the German mark in 
1961, when the differences of opinion came out into the open, bore little fruit, since no 
lasting agreement was reached among the parties on the interpretation of the disputed 
clause, nor did the conduct of the individual parties give any decisive insight into what 
they understood by the terms "depreciated”, “dépréciée” and “Abwertung”.1084 
 
The Tribunal eventually turned to the analysis of the travaux préparatoires.  
 It found that the clause in dispute was a compromise agreed, after lengthy 
negotiations, by the private creditors' representatives and the delegates of the creditor 
States participating in the Conference on German External Debts1085 and which had 
become necessary due to the United States not agreeing to retain the protection clause 
(the gold clause) originally embodied in Article VI (a) of the General Bond of the Young 
Loan.  
 The travaux préparatoires showed that the creditors agreed that they had to insist 
on protection against a potential drop in the value of the currencies of issue. However, 
the question of how far such protection should be extended was open and was disputed. 
In this respect, the minutes submitted to the Tribunal contained no statement indicating, 
even by implication, that the new clause, in addition to protecting the relevant currency 
of issue against devaluation, also had to guarantee participation in the revaluation of any 
other currency of issue. Moreover, the testimony of witnesses confirmed that neither 
revaluation, nor appreciation had been mentioned at the Conference on German External 
Debts.  
 On the basis of such elements, the Tribunal drew the conclusion that no one at the 
Conference had seriously reckoned with the possibility of a revaluation of the German 
mark and therefore no one had mentioned this eventuality. In addition, the Tribunal 
noted that the possibility that another currency could have been revalued had not been 
expressly taken into consideration in the course of the negotiations and, from such a 
basis, inferred that there was no intention of contemplating the consequences of a 
revaluation of any currency whatever.  
 Finally, the Tribunal noted that its conclusion was further supported by the fact 
that, in the course of the Conference, the possibility to include a currency option clause 
with reference to the Young Loan had been never discussed, while it had been so with 
regard to two other loans.1086 Since currency options generally also covered the case of 
revaluation, the absence of any serious discussion in that respect strengthened the 
conviction that all that had been ever intended was a clause protecting creditors against 
currency devaluations.  
 The Tribunal thus found that the analysis of the travaux préparatoires confirmed 
the interpretation reached through the application of Article 31 VCLT.1087 
                                                     
1084 See Arbitral Tribunal for the Agreement on German External Debts, 16 May 1980, The Kingdom of 
Belgium et al. v. the Federal Republic of Germany (Young Loan), 59 International Law Reports (1980), 494 et 
seq., at 542-543, para. 31. 
1085 Conference held in London, between February and August 1952. 
1086 Namely the City of Munich and the Potash Loans. 
1087 See Arbitral Tribunal for the Agreement on German External Debts, 16 May 1980, The Kingdom of 




3.4.3.9. The decisions delivered by the ECJ with regard to the interpretation of the 
Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters 
 
The application of the rules of interpretation enshrined in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT for 
the purpose of reconciling prima facie divergent authentic texts has also been endorsed 
by the ECJ, when called upon to construe certain provisions of the Brussels Convention 
on jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters.1088 
 
For instance, in the case De Bloos v. Bouyer,1089 the ECJ had to interpret Article 5(1) of 
the Brussels Convention, according to which:  
  
A person domiciled in a Contracting State may, in another Contracting State, be sued: 
 (1) in matters relating to a contract, in the courts for the place of performance of the 
obligation in question. 
 
In particular, the Court was asked whether, with reference to an action brought by the 
Belgian grantee of an exclusive sales concession against the French grantor thereof, in 
which the former claimed that the latter had infringed the exclusive concession, the term 
“obligation” in Article 5(1) was to be interpreted as applying without distinction to any 
obligation arising out of the contract granting the exclusive sales concession (or even 
arising out of the successive sales concluded in performance of the said contract), or as 
referring exclusively to the obligation forming the basis of the legal proceedings brought 
before the court seeking to establish its jurisdiction. The various authentic texts of 
Article 5(1) seemed capable of diverging constructions in that respect. 
The ECJ solved the interpretative issue by stating that Article 5(1) could not be 
interpreted as referring to any obligation whatsoever arising under the contract in 
question, but, on the contrary, the term “obligation” had to be construed as referring to 
the specific contractual obligation forming the basis of the legal proceedings before the 
referring court.1090 This solution was mainly justified on the basis of the object and 
purpose of the Convention, as derived from its preamble, which required the need to 
avoid as far as possible creating situations in which a number of courts had jurisdiction 
in respect of one and the same contract.1091 In addition, the Court highlighted that such a 
conclusion was further supported by the Italian and German authentic texts of Article 
                                                                                                                                  
Belgium et al. v. the Federal Republic of Germany (Young Loan), 59 International Law Reports (1980), 494 et 
seq., at 543-548, paras. 32-47. 
1088 Convention concluded in Brussels on 27 September 1968. 
1089 ECJ, 6 October 1976, Case 14/76, A. De Bloos, SPRL v. Société en commandite par actions Bouyer. 
1090 See ECJ, 6 October 1976, Case 14/76, A. De Bloos, SPRL v. Société en commandite par actions Bouyer, 
paras. 10 and 11. 
1091 See ECJ, 6 October 1976, Case 14/76, A. De Bloos, SPRL v. Société en commandite par actions Bouyer, 
paras. 8 and 9. 
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5(1),1092 which appeared less ambiguous in this respect. 
 
In the Effer v. Kantner case,1093 the ECJ was again faced with the interpretation of 
Article 5(1) of the Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments in 
civil and commercial matters. In this case, the issue at stake whether the court of the 
place of performance of a contractual obligation had jurisdiction even where the very 
existence of the contract was disputed between the parties. 
The Court eventually answered in the affirmative.1094 It first noted that the 
wording of the authentic texts of Article 5(1) did not resolve the issue unequivocally, 
since while the German text used the expression “Vertrag oder Ansprüche aus einem 
Vertrag” in order to denote the scope of paragraph 1, while the French and Italian 
authentic texts contained the expressions “en matière contractuelle” and “in materia 
contrattuale” respectively. The ECJ considered that, in view of the ambiguity and lack of 
uniformity between the different authentic texts, it was advisable to have regard both to 
the context of Article 5(1) and to the object and purpose of the Convention.1095 
With regard to the latter, the Court found that it was clear from the provisions of 
the Convention, and in particular from the preamble thereto, that its essential aim was to 
strengthen in the Community the legal protection of persons established therein; for that 
purpose, the Convention provided a collection of rules which were designed to avoid the 
occurrence, in civil and commercial matters, of concurrent litigation in two or more 
contracting States and which, in the interests of legal certainty and for the benefit of the 
parties, conferred jurisdiction upon the national court territorially best qualified to 
determine a dispute.1096 
With regard to the former, the ECJ noted that the provisions of the Convention, in 
particular those included in section 7 of title II (Examination as to jurisdiction and 
admissibility), appeared to include among the powers of the referred national court the 
power to consider the existence of the contract itself, that being indispensable in order to 
enable that court to examine whether it had jurisdiction under Article 5(1). According to 
the ECJ, if this had not been the case, Article 5(1) would have been in danger of being 
deprived of its legal effect, since it would have been accepted that, in order to defeat the 
rule contained in that provision, it was sufficient for one of the parties to claim that the 
contract did not exist.1097  
The Court thus concluded that respect for the aims and spirit of the convention 
demanded Article 5(1) to be construed as meaning that the court called upon to decide a 
dispute arising out of a contract might examine the essential preconditions for its 
jurisdiction, so establishing the existence or the inexistence of the relevant contract.1098  
                                                     
1092 See ECJ, 6 October 1976, Case 14/76, A. De Bloos, SPRL v. Société en commandite par actions Bouyer, 
para. 12. 
1093 ECJ, 4 March 1982, Case 38/81, Effer SpA v. Hans-Joachim Kantner. 
1094 See ECJ, 4 March 1982, Case 38/81, Effer SpA v. Hans-Joachim Kantner, para. 8. 
1095 See ECJ, 4 March 1982, Case 38/81, Effer SpA v. Hans-Joachim Kantner, para. 5. 
1096 See ECJ, 4 March 1982, Case 38/81, Effer SpA v. Hans-Joachim Kantner, para. 6. 
1097 See ECJ, 4 March 1982, Case 38/81, Effer SpA v. Hans-Joachim Kantner, para. 7. 
1098 Ibidem. see, similarly, ECJ, 24 June 1981, Case 150/80, Elefanten Schuh GmbH v. Pierre Jacqmain, paras. 
13-17, concerning the interpretation of Article 18, second sentence, of the very same Brussels Convention on 




3.4.4. The preference for the interpretation(s) common to all the compared authentic 
texts  
3.4.4.1. The need to distinguish between (i) the attribution to treaty terms of the 
meaning common to all the compared authentic texts and (ii) the restrictive 
interpretation of treaty terms  
 
In his cornerstone work on the interpretation of multilingual treaties, which predates the 
VCLT, Hardy concluded that where one authentic text allows several interpretations, 
while the other authentic text allows only one of them, the interpreter is bound to choose 
the latter construction, that being the only one “reconciling” the various texts.1099 
 
A rule based on this position had been originally included by Sir Humphrey Waldock in 
his Third Report on the Law of Treaties, whose Article 75(3) read as follows:1100 
 
If in each of two or more authentic texts a term is capable of being given more than one 
meaning compatible with the objects and purposes of the treaty, a meaning which is 
common to both or all the texts is to be adopted.  
 
The ILC Drafting Committee, however, removed this provision from the text of Article 
75 in the course of the ILC’s sixteenth session without providing any explanation.  
 One can merely speculate that the reason behind this was the risk that the 
provision could have been (mis)construed as a rule favoring “restrictive” interpretations, 
i.e. the kind of interpretation that some scholars thought the PCIJ had embraced in the 
Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions case1101 and that the ILC, on the contrary, intended 
to reject as a general rule.1102 
 In this respect, the commentary to Article 75(3) of Sir Humphrey Waldock’s 
Third Report on the Law of Treaties clarified that the proposed rule of interpretation was 
not to be confused with the restrictive interpretation, according to which the more 
                                                                                                                                  
jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters.  
1099 See J. Hardy, “The Interpretation of Plurilingual Treaties by International Courts and Tribunals”, 37 British 
Yearbook of International Law (1961), 72 et seq., at 150. 
1100 See YBILC 1964-II, p. 62. 
1101 See PCIJ, 30 August 1924, The Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. Britain), judgment, p. 19, 
where it was stated the following: 
“The Court is of opinion that, where two versions possessing equal authority exist, one of which appears to have a 
wider bearing than the other, it is bound to adopt the more limited interpretation which can be made to harmonize 
with both versions and which, as far as it goes, is doubtless in accordance with the common intention of the parties. 
In the present case this conclusion is indicated with especial force because the question concerns an instrument 
laying down the obligations of Great Britain in her capacity of Mandatory for Palestine and because the original draft 
of this instrument was probably made in English”. 
See also the laconic conclusion (which seems to favor a “restrictive” interpretation) on the issue of the prima 
facie divergence between the French and English authentic texts of Article 302(2) of the 1919 Treaty of 
Versailles, in Germano-Polish Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, 1 August 1929, Poznaski v. German State, 5 Annual 
digest of public international law cases (1929-1930), 506 et seq. [Case No. 298], at 507. 
1102 See YBILC 1964-II, p. 65, para. 8; YBILC 1966-II, pp. 225-226, para. 8. 
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limited (restrictive) construction which can be made to harmonize with all authentic texts 
is the one which must be adopted.1103  
 Moreover, the commentary to the 1966 Draft provides that the PCIJ, in the 
Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions case, did “not appear necessarily to have intended 
[…] to lay down as a general rule that the more limited interpretation which can be made 
to harmonize with both texts is the one which must always be adopted. Restrictive 
interpretation was appropriate in that case. But the question whether in case of ambiguity 
a restrictive interpretation ought to be adopted is a more general one the answer to which 
hinges on the nature of the treaty and the particular context in which the ambiguous term 
occurs. The mere fact that the ambiguity arises from a difference of expression in a 
plurilingual treaty does not alter the principles by which the presumption should or 
should not be made in favour of a restrictive interpretation. Accordingly, while the 
Mavrommatis case gives strong support to the principle of conciliating — i.e. 
harmonizing — the texts, it is not thought to call for a general rule laying down a 
presumption in favour of restrictive interpretation in the case of an ambiguity in 
plurilingual texts”.1104 
 
The restrictive interpretation, on the one hand, and the construction of treaty terms 
according to the meaning common to all the authentic texts compared, on the other hand, 
must be clearly distinguished both (a) with regard to the interpretative results that they 
tend to achieve and (b) in terms of their possible use within the system of interpretation 
of the VCLT. 
 
Under the first perspective (a), the restrictive interpretation leads to the result that, if (i) 
one authentic text may be interpreted as meaning A and the other authentic text as 
meaning B and (ii) the denotata of B constitute a subset of the denotata of A, then 
meaning B is to be adopted.  
 The construction of treaty terms according to the meaning common to all the 
compared authentic texts, instead, implies that, where one authentic text may be 
interpreted as meaning either A or B and the other authentic text as meaning either B or 
C, meaning B is to be adopted. 
 
Under the second perspective (b), the following comments can be made. 
 The former rule has been explicitly rejected as a general rule of interpretation by 
the ILC. The author praises this decision since, as treaty interpretation is directed at 
establishing the common intention of the parties, where two authentic texts appear prima 
facie to point towards two diverging, reasonable and unambiguous meanings, no 
mechanical rule providing for a preference for the most restrictive meaning can ensure 
that such a meaning represent the utterance meaning of the treaty. 
 On the contrary, the latter rule, whatever the reason for dropping it from the text 
                                                     
1103 See YBILC 1964-II, pp. 64-65, para. 8. 
1104 YBILC 1966-II, pp. 225-226, para. 8 (footnotes omitted). See, similarly, J. Hardy, “The Interpretation of 
Plurilingual Treaties by International Courts and Tribunals”, 37 British Yearbook of International Law (1961), 
72 et seq., at 80 
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of (now) Article 33,1105 appears to suitably fit the purpose of establishing the common 
intention of the parties. In fact, where one authentic text presents an ambiguity of 
meanings that cannot be resolved by means of the rules of interpretation enshrined in 
Articles 31 and 32 VCLT, while the other authentic text may be attributed only one 
clear, unambiguous and reasonable meaning, and the latter meaning coincides with one 
of the meanings attributable to the former text, it is only reasonable (although not 
compulsory) to conclude that the parties intended to attach to the treaty the latter 
meaning.     
 
3.4.4.2. The limited scope of the rule providing for the attribution to treaty terms of the 
meaning common to all the authentic texts compared  
 
At a closer look, however, the rule providing for the attribution to treaty terms of the 
meaning common to all the compared authentic texts appears to be characterized by a 
rather limited scope in practice, since it is based on the premises that:  
(i) each authentic text, or at least some authentic texts, may be construed in an 
array of alternative ways and  
(ii) the arrays of alternative meanings corresponding to each authentic text differ 
from each other due exclusively to the wording used in such texts (and not to the 
overall context).  
 
In that respect, it has been already shown that:  
(a) the meaning of a treaty provision (like the meaning of any other utterance) is 
highly dependent on its overall context and that the role played by its wording is 
thus limited and  
(b) in the VCLT system the choice of the meaning to be attributed to undefined 
terms is significantly influenced by elements other than the mere dictionary 
meanings of those terms, such as their context, the object and purpose of the 
treaty, the subsequent agreements and practice of the parties, the interaction with 
                                                     
1105 After this provision had been removed from the ILC draft articles, Bernhardt maintained that the 
presumption provided for in Article 29(3) of the 1966 Draft, now Article 33(3) VCLT, led  to the substantially 
same result. According to the author, that presumption would effectively fix the precedence of the authentic 
text using unequivocal expressions, so far as its meaning was included in the ambiguous (although the term 
actually used by Bernhardt is “unclear”) provisions of the other texts; in contrast, where all texts were 
ambiguous, the presumption would not give further help to the interpreter (see R. Bernhardt, “Interpretation 
and Implied (Tacit) Modification of Treaties. Comments on Arts. 27, 28, 29 and 38 of the ILC’s 1966 Draft 
Articles on the Law of Treaties”, 27 Zeitschrift für Ausländisches Öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (1967), 
491 et seq., at 505). The conclusion reached by Bernhardt was later criticized by other scholars. In particular, 
Germer affirmed that, where it is argued that a possible difference in meaning exists, the presumption provided 
for by Article 33(3) VCLT ceases to hold and the interpreter is to apply the rules enshrined in Article 33(4) 
VCLT, which do not embody the principle of preference for the unambiguous (although the term actually used 
by Germer is “clearest”) text (see P. Germer, “Interpretation of Plurilingual Treaties: A Study of Article 33 of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties”, 11 Harvard International Law Journal (1970), 400 et seq., at 
414). Such criticism, however, seems erected on highly disputable foundations, especially in light of the 
analyses conducted by the author and reported in the previous sections and in the following pages. 
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other rules of international law, the travaux préparatoires, the other 
supplementary means of interpretation and, more generally, all elements and 
items of evidence included in the overall context.  
In addition, it has been put forward in section 3 of Chapter 3 of Part I that the choice of 
the treaty meaning by the interpreter, as well his choice of the legally sound arguments 
that support it, is influenced by his cultural and political preferences, which commonly 
lead him to favor one single meaning among those potentially available.  
 
Therefore, where a authentic treaty text, taken in isolation, is construed by the interpreter 
in accordance with its overall context (which includes the rules of interpretation 
enshrined in Article 31 and 32 VCLT), the result of the interpretative process is 
generally the meaning that best suits, from the interpreter’s perspective, all elements and 
items of evidence thrown into the crucible.  
 Hence, in light of the nature of such an interpretative process, it is reasonable to 
expect that, in the vast majority of cases, the interpretative result will be the same with 
regard to all authentic texts, since all the elements and items of evidence thrown into the 
crucible, except the very same terms and expressions to be interpreted, are the same for 
the purpose of construing all of them.  
 Even in the unusual case where the interpreter arrives, with regard to each 
authentic texts, at an array of alternative meanings among which he struggles to choose 
one, it is submitted that such a difficulty will generally be partially independent from the 
nuances of the various authentic texts and thus it will be hardly solved by means of 
choosing the single meaning common to all the possibilities, since most probably the 
various authentic texts will present the same or similar arrays of possible meanings.  
 
All in all, such a rule lies on a tremendously simplified representation of the process of 
treaty interpretation and, in practice, it will seldom be applicable due to the infrequency 
of cases where one authentic text may be attributed several meanings and the other only 
one of them.1106   
 
3.4.4.3. Relevant case law: in general 
 
The three decisions described here below aptly illustrate the difficulty to apply in 
practice the above-mentioned rule of interpretation.  
 
They are the same decisions taken by Gardiner as examples of the fact that “the 
requirement in Article 33(4) to achieve a meaning which best reconciles the texts, having 
                                                     
1106 One of the few cases in which the competent court or tribunal justified its decision solely on the basis of 
this approach is Arbitrator, 3 September 1924, Affaire des réparations allemandes selon l’article 260 du Traité 
de Versailles (Allemagne contre Commission des Réparations), 1 Reports of International Arbitral Awards, 
429 et seq., in particular at. 437-439, where the arbitrator concluded that where “l’un des textes est clair et 
l'autre ne l'est pas, la solution qui s'impose est celle d'interpréter le texte moins clair à la lumière de l'autre texte 
et conformément au sens qui résulte des termes de ce dernier texte” (see ibidem, at 439).    
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regard to the object and purpose of the treaty, does not exclude the possibility of 
concluding that the meaning which is clear in one of the texts [author’s note: while the 
others are ambiguous] is the correct one”.1107  
 
A close analysis of these decisions, however, shows that Gardiner’s statement is 
misleading since in none of them was the court:  
(i) dealing with the issue of reconciling authentic texts whose meanings remained 
irremovably different after the application of Article 31-32 VCLT and  
(ii) justifying the chosen solution as resulting from the selection of the only 
meaning common to the various texts and the consequent rejection of the other 
meanings attributable to the ambiguous texts.  
On the contrary, it appears that the courts:  
(i) construed the various authentic texts and eliminated potential differences of 
meaning through the application of the principles of interpretations enshrined in 
Articles 31 and 32 VCLT and, as a result thereof,  
(ii) removed the uncertainty concerning the meaning of the potentially ambiguous 
texts by affirming that such texts could be reasonably attributed only one meaning 
where interpreted in light of the overall context. 
 
3.4.4.4. Relevant case law: the ECtHR decision in the Wemhoff case 
 
Just before the VCLT was concluded, the ECtHR decided the Wemhoff case,1108 in which 
it was confronted with, among other things, the issue of whether there had been a 
contravention by the German judicial authorities of the second part of Article 5(3) of the 
ECHR. The Court had thus to interprete the latter Article, which, in the English and 
French authentic texts, reads as follows: 
 
3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1(c)1109 
[…] shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. […]  
 
3. Toute personne arrêtée ou détenue, dans les conditions prévues au paragraphe 1 c) […] a 
le droit d'être jugée dans un délai raisonnable, ou libérée pendant la procédure. […]  
 
The Court found that Article 5(3), read in its context, required the provisional detention 
of accused persons not to be prolonged beyond a reasonable time.1110 The issue, 
                                                     
1107 See R. Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 375. 
1108 ECtHR, 27 June 1968, Wemhoff v. Germany (Application no. 2122/64). 
1109 Paragraph 1(c) of Article 5 ECHR reads as follows:  
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the 
following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:  
[…] 
(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal 
authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to 
prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so 
1110 See ECtHR, 27 June 1968, Wemhoff v. Germany (Application no. 2122/64), para. 5 of the Court’s findings. 
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however, arose of whether this requirement concerned just the period of detention until 
the beginning of the trial or whether it also covered the duration of the trial.  
 The German government argued that it was the opening of the trial that marked 
the end of the period with which Article 5(3) was concerned.1111 
The Court, however, rejected such an interpretation.  
 
At the outset, it recognized that the English authentic text could be theoretically 
construed in accordance with the interpretation put forward by the German government.  
That text was prima facie ambiguous, since the expression “entitled to trial” could also 
be read as meaning “entitled to be brought to trial” and the following reference to 
“pending trial” seemed to require release before the trial, taken as whole, i.e., before its 
opening.1112 
However, the Court then noted that while the English authentic text theoretically 
permitted both interpretations, the French authentic text of Article 5(3) could not be 
construed as the German government had done. In fact, it provided that:  
(i) the obligation to release the accused person within a reasonable time continued 
until that person had been “jugée”, i.e. until the day of the judgment closing the 
trial, and  
(ii) the accused person had to be released “pendant la procédure”, a very broad 
expression that in the Court’s view indubitably covered both the trial and the 
investigation.1113  
Ultimately, the ECtHR concluded that, since it was confronted with two versions of a 
treaty which were equally authentic but not exactly the same, it had to follow established 
international law precedents and hence interpret those authentic texts so as to reconcile 
them as far as possible.1114  
 
The Court, nonetheless, did not justify the interpretation finally endorsed as resulting 
from the selection of the only meaning common to both the ambiguous and the 
unambiguous texts, but as the only reasonable construction that each of the authentic 
texts allowed.  
 In this regard, the ECtHR noted that, due to the law-making treaty nature of the 
ECHR, it was necessary to seek the interpretation most appropriate to realizing the aim 
and achieve the object of the treaty. From this perspective, it found impossible to see 
why the protection against unduly long detention that Article 5 sought to ensure for 
persons suspected of offences should not continue up to delivery of the judgment rather 
than cease at the moment the trial opens.1115  
 
3.4.4.5. Relevant case law: the ICJ decision in the Border and Transborder Armed 
                                                     
1111 See ECtHR, 27 June 1968, Wemhoff v. Germany (Application no. 2122/64), para. 6 of the Court’s findings. 
1112 See ECtHR, 27 June 1968, Wemhoff v. Germany (Application no. 2122/64), para. 7 of the Court’s findings. 
1113 See ECtHR, 27 June 1968, Wemhoff v. Germany (Application no. 2122/64), para. 7 of the Court’s findings. 
1114 See ECtHR, 27 June 1968, Wemhoff v. Germany (Application no. 2122/64), para. 8 of the Court’s findings. 
1115 ECtHR, 27 June 1968, Wemhoff v. Germany (Application no. 2122/64), para. 8 of the Court’s findings. 
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Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras) case  
 
A second relevant decision is that delivered by the ICJ in the Border and Transborder 
Armed Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras) case,1116 where the Court was confronted with 
the question of whether it had jurisdiction over a dispute between Nicaragua and 
Honduras concerning the alleged activities of armed bands said to be operating from 
Honduras on the border between Honduras and Nicaragua and in the Nicaraguan 
territory.  
 
In order to establish the jurisdiction of the ICJ, Nicaragua relied on the provisions of 
Article XXXI of the Pact of Bogotá1117 and the connected declarations made by the two 
parties accepting the jurisdiction of the Court. Article XXXI of the Pact of Bogotá 
provided as follows:  
 
In conformity with Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice, the High Contracting Parties declare that they recognize, in relation to any other 
American State, the jurisdiction of the Court as compulsory ipso facto, without the 
necessity of any special agreement so long as the present Treaty is in force, in all disputes 
of a juridical nature [ed.’s note: différends d'ordre juridique in the French text] that arise 
among them […]  
 
In this respect, the Court held it had jurisdiction in the dispute submitted to it by 
Nicaragua on the basis of Article XXXI of the Pact of Bogotá.1118 Honduras objected to 
such jurisdiction by relying on Article XXXII of the same treaty, which in its English 
and French authentic texts reads as follows:1119 
 
When the conciliation procedure previously established in the present Treaty or by 
agreement of the parties does not lead to a solution, and the said parties have not agreed 
upon an arbitral procedure, either of them shall be entitled to have recourse to the 
International Court of Justice in the manner prescribed in Article 40 of the Statute thereof. 
The Court shall have compulsory jurisdiction in accordance with Article 36, paragraph 1, 
of the said Statute. 
 
Lorsque la procédure de conciliation établie précédemment, conformément à ce traité ou 
par la volonté des parties, n'aboutit pas à une solution et que ces dites parties n'ont pas 
convenu d'une procédure arbitrale, l'une quelconque d'entre elles aura le droit de porter la 
question devant la Cour internationale de Justice de la façon établie par l'article 40 de son 
Statut. La compétence de la Cour restera obligatoire, conformément au paragraphe l de 
l'article 36 du même Statut. 
 
                                                     
1116 ICJ, 20 December 1988, Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras), judgment. 
1117 American Treaty on Pacific Settlement, concluded in Bogotá on 30 April 1948 in the English, French, 
Portuguese and Spanish languages. 
1118 See ICJ, 20 December 1988, Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras), judgment, 
paras. 28-41. 
1119 Emphasis added by the author. 
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Honduras contended that Articles XXXI and XXXII of the Pact of Bogotá had to be read 
together: while the former was to define the extent of the ICJ’s jurisdiction, the second 
was to determine the conditions under which the Court could be seized. Thus, according 
to Honduras, the Court could have jurisdiction under Article XXXI only if, as specified 
in Article XXXII, there had been a prior recourse to conciliation and lack of agreement 
to arbitrate, which was not the situation at stake.1120  
To support its position, Honduras relied heavily on the French authentic text of 
Article XXXII, which provided that either party had le droit de porter la question devant 
la Cour. In this respect, it argued that this French expression and, in particular, the term 
“question” had been used in order to link the two articles by means of a reference to the 
question which might have been the subject of the dispute referred to the ICJ under 
Article XXXI.  
 
The ICJ, although recognizing that the use of the term “question” could make the French 
authentic text of Article XXXII ambiguous at first sight, upheld the position taken by 
Nicaragua, i.e. that the two articles were autonomous.  
In justifying its decision, the Court made reference to the other three authentic 
texts of the Pact of Bogotá, i.e. those written in the English, Portuguese and Spanish 
languages, noting that all of them spoke, in general terms, of an entitlement to have 
recourse to the Court and did not justify the conclusion that there was a link between 
Article XXXI and Article XXXII.1121 
However, from the whole reasoning developed by the ICJ it seems that, even in 
the absence of the three other authentic texts, its conclusion would have not changed and 
the French text would have not remained ambiguous. To put it differently, it does not 
seem that, in the Court’s view, the French text allowed two alternative interpretations, 
while the other authentic texts allowed only one construction, the ICJ thus being bound 
to choose the common interpretation for the purpose of applying the treaty. On the 
contrary, it appears that the Court used several elements and items of evidence to support 
the conclusion that the French text (as well as the others) could be reasonably construed 
only in the sense put forward by Nicaragua. 
In this respect, the ICJ first noted that the interpretation put forward by Honduras 
ran counter to the wording of the French text of Article XXXII, which made no reference 
to Article XXXI and in which the parties could have used the term “différend”, instead 
of the ambiguous “question”, the former being the very same term used in Article XXXI, 
had they intended to make the jurisdiction of the Court under Article XXXI subject to 
the conditions enshrined in Article XXXII. 
Second, the ICJ took into account the context of Article XXXII and mentioned 
the fact that the latter, unlike Article XXXI, referred expressly to the jurisdiction of the 
Court under Article 36(1) of its Statute. According to the ICJ, such a reference would 
have been difficult to understand if the sole purpose of Article XXXII had been to 
                                                     
1120 See ICJ, 20 December 1988, Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras), judgment, 
para. 43. 
1121 See ICJ, 20 December 1988, Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras), judgment, 
para. 45. 
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specify the procedural conditions for bringing before the Court disputes for which 
jurisdiction had already been conferred upon it by virtue of the declaration made in 
Article XXXI, pursuant to Article 36(2) of its Statute.1122  
Third, the ICJ made reference to the object and purpose of the Pact of Bogotá, as 
resulting from both its text and the travaux préparatoires, which consisted in the 
reinforcement of the mutual commitments of the American States with regard to judicial 
settlement. In particular, the Court quoted the position expressed by the Sub-Committee 
that had prepared the draft treaty, according to which “[l]a Subcomisión estimó que el 
procedimiento principal para el arreglo pacifico de los conflictos entre los Estados 
Americanos ha de ser el procedimiento judicial ante la Corte Internacional de Justicia 
[…]”.1123 The Court found that Honduras’ interpretation was clearly contrary to the 
object and the purpose of the Pact, since it implied that the commitment, at first sight 
firm and unconditional, set forth in Article XXXI would have in fact been emptied of all 
content if, for any reason, the dispute had not been subjected to prior conciliation.1124  
 
3.4.4.6. Relevant case law: the decision of the Court of Appeals of Alaska in the Busby 
v. State of Alaska case 
 
The third decision analysed by the author was delivered in 2002 by the Court of Appeals 
of Alaska in the Busby v. State of Alaska case1125 and concerned the interpretation of 
Article 24(5) of the UN Convention on Road Traffic.1126  
 
Mr Busby was a former resident of Alaska whose driver's license had been revoked 
while he was living there. Busby later moved to Nicaragua, where he obtained an 
international driving permit under the provisions of the UN Convention on Road Traffic.  
 In 1998, Mr Busby drove from Central America to Alaska and there was stopped 
by a state trooper for a traffic violation. During the stop, the trooper discovered that Mr 
Busby's Alaska driver's license was revoked, so Mr Busby was charged with (and 
subsequently convicted of) the misdemeanor of driving while his international driving 
license was revoked.  
 Mr Busby, however, argued that, although his Alaska driver's license was 
revoked, he was still entitled under the UN Convention on Road Traffic to drive in 
Alaska because he had an international driving permit.  
 
                                                     
1122 See ICJ, 20 December 1988, Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras), judgment, 
para. 45. 
1123 See Novena Conferencia Internacional Americana, Actas y Documentos, Vol. IV, p. 156 (Registry’s 
translation into English: “the Sub-committee took the position that the principal procedure for the peaceful 
settlement of conflicts between the American States had to be judicial procedure before the International Court 
of Justice”). 
1124 See ICJ, 20 December 1988, Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras), judgment, 
para. 46. 
1125 Court of Appeals (United States), 1 February 2002, Thomas Busby v. State of Alaska, 40 P.3d 807. 
1126 Convention on Road Traffic, concluded in Geneva on 19 September 1949. 
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In this respect, the Court was called upon to interpret Article 24(5) of the UN 
Convention on Road Traffic in order to decide whether the State of Alaska was 
authorized, under that article, to withdraw Mr Busby's right to use his international 
driving permit within that State.  
Article 24(5) of the UN Convention on Road Traffic, in the English and French 
authentic texts, reads as follows (emphasis and [interpolations] by the author): 
 
A Contracting State or a subdivision thereof may withdraw from the driver the right to use 
[an international driving permit] only if the driver has committed a driving offence of such 
a nature as would entail the forfeiture of his driving permit under the legislation and 
regulations of that Contracting State 
In such an event, the Contracting State or subdivision thereof withdrawing the use of the 
permit may withdraw and retain the permit until the period of the withdrawal of use 
expires or until the holder leaves the territory of that Contracting State, whichever is the 
earlier […]. 
 
Un État contractant ou une de ses subdivisions ne peut retirer à un conducteur le droit de 
faire usage d'un [permis international de conduire] que si ce dernier a commis une 
infraction à la réglementation nationale en matière de circulation susceptible d'entraîner le 
retrait du permis de conduire en vertu de la législation dudit État 
En pareil cas, l'État contractant ou celle de ses subdivisions qui a retiré l'usage du permis 
pourra se faire remettre le permis et le conserver jusqu'à l'expiration du délai pendant 
lequel l'usage de ce permis est retiré au conducteur, ou jusqu‘au moment où ce dernier 
quittera le territoire de cet État contractant, si son départ est antérieur à l'expiration dudit 
délai. […] 
 
The Court recognized that the double use of the term “withdraw” in the English text (i.e. 
with reference to both the right to use the driving permit and the driving permit itself) 
created some ambiguity, which in turn provided some support for Mr Busby's contention 
that his international driving permit remained in force until the State of Alaska took 
some positive action to “withdraw and retain it”.  
 However, it noted that the authentic French text did not contain such an 
ambiguity. The use of the expression “pourra se faire remettre le permis ”, in contrast 
with the previous “peut retirer […] le droit de faire usage d'un [permis]”, made clear that 
a contracting State’s act of withdrawing a driver's right to use an international driving 
permit on its roads was distinct from any action that State might take to secure physical 
custody of the permit. Under the French authentic text, it was plain that if a State had 
withdrawn a driver's right to use the international driving permit, it might also require 
the driver to surrender the permit until the driver's right to drive was restored or until the 
driver left its territory. The latter follow-up action (i.e. securing physical custody of the 
permit) was just an additional remedy available to that State under the Convention and, 
therefore, the legality of its initial action (i.e. withdrawing the driver's right to drive 
within its territory) did not depend on whether it actually forced the driver to surrender 
physical custody of the international driving permit. 
On the basis of the above analysis, the Court concluded that no direct 
inconsistency existed between the English and French authentic texts. The interpretative 
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issue at stake stemmed from an ambiguity in the English text (i.e. the double use of 
“withdraw”), which might arguably make such a text inconsistent with the French text. 
In these circumstances, the Court found itself bound, under Article 33(3) VCLT, to 
assume that the two authentic texts had the same meaning and, thus, to resolve the 
ambiguity in the English text in favor of the clear meaning of the French text. 
The reasoning of the Court, nonetheless, went on to consider (i) the relevance of 
the treaty’s object and purpose and (ii) whether the possible alternative interpretation of 
the English authentic text was absurd or unreasonable. In this respect, it reasoned that the 
alternative construction of the English text of Article 24(5), i.e. the one proposed by Mr 
Busby, would have led to results that were at odds with the objectives and purpose of the 
Convention on Road Traffic:  drivers could obtain new international driving permits and 
then play a game of “cat and mouse” with States that had previously suspended their 
licenses. The Court concluded that Mr Busby’s construction was unreasonable and that 
the contracting parties, had they thought that the Convention led to these results, would 
have never signed it.1127 
Hence, what the Court in fact achieved was to remove the alleged ambiguity of 
the English text through an interpretation compliant with Articles 31 and 32 VCLT, thus 
finding that its only reasonable construction corresponded to the above interpretation of 
the French text. 
 
 
3.4.5. Ancillary issues concerning the reconciliation of the prima facie divergent 
authentic texts  
 
In this section the author briefly tackles certain ancillary issues concerning the 
reconciliation of the prima facie divergent authentic texts.  
 
First, the question might arise if, where a party has put forward the possibility of a 
divergence of meanings among certain authentic texts, the interpreter is bound to 
compare solely such texts or, on the contrary, all authentic texts of the treaty.  
In this regard, the recent case law of the ICJ seems to constitute evidence in 
support of the former solution.1128 In particular, in the LaGrand case,1129 the Court 
limited the comparison solely to the English and French authentic texts of Article 41 of 
its Statute, in relation to which a prima facie divergence of meanings had been put 
                                                     
1127 See Court of Appeals (United States), 1 February 2002, Thomas Busby v. State of Alaska, 40 P.3d 807, at 
813-815. 
1128 Other courts and tribunal have endorsed the same solution as well. See, for instance, French-Italian 
Conciliation Commission, 29 August 1949, Différend Impôts extraordinaires sur le patrimoine institués en 
Italie  - décision No. 32, 13 Reports of International Arbitral Awards, 108 et seq., at 111 et seq., where the 
Commission solved a prima facie divergence of meanings between the English and French authentic texts of 
Article 78(6) of the Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Italy, concluded in Paris on 
10 February 1947, by comparing only those two texts, notwithstanding that the Russian text was equally 
authentic under Article 90 of the treaty. 
1129 ICJ, 27 June 2001, LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), judgment; for an analysis thereof, see 
the former part of the present section. 
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forward by the United States, although its Statute had also been authenticated in the 
Chinese, Russian and Spanish languages.1130  
 
Second, where the interpreter, on the basis of a comparison of the various authentic texts 
and the analysis of the travaux préparatoires, reaches the conclusion that an editorial 
oversight occurred in one authentic text, it seems reasonable that such an interpreter is 
not bound to take into account the defective authentic text in order to construe the 
relevant treaty provision and may rely exclusively on the other authentic texts.1131 
 
Third, in line with the position expressed in section 3.2.4., the author recognizes the 
possibility for the interpreter to have recourse (also) to non-authentic versions of the 
treaty in order to univocally construe the prima facie divergent authentic texts, as such 
versions constitute supplementary means of interpretation under Article 32 VCLT.1132 
That said, the relevance for interpretative purposes of such versions will depend on their 
drafting history,1133 as well as on how the contracting States actually made use of them 
in order to construe and apply the treaty.1134  
 
Finally, in the process of construing the various authentic texts for the purpose of 
removing their apparent divergences of meaning, the interpreter may also attribute a 
significant weight to the drafted text(s), for the same reasons already put forward in 
section 3.2.3 of this chapter. In this respect, Rosenne suggested that the ILC, in drafting 
the rules of interpretation applicable in respect of multilingual treaties, wanted to stress 
“the importance of determining the history of the multilingual texts concerned in order to 
establish their interrelationship as a matter of fact. That would be the point of departure 
for an operation designed to establish the intention of the parties to the treaty in question. 
Already in 1964, the Commission […] requested the Secretariat to furnish further 
information regarding the practice of the United Nations in drawing up the texts of 
multilingual instruments”.1135 
 
                                                     
1130 In this respect, it must be noted that Germany had instead analysed and compared all five authentic texts in 
its Memorial to the Court of 16 September 1999, paras. 4.149 and 4.150. 
1131 See, in accordance, the Report of the Human Rights Committee, 22 November 1978 (Yearbook of the 
Human Rights Committee 1977-78, vol. II, p. 300). 
1132 See, in thist respect, YBILC 1966-II, p. 226, para. 9; M. Hilf, Die Auslegung mehrsprachiger Verträge. 
Eine Untersuchung zum Völkerrecht und zum Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Berlin: Springer-
Verlag, 1973), pp. 105-108; F. Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law (Amsterdam: 
IBFD Publications, 2004), p. 398.  
1133 One thing is that the non-authentic language version had been discussed in the course of the negotiations 
and represents the document on which the final agreement of the parties had been actually reached (although 
later the contracting States had translated it into texts drafted in their respective official languages, which alone 
had been authenticated); another thing is that the non-authentic version is a later translation unilaterally 
prepared by the foreign affairs department of one of the contracting State for internal use only. 
1134 See Arbitral Tribunal, 29 September 1988, Case concerning the location of boundary markers in Taba 
between Egypt and Israel, 20 Reports of International Arbitral Awards, 1 et seq., in particular para. 45 thereof, 
which is discussed in section 3.2.4 of this chapter.  
1135 See S. Rosenne, “On Multilingual Interpretation”, in S. Rosenne, Essays on International Law and Practice 
(Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff  Publisher, 2007), 449 et seq., at 450-451. 




3.4.6. Conclusions on research question e)  
 
In most of the cases where the interpreter is faced with two or more authentic texts, i.e. 
either where one party has raised the issue of a prima facie discrepancy in meanings 
among them, or where the interpreter has voluntarily decided to compare such texts in 
order to find an aid for the purpose of construing an apparently unclear or ambiguous 
text, he will be able to interpret them so as to find a common, clear, unambiguous and 
reasonable meaning and to plausibly justify his construction on the basis of the rules of 
interpretation enshrined in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT (including the possibility of taking 
into account non-authentic versions of the treaty and the opportunity to ascribe a special 
relevance to the drafted text).  
 Even in cases where the construction of an authentic text, taken in isolation, 
according to Articles 31 and 32 VCLT leaves the meaning thereof ambiguous or 
obscure, the comparison with other authentic texts may prove a decisive aid for the 
interpreter in order to clear up his doubts and arrive at an univocal solution, which may 
be reasonably supported from a logical and legal standpoint. 
 
The recourse to Articles 31 and 32 VCLT implies that no rigid ad hoc rule of 
interpretation is applied in order to remove the prima facie discrepancies in meaning 
among the authentic treaty texts, but the solution actually adopted and the arguments to 
support it are selected on the basis of the treaty overall context. 
In particular, the rule of restrictive interpretation does not play a specific role in 
the solution of apparent divergences of meanings among the authentic treaty texts under 
the system of the VCLT and has been explicitly rejected as such by the ILC. Whether a 
restrictive interpretation is to be adopted in any specific case depends upon the nature 
and history of the treaty, its object and purpose, the particular context where the 
ambiguous terms occur and the situation dealt with in that case.  
Though, in the infrequent cases where the comparison of the authentic texts does 
not prove a sufficient aid to remove all the ambiguities of such texts, where only one 
reasonable and clear meaning1136 exists that is common to the various authentic texts, 
such a meaning will be generally selected as being the only interpretative solution 
logically possible. This preference for the only meaning common to the compared 
authentic texts does not represent, however, the application of a rigid ad hoc rule, but a 
mere instance of treaty interpretation in good faith and in light of the overall context. 
 
                                                     
1136 I.e. one single intension common to the various authentic texts (e.g. text A may mean X or Y; text B may 
mean X or Z: X is the only common intension possible and, as such, it will be probably selected as the treaty 
meaning) and not one particular denotatum that is common to all the possible extensions of the various 
authentic texts (e.g. text A appears to mean just X; text B appears to mean just Y; however the denotata of X – 
its extension – are a subgroup of the denotata of Y; the conclusion that the meaning X must be selected since it 
represents the most restrictive interpretation capable of reconciling the various authentic texts cannot be 
upheld, since that solution consists of choosing one meaning over another simply because the former denotes a 
number of referents smaller that the latter). 
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Those conclusions appear in line with principles (iv), (v), (vi) and (vii) established by the 
author in section 2 of Chapter 3 of Part I, according to which: 
(iv) any alleged discrepancy in meaning among the authentic texts of a treaty is just 
apparent, since the treaty is an instrument intended by the parties to convey a single 
message; 
(v) the interpreter must remove the prima facie discrepancy in meaning among the 
authentic treaty texts by construing them in accordance with the general principles of 
treaty interpretation; in particular, the relevance of the treaty texts for the purpose of 
establishing the single utterance meaning should not be overestimated; 
(vi) for the purpose of removing the prima facie discrepancy in meaning among the 
authentic treaty texts, it is reasonable to attribute a particular relevance to the text that 
has been originally drafted by the contracting States’ representatives and on which was 
formed the consensus among them; 
(vii) the interpreter may take into account non-authentic language versions of a treaty for 
the purpose of construing it; the interpretative weight that should be attributed thereto 
varies depending on the available evidence that they may contribute to ascertain the 
common intention of the parties.  
 
3.5. Reconciling the residual divergences and discrepancies: following the object 
and purpose of the treaty? 
 
3.5.1. Research question addressed in this section  
 
The present section is aimed at tackling the following research question.  
 
f) What should the interpreter do where the prima facie discrepancies could not 
be removed by means of (ordinary) interpretation? 
 
The possibility that the ordinary process of interpretation might fall short in removing 
the prima facie discrepancies in meaning among the various authentic treaty texts seems 
to be suggested by Article 33(4) VCLT, according to which, where the contracting States 
did not agree on a different solution and the application of Articles 31 and 32 VCLT has 
failed to remove the apparent discrepancy, “the meaning which best reconciles the texts, 
having regard to the object and purpose of the treaty, shall be adopted”. 
 
Such a provision raises three issues that the interpreter will deal with in the present 
section. 
 
First, one might doubt whether and to what extent, in cases of divergences not removed 
by the application of Articles 31 and 32 VCLT, the presumption established by Article 
33(3) VCLT (the terms of the treaty are presumed to have the same meaning in each 
authentic text) continues to play a role for interpretation purposes. Should one accept 
that the various authentic texts may have (and actually do have) different meanings? And 
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what should follow from such a conclusion?  
  
Second, one could wonder what the meaning of the expression “the meaning which best 
reconciles the texts” is. Does it mean that the interpreter has to stretch the meaning of 
one text towards the other texts’ meaning(s)? And, in such a case, how much is the 
interpreter entitled to stretch the former meaning? Does it mean, instead, that the 
interpreter is bound to find some midpoint between the meanings of the various 
authentic texts? Does he have to give preference to the meaning common to the highest 
number of authentic texts? Or does he have to apply the most restrictive interpretation, if 
any? 
 
Third, what is the bearing of the final reference to the treaty object and purpose (“having 
regard to the object and purpose of the treaty”), considering that such an object and 
purpose is to be taken into account also for the purpose of Articles 31-32 VCLT? 
  
 
3.5.2. Scholarly opinions on whether the presumption established by Article 33(3) 
VCLT continues to hold true where the discrepancy in meanings among the 
authentic treaty texts is not removed by the application of Articles 31 and 32 
VCLT  
 
As noted above, one might doubt whether and to what extent, in cases of divergences of 
meanings not removed by the application of Articles 31 and 32 VCLT, the presumption 
established by Article 33(3) VCLT continues to play a role for interpretation 
purposes.1137 
 
In this respect, Tabory concluded that “the answer probably differs for each individual 
linguistic discrepancy”.  
 She also pointed out that the use of the term “reconcile” and the reference to the 
object and purpose of the treaty, which is indubitably common to all authentic texts, 
seemed to deny giving preference to any single language version and to point to the 
continued regard, as far as possible, to all the authentic texts of the treaty.1138  
 At the same time, however, she also appeared to recognize that the need for 
“preferring one text to another” might arise.1139 
 
According to Germer, “[a]s soon as it is argued that the authentic [texts] of the treaty 
                                                     
1137 Before the adoption of the VCLT, Dahm argued that the existence of an irreconcilable difference between 
the various authentic texts (i.e. the existence of a situation similar to that considered in the last part of Article 
33(4) VCLT) made the treaty null and void, due to the absence of a true agreement among and consent of the 
parties (see G. Dahm, Völkerrecht. Vol. 3 (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer Verlag, 1961), p. 44).   
1138 See M. Tabory, Multilingualism In International Law and Institutions (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & 
Noordhoff, 1980), p. 202. 
1139 See M. Tabory, Multilingualism In International Law and Institutions (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & 
Noordhoff, 1980), p. 200.  
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present a difference of meaning, the presumption ceases to be effective. This is a simple 
consequence of the very nature of the presumption”.1140  
 Thus, it seems that the author considered that the effectiveness of the presumption 
ceased as soon as a potential divergence was noted. That, however, does not imply that 
Germer intended to express the view that the basic idea of the treaty as a unique body 
with a single agreed meaning had to be abandoned, but just that, as soon as a potential 
difference was pointed out, the interpreter could no longer rely on a single authentic text 
for interpretation purposes.  
 
Mössner, on the other hand, concluded that Article 33(4) VCLT constituted an exception 
to the general rule of equality of meaning among the various authentic texts and allowed 
the possibility for the interpreter to give priority to some of them.1141  
 
The same position seems to have been taken by Hilf.1142  
 
 
3.5.3. Scholarly opinions on the meaning of the expression “the meaning which best 
reconciles the texts” used in the last part of Article 33(4) VCLT 
 
Numerous scholars have attempted to answer the question of what meaning should be 
attributed to the expression “the meaning which best reconciles the texts” employed in 
the last part of Article 33(4) VCLT.  
 In particular, many of them have wondered whether it should be intended as 
requiring the interpreter to stretch the meaning of one text towards the other texts’ 
meaning(s); or as implying that the interpreter is bound to find some midpoint between 
the meanings of the various authentic texts; or as meaning that the interpreter must give 
preference to the meaning common to the highest number of authentic texts; or even as 
requiring the interpreter to apply the most restrictive interpretation, if any. 
 
Tabory, for instance, concluded that the individual circumstances of the case, as well as 
the object and purpose of the treaty, must be taken into account for the purpose of 
choosing the best solution in each given case.1143 
 
Similarly, Mössner found that the choice, adopted by the ILC, not to prescribe any 
technical rule of interpretation for resolving discrepancies among the various authentic 
texts represented a compromise solution and an accumulation of two otherwise 
                                                     
1140 See P. Germer, “Interpretation of Plurilingual Treaties: A Study of Article 33 of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties”, 11 Harvard International Law Journal (1970), 400 et seq., at 414. 
1141 See J. M. Mössner, “Die Auslegung mehrsprachiger Staatsverträge, Bemerkungen zu Artikel 33 der Wiener 
Konvention über das Recht der Verträge vom 23. Mai 1969”, 15 Archiv des Völkerrechts (1972), 273 et seq., at 
300-301. 
1142 See M. Hilf, Die Auslegung mehrsprachiger Verträge. Eine Untersuchung zum Völkerrecht und zum 
Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1973), p. 102. 
1143 See M. Tabory, Multilingualism In International Law and Institutions (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & 
Noordhoff, 1980), p. 213 
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alternatives sub-rules, i.e.:  
(i) preferring the meaning that best reconciles the various authentic texts;  
(ii) preferring the meaning that best reflects the “object and purpose” of the 
treaty.  
As such, it might be useful simply as a general guideline.  
 According to Mössner, the vagueness of the interpretative rule encompassed in 
Article 33(4) derives from its lack of precision as to the (a) degree and (b) manner in 
which the two sub-rules should be applied: its absolutely abstract nature leaves the 
interpreter exactly in the same situation in which he would have been if Article 33(4) 
had not be included in the VCLT.1144   
 
Sur, dealing with the entire package of interpretative principles codified by the 
VCLT,1145 concluded that this principles presents uncertain and ambiguous solutions for 
the interpreter and that they seemed to perpetuate the ambiguities that characterized the 
practice before the VCLT, more than remove them.1146  
 According to the author, the solution adopted by the ILC did not simplify the 
interpretive process in practice: the interpreter was just given a general framework to be 
filled in according to the circumstances, while a number of issues were left completely 
or partially unresolved. 1147  
 With specific reference to the principles of interpretation for multilingual treaties, 
Sur appeared to appreciate the solution proposed by the ILC in Article 29(3) of the Draft 
Convention submitted to the Vienna Conference: in particular, the use of the expression 
“as far as possible” allowed the interpreter to remove the possible divergences among 
the authentic texts even where the actual reconciliation was impossible.1148  
 
Finally, Germer found that the last clause of Article 33(4) failed to clarify the method 
through which the meaning that best reconciles the authentic text has to be chosen.1149 
 
 
3.5.4. An alternative approach for the solution of the first two issues 
3.5.4.1. The contextual interpretation of the term “reconcile” 
                                                     
1144 See J. M. Mössner, “Die Auslegung mehrsprachiger Staatsverträge, Bemerkungen zu Artikel 33 der Wiener 
Konvention über das Recht der Verträge vom 23. Mai 1969”, 15 Archiv des Völkerrechts (1972), 273 et seq., at 
302. 
1145 See S. Sur, L'interprétation en droit international public (Paris: Librairie générale de droit et de 
jurisprudence, 1974), pp. 247-285. 
1146 See S. Sur, L'interprétation en droit international public (Paris: Librairie générale de droit et de 
jurisprudence, 1974), p. 269 
1147 See S. Sur, L'interprétation en droit international public (Paris: Librairie générale de droit et de 
jurisprudence, 1974), pp. 273-275. 
1148See S. Sur, L'interprétation en droit international public (Paris: Librairie générale de droit et de 
jurisprudence, 1974), p. 274. 
1149 See P. Germer, “Interpretation of Plurilingual Treaties: A Study of Article 33 of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties”, 11 Harvard International Law Journal (1970), 400 et seq., at 403 and 423. 
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In the author’s opinion, the way those two issues have been dealt with by scholars is 
significantly impaired by the unconsciously ambiguous and unclear use, by the very 
same scholars, of terms such as “texts”, “versions”, “meaning” and “reconcile”, which 
mirrors the probably unclear perception of the semantic issue underlying those questions. 
 
The following analysis is directed to clarifying those issues. 
 
Article 33(4) VCLT requires the interpreter to verify whether the authentic texts 
appearing prima facie divergent may be construed, under the rules enshrined in Articles 
31 and 32 VCLT, so that a clear, unambiguous and reasonable meaning is attributed to 
all of them. If such a meaning exists, that is the end of the quest: that meaning is to be 
adopted by the interpreter.  
 Where this is not the case, however, the interpreter must adopt “the meaning 
which best reconciles the texts”. Such an expression must be read in its context, which 
first and foremost includes the underlying idea of the unity of the treaty and the 
connected rule of law, reflected in Article 33(3), that all authentic texts do have the same 
meaning.1150  
 In this context, the use of the term “reconciles” simply means that the interpreter 
must attribute to all authentic texts one single meaning, notwithstanding the fact that 
such a meaning could not be provisionally attributed to all those texts on the basis of an 
interpretation made in accordance with the provisions of Articles 31 and 32 VCLT.1151 In 
fact, if the interpreter is arrived at the conclusion that, according to his own judgment, it 
is apparently not possible to construe all authentic texts in the same way on the basis of 
the interpretative rules enshrined in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT, it is inevitable that the 
meanings provisionally attributed to some of those texts in application of such rules will 
be discharged and a different meaning will be preferred to them as the utterance meaning 
of the treaty.  
 The activity of the interpreter thus consists in choosing one of the provisional 
utterance meanings attributable to the various authentic texts in accordance with the 
provisions of Articles 31 and 32 VCLT and in attributing it to all other authentic texts. 
 The possibility of adopting a meaning that could not be reasonably attributed to 
any of the authentic texts on the basis of the principles enshrined in Articles 31 and 32 
VCLT should be rejected,1152 unless exceptional and very strong evidence exists in favor 
of such a solution, since it appears contrary to the whole system of interpretation 
provided for in the VCLT, where the texts of the treaty are the starting point of the 
interpretative process and the attribution of meaning must comply with the rules 
                                                     
1150 See also principle (iv) established by the author in section 2 of Chapter 3 of Part I. 
1151 This is also the etymological meaning of “to reconcile”, coming from the Latin verb “reconciliare” (to 
reestablish the agreement; to reunify), which morphologically derives from the union of “conciliare” (i.e. to 
unify; to establish an agreement) and “re” (once again) (see Online Etymology Dictionary (Douglas Harper. 
Accessed 14 July 2010); M. Cortelazzo and P. Zolli, Il Nuovo Etimologico. Dizionario Etimologico della 
Lingua Italiana (Bologna: Zanichelli Editore, 1999)).  
1152 See, similarly, U. Linderfalk, On the Interpretation of Treaties. The Modern International Law as 
Expressed in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Dordrecht: Springer-Verlag, 2007), p. 363. 
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provided for in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT. That solution appears also unreasonable, in 
that it implies that the contracting States failed to fairly convey their intended message 
through all the authentic texts, even where due weight is given to the overall context. 
 
Against this background, to say, as Tabory did,1153 that the last sentence of Article 33(4) 
VCLT denies “giving preference to any single language version and to point to the 
continued regard, as far as possible, to all the versions of the treaty” in thus nonsensical.  
 Strictly speaking, within the system of the VCLT, it is not possible to give any 
preference to a text over another, but just to a meaning over another.  
 However, if even, in her proposition, the reference to the meanings attributed to 
the various authentic texts is substituted for the reference to the language versions, the 
proposition still remains nonsensical since either:  
(i) the interpreter has arrived at the conclusion that he cannot construe all the texts 
in the same way, which by itself demonstrates that some meaning has to prevail 
over the others, or  
(ii) the interpreter has not arrived at such a conclusion, i.e. he can attribute the 
same meaning to all authentic texts under Articles 31 and 32 VCLT and, 
therefore, he does not need to apply the last sentence of Article 33(4) VCLT.  
 
3.5.4.2. Evidence from the travaux préparatoires of the VCLT 
 
This interpretation of the term “reconcile” finds support in the travaux préparatoires of 
the VCLT. 
 
First, the possibility that the interpreter had to choose among the meanings provisionally 
attributed to the various authentic texts was clearly recognized by the members of the 
ILC.  
 For instance, before the Vienna Conference modified its text, Article 29 of the 
1966 Draft (now Article 33 VCLT) provided that, “when a comparison of the texts 
discloses a difference of meaning which the application of Articles 27 and 28 does not 
remove, a meaning which as far as possible reconciles the texts shall be adopted”.1154 
Thus, by way of the expression “as far as possible”, the ILC seemed to admit the 
possibility that the “final” meaning was to be chosen among those provisionally 
attributed to the otherwise irreconcilable texts.1155  
 To the same extent, in the course of the ILC 874th meeting, the Special 
Rapporteur, in replying to an observation submitted by Mr Verdross, affirmed that “[i]t 
was inadvisable to try to lay down a general rule providing an automatic solution for the 
                                                     
1153 See M. Tabory, Multilingualism In International Law and Institutions (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & 
Noordhoff, 1980), p. 202. 
1154 See YBILC 1966-II, p. 224 (emphasis added). 
1155 See, similarly, S. Sur, L'interprétation en droit international public (Paris: Librairie générale de droit et de 
jurisprudence, 1974), p. 274. 
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case in which two or more authentic texts could not be reconciled. If, after resort to all 
the means of interpretation set out in Article 69 and the further means set out in Article 
70, it was found impossible to determine the meaning of a treaty provision, then, 
according to paragraph 4 of the new Article 72, an attempt must be made to find a 
meaning which as far as possible reconciled the various authentic texts. Beyond that it 
was inadvisable to go, and if no reconciliation of the texts was possible, the 
interpretation should be left to be determined in the light of all the circumstances.”1156  
 The Commentary to Article 29 of the 1966 Draft1157 was even more explicit in 
this respect and stated that:  
(i) the presumption that the treaty terms are intended to have the same meaning in 
each authentic text “requires that every effort should be made to find a common 
meaning for the texts before preferring one to another” and  
(ii) “[t]he plurilingual form of the treaty does not justify the interpreter in simply 
preferring one text to another and discarding the normal means of resolving an 
ambiguity or obscurity on the basis of the objects and purposes of the treaty, 
travaux préparatoires, the surrounding circumstances, subsequent practice, etc. 
On the contrary, the equality of the texts means that every reasonable effort 
should first be made to reconcile the texts and to ascertain the intention of the 
parties by recourse to the normal means of interpretation”.  
 
Second, from the reading of the minutes of the Vienna Conference it may be inferred 
that one of the main reasons that led the contracting States to modify the text of Article 
29(3) of the 1966 Draft and to adopt the current text of Article 33(4) VCLT was exactly 
the need to introduce a rule that might give some guidance to the interpreter in case he 
had to choose among the possible meanings attributable to the various authentic texts.  
 In the course of the first session of the Vienna Conference, the United States1158 
suggested redrafting the last paragraph of Article 29 in order to include the following 
clause: “a meaning shall be adopted which is most consonant with the object and 
purpose of the treaty”.  
 According to the United States, under such a clause, in cases of persistent 
differences between the various language versions of a treaty, not a meaning that as far 
as possible reconciled the texts had to be adopted, but the meaning most consonant with 
the object and purpose of the treaty, thus explicitly recognizing the eventuality that in 
certain cases the reconciliation of the different language versions was impossible. The 
United States representative, in introducing this proposal, stressed that reconciliation of 
the different language versions was sometimes impossible and this was especially true 
where a problem of multijuralism occurred, i.e. where the treaty dealt with legal issues 
and two or more systems of law were involved. According to the United States 
representative, in such cases it often happened that there was no legal concept in one 
system that exactly corresponded to a certain legal concept in the other system. 
Therefore, even if two “equivalent” terms were used, the legal concepts underlying and 
                                                     
1156 See YBILC 1966-I (part II), p. 210, para. 33 (emphasis added).  
1157 See YBILC 1966-II, p. 225, para. 7 (emphasis added). 
1158 With reference to the proposals put forward by the United States, see UNCLT-Doc, p. 151. 
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expressed by them could be non-reconcilable.1159  
 The Republic of Vietnam and Australia took a similar approach in this respect, 
although the latter suggested certain modifications to the text proposed by the United 
States.1160  
 The Drafting Committee of the Vienna Conference presented a redrafted text of 
Article 29 to the Committee of the Whole at its 74th meeting, held on 16 May 1968.1161 
Mr Yasseen, in his capacity of Chairman of the Drafting Committee, explained to the 
Committee of the Whole that the Drafting Committee decided to embrace the idea 
underlying the United States suggestion of adopting the meaning closest to the object 
and purpose of the treaty for the purpose of reconciling the different texts.1162 In this 
respect, the position taken by the Drafting Committee seemed to be largely influenced by 
the compromise proposal put forward by Australia. The new text proposed by the 
Drafting Committee was approved without formal vote and recommended to the 
Conference for adoption.1163 The Vienna Conference eventually approved it.  
 
3.5.4.3. The concordant position of certain scholars 
 
Other scholars have also allowed the possibility for the interpreter to give preference to 
(the meaning attributable to) a single authentic text over the others. 
 
According to Hilf, for instance, where reconciliation of the texts by means of the 
application of the interpretative rules enshrined in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT has failed, 
Articles 33(4) VCLT admits the possibility of giving preference to the meaning of the 
text that is most in accord with the object and purpose of the treaty.1164 
 
Gardiner affirmed that “[a]s article 33(4) requires that regard be had to the object and 
purpose of the treaty when achieving this reconciliation, the process seems more one of 
selecting a meaning by application of that criterion than trying to find commonality 
between elements of provisions whose differences have already become so apparent as 
to raise the need for reconciliation.”1165 
                                                     
1159 See UNCLT-1st,, p. 189, para. 41. See, in this respect, also the comment on Part III of the ILC’s 1964 Draft 
made by the Yugoslavian government (YBILC 1966-II, p. 361).   
1160 With reference to the proposals put forward by the Republic of Vietnam, see UNCLT-Doc, p. 151 and 
UNCLT-1st,, p. 189, para. 45. With reference to the proposals put forward by the Australia, see UNCLT-Doc, 
p. 151 and UNCLT-1st,, p. 189, paras. 52-53. 
1161 See UNCLT-1st, p. 442. para. 35. 
1162 See UNCLT-1st, p. 443, para. 38. 
1163 See UNCLT-1st, p. 443, para. 38. 
1164 See M. Hilf, Die Auslegung mehrsprachiger Verträge. Eine Untersuchung zum Völkerrecht und zum 
Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1973), p. 102. Similarly J. M. Mössner, 
“Die Auslegung mehrsprachiger Staatsverträge, Bemerkungen zu Artikel 33 der Wiener Konvention über das 
Recht der Verträge vom 23. Mai 1969”, 15 Archiv des Völkerrechts (1972), 273 et seq., at 301 and F. Engelen, 
Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2004), pp. 405-406.  
1165 See R. Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 360. 
PART II: CHAPTER 4 
 314 
 
Finally, Linderfalk rightly pointed out that “[o]ne cannot reasonably assume the parties 
to the Vienna Convention to have envisioned the meaning of the VCLT article [33(4)] in 
such a way that an applier – seeking to identify the meaning that best reconciles the 
authenticated texts – can choose not only a meaning already given, but also other 
possible meanings. Comparison must be limited to the meanings already given. […] the 
applier must choose between meaning M1 and meaning M2 [author’s note: those being 
the ordinary meaning attributed to the authentic text 1 and the authentic text 2, on the 
basis of an interpretation conformed to the rules enshrined in Articles 31 and 32 
VCLT].”1166  
 
3.5.4.4. The decision of the Arbitral Tribunal for the Agreement on German External 
Debts in the Young Loan arbitration 
 
International courts and tribunals have also admitted that, for the purpose of reconciling 
otherwise irreconcilable authentic texts, it is necessary to adopt the meaning attributable 
to one (or more) of them and discharge the others. 
 
The traditional reference, in this respect, is to the Young Loan arbitration.  
 
In that case, the majority of the Tribunal held that “[t]he repeated reference by Article 33 
(4) of the [VCLT] to the ‘object and purpose’ of the treaty means in effect nothing else 
than that any person having to interpret a plurilingual international treaty has the 
opportunity of resolving any divergence in the texts which persists, after the principles of 
Articles 31 and 32 of the [VCLT] have been applied, by opting, for a final interpretation, 
for the one or the other text which in his opinion most closely approaches the ‘object and 
purpose’ of the treaty. Application of Article 33 (4) of the [VCLT] to the case under 
decision means that the Arbitral Tribunal has the right - and the duty - to adopt that 
interpretation of the clause in dispute which most closely approaches the object and 
purpose of the LDA.”1167  
 
Similarly, the three dissenting Arbiters affirmed that “[i]n cases where it is obvious that 
the terms used in the different authentic languages have different meanings that can be 
‘reconciled’ only by adopting one or the other, it becomes necessary to apply rules of 
interpretation not specifically codified by the Convention. For this purpose the rules of 
customary International Law will govern. Resort to such customary rules is specifically 
affirmed in the last paragraph of the preamble of the [Vienna Convention on the Law of 
                                                     
1166 See U. Linderfalk, On the Interpretation of Treaties. The Modern International Law as Expressed in the 
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Dordrecht: Springer-Verlag, 2007), p. 363. 
1167 See Arbitral Tribunal for the Agreement on German External Debts, 16 May 1980, The Kingdom of 
Belgium et al. v. the Federal Republic of Germany (Young Loan), 59 International Law Reports (1980), 494 et 
seq., at 548, para. 39. 




 The dissenting Arbiters concluded that customary rules of interpretation allowed 
and, in the case at stake, required giving a special weight to the drafted text in order to 
interpret multilingual treaties,1169 which actually seemed to be a reasonable solution in 
light of the particular overall context (including the travaux préparatoires and the facts 
and circumstances of the negotiation and conclusion of the LDA).1170  
 
It is interesting to note, however, that Gardiner1171 gave an apparently different reading 
of the Arbitral Tribunal decision in the Young Loan arbitration case.  
 According to Gardiner, by choosing to give effect to the meaning attributed to the 
German authentic text of Article 2(2) of Annex 1 of the LDA, the Tribunal substantially 
reconciled such a text with the other authentic texts of the treaty, namely those in the 
French and English languages, since the meaning attributed the latter were wide enough 
to encompass the meaning attributed to the former.  
 In that case, the reconciliation consisted in choosing the “more restrictive”1172 
meaning, i.e., the meaning that was within the range of possibilities in all three 
languages,1173 although the Tribunal described its solution as one of selecting the 
meaning attributed to one authentic text (the German authentic text), over the others, as 
that most in line with the object and purpose of the treaty.1174  
 
The author does not share the reading of the case given by Gardiner. 
 
It must be preliminarily noted that the Tribunal did not proceed as Gardiner described.  
 First, it concluded that the different texts might be construed so as to remove any 
                                                     
1168 See Arbitral Tribunal for the Agreement on German External Debts, 16 May 1980, The Kingdom of 
Belgium et al. v. the Federal Republic of Germany (Young Loan), 59 International Law Reports (1980), 494 et 
seq., dissenting opinion of Messrs. Robinson, Bathurst and Monguilan, at 578, para. 37. 
1169 See Arbitral Tribunal for the Agreement on German External Debts, 16 May 1980, The Kingdom of 
Belgium et al. v. the Federal Republic of Germany (Young Loan), 59 International Law Reports (1980), 494 et 
seq., dissenting opinion of Messrs. Robinson, Bathurst and Monguilan, at 578-585, paras. 37-41. 
1170 See para. 4 of the commentary to Articles 27-28 (YBILC 1966-II, p. 218, para. 4) and para. 9 of the 
commentary to Article 29 of the 1966 Draft (YBILC 1966-II, p. 226, para. 9). 
1171 R. Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 382-383. 
1172 This term is not used by Gardiner; it is derived from the Commentary to Article 75 of the Sir Humphrey 
Waldock’s Third report on the law of treaties (YBILC 1964-II, p. 65, para. 8).  
1173 See R. Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 382. In other terms, 
Gardiner seems to mean that the Tribunal  selected the only meaning whose denotata were all denoted also by 
the other meanings. Since the relevant terms in the French (“dépréciée”) and English (“depreciated”) texts of 
Article 2(2) of Annex 1 of the LDA had been interpreted as denoting both formal currency devaluations and 
actual currency depreciations due to the revaluation of other currencies, while the term used in the German text 
(“Abwertung”) had been interpreted as denoting only formal currency devaluations, the latter meaning was the 
only one whose denotata (i.e. formal currency devaluations) were all also denoted by the other meaning (the 
contrary, in fact, was not true, since certain denotata of the French and English terms, as interpreted by the 
Tribunal according to Gardiner, namely the actual currency depreciations due to the revaluation of other 
currencies, were not denoted by the German term, as interpreted by the Tribunal). 
1174 See Arbitral Tribunal for the Agreement on German External Debts, 16 May 1980, The Kingdom of 
Belgium et al. v. the Federal Republic of Germany (Young Loan), 59 International Law Reports (1980), 494 et 
seq., at 548-550, paras. 39 and 41. 
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prima facie divergence of meanings by applying the rules of interpretation enshrined in 
Articles 31 and 32 VCLT.1175   
 Then, it stated that “even if credence were given to the view that the discrepancy 
between the meaning of the German text of the disputed clause, on the one hand, and 
that of the English and French texts, on the other, could not be resolved by interpretation 
in the terms of Article 31(1)” VCLT, the application of the last sentence of Article 33(4) 
VCLT, according to which “any discrepancy between the several authentic texts of a 
treaty that cannot be eliminated by applying the principles of Articles 31 and 32 should 
ultimately be settled by attaching that meaning to the provision in question ‘which best 
reconciles the texts, having regard to the object and purpose of the treaty’ ”, would lead 
to the same conclusion.1176 
 
That said, even limiting the present analysis to the way in which the Tribunal applied the 
final clause of Article 33(4) VCLT in order to support the latter statement, it does not 
seem that the reading of the Tribunal’s arguments given by Gardiner may be shared.  
 First, such a reading is misleading, since it may induce the reader to believe that 
the Tribunal, in that part of its reasoning, found out an ordinary meaning common to all 
three authentic texts, while, in fact, the Tribunal:  
(i) clearly stated that it was dealing with the hypothetical situation in which the 
apparent discrepancy between the various authentic texts could not be resolved by 
an interpretation made in accordance with Article 31(1) VCLT and  
(ii) concluded that, in such a hypothetical situation, the only solution available 
consisted in “opting” for one of the conflicting meanings.  
Second, that reading might be seen as supporting the idea that reconciliation of otherwise 
irreconcilable texts could be fairly done by means of choosing the most restrictive 
meaning, that being the one “within the range of possibilities in all” authentic texts. 
However, this author submits that such a solution should be rejected as a general rule 
(and, in fact, the ILC rejected it as such),1177 since it actually leads the interpreter to 
                                                     
1175 See Arbitral Tribunal for the Agreement on German External Debts, 16 May 1980, The Kingdom of 
Belgium et al. v. the Federal Republic of Germany (Young Loan), 59 International Law Reports (1980), 494 et 
seq., at 548, paras. 37-38. 
1176 See Arbitral Tribunal for the Agreement on German External Debts, 16 May 1980, The Kingdom of 
Belgium et al. v. the Federal Republic of Germany (Young Loan), 59 International Law Reports (1980), 494 et 
seq., at 548, paras. 38-39. 
1177 See section 3.4.4 of this chapter. That solution was explicitly rejected by the ILC in the Commentary to 
Article 29 of the 1966 Draft, where it stated that  (i) the reading given by certain scholars of the PCIJ’s 
decision in the Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions case, according to which the most limited (restrictive) 
interpretation that can be made to harmonize with all authentic texts is the one which must always be adopted, 
could not be accepted and that (ii) whether a restrictive interpretation is to be adopted depends upon the nature 
of the treaty and the particular context in which the ambiguous term occurs (see YBILC 1966-II, pp. 225-226, 
para. 8). See, similarly, J. Hardy, “The Interpretation of Plurilingual Treaties by International Courts and 
Tribunals”, 37 British Yearbook of International Law (1961), 72 et seq., at 80. 
1177 It may be reasonably upheld, for instance, that the drafted text could play a relevant role in the selection of 
the meaning to be attributed to the otherwise irreconcilable authentic texts and for the purpose of its 
justification (see Arbitral Tribunal for the Agreement on German External Debts, 16 May 1980, The Kingdom 
of Belgium et al. v. the Federal Republic of Germany (Young Loan), 59 International Law Reports (1980), 494 
et seq., dissenting opinion of Messrs. Robinson, Bathurst and Monguilan, at 578-585, paras. 37-41). 
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choose among the meanings provisionally attributable to equally authoritative texts on 
the basis of a purely accidental element, i.e. that the concept underlying the relevant term 
used in the “chosen” text denotes a group of items that is a subset of the group of items 
denoted by the corresponding terms used in the other authentic texts.1178  
 
 
3.5.5. The relevance of the object and purpose of the treaty in order to reconcile the 
otherwise diverging texts 
 
With regard to the issue of which meaning should be selected in order to reconcile the 
authentic treaty texts, it seems fairly obvious that such a meaning should be the one that 
best reflects the common intention of the parties. In order to select that meaning, the 
interpreter assesses and balances all the available elements and items of evidence,1179 
although he appears bound to ascribe a significant weight to the object and purpose of 
the treaty due to the specific reference thereto included in Article 33(4) VCLT.1180  
 
The reference to the “object and purpose of the treaty” in Article 33(4) VCLT, however, 
raises two questions that need to be addressed. 
 
The first question concerns “which” object and purpose of the treaty should be taken into 
account in order to apply the last clause of Article 33(4) VCLT, since it is possible, and 
indeed not infrequent, that a treaty has many objects and purposes. Gaja, in this respect, 
pointed out that “the reference to the object and purpose of a treaty raises difficulties 
because treaties generally do not define their object and purpose and, moreover, may 
have a plurality of objects and purposes, without establishing any clear hierarchy among 
those objects and purposes”.1181  
                                                     
1178 Such a solution, in fact, had been explicitly rejected by the ILC in the Commentary to Article 29 of the 
1966 Draft, where it stated that  (i) the reading given by certain scholars of the PCIJ’s decision in the 
Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions case, according to which the most limited (restrictive) interpretation that 
can be made to harmonize with all authentic texts is the one which must always be adopted, could not be 
accepted and that (ii) whether a restrictive interpretation is to be adopted depends upon the nature of the treaty 
and the particular context in which the ambiguous term occurs (see YBILC 1966-II, pp. 225-226, para. 8; see, 
similarly, J. Hardy, “The Interpretation of Plurilingual Treaties by International Courts and Tribunals”, 37 
British Yearbook of International Law (1961), 72 et seq., at 80). 
1179 It may be reasonably upheld, for instance, that the drafted text could play a relevant role in the selection of 
the meaning to be attributed to the otherwise irreconcilable authentic texts and for the purpose of its 
justification (see Arbitral Tribunal for the Agreement on German External Debts, 16 May 1980, The Kingdom 
of Belgium et al. v. the Federal Republic of Germany (Young Loan), 59 International Law Reports (1980), 494 
et seq., dissenting opinion of Messrs. Robinson, Bathurst and Monguilan, at 578-585, paras. 37-41).   
1180 It goes without saying that the meaning to be adopted cannot contrast with the object and purpose of the 
treaty (or that of the construed provision), as otherwise:  
(i) it would prove to be an unreasonable meaning and, as such, contrary to an interpretation in good 
faith of the treaty;  
(ii) a fortiori - it could not be regarded as one of the reasonable meanings preliminary attributed to the 
various authentic texts and, thus, it could not be one of the meanings among which the interpreter 
could select the “final” utterance meaning. 
1181 See G. Gaja, “The perspective of international law”, in G. Maisto (ed.), Multilingual Texts and 
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 The interpretative problem created by the plurality of the treaty’s objects and 
purposes may be overcome where the provision to be construed appears to pursue only 
one of such objects and purposes. In such a case, it may be reasonably upheld that the 
specific object and purpose of that provision is the one that must be taken into account in 
order to apply Article 33(4) VCLT.  
 However, this is not always the case, since some objects and purposes may 
underlie all treaty provisions and, in turn, certain treaty provisions may be regarded as 
pursuing more than one object and purpose. In such cases, the interpreter must balance 
the relevant objects and purposes, in order to find a reasonable equilibrium among them 
with reference to the specific situation at stake, in the same way as he would do in 
respect of potentially conflicting principles of law. 
 
The second question concerns the double reference to the object and purpose of the 
treaty included in Article 33(4) VCLT.  In this respect, it has been correctly pointed out 
that the object and purpose of the treaty comes into operation twice in the process of 
resolving apparent divergences of meanings between the various authentic texts, i.e.:  
(i) indirectly, through the reference to the general rule of interpretation 
encompassed in Article 31 VCLT, which includes the object and purpose of the 
treaty among the primary means of interpretation; 
(ii) directly, in cases of residual divergences, where it is stated that in reconciling 
the various authentic texts the interpreter must have “regard to the object and 
purpose of the treaty”.1182 
 
The existence of such a double reference to the object and purpose of the treaty was 
criticized by some delegations at the Vienna Conference.1183  
 
Among scholars, Mössner considered redundant the reference to Articles 31 and 32 
made by Article 33(4) VCLT, since generally a divergence between the various 
authentic texts would be discovered during the routine interpretation process provided 
for in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT and, therefore, already tackled through their application 
for the purpose of removing it.1184 
 
Similarly, Hilf doubted the usefulness of a reference to the object and purpose of the 
treaty in order to solve a divergence that could not have been removed by an 
interpretation based on the rules enshrined in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT, in which the 
                                                                                                                                  
Interpretation of Tax Treaties and EC Tax Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2005), 91 et seq., at 94. 
1182 See M. Hilf, Die Auslegung mehrsprachiger Verträge. Eine Untersuchung zum Völkerrecht und zum 
Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1973), p. 101; P. Germer, 
“Interpretation of Plurilingual Treaties: A Study of Article 33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties”, 11 Harvard International Law Journal (1970), 400 et seq., at 425. 
1183 In particular, the criticism was raised by the representatives of Israel and Trinidad Tobago (see UNCLT-1st,, 
p. 190, paras. 66 and 68 respectively). 
1184 See J. M. Mössner, “Die Auslegung mehrsprachiger Staatsverträge, Bemerkungen zu Artikel 33 der Wiener 
Konvention über das Recht der Verträge vom 23. Mai 1969”, 15 Archiv des Völkerrechts (1972), 273 et seq., at 
300 et seq. 
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object and purpose of the treaty also played a relevant role. The author, however, 
recognized that the double reference to the object and purpose of the treaty at least made 
clear that the interpreter should adopt the meaning most compatible with such object and 
purpose.1185 
 
Germer considered such a double reference to be artificial, since the problems arising in 
connection with a divergence between different authentic texts would be essentially the 
same as those encountered in respect of a divergence between different provisions of a 
treaty authenticated in a single language. In both cases, the purpose of the interpreter 
would be to find out the meaning that the contracting States intended to attach to the 
terms of the treaty.1186  
 
Contrary to the above scholars, Engelen maintained that the repeated reference, in 
Article 33(4) VCLT, to the object and purpose of the treaty is not without significance.  
 On the one hand, Article 31 VCLT emphasizes the primacy of the text of the 
treaty and does not admit of teleological interpretations going beyond what is expressed 
or necessarily implied in the text. In this context, the object and purpose of the treaty 
plays a limited role, being taken into account for the purpose of determining the ordinary 
meaning attributable to undefined terms.  
 On the other hand, Article 33(4) VCLT places the main emphasis on the object 
and purpose of the treaty and admits, as a last resort, of more liberal interpretations in an 
effort to reconcile the authentic texts, which would not be admissible in applying Article 
                                                     
1185 See M. Hilf, Die Auslegung mehrsprachiger Verträge. Eine Untersuchung zum Völkerrecht und zum 
Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1973), pp. 101-102. 
1186 See P. Germer, “Interpretation of Plurilingual Treaties: A Study of Article 33 of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties”, 11 Harvard International Law Journal (1970), 400 et seq., at 425-426.  
In this respect, this author submits that Germer, although concluding in a reasonable manner by making 
reference to the intention of the parties, used the wrong analogy since the problems faced by the interpreter in 
the two cases he mentioned are not “essentially the same”. Although they certainly present certain similarities, 
the relation between two potentially antinomic provisions (rules) differs from the relation between two 
authentic texts of same provision (rule). With reference to the former, the scope, the contexts and the objects 
and purposes of the two provisions (rules) are not the same and their comparison and the analysis of their 
interaction generally play a fundamental role for the purpose of removing the apparent antinomy. With regard 
to the latter, there is only one scope, one context and one set of objects and purposes, since only one provision 
(rule) is at stake. Therefore, the above-mentioned dynamic analysis (comparison and analysis of the 
interaction) cannot be applied to the latter and a more static type of analysis has to be performed instead. In 
addition, the solution of the potential antinomies is generally different: while in the case of apparently 
divergent authentic texts the interpreter may choose between the meaning provisionally attributed to one text 
and that provisionally attributed to the other text in order to determine their common meaning, in the case of 
apparently incompatible provisions (rules) of a treaty, the interpreter is called upon to modify the apparent 
scope of one (or both) of them, without the possibility of simply discharging one of the two. All in all, in one 
case the interpreter is faced with two distinct rules, while in the other he is faced with a single rule expressed 
by means of two distinct utterances. Hence, the purpose of the interpretation is different: in the former case, the 
interpreter is called to determine the exact scope of each rule, in order to eliminate possible antinomies (i.e. to 
eliminate the possibility that their contextual application to a single instance will lead to contrary results ); in 
the latter case, the interpreter is called upon to construe two (or more) utterances in order to determine their 
single utterance meaning, i.e. the single rule. 




In a similar vein, Tabory concluded that the purpose of the reference to the treaty object 
and purpose is different on the two occasions, since in the closing provision of Article 33 
VCLT, the reference could be seen as a warning to the interpreter not to abandon the due 
regard for the “object and purpose” when reconciling the various authentic texts, even 
where other elements of the general rule of interpretation had been abandoned.1188  
  
In broad terms, the thesis put forward by Engelen and Tabory appears the most 
convincing, as it makes clear that the roles played by the treaty object and purpose in 
Article 31 VCLT and in the last sentence of Article 33(4) VCLT are different.  
 As mentioned in the previous sections, the last sentence of Article 33(4) VCLT 
requires the interpreter who could not find a common meaning attributable to all 
authentic texts by applying Articles 31 and 32 VCLT1189 to choose among the various 
meanings provisionally attributed to such texts in order to establish the treaty utterance 
meaning. In this regard, the object and purpose of the treaty works as the most important 
yardstick for the interpreter to choose among those meanings.  
 How such a yardstick is actually used by the interpreter depends on the particular 
circumstances of the case and on the personal background of the interpreter: the actual 
approach may range from the position expressed by Linderfalk, according to whom the 
interpreter has to choose the interpretation through which the object and purpose of the 
treaty is best realized,1190 to that supported by Gaja, who submitted that the “object and 
purpose” constitutes the “framework” within which the texts have to be reconciled, i.e. 
the choice between the possible meanings has to be made.1191 
                                                     
1187 See F. Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 
2004), pp. 403-404. 
1188 See, in this sense, M. Tabory, Multilingualism In International Law and Institutions (Alphen aan den Rijn: 
Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1980), pp. 212-213. 
1189 In the context of Articles 31 and 32 VCLT, the object and purpose of the treaty plays a double role: first, it 
constitutes a relevant element to be considered in order to determine the common “ordinary” meaning to be 
attached to the corresponding terms used in the various authentic texts: second, it functions as a external limit 
that draws the borderline between reasonable and unreasonable (i.e. contrary to good faith) interpretations of 
the treaty. 
1190 See U. Linderfalk, On the Interpretation of Treaties. The Modern International Law as Expressed in the 
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Dordrecht: Springer-Verlag, 2007), p. 366. 
1191 See G. Gaja, “The perspective of international law”, in G. Maisto (ed.), Multilingual Texts and 
Interpretation of Tax Treaties and EC Tax Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2005), 91 et seq., at 94. Gaja 
further clarifies his position on the role theoretically played by the “object and purpose” in Article 33(4) VCLT 
(although recognizing that the case law analysis seems to confirm a trend towards giving decisive weight to 
such criterion in order to overcome divergences in multilingual texts – see ibidem, p. 98) by stating that “only 
an interpretation that is sustainable according to the object an purpose of the treaty could be viable to this 
effect” (see ibidem, p. 94). According to the author, however, the requirement that the reconciling 
interpretation (i.e. meaning) must be “sustainable according to the object an purpose of the treaty” seems 
redundant at this stage of the analysis/justification process, for any interpretation (i.e. meaning) not being 
sustainable according to the object an purpose of the treaties should have been already rejected as non-
admissible under the rules of interpretation provided for under Articles 31 and 32 VCLT, which would exclude 
it from the array of possible interpretations (i.e. meanings), remaining after the application of said Articles 31 
and 32, among which the reconciling interpretation (i.e. meaning) is to be chosen. 




Conversely, the author does not share the idea, underlying the thesis upheld by Engelen 
and Tabory, that the last sentence of Article 33(4) VCLT allows the interpreter to have 
recourse to more liberal interpretations and to abandon the other elements of the general 
rules of interpretation. This aspect is further examined in the following section. 
 
 
3.5.6. Article 33(4) VCLT and special meanings 
 
As the last sentence of Article 33(4) VCLT requires the interpreter, in order to establish 
the final utterance meaning, to choose among the various meanings provisionally 
attributed to the authentic treaty texts in accordance with Articles 31 and 32 VCLT, the 
author submits that the final utterance meaning is always established through the 
application of the ordinary rules of interpretation (enshrined in Articles 31 and 32 
VCLT) to one of the authentic treaty texts.  
 However, since in this case the final utterance meaning differs from the meanings 
provisionally attributed to (at least) some of the authentic treaty texts,1192 which in turn 
were determined under the broadest application of the interpretative rules enshrined in 
Articles 31 and 32 VCLT, the question arises of whether the final utterance meaning 
might also be regarded as the result of the application of the general rules of 
interpretation (enshrined in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT) to such authentic treaty texts.  
 A brief example may help clarify that issue. Consider a treaty with two language 
authentic texts (A and B), which have been construed by the interpreter under Articles 
31 and 32 VCLT as meaning “X” and “Y”, respectively. Assume that the interpreter has 
established that the meaning that “best reconciles the texts, having regard to the object 
and purpose of the treaty” is “X”. Obviously, meaning “X” may be regarded as the result 
of the application of the rules of interpretation enshrined in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT to 
text A. However, the legitimate question arises of whether meaning “X” might also be 
regarded as the result of the application of the rules of interpretation enshrined in 
Articles 31 and 32 VCLT to text B. 
 
If the question is answered in the positive, this implies that the application of the last 
clause of Article 33(4) VCLT was not necessary and, strictly speaking, that that clause 
cannot be said to have been applied, since its prerequisite was not fulfilled (i.e. no 
difference of meaning existed that the application of Articles 31 and 32 did not remove). 
Hence, this answer leads to the conclusion that the final clause of Article 33(4) VCLT is 
never applicable.  
 If the question is answered in the negative, conversely, this means that treaties 
may be legitimately construed in a way that is contrary to that compelled by the rules of 
interpretation enshrined in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT, which in turn would destroy the 
foundations of the customary system of interpretation codified by the VCLT, since the 
                                                     
1192 Otherwise the interpreter would not have had the need to apply the rule encompassed in the last sentence of 
Article 33(4) VCLT. 
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very same VCLT would allow the non-application of its rules of interpretation in order 
to construe a treaty text, thus reducing them to no more than a set of non-binding 
suggestions. 
 
The author submits that this apparent paradox should be disentangled as follows.  
 
First, the latter answer should be rejected in order to preserve the reliability and the 
internal coherence of the VCLT system of interpretation.  
 In fact, its acceptance would imply for the interpreter to have at his disposal two 
sets of interpretative rules: one set, made up exclusively of the rules enshrined in 
Articles 31 and 32 VCLT, to be used where monolingual treaties are at stake and another 
set, made up of both the rules enshrined in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT and some other 
(teleological?) rule, to be applied to multilingual treaties.  
 The existence of such a double set of rules, apart from being internally 
incoherent, could be relied on by the interpreter in order to argue in favor of a final 
utterance meaning that could not be reasonably attributed to any of the authentic texts on 
the basis of Articles 31 and 32 VCLT, since Article 33(4) VCLT would in this case 
allow the interpreter to liberally and teleologically construe all authentic treaty texts.1193  
 
Second, the argument is put forward that the last sentence of Article 33(4) must be 
construed as a rule that indirectly allows the interpreter to take, as the “special meaning” 
that the parties intended to attach to a certain term used in one of the authentic treaty 
texts, the meaning provisionally attributed to the corresponding term used in another 
authentic text and eventually chosen by the interpreter as the final utterance meaning 
thereof, i.e. as the meaning that “best reconciles the texts, having regard to the object and 
purpose of the treaty”.  
 In this respect, the author does not share the proposition, made by Engelen, that 
“[s]imply preferring one authentic text to another is no doubt in flagrant contradiction of 
the principle of equal authority of the texts (Article 33(1) VCLT)”1194 since the choice 
made by the interpreter: 
(i) is not between the two authentic texts, but between the meanings provisionally 
attributed thereto;  
(ii) is aimed solely at determining the final utterance meaning common to all 
authentic texts;  
(iii) entails the adoption of the (ordinary or special) meaning provisionally 
attributed to a term employed in one authentic text1195 as the special meaning of 
the corresponding term employed in the other authentic text.1196 
                                                     
1193 Engelen and Tabory apparently consider that the last sentence of Article 33(4) VCLT allows the interpreter 
to opt for such an interpretation (see previous section).  
1194 See F. Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 
2004), p. 405. 
1195 On the basis of the rules of interpretation enshrined in Article 31 and 32 VCLT. 
1196 The same, mutatis mutandis, holds true with regard to the expressions (and not terms) used in the various 
authentic texts, as well as in cases where a corresponding term or expression does not compare in a certain 
authentic text, but nonetheless it may be implied therein. 




Under this perspective:  
(i) the fact that the (ordinary or special) meaning provisionally attributed to a 
certain term(s) in one (or more) authentic text(s) is regarded as the meaning 
“which best reconciles the texts, having regard to the object and purpose of 
the treaty”, is thus taken as the decisive evidence of the common intention of 
the parties to attach that meaning, as a “special meaning”, to the 
corresponding terms used in the other authentic texts; 
(ii) the last sentence of Article 33(4) VCLT is regarded as a rule of a purely 
procedural nature, purporting to offer a way out for those interpreters that 
considered the attribution of a certain special meaning to the relevant treaty 
term as an intolerable stretch of its reasonable meaning. 
 
3.5.7. Conclusions on research question f)  
 
Under Article 33(4) VCLT, where a comparison of the authentic treaty texts discloses a 
difference of meaning that the application of Articles 31 and 32 VCLT does not remove, 
the interpreter must adopt “the meaning which best reconciles the texts”. Such an 
expression must be read in its context, which first and foremost includes the underlying 
principle of the unity of the treaty and the connected rule of law, reflected in Article 
33(3), that all authentic texts do have the same meaning.1197  
 In that context, the use of the term “reconcile” simply means that the interpreter 
must attribute to all authentic texts a single meaning, notwithstanding the fact that such a 
meaning could not be provisionally attributed to all those texts on the basis of an 
interpretation made in accordance with the provisions of Articles 31 and 32 VCLT.  
 
The activity of the interpreter thus consists in choosing one of the provisional utterance 
meanings attributable to the various authentic texts in accordance with the provisions of 
Articles 31 and 32 VCLT and attributing it to all other authentic texts.  
 The possibility of adopting a meaning that could not be reasonably attributed to 
any of the authentic texts on the basis of the principles enshrined in Articles 31 and 32 
VCLT should be rejected, unless exceptional and very strong evidence exists in favor of 
such a solution, since it appears contrary to the whole system of interpretation provided 
for in the VCLT, where the texts of the treaty are the starting point of the interpretative 
process and the attribution of meaning must comply with the rules provided for in 
Articles 31 and 32 VCLT. That solution appears unreasonable as well, in that it implies 
that the contracting States failed to fairly convey their intended message through all the 
authentic texts, even where due weight is given to the overall context. 
 
The meaning to be selected by the interpreter in order to reconcile the authentic treaty 
texts should be the one that best reflects the common intention of the parties.  
 In order to select that meaning, the interpreter assesses and balances all available 
                                                     
1197 See principle (iv) established by the author in section 2 of Chapter 3 of Part I. 
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elements and items of evidence, although he appears bound to ascribe a significant 
weight to the object and purpose of the treaty due to the specific reference thereto in 
Article 33(4) VCLT. In other terms, the object and purpose of the treaty works as the 
most important yardstick for the interpreter to choose, among the meanings provisionally 
attributed to the authentic treaty texts on the basis of the principles enshrined in Articles 
31 and 32 VCLT, the final utterance meaning of the treaty. 
 In this respect, since treaties generally have many objects and purposes, the 
interpreter should use as yardstick those objects and purposes that appear relevant with 
respect to the provision to be interpreted and balance them in order to find a reasonable 
equilibrium with reference to the specific situation at stake. 
 
Finally, the last sentence of Article 33(4) should be construed as a rule that indirectly 
allows the interpreter to take, as the “special meaning” that the parties intended to attach 
to a certain term used in one of the authentic treaty texts, the (ordinary or special) 
meaning provisionally attributed to the corresponding term used in another authentic text 
and eventually chosen by the interpreter as the final utterance meaning, i.e. as the 
meaning that “best reconciles the texts, having regard to the object and purpose of the 
treaty”. Under this perspective:  
(i) the fact that the (ordinary or special) meaning provisionally attributed to a 
certain term(s) in one (or more) authentic text(s) is regarded as the meaning 
“which best reconciles the texts, having regard to the object and purpose of the 
treaty”, is thus taken as the decisive evidence of the common intention of the 
parties to attach that meaning, as a “special meaning”, to the corresponding 
terms used in the other authentic texts; 
(ii) the last sentence of Article 33(4) VCLT is regarded as a rule of a purely 
procedural nature, purporting to offer a way out for those interpreters that 
considered the attribution of a certain special meaning to the relevant treaty 
term as an intolerable stretching of its reasonable meaning. 
 
So construed, the rule provided for in the last sentence of Article 33(4) VCLT appears an 
eminently reasonable solution, since: 
(a) it is in line with principle (iv) established by the author in section 2 of Chapter 3 
of Part I, according to which any alleged discrepancy in meaning among the 
authentic texts of a treaty is only apparent, since the treaty is an instrument for 
the parties to convey a single message and, therefore, it must always be 
attributed a single utterance meaning, notwithstanding the number of its 
authentic texts; 
(b) it restates the content of principle (v) established by the author in section 2 of 
Chapter 3 of Part I, in that, on the one hand, it requires the interpreter to 
establish the final utterance meaning on the basis of the overall context and, in 
particular, of the parties’ object and purpose and, on the other hand, it does not 
overestimate the relevance of the treaty texts for the purpose of establishing the 
final utterance meaning, providing the possibility for the interpreter to attach to 
the terms used in certain authentic texts a special meaning that might seem 
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prima facie difficult to attribute to it, but which nonetheless appears to best suit 
the parties’ intention and the treaty’s object and purpose. 
 
3.6. The case of the prevailing text  
 
3.6.1. Research questions addressed in this section  
 
The present section is aimed at tackling the following three research (sub)question(s), 
here briefly illustrated by means of examples. 
 
g) Where the treaty provides that a certain authentic text is to prevail in the case 
of divergences: (i) at which point of the interpretative process must there be 
recourse to such a prevailing text? 
 
This issue may be illustrated by taking as case study Article 208 of the Peace Treaty of 
Saint German, concluded on 10 September 1919 in Saint-Germain-en-Laye.  
 According to the English authentic thereof, the States to which the territory of the 
former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was transferred at the end of World War I and the 
States arising from the dismemberment of that Monarchy acquired all property and 
possessions situated within their territories belonging to the former or existing Austrian 
Government, including “the private property of members of the former Royal Family of 
Austria-Hungary”. The French authentic text of the Treaty, in this respect, made 
reference to the “biens privés de l’ancienne famille souveraine d’Autriche-Hongrie”. 
Between the English and the French authentic texts, therefore, a prima facie divergence 
in meaning might be alleged to exist, where the former was construed as referring to all 
private property owned by members of the Royal Family of Austria-Hungary, while the 
latter was construed as limiting the scope of the provision to the private property directly 
owned by the Royal Family as such. 
 Under the final clause of the treaty, the French authentic text of Article 208 was 
to prevail over the English and Italian authentic texts in cases of divergences. 
 Assume that the members of the former Royal Family of Austria-Hungary held 
some of their property in their individual capacity and not together as Royal Family.1198  
 In order to decide whether the property individually held by the members of the 
former Royal Family could be legitimately transferred to the States arising from the 
dismemberment of the Monarchy under Article 208 of the Peace Treaty of Saint 
German, the interpreter could follow two alternative and mutually exclusive 
argumentative paths, as well as any of the paths lieing between such two extremes. The 
two outermost argumentative paths that the interpreter might follow are: 
(i) he automatically applies the French (prevailing) text, since a prima facie 
                                                     
1198 The example is derived from Supreme Court (Poland), 16 June 1930, Archdukes of the Habsburg-Lorraine 
House v. The Polish State Treasury, 5 Annual digest of public international law cases (1929-1930), 365 et seq. 
[Case No. 235]. 
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divergence between the French and English texts was alleged to exist; 
(ii) he has recourse to all available means of interpretation in order to reconcile 
the French and English texts, before concluding that there is an actual divergence 
between the provisional meanings of such texts and, therefore, before relying 
exclusively on the treaty’s prevailing text. 
In this respect, the question arises of whether an obligation exists for the interpreter to 
follow some of the above paths, or, in any case, whether any reason exists to prefer one 
over the others.  
 This question is addressed in section 3.6.2. 
 
g) Where the treaty provides that a certain authentic text is to prevail in the case 
of divergences: (ii) what must the interpreter do if the prevailing text is 
ambiguous or obscure? 
 
With regard to the previous example and assuming that the French prevailing text 
appeared ambiguous (or obscure, or unreasonable), what relevance should the interpreter 
attribute to the other authentic texts for the purpose of construing Article 208 of the 
Peace Treaty of Saint German, in particular where he concluded that the English and 
Italian authentic texts pointed towards the same meaning? 
 This question is addressed in section 3.6.3. 
 
 
g) Where the treaty provides that a certain authentic text is to prevail in the case 
of divergences: (iii) what must the interpreter do if the prevailing text contrasts 
with the other coherent authentic texts? 
 
With regard to the previous example, what should the interpreter do where he 
provisionally concluded that:  
(i) the French (prevailing) text of Article 208 of the Peace Treaty of Saint German 
did not to allow the transfer of the property individually held by the members of 
the former Royal Family to the States arising from the dismemberment of the 
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, while  
(ii) both the English and the Italian authentic texts seemed to permit such a 
transfer?  
Should he try to remove the apparent difference of meaning by having recourse to all 
available means of interpretation? Where he failed to remove the prima facie 
discrepancy among the French, English and Italian authentic texts, should he opt for the 
meaning attributable to the most numerous concordant texts, or rely on the French 
prevailing text? 
 This question is addressed in section 3.6.4. 
 
 
3.6.2. When does the recourse to the prevailing text become compulsory? 
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3.6.2.1. The position of the ILC and the discordant case law of national and 
international courts and tribunals 
 
As the ILC correctly detected,1199 the application of treaty provisions giving priority to a 
particular authentic text in the case of potential divergences in meaning1200 may raise the 
difficult issue of the exact point in the interpretative process at which such provision 
should be put into operation.  
 In particular, one could wonder whether the prevailing text should be 
automatically applied as soon as the slightest difference appears between the wordings of 
the various authentic texts,1201 or recourse should instead first be had to all the relevant 
means of interpretation provided for under Articles 31 and 32 VCLT, in order to 
reconcile the texts, before concluding that there is in effect a divergence between the 
provisional utterance meanings of such texts.  
 
According to the ILC,1202 this issue should be resolved by the interpreter on a case-by-
case basis, since the intention of the parties inserting such a provision in the treaty might 
vary greatly from one extreme to the other. In this respect, the interpreter should first and 
foremost determine the intention of the parties in relation to that issue.  
 
The case law of national and international courts and tribunals mirrors such 
uncertainty.1203  
 
As the ILC also noted, in some cases courts and tribunals simply applied the prevailing 
text from the outset without going into the question of whether there was an actual 
divergence between the authentic texts.1204 As example of such an approach, the ILC 
referred to the Interpretation of paragraph 4 of the Annex following Article 179 of the 
Treaty of Neuilly case,1205 in which the PCIJ based its decision exclusively on the French 
                                                     
1199 See paragraph 4 of the commentary to the 1966 Draft (YBILC 1966-II, p. 224, para. 4). 
1200 Infrequently, treaty’s final clauses provide that, in the case of divergent or unclear texts, the interpreter has 
to apply not a predetermined authentic text, but the text that best satisfies certain requirements in the specific 
case at stake. Although such uncommon final clauses are not deal with in the present study, due to the fact that 
they hardly ever appear in tax treaties, it may be interesting to reproduce below the text of the declaration (in 
French) appended to the 1869 Extradition Agreement between Austria-Hungary and Italy, concluded in 
Florence on 27 February 1869:  
“Que les deux textes de la Convention, savoir le texte allemand et le texte italien, doivent être 
considères comme également authentiques, et que s'il pouvait se trouver une divergence entre ces 
deux textes, de même que s'il surgissait un doute sur l'interprétation suivra l'interprétation la plus 
favorable a l'extradition du prévenu.”   
1201 Or even from the outset of the interpretative process, without any attempt to apply the other authentic texts. 
1202 See paragraph 4 of the commentary to the 1966 Draft (YBILC 1966-II, p. 224, para. 4). 
1203 For a comprehensive analysis of the case law on this matter before the conclusion of the VCLT, see J. 
Hardy, “The Interpretation of Plurilingual Treaties by International Courts and Tribunals”, 37 British Yearbook 
of International Law (1961), 72 et seq., at 129-136. 
1204 See paragraph 4 of the commentary to the 1966 Draft (YBILC 1966-II, p. 224, para. 4). 
1205 PCIJ, 12 September 1924, Interpretation of paragraph 4 of the Annex following Article 179 of the Treaty of 
Neuilly (Bulgaria v. Greece), judgment, pp. 3-10. 
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authentic text of paragraph 4 of the Annex to Section IV of Part IX of the Treaty of 
Neuilly,1206 which was to prevail over the other authentic texts (in the English and Italian 
languages) in the case of divergences.1207  
 
Another instance of such an approach is that of the Aron Kahane successeur v. 
Francesco Parisi and the Austrian State case,1208 where the Austrian-Romanian Mixed 
Arbitral Tribunal concluded, contrary to the submission of the Austrian government, that 
the English authentic text should not be taken into consideration for the purpose of 
interpreting the Treaty of Saint-Germain.1209  
 According to the Austrian-Romanian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, the interpretation 
of the debated provision of the Treaty of Saint-Germain was to be based solely on the 
French authentic text thereof, apparently due to the fact that, under the final clause of 
that treaty, in the case of divergence the French text prevailed over the English and 
Italian authentic texts.1210  
 
In other occasions, however, the competent courts and tribunals carried out a comparison 
of the various authentic texts in order to ascertain the intention of the parties, 
notwithstanding the fact that the treaty provided for a prevailing text to be applied in 
cases of discrepancies in meanings.  
 
This was the case, for instance, with reference to the decision delivered by the Supreme 
Court of Poland in the Archdukes of the Habsburg-Lorraine House v. the Polish State 
Treasury case,1211 which dealt with the interpretation and application of Article 208 of 
the Treaty of Saint-Germain.1212 
 The case concerned the claim advanced by the Archdukes of the Habsburg-
Lorraine House for the restitution of lands that the Polish State had acquired under 
Article 208 of the Treaty of Saint-Germain, according to which the States to which the 
territory of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was transferred and the States 
arising from the dismemberment of that Monarchy acquired all property and possessions 
situated within their territories belonging to the former or existing Austrian Government, 
including “the private property of members of the former Royal Family of Austria-
Hungary”. The plaintiffs maintained that the acquisition of property by the Polish State 
was unlawful, since the members of the former Royal Family had held such property 
                                                     
1206 Treaty concluded on 27 November 1919 in Neuilly-sur-Seine, France. 
1207 See Interpretation of paragraph 4 of the Annex following Article 179 of the Treaty of Neuilly, PCIJ, Ser. 
A., No. 3, 1924, pp. 5-7.  
1208 Romanian-Austrian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, 19 March 1929, Aron Kahane successor v. Francesco Parisi 
and the Austrian State, 8 Recueil des décisions des tribunaux arbitraux mixtes institués par les traités de paix 
(1929), 943 et seq. 
1209 Treaty concluded on 10 September 1919 in Saint-Germain-en-Laye, France. 
1210 Except with regard to Parts I (Covenant of the League of Nations) and XIII (Labour) of the Treaty, for the 
purpose of which the French and English texts were considered of equal force. 
1211 See Supreme Court (Poland), 16 June 1930, Archdukes of the Habsburg-Lorraine House v. The Polish 
State Treasury, 5 Annual digest of public international law cases (1929-1930), 365 et seq. [Case No. 235]. 
1212 Treaty cocluded on 10 September 1919 in Saint-Germain-en-Laye, France. 
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(mainly lands) in their individual capacity. For that reason, such property could not be 
considered to be property of the former Royal Family, i.e. “biens privés de l’ancienne 
famille souveraine d’Autriche-Hongrie”, as provided for by the French authentic text of 
Article 208 of the Treaty,1213 which was to prevail over the other authentic texts (in the 
English and Italian languages) in the case of divergence.1214  
The Polish Supreme Court, however, dismissed the appeal of the Archdukes of 
the Habsburg-Lorraine House. In giving grounds for its decision, the Court affirmed the 
following.1215  
First, the final clause of the Treaty of Saint-Germain, according to which (i) the 
treaty was ratified in French, English, and Italian and, (ii) in the case of divergence, the 
French text of which was to prevail,1216 had to be interpreted as meaning that all three 
texts were authentic and therefore relevant for interpretative purposes, the superior status 
of the French text coming into play only in case the existence of a material divergence 
was established. In fact, since the contracting parties decided to have texts in different 
languages, it had to be assumed that their decision was intended to produce some legal 
consequence, i.e. that they wanted to attribute legal authority to each text for the purpose 
of the interpretation and application of the treaty. This conclusion drawn by the Court 
appears in line with the maxim “ut res magis valeat quam pereat”, since the contrary 
assumption that a text (e.g. the English, or Italian text) had no importance at all was 
tantamount to maintaining that the parties, in having drafted and authenticated it, wished 
to regard such a text as non-existent.  
Second, it was not possible to establish the existence of a material divergence 
between the various authentic texts without a careful analysis thereof. Such an analysis, 
carried out with the aid of all available means of interpretation, was purported to 
determine all possible meanings attributable to the various authentic texts. No material 
divergence might be said to exist solely because a prima facie literal difference existed. 
Third, the true significance of the final clause was that, where an authentic text 
might be interpreted in several ways, one of which reconcilable with the other authentic 
texts, such a common meaning was to prevail. In fact, a general rule of interpretation 
existed according to which, where an authentic text is unclear or ambiguous, it is 
necessary to take into account the meaning of the other authentic texts in order to 
properly interpret it. Hence, an authentic text could be disregarded only insofar as none 
of its possible meanings might also be attributed to the text that had to prevail in the case 
of divergence.  
Thus, it seems that the Polish Supreme Court arrived at the conclusion that the 
                                                     
1213 See Supreme Court (Poland), 16 June 1930, Archdukes of the Habsburg-Lorraine House v. The Polish 
State Treasury, 5 Annual digest of public international law cases (1929-1930), 365 et seq. [Case No. 235], at 
367.  
1214 See the final clause the Treaty of Saint-Germain (immediately following Article 381 thereof). 
1215 See Supreme Court (Poland), 16 June 1930, Archdukes of the Habsburg-Lorraine House v. The Polish 
State Treasury, 5 Annual digest of public international law cases (1929-1930), 365 et seq. [Case No. 235], at 
368-371; J. Hardy, “The Interpretation of Plurilingual Treaties by International Courts and Tribunals”, 37 
British Yearbook of International Law (1961), 72 et seq., at 130-131. 
1216 Except in Parts I (Covenant of the League of Nations) and XIII (Labour), where the French and English 
texts were of equal force. 
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only actual difference existing between (i) a final clause providing for the prevalence of 
one authentic text over the others in the case of divergence and (ii) a final clause simply 
stating the equal authority of the various authentic texts consists in that where an 
otherwise irreconcilable difference is established to exist, the former (i) provides the 
interpreter with a quick and certain means of resolving that divergence, while the latter 
(ii) does not. Conversely, as long as no material divergence has been proved to exist, 
both final clauses require the interpreter to carefully analyse the various authentic texts, 
in order to find, where possible, a meaning common to all of them.1217  
 
In the Clorialdo Devoto v. Austrian State case,1218 the Italian-Austrian Mixed Arbitral 
Tribunal, in interpreting paragraph 4 of the Annex to Section IV of Part X of the Treaty 
of Saint-Germain,1219 which instituted a special settlement procedure for claims 
presented by nationals of an Allied or Associated Power against Austria, interpreted the 
ambiguous (prevailing) French authentic text in light of the more precise English 
authentic text, which allowed only one of the meanings attributable to the former. 
According to the tribunal, such a meaning was also in line with the clear intention of the 
parties, determined on the basis of all available elements and items of evidence. 
 
Similarly, in the De Paoli v. Bulgarian State case,1220 the Italian-Bulgarian Mixed 
Arbitral Tribunal, in interpreting Article 179 of the Treaty of Neuilly,1221 which allowed 
certain diplomatic or consular claims to be submitted to the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal 
established under that Treaty, interpreted the ambiguous (prevailing) French authentic 
text in light of the more precise English authentic text. 
 
In light of this uncertainty the ILC, doubting whether it would have been appropriate to 
try to resolve such an issue by including a specific rule of interpretation in its draft 
articles on the Law of Treaties, limited itself to the insertion of a general reservation for 
cases where the treaties contain this type of provision.1222 
 
3.6.2.2. The solution proposed by Hardy and the possible criticisms thereof  
 
As previously mentioned, in facing the ambiguity of the relevant case law on the matter, 
                                                     
1217 See Supreme Court (Poland), 16 June 1930, Archdukes of the Habsburg-Lorraine House v. The Polish 
State Treasury, 5 Annual digest of public international law cases (1929-1930), 365 et seq. [Case No. 235],  at 
371, note III. 
1218 See Italian-Austrian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, 23 April 1924, Clorialdo Devoto v. Austrian State, 4 Recueil 
des décisions des tribunaux arbitraux mixtes institués par les traités de paix (1925), 500 et seq., at 502; on such 
a case, see also J. Hardy, “The Interpretation of Plurilingual Treaties by International Courts and Tribunals”, 
37 British Yearbook of International Law (1961), 72 et seq., at 134-135. 
1219 Treaty comcluded on 10 September 1919 in Saint-Germain-en-Laye, France. 
1220 See Italian-Bulgarian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal , 8 January 1925, De Paoli v. Bulgarian State, 6 Recueil des 
décisions des tribunaux arbitraux mixtes institués par les traités de paix (1927), 451 et seq., at 456. 
1221 Treaty concluded on 27 November 1919 in Neuilly-sur-Seine, France. 
1222 I.e. the reservation included in paragraphs 1 and 4 of Article 33 VCLT. 
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the ILC expressed the view that the issue concerning the exact moment at which the 
prevailing text should be given precedence was to be resolved by the interpreter on a 
case-by-case basis, since the intention of the parties might vary considerably in this 
respect. Therefore, the quest of the interpreter should first and foremost be directed to 
ascertaining the intention of the parties with regard to the meaning of the relevant final 
clause.  
 
The conclusion of the ILC, although reasonable in theory, presents a significant 
drawback in its actual application. In fact, as Hardy correctly pointed out, “final clauses 
are nearly always drawn up somewhat automatically”,1223 so that it is reasonable to 
assume that the contracting States generally do not really discuss with each other the 
meaning to be attached thereto and, even worse, they probably do not have any accurate 
idea of when the prevailing text should be given precedence.  
 
Hardy,1224 in order to overcome the interpretative problem stemming from the fact that 
“final clauses are nearly always drawn up somewhat automatically”, suggested that the 
intention of the parties that agreed on the adoption of a final clause providing for a 
prevailing text in the case of divergence seems to be, “above all, to eliminate any 
uncertainty that might arise from the plurality of texts and to provide the judge with a 
sure and rapid means of settling any dispute on the subject”.  
 He continued by saying that “to require of a judge that he constantly keep 
comparing the texts and only as a last resort recognize that the authentic text [ed.’s note: 
the prevailing authentic text] must prevail would seem contrary to that intention”.  
 Then, although recognizing that it would be somewhat arbitrary to set an exact 
limit up to which the effort at textual conciliation should be sustained by the adjudicator 
before the prevailing text is actually given precedence, Hardy concluded that it would 
appear reasonable to say that there is a divergence and, consequently, an obligation to 
apply the prevailing text as soon as the comparison of the texts no longer suffices to 
reconcile them. He supported such a conclusion by affirming that “the only type of 
divergence which the contracting parties would normally have in mind is a purely verbal 
or prima facie divergence, for the much more complex notion of a discrepancy which 
cannot be solved except by the most subtle process of construction can only be grasped 
                                                     
1223 See J. Hardy, “The Interpretation of Plurilingual Treaties by International Courts and Tribunals”, 37 British 
Yearbook of International Law (1961), 72 et seq., at 132. See also A. Parolini, “Italy”, in G. Maisto (ed.), 
Multilingual Texts and Interpretation of Tax Treaties and EC Tax Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2005), 
245 et seq., at 255, where the author admits that it is “not altogether clear whether the different wordings of the 
“prevalence” clause [in Italian tax treaties] are meant to reach different results” (the typical wordings of such 
clauses, in the Italian tax treaty practice, are the following: “in case of doubt”, “in case of dispute”, in case of 
divergences in interpretation”, “in case of divergences in interpretation and application of the treaty”); 
similarly, R. Cadosch, “Switzerland”, in G. Maisto (ed.), Multilingual Texts and Interpretation of Tax Treaties 
and EC Tax Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2005), 303 et seq., at 310-311, who notes, with regard to 
Swiss tax treaties, that “[t]here is no obvious reason for a different wording of the [prevalence] clause, and 
Switzerland’s Federal Tax Administration does not assume any difference in practice”. 
1224 See J. Hardy, “The Interpretation of Plurilingual Treaties by International Courts and Tribunals”, 37 British 
Yearbook of International Law (1961), 72 et seq., at 132. 
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after exhaustive study of the relevant case law” and that, in “any event, when the texts 
can only be reconciled by reference to the preparatory work, a refusal to apply the 
authentic text [ed.’s note: the prevailing authentic text] would render the relevant final 
clauses wholly meaningless and constitute a flagrant disregard of the will of the 
contracting parties”.1225 
 
The reasoning and conclusions upheld by Hardy may be criticized in several respects, 
just as Hardy found to be the case with regard to the decision delivered by the Polish 
Supreme Court in the Archdukes of the Habsburg-Lorraine House v. the Polish State 
Treasury case.  
 
First, Hardy did not give any reason in support of the presumption that the intention of 
the contracting parties, when introducing a highly routine and automatic final clause 
providing for a prevailing text in the case of divergence, is (also) to “to provide the judge 
with a sure and rapid means of settling any dispute on the subject”.  
 One could presume as well that the intention of the parties is to provide the 
interpreter with a single and clear means to construe the multilingual treaty where no 
(other) reconciliation appears possible, i.e. where no single reasonable meaning may be 
attributed to all authentic texts when they are interpreted in good faith and the light of 
the overall context.1226  
 
Second, the assertion that “the only type of divergence which the contracting parties 
would normally have in mind is a purely verbal or prima facie divergence” clashes with 
the previous claim that “final clauses are nearly always drawn up somewhat 
automatically”, since the latter seems to imply that the contracting States, when agreeing 
on the inclusion of the relevant final clause, probably do not have any accurate idea of 
when the prevailing text should be given precedence, while the former suggests that such 
contracting States generally have a clear idea thereof and draw the final clause 
accordingly: therefore the two sentences are contrary, even if not (necessarily) 
contradictory. 
 
Third, that very same assertion (“the only type of divergence which the contracting 
parties would normally have in mind is a purely verbal or prima facie divergence”) is not 
supported by any adequate evidence: why could the contracting parties not have in mind 
the divergence remaining between the meanings attached to two (or more) authentic 
                                                     
1225 See, accordingly, T. Bender and F. Engelen, “The final clause of the 1987 Netherlands Model Tax 
Convention and the interpretation of plurilingual tax treaties”, in H. van Arendonk, F. Engelen and S. Jansen 
(eds.), A Tax Globalist. Essays in honour of Maarten J. Ellis (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2005), 12 et 
seq., at 31, where the authors submit that “the parties precisely intended to avoid the exacting task of 
reconciling the different texts by applying the rather “abstract” rules of interpretation set forth in the Vienna 
Convention. In case of divergence, these rules at least require a careful comparison of the three texts, and 
because of the language barrier, this would raise serious practical difficulties. […] It is, therefore, submitted 
that a prima facie divergence of interpretation between the [two] texts should suffice to invoke the supremacy 
of the [prevailing] text”. 
1226 I.e. in accordance with the rules of interpretations enshrined in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT. 
PART II: CHAPTER 4            
 
 333 
texts after they have been interpreted in light of their overall context, i.e. by taking into 
account all the relevant elements and items of evidence?  
 Moreover, the connected reference to “the exhaustive study of the relevant case 
law”, which would be necessary in order to grasp the “much more complex notion of a 
discrepancy which cannot be solved except by the most subtle process of construction”, 
is absolutely misleading and probably the result of a conceptual confusion: the 
contracting States do not need to have in mind all the possible divergences and 
uncertainties that might arise with reference to all the provisions of a treaty in order to be 
aware of the possibility that such “complex discrepancies” may result from the 
interpretation of the different authentic texts thereof. The average experience of an 
international lawyer or diplomat suffices more than abundantly in this respect.  
 
Finally, the conclusion that, “when the [authentic] texts can only be reconciled by 
reference to the preparatory work, a refusal to apply the [prevailing text] would render 
the relevant final clauses wholly meaningless” is false: where the intention of the parties 
is to provide the interpreter with a single and clear means to construe the multilingual 
treaty in case no reconciliation appears possible in light of the ordinary rules of 
interpretation,1227 a reconciliation of the authentic texts (also) by reference to the travaux 
préparatoires does not render the final clause meaningless, it simply render superfluous 
the recourse to the prevailing text in the specific case.   
 
3.6.2.3. The solution proposed by the author  
 
The author submits that, unless some decisive evidence to the contrary is available,1228 
final clauses providing for a prevailing text in the case of divergences should be 
construed as requiring the interpreter to compare the prima facie divergent authentic 
texts in light of all the available elements and items of evidence, in order to determine 
whether a reconciliation is possible by applying the rules of interpretation enshrined in 
Articles 31 and 32 VCLT, before relying exclusively on the prevailing text.1229  
The apparently divergent authentic texts, therefore, should be construed in light 
of the overall context and compared with each other in the quest for a common meaning. 
Only where, at the end of the interpretative process, no common meaning may be 
reasonably said to exist should preference be given to the meaning of the prevailing 
text.1230  
                                                     
1227 I.e. the rules of interpretations enshrined in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT. 
1228 Such evidence may stem from the analysis of any of the means of interpretation provided for under Articles 
31 and 32 VCLT. 
1229 See L. Ehrlich, “L’interprétation des traités”, 24 RCADI (1928), 5 et seq., at 98-99 and Research in 
International Law, “Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties with Comments”, 29 American Journal of 
International Law - Supplement (1935), 653 et seq., at 973. 
1230 Somewhat similarly, Jennings and Watts maintained that the presumption of equal meaning enshrined in 
Article 33(3) VCLT “suggests that, even where the parties stipulate that one or two authentic texts shall 
prevail, they should normally be taken to intend that some attempt should first be made to reconcile the 
authentic texts so as to discover whether there really is any divergence, rather then the ‘master’ text should be 
PART II: CHAPTER 4 
 334 
 
There are several arguments that may be relied upon in order to support this conclusion. 
 
First, from logical and semantic perspectives, no divergence in meaning between two or 
more authentic texts may be said to exist before the meaning thereof have been 
determined. Thus, since:  
(i) the only possible meaning for interpretative purposes is the utterance meaning 
and  
(ii) the utterance meaning is the result of the process of interpretation of an 
authentic text in light of the overall context and, in particular, of the elements and 
means of interpretation enshrined in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT,  
no divergence between the authentic texts may be said to exist before such texts are 
construed in light of the overall context and by applying the rules of interpretation 
provided for in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT. 
 
Second, the conclusion put forward by the author fits better (than the conflicting solution 
upheld by Hardy) in the system of the VCLT. As the ILC correctly pointed out, although 
plurilingual in expression, any treaty remains one in law. In particular:  
(i) “in law there is only one treaty - one set of terms accepted by the parties 
and one common intention with respect to those terms - even when two 
authentic texts appear to diverge”;1231  
(ii) “[p]lurilingual in expression, the treaty remains a single treaty with a 
single set of terms the interpretation of which is governed by the rules set 
out in Articles 27 and 28 [ed.’s note: now Articles 31 and 32 VCLT]. The 
unity of the treaty and of each of its terms is of fundamental importance in 
the interpretation of plurilingual treaties and it is safeguarded by combining 
with the principle of the equal authority of authentic texts the presumption 
that the terms are intended to have the same meaning in each text. This 
presumption requires that every effort should be made to find a common 
meaning for the texts before preferring one to another”;1232  
(iii) “whether the ambiguity or obscurity is found in all the texts or arises from 
the plurilingual form of the treaty, the first rule for the interpreter is to look 
for the meaning intended by the parties to be attached to the term by 
applying the standard rules for the interpretation of treaties. The plurilingual 
form of the treaty does not justify the interpreter in simply preferring one 
text to another and discarding the normal means of resolving an ambiguity 
or obscurity on the basis of the objects and purposes of the treaty, travaux 
préparatoires, the surrounding circumstances, subsequent practice, etc. On 
the contrary, the equality of the texts means that every reasonable effort 
should first be made to reconcile the texts and to ascertain the intention of 
                                                                                                                                  
applied automatically right at the outset” (see R. Jennings and A. Watts (eds.), Oppenheim’s International 
Law. Volume I. Peace (London: Longman, 1992), p. 1283, note 3). 
1231 See paragraph 6 of the commentary to Article 29 of the 1966 Draft (YBILC 1966-II, p. 225, para. 6). 
1232 See paragraph 7 of the commentary to Article 29 of the 1966 Draft (YBILC 1966-II, p. 225, para. 7). 
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the parties by recourse to the normal means of interpretation”.1233  
Even where the parties have agreed that, in the case of divergence, a specific authentic 
text is to prevail, the treaty remains one in law and the very same fact that the priority of 
the prevailing text is relevant only in the case of a divergence supports such a 
conclusion.  
 In this perspective, the solution put forward by the author, in the absence of 
strong evidence in favor of a different intention of the parties, preserves as much as 
possible the unity of the treaty, requiring the interpreter to compare the prima facie 
diverging texts and to construe them on the basis of the rules of interpretation enshrined 
in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT in order to establish the treaty utterance meaning.  
 
Third, the conclusion put forward by the author does not conflict with any of the 
provisions of the VCLT.  
In particular, it does not clash with Article 33(1) VCLT, since the latter does not 
state that authentic texts other than the prevailing one are not authoritative for 
interpretative purposes, but simply provides (tautologically) that the parties are free to 
decide that in the case of divergence a text is to prevail over the other, otherwise 
authoritative, texts.1234 In this respect, the combined reading of paragraphs 1 and 2 of 
Article 33 VCLT supports the conclusion that all authenticated texts are to be treated as 
authoritative for interpretative purposes, unless the parties agree that some of them are 
not and evidence exists of such an agreement.  
The solution proposed by the author does not conflict with Article 33(4) VCLT 
either. The last sentence of that article establishes a rule of interpretation for cases where 
(i) an otherwise irreconcilable divergence exists and (ii) the parties did not agree that a 
specific text is to prevail in the case of divergence.1235 However, Article 33(4) VCLT 
does not state anything on the interpretative process that should be followed where the 
parties agreed that, in the case of divergence, a specific text is to prevail. An a contrario 
reasoning, according to which the fact that Article 31(4) VCLT explicitly states that an 
interpretation of the prima facie divergent texts according to Articles 31 and 32 VCLT 
must be carried out where the parties did not agree on a prevailing text, while it does not 
state anything with reference to the case where the parties so agreed, implies that in the 
latter case no attempt should be made to remove the prima facie divergence by 
interpreting the authentic texts in accordance with Articles 31 and 32 VCLT and that the 
prevailing text should instead apply from the outset, is faulty. There is nothing in the text 
of Article 33 VCLT, nor in the overall context, that justifies a similar implicature.  
Likewise, it cannot be reasonably upheld that, since Article 31(4) VCLT speaks 
of “a difference of meaning which the application of Articles 31 and 32 does not 
remove”, thus implying that such a difference of meaning results before the authentic 
                                                     
1233 See paragraph 7 of the commentary to Article 29 of the 1966 Draft (YBILC 1966-II, p. 225, para. 7). 
1234 See, to this extent, the distinction made by the ILC between the case where the parties decide that only 
certain authenticated texts are authentic (i.e. authoritative) and the case where the parties agree (implicitly or 
explicitly) on the authoritativeness of all the authenticated texts and on the prevalence of a certain authentic 
text where a divergence exists (YBILC 1966-II, p. 224, para. 3). 
1235 See sections 3.4. and 3.5 of this chapter. 
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texts are interpreted according to such articles, the term “divergence” in Article 33(1) 
VCLT must be construed as a difference of meaning resulting before the authentic texts 
are interpreted according to Articles 31 and 32 VCLT. Although such an interpretation 
could at first sight appear a sound “contextual” interpretation, three relevant pieces of 
evidence contradict it:  
(i) the terminology used is different, “difference” v. “divergence”;  
(ii) in paragraph 8 of the commentary to Article 29 of the 1966 Draft, the ILC 
used the term “divergence” as a synonym for “difference of meaning which the 
application of Articles 27 and 28 does not remove”, which would actually point to 
the opposite conclusion;1236  
(iii) paragraph 4 of the commentary to Article 29 of the 1966 Draft is clear 
enough in denying the existence, under Article 33 VCLT, of any obligation for 
the interpreter to apply the prevailing text as soon as a prima facie difference 
between the various authentic texts is put forward.   
 
Fourth, the author submits that, in order to ascertain the existence of a “verbal” 
divergence (as suggested by Hardy), the interpreter should preliminarily determine the 
“verbal” meaning of the authentic texts being compared.  
 However, the distinction between an interpretation intended to determine the 
“verbal” meaning of an utterance and that intended to determine the utterance meaning 
thereof appears to be a vague one: how accurate should the construction of the compared 
authentic texts carried out by the interpreter be in order to fairly show the existence of a 
“verbal” divergence and thus justify the exclusive reference to the prevailing text?  
 This vague minimum-interpretation requirement could detract from the most 
attractive feature of Hardy’s proposal, i.e. that of providing the judge with a sure and 
rapid means of settling any dispute. In order to avoid such drawback, “verbal” meanings 
should be equated to dictionary meanings and any contextual interpretation should be 
avoided. This approach, however, would lead to the extremely recurrent appearance of 
“verbal” differences between the various authentic texts, for it is hard for two different 
lexemes in two different languages to be associated exactly (and solely) to the same 
concept. That, in turn, would entail the extremely recurrent exclusive recourse to the 
prevailing text. In such a way, as a matter of fact, any interested party could unilaterally 
invoke and obtain the right to rely exclusively on the prevailing text, whenever it would 
appear more favorable for it than the other authentic texts, by simply highlighting a 
prima facie dictionary divergence. In this respect, the final clause would be transformed 
into a mere procedural tool in the hands of interested parties.  
However, since treaties should be interpreted and applied in good faith, it seems 
reasonable that the prevailing text is to be preferred to the other authentic texts only 
insofar the existence of an divergence between the provisional utterance meanings of 
those texts have been ascertained in accordance with the rules of interpretation enshrined 
in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT, not sufficing in that respect that an interested party merely 
put forward a presumed difference of meanings in order to rely on the potentially more 
                                                     
1236 See YBILC 1966-II, p. 225, para. 8. 
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favorable prevailing text.1237 
 
Fifth, the solution proposed by Hardy appears not coherent with the system of 
interpretation provided for by the VCLT, the former attributing relevance to pure 
“verbal” differences, while the latter allowing special meaning to be attributed to treaty 
terms and stressing that the ordinary meaning thereof is to be determined in good faith, 
in light of the object and purpose of the treaty and of the relevant context.  
 
Sixth, the comparison of the allegedly divergent authentic texts, combined with an 
interpretation thereof based on Articles 31 and 32 VCLT, enhances the trustworthiness 
of the utterance meaning determined and argued for by the interpreter.  
 In fact, on the one hand, textual comparison may shed light on possible 
alternative meanings that could be not so evident where the interpreter were just engaged 
in construing a single authentic text, even where it was the prevailing text. On the other 
hand, the comparison may restrict the set of possible meanings attributable to the 
prevailing texts construed in isolation, since some of them could be incompatible with 
the meanings reasonably attributable to the other authentic texts.  
 While the potential lower reliability of an interpretation arrived at by construing 
an authentic text in isolation is acceptable where no apparent divergence has been put 
forward by any party, since in this case the presumption of clarity and identity of the 
provisional utterance meanings of the various authentic text operates, the same 
conclusion does not hold true where the risk of a potential discrepancy in the provisional 
utterance meanings has been pointed out and must accordingly be set aside by means of 
comparative interpretation.   
It is interesting to note that Hardy recognized that issue and, with reference to the 
assertion made by certain authors that either the authentic texts are divergent and thus 
the authentic text must necessarily be applied, or they are in agreement and so the 
prevailing text may still be applied because equivalent to the other texts, concluded that 
such an assertion was false “because the interpretation most compatible with all the texts 
is not necessarily the one suggested by the [prevailing] text viewed separately”.1238 
However, he maintained that it was highly unlikely that the contracting parties ever 
worried about the falsehood of such an assertion and that the method of having direct 
recourse to the prevailing text in the case of verbal divergences presented one practical 
advantage that should suffice to ensure its adoption: being simple, rapid and sure.1239 
 
                                                     
1237 See, to this extent, the argument put forward by the plaintiffs in the Archdukes of the Habsburg-Lorraine 
House v. the Polish State Treasury case, according to which a divergence existed between the authentic texts 
and therefore exclusively the prevailing text (the French text, potentially more favorable to them) had to be 
used for interpretative purposes (see Supreme Court (Poland), 16 June 1930, Archdukes of the Habsburg-
Lorraine House v. The Polish State Treasury, 5 Annual digest of public international law cases (1929-1930), 
365 et seq. [Case No. 235], at 367). 
1238 See J. Hardy, “The Interpretation of Plurilingual Treaties by International Courts and Tribunals”, 37 British 
Yearbook of International Law (1961), 72 et seq., at 126 and 133-134. 
1239 See J. Hardy, “The Interpretation of Plurilingual Treaties by International Courts and Tribunals”, 37 British 
Yearbook of International Law (1961), 72 et seq., at 134. 
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Seventh, it is submitted that the slightly different forms that the treaty’s final clauses 
giving preference to one authentic text in cases of divergences may take do not generally 
affect the conclusion drawn in this section.  
 A survey of the final clauses adopted in tax treaties has shown that a variety of 
formulas, such as “in the case of dispute in the interpretation”, “in the case of doubt”, “in 
the case of any divergence of interpretation”, “in the case of divergence between the 
texts”, is actually used by contracting States.1240 
 However, as has been already noted, final clauses are nearly always drawn up 
somewhat automatically and contain a number of more or less stereotypical formulas 
that are accepted in diplomatic parlance, but which courts and tribunals do not take into 
consideration because they have lost their true meaning.1241 Such a somewhat automatic 
use of stereotypical and interchangeable formulas significantly lower the relevance of 
their texts for the purpose of their interpretation, due to the likely absence of a clear 
agreed intention of the contracting parties in that respect, or, at least, to the likely 
absence of a strong link between the intention of the parties and the formula actually 
adopted in the final clause of the treaty. Since the interpretation that the author put 
forward in this section is mostly grounded on:  
(i) the only common feature of those formulas, i.e. that the prevalence of one text 
over the other authentic texts is made subject to the existence of an interpretative 
issue due to the multilingual character of the treaty,  
(ii) the logical and semantic analysis of the premise of such final clauses, i.e. the 
existence of a divergence between the authentic texts and  
(iii) the need to preserve as much as possible the principles enshrined in Articles 
31-33 VCLT and to construe such final clauses in a fashion that is coherent with 
those principles,  
it is sensible to conclude that slight changes in the wording of the final clauses do not 
impact on the reliability of that interpretation.  
 
Finally, it is the author’s opinion that, where the provisional utterance meaning of the 
prevailing text is given priority by the interpreter, the principle of the unity of the treaty 
causes that meaning to become the final utterance meaning (as well) of all other 
authentic texts. In this respect, with regard to those texts that could not be provisionally 
                                                     
1240 In this respect, it is also interesting to note the statement of a former Canadian tax treaty negotiator, 
according to which, in cases where treaties are concluded in two or more official languages, “some countries 
would insist that, in cases of inconsistencies between the two versions, the language used during the 
negotiations would prevail over the other language” (see J-M. Déry , “The Process of Tax Treaty Negotiation”, 
in B. Arnold and J. Sasseville (eds.), Special Seminar on Canadian Tax Treaties: Policy and Practice 
(Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 2000), 2 et seq.). This statement reflects the common ground that the 
prevailing authentic text in (tax) treaties is in most cases the drafted text. From the perspective of the issue 
dealt with in the present section, such a general coincidence of prevailing text and drafted text is an argument 
for concluding that the prevailing text (wearing the hat of the drafted text) might be given by the interpreter a 
special weight for the purpose of determining the common meaning of apparently diverging authentic texts, 
even before (from a logical perspective) the apparent divergence is resolved by recourse to the prevailing text 
as such.    
1241 See J. Hardy, “The Interpretation of Plurilingual Treaties by International Courts and Tribunals”, 37 British 
Yearbook of International Law (1961), 72 et seq., at 132 and 133. 
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attributed the meaning of the prevailing text on the basis of an interpretation in line with 
Articles 31 and 32 VCLT, it is submitted that the latter meaning must be regarded as the 
“special meaning” that the parties intended to attach to the relevant treaty terms 
employed in those texts.  
 
 
3.6.3. What if the meaning of the prevailing text is ambiguous, obscure or 
unreasonable? 
 
Where the meaning attributable to the prevailing text, construed in isolation from the 
other texts and according to the rules of interpretation enshrined in Articles 31 and 32 
VCLT,1242 is ambiguous, obscure or unreasonable, there is still chance that the analysis 
of the other authentic texts may shed some light on the utterance meaning of the 
former.1243  
 
That holds particularly true where a single meaning is attributable to all the other texts, 
which appears clear, unambiguous and reasonable.  
 However, even in this case, the interpreter is not bound to attribute such a 
common meaning to the prevailing text as well. The VCLT does not dispose over any 
mechanical rule in that respect, since the ILC and, arguably, the Vienna Conference 
considered that, although attributing to the unclear, ambiguous, or unreasonable 
(prevailing) text of a treaty the clear, unambiguous and reasonable meaning of the other 
texts appears a solution of common sense, it might not always be the correct one1244 
since much may depend on the circumstances of each case and the evidence of the 
intention of the parties.1245 
 
That notwithstanding, it is the author’s opinion that in most cases the interpreter will 
choose to attribute that common meaning to the prevailing text as well.  
In fact, where the latter is ambiguous and one of its possible meanings coincides 
                                                     
1242 That may well be the case where, for instance, the person applying the treaty is basing his interpretation 
thereof exclusively on such a text, on the basis of the right to rely on any of the authentic texts, taken in 
isolation, which is established by Article 33, paragraphs 1 and 3 VCLT.  
1243 See T. Bender and F. Engelen, “The final clause of the 1987 Netherlands Model Tax Convention and the 
interpretation of plurilingual tax treaties”, in H. van Arendonk, F. Engelen and S. Jansen (eds.), A Tax 
Globalist. Essays in honour of Maarten J. Ellis (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2005), 12 et seq., at 32. 
1244 This is particularly true with regard to the case at stake, considering that quite often the prevailing text is 
also the drafted text.  
1245 See the explanation given by Sir Humphrey Waldock, during the 700th ILC’s meeting, concerning the 
elimination by the ILC Drafting Committee of paragraph 4 (and implicitly 5) of Article 74 of his Third Report, 
according to which, in cases where the meaning of one text was clear and that of the other was not, the former 
had to be adopted (YBILC 1964-I, p. 319, para. 57); see also paragraph 9 of the commentary to Article 29 of 
the 1966 Draft (YBILC 1966-II, p. 226, para. 9). 
See, partially in accordance, T. Bender and F. Engelen, “The final clause of the 1987 Netherlands Model Tax 
Convention and the interpretation of plurilingual tax treaties”, in H. van Arendonk, F. Engelen and S. Jansen 
(eds.), A Tax Globalist. Essays in honour of Maarten J. Ellis (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2005), 12 et 
seq., at 32-33. 
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with the meaning attributed to the other authentic texts,1246 such a meaning will be 
probably adopted,1247 absent any strong evidence in favor of the other meaning(s) 
attributable to the prevailing text.1248  
Where the meaning of the prevailing text appears unclear, the clear, unambiguous 
and reasonable meaning of the other text(s) may probably persuade the interpreter of the 
possibility to attribute the same meaning to the prevailing text, especially considering 
that a proper treaty interpretation under the VCLT system is far from being a literal 
interpretation. 
 Similarly, where the meaning provisionally attributed to the prevailing text is, 
although clear and unambiguous, somewhat awkward,1249 the analysis of the other 
authentic texts may shed some light on the utterance meaning of the former, highlighting 
alternative solutions that had not emerged from the interpretation of the prevailing text 
taken in isolation.   
In the improbable event that the interpreter was not persuaded to extend to the 
prevailing text the meaning common to the other texts,1250 the prevailing text meaning 
should be theoretically adopted according to the final clause. In this scenario, the 
utterance meaning of the other authentic texts could still be somewhat relevant in 
directing the interpreter in his task of elucidating the meaning of the prevailing text. The 
issue, here, is substantially reduced to one of interpreting a single authentic text (the 
prevailing text) according to the rules enshrined in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT, where the 
other authentic texts would enter into play as part of the context (the text of the treaty).  
 
 
3.6.4. What about the contrast between the prevailing text and the other (consistent) 
texts? 
 
As previously noted, textual comparison may shed light on possible alternative meanings 
which might have been overlooked by the interpreter engaged in construing an authentic 
text in isolation.  
 Therefore, it is possible that textual comparison may direct the interpreter towards 
the attribution of the same meaning to all the authentic texts.1251  
                                                     
1246 Where none of the meanings attributable to the prevailing text, interpreted in isolation, coincides with the 
meaning attributed to the other texts, either the comparison of the text leads the interpreter to review and 
modify his original interpretations, so that an acceptable common meaning is arrived at, or, where this is not 
the case, the ambiguous meanings of the former should prevail. The meaning attributable to the other authentic 
texts, however, could still play a role in directing the interpreter in choosing among the alternative meanings of 
the prevailing text.  
1247 See also the conclusion drawn in section 3.4.4 of this chapter. 
1248 Such strong evidence will be probably missing, since otherwise the interpreter would have reasonably 
solved the ambiguity in favor of the other meaning even before the comparison of the texts. 
1249 But not so unreasonable to be considered to be an unacceptable interpretation under the canon of good 
faith. 
1250 It is submitted that, especially in the case of unclear or unreasonable meaning of the prevailing text, it 
would be hard for the interpreter to convincingly justify the adoption of a meaning other than the clear and 
reasonable meaning attributable to the other authentic texts. 
1251 Such a common meaning could theoretically be either the meaning attributed to the prevailing text, 




However, where this is not the case, the author is of the opinion that the final clause 
requires the interpreter to adopt the meaning of the prevailing text, provided that it is 
clear, unambiguous and reasonable.  
 
 
3.6.5. Conclusions on research question g) 
 
The application of a treaty provision giving priority to a particular text, in cases of 
divergences of meaning among the authentic treaty texts, requires the interpreter to 
establish at which stage of the interpretative process the prevailing text should be given 
such a priority.  
 
The VCLT is silent in this respect and the case law of national and international courts 
and tribunals does not provide any clear guidance. 
 According to the ILC, this issue should be resolved by the interpreter by 
determining, in each single case, the intention of the parties with regard to the meaning 
of the relevant final clause.  
 This conclusion, although reasonable in theory, presents a significant drawback in 
its actual application, since “final clauses are nearly always drawn up somewhat 
automatically”,1252 so that it is reasonable to assume that the contracting States generally 
do not really discuss with each other the meaning to be attached thereto and, even worse, 
they probably do not have any accurate idea of when the prevailing text should be given 
precedence.  
 
The author submits that, unless some decisive evidence to the contrary is available, final 
clauses providing for a prevailing text in the case of divergences should be construed as 
requiring the interpreter to compare the prima facie divergent authentic texts in light of 
all the available elements and items of evidence, in order to determine whether a 
reconciliation is possible by applying the rules of interpretation enshrined in Articles 31 
and 32 VCLT, before relying exclusively on the prevailing text.  
The apparently divergent authentic texts, therefore, should be construed in light 
of the overall context and compared with each other in the quest for a common meaning. 
Only where, at the end of the interpretative process, no (provisional) common meaning 
may be reasonably said to exist should preference be given to the meaning of the 
prevailing text.  
 This solution substantially corresponds to principle (viii) established by the 
author in section 2 of Chapter 3 of Part I, according to which, where the treaty provides 
that a specific text has to prevail in cases of discrepancy in meanings among the 
authentic texts, it appears reasonable to assume that the parties intended the utterance 
                                                                                                                                  
interpreted in isolation, or that attributed to the other text(s), interpreted in isolation. 
1252 See J. Hardy, “The Interpretation of Plurilingual Treaties by International Courts and Tribunals”, 37 British 
Yearbook of International Law (1961), 72 et seq., at 132. 
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meaning of that text to prevail only where an interpretation based on the prima facie 
divergent authentic texts and the overall context does not lead the interpreter to 
convincingly attribute a single utterance meaning to all such texts.  
 
From a different perspective, where the meaning attributable to the prevailing text, 
construed in isolation from the other texts and according to the rules of interpretation 
enshrined in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT, is ambiguous, obscure or unreasonable, there is 
still a chance that the analysis of the other authentic texts may shed some light on the 
utterance meaning of the former.  
 That holds particularly true where a single meaning is attributable to all other 
texts, which appears clear, unambiguous and reasonable. Even in this case, however, the 
interpreter is not bound to attribute such a common meaning to the prevailing text as 
well. The VCLT does not provide for any mechanical rule in that respect, since the ILC 
and, arguably, the Vienna Conference considered that, although attributing to the 
unclear, ambiguous, or unreasonable (prevailing) text of a treaty the clear, unambiguous 
and reasonable meaning of the other texts appears a solution of common sense, it might 
not always be the correct one since much may depend on the circumstances of each case 
and the evidence of the intention of the parties. In the improbable event that the 
interpreter is not persuaded to extend to the prevailing text the meaning common to the 
other texts, the prevailing text meaning must be theoretically adopted according to the 
final clause. In this scenario, the utterance meaning of the other authentic texts may still 
be relevant in directing the interpreter in his task of elucidating the meaning of the 
prevailing text. 
 
Finally, where the clear, unambiguous and reasonable meanings attributable to the 
prevailing text and to the other texts appear to conflict with each other, textual 
comparison may shed light on possible alternative meanings which might have been 
overlooked by the interpreter engaged in construing the authentic texts in isolation. It is 
thus possible that textual comparison may direct the interpreter towards the attribution of 
the same meaning to all authentic texts. 
 However, where this is not the case, the final clause requires the interpreter to 




4. The interpretation of legal jargon terms employed in (multilingual) treaties  
4.1. Research question addressed in and structure of this section  
 
The present section is aimed at tackling the following research question, here briefly 
illustrated by means of an example. 
 
h) What is the impact on the answers to be given to the questions discussed in 
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section 3 of the fact that legal jargon terms are employed in the treaty texts?  
 
Consider the English and French authentic texts of Article 6 of the ECHR, according to 
which (italics by the author): 
 
1.  In the determination […] of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair […] hearing by 
an independent and impartial tribunal […]  
3.   Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:  
[…]  
(e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak  the language used in court. 
--- 
1. Toute personne a droit à ce que sa cause soit entendue équitablement […] par un tribunal indépendant et 
impartial, établi par la loi, qui décidera […] soit du bien-fondé de toute accusation en matière pénale dirigée 
contre elle. 
[…] 
3. Tout accusé a droit notamment à:  
[…] 
e) se faire assister gratuitement d'un interprète, s'il ne comprend pas ou ne parle pas la langue employée à 
l'audience.  
 
With regard to the interpretation of Article 6(3) of the ECHR, in particular for the 
purpose of determining whether a person has been charged with a criminal offence in a 
specific case, the questions discussed in section 3 of this chapter are compounded by the 
fact that the relevant terms used in the two authentic texts, i.e. “criminal charge” and 
“accusation en matière pénale”, are (i) legal jargon terms used under the laws of States 
employing English and French as their official languages (e.g. legal jargon terms used 
under English and French domestic law) and (ii) terms generally regarded as 
corresponding to legal jargon terms used under the law of other contracting States (e.g. 
the German law term “Straftat”).  
 Suppose that a certain misconduct, for instance careless driving causing a traffic 
accident in Germany, is considered a “criminal offence” under English law, but is not 
considered a “Straftat” under German law (as well as under French law).1253 
 In order to decide the case, i.e. in order to determine whether such a misconduct 
falls within the scope of Article 6(3) of the ECHR, the interpreter should ask himself and 
answer some difficult interpretative questions, such as: 
(i) did the parties intend to attribute to the terms “criminal charge” and 
“accusation en matière pénale” a meaning other than the meanings they have 
under the laws of the States using them (e.g. under English and French domestic 
law) and other than the meanings of the corresponding terms used under the 
domestic law of the contracting States that are drafted in languages other than 
English and French (e.g. the German legal jargon term “Straftat”)? 
(ii) if question (i) is answered in the affirmative, how such a meaning should be 
determined? Should it be determined autonomously from the meanings under 
domestic law? Or should it reflect the minimum common denominator of the 
meanings that the legal jargon terms used in the authentic treaty texts have 
                                                     
1253 The example is derived from ECtHR, 21 February 1984, Öztürk v. Germany (Application no. 8544/79). 
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under the laws of the States using such terms (e.g. under English and French 
domestic law)? Or should such a common denominator be determined taking 
into account also the meanings of the corresponding terms used under the 
domestic law of other contracting States, which are drafted in languages other 
than English and French (e.g. the German legal jargon term “Straftat”)? 
(iii) if question (i) is answered in the negative, which domestic law meaning should 
be used by the interpreter? Should it be the meaning under, say, English or 
French law? Or should it be the meaning under the law of the State(s) 
presenting the most relevant connection(s) with the case (although such a law is 
written neither in English nor in French)? Or, on the contrary, should it be the 
meaning under the lex fori?1254 
(iv) how should questions (i) through (iii) be solved where the terms and 
expressions employed in the authentic treaty texts seemed to diverge to a more 
significant extent, for instance where the English authentic text used the terms 
“regulatory charge” and “regulatory offence”?  
 
With a view to answering such questions, the present section is structured as follows.  
 Section 4.2 describes the differences existing between legal jargon terms and day-
to-day language terms that are most relevant for the purpose of the present study. 
 Section 4.3 elaborates on the idiosyncratic features of legal jargon terms and 
shows what impact they may have on the interpretation of treaties (in general). In 
particular, sections 4.3.2 and 4.3.3 describe the most common approaches developed in 
the field of uniform law conventions with regard to the construction of legal jargon 
terms.  
 Section 4.4 highlights the most relevant issues faced by the interpreter when 
construing treaties employing legal jargon terms. 
 Finally, section 4.5 examines how the presence of legal jargon terms in the texts 
of multilingual treaties may affect their interpretation, in light of the analysis carried out 
by the author in sections 3 and 4 of this chapter.  
 
4.2. Difference between legal jargon and day-to-day language terminology 
 
Legal jargon terminology differs from day-to-day language terminology mainly from 
three perspectives. Such differences are those responsible for the additional issues that 
the interpreter may encounter when interpreting treaties where legal jargon terms are 
used. 
 
First, legal jargon terminology, as compared to day-to-day language terminology, is 
generally characterized by less ambiguous relations between terms and their underlying 
                                                     
1254 With regard to private law disputes, a relevant alternative would be the meaning under the law of the State 
to which the private international lex fori directs. 




 In fact, one of the most distinguishing features of legal jargons consists in that the 
social subgroups using them tend to relate each jargon term with only one concept, 
especially by means of legal definitions, in order to increase the precision of the 
language and thus enhance legal certainty and clearness of in-depth analysis on complex 
subject matters.1256 
 
Second, concepts underlying legal jargon terms are generally less vague than concepts 
associated with day-to-day language terms.  
 The scope of the former, in fact, is more clearly agreed upon by the social 
subgroup using that particular legal jargon, legal concepts being characterized by a 
comparatively higher number of prototypical denotata (and prototypical non-denotata) 
than concepts associated with day-to-day language terms. The reduction of the twilight 
zone1257 and, therefore, of the vagueness of most legal concepts is mainly due to the 
extensive use of legal definitions and, even more significantly, to the existence of settled 
praxis, well-established scholars’ opinions and converging case law. 
 
Third, the shape and scope of legal concepts tend to vary more significantly from one 
national community1258 to another than the shape and scope of concepts underlying day-
to-day language terms.  
As previously mentioned, concepts and relations among them are not a priori 
schemes for categorizing knowledge data; on the contrary, they are the product of human 
cognitive processes that, in turn, are influenced by the very same knowledge data that 
                                                     
1255 This does not mean, however, that within a national legal system each term corresponds exclusively to one 
underlying concept. It is, in fact, common, that in different branches of law of a single legal system a term 
corresponds to (more or less slightly) different concepts, so that different legal jargons may be said to exist in 
connection with different branches of law (see, among others, R. Guastini, Lezioni di teoria analitica del 
diritto (Torino: Giappichelli, 1986), at 6 et seq.). This holds particularly true for tax law, where statutes 
abundantly employ terms originally used in private and commercial law (see F. Gény, “Le particularisme du 
droit fiscal”, in R. Carré de Malberg et al., Mélanges R. Carré de Malberg (Paris: Librairie du Recueil Sirey, 
1933), 193 et seq.), although not infrequently either the legislator by means of ad hoc definitions, or the 
interpreters by means of legal construction do make them correspond, in the context of tax law, to concepts 
other than those underlying such terms in private and commercial law. In such cases, i.e. where the same legal 
terms are used in both private law and tax law statutes, one of the main issues that the tax law interpreter has to 
face is whether such terms are used (i) in their private law terms capacity, which would lead the interpreter to 
refer to the legal concepts associated with those terms under the relevant private law, or (ii) as autonomous tax 
law terms, thus allowing the interpreter to attach thereto different concepts (see similarly P. Locher, “The 
Swiss Experience”, in G. Maisto (ed.), Multilingual Texts and Interpretation of Tax Treaties and EC Tax Law 
(Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2005), 79 et seq., at 84 et seq.).     
1256 The reverse phenomenon, consisting in that each legal concept is related with one single legal jargon term, 
is not equally widespread, it not being uncommon that a single concept is (univocally) associated with two or 
more legal jargon synonyms.   
1257 I.e. the gray area of items that for a significant number of the social group members are, and for another 
significant part thereof are not, denoted by a certain legal jargon term. 
1258 Here, the term “national community” is intended to denote the leading community among those that form 
the population of a State. The author is aware that such a definition implies a significant simplification of the 
often problematic relations existing among national identity, State jurisdiction and social communities living 
within one State territory. 
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such schemes are used to categorize. 
In this perspective, social and cultural differences, as well as differences in life 
experience between various communities, do have a significant impact on the actual 
shape that concepts and relations among concepts tend to assume within such 
communities. Moreover, such interaction works in both directions: the specific pattern of 
concepts and relations among them that characterizes a specific community is a 
fundamental part of its cultural legacy and, as such, is transmitted through the 
generations and contributes to inform both the social life of the community and the way 
in which experiences, facts, things are looked at and approached.    
That said, concepts underlying day-to-day language terms are, for a large part, 
connected to everyday human experiences, which are perceived through the senses, and 
customs. Nowadays such everyday perceptions, experiences and customs do not vary 
extensively from one national community to another.  
This present state of affairs is due to manifold causes, the most relevant being the 
common biological nature of human beings, the very limited types of environment 
permitting human life on the planet, the wide-ranging homologation of every-day habits 
and the cultural convergence that had taken place in Europe since the Roman Empire 
through the Middle Ages and the Renaissance and has spread out all over the world 
boosted by colonialism from the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries until the mid-twentieth 
century and that has been enhanced by the significant migrations of the last two 
centuries, the booming of international trade after the Second World War and the late 
western cultural imperialism supported by means of mass communication, such as radio, 
television, and internet. As a result, the concepts underlying the majority of the day-to-
day terms in a certain language quite accurately match the concepts underlying the 
corresponding day-to-day terms in other languages. By means of simplification, it might 
be said that most of the concepts underlying day-to-day language terms are, broadly 
speaking, the same in each language and in each national community.  
However, it may be noted that, with regard to some specific fields of human 
knowledge, there are still significant cultural diversities existing among different 
national communities. Law is indubitably one of these fields. National legal systems 
have slowly developed through decades, sometimes centuries, and, notwithstanding the 
recent harmonization of some of their subfields achieved via international agreements 
and through the action of international organizations, they remain even today among the 
most idiosyncratic features of national communities.1259 This idiosyncrasy of national 
legal systems is reflected in the peculiarity of their underlying legal concepts, which 
normally do not have accurate equivalents in other legal systems, but just general 
correspondents (if any), i.e. concepts that fulfill similar functions within the respective 
                                                     
1259 It is interesting to note, in this respect, that even in cases where certain domestic statutory provisions 
appear similar in two or more States, as a consequence of an international effort towards harmonization or of 
the fact that a specific legal discipline of one State has been transplanted in the legal order of another State, in 
the absence of an international organization undertaking the task of guaranteeing a uniform interpretation of 
such provisions, the latter are often differently interpreted and applied in the various States due to the different 
legal systems and cultures thereof (see, similarly, M. Barassi, “Comparazione giuridica e studio del diritto 
tributario straniero”, in V. Uckmar (ed.), Diritto Tributario Internazionale (Padova: Cedam, 2005), 1499 et 
seq., at 1528, footnote 97).   
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legal systems and with which they share a significant part of their prototypical 
denotata.1260 Such idiosyncratic legal concepts are generally expressed by means of legal 
jargon terminology. Thus, the lack of an accurate correspondence between the legal 
concepts used in two national legal systems is mirrored by the absence of proper 
synonyms in the two legal jargons.1261  
 
This idiosyncrasy of national legal systems is commonly referred to as multijuralism.1262  
 
4.3. The possible approaches to the interpretation of legal jargon terms used in 
treaties  
 
                                                     
1260 See, with reference to income tax law, H. J. Ault and B. J. Arnold, Comparative Income Taxation: A 
Structural Analysis (New York: Aspen Publishers, 2004), at xxii and xxiii, where the authors point out that, 
although some recognizable “family resemblances” and common “broad features” exist among the income tax 
legal systems that belong to the same legal tradition (mainly common law v. civil law traditions), each system 
“has evolved in its own particular set of approaches and principles”, which have led each system to have its 
own proper set of detailed rules and concepts. In that respect, the authors conclude that “[t]here is of course 
always a danger in attempting to relate legal rules or concepts in one system to a seemingly similar situation in 
another system. The institutional and cultural backgrounds may be different and the actual operation of each 
individual rule depends on the overall structure of both the tax system and the legal system generally. Doing 
meaningful comparative analysis is especially difficult in the tax area, where political pressure, chance and 
historical accident have all had important influence on the development of the systems.” 
1261 No significant issue arises, however, where the different jargons relate to a common international 
background knowledge, i.e. where the social communities using the different jargons, although multilingual 
(which explains why different jargons exist), might be seen as forming an homogeneous group in respect of a 
common field of knowledge, characterized by a single set of principles, rules and concepts, although expressed 
in different languages (e.g. public international law). In addition, these types of social groups generally use one 
or two commonly spoken languages (e.g. English and French) as means of communication and for exchanging 
ideas at the international level. 
1262 See A. Breton et al. (eds.)., Multijuralism. Manifestations, Causes and Consequences (Farnham: Ashgate 
Publishing, 2009), p. 1, where the editors note that “[a]t one level of generality, multijuralism is the 
coexistence of two or more legal systems or sub-systems within a broader normative legal order to which they 
adhere. […] the co-existence of common law and civil law is a macroscopic divide. At a finer level of analysis, 
multijuralism is a more widespread phenomenon and also a more fluid reality than the distinction suggests. As 
a consequence, it becomes more difficult to identify the concepts associated with, or underlying, the 
expression. Multijuralism itself can be defined in a broad way as the coexistence of systems of norms 
considered binding by a subset of actors”.  
It must be noted that multijuralism may concern not only the legal systems of different States, when compared 
to each other, but also the legal systems coexisting within a single State. See, for instance with regard to 
Canada tax and private law, M. Cuerrier et al., “Symposium: Canadian Bijuralism and Harmonization of 
Federal Tax Legislation”, 51 Canadian Tax Journal (2003), 133 et seq.; J. Sasseville, “The Canadian 
Experience”, in G. Maisto (ed.), Multilingual Texts and Interpretation of Tax Treaties and EC Tax Law 
(Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2005), 35 et seq. The present study, however, does not analyse the effects of 
multijuralism on the construction of a State coherent legal system, but just focuses on the issues that 
multijuralism causes in respect of treaty interpretation.  
In that respect, for a broad analysis of the reciprocal influence of international treaties and domestic legal 
systems, see J. H. Currie, “International Treaties and Conventions as Agents of Convergence and Multijuralism 
in Domestic Legal Systems”, in A. Breton et al (eds.)., Multijuralism. Manifestations, Causes and 
Consequences (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, 2009), 11 et seq. 
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4.3.1. In general 
 
It must preliminarily be noted that, where a treaty term is used both in a legal jargon and 
in the day-to-day language, the interpreter must first establish whether such a term is to 
be construed, for the purpose of the treaty, according to its legal jargon or day-to-day 
meaning.  
In this respect, various elements and items of evidence exist that may lead the 
interpreter to conclude that the parties intended to use the relevant term in its legal 
jargon capacity, such as the subject matter of the treaty and of the specific provision to 
be construed, the identity of the treaty negotiators and the process that led to the treaty 
conclusion, the identity and capacity of the treaty addresses, the object and purpose of 
the treaty and of the relevant provision, the extensive use therein of idiomatic 
expressions and terms specific (solely) of the legal jargon.  
 
Where the interpreter concludes that the parties intended to use the relevant treaty term 
as a legal jargon term, the following more subtle and, at the same time, fundamental 
issues must be addressed.  
 
First, the interpreter should assess whether it is reasonable to conclude that the parties 
intended to attribute to the relevant term the technical (legal jargon) meaning 
corresponding to that term under the domestic laws of the States using that specific legal 
jargon.1263  
 Let the author take a step back for the sake of clarity. Any interpreter, where 
called to construe a treaty, should start his analysis by grasping the first impression of 
what could be the ordinary meaning of the relevant treaty term by looking at the entries 
corresponding to that term in dictionaries and encyclopedias. For instance, having to 
construe the term “alcoholic” as used in Article 5 of the ECHR, the interpreter should 
presumably start his quest by looking at the entries associated with the term “alcoholic” 
in English dictionaries and Encyclopedias and then, on such a basis, establish in good 
faith the reasonable meaning to be attributed to that term in its overall context. 
 However, one may wonder whether it is equally sensible for the interpreter of a 
multilateral treaty authenticated only in English to establish the meaning of the term 
“criminal charge” used therein primarily on the basis of the legal definition of that term 
under e.g. English law1264 and the analysis of the related national case law and scholarly 
writings (e.g. writings in legal dictionaries and encyclopedias). Is this reasonable, in that 
                                                     
1263 A case where the parties typically do not intend to attribute to a treaty term the meaning that it has under 
the law of the State(s) using it (as legal jargon term) is that of treaties concluded with the purpose to 
standardize contracting States’ domestic laws in the field of private law; see, for instance, S. Bariatti, 
L’interpretazione delle convenzioni internazionali di diritto uniforme  (Padova: Cedam, 1986), pp. 119-120, 
141 and 251 et seq.; P. Francescakis, “Qualifications”, in Répertoire de droit international Dalloz. Tome II 
(Paris: Jurisprudence Générale Dalloz, 1969), 703 et seq., at 705, para. 29; P. Reuter, “Quelque réflexion sur le 
vocabulaire de droit international”, in J. Boulouis et al., Mélanges offerts à Monsieur le Doyen Louis Trotabas 
(Paris: Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1970), 423 et seq., at 431. 
1264 The same holds true in respect of other domestic law using the same (or a similar) English term, such as 
Australian law, Canadian law, Irish law, etc. 
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respect, to infer from the fact that the treaty is authenticated only in English that the 
parties intended to attribute to the term “criminal charge” the legal jargon meaning that it 
has under the domestic law of only one contracting State (in the above example, English 
law),1265 especially where under the law of the other contracting States concepts similar 
to that underlying the legal jargon term “criminal charge” do exist?  
 That conclusion appears even more difficult to uphold where the treaty is 
authenticated in two languages, say English and French, and the legal jargon meanings 
of the terms employed in those texts, e.g. “criminal charge” and “accusation en matière 
pénale”, under the relevant domestic law, e.g. English and French law, differ from each 
other to a certain extent. In this case, it would be logically impossible to attribute to the 
treaty terms “criminal charge” and “accusation en matière pénale” a single meaning that 
exactly overlaps with both those domestic law meanings. 
 
Where the interpreter concludes that the relevant treaty term should be attributed a 
meaning other than its legal jargon meaning under the domestic law of the States using 
that specific legal jargon term in their legal systems, he has to establish the alternative 
meaning that must be attached to it.   
 For instance, the interpreter may find it reasonable that the parties intended to 
attribute to that term a meaning that somehow takes into account and reflects the 
corresponding concepts existing under the laws of the various contracting States, either 
in the form of a uniform meaning that, although based on such domestic legal concepts, 
departs therefrom in order to best suits the context, object and purpose of the relevant 
treaty provision,1266 or in the form of a meaning representing the minimum common 
denominator of the national legal concepts.1267  
                                                     
1265 Or even the meaning that that term has under the domestic law of a State that is not party to the treaty. 
1266 On the reasons for preferring an autonomous interpretation of treaties, in particular uniform law 
conventions, see S. Bariatti, L’interpretazione delle convenzioni internazionali di diritto uniforme  (Padova: 
Cedam, 1986), pp. 165 et seq. and the scholars cited in footnote 81 therein. Bariatti also points out that 
involving an international organization or an international court or tribunal in the process of interpreting 
uniform law conventions is generally recognized as the best solution in order to guarantee the uniform 
application thereof in the different contracting States. However, due to the relevant interests at stake, where the 
treaties are not concluded within the framework of an international organization, the above solution is often 
disregarded and the contracting States tend to rely on peer review processes of consultation and, possibly, to 
periodical modifications of the original treaties by virtue of ad hoc protocols (ibidem, pp. 169-171).  
1267 Such a solution, however, subtly corresponds to giving preference to one party’s intended interpretation 
(the most restrictive) over the other parties’ intended interpretations. Moreover, although it may be considered 
reasonable in certain cases, as for instance where its effect is not to bind any contracting States to any 
reciprocal concession unless all parties have clearly agreed to be so bound, in other cases it may lead to 
manifestly absurd results. Consider the following example: a certain tax treaty does not include any general 
rule of interpretation similar to Article 3(2) OECD Model; under the tax law of one contracting State, the term 
“employment” is deemed to denote (also) the relationships between a law school and the external lecturers that 
teach at the LLM programs organized by the former and structure their lectures on the basis of the directives 
received from it, while under the tax law of the other contracting State these relationships are clearly outside 
the intension of the term “employment”; in an OECD-type tax treaty, going for the most restrictive 
interpretation would lead to conclude that income derived by the lecturers from such relationships could not be 
taxed by the source State (i.e. the State of residence of the law school and in which the LLM lectures are 
given), since Article 21 of the treaty would apply to income of lecturers resident in the other contracting State, 
even where under the tax law of the source State these relationships would be regarded as “employment” 
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 Alternatively, he may infer from the overall context that the parties intended to 
attribute to that term a meaning corresponding to the legal concept existing under the 
domestic law of the contracting State that presents the strongest connection with the 
situation to which the treaty must be applied.1268  
Moreover, he may consider it sensible that the parties intended to attribute to that 
term a fixed hard-core meaning,1269 leaving the interpreter with the duty to complete it 
by reference to the national legal system of the State applying the treaty in the actual 
                                                                                                                                  
relationships.  
On the applicability of such a method for the purpose of interpreting uniform law conventions, see, among 
others, A. N. Makarov, “Réflexions sur l’interprétation des circonstances de rattachement dans les règles de 
conflit faisant partie d’une Convention internationale”, in Mélanges offerts à Jacques Maury. Tome I: Droit 
international privé et public (Paris: Librairie Dalloz et Sirey, 1960), 206 et seq., at 207 et seq.; R. David, “The 
International Unification of Private Law”, in International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law. Volume 2 (The 
Hague: Nĳhoff, 1971), Chapter 5, p. 101. 
1268 With reference to treaties purported to standardize the contracting States’ domestic private law and private 
international law, it is recognized by the majority of scholars that the uniform and autonomous (from domestic 
law jargons and categorizations) interpretation thereof is necessary in order to guarantee that the object and 
purpose of such treaties, i.e. to create a single set of rules applicable to certain facts in all contracting States, is 
not frustrated and equality of rights and obligations is achieved in respect of all persons covered by the treaty 
provisions; the failure of their uniform interpretation, moreover, may increase the tendency towards forum 
shopping (see, e.g., A. Malintoppi, “The Uniformity of Interpretation of International Conventions on Uniform 
Laws and of Standard Contracts”, in C. M. Schmitthoff (ed.), The Sources of the Laws of International Trade. 
With special reference to East-West Trade (London: Stevens & Sons, 1964), 127 et seq., at 128; E. 
Frankenstein, Internationales Privatrecht (Grenzrecht). Volumen I (Berlin: Rothschild, 1926), pp. 295 et seq.; 
S. Bariatti, L’interpretazione delle convenzioni internazionali di diritto uniforme (Padova: Cedam, 1986), pp. 
119-121, 129-130, 132-133, 141).  
However, the same scholars point out (quite obviously) that in certain cases treaties allow, or even demand, the 
competent court to construe their provisions in accordance with domestic law (e.g. the law pointed at by the lex 
fori, or the law of a specific State) and, therefore, with national legal jargons. In such cases, it would be 
incorrect to seek an autonomous and uniform interpretation, since the latter would be contrary to the common 
intention of the parties (see, for instance, S. Bariatti, L’interpretazione delle convenzioni internazionali di 
diritto uniforme  (Padova: Cedam, 1986), pp. 133-140; R. David, “The International Unification of Private 
Law”, in International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law. Volume 2 (The Hague: Nĳhoff, 1971), Chapter 5, 
pp. 96 et seq.).  
In this respect, the issue remains to determine whether the parties intended certain terms to be construed in 
accordance with the law and jargon of a specific State, even in the absence of an express provision to that 
extent in the treaty. According to Bariatti (see S. Bariatti, L’interpretazione delle convenzioni internazionali di 
diritto uniforme  (Padova: Cedam, 1986), p. 140), the question may be answered in the affirmative where the 
terms used in the treaty originally come from specific legal systems (e.g. the term “trust” as used in the 
Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations, concluded in Rome on 19 June 1980), or where a 
national legal jargon term is reproduced tel quel in the other authentic texts of the treaties (e.g. the term 
“mortgage”, as used in the French and Spanish authentic texts of Article 1(1)(d) of the Convention on the 
International Recognition of Rights in Aircrafts, concluded in Geneva on 19 June 1948). 
1269 The agreement, in this respect, would be limited to (i) the inclusion within the treaty terms denotata of the 
items that are denoted by all the corresponding terms in the legal jargons of the various contracting States and 
(ii) the exclusion from the treaty term denotata of the items that are not denoted by any of the corresponding 
terms in the legal jargons of the various contracting States. On the difficulties faced by contracting States, in 
the course of the negotiations, to find a common meaning for all treaty terms and expressions, and on the 
related necessity to use ambiguous and vague terms and expressions in order to accommodate the possible 
divergent views thereof, see W. Hummer, ““Ordinary” versus “Special” Meaning. Comparison of the 
Approach of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the Yale-School Findings”, 26 Österreichische 
Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht (1975), 87 et seq., at 153 et seq.  
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case, especially where the treaty is aimed at interacting with domestic law. And so forth. 
 
Finally, it is worth noting that different approaches may be contextually applied in order 
to construe different legal jargon terms in the very same treaty.  
 For instance, with regard to the Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters,1270 the ECJ affirmed:  
“10. The [Brussels] Convention frequently uses words and legal concepts drawn from 
civil, commercial and procedural law and capable of a different meaning from one 
Member State to another. The question therefore arises whether these words and concepts 
must be regarded as having their own independent meaning and as being thus common to 
all the Member States or as referring to substantive rules of the law applicable in each case 
under the rules of conflict of laws of the court before which the matter is first brought. 
11. Neither of these two options rules out the other since the appropriate choice can only 
be made in respect of each of the provisions of the Convention to ensure that it is fully 
effective having regard to the objectives of article 220 of the [EEC] treaty. […]”1271 
 
In the following sections the author briefly describes the most common approaches to 
the interpretation of legal jargon treaty terms that have been adopted in the field of 
uniform law conventions.1272  
 The decision to make reference to the solutions developed in that field of treaty 
law is mainly due to the following reasons.  
 First and foremost, the interaction between treaties and domestic legal systems 
(including legal jargon terminology) has been addressed more comprehensively and in 
depth with regard to that field of international law than in respect of other fields.1273  
 Moreover, uniform law conventions also present certain features that make them 
comparable to tax treaties. First, they both provide for rules of law that, on the one hand, 
are internationally binding on the contracting States and, on the other hand, strictly 
interact with and partially modify the relevant domestic law of those contracting States. 
                                                     
1270 Concluded in Brussels on 27 September 1968. 
1271 See ECJ, 6 October 1976, Case 12/76, Industrie Tessili Italiana Como v. Dunlop AG, paras. 10-11. 
1272 This field is here intended to cover treaties dealing with (i) uniform substantive private law, (ii) uniform 
international private law (conflict of laws) and (iii) procedural international law.  
1273 See, among many others, A. Malintoppi, “The Uniformity of Interpretation of International Conventions on 
Uniform Laws and of Standard Contracts”, in C. M. Schmitthoff (ed.), The Sources of the Laws of 
International Trade. With special reference to East-West Trade (London: Stevens & Sons, 1964), 127 et seq.; 
E. Frankenstein, Internationales Privatrecht (Grenzrecht). Volumen I (Berlin: Rothschild, 1926); S. Bariatti, 
L’interpretazione delle convenzioni internazionali di diritto uniforme  (Padova: Cedam, 1986); R. David, “The 
International Unification of Private Law”, in International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law. Volume 2 (The 
Hague: Nĳhoff, 1971), Chapter 5; P. Reuter, “Quelque réflexion sur le vocabulaire de droit international”, in J. 
Boulouis et al., Mélanges offerts à Monsieur le Doyen Louis Trotabas (Paris: Librairie générale de droit et de 
jurisprudence, 1970), 423 et seq.; J. W. F. Sundberg, “A Uniform Interpretation of Uniform Law” 10 
Scandinavian Studies in Law (1966), 219 et seq.; A. Malintoppi, “Mesures tendant à prévenir les divergences 
dans l'interprétation des règles de droit uniforme”, L’Unification de Droit. Annuaire (1959), 249 et seq.; P. 
Francescakis, “Qualifications”, in Répertoire de droit international Dalloz. Tome II (Paris: Jurisprudence 
Générale Dalloz, 1969), 703 et seq. On the (limited) relationship between “qualification” issues under private 
international law and under international tax law, see K. Vogel et al., Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation 
Conventions (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997), pp. 52-53, m.nos. 90-92. 
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Second, the interpretation of both types of treaties is primarily left to domestic courts.1274   
 
 
4.3.2. Uniform interpretation of treaties   
 
As previously noted, the parties may have intended to attribute to the legal jargon terms 
used in the treaty a meaning that is uniform. In this respect, the term “uniform” is used 
here to indicate that the concept corresponding to a certain treaty term is always the 
same in all possible circumstances in which the provision containing such term is 
applied.  
With regard to uniform law conventions, the majority of scholars have expressed 
a theoretical preference for the uniform construction of treaty terms, mainly due to the 
alleged autonomy of the legal systems created by the treaties from the legal systems 
existing under the contracting States’ domestic law, as well as to the need to guarantee 
that equal rights are granted to and legal obligations imposed on different persons by 
reason of the same treaty provisions.1275  
 
This uniformity of meaning may be achieved in different ways.  
 
A first method consists in using a term that is an international legal jargon term, i.e. a 
term commonly used in the field of international law (or a specific subfield thereof) and 
having a relatively unambiguous and clear meaning when used in such a field,1276 that 
meaning being different from the one it has when used in the context of the relevant 
national legal systems.  
 The intention of the parties in this respect is established by the interpreter on the 
                                                     
1274 See, with reference to uniform law conventions, S. Bariatti, L’interpretazione delle convenzioni 
internazionali di diritto uniforme  (Padova: Cedam, 1986), p. 119 and, with reference to tax treaties, IBFD Tax 
Treaties Case Law Database (accessed on 6 July 2011).  
1275 See, inter alia, P. Reuter, “Quelque réflexion sur le vocabulaire de droit international”, in J. Boulouis et al., 
Mélanges offerts à Monsieur le Doyen Louis Trotabas (Paris: Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, 
1970), 423 et seq. at 432; P. Francescakis, “Qualifications”, in Répertoire de droit international Dalloz. Tome 
II (Paris: Jurisprudence Générale Dalloz, 1969), 703 et seq., at 705, paras. 38-39; G. Gaja, “The perspective of 
international law”, in G. Maisto (ed.), Multilingual Texts and Interpretation of Tax Treaties and EC Tax Law 
(Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2005), 91 et seq., at 99; D. Martiny, “Autonome und einheitliche Auslegung 
im Europäischen Internationalen Zivilprozeßrecht”, 45 Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales 
Privatrecht (1981), 427 et seq., at 430 et seq. and references therein.  
As far as case law in concerned, see the authoritative statement made by the ECJ with regard to the 
interpretation of Article 1 of the Convention on jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters, concluded in Brussels on 27 September 1968: “in order to ensure, as far as possible, that 
the rights and obligations which derive from [the Brussels Convention] for the Contracting States and the 
persons to whom it applies are equal and uniform, [the terms of the Convention] should not be interpreted as a 
mere reference to the internal law of one or the other of the States concerned. […] The concept used […] must 
be regarded as independent concepts which must be interpreted by reference, first, to the objectives and 
scheme of the Convention and, secondly, to the general principles which stem from the corpus of the national 
legal systems ” (see ECJ, 22 February 1979, Case 12/76, Henri Gourdain v. Franz Nadler, para. 3). 
1276 Consider, for example, terms such as “State”, “territory”, “reservation”, “authentic text”, “ratification”, 
“good faith”, “contracting parties”. 
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basis of all available elements and items of evidence, which might support the 
conclusion that the “international meaning” is to be preferred over the conflicting 
“national meanings”.1277 For the sake of legal certainty, however, the parties sometimes 
insert a specific provision in the treaty in order to appropriately direct the interpreter to 
that conclusion.  
 
A second method is to provide the interpreter with a legal definition of the treaty 
terms.1278 The drawback of this solution is, obviously, that whenever other legal jargon 
terms are used in the definition, the very same issue surfaces again. 
 
A third method consists in inserting a specific provision calling for a uniform 
interpretation, as far as possible independent from the meanings that the legal jargon 
terms have under their respective domestic laws.  
 For instance, Article 18 of the 1980 Rome Convention1279 provides that “[i]n the 
interpretation and application of the preceding uniform rules, regard shall be had to their 
international character and to the desirability of achieving uniformity in their 
                                                     
1277 The “international” meaning of treaty terms may also be established on the basis (i) of the analysis of the 
definitions of the same terms contained in other treaties, or (ii) of the interpretation of the same terms, used in 
other treaties, made by courts, tribunals and scholars, or emerging as result of widespread and constant praxis. 
The reference to other treaties and their construction as means of interpretation (i.e. as elements used in order 
to support a certain construction of the provision to be interpreted) is allowed within the system of 
interpretation provided for by Articles 31-33 VCLT, either under Article 31(3)(c) VCLT (where they are 
concluded between the very same parties of the treaty to be interpreted, or where their provision represent 
customary international law), or under Article 32 VCLT as supplementary means of interpretation. Moreover, 
the meaning attached to the same terms in other treaties may be regarded as evidence of the ordinary meaning 
of the relevant terms in the international law context. A classical instance of interconnected interpretation of 
treaties (and treaty terms) is that of the International Labour Organization conventions, with reference to which 
see J. M. Servais, International Labour Law (The Hague: Kluwer International Law, 2009), paras. 162-164. 
Another instance is provided by the interpretation made by the ECJ of Articles 5(1) and 16(4) of the 
Convention on jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, concluded in 
Brussels on 27 September 1968: with reference to the first article, the Court made reference to Article 6 of the 
Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligation, concluded in Rome on 19 June 1980, in order to 
interpret the expression “place of performance of the obligation” contained therein (see ECJ, 26 May 1982, 
Case 133/81, Roger Ivenel v. Helmut Schwab, paras. 13-15) ; with reference to the second article, in order to 
construe the expression “proceedings concerned with the registration or validity of patents”, the Court made 
reference to the European Patent Convention, concluded in Munich on 5 October 1973, and to the Community 
Patent Convention, concluded in Luxembourg on 15 December 1975, both not applicable in the case at stake 
(see ECJ, 15 November 1983, Case 288/82, Duijnstee v. Goderbauer, para. 27).   
1278 See, for instance, Article 22(3) of the Convention on jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters, concluded in Brussels on 27 September 1968; Article 5 of the OECD Model and all tax 
treaties based thereon; Article 1(2) of the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to 
International Carriage by Air, signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929. Moreover, in certain cases, the treaty 
definition refers to the definition of the same term included in another treaty; for example, Article 1 of the 
European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, concluded in Strasbourg on 27 January 1977, refers to 
both the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, concluded in the Hague on 16 
December 1970, and to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil 
Aviation, concluded in Montreal on 23 September 1971, for the purpose of shaping the meanings of the 
expressions “political offence”, “offence connected with a political offence” and “offence inspired by political 
motives”, which are used in the former convention. 
1279 Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations, concluded in Rome on 19 June 1980. 
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interpretation and application”.1280  
 
A fourth method is to rely on the good faith and common sense of the interpreter, who 
will decide, in light of all available elements and items of evidence, including the fact 
that the treaty to be construed is a uniform law-making treaty, whether a uniform 
meaning is required that best suits the object and purpose of the treaty and fits in the 
context of the provision containing the relevant term,1281 or, on the contrary, whether 
compelling reasons exist for adopting a different solution.1282  
 
The above four methods are generally purported to achieve an interpretation that, in 
addition to being “uniform”, is also “autonomous” in the sense that is independent from 
the national legal jargon meanings that the terms used (or their corresponding national 
legal jargon terms) may have under the relevant domestic laws.  
 Also in the case where the different national legal jargon meanings are taken into 
account by the interpreter, they merely represent the starting point for the purpose of 
arriving at uniform and autonomous meaning, which must primarily fit in the context 
and suit the object and purpose of the treaty to be construed.  
 Nonetheless, the comparative analysis of the relevant domestic legal concepts and 
                                                     
1280 See also Article 7 of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 
concluded in Vienna on 11 April 1980; Article 15 of the Annex to the Convention providing a Uniform Law on 
the Form of an International Will, concluded in Washington on 26 October 1973; Article 6(1) of the 
Convention on Agency in the International Sale of Goods, concluded in Geneva on 17 February 1983.  
1281 See, in this respect, P. Reuter, “Quelque réflexion sur le vocabulaire de droit international”, in J. Boulouis 
et al., Mélanges offerts à Monsieur le Doyen Louis Trotabas (Paris: Librairie générale de droit et de 
jurisprudence, 1970), 423 et seq., at 429 et seq.; P. Guggenheim, “Landesrechtliche Begriffe im Volkerrecht, 
vor allem im Bereiche der internationalen Organisation”, in W. Schätzel and H. J. Schlochauer (eds.), 
Rechtsfragen der internationalen Organisation. Festschrift für Hans Wehberg zu seinem 70. Geburtstag 
(Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1956), 133 et seq., at 133 et seq. 
1282 For instance, in the case US – Softwood Lumber from Canada the WTO Appellate Body, dealing with the 
interpretation of Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii) of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, 
rejected an interpretation of the term “goods” based on the municipal law of one of the WTO Member States. 
In this respect, Canada had contended that standing timbers were not “goods”, since they were neither 
"personal property" nor "identified thing to be severed from real property". The Appellate Body, after having 
noted that the concepts of “personal” and “real” property, as referred to by Canada, are creatures of municipal 
law not reflected in Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii), submitted that the manner in which the municipal law of a WTO 
Member classifies an item cannot be determinative of the interpretation of provisions of the WTO agreements 
(see WTO Appellate Body, 19 January 2004, United States – Final Countervailing Duty Determination with 
Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, AB-2003-6 (WT/DS257/AB/R), para. 65).  
In the King v. Bristow Elicopters and Morris v. KLM cases, Lord Steyn and Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough 
expressed the view that, in order to construe the term “lésion corporelle” used in Article 17 of the 1929 
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, the legal jargon 
meaning of that term under any national legal system was irrelevant, since it followed from the convention 
scheme and nature that the basic concepts it employed in order to achieve its purpose were autonomous 
concepts, which, as such, were to be construed autonomously and independently from national laws. The 
opposite approach would have  defeated uniformity and led to the complication of simple issues, the 
inadequately informed investigation of other legal systems and, most importantly, to uncertainty (see House of 
Lords (United Kingdom), 28 February 2002, King v. Bristow Helicopters Ltd, In Re M (A Child By Her 
Litigation Friend CM), [2002] UKHL 7, paras. 16 and 147). 
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principles1283 is generally recognized as being of great significance for the purpose of the 
above methods.1284 The analysis of the (contracting and non-contracting) States’ 
domestic laws, in this case, is mainly aimed:  
(i) at finding the common ground on which the interpreter may build up the 
“ordinary meaning” of the treaty terms in their context and in light of the object 
and purpose of the treaty; or  
(ii) where it proves difficult to establish such a common ground, at suggesting the 
interpretative solution that best suits the object and purpose of the treaty and fits 
in the context thereof.1285  
In contrast, the quest of the interpreter is generally not directed at finding a “minimum 
common denominator” of the relevant domestic law concepts and principles in order to 
take it as, or immediately derive from it, the autonomous treaty meaning.1286  
 This reference to the relevant domestic legal systems, whose legitimacy may be 
grounded, among other things, on the need to determine the “ordinary meaning” of the 
treaty terms under Article 31 VCLT,1287 on the possibility to rely on supplementary 
means of interpretation under Article 32 VCLT1288 and on the explicit reference to the 
                                                     
1283 On the different effects, on the interpretation of uniform law conventions, of the existence of common legal 
concepts, as compared to the mere existence of common legal principles, see S. Bariatti, L’interpretazione 
delle convenzioni internazionali di diritto uniforme  (Padova: Cedam, 1986), pp. 289 et seq., who highlights 
that in the latter case the interpreter discretion is generally wider and his construction is generally regarded as 
“creative”. In this sense, see also P. Guggenheim, “Landesrechtliche Begriffe im Volkerrecht, vor allem im 
Bereiche der internationalen Organisation” in W. Schätzel and H. J. Schlochauer (eds.), Rechtsfragen der 
internationalen Organisation. Festschrift für Hans Wehberg zu seinem 70. Geburtstag (Frankfurt: Vittorio 
Klostermann, 1956), 133 et seq., at 141 and P. Reuter, “Quelque réflexion sur le vocabulaire de droit 
international”, in J. Boulouis et al., Mélanges offerts à Monsieur le Doyen Louis Trotabas (Paris: Librairie 
générale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1970), 423 et seq., at 431. 
1284 See R. Plaisant, Les règles de conflit de lois dans les traités (Alençon: Imprimerie Alençonnaise, 1946), p. 
69; P. Guggenheim, “Landesrechtliche Begriffe im Volkerrecht, vor allem im Bereiche der internationalen 
Organisation” in W. Schätzel and H. J. Schlochauer (eds.), Rechtsfragen der internationalen Organisation. 
Festschrift für Hans Wehberg zu seinem 70. Geburtstag (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1956), 133 et seq., 
at 133 ff; D. Martiny, “Autonome und einheitliche Auslegung im Europäischen Internationalen 
Zivilprozeßrecht”, 45 Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht (1981), 427 et seq., 
at 441 et seq.  
1285 See P. Reuter, “Quelque réflexion sur le vocabulaire de droit international”, in J. Boulouis et al., Mélanges 
offerts à Monsieur le Doyen Louis Trotabas (Paris: Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1970), 423 
et seq., at 431. 
For an actual instance where the competent tribunal construed the uniform and autonomous meaning of the 
relevant treaty term (also) on the basis of the analysis of the contracting States’ legal systems, see ECtHR, 21 
February 1984, Öztürk v. Germany (Application no. 8544/79), in particular paras. 50-53. 
1286 See, in this sense, the analysis of the ECJ’s usual reference to the contracting States’ domestic law made by 
Advocate General Lagrange in Case 14/61, Hoogovens v. High Authority.  
1287 It is, in fact, just reasonable to expect that the meaning of a treaty term that has a specific legal jargon 
meaning under the domestic law of a certain State and whose corresponding terms in other languages have as 
well specific legal jargon meanings under the domestic law of other States, had been determined through a 
negotiation taking such meanings as starting point, especially where the main object and purpose of the treaty 
is that of making those States’s domestic law uniform in that respect. 
1288 On the relevance of comparative law as a subsidiary means of interpretation before the conclusion of the 
VCLT, see H. Lauterpacht, Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law. With Special Reference 
to International Arbitration (London: Longmans, 1927), pp. 183 et seq. For an instance in which the ICJ relied, 
inter alia, on the common principles of law in force in different States in order to support its interpretation of a 
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“general principles of law recognized by civilized nations” contained in Article 38(1)(c) 
of the ICJ Statute, is quite flexible with regard to the subject of the comparative analysis: 
in fact, depending on the characteristics of the case at stake, the analysis may be limited 
to contracting States, or include also non-contracting States; it may refer indifferently to 
the original treaty parties, as well as to parties that acceded subsequently; it may concern 
the legal concepts and principles in force at the moment of the treaty conclusion, or those 
in force at the moment of the treaty application.1289    
 
Finally, a fifth method that may be adopted consists in directing the interpreter towards a 
specific national legal jargon meaning for the purpose of using it as uniform meaning in 
the context of a specific treaty provision.  
 This is a first type of renvoi1290 (hereafter “type-I renvoi”) to the domestic law of 
                                                                                                                                  
treaty provision, see ICJ, 28 November 1958, Case concerning the application of the convention of 1902 
governing the guardianship of infants (Netherlands v. Sweden), judgment, p. 71. 
1289 See, for instance, D. Martiny, “Autonome und einheitliche Auslegung im Europäischen Internationalen 
Zivilprozeßrecht”, 45 Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht (1981), 427 et seq., 
at 442 et seq. 
1290 In the present work, and particularly in this and the following chapters, ther term “renvoi” is used in a sense 
other than the one in which it is generally employed in the English writings on private international law.  
In the latter, the term “renvoi” is commonly used in order to denote the problem emerging where the foreign 
law which is applicable under the choice of law rules of the forum is intended to include the private 
international law rules of the foreign State: in this case, if, under the private international law of the foreign 
State, the rules applicable to the case at stake are not those of that very same State, but those of a different 
State (which may be either the State of the forum, or a third State), the issue for the forum arises whether, and 
to what extent, it should accept such a renvoi to the rules of the latter State (see, among many others, L. Collins 
(gen. ed.), Dicey, Morris and Collins on The Conflict of Laws (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2006), pp. 73 et 
seq.; P. North and J. J. Fawcett, Cheshire and North’s Private International Law (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2004), pp. 51 et seq.; K. Lipstein, “The General Principles of Private International Law”, 135 RCADI 
(1972), 97 et seq., at 210 et seq.; E. G. Lorenzen, “The Renvoi Theory and the Application of Foreign Law. I. 
Renvoi in General”, 10 Columbia Law Review (1910), 190 et seq.).  
In contrast, the term “renvoi” is employed here to denote the case where the meaning of a legal jargon term 
employed in a treaty (or in the private international law of a State) is established by reference to the domestic 
law of a(nother) State. This construction of the term “renvoi” is rooted in the general theory of law, where it 
(and its Latin-derived correspondents, such as the Italian “rinvio”) is employed to denote the legal technique of 
referring to another legal order (or to another part of the same legal order) for the purpose of establishing the 
meaning of a legal jargon term, or of regulating a certain case by means of a rule of law (see, for instance, H. 
Kelsen (translated by B. Laroche and V. Faure), Théorie générale du droit et de l’État (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 
1997); N. Bobbio, Teoria generale del diritto (Torino: Giappichelli Editore, 1993); S. Romano, L’ordinamento 
giuridico (Firenze: Sansoni, 1946)). Moreover, this construction of the term “renvoi” is also sometimes adoped 
in legal writings in the fields of private international law and uniform law conventions (see, for instance, C. 
Focarelli, Lezioni di diritto internazionale privato (Perugia: Morlacchi Editore, 2005), pp. 49 et seq.; H. 
Kelsen, “Observations sur le rapport de George S. Maridakis: “Le renvoi en droit international privé””, in H. 
Kelsen (edited by C. Leben), Ecrits français de droit international (Paris: PUF, 2001), 309 et seq., in particular 
at 312; S. Bariatti, L’interpretazione delle convenzioni internazionali di diritto uniforme  (Padova: Cedam, 
1986), Chapters 2 and 4; P. Picone, “Il rinvio all’ “ordinamento competente” nel diritto internazionale privato”, 
Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale (1981), 309 et seq.). Finally, the term “renvoi” is not 
unusually employed in this sense in legal writings on tax treaty law, with particular reference to Article 3(2) 
OECD Model and equivalent tax treaty provisions (see, among others, S. A. Rocha, Interpretation of Double 
Taxation Conventions: General Theory and Brazilian Perspective (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law 
International, 2009), pp. 122 et seq.; E. van der Bruggen, “Unless the Vienna Convention Otherwise Requires: 
Notes on the Relationship between Article 3(2) of the OECD Model Tax Convention and Articles 31 and 32 of 
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a State.1291 The issue for the parties, in this respect, consists in how to render 
unambiguous their intention to adopt a specific national legal jargon meaning as the 
meaning of the treaty term (or terms). There are various alternatives to achieve that 
result, the most common being the following: 
(i) using a term that originally comes from a specific legal system;1292  
(ii) employing the same national legal jargon term in all authentic texts of the 
treaty, either by itself or in brackets after the corresponding legal jargon term in 
the languages of the other authentic texts;1293  
(iii) using a legal jargon term in a language different from the language generally 
employed in the sole authentic text of the treaty;  
(iv) explicitly stating that the interpreter has to make reference to the meaning 
that a certain term has under the domestic law of a specific State;  
(v) relying on the good faith of the interpreter, who will decide in light of all 
available elements and items of evidence1294 whether the renvoi to a specific 
national legal jargon meaning is required, or, on the contrary, persuasive reasons 
exist to support a different choice.1295  
                                                                                                                                  
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties”, 43 European Taxation (2003), 142 et seq.; K. Vogel, “La 
clause de renvoi de l’article 3, par. 2 Modèle de Convention de l’OCDE”, in Réflexions offertes a Paul Sibille. 
Études de fiscalité (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 1981), 857 et seq.; R. Lenz, “General Report”, in International Fiscal 
Association, Cahiers de droit fiscal international, Vol. 42 (Basel: Verlag für Recht and Gesellschaft, 1960), 
281 et seq., in particular at 296). 
In addition, with regard to the relevance of the renvoi, as intended in the present work, for the purpose of 
private international law, it is worth noting that such a renvoi is a technique sometimes employed by legal 
scholars and courts to solve the problems of characterization that often arise in the interpretation and 
application of the private international law of the forum (which may then lead to a renvoi in the private 
international law sense). See, in this respect, the comprehensive analysis carried out by the first authors to have 
dealt with this issue: F. Kahn, “Gesetzeskollisionen. Ein Beitrag zur Lehre des internationalen Privatrechts”, 30 
Jahrbücher für die Dogmatik des heutigen römischen und deutschen Privatrechts (1891), 1 et seq.; E. Bartin, 
“De l’impossibilité d’arriver à la solution définitive des conflits de loi”, Journal du droit international privé 
(1897), 225 et seq., 466 et seq. and 720 et seq.; E. G. Lorenzen, “The Theory of Qualifications and the Conflict 
of Laws”, 20 Columbia Law Review (1920), 247 et seq.; E. Bartin, “La doctrine des qualifications et ses 
rapports avec le caractère national du conflit des lois”, 31 RCADI (1930), 561 et seq.; E. Rabel, “Das Problem 
der Qualifikation”, 5 Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht (1931), 241 et seq.; 
J. D. Falconbridge, “Characterisation in the Conflict of Laws”, 53 Law Quarterly Review (1937), 235 et seq. 
and 537 et seq.; A. H. Robertson, Characterisation in the Conflict of Laws  (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1940); E. G. Lorenzen, “The Qualification, Classification, or Characterization Problem in the Conflict of 
Laws”, 50 Yale Law Journal (1940-1941), 743 et seq.   
1291 Generally, but not necessarily, a contracting State. 
1292 E.g. the term “trust” as used in the Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations, concluded 
in Rome on 19 June 1980. 
1293 E.g. the term “mortgage”, as used in the French and Spanish authentic texts of Article 1(1)(d) of the 
Convention on the International Recognition of Rights in Aircrafts, concluded in Geneva on 19 June 1948; the 
term “force majeure” in the English authentic text of Article 3 of the Hours of Work (Industry) Convention, 
concluded in Washington on 28 November 1919. 
1294 Including, for instance, the nature of the drafted text, the fact that the treaty has just one authentic text and 
the travaux préparatoires. 
1295 For example, Malaurie indicates that Belgian judges often made reference to English legal concepts and 
principles for the purpose of interpreting the International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of 
Law relating to Bills of Lading, concluded in Brussels on 25 August 1924 in the sole French authentic text, 
since they considered that the Convention provisions were based on English law (see P. Malaurie, “Le droit 
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It is clear from the above that such a fifth method does not lead to an autonomous 




4.3.3. Non-uniform interpretation of treaties  
 
The parties may have intended not to attribute a uniform meaning to some of the legal 
jargon terms used in the treaty, for instance in order to increase the predictability of its 
interpretation and thus legal certainty, to make less burdensome the application of the 
treaty by national courts and tribunals, to improve the interaction between the treaty 
provisions and the intertwined provisions of domestic law, or simply due to the 
impossibility of reaching an agreement on the uniform intension of a legal concept.1296   
 Despite the underlying reasons, the choice of the parties to reject the uniform 
construction of certain treaty terms almost invariably leads to the adoption, for the 
purpose of treaty interpretation, of some national legal jargon meanings. 
This renvoi to the domestic law meaning of the treaty terms (or their 
correspondent legal jargon terms in the official languages of other contracting States, 
where such languages have not be used for drafting the authentic texts of the treaties), 
may, however, take different forms, which in turn often lead to significantly different 
interpretative results.  
 
In a first form, the renvoi may be to the substantive lex fori, i.e. to the relevant 
substantive law of the legal system of the court of the forum (hereafter “type-II renvoi”).  
 For instance, the original text of Article 25(1) of the 1929 Warsaw Convention1297 
                                                                                                                                  
français et la diversité des langues”, Journal du droit international (1965), 565 et seq., at 573, footnote 31). 
Similarly, in the Eastern Airlines v. Floyd case, the US Supreme Court, in order to decide whether the term 
“lésion corporelle”, used in the (sole) French authentic text of Article 17 of the 1929 Convention for the 
Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, denoted also the mental distress 
suffered by the passengers of a flight and caused by the risk of an imminent crash, considered the meaning that 
the term “lésion corporelle” had under French law in 1929, as a guidance to the shared expectations of the 
parties to the Convention, due to the fact that the latter was drafted in French by continental jurists (see 
Supreme Court (United States), 17 April 1991, Eastern Airlines Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530 (1991), p. 536). 
1296 With specific reference to the use of the renvoi to the contracting States’ domestic law in private law 
treaties and tax treaties, Gaja cites, as instances of the reasons that may lead the parties to implement such a 
solution, (i) the fact that national authorities may not be sufficiently equipped to analyse the different texts in 
their possibly diverging meanings and to apply Articles 31-33 VCLT in order to determine a uniform 
interpretation and (ii) the fact that the use of the same rules of interpretation (namely those stemming from 
Articles 31-33 VCLT) by different domestic courts is no guarantee of a uniform result (see G. Gaja, “The 
perspective of international law”, in G. Maisto (ed.), Multilingual Texts and Interpretation of Tax Treaties and 
EC Tax Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2005), 91 et seq., at 98).  
With regard to the adoption of the renvoi to the lex fori in the field of uniform law conventions, Bariatti points 
out that such a choice is generally due to the resistance of the contracting States to standardizing certain legal 
concepts, especially in relation with procedural law, or to the actual impossibility to reach an agreement, in the 
course of the negotiation, on the uniform intension of a legal concept (see S. Bariatti, L’interpretazione delle 
convenzioni internazionali di diritto uniforme  (Padova: Cedam, 1986), p. 137).   
1297 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, signed at 
Warsaw on 12 October 1929, in the French authentic text in force before the changes made by the 1955 Hague 
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provided for an explicit renvoi to the law of the referred court for the purpose of 
determining the “faute qui, d’après la loi du tribunal saisi, est considérée comme 
équivalente au dole”.1298  
 This type of renvoi implies that the meaning attributed to a certain treaty 
provision may vary due to the “nationality” of the court deciding the case and, therefore, 
that two identical situations may in fact be subject to two different rules of law simply 
because of the different “nationality” of the courts to which the cases have been referred 
and independent of the exercise of any discretionary judgment by those courts. This type 
of renvoi, clearly, favors attempts at forum shopping.  
 With regard to the methods that could be adopted in order to regulate the renvoi, 
the latter is generally required by an explicit provision of the treaty to be interpreted.1299 
However, it is possible that, in the silence of the parties and on the basis of all available 
elements and items of evidence, the interpreter arrives at and justifies the conclusion that 
the contracting States intended to operate a renvoi to the substantive lex fori.1300 
 
In a second form, the renvoi may be to the private international lex fori, i.e. to the rules 
on the conflict of laws of the court of the forum (hereafter “type-III renvoi”).  
 In this case, the court of the forum will determine, on the basis of its State’s rules 
on the conflict of laws, which is the domestic substantive law applicable to the case at 
stake and will consequently interpret the relevant treaty terms on the basis of the legal 
jargon meanings that such terms (or their corresponding legal jargon terms in the official 
language in which the applicable domestic substantive law is expressed) have under the 
applicable domestic substantive law.  
 Although to a different extent and through a different process, type-III renvoi also 
                                                                                                                                  
amending protocol.  
1298 Other well-know examples of renvoi type-II are: Articles 21, 22(1) and 29 of the same 1929 Warsaw 
Convention; Article 1(3) of the Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations, concluded in 
Rome on 19 June 1980; Articles 33 and 52(1) of the above-mentioned Convention on jurisdiction and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, concluded in Brussels on 27 September 1968.  
1299 See the examples given in the previous footnotes.  
1300 A case where it is not unfrequent to regard the renvoi to domestic law as intended to be to the substantive 
lex fori concerns those (treaty) terms that must be interpreted in order to characterize a legal relation (or 
situation) for the purpose of selecting the appropriate rule of conflict of laws. The first explicitly analyses of 
such an issue, although carried out with reference to the domestic rules on the conflict of laws, appeared in F. 
Kahn, “Gesetzeskollisionen. Ein Beitrag zur Lehre des internationalen Privatrechts”, 30 Jahrbücher für die 
Dogmatik des heutigen römischen und deutschen Privatrechts (1891), 1 et seq. and in E. Bartin, “De 
l’impossibilité d’arriver à la solution définitive des conflits de loi”, Journal du droit international privé (1897), 
225 et seq., 466 et seq. and 720 et seq., at 226 et seq. In the latter, the author commented the decision delivered 
by the Court of Appeal of Alger, on 24 December 1889, in the Bartholo case. In that case, the court had to 
decide whether the French or Maltese substantive private law was to be applied in order to establish the rights 
that the widow of Mr Bartholo had on the estate of her former husband (originally a Maltese citizen, married in 
Malta and died in Alger – at that time being part of France – as a French citizen). The question at stake before 
the court originated from the fact that under Maltese law such rights were regulated by succession law, while 
under French law they were regulated by family law. Thus, the issue obviously arose of whether the private 
international law rule regarding family law matters or that regarding succession law matters had to apply. The 
Court of Appeal decided to characterize the widow’s rights in accordance with the substantive lex fori (i.e. as 
family law relation) for the purpose of deciding which private international law rule to apply.  
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implies that the meaning attributed to a certain treaty term may vary due to the 
“nationality” of the court of the forum. It is true that, due to the operation of their 
respective rules on the conflict of laws, the courts of two different jurisdictions may end 
up to apply the same domestic substantive law to two identical cases. However, due to 
the discrepancies existing between the private international law rules of different States, 
the coincidence of the applicable domestic substantive rules is not certain, but just the 
result of chance.1301  
 Furthermore, similar to what it has been noted with regard to type-II renvoi, type-
III renvoi may favor attempts at forum shopping and is generally required by an explicit 
provision of the treaty to be interpreted,1302 although it is possible that the interpreter 
decides to apply it, even in the absence of that explicit provision, on the basis of its 
appreciation of the available elements and items of evidence.1303  
 
In a third form, the renvoi is not directed to the lex fori, but to the substantive domestic 
law of a State bearing a certain connection with the situation potentially regulated by the 
treaty provision to be interpreted (hereafter “type-IV renvoi”).  
 For example, Article V(1)(d) of the 1958 New York  Convention1304 provides that 
the recognition and enforcement in one State of an arbitral award made in the territory of 
another State may be refused where “[t]he composition of the arbitral authority or the 
arbitral procedure […] was not in accordance with the law of the country where the 
arbitration took place”. Similarly, Article 3(2) of the bilateral treaty between Italy and 
Switzerland on claims for damages caused by road accidents1305 provides that “[i]l 
                                                     
1301 See, similarly, F. Deby-Gérard, Le rôle de la règle de conflit dans le règlement des rapports internationaux 
(Paris: Dalloz, 1973), p. 267. 
1302 See, for instance, Article 53 of the Convention on jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters, concluded in Brussels on 27 September 1968, and Article 18 of the Hague Convention on 
the Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions Relating to Maintenance Obligations, concluded on 2 October 
1973. 
1303 For instance, the ECJ, in a decision concerning the interpretation of Article 5(1) of the Brussels Convention 
on jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, after noting that “in the case of 
an action relating to contractual obligations Article 5(1) allows a plaintiff to bring the matter before the court 
for the place 'of performance' of the obligation in question”, concluded that it was “for the court before which 
the matter [was] brought to establish under the Convention whether the place of performance is situate within 
its territorial jurisdiction” and that, for such a purpose, the referred court had to “determine in accordance with 
its own rules of conflict of laws what [was] the law applicable to the legal relationship in question and define 
in accordance with that law the place of performance of the contractual obligation in question”. According to 
the ECJ, “in these circumstances the reference in the Convention to the place of performance of contractual 
obligations [could not] be understood otherwise than by reference to the substantive law applicable under the 
rules of conflict of laws of the court before which the matter [was] brought” (see ECJ, 6 October 1976, Case 
12/76, Industrie Tessili Italiana Como v. Dunlop AG, paras. 13 and 15). 
See also Court of Rotterdam, 18 June 1963, Journal du Droit International (1969), 990 et seq., at 991; Cour de 
Cassation (France), 4 March 1963, Hocke, 53 Revue critique de droit international privé (1964), 264 et seq., 
where the renvoi to the substantive domestic law of a State, made by the private international law of the State 
of the forum, is construed by the court of the forum as including the interpretation of the relevant uniform law 
convention terms made by the judges of the former State. 
1304 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, concluded in New York on 
10 June 1958. 
1305 Accordo tra la Confederazione Svizzera e la Repubblica Italiana concernente il risarcimento dei danni in 
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concetto di veicolo a motore si determina secondo la legislazione del Paese dove avviene 
l’incidente”.1306 
The specific features of this type of renvoi, as compared to type-II and type-III 
renvois, consist in that the former (i) does not permit any forum shopping and (ii) 
guarantees a partially uniform interpretation.1307 With reference to (ii), in fact, although 
it is true that two situations that are identical, but for the connections they have with 
different States, are potentially subject to different rules when those connections are 
relevant for the purpose of the renvoi to the applicable domestic substantive law, where 
those situations do not present any differences in respect of their geographical 
connections, they will be invariably subject to the same rule, independent of the court to 
which the case is referred.  
Finally, it may be noted that type-IV renvoi is generally regulated by an explicit 
treaty provision, although, even in this case, it cannot be excluded that the interpreter 
decides to adopt it for the purpose of treaty interpretation and justifies such a decision on 
the basis of the available elements and items of evidence.1308  
 
With regard to all the above types of renvoi the question arises of whether the reference 
to the domestic law of the relevant State must be considered to include treaties to which 
that State is party and other international legal instruments addressing that State (such as 
regulations and directives in the legal framework of the European Union). The issue is 
actually twofold.  
 First, the question of the theoretical admissibility of such an inclusion should be 
generally answered in the affirmative, as long as those treaties and other international 
legal instruments provide for rules and principles of law applicable in the legal order of 
the State concerned, independent of whether they are applied directly or are 
                                                                                                                                  
caso di incidenti della circolazione stradale, concluded in Rome on 16 August 1978. Article 3(2) thereof may 
be translated in English as follows: “the concept of motor vehicle is determined according to the law of the 
State where the accident took place”. 
1306 See also Article 50 of the Convention on jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters, concluded in Brussels on 27 September 1968; Articles V(1) and VII of the Convention 
providing a Uniform Law on the Form of an International Will, concluded in Washington on 26 October 1973; 
Article 3 of the Convention on the law governing transfer of title in international sales of goods, concluded in 
the Hague on 15 April 1958. 
1307 It must be noted that the categorization here adopted by the author with reference to “uniform”, “partially 
uniform” and “non-uniform” interpretation does not coincide with that followed by the majority of private 
international law scholars, who tend to include type-IV renvoi within the methods to achieve “uniform” 
interpretation (see S. Bariatti, L’interpretazione delle convenzioni internazionali di diritto uniforme (Padova: 
Cedam, 1986), Chapters II and IV and the references to scholars therein).   
1308 This may be the case, for instance, where the private international laws of the contracting States (or, more 
generally, the private international laws of a highly significant number of States worldwide) provide for the 
same connecting factor for the purpose of identifying the relevant private law applicable to a certain subject 
matter. In such a case, the comparative analysis of the (contracting) States’ private international law rules may 
show a significant convergence in relation to a specific subject matter, which in turn may lead the interpreter to 
conclude (and justify) that the treaty terms included in the provisions dealing with that subject matter should be 
attributed the legal jargon meaning they have under the law of the State to which such international private law 
rules would have referred (see A. Cassese, Il diritto interno nel processo internazionale (Padova: Cedam, 
1962), pp. 202 et seq.).   
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implemented by means of ad hoc domestic legislation.1309  
 Second, with regard to whether, in the specific case, the renvoi should be 
considered to include such international legal instruments, the interpreter must assess all 
available elements and items of evidence in order to establish the intention of the parties 
in that respect.1310  
 
Similarly it is not possible to determine a priori whether the renvoi is meant to the law in 
force at the moment of the treaty conclusion, or to that in force at the moment of the 
treaty application, that depending on the intention of the parties, which is to be 
established by the interpreter on the basis of all available elements and items of 
evidence.1311 
 
4.4. Problems arising in the interpretation of legal jargon terms  
 
4.4.1. The required knowledge of foreign legal systems and concepts  
 
The choice to attribute a uniform and autonomous meaning to undefined treaty terms, or 
to employ one of the aforementioned types of renvoi, also leads to different burdens on 
the interpreter in terms of knowledge of the relevant foreign legal concepts and systems 
of law.  
On one extreme of the scale, the use of a type-II renvoi renders the task of the 
interpreter rather easy, since the latter has to refer to and apply its domestic law concepts 
for the purpose of construing the relevant treaty provision.  
The situation generally becomes more complicated where type-III and type-IV 
renvois are at stake, since the interpreter may be often required to refer to and apply 
legal concepts of foreign substantive law and, therefore, he needs to acquire a sufficient 
understanding of the foreign legal system and of the role played therein by the foreign 
                                                     
1309 See A. von Overbeck, “Le champ de l'application des règles de conflit ou de droit matériel uniforme 
prévues par les traits. Exposé préliminaire et rapport définitif avec projet de résolution présentés à l’Institut de 
Droit International”, 58-I Annuaire de l’Institut de Droit International (1979), 97 et seq., at 117; W. Wengler, 
“Réflexions sur l’application du droit international public par les tribunaux internes”, 72 Revue Générale de 
Droit International Public (1968), 921 et seq., at 964, in particular note 15 and references therein. With 
specific regard to the relevance of EU law for the purpose of Article 3(2) of OECD Model-based tax treaties, 
see F. Avella, “Using EU Law To Interpret Undefined Tax Treaty Terms: Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties and Article 3(2) of the OECD Model Convention”, World Tax Journal 
(2012), 95 et seq., at 113 et seq. 
1310 See, although with reference to tax treaties, F. Avella, “La qualificazione dei redditi nelle Convenzioni 
internazionali contro le doppie imposizioni stipulate dall’Italia”, Rivista di Diritto Tributario. Parte Quinta 
(2010), 45 et seq., at 54; F. Avella, “Il beneficiario effettivo nelle convenzioni contro le doppie imposizioni: 
prime pronunce nella giurisprudenza di merito e nuovi spunti di discussione”, Rivista di Diritto Tributario. 
Parte Quinta (2011) 14 et seq., at 22 et seq. 
1311 See P. Reuter, “Quelque réflexion sur le vocabulaire de droit international”, in J. Boulouis et al., Mélanges 
offerts à Monsieur le Doyen Louis Trotabas (Paris: Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1970), 423 
et seq., at 428; J. W. F. Sundberg, “A Uniform Interpretation of Uniform Law”, 10 Scandinavian Studies in 
Law (1966), 219 et seq., at 236. See, by analogy, the analysis of the inter-temporal law issue in section 2.3.3.4 
of Chapter 3 of Part II. 
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legal concepts for the purpose of properly interpreting the relevant treaty provision.  
The use of a type-I renvoi presents similar qualitative problems, although 
quantitatively more significant due to the fact that, at least with reference to multilateral 
treaties, interpreters from most of the contracting States have to refer to and apply 
foreign legal concepts.  
Finally, at the other extreme of the scale, the choice to attribute a uniform and 
autonomous meaning to undefined treaty terms presents major interpretative issues and 
uncertainties, caused by the need for the interpreter to take into account a vast spectrum 
of contextual elements, including the relevant foreign legal concepts and systems of law, 
in order to construe the treaty provisions at stake. 
 
 
4.4.2. The tendency to examine foreign legal systems and concepts through the 
looking glasses of the interpreter’s domestic law  
 
Not infrequently do interpreters lack the knowledge of the relevant foreign legal 
concepts and systems of law necessary to properly construe the treaty.1312  
 
What interpreters tend to do in these cases1313 is to attribute to the treaty terms the 
domestic legal jargon meaning of the corresponding terms employed in their national 
legal systems. The “correspondence” between such terms is generally established by 
interpreters by taking into account their past practice, multilingual dictionaries, 
comparative law studies and the analysis of multilingual treaties in which both languages 
(legal jargons)1314 are used as authentic languages. Such correspondence is generally 
established on the basis of:  
(i) the similarity of the functions performed by the concept underlying the treaty 
term in its original legal system and by the concept underlying the 
“corresponding” term under the interpreter’s national legal system; 
(ii) the correspondence of a significant part of the prototypical denotata (and non-
denotata) of those two terms.1315  
                                                     
1312 With regard to the field of private international law and private substantive law treaties, the risk of an 
unsatisfactory interpretation of the treaty due to the inappropriate knowledge of foreign law is pointed out in R. 
David, “The International Unification of Private Law”, in International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law. 
Volume 2 (The Hague: Nĳhoff, 1971), Chapter 5, p. 106 and R. Mankiewicz, “Die Anwendung des 
Warschauer Abkommens”, 27 Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht (1962), 456 
et seq., at 457.  
1313 With reference to tax law, see, by analogy, the interesting statement made by Thuronyi on the dangerous 
effects of “ethnocentrism” in the practice of drafting foreign States’ tax law systems (see V. Thuronyi, 
“Studying Comparative Tax Law” in G. Lindencrona, S. Lodin and B. Wiman (eds.), International Studies in 
Taxation: Law and Economics. Liber Amicorum Leif Mutén (London: Kluwer Law International, 1999), 333 et 
seq., at 334 and 338), according to which, in the drafting of the tax legislation of foreign States, tax specialists 
inevitably tend to look at tax law either exclusively or excessively from the perspective of their own States, 
mainly because most of them are first and foremost specialists in the law of the latter.  
1314 I.e. the language in which the treaty to be interpreted is authenticated and the language in which their own 
domestic laws are drafted. 
1315 For instance, where an Italian lawyer is faced with the interpretation of the term “enterprise” included in a 
PART II: CHAPTER 4 
 364 
This phenomenon, often unperceived, causes the construction of undefined treaty terms 
to be heavily influenced by the domestic legal system and concepts of the treaty 
interpreter. This, in turn, leads interpreters from different States to construe the same 




4.4.3. Whether proxies of the relevant legal jargon terms should be used for the 
purpose of interpretation  
 
In order to interpret a treaty term in light of its domestic law meaning, the interpreter is 
often required to decide whether that treaty term, although not being a term of the 
relevant legal jargon, may be regarded as a proxy for a term of the relevant legal jargon 
and, therefore, whether it may be attributed the legal jargon meaning of the latter for the 
purpose of the treaty1318   
Some instances of this issue may be taken from Italian tax treaty practice. The 
legal jargon term used in the Italian income tax code (ITC)1319 to denote employment 
                                                                                                                                  
treaty provision, he will commonly construe that term as denoting the concept underlying the Italian legal 
jargon term “impresa”, which is generally regarded as corresponding to the English term “enterprise”. 
However, it is normal that some of the denotata of one term are not denoted by the other term (and vice versa), 
either because they are unknown in the legal system corresponding to the jargon of the latter term, or because 
they are denoted by a different term in such a jargon.  
1316 This tendency is also stressed in S. Bariatti, L’interpretazione delle convenzioni internazionali di diritto 
uniforme (Padova: Cedam, 1986), pp. 154-160, where it is pointed out that the major reason for the existence 
of divergent interpretations of (uniform private law) treaty provisions is that treaties are highly incomplete 
legal systems, in which general principles of law, legal categorizations, fundamental legal concepts are absent; 
in addition, treaties generally regulate only a few selected features of the underlying relevant domestic legal 
systems (e.g. contract law, family law, income tax law, etc.). Such incompleteness necessarily leads the 
interpreter to rely on his encyclopedic knowledge of his own legal system(s) in order to interpret undefined 
terms and to complete (or extensively interpret) treaty provisions by means of analogy. As a result, when two 
interpreters are from two different States (where different legal systems are in force), it is just part of the 
normal course of events that two different interpretations are arrived at and supported (see also R. David, “The 
International Unification of Private Law”, in International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law. Volume 2 (The 
Hague: Nĳhoff, 1971), Chapter 5, pp. 94, 98 et seq., 106, 167 et seq.; P. Reuter, “Quelque réflexion sur le 
vocabulaire de droit international”, in J. Boulouis et al., Mélanges offerts à Monsieur le Doyen Louis Trotabas 
(Paris: Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1970), 423 et seq., at 432; J. W. F. Sundberg, “A 
Uniform Interpretation of Uniform Law” 10 Scandinavian Studies in Law (1966), 219 et seq., in particular at 
234; 119; A. Malintoppi, “The Uniformity of Interpretation of International Conventions on Uniform Laws and 
of Standard Contracts”, in C. M. Schmitthoff (ed.), The Sources of the Laws of International Trade. With 
special reference to East-West Trade (London: Stevens & Sons, 1964), 127 et seq., at 128 et seq.).     
1317 I.e. the absence of uniformity, where uniformity is sought, and the misconstruction of foreign legal jargon 
terms, where a renvoi to foreign legal concepts is at stake. 
1318 The fact that a day-to-day language term (or a term of a different legal jargon in the same natural language) 
may be regarded as a proxy for a legal jargon term depends on various circumstances that have to be 
appreciated by the interpreter, the most important of which are the following: (i) the two terms are synonyms 
where used in the day-to-day language; (ii) the definition of the legal jargon term makes reference to (or use 
of) the other term; (iii) even where they are not synonyms, their related concepts may play the same function in 
the context where the treaty term is used and have a significant common group of denotata (and non-denotata). 
1319 Presidential Decree no. 917 of 22 December 1986. 
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income1320 is “redditi di lavoro dipendente”;1321 however, in Article 15 (or its equivalent) 
of many tax treaties concluded by Italy the expression “lavoro subordinato” is used 
instead of “lavoro dipendente”. Similarly, the legal jargon term used in the ITC to denote 
alienation is “cessione”;1322 however, in Article 13 (or equivalent) of many tax treaties 
concluded by Italy the term “alienazione” is used instead of “cessione”.  
The issue at stake here is twofold. 
On the one hand, the question may be raised of whether and on which basis the 
two terms might be regarded as proxies. In that respect, in footnote 1318 the author has 
mentioned some of the elements that could be taken into account by the interpreter in 
order to answer such a question. 
On the other hand, provided that the interpreter concludes that the two terms are 
proxies in the specific context, the issue must be tackled of whether such proximity is to 
be seen as evidence of the intention of the parties to attach to the treaty term the meaning 
of the corresponding legal jargon term, or, on the contrary, whether the use of a term 
different from the legal jargon term constitutes evidence of the parties’ intention not to 
rely on the legal jargon meaning. In order to solve such an issue, the interpreter may take 
into account other elements, such as how common the use of similar kinds of proxies in 
the treaty is, the reasonableness of the interpretations based on either solution, the 
existence of other possible reasons that could explain why a proxy, and not the legal 
jargon term, has been used and so forth.  
 
 
4.4.4. Whether domestic law assimilations should be taken into account for the 
purpose of interpretation  
 
An additional problem emerges with regard to cases of assimilation occurring in the 
legal jargon from which the treaty terms are derived.  
 By assimilation, the author intends to refer to instances where, for specific 
purposes, the denotata of a certain term (B) are treated as if they were (also) denoted by 
a different term (A).  
 The assimilation may take different forms. For instance, under the ITC the 
following assimilations take place, among other ones:  
                                                     
1320 Note that the sentence that the author has just written down is a tautology, since here “employment 
income” is nothing other that a different sign used to denote the same denotata of “the legal jargon term used in 
the Italian income tax code”, which in turn is used a perfect synonym of the following “redditi di lavoro 
dipendente”. There is no attempt to know what the concept associated with the term “employment income” is 
where the latter is used as English legal jargon term (if any); that would be useless for the purpose of the 
reasoning expressed by the sentence and, furthermore, by far too complicated.  
As previously noted, the same mental process usually occurs when an interpreter who has knowledge of the 
legal system, and related legal jargon, of a certain State (e.g. France) reads and attributes a meaning to a term 
of a different legal jargon (e.g. Japanese): the second terms is often treated as if it were an exact synonym of 
the former (just a different sign that denotes the same denotata of the former term). 
1321 SeeArticle. 49 et seq. ITC. 
1322 As of September 2010, the term “cessione” appears more than fifty times in the ITC; in contrast, the term 
“alienazione” is not used at all (its derived term “alienate” is employed just once). 
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(i) the tax law provisions dealing with “cessioni a titolo oneroso” (alienations 
against remuneration) of property also apply to “conferimenti in società” (capital 
contributions into companies);1323  
(ii) the “strumenti finanziari” (financial instruments) whose remuneration is 
totally represented by participation in the profits of the issuing company are 
deemed to be akin to “azioni” (shares);1324  
(iii) income derived by a company’s director, who, as such, is not an employee of 
that company for private law purposes, is (generally) assimilated to “redditi di 
lavoro dipendente” (income from employment).1325  
The existence of assimilations under the relevant domestic law may lead the interpreter 
to conclude that the above-mentioned treaty term (A) should be construed as if it denoted 
also the denotata of the legal jargon term (B), especially where the scope of the treaty 
significantly overlaps with the scope of the domestic provisions in relation to which the 
assimilation has been set up.  
 However, the opposite conclusion could be drawn as well. The interpreter, for 
instance, could argue that, since for the purpose of the domestic legal system a specific 
assimilation has been considered necessary in order to regard term (A) as denoting also 
the denotata of term (B), the absence of an equivalent assimilation, or specific definition, 
in the treaty would make it impossible to make a similar enlargement of the intension of 
term (A) in the treaty context. The interpreter could further uphold his position by 
drawing the distinction, which might be customary in the relevant national legal system, 
between cases of assimilation and cases of broad definition of terms.1326   
 
4.5. Conclusions on research questions h): the relevance of multijuralism for the 
interpretation of multilingual treaties 
 
The preliminary comment to be made, with regard to the impact of multijuralism on the 
interpretation of multilingual treaties, is that the presence of legal jargon terms in the 
authentic texts of a treaty does not change the goal of its interpreter, which remains 
establishing the utterance meaning of its provisions. 
 
                                                     
1323 See Article 9(5) ITC; therefore, each capital contribution transaction is treated, for Italian income tax 
purposes, as if it were an alienation against remuneration, although it is not directly denoted by the latter 
expression in the Italian tax legal jargon (and not denoted at all thereby in the Italian private and commercial 
legal jargon). 
1324 See Article 44(2) ITC. 
1325 See Article 50(1) ITC. 
1326 It might, however, be counter-argued that (i) the latter distinction is, from a treaty perspective, of a purely 
formal nature, since the function performed by those two different techniques (i.e. assimilation and broad 
definition) is substantially the same within the specific national legal system and the choice of one, instead of 
the other, has not been made by the legislator having the treaty scenario in mind and (ii) it is reasonable to 
imagine that the parties, when concluding the treaty, had clearly in mind that term (A), in the specific legal 
jargon, actually also denotes the denotata of term (B) and thus its inclusion in the treaty was intended to 
achieve the same result. 
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Similarly, the outcomes of the analysis carried out by the author in section 3 of this 
chapter are not fundamentally affected by the fact that the treaty terms to be construed 
are legal jargon terms. Therefore, the interpreter continues to be entitled to rely on any 
single authentic text, taken in isolation, for the purpose of interpreting the treaty, and he 
is required to remove the prima facie discrepancies in meaning by applying the rules of 
interpretation enshrined in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT and, where this proves 
unsuccessful, by adopting the meaning attributable to the prevailing text or, absent a 
prevailing text, the meaning which best reconciles the texts having regard to the object 
and purpose of the treaty.  
 
At a more in-depth level of analysis, however, the interaction between the multilingual 
nature of the treaty and the use therein of legal jargon terms may play a substantial role. 
 
First, the multilingual character of the treaty comes into play as an element that the 
interpreter may assess in order to establish how the parties intended to construe the legal 
jargon terms employed in the treaty. 
 In particular, where the treaty is authenticated in all the official languages of the 
contracting States and, due to its nature, it interacts strictly with the contracting States’ 
domestic laws, the interpreter could be led to conclude that the parties intended the legal 
jargon terms employed in the treaty to be attributed their technical meanings under the 
domestic law of the contracting State applying the treaty. In this case, in fact, the 
interpreter might regard the linguistic aspect so deeply intertwined with the legal 
characterization aspect, for the purpose of the treaty application, as to render such a 
solution almost unavoidable.1327  
 The treaty term expressed in the official language of the State applying the treaty, 
in this respect, would work as the key to unlock the door of the appropriate domestic law 
meaning, i.e. as a guide for the interpreter to select the domestic law meaning that the 
parties considered to best fit in the context of the relevant treaty provision. 
 
Second, the fact that the interpretation concerns legal jargon terms significantly 
influences the resolution by the interpreter of the prima facie discrepancies in meaning 
among the authentic treaty texts.  
 In fact, based on the assumption that the concepts underlying the legal jargon 
terms employed in one legal system do not normally have accurate equivalents in other 
                                                     
1327 Similarly, Fantozzi has pointed out, with reference to tax treaties (although his analysis applies well beyond 
such a narrow field), that there is an intrinsic difficulty in singling out “the “linguistic” issues relating to the 
interpretation of double tax conventions from the broader “classification” issues. The two concepts are deeply 
intertwined, and I therefore do not know if it is possible to define where the thin line that divides the two 
exactly lies. I find it rather easier to imagine them as two sides of the same coin. In the various hypotheses the 
interpreter/translator can be faced with, there is, in my view, always a part of each aspects. […] For the treaty 
to apply […] it is required that a treaty situation takes place. It is therefore required that the State which has to 
give up part of its power to tax recognizes the material event occurred in the other State, as represented by a 
legal concept. The definition of this legal concept involves issues of both kinds: linguistic and classification 
issues.” (A. Fantozzi, “Conclusions”, in G. Maisto (ed.), Multilingual Texts and Interpretation of Tax Treaties 
and EC Tax Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2005), 335 et seq., at 335-336).  
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legal systems, but just general correspondents (if any), i.e. concepts that fulfill similar 
functions within the respective legal systems and with which they share a considerable 
part of their prototypical denotata (and non-denotata),1328 the interpreter must not look 
for an exact equivalence, but just for a general correspondence among the domestic law 
concepts underlying the legal jargon terms used in the various authentic texts in order to 
establish that no discrepancy exists between such texts. 
 For instance, where a treaty concluded between Austria and Italy is authenticated 
in the German and Italian languages and employs the terms “Unternehmen” and 
“impresa”, the interpreter, in order to conclude that there is no discrepancy in meaning 
between those two terms, must be satisfied in ascertaining that the legal concepts 
underlying these two terms under Austrian and Italian domestic laws generally 
correspond with each other, in the sense that they fulfill similar functions within the 
respective legal systems1329 and share a substantial part of their prototypical denotata 
(and non-denotata).1330  The fact these two concepts do not perfectly overlap may not be 
considered significant in order to establish whether a discrepancy in meaning exists 
between the two texts. 
 
Once such a general correspondence has been established, any discrepancy in meaning 
bewteen the authentic treaty texts will no longer be considered to exist and the 
interpreter must proceed to determine the utterance meaning of the legal jargon treaty 
terms on the basis of either authentic text. 
 Thus, for instance, where the interpreter concludes that the parties intended to 
attribute a uniform and autonomous meaning to a certain legal jargon treaty term, he will 
construe such a term on the basis of the overall context and by taking into account the 
various corresponding concepts under the domestic laws of the contracting States. In the 
previous example, where the treaty was in force between Austria, Italy, France and 
Spain, the interpreter would consider, as part of the overall context, the domestic law 
meanings that the treaty terms “Unternehmen” and “impresa” and their corresponding 
terms “entreprise” and “empresa” have under Austrian, Italian, French, and Spanish 
domestic law, respectively.1331 The result of his interpretation, due to the loose relation 
existing between the autonomous treaty meaning and the corresponding domestic law 
meanings under the laws of the contracting States, will be regarded as a reasonable 
construction of any of the corresponding legal jargon terms employed in the authentic 
treaty texts. 
                                                     
1328 See the position expressed by the United States representative at the Vienna Conference with regard to the 
impossibility of reconciling the different authentic texts of a treaty where different systems of law were 
involved, due to the fact that often there is no legal concept in one system that exactly corresponds to a certain 
legal concept in the other system (UNCLT-1st,, p. 189, para. 41). See also, in this respect, the comment on Part 
III of the 1964 Draft made by the Yugoslavian government (YBILC 1966-II, p. 361). 
1329 E.g. both are used by the respective legal system in order to distinguish certain economic activities from 
others, in connection with bankruptcy procedures, the requirement to keep accounts, etc. 
1330 E.g. they both denote banking activities, insurance activities, sale and production of goods activities, 
certain activities in the provision of services, etc. 
1331 He could take into account as well the domestic law meanings of other corresponding terms under the laws 
of non-member States, as long as he can reasonably argue their relevance for his current analysis.  
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 Similarly, where the interpreter concludes that the parties intended to attribute to 
a certain legal jargon treaty term the meaning that it has under the substantive lex 
fori,1332 he will construe such a term in accordance with the domestic law meaning that it 
(or its corresponding term in the legal jargon of the State of the forum) has under the 
substantive lex fori. In the previous example, where the treaty in force between Austria, 
Italy, France, and Spain was to be interpreted by a French court, the interpreter would 
attribute to the treaty terms “Unternehmen” and “impresa” the meaning that the term 
“entreprise” has under French domestic law. The result of his interpretation, due to the 
loose correspondence required and expected between the domestic law meaning under 
the lex fori and the domestic law meaning under the laws of the other contracting States, 
will be regarded as a reasonable construction of any of the corresponding legal jargon 
terms employed in the authentic treaty texts. 
 
However, where the interpreter establishes that no general correspondence may be 
considered prima facie to exist among the legal jargon terms employed in the various 
authentic texts, e.g. because their underlying concepts under the relevant domestic laws 
do not fulfill similar functions and do not share any significant part of their prototypical 
denotata (and non-denotata), the interpreter must remove the consequent apparent 
discrepancy in meanings among the authentic treaty texts by applying the rules of 
interpretation enshrined in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT and, where this proves 
unsuccessful, by adopting the meaning attributable to the prevailing text or, absent a 
prevailing text, the meaning which best reconciles the texts having regard to the object 
and purpose of the treaty.1333 In the previous example, where the Italian authentic text of 
the treaty employed the term “attività economica” instead of “impresa”, the former 
having a much wider scope than the latter under Italian law, a prima facie discrepancy in 
meaning might be considered to exist between the Italian and the German authentic 
texts. An interpretation of those texts based on Articles 31 and 32 VCLT could then lead 
the interpreter to conclude that the general meaning underlying the treaty terms 
“Unternehmen” and “attività economica” is that characterizing the terms 
“Unternehmen”, “impresa” (and not “attività economica”), “entreprise” and “empresa” 
under Austrian, Italian French and Spanish domestic laws.  
 Once the prima facie discrepancy has been set aside and the general meaning 
underlying all legal jargon terms employed in the authentic treaty texts has been 
established, the more precise meaning that the parties intended to attach thereto (i.e. the 
utterance meaning) will be determined by the interpreter according to the circumstances.  
 For instance, where the interpreter concludes that the parties intended to attribute 
to a certain legal jargon treaty term the meaning that it has under the substantive lex 
fori,1334 he will construe such a term in accordance with the domestic law meaning that it 
(or its corresponding term in the legal jargon of the State fori) has under the substantive 
                                                     
1332 The same, however, holds true as well with regard to other types of renvoi. 
1333 See, although with specific regard to tax treaties, G. Gaja, “The perspective of international law”, in G. 
Maisto (ed.), Multilingual Texts and Interpretation of Tax Treaties and EC Tax Law (Amsterdam: IBFD 
Publications, 2005), 91 et seq., at 99-100. 
1334 The same, however, holds true as well with regard to other types of renvoi. 
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lex fori. In the previous example, where the treaty was to be interpreted by a French 
court, the interpreter would attribute to the treaty terms “Unternehmen” and “attività 
economica” the meaning that the term “entreprise” has under French domestic law. The 
result of his interpretation, due to the loose correspondence required and expected 
between the domestic law meaning under the lex fori and the domestic law meaning 
under the laws of the other contracting States, will be regarded as a reasonable 
construction of any of the corresponding legal jargon terms employed in the authentic 
treaty texts. 
 
Finally, whenever faced with the interpretation of a treaty term, the interpreter must 
assess, as illustrated in subsections 4.4.3 and 4.4.4 of this chapter, whether for the 
purpose of construing that term he should also take into account legal jargon proxies and 
assimilations under the relevant domestic law. 
 
The above conclusions are substantially in line with principle (ix) established by the 
author in section 2 of Chapter 3 of Part I. That principle highlights that, especially where 
the relevant treaty is authenticated in all the official languages of the contracting States, 
the question may arise of whether the parties intended the relevant terms used in the 
various authentic texts to be attributed a uniform meaning, or whether they intended each 
State to interpret those terms in accordance with the meaning that the term employed in 
the text authenticated in its own official language has under its domestic law.   
 According to principle (ix), the interpreter should first answer such a question on 
the basis of the treaty text(s) and the overall context and then determine the utterance 
meaning of the relevant treaty provision: 
(a) in case a uniform meaning was intended by the parties, by attributing a 
particular relevance to the overall context and to the prototypical items 
denoted by all, or most of, the terms employed in the various authentic texts; 
(b) in case a uniform meaning was not intended by the parties, by construing the 
treaty in accordance with the (national) meaning of the term used in the text 
authenticated in the official language of the State applying the treaty, 
provided that such term is similar to the (majority of the) terms used in the 
other authentic texts. Where the test of similarity fails, the reasonable 
suspicion may arise that the parties did not intend the relevant treaty 
provision to be construed in accordance with the (national) meaning of that 
term.  
For the purpose of such a comparison, two terms, construed in accordance with their 
respective national meanings, may be considered similar:  
(i) when they share most of their prototypes, or  
(ii) in the case their prototypes are limited to a few or do not coincide, when most 
of the features (including their function in the relevant field of knowledge) 
that characterize such prototypes coincide or, at least, present strong 
similarities.  
What constitutes the majority of the respective prototypes and their distinctive features, 
which have to be taken into account for the purpose of assessing the similarity, cannot be 
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said in vacuo. The answer to that question depends upon:  
(a) the nature of and the functions performed by the concepts underlying those 
terms;  
(b) the overall context in which those terms are used (in particular the object and 
purpose of the provision containing those terms). 
 
5. Significant principles and maxims of interpretation applied by international 
tribunals: interactions with the rules of Article 33 VCLT 
 
The author has already mentioned that the ILC decided to codify only “the 
comparatively few general principles [that appeared] to constitute general rules for the 
interpretation of treaties”,1335 leaving the interpreter the freedom to apply the other other 
principles and maxims suitable for use in the particular case at stake. As the ILC pointed 
out, such principles and maxims “are, for the most part, principles of logic and good 
sense valuable only as guides to assist in appreciating the meaning which the parties may 
have intended to attach to the expressions that they employed in a document. Their 
suitability for use in any given case hinges on a variety of considerations which have 
first to be appreciated by the interpreter of the document; the particular arrangement of 
the words and sentences, their relation to each other and to other parts of the document, 
the general nature and subject-matter of the document, the circumstances in which it was 
drawn up, etc. Even when a possible occasion for their application may appear to exist, 
their application is not automatic but depends on the conviction of the interpreter that it 
is appropriate in the particular circumstances of the case.”1336 
 
An analysis of the case law of the ICJ (and, previously, of the PCIJ), of the decisions of 
national and international courts and tribunals, as well as the scrutiny of the positions 
expressed by scholars in the field of public international law, show the existence of a 
significant number of other principles and maxims occasionally referred to in connection 
with the interpretation of multilingual treaties. The following is deemed to be an 
extensive, although not complete, list of these principles and maxims:1337 
  
(i) Preference for the authentic texts with a clear meaning over those with unclear 
meanings1338 
                                                     
1335 See paragraph 5 of the Commentary to Articles 27 and 28 of the 1966 Draft (YBILC 1966-II, pp. 218-219, 
para. 5).  
1336 See paragraph 4 of the Commentary to Articles 27 and 28 of the 1966 Draft (YBILC 1966-II, p. 218, para. 
4). 
1337 The author has maintened as much as possible, in such a list, the wording used by courts, tribunals and 
legal scholars; in particular, it may be noted that the following principles and maxims often make reference to 
the treaty “texts”, although, for the reasons put forward in the present study, reference to the “meanings” of 
such texts should have been made in some cases.  
1338 Explicitly rejected by the ILC as a general principle to be codified. See paragraph 9 of the Commentary to 
Article 29 of the 1966 Draft (YBILC 1966-II, p. 226, para. 9). See also J. Hardy, “The Interpretation of 
Plurilingual Treaties by International Courts and Tribunals”, 37 British Yearbook of International Law (1961), 
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(ii) Preference for the drafted text(s)1339 
  
(iii) Comparison (from the outset) of the various authentic texts1340 
  
(iv) Subjective interpretation of the treaty (i.e. interpretation of the treaty mainly based 
on the intention of the parties as a subjective element distinct from the text)1341  
 
(v) The maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat and the principle of effectiveness. In the 
case of a prima facie divergence among the authentic treaty texts, this maxim would 
imply that the text(s) whose meaning makes a treaty provision have a certain effect 
should be preferred over those texts whose meanings make the same provision 
ineffective, or meaningless (the effectiveness being assessed in light of the object and 
purpose of the treaty)1342   
 
(vi) Preference for the text that best harmonizes the treaty with the relevant rules of 
                                                                                                                                  
72 et seq., at 87-92; M. S. McDougal et al., The Interpretation of Agreements and World Public Order. 
Principles of Content and Procedure (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), pp. 7-8, 11, 82, 328; J. M. 
Mössner, “Die Auslegung mehrsprachiger Staatsverträge, Bemerkungen zu Artikel 33 der Wiener Konvention 
über das Recht der Verträge vom 23. Mai 1969”, 15 Archiv des Völkerrechts (1972), 273 et seq., at 285-286; 
W. Rudolf, Die Spreche in der Diplomatie und internationalen Verträgen (Frankfurt: Athenäum Verlag, 1972), 
p. 70; M. Hilf, Die Auslegung mehrsprachiger Verträge. Eine Untersuchung zum Völkerrecht und zum 
Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1973), pp. 94-95. 
1339 See section 3.2.3 of this chapter; see also A. D. McNair, The Law of Treaties (Oxford; The Clarendon 
Press,1961), p. 434; J. Hardy, “The Interpretation of Plurilingual Treaties by International Courts and 
Tribunals”, 37 British Yearbook of International Law (1961), 72 et seq., at 98-105; A. Verdross et al., 
Völkerrecht (Vienna: Springer-Verlag, 1964), p. 174; M. S. McDougal et al., The Interpretation of Agreements 
and World Public Order. Principles of Content and Procedure (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), pp. 
326-327; P. Germer, “Interpretation of Plurilingual Treaties: A Study of Article 33 of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties”, 11 Harvard International Law Journal (1970), 400 et seq., at 418 et seq.; J. M. 
Mössner, “Die Auslegung mehrsprachiger Staatsverträge, Bemerkungen zu Artikel 33 der Wiener Konvention 
über das Recht der Verträge vom 23. Mai 1969”, 15 Archiv des Völkerrechts (1972), 273 et seq., at 288-289; 
M. Hilf, Die Auslegung mehrsprachiger Verträge. Eine Untersuchung zum Völkerrecht und zum Staatsrecht 
der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1973), pp. 65-69, 88-94. 
1340 See section 3.3 of this chapter. 
1341 On the relevance of such a principle with reference to the interpretation of multilingual treaties, see the 
Commentary to the Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties with Comments, prepared by the Research in 
International Law (see Research in International Law, “Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties with 
Comments”, 29 American Journal of International Law - Supplement (1935), 653 et seq., at 971); M. S. 
McDougal et al., The Interpretation of Agreements and World Public Order. Principles of Content and 
Procedure (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), pp. 82-83; H. Lauterpacht, “Restrictive Interpretation 
and the Principle of Effectiveness in the Interpretation of Treaties”, 26 British Yearbook of International Law 
(1949), 48 et seq., at 76; C. Parry, “The Law of Treaties”, in M. Sørensen (ed.), Manual of Public International 
Law (London: Macmillan, 1968), 175 et seq., at 214.    
1342 See R. Jennings and A. Watts (eds.), Oppenheim’s International Law. Volume I. Peace (London: Longman, 
1992), pp. 1280-1281. It must be noted that the ILC considered that such principle(s), insofar it reflected a true 
general rule of interpretation, was already embodied in the provision of (now) Article 31(1) VCLT, which 
requires a treaty to be interpreted in good faith and in light of its object and purpose (see YBILC 1966-II, p. 
225, para. 7). 
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international law applicable in the relation between the parties1343 
 
(vii) Preference for the narrowest authentic text1344 
 
(viii) Interpretation contra proferentem, according to which the authentic text whose 
meaning is least to the advantage of the party which proposed and first prepared the 
provision, or for the benefit of which the provision was inserted in the treaty, should be 
preferred1345  
 
(ix) Preference for the authentic text in the language used in the proceedings before the 
court or tribunal1346  
 
(x) Preference for the authentic text in the official language of the party to which the 
disputed provision refers1347  
 
(xi) Preference for the authentic text in the official language of the obligated party, or for 
the authentic text that the obligated party has ratified1348 
                                                     
1343 See F. Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 
2004), p. 408.  
1344 See J. Hardy, “The Interpretation of Plurilingual Treaties by International Courts and Tribunals”, 37 British 
Yearbook of International Law (1961), 72 et seq., at 76-81; R. Bernhardt, “Interpretation and Implied (Tacit) 
Modification of Treaties. Comments on Arts. 27, 28, 29 and 38 of the ILC’s 1966 Draft Articles on the Law of 
Treaties”, 27 Zeitschrift für Ausländisches Öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (1967), 491 et seq., at 505; M. 
S. McDougal et al., The Interpretation of Agreements and World Public Order. Principles of Content and 
Procedure (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), p. 325 and references in footnotes 157-159; J. M. 
Mössner, “Die Auslegung mehrsprachiger Staatsverträge, Bemerkungen zu Artikel 33 der Wiener Konvention 
über das Recht der Verträge vom 23. Mai 1969”, 15 Archiv des Völkerrechts (1972), 273 et seq., at 287-288; 
M. Hilf, Die Auslegung mehrsprachiger Verträge. Eine Untersuchung zum Völkerrecht und zum Staatsrecht 
der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1973), pp. 63-65. For instance, in his separate 
opinion in the Western Sahara case, Judge Ammoun stated that he could not reject the contention, put forward 
by Marocco, in favour of the authentic text with the narrower meaning, since it was based on settled case law 
(see ICJ, 16 October 1975, Western Sahara, advisory opinion, Judge Ammoun’s separate opinion, p. 88). 
1345 See, among others, M. Hilf, Die Auslegung mehrsprachiger Verträge. Eine Untersuchung zum Völkerrecht 
und zum Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1973), pp. 99-100; D. P. 
O’Connell, International Law (London: Stevens & Sons, 1970), p. 257; R. Jennings and A. Watts (eds.), 
Oppenheim’s International Law. Volume I. Peace (London: Longman, 1992), p. 1279 and footnotes therein. 
1346 See J. Hardy, “The Interpretation of Plurilingual Treaties by International Courts and Tribunals”, 37 British 
Yearbook of International Law (1961), 72 et seq., at 152.  
1347 See J. Hardy, “The Interpretation of Plurilingual Treaties by International Courts and Tribunals”, 37 British 
Yearbook of International Law (1961), 72 et seq., at 152. 
1348 See A. Rivier, Principes du droit des gens. Tome II (Paris: Arthur Rousseau, 1896), p. 122; J. Hardy, “The 
Interpretation of Plurilingual Treaties by International Courts and Tribunals”, 37 British Yearbook of 
International Law (1961), 72 et seq., at 113-115; M. S. McDougal et al., The Interpretation of Agreements and 
World Public Order. Principles of Content and Procedure (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), pp. 327-
329; D. P. O’Connell, International Law (London: Stevens & Sons, 1970), p. 256 and n. 69; J. M. Mössner, 
“Die Auslegung mehrsprachiger Staatsverträge, Bemerkungen zu Artikel 33 der Wiener Konvention über das 
Recht der Verträge vom 23. Mai 1969”, 15 Archiv des Völkerrechts (1972), 273 et seq., at 284-285; M. Hilf, 
Die Auslegung mehrsprachiger Verträge. Eine Untersuchung zum Völkerrecht und zum Staatsrecht der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1973), pp. 95-99. This principle appears strictly 
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(xii) The maxim in dubio mitius, according to which the authentic texts whose meaning 
is less onerous to the party assuming an obligation, or imposes the fewest restrictions on 
the (sovereign) parties, should be preferred1349 
 
(xiii) Preference for the authentic text that best balances the rights and obligations of the 
parties1350  
 
(xiv) Recourse to non-authentic versions1351  
 
(xv) Preference for the authentic texts with an unambiguous meaning, which is also one 
of the meanings of the other ambiguous texts1352  
 
(xvi) A combination of several of the above principles. 
 
The most interesting question, with regard to such principles and maxims, concerns their 
status as principles of international law (if any) and their relation to the rules expressed 
by Articles 31-33 VCLT.  
 Some of them, in particular no. (i), (v), (vi) and (xv), might qualify (in the future) 
as “international customs” or “general principles of law” and could be regarded as 
principles expressed by “judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified 
publicists of the various nations” under Article 38 of the ICJ Statute.1353 
                                                                                                                                  
connected to the the other principle according to which each party is bound only by the authentic text drawn up 
in its own official language (see J. Hardy, “The Interpretation of Plurilingual Treaties by International Courts 
and Tribunals”, 37 British Yearbook of International Law (1961), 72 et seq., at 76-81; J. M. Mössner, “Die 
Auslegung mehrsprachiger Staatsverträge, Bemerkungen zu Artikel 33 der Wiener Konvention über das Recht 
der Verträge vom 23. Mai 1969”, 15 Archiv des Völkerrechts (1972), 273 et seq., at 288-289; M. Hilf, Die 
Auslegung mehrsprachiger Verträge. Eine Untersuchung zum Völkerrecht und zum Staatsrecht der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1973), pp. 55 et seq.; D. P. O’Connell, International 
Law (London: Stevens & Sons, 1970), p. 258; M. Tabory, Multilingualism In International Law and 
Institutions (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1980), p. 223, note 86). 
1349 See R. Jennings and A. Watts (eds.), Oppenheim’s International Law. Volume I. Peace (London: Longman, 
1992), pp. 1278-1279 and the case law cited in the footnote therein. The Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions 
case (PCIJ, 30 August 1924, The Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. Britain), judgment) could 
also be seen as an instance of application of the maxim in dubio mitius, although, as clearly pointed out by 
Jennings and Watts, the application of such a maxim in that case could be better regarded as flowing from the 
general nature of the treaty rather than as a consequence of its multilingual character (see R. Jennings and A. 
Watts (eds.), Oppenheim’s International Law. Volume I. Peace (London: Longman, 1992), p. 1284, note 5). 
1350 See F. Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 
2004), p. 408. 
1351 On the possibility and relevance of using non-authentic version for the purpose of interpreting multilingual 
treaties, see section 3.2.4 of this chapter See also J. Hardy, “The Interpretation of Plurilingual Treaties by 
International Courts and Tribunals”, 37 British Yearbook of International Law (1961), 72 et seq., at 123-138 
and 153-154; M. Hilf, Die Auslegung mehrsprachiger Verträge. Eine Untersuchung zum Völkerrecht und zum 
Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1973), pp. 103-115. 
1352 See section 3.4.4 of this chapter. 
1353 See, in this sense, M. Tabory, Multilingualism In International Law and Institutions (Alphen aan den Rijn: 
Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1980), p. 207. 
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 In any event, although scholars’ positions vary greatly with regard to the actual 
relevance and status of such principles and maxims,1354 it seems that their reasonable use 
in practice should be limited to assisting the interpreter in establishing and arguing for 
the utterance meaning of the treaty provisions where the overall context appears to 
support their relevance.1355 
 In contrast, these principles and maxims cannot be “automatically” applied by the 
interpreter in order to resolve prima facie divergences between the various authentic 
texts, since such a use would conflict with both (i) the principle that, as far as possible, 
the meaning common to all authentic texts is to be determined by applying the rules of 
interpretation enshrined in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT,1356 and (ii) the principle that, when 
this is not possible, the meaning which best reconciles the texts, having regard to the 
object and purpose of the treaty, is to be adopted.1357 Some of them1358 may provide the 
interpreter with a reasonable solution, in light of the overall context, for the purpose of 
determining the common meaning of the various authentic texts on the basis of the 
interpretative rules enshrined in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT and, to a lesser extent, in order 
to adopt the meaning which best reconciles the various authentic texts, having regard to 
the object and purpose of the treaty. In these cases, however, the recourse to such 
principles and maxims appears supported not so much by their previous, more or less 
recurrent, use by courts and tribunals, nor by the fact that they have been upheld by well-
known scholars, but simply by the fact that their application provides a logical and fair 
solution of the interpretative issue at stake, within the framework of the VCLT. As put 
by Germer, the specific principles for the interpretation of multilingual treaties that have 
been proposed from time to time are nothing but an application of the standard rules of 
treaty interpretation enshrined in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT with a special view to the 
                                                     
1354 See S. Sur, L'interprétation en droit international public (Paris: Librairie générale de droit et de 
jurisprudence, 1974), pp. 283-285; J. M. Mössner, “Die Auslegung mehrsprachiger Staatsverträge, 
Bemerkungen zu Artikel 33 der Wiener Konvention über das Recht der Verträge vom 23. Mai 1969”, 15 
Archiv des Völkerrechts (1972), 273 et seq., at 279; M. Hilf, Die Auslegung mehrsprachiger Verträge. Eine 
Untersuchung zum Völkerrecht und zum Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 
1973), p. 101; D. P. O’Connell, International Law (London: Stevens & Sons, 1970), p. 253; M. S. McDougal 
et al., The Interpretation of Agreements and World Public Order. Principles of Content and Procedure (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), p. 104; M. Tabory, Multilingualism In International Law and Institutions 
(Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1980), p. 207; L. Ehrlich, “L’interprétation des traités”, 24 
RCADI (1928), 5 et seq., at 99-100; H. Kelsen (revised and edited by R. W. Tucker), Principles of 
International Law (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966), pp. 459-460. 
1355 See, in this respect, YBILC 1966-II, p. 218, para. 4, and p. 226, para. 9; see also M. Tabory, 
Multilingualism In International Law and Institutions (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1980), p. 
208, where the author pointed out that the VCLT avoids clearly dividing the principles and maxims that 
constitute customary international law, whose application (compulsory, unless a different agreement between 
the parties exists) is regulated by the VCLT Preamble, from those principles and maxims that just represent 
judicial practice, whose (non-compulsory) application is delineated in the VCLT Commentary.  
1356 Which, in turn, do not provide for any automatic rule for the solution of potential divergences of meanings. 
1357 See, similarly, F. Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law (Amsterdam: IBFD 
Publications, 2004), p. 408, who mentions as support for this argument the decision of the ILC not to include 
among the general rules for the interpretation of multilingual treaties the rules set out in paragraphs 3 and 4 of 
Article 75 of Sir Humphrey Waldock’s Third Report on the Law of Treaties (see sections 2.1 and 2.2 of this 
chapter). 
1358 In particular nos. (i), (ii), (iv), (v), (vi), (xii), (xiii), (xiv), (xv) and (xvi). 
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concrete problems of interpretation with which the interpreter had been confronted.1359 
 
Finally, it has been maintained that most of such principles and maxims would constitute 
supplementary means of interpretations under Article 32 VCLT.1360  
 The author submits that this characterization should be rejected.1361 In fact, the 
means of interpretation referred to by Article 32 VCLT are acts, facts and circumstances 
that may be appreciated as items of evidence of the common intention of the parties and, 
therefore, as elements from which it is possible to infer the utterance meaning of the 
treaty. The above-mentioned principles and maxims, in contrast, are not elements on the 
basis of which the possible common intention of the parties can be determined, but paths 
that the inferential process of interpretation could follow, in order to determine the 
utterance meaning of the treaty, starting from the elements available (acts, facts and 




The main goal achieved by the VCLT, in respect of the interpretation of multilingual 
treaties, is the codification of the fundamental principles to be followed by the 
interpreter, about which some uncertainty existed before.1362 
  
The analysis carried out by the author has highlighted the heterogeneous nature of the 
provisions encompassed in Article 33 VCLT and the ontological differences between 
these and the provisions of Articles 31 and 32 VCLT. While the latter, for the most part, 
are limited to pointing out which elements and items of evidence are to be taken into 
account for the purpose of treaty interpretation and to illustrating the different weights 
that the interpreter should typically attribute thereto due to their different intrinsic 
attitudes toward conveying the final agreement of the parties, the provisions of Article 
33 VCLT perform different tasks.  
 On the one hand, the provisions of the first two paragraphs of Article 33 VCLT 
establish the rules of legal effectiveness of the treaty language versions. Thus, they are 
not actually concerned with treaty interpretation, but constitute a logical prerequisite to 
                                                     
1359 See P. Germer, “Interpretation of Plurilingual Treaties: A Study of Article 33 of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties”, 11 Harvard International Law Journal (1970), 400 et seq., at 427. 
1360 See M. Hilf, Die Auslegung mehrsprachiger Verträge. Eine Untersuchung zum Völkerrecht und zum 
Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1973), pp. 100-101. 
1361 See, accordingly, F. Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law (Amsterdam: IBFD 
Publications, 2004), pp. 410-411 and P. Germer, “Interpretation of Plurilingual Treaties: A Study of Article 33 
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties”, 11 Harvard International Law Journal (1970), 400 et seq., 
at 427. 
1362 For instance, Liang, in an article published in 1953, wondered whether, with regard to a treaty concluded 
under the auspices of the United Nations, whose provisions had been originally drafted in one language and 
then officially translated into the other United Nations official langages, all five texts should have been 
considered “equally authentic” in the absence of any specific provision in this respect (see Y-L. Liang, “The 
Question of Revision of a Multilingual Treaty Text”, 47 American Journal of International Law (1953), 263 et 
seq., at 264). 
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such an activity, since they provide the rules for determining which texts must be 
interpreted and which (language) versions, in contrast, may be taken into account only as 
additional elements to corroborate the utterance meaning of the treaty text(s).  
 On the other hand, the last two paragraphs of Article 33 VCLT establish two 
proper rules of interpretation,1363 which cannot be entirely inferred either from Articles 
31 and 32 VCLT, or from the first two paragraphs of Article 33 VCLT:  
(i) Article 33(3) VCLT establishes that all authentic texts always have the same 
meaning and that the interpreter may, unless a prima facie discrepancy between 
different authentic texts is pointed out, rely autonomously on any of those 
authentic texts in order to construe the treaty;  
(ii) Article 33(4) VCLT provides that prima facie discrepancies among the 
various authentic texts must be removed by applying the rules of interpretation 
enshrined in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT and that, where such a procedure does not 
succeed, the interpreter has to adopt either the meaning attributable to the 
prevailing text, or, in the absence of a prevailing text, the meaning that best 
reconciles the authentic texts, having regard to the object and purpose of the 
treaty.  
 
With regard to the (proper) rules of interpretation established by Article 33 VCLT, as 
previously noted, some scholars have criticized the choice of the ILC and the Vienna 
Conference not to insert clear and firm guidelines for the solution of issues concerning 
the interpretation of multilingual treaties.  
 Germer, for instance, stated that, although the last clause of Article 33(4) VCLT 
directs the interpreter to adopt the meaning which best reconciles the authentic texts in 
light of the object and purpose of the treaty, the very same provision fails to specify the 
precise method by which this meaning is to be found.1364 
 After an extensive review of the literature on the interpretation of multilingual 
treaties, Tabory submitted that the “absence of sufficiently firm guidelines to overcome 
problems involved in multilingual interpretation is widely noted in the literature”.1365 
Tabory also affirmed that the “elusive” solution adopted by the Vienna Conference and 
based on the reconciliation of the texts in light of the object and purpose of the treaty did 
not clarify whether the meaning to be finally adopted was to be arrived at by pushing or 
stretching the meaning in one text as far as possible towards the other, or by finding the 
midpoint between them, or by reducing the meaning in both texts to the lowest possible 
common denominator. However, she recognized that the individual circumstances of the 
                                                     
1363 I.e. rules that are not limited to highlighting which elements and items of evidence are to be taken into 
account for the purpose of treaty interpretation and to illustrating the different weights that the interpreter 
should typically attribute thereto, but which prescribe, under certain conditions, the meaning that must be 
attributed to the authentic treaty texts. 
1364 See P. Germer, “Interpretation of Plurilingual Treaties: A Study of Article 33 of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties”, 11 Harvard International Law Journal (1970), 400 et seq., at 403; similarly, J. M. 
Mössner, “Die Auslegung mehrsprachiger Staatsverträge, Bemerkungen zu Artikel 33 der Wiener Konvention 
über das Recht der Verträge vom 23. Mai 1969”, 15 Archiv des Völkerrechts (1972), 273 et seq., at 302. 
1365 See M. Tabory, Multilingualism In International Law and Institutions (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & 
Noordhoff, 1980), p. 215. 
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case, as well as the object and purpose of the treaty, no doubt provide the interpreter with 
some guidance in that respect.1366  
 O’Connell, discussing the whole set of rules on treaty interpretation enshrined in 
Articles 31-33 VCLT, asserted that such articles “have the effect of transforming logical 
positions into rules of law. However, the priorities inherent in the application of these 
rules are not clearly indicated, and the rules themselves are in part so general that it is 
necessary to review traditional methods whenever interpreting a treaty. […] More 
controversy is likely to be aroused by them than allayed.”1367 
 
Such criticisms, however, fail to appreciate that the process of interpretation of 
multilingual treaties, as any other process of meaning attribution to signs, is a cognitive 
process based on the triangular interaction between the speaker (contracting States), the 
hearer (interpreter) and the utterance (treaty texts); and, as any other cognitive process, it 
cannot be imprisoned in a jail of strict, compulsory rules to be followed, since it is based 
on intuition and logic, both having their own necessary role in the process of 
interpretation and both being inherently refractory to a priori external restrictions. In this 
respect, as Poincaré put it, logic and intuition are both “indispensable. Logic, which 
alone can give certainty, is the instrument of demonstration; intuition is the instrument of 
invention.”1368 
 Thus, the author agrees with Rosenne who, with regard to (multilingual) treaty 
interpretation, acknowledged that the most the law can do is “to indicate in general 
terms […] the nature of the rules governing the process by which this art [ed.’s note: of 
interpretation] is applied in a concrete case, the kind of intellectual discipline with which 
the interpreter must gird himself.”1369 
 That is exactly what Article 33 VCLT does: drawing a framework of basic 
principles within which the interpreter may exercise his discretionary judgment in order 
to determine the utterance meaning of the treaty in light of the overall context.1370   
 
In this respect, the comparison between the outcomes of the semantics-based normative 
analysis carried out in Part I and the results of the positive analysis on how scholars, 
courts and tribunals have construed and applied Articles 31-33 VCLT, carried out in this 
                                                     
1366 See M. Tabory, Multilingualism In International Law and Institutions (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & 
Noordhoff, 1980), p. 213. 
1367 See D. P. O’Connell, International Law (London: Stevens & Sons, 1970), p. 253.  
1368 See H. Poincaré (translated by G.B. Halstead), The Foundations of Science: Science and Hypothesis, The 
Value of Science, Science and Methods (Lancaster: The Science Press, 1946), p. 219. 
1369 See S. Rosenne, “On Multilingual Interpretation”, in S. Rosenne, Essays on International Law and Practice 
(Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff  Publisher, 2007), 449 et seq., at 454.  
1370 See, in this sense, M. Tabory, Multilingualism In International Law and Institutions (Alphen aan den Rijn: 
Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1980), p. 218; similarly, Germer, according to whom the VCLT “does not set forth a 
rigid formula for the interpretation of plurilingual treaties, but adheres to the idea that whether the obscurity is 
found in all the texts or arises from the plurilingual form of the treaty, the first rule for the interpreter is to look 
for the meaning intended by the parties to be attached to the term by applying the standard rules for the 
interpretation of treaties” (see P. Germer, “Interpretation of Plurilingual Treaties: A Study of Article 33 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties”, 11 Harvard International Law Journal (1970), 400 et seq., at 
426).  
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and the previous chapter, has shown that, within the general guidelines on the 
interpretation of multilingual treaties set forth in the VCLT, the interpreter may often 
find an appropriate compass in the teachings of modern semantics, whose applications in 
the field of (multilingual) treaty interpretation have been inferred and arranged in the 
form of fundamental principles of interpretation by the author in sections 1 and 2 of 
Chapter 3 of Part I. 
 





CHAPTER 5 – INTERPRETATION OF MULTILINGUAL TAX TREATIES  
 
1. Prolegomenon 
1.1. Research questions addressed in this chapter 
 
As outlined in the introduction, some interpretative issues exist that specifically relate to 
multilingual tax treaties,1371 due to the following idiosyncratic features thereof:  
(i) most tax treaties are based on the OECD Model,1372 which is officially drafted 
only in the English and French languages; 
(ii) the OECD Model comes with a commentary (the OECD Commentary) intended 
to explain, sometimes in great detail, the purpose and the application of the rules 
expressed by means of the model articles; the OECD Commentary is also 
officially drafted only in the English and French languages; 
(iii) most tax treaties include a rule of interpretation providing that each undefined 
treaty term must be given the meaning it has under the law of the contracting 
State applying the treaty, unless the context otherwise requires. 
 
The present chapter is primarily aimed at examining such specific issues, which may be 
expressed by means of the following research questions: 
 
a) What is the relevance of the OECD Model official versions for the purpose of 
interpreting multilingual tax treaties (either authenticated also in English and/or 
French, or authenticated in neither of these languages) and monolingual tax 
treaties authenticated neither in English nor in French? 
 
b) What is the relevance of the OECD Commentary for the purpose of interpreting 
multilingual tax treaties? 
 
c) With regard to the relevance of Article 3(2) of OECD Model-based multilingual tax 
treaties for the purpose of their interpretation:  
 
(i) Does Article 3(2) have an impact on the nature of the potential discrepancies 
in meanings among the authentic texts of a multilingual tax treaty? Where this 
question is answered in the affirmative, which are the various types of prima 
facie discrepancies that may arise? Should the interpreter put all of them on 
                                                     
1371 Or other types of treaties that present similar features, e.g. bilateral treaties concerning estate, inheritance 
and gift taxes. 
1372 Or on other models (such as national models, or the United Nations Model, which in turn are based to a 
large extent on the OECD Model). 
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the same footing for the purpose of interpreting multilingual tax treaties?  
 
(ii) Is there any obligation for the interpreter to reconcile (at least to a certain 
extent) the prima facie divergent authentic texts of an OECD Model-based tax 
treaty? 
 
(iii) If the previous question is answered in the affirmative, to what extent must the 
differences of meaning deriving from the attribution of the domestic law 
meanings to the corresponding legal jargon terms used in the various 
authentic texts be removed (e.g. in accordance with Article 33(4) VCLT) and, 
instead, to what extent must such differences be preserved in accordance with 
Article 3(2)?  
 
(iv) What is the relevance of Article 3(2) for the purpose of resolving the prima 
facie discrepancies in meaning among the various authentic texts, where the 
treaty’s final clause provides that a certain authentic text is to prevail in the 
case of divergences? 
 
Other interpretative issues, generally concerning multilingual treaties, have been already 
analysed in section 3 of Chapter 4 of Part II and, due to the fact that they arise without 
any relevant distinction in connection with both multilingual tax treaties and other 
multilingual treaties, the author will not examine them again in this chapter.  
 
1.2. The need to distinguish between interpretation of legal jargon terms and 
interpretation of other terms included in (multilingual) tax treaties 
 
A necessary preamble when one is going to deal with tax treaty interpretation concerns 
the possible categorization of treaty terms for the purpose of their construction.1373  
Such a categorization has the pragmatic function of directing the interpreter 
towards the appropriate elements and items of evidence that should be taken into account 
for the purpose of attributing a meaning to the relevant treaty terms and arguing in favor 
of such an interpretation. The need for this direction derives from the presence, in OECD 
Model-based tax treaties, of the special rule of interpretation encompassed in Article 
3(2).  
                                                     
1373 It is outside the scope of this section to deal with the interpretative issues stemming from the construction 
of multilingual domestic (tax) law, in particular multilingual (tax) statutes; on such issues see, among many, G. 
Maisto (ed.), Multilingual Texts and Interpretation of Tax Treaties and EC Tax Law (Amsterdam: IBFD 
Publications, 2005); V. K. Bhatia et al. (eds.), Multilingual and Multicultural Contexts of Legislation 
(Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2003); P. Salembier, “Rethinking the Interpretation of Bilingual Legislation: the 
Demise of the Shared Meaning Rule”, 35 Ottawa Law Review (2003-2004), 75 et seq.; J. Vanderlinden, 
“Langue et Droit (Belgique et Canada)”, in E. Jayme (ed.), Langue et Droit. XV Congrès International de 
Droit Comparé. Bristol 1998 (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 1999), 65 et seq.; P. Viau, “Quelques considérations sur la 
langue, le droit, le bilinguisme et le bijuridisme au Canada”, in E. Jayme (ed.), Langue et Droit. XV Congrès 
International de Droit Comparé. Bristol 1998 (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 1999), 141 et seq. 




In that respect, one may first distinguish between defined and undefined treaty terms.  
 The former must be generally attributed the meaning that their definitions are 
purported to enlighten.1374 The latter, in contrast, are theoretically subject to the 
interpretative rule provided for in Article 3(2).1375 It is worth noting that, ironically, the 
terms used in the definitions of defined terms are generally not themselves defined in the 
treaty, thus being possibly subject as well to the interpretative rule provided for in 
Article 3(2). 
 Undefined terms, in turn, may be divided in legal jargon terms and non-legal 
jargon terms. The former are those terms that are attributed a specific legal jargon 
meaning under the law of the State applying the tax treaty.1376 The latter are the 
remainder.1377 In order to categorize a term as an undefined non-legal jargon term, it is 
irrelevant whether such term is attributed a legal jargon meaning under international law 
or under the law of the other contracting State. For instance, the term used in the 
Japanese authentic text of Article 16 of the 1971 Japan-United States tax treaty and 
corresponding to the term “capital assets” employed in the English authentic text of the 
                                                     
1374 As more extensively discussed infra, tax treaties often explicitly subordinate the attribution to defined 
terms of the meaning provided for by the relevant definition to the fact that the context does not require 
otherwise (see Article 3(1) OECD Model). Even where such an explicit condition is not spelt out in the treaty 
text, one might wonder whether, in extreme cases, the overall context and, in particular, good faith (honesty, 
fairness, reasonableness and trustworthiness) could require a different meaning to be attributed to a defined 
term. 
1375 As rightly pointed out by Gibson L.J. in the Memec case, the expression “any term not defined’” found in 
Article 3(2) OECD Model should be read as "any term not relevantly defined’’ (see Court of Appeal of 
England and Wales (United Kingdom), 9 June 1998, Memec Plc v. IRC, 1 ITLR, 3 et seq., at 21 per Gibson 
L.J.). The question at stake in the Memec case concerned whether the absence of a definition of the term 
“dividends” in Article XVIII of the 1964 Germany-United Kingdom tax treaty, as modified by the 1970 
protocol, signified that the term “dividends” in that article was to be construed as having the same meaning 
expressed by the definition found in Article VI(4) of the treaty, or as having the meaning indicated by Article 
II(3) thereof, which allowed the domestic law of the United Kingdom to determine it. Gibson L.J, in that 
respect, accepted the submission of one party to the dispute, not challenged by the other, that the words of 
Article II(3), “any term not otherwise defined’’, meant "any term not otherwise relevantly defined’’. According 
to Gibson L.J. “[a]rticle VI(4) commences with the words "The term ‘dividends’ as used in this article 
means...’’. The fact that the definition is not included in Article II as a general definition supports the view that 
the draftsman did not intend the Article VI(4) definition to apply whenever "dividends’’ is found in the 
Convention. That view is strengthened by the fact that Article VI(4) was substituted by the 1970 Convention at 
the very same time that Article XVIII was substituted, and it would be very surprising if the draftsman had 
intended the Article VI(4) definition to apply to Article XVIII not merely without saying so but whilst 
qualifying the scope of the application of Article VI(4) in the way I have indicated. Moreover where a term 
defined only in a distributive article is to have the same meaning in another but not every article, the draftsman 
has taken care to say so (see Articles XII(2), VIII(1) (substituted by the 1970 Protocol) and XVI(1)”. 
1376 Such terms, or the corresponding terms in the other authentic texts of the tax treaty, may be attributed no 
legal jargon meaning under the law of the other contracting State, that being irrelevant for the purpose of 
categorizing such terms as legal jargon terms with reference to the application of the tax treaty by the former 
contracting State. 
1377 Therefore, the categorization of a tax treaty term as undefined non-legal jargon term cannot be made in the 
abstract, since that category is the complement of the sub-category undefined legal jargon terms in the 
category undefined terms and, thus, indirectly depends on which undefined terms are attributed a legal jargon 
meaning under the relevant law of the State applying the tax treaty. 
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same article (the capital gains article) should not be considered a legal jargon term where 
Japan is applying the treaty since, as maintained by Gomi and Ozawa, that term is not 
used under Japanese domestic law and was intended to take its meaning from the United 
States domestic law, in which the term “capital assets” is used as a legal jargon term.1378 
  
While Article 3(2) is directly applicable for the purpose of interpreting undefined legal 
jargon terms, one may wonder about its relevance in order to interpret undefined non-
legal jargon terms. 
The solution to such an issue may be (formally) twofold. On the one hand, one 
could argue that, since the term to be interpreted is not attributed any legal jargon 
meaning under the relevant law of the State applying the tax treaty, Article 3(2) is not 
applicable and that term is to be construed in accordance with the general rules of 
interpretation enshrined in Articles 31-33 VCLT. On the other hand, it might be 
maintained that, in such a case, Article 3(2) does apply and, absent the relevant legal 
jargon meaning, the term must be attributed a contextual meaning.  
In this respect, the author believes that no difference exists between the two 
mentioned approaches, since, for the purpose of interpreting tax treaties, ascribing to a 
term a contextual meaning under Article 3(2) means nothing other than interpreting that 
term in accordance with Articles 31-33 VCLT.1379 To put it differently, the context for 
the purpose of Article 3(2) OECD Model is the overall context that the author has 
referred to in section 3 of Chapter 3 of Part II. It would, in fact, seem unreasonable that 
the contracting States had chosen to apply different rules of interpretation (with regard to 
both the inferential processes involved and the elements and items of evidence to be 
taken into account) in order to construe (i) undefined non-legal jargon terms and (ii) 
undefined legal jargon terms in cases where the application of the domestic legal jargon 
meaning led to an unreasonable result.1380  
                                                     
1378 See Gomi and Ozawa, Explanation Article by Article of the Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty (nichibei sozei joyaku 
chikujo kaisetsu) (1979), p. 71, cited by J. F. Avery Jones et al., “The interpretation of tax treaties with 
particular reference to article 3(2) of the OECD Model”, British Tax Review (1984), 14 et seq. and 90 et seq., at 
53-54. 
1379 See, seemingly in accordance, A. Rust, “Germany”, in G. Maisto (ed.), Multilingual Texts and 
Interpretation of Tax Treaties and EC Tax Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2005), 221 et seq., at 231-
232. 
1380 I..e. in cases where “the context otherwise requires”. 
That the term “context” in Article 3(2) cannot be reasonably held to have the same (rather restrictive) meaning 
that term is given in Article 31 VCLT is submitted by the International Tax Group, according to whom such an 
equation “would make no sense”, since the use of the term “context” in the limited sense it is employed in 
Article 31 VCLT “would have the effect of overriding or ousting those additional tools of treaty interpretation 
which the Vienna Convention itself indicates are to be used. Context [in Article 3(2) OECD Model] therefore 
should mean anything that can normally be taken into account or to which one may have recourse in 
interpreting the treaty.” (see J. F. Avery Jones et al., “The interpretation of tax treaties with particular reference 
to article 3(2) of the OECD Model”, British Tax Review (1984), 14 et seq. and 90 et seq., at 104). Similarly, 
Vogel maintains that “the ‘context’ concept should nevertheless be interpreted as broadly as possible” and that 
the “definition of ‘context’ in Art. 31(2) of VCLT […] has no bearing on the interpretation of [Model 
Convention]” (see K. Vogel et al., Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 1997), p. 214, m.no 72). See, concurring, M. Edwardes-Ker, Tax Treaty Interpretation. The 
International Tax Treaties Service (Dublin: In-Depth, 1994 – loose-leaf), at 7.06, who puts forward six reasons 




This conclusion is reinforced by the following two arguments.  
First, as just noted, the cases where under Article 3(2) OECD Model the context 
requires otherwise seem to be those where the application of the legal jargon meaning 
leads to unreasonable results. In this respect, it must be remarked that the canon of 
reasonableness in interpreting treaties is the crucial principle on which Articles 31-33 
VCLT are built: the principle of interpreting treaties in good faith. Thus, it is reasonable 
to argue that, in order to assess the reasonableness of the construction of a tax treaty 
provision, the elements and items of evidence to be taken into account and the standards 
of logic and inference to be followed are the same independently from the fact that the 
undefined terms used in that provision1381 are attributed a legal jargon meaning under the 
relevant law of the State applying the treaty or not.  
Second, it has already been mentioned1382 that, within the community of 
international law players (States, international organizations, international courts and 
tribunals and other persons affected by international law) and with specific regard to 
treaties, Articles 31-33 VCLT spell out a significant part of the overall context that the 
cooperative principles of that community require its members to take into account when 
producing and interpreting treaty utterances. Such an overall context, however, is not 
limited to the means and rules of interpretation enshrined in Articles 31-33 VCLT, the 
former including, for instance, also generally accepted principles of logic and good 
sense.1383 In this regard, the author concluded that no meaning (as opposed to a mere 
guess) of a specific treaty provision may be said to exist before the interpreter has gone 
through the process of construing the authentic text(s) in light of the overall context. If 
this is the approach for the interpreter to follow in order to construe a (tax) treaty in 
accordance with Articles 31-33 VCLT, the author does not see how Article 3(2) of 
OECD Model-type tax treaties could fairly be said to compel the interpreter to perform a 
different task for the purpose of determining where the (undefined) context requires 
otherwise and, in such a case, what it does indeed require.  
 
In light of the previous analysis, the following conclusions may be drawn.  
Article 3(2) must be taken into account for the purpose of interpreting a 
significant part of the undefined tax treaty terms. In fact, as it has been correctly pointed 
                                                                                                                                  
to reject the above-mentioned equation. 
It should be noted, in this respect, that such a broad construction of the term “context”, as used in Article 3(2), 
appears to be supported also by the history of the latter provision. As will be mentioned in the following 
sections, the origin of the expression “unless the context otherwise requires” in Article 3(2) may be traced back 
to British law, where the term “context” was generally given a very broad intension (see J. F. Avery Jones et 
al., “The interpretation of tax treaties with particular reference to article 3(2) of the OECD Model”, British Tax 
Review (1984), 14 et seq. and 90 et seq., at 93, in particular footnote 16 and case law cited therein).  
1381 Even “indirectly used”, where the terms used are defined in the tax treaty, but the terms used in those 
definitions are, in turn, undefined therein.  
1382 See section 3 of Chapter 3 of Part II. 
1383 Such as, for instance, (i) the logical principles of inference and (ii) the principles and maxims of treaty 
interpretation not codified in the VCLT since considered by the ILC to be principles of logic and good sense of 
non-binding character (see commentary on Articles 27-28 of the 1966 Draft - YBILC 1966-II, p. 218, para. 4). 
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out, “[m]any of the undefined terms used in tax treaties have highly technical meanings 
in each State”,1384 i.e. they are (also) used as legal jargon terms in the domestic law of 
the contracting States.  
However, where undefined non-legal jargon terms are at stake, Article 3(2) as 
such may be disregarded, the interpreter having to go through the process of construing 
the text in light of the overall context and, in particular, of the rules and means of 
interpretation enshrined in Articles 31, 32 and 33 VCLT. 
Moreover, the above-mentioned approach is indirectly relevant with reference to 
defined treaty terms as well: on the one hand, where the undefined terms used in the 
definition are legal jargon terms, Article 3(2) is to be applied;1385 on the other hand, 
where the undefined terms used in the definition are non-legal jargon terms, the overall 
context is to be directly taken into account in order to construe such terms. Similarly, 
Article 3(2) and the overall context guide the interpreter in dealing with inclusive 
definitions, i.e. in construing terms that are not properly defined, but merely said to 
include certain items or to apply to certain situations.1386 Finally, depending on the 
circumstances, the interpreter might conclude that the (overall) context requires the 
treaty definition of a term not to be applied: this might be the case, for instance, where 
the provision establishing the definition provides that the latter applies “unless the 
context otherwise requires”;1387 however, the interpreter might also plausibly arrive at 
and argue for the same conclusion, in the absence of such an explicit caveat, where 
strong evidence exists that the application of the definition would lead, in the specific 
case, to an absurd or unfair result.1388  
                                                     
1384 See J. F. Avery Jones et al., “The interpretation of tax treaties with particular reference to article 3(2) of the 
OECD Model”, British Tax Review (1984), 14 et seq. and 90 et seq., at 15. On the application of the renvoi 
provided for under Article 3(2) to multilingual tax treaties, see F. Wassermeyer, in H. Debatin and F. 
Wassermeyer (eds.), Doppelbesteuerung: DBA (Munich: Beck, 1997 – loose-leaf), at m.no. 15 to Article 16. 
1385 See, similarly, J. F. Avery Jones et al., “The interpretation of tax treaties with particular reference to article 
3(2) of the OECD Model”, British Tax Review (1984), 14 et seq. and 90 et seq., at 21; C. van Raad, 
“Interpretatie van belastingverdragen”, 47 Maandblad Belasting Beschouwingen (1978), 49 et seq., at 53; J. F. 
Avery Jones, “Problems of Categorising Income and Gains for Tax Treaty Purposes”, British Tax Review 
(2001), 382 et seq., at 395-396, where reference is made also to Hoge Raad (Netherlands), 25 May 1994, case 
28959, BNB 1994/219; M. Edwardes-Ker, Tax Treaty Interpretation. The International Tax Treaties Service 
(Dublin: In-Depth, 1994 – loose-leaf), at 8.07.  
See, explicitly contra, Supreme Administrative Court (Czech Republic), 10 February 2005, AAA v. Financial 
Directorate, 8 ITLR, 178 et seq., at 202, with regard to the interpretation of the undefined terms employed in 
the definition of “dividends”, provided for in Article 10 of an OECD Model-type tax treaty. It is interesting to 
note, however, that the Supreme Administrative Court, in its reasoning, made abundantly reference to Czech 
Republic private law, in particular to the private law (and tax law) meaning of the Czech term, corresponding 
to the English “corporate right”, used in the treaty definition for the purpose of construing and applying Article 
10 (ibidem, at 203). 
1386 See, similarly, J. F. Avery Jones et al., “The interpretation of tax treaties with particular reference to article 
3(2) of the OECD Model”, British Tax Review (1984), 14 et seq. and 90 et seq., at 21. For an instance of 
recourse to the domestic legal jargon meaning in order to construe a inclusively defined treaty term, see House 
of Lords (United Kingdom), 16 July 1959, Ostime v. Australian Mutual Provident Society, 38 TC 492, opinion 
of Lord Denning at 525. 
1387 See, for instance, Article 3(1) OECD Model.  
1388 I.e. at an interpretation and application of the tax treaty that is contrary to good faith. In such a case, the 
interpreter might, for instance, decide to use the domestic legal jargon meaning of the other Contracting States 




Based on such conclusions, the author has decided that: 
(i) issues concerning the interpretation of treaty undefined legal jargon terms1389 will 
be dealt with in this chapter, since they fall within the scope of research question 
(c) outlined in section 1.1 of this chapter; 
(ii) issues concerning the interpretation of treaty undefined non-legal jargon terms1390 
will not be generally dealt with in this chapter, since they were already analysed 
in section 3 of Chapter 4 of Part II, except where those issues relate to how the 
OECD Model and its Commentary may affect the interpretation of such terms; in 
this case, in fact, those issues fall within the scope of research questions (a) and 
(b) outlined in section 1.1 of this chapter.   
 
1.3. The international law perspective of the analysis carried out in this chapter  
 
A second necessary preamble to any work on tax treaty interpretation concerns the field 
of analysis of the work itself.  
 
In both monistic and dualistic States, tax treaties are applicable domestically, either 
because they are reproduced (or referred to) by a specific domestic statute, or because 
they directly become part of the domestic legal system under the relevant constitutional 
law. In both cases, tax treaties are to be interpreted and applied by the judiciary as rules 
governing the relation between each contracting State and its taxpayers. 
 As part of the domestic legal systems of the contracting States, tax treaty texts 
must be construed in accordance with the rules and principles of interpretation provided 
for in such contracting States,1391 which may partially differ from those expressed by 
means of Articles 31-33 VCLT.  
  
At the same time, however, tax treaties maintain their original status as international 
written agreements between States and, as such, they are subject to the VCLT and other 
relevant principles and rules of international law.  
 Theoretically, the present study does not deal with how tax treaties should be 
construed as part of the domestic law of the contracting States. It only concerns the rules 
and principles of interpretation of such treaties under public international law.  
 
To a large extent, however, the latter rules and principles of interpretation are considered 
                                                                                                                                  
(the State not applying the treaty) in order to construe the relevant term, such an interpretation being the most 
sound one in light of the overall context (on the basis of the fact that the parties have agreed to refer to the 
domestic legal jargon meanings to a large extent by means of Article 3(2)). See, similarly, High Court of 
Justice of England and Wales (United Kingdom), 1 March 1982, IRC v. Exxon Corporation, [1982] STC 356. 
1389 Even those used in the definition of a defined treaty term. 
1390 Even those used in the definition of a defined treaty term. 
1391 Which may vary depending on the subject matter of the statutes (e.g. private law, criminal law, 
administrative law, etc.), as well as the origin of the statutes (internal, international, European Union, etc.). 
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to be relevant and are referred to also by domestic courts, tribunals and tax 
authorities.1392  
 In this respect, the results of the present study may be, at least in part, of 
importance for the day-to-day practice of taxpayers, tax authorities and judges from 
different States.  
 For a similar reason, the author will pay attention to the case law of national 
courts and tribunals concerning the application of tax treaties, in order to understand to 
which extent, notwithstanding domestic law constraints, such courts and tribunals follow 
the rules and principles of treaty interpretation in force under public international law 
and how they actually construe them. 
 
1.4. Structure of the chapter 
 
Section 2 briefly examines how scholars, domestic courts and tribunals have applied to 
tax treaties the rules of interpretation enshrined in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT, in order to 
confirm that the conclusions drawn in sections 3.4 through 3.6 of Chapter 4 of Part II 
with regard to the solution of prima facie discrepancies among the authentic texts of a 
treaty, which are mainly based on the application of Articles 31 and 32 VCLT, also 
remain valid in connection to tax treaties.  
 Section 3 analyses the significance of the OECD Model, in its English and French 
official versions, for the purpose of interpreting multilingual tax treaties and, in 
particular, its relevance for removing prima facie discrepancies among the tax authentic 
treaty texts. That section, thus, attempts to answer research question (a). 
 Section 4 deals with the relevance of the OECD Commentary for the purpose of 
interpreting multilingual tax treaties and, more specifically, in order to remove prima 
facie discrepancies among the tax authentic treaty texts. That section, therefore, attempts 
to answer research question (b). 
 Section 5 tackles research question (c) and its sub-questions by examining how 
the interpreter should approach the interpretation of the legal jargon terms used in tax 
treaties and, in particular, how he should solve the prima facie divergences of meaning 
among the legal jargon terms employed in the various authentic texts. In order to answer 
such questions, section 5 preliminary analyses how the rule of interpretation 
encompassed in Article 3(2) OECD Model should be construed and then discusses its 
specific bearing on the interpretation of multilingual tax treaties. That analysis is based 
on the results of the study carried out in section 4 of Chapter 4 of Part II. 
 Section 6 portrays the most important decisions on the interpretation of 
multilingual tax treaties delivered by domestic courts and tribunals and identifies any 
significant departure from the conclusions reached in the previous sections. 
 Finally, section 7 draws some general conclusions.  
                                                     
1392 This may be the case, for instance, where the relevant constitutional law provides the obligation for 
domestic law to comply with the treaties (in force) concluded by the State, or it makes domestic law subject to 
such treaties (e.g., see Article 117 of the Italian Constitution).  




2. The rules of interpretation enshrined in Articles 31-32 VCLT applied to tax 
treaties  
2.1. In general 
 
As previously mentioned, Articles 31 and 32 VCLT are generally regarded as 
codifications of customary international law. As such, they are applicable to tax treaties 
for the purpose of their construction. 
 
National courts and tribunals charged with the task of interpreting and applying tax 
treaties have generally endorsed such an approach, either explicitly or implicitly.1393  
                                                     
1393 See, for an explicit reference to Articles 31-33 VCLT in order to interpret the relevant tax treaties, High 
Court of Justice of England and Wales (United Kingdom), 9 February 1990, IRC v. Commerzbank, 63 TC 218, 
at  234-236; High Court (Australia), 22 August 1990, Thiel v. Commissioner of Taxation, 171 Commonwealth 
Law Reports, 338 et seq., at 356; Administrative Appeals Tribunal of Adelaide (Australia), 3 April 1998, Ngee 
Hin Chong v. CoT, 1 ITLR, 75 et seq., at. 90, para. 34; Federal Court (Australia), 16 May 2000, Ngee Hin 
Chong v. CoT, 2 ITLR, 707 et seq., at 714 (with regard to Australia, see however the contrary approach taken 
by the majority of the judges in High Court (Australia) 15 August 2012, Minister for Home Affairs of the 
Commonwealth v Zentai, 246 Commonwealth Law Reports, 213 et seq., at 238-239, para. 65, per Gummow, 
Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ, where it was stated that the Treaty on Extradition between Australia and the 
Republic of Hungary, concluded on 25 October 1995, had to be interpreted “by the application of ordinary 
principles of statutory interpretation”; contrary, ibidem, para. 19, per French CJ, where the Chief Justice made 
reference to articles 31 and 32 VCLT in order to construe the extradition treaty; with regard to the relevance of 
the Hight Court (Australia) majority decision in Zentai for the purpose of interpreting tax treaties, see Federal 
Court (Australia), 26 April 2013, Resource Capital Fund III LP v Commissioner of Taxation, 15 ITLR, 814 et 
seq., at 835 et seq., paras. 48-53, where the court concluded for the substantial irrelevance thereof); Federal 
Commission of Appeal in Tax Matters (Switzerland), 28 February 2001, Re V SA, 4 ITLR, 191 et seq., at 208, 
para. 7.b.; Conseil d’Etat (France), 28 June 2002, Re Société Schneider Electric, 4 ITLR, 1077 et seq., 
conclusions of the Commissaire du Gouvernement at 1115-1116; Supreme Court (Canada), 22 June 1995, 
Crown Forest v. Canada, [1995] 2 SCR 802, para. 54; Tax Court (Canada), 27 June 2002, Edwards v. R, 5 
ITLR, 1 et seq., at 22-23; New South Wales Supreme Court (Australia), 4 December 2002, Unisys Corp v. 
FCT, 5 ITLR, 658 et seq., at 670, para. 43; Hoge Raad (Netherlands), 21 February 2003, case 37024, 5 ITLR, 
818 et seq., at 876, paras. 3.5 and 3.6; Tax Court (Canada), 24 February 2003, Cloutier v. R, 5 ITLR, 878 et 
seq., at 886-887, para. 14; Borgarting Appeals Court (Norway), 13 August 2003, PGS Geographical AS v. 
Government of Norway, 6 ITLR, 212 et seq., at 229; Federal Court of Appeal (Canada), 4 February 2004, 
Beame v. R, 6 ITLR, 767 et seq., at 770-771, para. 13; Supreme Court (Norway), 8 June 2004, PGS Exploration 
AS v. State of Norway, 7 ITLR, 51 et seq., at 74-75, paras. 40-42; Federal Court (Australia), 29 April 2005, 
McDermott Industries (Aust) Pty Ltd v. Commissioner of Taxation, 7 ITLR, 800 et seq., at 811-812, paras. 37-
38; Income Tax Appellate Tribunal of Mumbai (India), 1 March 2005, Hindalco Industries Ltd v. Assistant 
Commissioner of Income Tax, 8 ITLR, 1 et seq., at 8-9, para. 10; Federal Court  (Switzerland), 29 November 
2005, A Holding ApS v. Federal Tax Administration, 8 ITLR, 536 et seq., at 555-556, para. 3.4.1. and 3.4.2.; 
Tax Court (Canada), 18 August 2006, MIL (Investments) SA v. Canada, 9 ITLR, 25 et seq., at 49, para. 80; 
Income Tax Appellate Tribunal of Mumbai (India), 13 April 2007, Mashreqbank psc v. Deputy Director of 
Income Tax, 9 ITLR, 1062 et seq., at 1074, para. 15; High Court (Ireland), 31 July 2007, Kinsella v. Revenue 
Commissioners, 10 ITLR, 63 et seq., at 72-73; District Court of Tel Aviv-Yafo (Israel), 30 December 2007, 
Yanko-Weiss Holdings (1996) Ltd v. Holon Assessing Office, 10 ITLR, 524 et seq., at 544; Tax Court (Canada), 
22 April 2008, Prévost Car Inc v. R, 10 ITLR, 736 et seq., at 749, para. 36; Supreme Court (Norway), 24 April 
2008, Sølvik v Staten v/Skatt Øst, 11 ITLR, 15 et seq., at 34, paras. 46 and 47; Special Commissioners (United 
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 In certain jurisdictions, courts do not usually refer to the VCLT when construing 
and applying tax treaties, but this is not conclusive evidence that they disregard such 
rules altogether. Moreover, as the author has already mentioned, Articles 31 and 32 
VCLT substantially affirm a common sense principle, i.e. that treaties must be 
interpreted honestly, reasonably and with fairness, by taking into account the overall 
context.1394 This is, in the vast majority of cases, what courts and tribunals of most 
jurisdictions tend to do, even without taking a look at the specific guidance of the VCLT.  
 
Only in very limited instances has the review of national case law shown an explicit 
rejection of applying the interpretative principles enshrined in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT. 
One example is the judgment of the Court of Appeal of Liege (Belgium) in the Verast & 
Folens case, where it was held that “[e]n raison du caractère explicite, précis et dépourvu 
de toute équivoque des article 11,1, et 11,2,(c) de la Convention belgo-française du 10 
mars 1964, il est inutile de recourir aux règles d’interprétions dont l’administration se 
prévaut”, i.e. those encompassed in Articles 31-32 VCLT.1395  
 
Finally, the analysis of national case law has shown the tendency of judges to adopt a 
holistic and comprehensive approach, where all the available elements and items of 
                                                                                                                                  
Kingdom), 19 November 2008, Bayfine UK Products and another v. Revenue and Customs Commissioners, 11 
ITLR, 440 et seq., at 478, para. 56; Federal Court (Australia), 10 October 2008, Virgin Holdings SA v. 
Commissioner of Taxation, 11 ITLR, 335 et seq., at 342-344, paras. 19-24; Federal Court (Australia), 22 
October 2008, Deutsche Asia Pacific Finance Inc v. Commissioner of Taxation, 11 ITLR, 365 et seq., at 396-
397, paras. 84-87; Federal Court (Australia), 3 February 2009, Undershaft Ltd and Undershaft BV v. 
Commissioner of Taxation, 11 ITLR, 652 et seq., at 681-683, paras. 38-41; Conseil d’Etat (France), 31 March 
2010, Société Zimmer Ltd v. Ministre de l’Economie, des Finances et de l’Industrie, 12 ITLR, 739 et seq., 
conclusions of the Rapporteur Public at 759 (where the Rapporteur Public, however, use the misleading 
expression “interprétation littérale” in order to describe the principle of interpretation provided for in Articles 
31-33 VCLT); Tax Court (Canada), 8 April 2010, TD Securities (USA) LLC v. R, 12 ITLR, 783 et seq., at 812, 
para. 50; Court of Appeal of England and Wales (United Kingdom), 8 July 2010, Smallwood and another v. 
Revenue and Customs Commissioners, 12 ITLR, 1002 et seq., at 1018, para. 27. 
For an implicit reference to the principles of interpretation provided for in Articles 31-32 VCLT, see, for 
instance, Income Tax Appellate Tribunal of Delhi (India), 26 July 2004, Ensco Maritime Ltd v. Deputy 
Commissioner of Income Tax, 7 ITLR, 822 et seq., at 837.   
1394 Similarly, Arnold notes that “[t]he basic interpretive approach set out in Art. 31(1) [VCLT] should not 
strike anyone as novel. The interpretation of any written material – newspapers, books, articles, memos, and 
legal documents – requires us to read the words, sometimes several times, very carefully. Further, […] the 
meaning of words is always dependent on the context in which they are used. And finally, all language is 
purposive. Obviously, the parties to a treaty are attempting to accomplish certain results, and the treaty should 
be interpreted to promote, rather than frustrate, those intentions or purposes. The same three major elements – 
the ordinary meaning of words (text), context, and purpose – form the foundation for the interpretation of 
language generally. Tax legislation and tax treaties are no different in this regard. The general principle or 
approach set out in Art. 31(1) of the Vienna Convention is self-evident; as a result, it is unhelpful to judges and 
others trying to decipher the meaning of a provision in a tax treaty. Would anyone seriously suggest that a 
meaning could be attributed to a treaty provision without considering the ordinary meaning of the words or the 
particular context in which they appear?” (see B. Arnold, “The Interpretation of Tax Treaties: Myths and 
Realities”, 64 Bulletin for international taxation (2010), 2 et seq., at 5). 
1395 Court of Appeal of Liege (Belgium), 14 January 1998, Verast & Folens v. Belgium, 1 ITLR, 435 et seq., at 
441. See also Supreme Administrative Court (Czech Republic), 10 February 2005, AAA v. Financial 
Directorate, 8 ITLR, 178 et seq., at 203-204. 
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evidence are considered together for the purpose of treaty interpretation and accordingly 
weighted on the basis of the specific circumstances of the case.1396  
 
2.2. Good faith and the agreed expectation of the parties  
 
National courts and tribunals make often reference to “good faith” when interpreting tax 
treaties within the context of the VCLT.1397  
 In certain cases, they even deal with the possible meaning of “good faith” for the 
purpose of construing tax treaties in accordance with the VCLT. For instance, the United 
Kingdom Special Commissioners of Taxation, in the Sportsman case,1398 held that the 
reference to “good faith” in Article 31 VCLT is generally accepted as simply meaning 
that the interpretation should not lead to manifestly absurd or unreasonable results, i.e. 
that the treaty construction should be a sensible one.  
 
More fundamentally, national courts and tribunals normally reject those constructions 
that result in unreasonable outcomes,1399 even where the alternative interpretations 
                                                     
1396 See, for instance, the explicit statements in Federal Court of Appeal (Canada), 24 February 2000, R v. 
Dudney, 2 ITLR, 627 et seq., at 632, para. 10; Federal Court of Australia, 16 May 2000, Ngee Hin Chong v. 
CoT, 2 ITLR, 707 et seq., at 714, quoting High Court (Australia), 24 February 1997, Applicant A. v. Minister 
for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, 190 Commonwealth Law Reports, 225 et seq., at 254-256; Income Tax 
Appellate Tribunal of Mumbai (India), 1 March 2005, Hindalco Industries Ltd v. Assistant Commissioner of 
Income Tax, 8 ITLR, 1 et seq., at 12, para. 17; Income Tax Appellate Tribunal of Mumbai (India), 13 April 
2007, Mashreqbank plc v. Deputy Director of Income Tax, 9 ITLR, 1062 et seq., at 1074, para. 15. 
1397 See, for instance, Federal Commission of Appeal in Tax Matters (Switzerland), 28 February 2001, Re V SA,  
4 ITLR, 191 et seq., at 213; Supreme Administrative Court (Finland), 20 March 2002, Re A Oyj Abp, 4 ITLR, 
1009 et seq., at 1065; Income Tax Appellate Tribunal of Mumbai (India), 1 March 2005, Hindalco Industries 
Ltd v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, 8 ITLR, 1 et seq., at 10, para. 13; Federal Court  (Switzerland), 
29 November 2005, A Holding ApS v. Federal Tax Administration, 8 ITLR, 536 et seq., at 557, para. 3.4.3., 
where the Court held that the principle of good faith includes the prohibition of abuses and, more specifically, 
the use of a rule of law against its object and purpose to realize interests which are not protected by it and, as a 
consequence, concluded that the prohibition for the taxpayers to abuse the rights otherwise granted by the tax 
treaties is recognized at the European level (the Court was dealing with the interpretation and application of the 
1973 Denmark-Switzerland tax treaty) and that is not necessary for the contracting States to adopt an explicit 
provision to that effect in their treaties; District Court of Tel Aviv-Yafo (Israel), 30 December 2007, Yanko-
Weiss Holdings (1996) Ltd v. Holon Assessing Office, 10 ITLR, 524 et seq., at 544. 
1398 Special Commissioners (United Kingdom), 23 September 1998, Sportsman v. IRC, 1 ITLR, 237 et seq., at 
244, paras. 4.1 and 5.1.  
1399 See the contrary proposition, put forward by Mössner, that “[l]egal rules of interpretation do not guarantee 
that the process of understanding would lead to a reasonable result. They, rather, give guidance and allot the 
responsibility for a failed communication” (see J. M. Mössner, “Klaus Vogel Lecture 2009 – Comments”, 64 
Bulletin for international taxation (2010), 16 et seq., at 17). It must be noted that such a proposition is 
expressed with reference to (i) domestic tax law and (ii) tax treaties, seen as part of the contracting States’ 
domestic law; it does not concern tax treaties under international law.  
Notwithstanding this, the proposition appears misleading: no judge would seriously agree to having delivered 
an “unreasonable” decision; the judge would, in any case, maintain that his interpretation of the (domestic or 
treaty) legal provision at stake was the most reasonable construction that could be argued for on the basis of the 
available and usable elements and items of evidence. In the vast majority of cases, the elements and items of 
evidence that the judge may rely on and use for the purpose of interpretation are those that all the parties to the 
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upheld diverge from the prima facie readings of those provisions.1400 In this respect, it is 
                                                                                                                                  
disputes, i.e. the hearers of the legal utterance, could have access to. Therefore, his interpretation coincides 
with the utterance meaning of the legal provision at stake, which implies its being a reasonable interpretation. 
1400 See, for instance, Federal Court (Canada), 22 January 1985, The Estate of the Late John N Gladden v. R, 85 
DTC 5188, para. 19, where Addy J. concluded that the deemed disposition by a deceased person of his capital 
property immediately before his death, provided for in the Canadian Income Tax Act, should be regarded as a 
“sale or exchange of capital assets” under Article VIII of the 1942 Canada-United States tax treaty (which 
exempted from tax in one contracting State the capital gains on such sales or exchanges realized by a resident 
of the other contracting State), since the opposite construction would lead to an absurd and unreasonable result 
in light of the “general intention” of the parties; Conseil d’Etat (France), 13 October 1999, Re SA Diebold 
Courtage, 2 ITLR, 365 et seq., at 381, and the related conclusions of the Commissaire du Gouvernement at 
387, concerning the necessity of regarding the payment of royalties to a partnership treated as tax transparent 
under the law of the other Contracting State as paid to its partners where the latter are resident in that State for 
the purpose of the tax treaty (it is interesting to note that such an approach appears to contrast with the 
reservations expressed by France in Annex II to the OECD Partnerships Report, in particular at paragraphs 4, 
12 and 13 thereof, and reiterated as observations in the 2000 update of the OECD Commentary – see paragraph 
27.2 of the Commentary to Article 1 OECD Model; it should be noted, however, that in 2008 France modified 
the latter paragraph in order to reduce the extent of its declared disagreement with the OECD approach); 
Bundesfinanzhof (Germany), 21 September 1999, Re A Foreign Silent Partnership, 2 ITLR, 859 et seq., at 866-
867 concerning the rational for considering the permanent establishment of a fiscally transparent (atypical 
silent) partnership as a permanent establishment of its (atypical silent) partners for tax treaty purposes; Conseil 
d’Etat (France), 20 October 2000, Re SA New Building Promotion Limited, 3 ITLR, 783 et seq., conclusions of 
the Commissaire du Gouvernement at 802 ; Hoge Raad (Netherlands), 7 December 2001, case 35231, 4 ITLR, 
558 et seq., at 576, Opinion of the Advocate General at 585-586, paras. 5.12-5.16, in the sense to reject an 
interpretation that would unlikely represent the common understanding of the parties and to prefer a 
substantive approach on the basis of the matter considered in its entirety; Income Tax Appellate Tribunal of 
Mumbai (India), 27 September 2001, Clifford Chance (United Kingdom) v. Deputy Commissioner of Income 
Tax, 4 ITLR, 711 et seq., at 731-732, paras. 49 and 51; Federal Court (Canada), 8 November 2002, Pacific 
Network Services Ltd and another v. Minister if National Revenue, 5 ITLR, 638 et seq., at 649-650, paras. 29-
30, where the Court, with regard to the question whether the obligation to exchange information under Article 
26 of the 1975 Canada-France tax treaty was limited to information already in the possession of the requested 
tax authorities, considered that it would have been hard to imagine that such authorities already had, in all 
cases, in their possession all the information needed by the requesting State for the purpose of implementing its 
domestic law provisions and, thus, inferred from the article read as a whole that the requested tax authorities 
were under an obligation to gather the information not already in their possession; Cour de Cassation 
(Belgium), 28 May 2004, Belgium v. SW and VR-M, 7 ITLR, 442 et seq., at 452, where the Court seemed to 
have applied Article 15(1) of the 1970 Belgium-Luxembourg tax treaty to the income derived by an 
international hauler resident of Belgium and employed by a Luxembourg-based haulage company as if that 
article contained a rule equivalent to the one enshrined in Article 15(3) OECD Model, apparently due to the 
analogy between the activity of an international hauler and that of a person working aboard of a ship or aircraft 
operated in international traffic; Income Tax Appellate Tribunal of Mumbai (India), 1 March 2005, Hindalco 
Industries Ltd v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, 8 ITLR, 1 et seq., at 9-10 and 14, paras. 13 and 19, 
where the Court also made reference to the principle ut res magis valeat quam pereat (quoting Harman J. in 
High Court of Justice of England and Wales (United Kingdom), 31 August 1988, Union Texas Petroleum 
Corporation v. Critchley, [1998] STC 691, at 707); ibidem, at 18, para. 29.1, where the Court stated that an 
“interpretation leading to such an incongruity is to be avoided even if some violence is required to be done to 
the words of the treaty”, and at 20, para. 30; Tax Court (Canada), 24 October 2006, Canwest Mediaworks Inc 
v. Canada, 9 ITLR, 189 et seq., at 196, para. 14; Income Tax Appellate Tribunal of Mumbai (India), 13 April 
2007, Mashreqbank psc v. Deputy Director of Income Tax, 9 ITLR, 1062 et seq., at 1074, para. 15; Special 
Commissioners (United Kingdom), 19 November 2008, Bayfine UK Products and another v. Revenue and 
Customs Commissioners, 11 ITLR, 440 et seq., at 477-478, paras. 54-56 and, generally, at 481-483; Authority 
for Advance Rulings  (India), 30 September 2009, Gearbulk AG v. Director of Income Tax, 12 ITLR, 495 et 
seq., at 501-503, paras. 7-8, where the authority seemed to attribute decisive weight to the reasonableness of 
one possible interpretation of the 1994 India-Switzerland tax treaty (leading to the taxability in India, even in 
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the absence of a permanent establishment therein, of profits derived by a non-resident from the operation of 
ships in international traffic), as opposed to the unreasonableness of the contrary interpretation (leading to the 
non-taxability in India of such profits), in light of the treaty’s overall structure (the absence of any provision 
dealing expressly with the taxation of profits derived from the operation of ships in international traffic, as 
compared to the existence – Article 8 of the tax treaty - of a provision dealing with the taxation of profits 
derived  from the operation of aircrafts in international traffic) and its history (its later amendment by protocol 
in 2000, introducing a previously missing “other income” article); Tax Court (Canada), 8 April 2010, TD 
Securities (USA) LLC v. R, 12 ITLR, 783 et seq., at 812, para. 51, and at 813, para 57. 
See, however, Conseil d’Etat (France), 9 February 2000, Re Hubertus AG, 2 ITLR, 637 et seq., where both the 
Court and the Commissaire du Gouvernement concluded that the income attributed to the partners of a fiscally 
transparent (“translucent”) partnership does not maintain the character it had in the hands of the partnership; 
the author maintains that it is questionable whether this is a reasonable interpretation of OECD Model-like tax 
treaties, since it would lead on many occasions to an allocation of the taxing rights between the contracting 
States different from the one the latter agreed upon with regard to the prototypical cases of direct investment or 
activity carried on by the taxable person (here the partners); see the substantially similar comment by Baker in 
2 ITLR, at 639. 
See also High Court of Justice of England and Wales (United Kingdom), 9 February 1990, IRC v. 
Commerzbank, 63 TC 218, where Mummery J., interpreting Article XV of the 1945 United Kingdom-United 
States tax treaty, concluded that “[t]he words of art XV, both on their own and in the context of the convention 
as a whole, are clear. The natural and ordinary meaning of the words is that art XV exempts from United 
Kingdom tax interest which has been paid by United States corporations”, although such a conclusion could 
have been considered to infringe (as it most probably did, in the author’s view) the common intention of the 
parties, as ascertainable from the structure and the relevant provisions of the tax treaty, i.e. that, where profits 
(including interest) were attributable to a permanent establishment in the United Kingdom (which was the case 
in the situation at stake before the High Court of Justice), the latter State retained the right to tax them. See, in 
the same vein, Bundesfinanzhof (Germany), 9 October 1985, case IR 128/80, Bundessteuerblatt. Teil II (1988), 
810 et seq., where the Court, interpreting the similarly worded provision encompassed in Article XIV of the 
1954 Germany-United States tax treaty and applying it to an analogous situation, i.e. to the case of interest paid 
by a United States corporation and attributable to a permanent establishment that the recipient had in Germany, 
concluded that Germany was prevented from taxing the interest. Interestingly, the United States Court of 
Federal Claims, faced with the interpretation of the corresponding provision included in Article XII(1) of the 
1942 Canada-United States tax treaty (as amended by a protocol of 21 November 1951), construed it in the 
opposite way and held that, though a prima facie reading of Article XII(1) led to the conclusion that interest 
was to be exempt in the United States since paid by a Canadian corporation and received by a Canadian 
corporation, Article XII(1) had to be applied in accordance with the intention of the parties, which certainly 
was not to exempt the interest where the recipient carried on a business in the United States through a branch 
and the interest was connected therewith. Kashiwa J., in that respect, noted that “the ultimate question remains 
what was intended when the language actually employed in Article XII was chosen, imperfect as that language 
may be. […] that language, when understood in light of the treaty's history and explanatory provisions, effected 
only a waiver of United States taxes imposed solely through the deemed sourcing provisions on those not 
present in the United States.” (see Court of Federal Claims (United States), 5 May 1982, Great -West Life 
Assurance Company, 678 F.2d 180). 
For a seemingly explicit rejection of the canon of reasonableness in interpreting tax treaties, see High Court of 
Justice of England and Wales (United Kingdom), 12 March 1976, Avery Jones v. IRC, [1976] STC 290, where 
Walton J. stated (italics added by the author): “[Mr Oliver] submitted that article XV should be given - in 
particular the words relating to citizenship - "as much meaning as it needs to have" and that the construction he 
would place upon the words used was "reasonable". These are truly remarkable submissions. On what principle 
is the Court to decide how much meaning a provision needs to have? And what authority is there that because a 
construction which a particular person seeks to place upon a provision is "reasonable" it must be the correct 
one? Such propositions have only to be stated to be rejected as unsound. If the present case has to be decided 
upon any such general propositions, the general propositions applicable are that, as far as it is humanly 
possible, a document must be construed so as to give effect to every word used by the Parties, and in deciding 
what the meaning of those words is one must look at the document as a whole to see whether those words 
occur elsewhere, as, if possible, the same construction should be placed on them in both contexts. Moreover, I 
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interesting to report the following passage from the decision delivered by the Income 
Tax Appellate Tribunal of Mumbai in the Clifford Chance case:1401 “Law consists not in 
a particular instance, but in the reason. It is said ubi eadem ratio ibi idem judicium […] It 
is not within human powers to foresee the manifold sets of facts which may arise, 
therefore it is not possible under lex scripta […] to provide for them in clear and 
unequivocal terms. The trouble lies with our method of drafting. The principal object of 
the draftsman is to achieve certainty – a laudable object in itself. But in pursuit of it, he 
loses sight of the equally important object – clarity. Resultantly it brings obscurity and 
absurdity. It is therefore important to find out the intention of the law-makers. If we 
accept the interpretation as suggested by the assessee, it would lead to absurdity. […] 
Certainly this could not be the intention of the treaty-maker […]”.   
 
Closely related to the above-mentioned approach is the inclination of national courts and 
tribunals to make reference to the desirability of implementing the true intentions of the 
contracting States, their agreed expectations, or the like.1402 The statements of Iacobucci 
                                                                                                                                  
think that the Courts would always be very slow to refuse to give any meaning at all to a provision in an 
agreement made between two governments if any sensible construction at all could be placed upon it.” 
Ironically, Walton J. ended up substituting the adjective “sensible” for the adjective “reasonable”.   
1401 Income Tax Appellate Tribunal of Mumbai (India), 27 September 2001, Clifford Chance (United Kingdom) 
v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, 4 ITLR, 711 et seq., at 731, para. 49.  
1402 See High Court of Justice of England and Wales (United Kingdom), 9 February 1990, IRC v. 
Commerzbank, 63 TC 218, at  234-236; Tax Court (Canada), 30 October 1998, Dudney v. R, 1 ITLR, 371 et 
seq., at 376; Federal Commission of Appeal in Tax Matters (Switzerland), 28 February 2001, Re V SA,  4 ITLR, 
191 et seq., at 211 and 212; Hoge Raad (Netherlands), 6 December 2002, case 36773, 5 ITLR, 680 et seq., at 
698, where the Court found that no evidence whatsoever existed of a common intention of the contracting 
States (Belgium and the Netherlands) to treat dividends paid to the acquirer of shares as dividends paid to the 
vendor of those shares for the purpose of applying Article 10 of the 1970 Belgium-Netherlands tax treaty (not 
even for anti-avoidance purposes); ibidem, Opinion of the Advocate General at 709, para. 5.3; Supreme Court 
(India), 7 October 2003, Union of India and another v. Azadi Bachao Andolan and another, 6 ITLR, 233 et 
seq., at 279-280 where the Court appeared to conclude that “abuse” and “treaty shopping” (rectious: behavior 
that would be usually labeled as such, since when the contracting States agree on allowing this type of use of 
the tax treaty by third countries resident taxpayers, that behavior cannot be seriously denoted any longer by the 
term “abuse”, nor via the term “treaty shopping”) of the India-Mauritius tax treaty might have been foreseen 
and even intended by the Contracting States, at the moment of concluding such a treaty, in order to boost the 
flow of capital and investments from third countries in India through Mauritius and that, if it were so, there 
would be nothing in that tax treaty to prevent a resident of a third country from benefitting from the favorable 
provisions of the 1982 India-Mauritius tax treaty by means of setting up a (letter-box) investment company in 
Mauritius; Court of Federal Claims (United States), 14 November 2003, National Westminster Bank plc v. 
United States of America, 6 ITLR, 292 et seq., at 302; Federal Court of Appeal of Ottawa (Canada), 13 October 
2003, Edwards v. R, 6 ITLR, 564 et seq., at 570, paras. 27-29, in particular 29, where the Court stated that “the 
commonly expressed intention of the parties is entitled to great weight and should not be ignored unless a 
contrary intent can be shown in either the words of the treaty or in some other expression by the parties”; Court 
of Federal Claims (United States), 4 January 2005, Sarkisov v. United States of America, 7 ITLR, 469 et seq., at 
472, where there is also reference to further relevant United States’ case law; Tax Court (Canada), 8 April 
2005, Allchin v. R, 7 ITLR, 851 et seq., at 864, para. 33, quoting Iacobucci J. in Crown Forest (see Supreme 
Court (Canada), 22 June 1995, Crown Forest v. Canada, [1995] 2 SCR 802, para. 43); Income Tax Appellate 
Tribunal of Mumbai (India), 1 March 2005, Hindalco Industries Ltd v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, 
8 ITLR, 1 et seq., at 10, para. 14, quoting, indirectly, Federal Court (Canada), 22 January 1985, The Estate of 
the Late John N Gladden v. R, 85 DTC 5188, at 5190; Income Tax Appellate Tribunal of Mumbai (India), 13 
April 2007, Mashreqbank psc v. Deputy Director of Income Tax, 9 ITLR, 1062 et seq., at 1073-1074, para. 14, 
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J. in the Crown Forest decision are a good example in that respect: “[r]eviewing the 
intentions of the drafters of a taxation convention is a very important element in 
delineating the scope of the application of that treaty” and, quoting Addy J. in J. N. 
Gladden Estate v. The Queen,1403 “[c]ontrary to an ordinary taxing statute a tax treaty or 
convention must be given a liberal interpretation with a view to implementing the true 
intentions of the parties”.1404  
The other side of the coin, notably, is that national courts and tribunals appear 
used to regarding the overall context (i.e. the context for the purpose of article 3(2)) as 
comprising “tout ce qui pout éclairer l’intention des autours de la Convention”.1405  
                                                                                                                                  
quoting, indirectly, Federal Court, 22 January 1985, The Estate of the Late John N Gladden v. R, 85 DTC 
5188, at 5190; Tax Court (Canada), 28 September 2007, Garcia v. Canada, 10 ITLR, 179 et seq., at 188, 
quoting Federal Court (Canada), 22 January 1985, The Estate of the Late John N Gladden v. R, 85 DTC 5188, 
at 5190; Court of Appeals (United States), 15 January 2008, National Westminster Bank plc v. United States of 
America, 10 ITLR, 423 et seq., at 413-432 (citing, among other cases, Supreme Court (United States), 15 June 
1982, Sumitomo Shoji America Inc v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982), at 180; Supreme Court (United States), 
29 April 1963, Maximov v. United States, 373 U.S. 49 (1963), at 54; Court of Appeals (United States), 6 
December 1994, Xerox Corporation v. United States, 41 F.3d 647, at 652 and 656; Supreme Court (United 
States), 9 November 1936, Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5 (1936), at 11; Court of 
Federal Claims (United States), 5 May 1982, Great -West Life Assurance Company, 678 F.2d 180, at 183), at 
443 and at 445; Tax Court (Canada), 22 April 2008, Prévost Car Inc v. R, 10 ITLR, 736 et seq., at 749, para. 
37; Tax Court (Canada), 16 May 2008, Knights of Columbus v. R, 10 ITLR, 827 et seq., at 34 (quoting Supreme 
Court (Canada), 20 October 1994, Thomson v. Thomson, [1994] 3 SCR 551, at 578 and Supreme Court 
(Canada), 22 June 1995, Crown Forest v. Canada, [1995] 2 SCR 802, at 814, para. 43); Income Tax Appellate 
Tribunal of Mumbai (India), 13 august 2008, Deputy Director and Assistant Director of Income Tax 
(International Taxation) v. Balaji Shipping (UK) Ltd, 11 ITLR, 103 et seq., at 117, para. 18; Authority for 
Advance Rulings  (India), 30 September 2009, Gearbulk AG v. Director of Income Tax, 12 ITLR, 495 et seq., 
at 502-503, para. 8; Tax Court (Canada), 8 April 2010, TD Securities (USA) LLC v. R, 12 ITLR, 783 et seq., at 
825, para. 98. 
Seemingly contra Edwardes-Ker, who submits that Article 31(1) VCLT, “by omitting an express reference to 
the parties’ intentions, makes clear that treaty terms must be given the meaning which they do have (the textual 
approach) – rather than a meaning which the parties may (or may not) have intended them to have. The best 
evidence of the treaty partner States’ intentions is to be found in the ordinary meaning of the treaty text itself. 
[…] If excessive weight is given to the parties’ supposed intentions (by, for example, stressing the contractual 
nature of a treaty) insufficient weight may then be given to the treaty’s actual text. […] some domestic courts 
have focused excessively on the fact that a treaty is an agreement between two States – and have then sought 
(often unsuccessfully) to give effect to what they supposed these intentions were.” (see M. Edwardes-Ker, Tax 
Treaty Interpretation. The International Tax Treaties Service (Dublin: In-Depth, 1994 – loose-leaf), at 6.01 
and 6.02; more generally, the whole of Chapter 6).  
For a strong criticism of textuality, as an improper restriction in the quest for the intention of the parties, see M. 
S. McDougal et al., The Interpretation of Agreements and World Public Order. Principles of Content and 
Procedure (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), in particular Chapters 1-3, and M. S. McDougal, “The 
International Law Commission’s Draft Articles upon Interpretation: Textuality Redivivus”, 61 American 
Journal of International Law (1967), 992 et seq.   
1403 Federal Court, 22 January 1985, The Estate of the Late John N Gladden v. R, 85 DTC 5188, at 5190. 
1404 Supreme Court (Canada), 22 June 1995, Crown Forest v. Canada, [1995] 2 SCR 802, p. 822, para. 43. 
1405 Conseil d’Etat (France), 27 July 2001, Re SA Golay Buchel France, 4 ITLR, 249 et seq., conclusions of the 
Commissaire du Gouvernement at 255. For other instances, see Federal Court of Appeal of Ottawa (Canada), 
13 October 2003, Edwards v. R, 6 ITLR, 564 et seq., at 568-569, paras. 27-29, where the Court attributed great 
weight to the common intention of the parties, as expressed by an exchange of diplomatic notes subsequent to 
the conclusion of the relevant tax treaty, in order to support its construction of the latter; First Council of 
Taxpayers (Brazil), 19 October 2006, Eagle Distribuidora de Bebidas SA v. Second Group of the Revenue 
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2.3. Ordinary meaning under Article 31(1) VCLT 
 
There are two common trends in national case law with regard to the requirement, 
provided for by Article 31(1) VCLT, that treaties must be interpreted in accordance with 
the (qualified) ordinary meaning to be given to their terms. 
 
On the one hand, most decisions show the tendency of national courts and tribunals not 
to equate the “ordinary meaning” of a term, for the purpose of Article 31 VCLT, to its 
mere “grammatical or dictionary” meaning (even supposing that something such as a 
“grammatical or dictionary” meaning exists),1406 but to choose and argue in favor of the 
meaning that makes the most sense1407 in the context where the relevant term is found 
and, in particular, against the background of the provision of which it is a part.1408 
                                                                                                                                  
Department in Brasilia, 9 ITLR, 627 et seq., at 659, where the Council stated that, for the purpose of Article 
3(2) of the relevant tax treaty (corresponding to Article 3(2) OECD Model), the context was constituted by the 
intention of the parties at the time of the signature of the treaty and, therefore, also by the meaning that the 
term to be interpreted has under the law of the other contracting State (an implicit reference to the reciprocity 
principle). 
1406 See, in that respect, District Court of Tel Aviv-Yafo (Israel), 30 December 2007, Yanko-Weiss Holdings 
(1996) Ltd v. Holon Assessing Office, 10 ITLR, 524 et seq., at 543, where the Court, quoting Wittgenstein, 
affirmed that “… there is no such thing as a literal meaning apart from the context that makes it meaningful”.  
1407 From the interpreter’s perspective.  
1408 See High Court of Justice of England and Wales (United Kingdom), 9 February 1990, IRC v. 
Commerzbank, 63 TC 218, at  234-236; Special Commissioners (United Kingdom), 23 September 1998, 
Sportsman v. IRC, 1 ITLR, 237 et seq., at 244-245, para. 4.1; Tax Court (Canada), 30 October 1998, Dudney v. 
R, 1 ITLR, 371 et seq., at 376; Tax Court (United States), 18 November 1999, Compaq v.  CIR (the ACT credit 
claim), 2 ITLR, 323 et seq., at 331, 333 and 336; Income Tax Appellate Tribunal on Mumbai (India), 27 
September 2001, Clifford Chance (United Kingdom) v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, 4 ITLR, 711 et 
seq., at 730-731, paras. 48-49; Federal Court (Canada), 8 November 2002, Pacific Network Services Ltd and 
another v. Minister if National Revenue, 5 ITLR, 638 et seq., at 648, para. 25, where the Court stated that its 
construction of Article 26 of the 1975 Canada-France tax treaty (concerning exchange of information) 
conformed with the object and purpose of that article, with the general coverage of the treaty, as well as with 
the interpretation of the model provision upon which Article 26 of the tax treaty was based; ibidem, at 650-651, 
para. 35, where the strict and literal interpretation put forward by applicants was rejected on the ground of the 
international nature of the 1975 Canada-France treaty; Supreme Court (Denmark), 4 February 2003, 
Halliburton Company Germany Gmbh v. Ministry of Taxation, 5 ITLR, 784 et seq., minority opinion at 814, 
referring, for interpretative purposes, to the objective and purpose of Article 11 of the 1948 Denmark-United 
States tax treaty and of Article 9 of the 1955 Canada-Denmark tax treaty (both corresponding to Article 15 of 
the OECD Model), which consisted in ensuring that tax regulations did not obstruct the international mobility 
of qualified labour; Tax Court (Canada), 24 February 2003, Cloutier v. R, 5 ITLR, 878 et seq., at 887, para.17 
where the Court pointed out that the terms used in Article XIX of the 1980 Canada-United States tax treaty 
were to be interpreted in light of the (primary) purpose of that article; Supreme Court (India), 7 October 2003, 
Union of India and another v. Azadi Bachao Andolan and another, 6 ITLR, 233 et seq., at 285; Tax Court 
(Canada), 24 October 2006, Canwest Mediaworks Inc v. Canada, 9 ITLR, 189 et seq., at 197, para. 18; Income 
Tax Appellate Tribunal of Mumbai (India), 13 April 2007, Mashreqbank psc v. Deputy Director of Income 
Tax, 9 ITLR, 1062 et seq., at 1074, para 15; Federal Court of Appeal (Canada), 21 September 2007, Gulf 
Offshore NS Ltd v. Canada, 10 ITLR, 172 et seq., at 176-177, paras. 20, 22 and 24; District Court of Tel Aviv-
Yafo (Israel), 30 December 2007, Yanko-Weiss Holdings (1996) Ltd v. Holon Assessing Office, 10 ITLR, 524 et 
seq., at 544; Authority for Advance Rulings  (India), 18 July 2008, Dell International Service India Pvt Ltd v. 




On the other hand, however, domestic courts and tribunals often use, as a starting point 
for their analysis and arguments, the definitions and the synonyms of the relevant treaty 
terms provided for in dictionaries.1409  
 
2.4. The object and purpose of the tax treaty 
 
National courts and tribunals often refer to the object and purpose of the relevant tax 
treaties, in particular as resulting from the preambles thereof,1410 in order to construe the 
                                                                                                                                  
CIT (International Taxation), 11 ITLR, 173 et seq., at 189, para. 12.7; Authority for Advance Rulings (India), 
26 June 2009, Cal Dive Marine Construction (Mauritius) Ltd v. Director of Income Tax, 12 ITLR, 38 et seq., at 
47-48, para. 6.4; Income Tax Appellate Tribunal of Delhi (India), 16 October 2009, New Skies Satellites NV v. 
Assistant Director of Income Tax & Shin Satellite Public Company Limited v. Deputy Director of Income Tax, 
12 ITLR, 409 et seq., at 427-428, para. 207; Authority for Advance Rulings  (India), 30 September 2009, 
Gearbulk AG v. Director of Income Tax, 12 ITLR, 495 et seq., at 503-504, paras. 9-9.1, with regard to the 
meaning of the expression “[i]tems of income […] not dealt with in the foregoing Articles” employed in 
Article 22 (corresponding to Article 21 OECD Model) of the 1994 India-Switzerland tax treaty, as amended by 
the 2000 protocol, and in particular to whether profits from the operation of ships in international traffic, which 
are explicitly excluded from the scope of Article 7 (dealing with business profits) of the treaty, could be 
considered to be “dealt with” in Article 7 and, therefore, excluded from the scope of Article 22; Tax Court 
(Canada), 8 April 2010, TD Securities (USA) LLC v. R, 12 ITLR, 783 et seq., at 812-813, paras. 51 and 54, and 
at 825, para. 99.   
See, however, Hoge Raad (Netherlands), 28 October 1998, case 32330, 1 ITLR, 551 et seq., at 559 and 564, 
where the Court distinguished between the terms “income” (“inkomsten” in the Dutch authentic text) and 
“items of income” (“bestanddelen van het inkomen” in the Dutch authentic text), included in Articles 27 and 
22, respectively, of the 1980 UK-Netherlands tax treaty, by considering capital gains denoted by the latter 
term, but not by the former.  
1409 See Federal Commission of Appeal in Tax Matters (Switzerland), 28 February 2001, Re V SA,  4 ITLR,  
191 et seq., at 209; Tax Court (Canada), 31 January 2002, Cheek v. R, 4 ITLR, 652 et seq., at 661, para 27; 
Income Tax Appellate Tribunal on Mumbai (India), 27 September 2001, Clifford Chance (United Kingdom) v. 
Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, 4 ITLR, 711 et seq., at 729-730, paras. 43-45; Tax Court (Canada), 8 
April 2005, Allchin v. R, 7 ITLR, 851 et seq., at 872, para. 52; Tax Court (Canada), 22 December 2005, 
Sutcliffe v. Canada, 8 ITLR, 563 et seq., at 590, para. 139; Tax Court (Canada), 24 October 2006, Canwest 
Mediaworks Inc v. Canada, 9 ITLR, 189 et seq., at 195, para. 11; Tax Court (Canada), 28 September 2007, 
Garcia v. Canada, 10 ITLR, 179 et seq., at 189, paras. 35-36; Tax Court (Canada), 22 April 2008, Prévost Car 
Inc v. R, 10 ITLR, 736 et seq., at 760, paras. 72-73; Income Tax Appellate Tribunal of Chennai (India), 19 May 
2008, West Asia Maritime Ltd and another v. Income Tax Officer, 10 ITLR, 965 et seq., at 969-970, para. 11-
14; Authority for Advance Rulings  (India), 18 July 2008, Dell International Service India Pvt Ltd v. CIT 
(International Taxation), 11 ITLR, 173 et seq., at 189-190, para. 12.7; Authority for Advance Rulings  (India), 
30 September 2009, Gearbulk AG v. Director of Income Tax, 12 ITLR, 495 et seq., at 503-504, para. 9; Federal 
Court of Appeal (Canada), 10 June 2010, Lingle v. R, 12 ITLR, 996 et seq., at 999, para. 7.  
For other references to case law where dictionaries have been used for the purpose of enlightening the ordinary 
meaning of undefined terms employed in the relevant tax treaties, see M. Edwardes-Ker, Tax Treaty 
Interpretation. The International Tax Treaties Service (Dublin: In-Depth, 1994 – loose-leaf), at 7.03. 
1410 The object and purpose of a tax treaty may be determined, of course, on the basis of elements other than the 
title or the preamble thereof, such as, for instance, the structure and goal of the relevant treaty articles. In this 
respect, it would be difficult to take seriously the statement that the only object and purpose of a tax treaty 
including OECD-type articles on exchange of information, assistance in the collection taxes and non-
discrimination is the avoidance of double taxation.  
On the other hand, it seems to the author that the actual inclusion of the expressions “prevention of fiscal 
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provisions thereof.1411  
                                                                                                                                  
evasion” or “prevention of fiscal evasion and avoidance” in the title of the treaty, or even the presence of an 
article on exchange of information in the corpus thereof, does not have a decisive weight for the purpose of 
deciding whether the tax treaty articles, in particular the distributive rules, may be construed so as to allow the 
prevention of perceived tax abuse or avoidance by the contracting States. The issue here is one of good faith in 
the interpretation and application of the treaty (by the contracting States; the taxpayer’s good faith being 
absolutely irrelevant in this respect) and of original common intention of the parties, i.e. whether it is 
reasonable to hold that the reciprocal surrender of taxing rights by the parties with a view to stimulating cross-
border economic relations (in particular trade and investments) was originally, or has later become, subject to, 
in the intention of the parties, the condition that no avoidance or abuse of the relevant domestic and treaty tax 
law provisions was at stake. The answer to such a question then becomes the foundation for deciding whether 
domestic anti-avoidance (re)characterizations of facts might affect the construction of the tax treaty provisions 
via Article 3(2), so that undefined legal jargon terms in the treaty might be given the meaning attributed thereto 
under domestic law anti-avoidance provisions or anti-abuse principles and, in the case of an affirmative 
answer, whether the context requires a different interpretation. In this respect, more than the title of the treaty, 
it seems relevant to ascertain whether in the domestic law of either contracting State at the time of the 
conclusion of the treaty, or later in both States, such anti-avoidance provisions and/or principles were present 
and the relevance they (have) had in the contracting State’s domestic law system (see more extensively infra, 
section 5.3 of this chapter; see also P. Arginelli et al., “The Royal Bank of Scotland case: More controversy on 
the interpretation of the term “beneficial owner””, in R. Russo and R. Fontana (eds.), A Decade of Case Law. 
Essays in honour of the 10th anniversary of the Leiden Adv LLM in International Tax Law (Amsterdam: IBFD 
Publications, 2008), 215 et seq., at 235-241).  
1411 See, for instance, High Court of Justice of England and Wales (United Kingdom), 9 February 1990, IRC v. 
Commerzbank, 63 TC 218, at  234-236; Administrative Appeals Tribunal of Adelaide (Australia), 3 April 
1998, Ngee Hin Chong v. CoT, 1 ITLR, 75 et seq., at 90, para. 35; Tax Court (Canada), 30 October 1998, 
Dudney v. R, 1 ITLR, 371 et seq., at 379; Supreme Court (Canada), 22 June 1995, Crown Forest v. Canada, 
[1995] 2 SCR 802, p. 822, para. 43, where Iacobucci J., quoting Addy J. in Federal Court (Canada), 22 January 
1985, The Estate of the Late John N Gladden v. R, 85 DTC 5188, stated that a “literal or legalistic 
interpretation must be avoided when the basic object of the treaty might be defeated or frustrated in so far as 
the particular item under consideration is concerned”; Federal Commission of Appeal in Tax Matters 
(Switzerland), 28 February 2001, Re V SA,  4 ITLR, 191 et seq., at 210, para. 7.bb. the Court stated that the 
search for the object and purpose of the treaty leads one to ask what the parties wished to achieve, and para. 
7.aaa., where the Court pointed out that tax treaties do not have as their object and purpose permitting persons 
that are not resident of either Contracting State from benefitting from the advantages of the treaty by 
interposing a conduit company; Conseil d’Etat (France), 28 June 2002, Re Société Schneider Electric, 4 ITLR, 
1077 et seq., at 1108, where the Court stated that the (alleged) treaty objective of combatting tax avoidance and 
evasion might not, in the absence of express provisions to that effect, derogate from the rules stated in the 
treaty (see, to the same effect, the conclusions of the Commissaire du Gouvernement at 1115 and 1117); 
Income Tax Appellate Tribunal of Mumbai (India), 1 March 2005, Hindalco Industries Ltd v. Assistant 
Commissioner of Income Tax, 8 ITLR, 1 et seq., at 9-10, paras. 11 and 13 (quoting Lord Denning in Court of 
Appeal of England and Wales (United Kingdom), 22 May 1974, H.P. Bulmer Ltd et al. v. J Bollinger S.A. et 
al., [1974] Ch 401, at 425-426); Court of Appeal of England and Wales (United Kingdom), 21 February 2007, 
UBS AG v, Revenue and Customs Commissioners, 9 ITLR, 767 et seq., at 788, para. 62 per Arden LJ.; Federal 
Court of Appeal (Canada), 13 June 2007, MIL (Investments) SA v. Canada, 9 ITLR, 1111 et seq., at 1113, 
paras. 5 and 6, where the Court, after having interpreted the treaty “purposively and contextually”, noted the 
following: “The appellant urged us to look behind this textual compliance with the relevant provisions to find 
an object or purpose whose abuse would justify our departure from the plain words of the disposition. We are 
unable to find such an object and purpose”; District Court of Tel Aviv-Yafo (Israel), 30 December 2007, 
Yanko-Weiss Holdings (1996) Ltd v. Holon Assessing Office, 10 ITLR, 524 et seq., at 544, where the Court 
stated that the object and purpose of tax treaties did not include the improper use of their provisions and the 
benefits they granted (one might question, however, whether such a statement takes us a step forward at all, 
since the issue is now what constitutes an improper use – abuse – of the treaty provisions); Federal Court 
(Australia), 22 October 2008, Deutsche Asia Pacific Finance Inc v. Commissioner of Taxation, 11 ITLR, 365 et 
seq., at 398, paras. 87-89; Income Tax Appellate Tribunal of Pune (India), 21 January 2009, DaimlerChrysler 
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 An illustration is given by Northrop J. of the Federal Court of Australia, who, 
when faced with the interpretation of Article 7 of the 1980 Australia-Switzerland tax 
treaty in the Thiel case, held that “[t]he policy behind the Agreement is to avoid the 
imposition of double taxation with respect to taxes on income. That is a stated purpose of 
the Agreement. If possible, the proper construction of the Agreement should be 
consistent with that policy or purpose.”1412  
 
Sometimes the object and purpose of the tax treaty even appear to be attributed a 
decisive weight for construing the relevant treaty provisions.  
 For instance, in the Re Austria-Germany double tax convention case,1413 the 
Austrian Verwaltungsgerichtshof, in deciding whether the 1954 Austria-Germany tax 
treaty (in particular Articles 4(1) and 15(1) thereof, corresponding to Articles 7(1) and 
23A(1) of the OECD Model) prevented Austria from taking into account the losses 
incurred by a resident taxpayer through its German permanent establishment1414 for the 
purpose of determining its taxable profits, considered that the treaty object and purpose, 
explicitly defined by Article 1(1) of the treaty as to ensure that persons resident in one or 
both the Contracting States did not incur double taxation, required an answer to that 
question in the negative. The Court found that the above-mentioned object and purpose 
made clear that the tax treaty was directed against increased taxation by means of 
multiple inclusion of revenue and, therefore, although within the limits imposed by the 
coexistence in the two contracting States of different rules to determine the taxable base 
and different tax rates, the treaty application should ideally lead to a taxation of income 
deriving from international operations that was neither grater, nor lesser than the taxation 
of comparable income from pure domestic operations.1415 Since, in purely domestic 
situations and in the absence of tax treaties, such a loss would have been deductible from 
                                                                                                                                  
India Private Ltd v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, 11 ITLR, 811 et seq., at 826-827 (citing Supreme 
Court (India), 7 October 2003, Union of India and another v. Azadi Bachao Andolan and another, 6 ITLR, 233 
et seq., at 279-280); Tax Court (Canada), 10 September 2009, Garron and others v. R, 12 ITLR, 79 et seq., at 
131-132, para. 381; Supreme Court (Japan), 29 October 2009, Glaxo Kabushiki Kaisha v. Director of 
Kojimachi Tax Office, 12 ITLR, 645 et seq., at 654-655, para. 5, where the Court concluded that only a 
“reasonable” domestic anti-tax haven rule could stand against a tax treaty, such as the 1994 Japan-Singapore 
tax treaty, purported to safeguard and promote bilateral economic transactions and to avoid international 
double taxation; Tax Court (Canada), 8 April 2010, TD Securities (USA) LLC v. R, 12 ITLR, 783 et seq., at 
813, para. 56 and at 824-825, para. 97. 
See also the cases reported in M. Edwardes-Ker, Tax Treaty Interpretation. The International Tax Treaties 
Service (Dublin: In-Depth, 1994 – loose-leaf) at 11.03, where courts and tribunals seem to swing, as is 
normally the case, between decisions more and other less teleologically oriented. 
1412 Federal Court (Australia), 20 December 1988, Thiel v. Commissioner of Taxation, [1988] FCA 443, at para. 
24 of the dissenting opinion of Northrop J. (upheld in High Court (Australia), 22 August 1990, Thiel v. 
Commissioner of Taxation, 171 Commonwealth Law Reports, 338 et seq.). 
1413 Verwaltungsgerichtshof (Austria), 25 September 2001, Re Austria-Germany double tax convention, 4 
ITLR, 547 et seq. 
1414 The losses accrued from the business carried on in Germany by a general partnership of which the Austrian 
resident taxpayer was  a partner; however, under both Austrian domestic law and the tax treaty, that partnership 
(‘s place of business) constituted a permanent establishment of the Austrian resident partner. 
1415 Verwaltungsgerichtshof (Austria), 25 September 2001, Re Austria-Germany double tax convention, 4 
ITLR, 547 et seq., at 554. 
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the taxpayer’s taxable base, the same result should occur where the tax treaty applied.1416 
 
2.5. The context under Article 31(2) VCLT 
 
National courts and tribunals generally analyse the structure of the provision that 
includes the term to be interpreted, as well as the meaning of the other terms employed 
therein, in order to construe the former. Moreover, they commonly make reference to 
other provisions of the same tax treaty for the purpose of construing the provision 
debated between the parties, both where such other provisions are part of the very same 
treaty article and where they are not (including the provisions incorporated in later 
protocols).1417 The same holds true with regard to the treaty preamble, which is 
                                                     
1416 The Court also found such a conclusion to be in accordance with the general principle that tax treaties do 
no more than limit the taxing rights of the contracting States and, by no means, extend tax liability as 
determined under domestic law (see Verwaltungsgerichtshof (Austria), 25 September 2001, Re Austria-
Germany double tax convention, 4 ITLR, 547 et seq., at 555). 
1417 See Hoge Raad (Netherlands), 28 October 1998, case 32330, 1 ITLR, 551 et seq., at 559 and 564; Tax 
Court (United States), 18 November 1999, Compaq v.  CIR (the ACT credit claim), 2 ITLR, 323 et seq., at 331 
and 333, where reference was also made to the “general structure” of the treaty; Federal Court of Australia, 16 
May 2000, Ngee Hin Chong v. CoT, in 2 ITLR, 707 et seq., at 715 and 723-725, where the Court referred to the 
possibility to find indications in favor of a certain interpretation by looking at the relevant tax treaty “as a 
whole”; Hoge Raad (Netherlands), 1 November 2000, case 35398, 3 ITLR, 466 et seq., at 483, para. 3.4, 
highlighting that, under Article 31 VCLT, the meaning to be attributed to undefined terms should be the one 
that best fits in the context of the treaty as a whole; Administrative Court of Appeal of Paris (France), 30 
January 2001, Re Schneider SA, 3 ITLR, 529 et seq., at 545, where the Court stated, with regard to the 
interrelation between domestic CFC rules and the 1966 France-Switzerland tax treaty, that from none of the 
provisions of that treaty did it appear that the objective of fighting tax avoidance and evasion permitted a 
derogation from the clear rule of Article 7 thereof, according to which the profits of a Swiss resident company 
might be taxed solely in Switzerland; Tax Court (Canada), 27 June 2002, Edwards v. R, 5 ITLR, 1 et seq., at 
33, paras. 70-71, where the Court pointed out that, in order to determine whether a person residing in Hong 
Kong (after 1997) and liable to Hong Kong taxes was to be regarded, for the purpose of Article 4 of the 1986 
Canada-China tax treaty, as liable to tax in China by reason of his residence “under the laws of that 
Contracting State”, it was necessary to construe the expression “under the laws of that Contracting State” 
against the background of Article 2 of the treaty (Taxes Covered); ibidem at 35-36, paras. 80-82, with regard to 
the need to construe Articles 3, 4, 23 and 24 of the 1986 Canada-China tax treaty in a harmonious fashion, in 
order to avoid internal inconsistencies that might jeopardize the functioning of the treaty; Hoge Raad 
(Netherlands), 21 February 2003, case 37024, 5 ITLR, 818 et seq., at 876, para. 3.6, where the Court, after 
having argued that the expression “is present” in Article 15(2)(a) of the Netherlands-Nigeria tax treaty, read in 
the context of that provision, indicated unmistakably physical presence, noted that there was nothing elsewhere 
in the treaty or the explanatory notes to indicate that the contracting States had a different meaning in mind; 
Federal Court (Australia), 29 April 2005, McDermott Industries (Aust) Pty Ltd v. Commissioner of Taxation, 7 
ITLR, 800 et seq., at 816-817, paras. 56-61, where the Court analysed the treaty provision to be interpreted, i.e. 
Article 4(3) of the 1969 Australia-Singapore tax treaty, against the background of the whole Article 4 of that 
treaty, in particular Article 4(1) thereof, and concluded that Article 4(3) (i.e. the permanent establishment 
deeming provision) was substantially independent from Article 4(1) (i.e. the permanent establishment general 
provision); Income Tax Appellate Tribunal of Mumbai (India), 1 March 2005, Hindalco Industries Ltd v. 
Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, 8 ITLR, 1 et seq., at 12, para. 17, and at 16, para. 24; High Court 
(Ireland), 31 July 2007, Kinsella v. Revenue Commissioners, 10 ITLR, 63 et seq., at 74, where the Court 
referred to Article 12 (Capital Gains) of the 1971 Italy-Ireland tax treaty in order to construe Article 2(2) 
thereof and concluded that the Irish Capital Gains Tax was to be regarded as a tax on income for the purpose of 
that tax treaty; Income Tax Appellate Tribunal of Pune (India), 10 September 2008, Automated Securities 
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frequently referred to in order to establish the object and purpose of the relevant tax 
treaty.1418 
For example, in the Ngee Hin Chong case,1419 the Administrative Appeals 
Tribunal of Adelaide (Australia), in order to support its interpretation of the expression 
“shall be taxable in that State” included in Article 18(2) of the English authentic text of 
the 1981 Australia-Malaysia tax treaty,1420 noted that, where the contracting States 
intended to deny the taxing right to one of them, they explicitly did so by using the term 
“only” in the English authentic text of the tax treaty, as for instance in Articles 7, 8, 14, 
17 and 18(1) thereof.1421 Similarly, the Tribunal noted that Articles 22 and 23, for the 
purpose of eliminating juridical double taxation by means of the credit method, made 
reference, inter alia, to Article 18 and that such a reference could be said not to be 
absurd only where Article 18(2) was construed as allowing concurrent taxation.1422 
 
                                                                                                                                  
Clearance Inc v. Income Tax Officer, 11 ITLR, 201 et seq., at 222, para. 38, where the tribunal made reference 
to Article 26(5) of the 1989 India-United States tax treaty for the purpose of interpreting Article 26(2) thereof; 
Special Commissioners (United Kingdom), 19 November 2008, Bayfine UK Products and another v. Revenue 
and Customs Commissioners, 11 ITLR, 440 et seq., at 478-481, where the Special Commissioners outlined (i) 
the way in which the distributive rules generally allocate taxing rights between the two contracting States with 
regard to the different categories of income (concurrent or exclusive taxation) and (ii) the circumstances under 
which the allocation under (i) might be modified under the 1975 United Kingdom-United States tax treaty (i.e. 
where the domestic CFC legislation applies, partnerships are involved, or the treaty “saving clause” operates), 
as a background against which to construe the interaction between Articles 1(4) and 23 of the above-mentioned 
treaty; ibidem, at 482-483, paras. 66 and 68; Federal Court (Australia), 22 October 2008, Deutsche Asia Pacific 
Finance Inc v. Commissioner of Taxation, 11 ITLR, 365 et seq., at 395-396, para. 82, where the Court made 
extensive references to Articles 10, 11(5) and 11(6) for the purpose of construing Article 11(9)(a) of the 1982 
Australia-United States tax treaty; Authority for Advance Rulings  (India), 26 June 2009, Cal Dive Marine 
Construction (Mauritius) Ltd v. Director of Income Tax, 12 ITLR, 38 et seq., at 47, paras. 6.2 and 6.3, where 
the authority pointed out the relevance, for interpretative purposes, of the contextual setting of the provision to 
be construed and noted that “[p]aragraph 1 of Article 5 [of the relevant tax treaty could] not be viewed as a 
water-tight compartment without taking colour from or shedding light on various clauses of para 2”; Supreme 
Court (Japan), 29 October 2009, Glaxo Kabushiki Kaisha v. Director of Kojimachi Tax Office, 12 ITLR, 645 et 
seq., at 653-654, para. 4, where the Court analysed Article 7(1) of the 1994 Japan-Singapore tax treaty as a 
whole in order to conclude that it only prohibited juridical double taxation and, therefore, did not prevent Japan 
from applying its CFC rule to a resident taxpayer investing in a company resident in Singapore; Court of 
Appeal of England and Wales (United Kingdom), 8 July 2010, Smallwood and another v. Revenue and 
Customs Commissioners, 12 ITLR, 1002 et seq., at 1018, para. 28, where the Patten LJ analysed the structure of 
the 1981 Mauritius-United Kingdom tax treaty (distinguishing, in particular, the function played by the 
“distributive rules” articles, on the one hand, from that of the article dealing with the elimination of double 
taxation, on the other hand) for the purpose of determining the goals that articles 4 and 13 of that treaty were 
designed to achieve, which, in turn “largely colour[ed] the interpretation of the provisions themselves”; ibidem, 
at 1022, paras. 40-41.  
1418 See section 2.3.3.1 of Chapter 3 of Part II. 
1419 Administrative Appeals Tribunal of Adelaide (Australia), 3 April 1998, Ngee Hin Chong v. CoT, 1 ITLR, 
75 et seq.  
1420 As well as the expression “may be taxed”, which represented the English translation, agreed upon by the 
parties to the litigation, of the corresponding Malaysian expression included in the Malaysia authentic text of 
the treaty. 
1421 See Administrative Appeals Tribunal of Adelaide (Australia), 3 April 1998, Ngee Hin Chong v. CoT, 1 
ITLR, 75 et seq., at 91, para. 38. 
1422 See ibidem, at 90-91, paras. 36-37. 
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In addition, where an instrument made by a contracting State in connection with the 
conclusion (here intended as a process) of the relevant tax treaty has been publicly 
recognized by the other contracting State as an instrument related to that treaty and 
reflecting the common understanding reached in the course of the negotiations, courts 
and tribunals often take it into account for the purpose of interpreting the treaty as 
provided for in Article 31(2)(b) VCLT. 
An instance thereof is represented by the Technical Explanations issued by the 
United States Treasury Department in connection with the conclusion of the 1980 
Canada-United States tax treaty and accepted by the Canadian Minister of Finance as 
accurately reflecting the understanding reached by the parties in the course of the 
negotiations with regard to the interpretation of that treaty.1423 
 
2.6. The other means of interpretation provided for by Article 31(3) VCLT 
 
National courts and tribunals not infrequently attribute relevance to the case law of the 
other State party to the tax treaty to be interpreted, given that it constitutes evidence of 
the understanding of that State of the relevant treaty provisions. As further mentioned in 
section 3 of this chapter, this holds true even where the provisions interpreted by the 
foreign courts and tribunals are part of a tax treaty concluded by the treaty partner with 
another State.1424  
 Obviously, where such judicial practice is consistently followed by courts and 
tribunals of both contracting States, it falls within the scope of Article 31(3)(b) VCLT, 
which provides that the interpreter must also take into account any subsequent practice 
in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding 
its interpretation. 
                                                     
1423 See Canadian Department of Finance Press Releases 81-16 of 4 February 1981 and 84-128 of 16 August 
1984. With reference to case law, see, for instance, Supreme Court (Canada), 22 June 1995, Crown Forest v. 
Canada, [1995] 2 SCR 802, at para. 64. Seemingly contra, Federal Court of Appeal (Canada), 26 September 
1997, Attorney General of Canada v. William F. Kubicek, 97 DTC 5454, at para. 10, which, however, appears 
to focus on the weight to be given to the United States Technical Explanation, as endorsed by the Canadian 
Minister of Finance, for interpretative purpose at the domestic law level (tax treaty as a Canadian statute), 
rather than at the international level (tax treaty as an international agreement). See also B. J. Arnold et al., 
Ward’s Tax Law and Planning. Volume 6 (Toronto: The Carwell Co. Ltd., 1983), pp. 21 et seq. and M. 
Edwardes-Ker, Tax Treaty Interpretation. The International Tax Treaties Service (Dublin: In-Depth, 1994 – 
loose-leaf), at 25.06. 
1424 See, for instance, Supreme Court (Canada), 22 June 1995, Crown Forest v. Canada, [1995] 2 SCR 802, p. 
822, para. 43; Federal Court  (Switzerland), 29 November 2005, A Holding ApS v. Federal Tax Administration, 
8 ITLR, 536 et seq., at 557, para 3.4.4., where reference was made to the fact that the principle of abuse of 
rights was recognized by the judiciary of the other Contracting State (Denmark); Tax Court (Canada), 22 April 
2008, Prévost Car Inc v. R, 10 ITLR, 736 et seq., at 751-753, para. 43, where reference was made to a decision 
of the Hoge Raad of the Netherlands, for the purpose of construing the term “beneficial owner” as used in the 
1986 Canada-Netherlands tax treaty; Income Tax Appellate Tribunal of Pune (India), 21 January 2009, 
DaimlerChrysler India Private Ltd v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, 11 ITLR, 811 et seq., at 839-840, 
paras. 57-59; Tax Court (Canada), 9 September 2009, Lingle v. R, 12 ITLR, 55 et seq., at 67-68, para. 15, 
where the Court made reference to a decision of the United States Tax Court on the meaning of the term 
“habitual abode” in order to construe Article IV(2) of the 1980 Canada-United States tax treaty.  




Similarly, national courts and tribunals sometimes take into account the common 
practice of the contracting States’ tax authorities and governmental organs in order to 
construe the relevant tax treaty provisions and argue in support of the chosen 
interpretation thereof.1425 This approach is clearly in line with Article 31(3)(b) VCLT.1426 
In particular, where the competent court or tribunal concludes that the contracting 
States tax authorities’ common practice is sufficiently unambiguous and consistent, it is 
rare that it rejects the construction of the relevant tax treaty provisions resulting from 
                                                     
1425 See Supreme Court (United States), Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982), at 
184-85; Supreme Court (Canada), 22 June 1995, Crown Forest v. Canada, [1995] 2 SCR 802, para. 63; Tax 
Court (Canada), 27 June 2002, Edwards v. R, 5 ITLR, 1 et seq., at 33-35, paras. 72, 73 and 77; Court of Federal 
Claims (United States), 14 November 2003, National Westminster Bank plc v. United States of America, 6 
ITLR, 292 et seq., at 315-317 where the Court seemed to attribute weight to the historical position of the 
United Kingdom regarding the proper interpretation of Article 7 of the 1975 United States-United Kingdom tax 
treaty, in order to construe this provision; Federal Court  (Switzerland), 29 November 2005, A Holding ApS v. 
Federal Tax Administration, 8 ITLR, 536 et seq., at 557, para. 3.4.4., where the Court made reference to the 
subsequent practice of the other contracting State (Denmark) to enter into tax treaties containing anti-abuse 
provisions in order to construe in an anti-abuse fashion the 1973 Denmark-Switzerland tax treaty; Tax Court 
(Canada), 24 October 2006, Canwest Mediaworks Inc v. Canada, 9 ITLR, 189 et seq., at 193, para. 17, where 
the Court noted that there had been no public or published statements by the governments of the contracting 
States (Canada and Barbados), nor any agencies or subdivisions thereof, nor any exchange of diplomatic notes, 
nor other internal documents (to the best of the Court’s knowledge) dealing with the issue at stake before the 
Court (i.e. the interaction between Articles XXVII(3) and XXX(2) of the 1980 Barbados-Canada tax treaty); 
Court of Appeals (United States), 15 January 2008, National Westminster Bank plc v. United States of 
America, 10 ITLR, 423 et seq., at 436-439, where, for the purpose of interpreting Article 7 of the 1975 United 
Kingdom-United States tax treaty in connection with bank inter-branch transactions (interest on internal 
“loans”), the Court made reference to both (i) the contracting States’ conduct contemporaneous to the treaty 
negotiations and conclusion and (ii) their subsequent conduct (the United Kingdom government also 
submitted, in that respect, an amicus curiae brief to the court), noting that the approach followed by the US 
government after the introduction of Treasury Regulation § 1.882-5 was publicly registered for the first time in 
the 1984 OECD Report Transfer Pricing and Multinational Enterprises and, thus, it could not be directly used 
(absent any evidence to the contrary) to support the view that it reflected the understanding of the United 
States, and even less that of both parties (the United Kingdom dissenting in that respect), at the time of the 
treaty conclusion; Tax Court (Canada), 8 April 2010, TD Securities (USA) LLC v. R, 12 ITLR, 783 et seq., at 
820-822, paras. 80-87, where the Court made reference to the Canadian Revenue Authority’s practice with 
regard to the application of tax treaties to income derived by fiscally transparent entities (other than United 
States limited liability companies – “LLC”), and at 822-824, paras. 90-94, where it made reference to the 
United States’ practice on the same matter, in order to get some evidence of the possible common 
understanding of Canada and the Unites States with reference to the application of their 1980 tax treaty to 
income derived by a United States LLC.  
1426 It is worth noting that the Finnish Supreme Administrative Court, in the case Re A Oyj Abp, recorded the 
divergence of opinion of the two contracting States (Belgium and Finland) Ministries of Finance regarding the 
compatibility of the Finnish CFC rule with the relevant tax treaty and, thus, the impossibility of ascertaining 
directly the common intention or position of the parties with respect to such an issue, before arguing in favor of 
the compatibility on the basis (also) of the OECD Commentary (see Supreme Administrative Court (Finland), 
20 March 2002, Re A Oyj Abp, 4 ITLR, 1009 et seq., at 1066). See also Bundesfinanzhof (Germany), 17 
October 2007, Re a Partnership, 10 ITLR, 628 et seq., at 653-654, where the Court seemed to be theoretically 
willing to take into account the subsequent consistent practice of the parties for the purpose of interpreting tax 
treaties, but, in the specific case, found that the German tax authorities had failed to prove that the factual 
application of the 1989 Germany-United States tax treaty by the two contracting States mirrored their 
consistent view on the construction of the relevant provisions of the treaty, thus concluding that Article 
31(3)(b) VCLT was not applicable in such circumstances. 




According to the majority of scholars,1428 mutual agreements reached by the competent 
authorities of the contracting States and purported to resolve issues concerning the 
interpretation of the relevant tax treaties under provisions similar to Article 25(3) OECD 
Model are binding on the contracting States at the international law level. In such a case, 
in fact, the competent authorities act as duly authorized representatives of the contracting 
States and, therefore, the mutual agreement reached thereby is to be regarded as a 
“subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or 
the application of its provisions” under Article 31(3)(a) VCLT.  
Similarly, paragraph 54 of the Commentary to Article 25 OECD Model states that 
“[m]utual agreements resolving general difficulties on interpretation or application are 
binding on administrations as long as the competent authorities do not agree to modify 
or rescind the mutual agreement” and paragraph 13.1 of the Commentary to Article 3 
OECD Model explicitly maintains that mutual agreements should be taken into account 
for the purpose of interpreting undefined treaty terms. 
The absence of national case law confirming the bindingness of mutual 
agreements for interpretative purposes is mainly due to the fact that, in general, their 
relevance at the domestic law level depends on whether certain legal requirements (in 
terms of form and procedure) imposed by the constitutions of the contracting States are 
satisfied, this often not being the case.1429 
 
Finally, it has been persuasively argued that rules and principles of European Union law 
should be regarded as “rules of international law applicable in the relations between the 
parties” under Article 31(3)(c) VCLT for the purpose of construing tax treaties 
                                                     
1427 Contra, however, Court of Appeal of Liege (Belgium), 14 January 1998, Verast & Folens v. Belgium, 1 
ITLR, 435 et seq., at 449, where the Court stated that the Belgian tax administration, which relied on the 
corresponding practice of the tax administration of the other contracting State (France), failed to establish that 
the latter tax administration did not misunderstand the rule enshrined in the relevant treaty provision; 
Bundesfinanzhof (Germany), 2 September 2009, Re a German-Belgian Competent Authority Agreement, 12 
ITLR, 475 et seq., at 490-491, where the Court (confusingly) held that the mutual agreement reached by the 
competent tax authorities under Article 25 of the 1967 Belgium-Germany tax treaty, with a view to solving the 
issue of double non-taxation of severance payments made to Belgian resident individuals working in Germany, 
represented a change in the tax treaty and not an interpretation of it since it went further than the clear text of 
Article 15 of the treaty allowed and, therefore, on the one hand, it could not be properly viewed as a 
subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or a subsequent practice 
establishing the agreed interpretation thereof  under Article 31(3)VCLT and, on the other hand, it could not 
have any effect on German courts unless incorporated into domestic law. 
1428 See, for instance, M. Edwardes-Ker, Tax Treaty Interpretation. The International Tax Treaties Service 
(Dublin: In-Depth, 1994 – loose-leaf), at 16.01; A. A. Skaar, “The Legal Nature of Mutual Agreements Under 
Tax Treaties”, Tax Notes International (1992), 1441 et seq., at 1446-1447; K. Vogel et al., Klaus Vogel on 
Double Taxation Conventions (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997), p. 47, m.no. 82c; F. Engelen, 
Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2004), pp. 431-434.  
1429 See M. Edwardes-Ker, Tax Treaty Interpretation. The International Tax Treaties Service (Dublin: In-
Depth, 1994 – loose-leaf), at 16.03 and 27.03-27.06; F. Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under 
International Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2004), p. 433; K. Vogel et al., Klaus Vogel on Double 
Taxation Conventions (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997), pp. 47-48, m.nos. 82d and 82e and case 
law referred to there. 
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concluded between European Union Member States.1430 This conclusion is in line with 
that supported by the author in section 2.3.3.4 of Chapter 3 of Part II. 
 
2.7. Supplementary means of interpretation under Article 32 VCLT and other 
extrinsic materials 
 
National courts and tribunals sometimes mention official documents prepared by the 
competent ministries or parliamentary committees in the course of the ratification 
process. Similarly, reference is at times made to the positions of the contracting States’ 
tax authorities and the interpretations put forward in the commentaries to national tax 
treaty models.  
 These documents, being unilateral in nature, do not directly shed light on the 
common understanding of the parties in respect of the relevant tax treaties and, thus, 
cannot be categorized either as (typical) travaux préparatoires, or as means of 
interpretation referred to in Article 31(3)(a) and (b).  
 However, it cannot be disputed that they constitute evidence of the understanding 
of one of the contracting States and, as such, may be certainly be taken into account as 
supplementary means of interpretation.1431 The actual weight that the content of these 
documents is to be attributed for the purpose of construing the relevant tax treaty 
provisions depends on the other items of evidence available and on the reasonableness of 
the interpretations provided for therein.1432  
                                                     
1430 See F. Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 
2004), p. 436; F. Avella, “Il beneficiario effettivo nelle convenzioni contro le doppie imposizioni: prime 
pronunce nella giurisprudenza di merito e nuovi spunti di discussione”, Rivista di Diritto Tributario. Parte 
Quinta (2011), 14 et seq., pp. 25 et seq., in particular footnote 32; F. Avella, “Using EU Law To Interpret 
Undefined Tax Treaty Terms: Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and Article 
3(2) of the OECD Model Convention”, World Tax Journal (2012), 95 et seq., at 97 et seq.   
1431 See, broadly in agreement, M. Edwardes-Ker, Tax Treaty Interpretation. The International Tax Treaties 
Service (Dublin: In-Depth, 1994 – loose-leaf), Chapter 25, in particular at 25.02; contrary, K. Vogel et al., 
Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997), p.34, m.no. 71. 
1432 See Court of Federal Claims (United States), 7 July 1999, National Westminster Bank v. US, 1 ITLR, 725 et 
seq., at 735, referring to the 1977 United States Treasury Department Technical Explanation concerning the 
1975 United States-United Kingdom tax treaty and to the Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations dated 25 April 1978 concerning its favorable recommendation of the same treaty; similarly, Court of 
Federal Claims (United States), 14 November 2003, National Westminster Bank plc v. United States of 
America, 6 ITLR, 292 et seq., at 306-307, where the Court, however, pointed out that, even where it was to 
read the above-mentioned documents as supporting the position of the US government in the dispute (which 
was not the case), the unilateral view of the United States were not controlling the proper construction of the 
1975 United States-United Kingdom tax treaty, since the Court had to give meaning to the common intention 
of the treaty parties; Tax Court (United States), 18 November 1999, Compaq v.  CIR (the ACT credit claim), 2 
ITLR, 323 et seq., at 332-333, where the Court made reference (i) to the United States Treasury Department 
Technical Explanation to the 1975 United States-United Kingdom tax treaty and (ii) to the US Rev. Proc. 80-
18 and concluded that, as unilateral documents, they presented no reason to deviate from the intention of the 
contracting States as evidenced by the structure of the tax treaty and the plain meaning of the language of the 
relevant provision; Federal Court of Australia, 16 May 2000, Ngee Hin Chong v. CoT, 2 ITLR, 707 et seq., at 
719, where reference was made to the explanatory memorandum accompanying the Bill that gave effect to the 
1980 Australia-Malaysia tax treaty (which the Court found equivocal and of little assistance) and to the Second 
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 Of course, the same holds true with regard to the case law of the treaty partner’s 
courts and tribunals,1433 as well as to that State’s subsequently implemented domestic 
law provisions, which interact (or might interact) with the tax treaty articles to be 
                                                                                                                                  
Reading speech introducing that Bill (which the Court also found equivocal); Federal Commission of Appeal 
in Tax Matters (Switzerland), 28 February 2001, Re V SA,  4 ITLR, 191 et seq., at 211; Supreme 
Administrative Court (Finland), 20 March 2002, Re A Oyj Abp, 4 ITLR, 1009 et seq., at 1061- 1062, where the 
Court referred to Government Bill no. 155/1994 vp dealing with the compatibility of the newly introduced 
Finnish CFC rule with the tax treaties to which Finland was party; Tax Court (Canada), 24 February 2003, 
Cloutier v. R, 5 ITLR, 878 et seq., at 881, para. 6 where reference was made to the United States Technical 
Explanation to Article XIX of the 1980 Canada-United States tax treaty (see ibidem at 887, paras. 15 and 16), 
para. 7 where reference is made to the United States Technical Explanation to Article 19 of the United States 
Model Income Tax Convention (see ibidem at 888, paras. 19 and 20), and at 882, para. 9 where the Court held 
that, although not constituting authority on a question of law, the United States Technical Explanations are “an 
element to be taken into account in the interpretation process” of the tax treaty; Tax Court (Canada), 28 
September 2007, Garcia v. Canada, 10 ITLR, 179 et seq., at 184, para. 13, where the Court referred to the 
Canada Revenue Agency Interpretation Bulletin IT-221R3 for the purpose to construe the term “permanent 
home” as used in Article IV(2) of the 1980 Canada-United States tax treaty; Court of Appeals (United States), 
15 January 2008, National Westminster Bank plc v. United States of America, 10 ITLR, 423 et seq., at 432-433, 
where reference was made to the United States Technical Explanation to the 1975 United Kingdom-United 
States tax treaty (submitted to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee), regarded by the Court as part of the 
“entire context” that must be taken into account for the purpose of construing that treaty; ibidem, at 438, where 
the Court held that, since a treaty must be interpreted so as to give effect to the intent of both parties, a 
government’s position merits less deference where that government and the one of the other contracting State 
disagree on the meaning of the treaty; ibidem, at 439, where the Court concluded that its construction of Article 
7 of the 1975 United Kingdom-United States tax treaty found direct support in the contemporary understanding 
of the United Kingdom, as evidenced by its contemporaneous and subsequent practice, as well as in the OECD 
Commentary to Article 7 of the 1963 OECD Draft, on which the treaty was based (moreover, the Court noted 
that there was very little evidence that the contemporary understanding of the United States differed in any way 
from that of the United Kingdom, although its subsequent practice clearly did); Income Tax Appellate Tribunal 
of Pune (India), 10 September 2008, Automated Securities Clearance Inc v. Income Tax Officer, 11 ITLR, 201 
et seq., at 219-220, paras. 30-32, where the Tribunal noted that the Technical Explanation to the United States 
Model Tax Convention, representing an authoritative statement on the treaty policy of the United States and 
being binding thereon, has a strong persuasive value on the ground of reciprocity as well for the purpose of 
construing the 1989 India-United States tax treaty, since one should suppose that India was aware of the United 
States Model Tax Convention and its accompanying Technical Explanation when negotiating the treaty and 
thus, as a corollary, it should be assumed that once an expression appearing in such a Model is being used in 
the tax treaty, that expression should be given the same meaning assigned to it in the Technical Explanation, 
unless evidence to the contrary exists (quite surprisingly, the Tribunal went on by stating that whenever a 
conflict exists between the OECD Commentary and the Technical Explanation to the United States Model, the 
former has to give way to the latter: the Tribunal did not seem to consider that the OECD Commentary is, to a 
very large extent, reproduced in or referred to by the Commentary to the United Nations Model, in the drafting 
of which India is involved); District Court of Oslo (Norway), 16 December 2009, Dell Products (NUF) v. Tax 
East, 12 ITLR, 829 et seq., at 857-858, where the Court referred to a letter of the Norwegian Ministry of 
Finance dated 4 April 2000, in which it was stated that under OECD Model-type tax treaties, the conclusion of 
contracts by an agent on behalf of the principal leads to a permanent establishment of the latter in the State 
where the former acts as if the contracts “in reality” bind the principal, even if they are not directly legally 
binding thereon.  
With regard to older case law, see M. Edwardes-Ker, Tax Treaty Interpretation. The International Tax Treaties 
Service (Dublin: In-Depth, 1994 – loose-leaf), at 28.03, 28.04 and, with specific regard to the United States, 
28.17 and 28.18. 
1433 References to courts and tribunals’ decisions where the case law of the other contracting States’ courts and 
tribunals are taken into account for the purpose of interpreting tax treaties are included in section 3 of this 
chapter. 





It is interesting to note that, in some cases, national courts and tribunals have also 
referred to the circumstances of the conclusion of the relevant tax treaty in order to 
interpret it, such as the domestic tax laws in force in the contracting States at the time of 
the treaty conclusion1435 and the international legal framework relevant to one of the 
contracting States, but not to the other.  
 For instance, in the Re V SA case,1436 the Federal Commission (Switzerland) noted 
that the reason1437 for the adoption of Article 10(2)(b) of the 1993 Luxembourg-
Switzerland tax treaty was to extend, to the relation between the two contracting States, 
                                                     
1434 See, for instance, Bundesfinanzhof (Germany), 5 March 1986, case IR 201/82, Bundessteuerblatt. Teil II 
(1986), 496 et seq., where the Court attributed relevance to the fact that the other contracting State 
(Switzerland) had enacted, after the conclusion of the 1931 Germany-Switzerland tax treaty, a domestic law 
provision purported to prevent abuse of its own tax treaties (i.e. the Swiss Federal Decree of 14 December 
1962), for the purpose of arguing that the German relevant domestic law anti-abuse provision (Article 6(1) of 
the German Steueranpassungsgesetz) could be applied to situations covered by that treaty. 
1435 See Federal Court (Canada), 22 January 1985, The Estate of the Late John N Gladden v. R, 85 DTC 5188, 
para. 19, where Addy J. referred to the United States tax law on capital gains in force at the time of the 
conclusion of the 1942 Canada-United States tax treaty, as part of the “surrounding circumstances when the 
treaty was signed”, in order to explain why that treaty employed the term “sale or exchange” in connection 
with the obligation of the source State to exempt capital gains derived by a resident of the other State; Federal 
Court  (Switzerland), 29 November 2005, A Holding ApS v. Federal Tax Administration, 8 ITLR, 536 et seq., at 
557, where the Court noted that Denmark, during the negotiations of the 1973 Denmark-Switzerland tax treaty, 
did not make any reservation on the application of the resolution of the Federal Council of Switzerland of 14 
December 1962, concerning measures against the unjustified use of tax treaties, which had already an impact 
on the former 1957 Denmark-Switzerland tax treaty (it might also be held that such an absence of explicit 
reservation on behalf of Denmark, together with the previous application by Switzerland of the above-
mentioned resolution to situations covered by the 1957 treaty, amounted to a tacit agreement between the 
parties allowing the application of anti-abusive measures by Switzerland to situations covered by the new 
(1973) tax treaty; in that case, the tacit agreement would be relevant as part of the context under Article 31(2) 
VCLT); Bundesfinanzhof (Germany), 17 October 2007, Re a Partnership, 10 ITLR, 628 et seq., at 650, where 
the Court held that the expression “business property of [such] a permanent establishment” used in the 1989 
Germany-United States tax treaty was chosen instead of the OECD Model expression “effectively connected 
with [such] a permanent establishment” because, under the previous 1954 Germany-United States tax treaty, 
the latter expression was to be construed in accordance with the United States domestic law under a mutual 
agreement entered into by the tax authorities of the contracting States and, thus, by not including such an 
expression the parties wanted to prevent the impression that the interpretation agreed upon in the mutual 
agreement was to be applied also in respect of the 1989 treaty; Federal Court (Australia), 22 October 2008, 
Deutsche Asia Pacific Finance Inc v. Commissioner of Taxation, 11 ITLR, 365 et seq., at 395, para. 81, where 
the Court took into account the domestic tax law policy of the United States, which triggered the inclusion of 
Article 11(9)(a) in the 1982 Australia-United States tax treaty, but concluded that the construction and 
application of the taxing right of Australia under Article 11(9)(a) could not be controlled by the United States 
domestic tax law policy, since the text of the article, read in its context, pointed to a different construction. See 
also Belgian Tax Authorities, Circular Letter No. AFZ/2004/0053 of 16 January 2004, where it is stated that 
the domestic law of the other contracting State (in particular the meaning that an undefined treaty term has 
under such law) should be taken into account as part of the context in order to construe Belgian tax treaties.  
1436 Federal Commission of Appeal in Tax Matters (Switzerland), 28 February 2001, Re V SA,  4 ITLR, 191 et 
seq., at 211 and 212. 
1437 Such a reason apparently resulted from the Swiss domestic “travaux préparatoires” to the 1993 
Luxembourg-Switzerland tax treaty. 
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the benefits provided for by the Parent-Subsidiary Directive1438 and, therefore, Article 
10(2)(b) was to be interpreted against the background of that directive as a whole. Since 
Article 1(2) of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive provided that the provisions of national 
law or tax treaties concerning the prevention of evasion and abuse might continue to 
operate, the Federal Commission concluded that the same should apply with regard to 
Article 10(2)(b) of the 1993 Luxembourg-Switzerland tax treaty, which was purported to 
do no more than to extend the scope of the directive benefits. 
 
In the same vein, national courts and tribunals sometimes analyse the previous and 
subsequent tax treaties concluded between the very same contracting States (as well as 
protocols modifying the relevant tax treaty), in order to draw some evidence by way of 
inference from the changes in the wording used.1439 
 
Another recurrent feature of national case law is the reference to the work of worldwide-
recognized scholars in the field of international taxation, in general, and of tax treaties, 
in particular. Thus, it is not rare to find citations of the works of Vogel, Baker and (the 
members of) the International Tax Group as authorities confirming the interpretation in 
favor of which the relevant court or tribunal is arguing.  
 The frequency of such references is so high1440 that one could get the impression 
                                                     
1438 Directive 90/435/EEC of the European Economic Community.  
1439 See, for instance, Tax Court (Canada), 24 February 2003, Cloutier v. R, 5 ITLR, 878 et seq., at 889, para. 
22 
1440 See, among many, Authority for Advance Rulings (India), 18 March 1997, TVM Ltd v. CIT, 1 ITLR, 296 et 
seq., at 315-316; Tax Court (Canada), 30 October 1998, Dudney v. R, 1 ITLR, 371 et seq., at 376; Authority for 
Advance Rulings (India), 28 April 1999, Y’s Application, 2 ITLR, 66 et seq., at 78 and 81; Federal Court of 
Australia, 16 May 2000, Ngee Hin Chong v. CoT, 2 ITLR, 707 et seq., at 715-716; Federal Commission of 
Appeal in Tax Matters (Switzerland), 28 February 2001, Re V SA,  4 ITLR, 191 et seq., at 208 and 210; 
Verwaltungsgerichtshof (Austria), 25 September 2001, Re Austria-Germany double tax convention, 4 ITLR, 
547 et seq., at 555; Tax Court (Canada), 27 June 2002, Edwards v. R, 5 ITLR, 1 et seq., at 31, paras. 62-63, at 
33, paras 69-70, and at 35, para. 79; New South Wales Supreme Court (Australia), 4 December 2002, Unisys 
Corp v. FCT, 5 ITLR, 658 et seq., at 676-678, paras. 67-70 and 76; Borgarting Appeals Court (Norway), 13 
August 2003, PGS Geographical AS v. Government of Norway, 6 ITLR, 212 et seq., at 229; Supreme Court 
(India), 7 October 2003, Union of India and another v. Azadi Bachao Andolan and another, 6 ITLR, 233 et 
seq., at 267-268, 270 and 275; Federal Court of Appeal of Ottawa (Canada), 13 October 2003, Edwards v. R, 6 
ITLR, 564 et seq., at 568-569, para. 22; Income Tax Appellate Tribunal of Mumbai (India), 1 March 2005, 
Hindalco Industries Ltd v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, 8 ITLR, 1 et seq., at 19, para. 30; High 
Court of Justice of England and Wales (United Kingdom), 7 October 2005, Indofood International Finance 
Limited v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA, London Branch, 8 ITLR, 236 et seq., at 254, para. 40, and at 256-257, 
paras. 45 and 48; Federal Court  (Switzerland), 29 November 2005, A Holding ApS v. Federal Tax 
Administration, 8 ITLR, 536 et seq., at 555, para. 3.4; Tax Court (Canada), 22 December 2005, Sutcliffe v. 
Canada, 8 ITLR, 563 et seq., at 585-586, paras. 110-111; Court of Appeal of England and Wales (United 
Kingdom), 2 March 2006, Indofood International Finance Limited v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA, London 
Branch, 8 ITLR, 653 et seq., at 670 and 672, paras. 34, 37 and 38; Court of Appeal of England and Wales 
(United Kingdom), 21 February 2007, UBS AG v, Revenue and Customs Commissioners, 9 ITLR, 767 et seq., 
at 794, paras. 75-76 per Arden LJ.; Supreme Court (India), 4 January 2007, Ishikawajma-Harima Heavy 
Industries Ltd v. Director of Income Tax, 9 ITLR, 799 et seq., 827-828; Income Tax Appellate Tribunal of 
Mumbai (India), 13 April 2007, Mashreqbank psc v. Deputy Director of Income Tax, 9 ITLR, 1062 et seq., at 
1071, para. 12, at 1076, para. 19, and at 1079-1080, paras. 29-34; High Court (Ireland), 31 July 2007, Kinsella 
v. Revenue Commissioners, 10 ITLR, 63 et seq., at 77, 80 and 81; Income Tax Appellate Tribunal of Chennai 
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that some of the interpretative guidance given in such works substantially amount to 
paradigms1441 of tax treaty application, i.e. to shared worldwide understandings of how 
tax treaties (and some of their OECD-standard provisions) should be generally construed 
and applied.1442 
 
Finally, national courts and tribunals have on certain occasions carried out a comparative 
analysis of the domestic law rules that could be restricted by the application of the 
relevant tax treaties, or a study of their historical background. 
 Where such rules are implemented worldwide, this kind of analysis becomes 
more frequent and national courts and tribunals appear to attribute more weight to them 
for the purpose of determining the interrelation between the domestic tax rules at stake 
and the relevant treaty provisions.1443   
 
                                                                                                                                  
(India), 19 May 2008, West Asia Maritime Ltd and another v. Income Tax Officer, 10 ITLR, 965 et seq., at 970-
971, para. 15; Authority for Advance Rulings  (India), 18 July 2008, Dell International Service India Pvt Ltd v. 
CIT (International Taxation), 11 ITLR, 173 et seq., at 188, para. 12.2, and at 193, para. 13.5; Income Tax 
Appellate Tribunal of Pune (India), 10 September 2008, Automated Securities Clearance Inc v. Income Tax 
Officer, 11 ITLR, 201 et seq., at 220, para. 34, and at 228-229, paras. 60-62; Income Tax Appellate Tribunal of 
Pune (India), 21 January 2009, DaimlerChrysler India Private Ltd v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, 11 
ITLR, 811 et seq., at 850-851; Income Tax Appellate Tribunal of Delhi (India), 16 October 2009, New Skies 
Satellites NV v. Assistant Director of Income Tax & Shin Satellite Public Company Limited v. Deputy Director 
of Income Tax, 12 ITLR, 409 et seq., at 435-437, in particular paras. 221 and 223; Income Tax Appellate 
Tribunal of Mumbai (India), 22 March 2010, J Ray McDermott Eastern Hemisphere Ltd v. Joint Commissioner 
of Income Tax, 12 ITLR, 915 et seq., at 930. 
1441 Here the term “paradigm” is employed in the sense it has been used in T. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962). See also A. Bird, “Naturalizing Kuhn”, 105 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (2005), 99 et seq., in particular at 112-114. 
1442 Baker, in his note as editor of the ITLR to the decision of the High Court in the Indofood case (High Court 
of Justice of England and Wales (United Kingdom), 7 October 2005, Indofood International Finance Limited 
v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA, London Branch, 8 ITLR, 236 et seq.) stated the following: “In some respects, 
the editor has never been more pleased that he wrote in his book about the meaning of ‘beneficial ownership’ 
since it is somewhat uncertain what the outcome of the case would have been if a judge without a tax 
background had been asked simply to explain the meaning of beneficial ownership. The editor hopes that the 
material cited is generally accepted as a correct definition of the meaning of beneficial ownership” (ibidem, at 
237).  
One of the few significant deviations from such paradigms is represented by the way in which Indian courts 
and tribunals are used to construing the expression “may be taxed”, commonly found in Indian tax treaties: that 
expression is generally interpreted by those courts and tribunals as a synonym for “shall be taxable only”, 
which is also a commonly used expression in OECD Model-type tax treaties, including Indian ones (see, for 
instance, Income Tax Appellate Tribunal of Pune (India), 29 June 2007, DCIT v. Patni Computer Systems Ltd, 
10 ITLR, 53 et seq., at 57-60, paras. 5-8). The effect of such an interpretation is that of converting India, which 
generally adopts the credit method to relieve double taxation in its tax treaties, into an exemption country.  
1443 See, for instance, the worldwide historical and comparative analysis of CFC rules carried out by the 
Supreme Administrative Court of Finland in the Re A Oyj Abp case (Supreme Administrative Court (Finland), 
20 March 2002, Re A Oyj Abp, 4 ITLR, 1009 et seq., at 1058); see, similarly, the analysis of the international 
background relating to the French CFC legislation carried on by the Commissaire du Gouvernement Austry in 
the Schneider case (Conseil d’Etat (France), 28 June 2002, Re Société Schneider Electric, 4 ITLR, 1077 et seq., 
conclusions of the Commissaire du Gouvernement at 1109-1111). 




The analysis of national case law has shown that, notwithstanding domestic law 
constraints, courts and tribunals tend to follow the principles enshrined in Articles 31 
and 32 VCLT when interpreting tax treaties.  
 From the perspective of this study, the most reasonable inference that may be 
drawn from this is that, where a prima facie discrepancy in meaning among the tax 
authentic treaty texts in put forward, national courts and tribunals should similarly apply 
those principles of interpretation in order to remove it.  
 Moreover, based on such an analysis, it does not seem that any of the approaches 
to treaty interpretation taken by national courts and tribunals includes elements that 
might constitute a ban on the application of the rule provided for in the last part of 
Article 33(4) VCLT, according to which the meaning that best reconciles the texts, 
having regard to the object and purpose of the treaty, must be adopted where the 
discrepancy in meaning cannot be removed by the application of Articles 31 and 32 
VCLT. 
 
The author, thus, maintains that the analysis carried out and the conclusions drawn in 
section 3 of Chapter 4 of Part II, which concerns the rules of interpretation applicable to 
multilingual treaties derived from Article 33 VCLT, should be considered to be 
generally relevant also for the purpose of the construction of multilingual tax treaties by 
national courts and tribunals. 
 
3. The significance of the OECD Model for the purpose of interpreting 
multilingual tax treaties  
3.1. Research question addressed in this section  
 
The present section is aimed at tackling the following research question, here briefly 
illustrated by means of an example. 
 
a) What is the relevance of the OECD Model official versions for the purpose of 
interpreting multilingual tax treaties (either authenticated also in English 
and/or French, or authenticated in neither of these languages) and monolingual 
tax treaties authenticated neither in English, nor in French? 
 
When the interpreter is faced with a multilingual tax treaty authenticated also in the 
English and/or French languages (together with other languages, e.g. Italian), may he 
rely exclusively or predominantly on the English and/or French authentic texts for the 
purpose of construing the relevant treaty article? In particular, may he support such a 
choice by arguing that, since the English and/or French authentic texts reproduce without 
significant deviations the official versions of the OECD Model, it is reasonable to infer 
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that the agreement of the parties was to import into the treaty the content of the Model 
and, therefore, that the other authentic texts should be construed in harmony with the 
meaning derived from the interpretation of the English and/or French texts? 
 On the other hand, when the interpreter is faced with a multilingual or 
monolingual treaty authenticated neither in English, nor in French, may or should he 
take into account the OECD Model English and/or French official versions for the 
purpose of determining the meaning of the authentic treaty text(s) and rely thereon in 
order to support his construction? In case such a question is answered in the affirmative, 
should the OECD Model official versions be used only to confirm the meaning 
determined on the basis of the authentic treaty text(s) or to determine the meaning where 
the construction based on the authentic text(s) left the meaning ambiguous, obscure, 
absurd or unreasonable, or, on the contrary, should the meaning determined on the basis 
of the OECD Model official versions be adopted also where conflicting with a 




“Frankly, […] my impression is that the words are not beacons of clarity. Maybe this is 
the risk of dozens of negotiators of several languages negotiating the OECD Model, and 
then two countries trying to adopt that model to their circumstances – we end up with a 
camel rather than a horse”1444 
 
Tax treaties currently in force worldwide are, to a very large extent, based on the OECD 
Model. This triggers several consequences of interest for the purpose of the present 
study, which are analysed separately in the following sections. 
 
Here it is merely noted that the fact that most of the tax treaties currently in force are 
based on the OECD Model constitutes the main reason for the abundant recourse to the 
OECD Commentary in order to construe such treaties. The relevance of the OECD 
Commentary for the purpose of interpreting (multilingual) tax treaties is dealt with in 
section 4 of this chapter. 
 
3.3. The OECD Model as a substitute for the treaty “drafted” text 
 
The process of negotiating tax treaties generally focuses on the desired departures from 
the OECD Model. This implies that, as a matter of fact, there is no real negotiation 
carried out between the contracting States with regard to the content of those treaty 
provisions reproducing the corresponding provisions of the Model.  
 
Thus, with regard to those provisions, it does not make much sense to refer to the drafted 
                                                     
1444 Miller J. in Tax Court (Canada), 16 May 2008, Knights of Columbus v. R, 10 ITLR, 827 et seq., at 855. 
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text as such in order to construe the treaty.1445 The reference, in these cases, should be 
made to the text of the OECD Model,1446 as supplemented by the OECD Commentary 
                                                     
1445 The limited influence that the drafted text as such (either in English or French) has on the other authentic 
texts of the relevant tax treaty indirectly emerges from the analysis of the wording of the capital gains article of 
the Italian tax treaties. In many of the treaties that are authenticated in French (but not in English), the Italian 
authentic text refers to “beni mobili facenti parte dell’attivo di una stabile organizzazione” (for instance, the 
Italian tax treaties concluded with Algeria, Argentina, Bulgaria, Hungary, Mozambique and Venezuela), which 
appears to be a translation of the OECD Model French provision “biens mobiliers qui font partie de l’actif d’un 
établissement stable”. Similarly, in many of the tax treaties authenticated in English (but not in French), the 
Italian authentic text refers to “beni mobili facenti parte della proprietà aziendale di una stabile 
organizzazione” or to “beni mobili appartenenti ad una stabile organizzazione” (for instance, the Italian tax 
treaties concluded with Bangladesh, China, India, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States), which 
appears to be a translation of the OECD Model English provision “business property of a permanent 
establishment”. This might be taken as evidence of the fact that the drafted text significantly influences the 
Italian authentic text even with regard to OECD Model-type provisions (see in this sense, A. Parolini, “Italy”, 
in G. Maisto (ed.), Multilingual Texts and Interpretation of Tax Treaties and EC Tax Law (Amsterdam: IBFD 
Publications, 2005), 245 et seq., at 246-247). There are, however, (i) a significant number of Italian tax treaties 
authenticated in French (and not in English), whose Italian authentic text of the capital gains article reads “beni 
mobili facenti parte della proprietà aziendale di una stabile organizzazione” or “beni mobili appartenenti ad 
una stabile organizzazione” (for instance, the Italian tax treaties concluded with the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden and Tunisia) and (ii) a significant number of Italian tax treaties authenticated in English (and 
not in French), where the Italian authentic text of that article refers to “beni mobili facenti parte dell’attivo di 
una stabile organizzazione” (for instance, the Italian tax treaties concluded with Estonia, Slovenia and 
Tanzania). The presence of such a considerable number of “exceptions” weakens the inference that the drafted 
text has a direct bearing on the Italian authentic text of Italian tax treaties and reinforces the conclusion that 
both OECD Model official versions (English and French) should be taken into account as relevant elements of 
the overall context for the purpose of interpreting tax treaty provisions based thereon. 
1446 In both its English and French official versions.  
Interestingly, Lang highlights that the OECD Model (and its Commentary) itself was originally negotiated and 
drafted by the representatives of the OEEC, and then OECD, member States in French and English and that 
while certain working parties, especially in the fifties, when most of the drafting work for the 1963 OECD 
Draft was done, were working mainly in French, others were working predominantly in English. In this regard, 
he raises the question of whether this fact should lead the interpreter to put more emphasis on either the 
English or the French official versions of the OECD Model in order to construe certain of its provisions, 
depending upon the working language predominantly used by the working party which originally drafted the 
specific provision at stake. Quite convincingly, he concludes that this should not be the case, since “more 
weight could only be put to a specific language version if there is a clear indication that this language was the 
predominant working language during drafting”, while “[i]f other versions were carefully drawn by the 
negotiators having reference to all the texts, they were not mere translations” and therefore they should be 
relied upon as well. According to the Lang, “[f]or the provisions of the OECD model which were drafted in the 
1950s, it is often not clear whether it is justifiable to put more emphasis on a specific language version. Almost 
all minutes and preliminary reports were available in both languages. Thus, there is no clear indication that the 
discussions focused only on one specific language version of the draft.” (see M. Lang, “The Interpretation of 
Tax Treaties and Authentic Languages”, in G. Maisto, A. Nikolakakis and J. M. Ulmer (eds.), Essays on Tax 
Treaties. A Tribute to David A. Ward (Amsterdam: IBFD and Canadian Tax Foundation, 2013), 15 et seq., at 
23-24; see also M. Lang, “Auslegung von Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen und authentische Vertragssprachen”, 
20 Internationales Steuerrecht (2011), 403 et seq.).  
This, however, is not the only reason why the practice of putting more emphasis on either the English or the 
French official versions of the OECD Model, for the purposes of interpreting tax treaties, should be generally 
rejected. One should never forget that the purpose of any tax treaty interpreter, at the international level, is to 
determine the “utterance meaning” of the tax treaty provisions, i.e. to determine which could have been the 
originally meaning agreed upon by the parties. In that respect, the travaux préparatoires of the OECD Model 
have not been publicly available, not even to tax treaty negotiators and State officials, for quite a long time 
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thereto,1447 especially in order to remove prima facie divergences of meaning among the 
tax authentic treaty texts. 
 Nevertheless, the arguments favoring the attribution of a special weight, for 
interpretative purposes, to the text of the OECD Model coincide with those already put 
forward by the author with regard to the relevance of the drafted text for construing 
treaties, the most important being the reasonable chance that the text of the OECD 
Model may convey more precisely the common intention of the parties than the (other) 
authentic texts of the tax treaty, since the OECD Model text was most probably before 
the negotiators where they agreed to not substantially deviate from it.  
 In the same vein, Lang points out that “[i]f English and French, or at least one of 
                                                                                                                                  
and, thus, they could not have been before the eyes of the contracting States’ representatives when negotiating 
and concluding tax treaties in such a period. It is, therefore, compelling to infer from the previous proposition 
that, independently of the actual behavior of the OEEC and OECD working parties in the original discussion 
on and drafting of the OECD Model provisions, such behavior should be regarded as irrelevant for the purpose 
of construing tax treaties based on such a Model and, as a consequence thereof, that the English and French 
official versions of the Model should be equally relied upon for the purpose of interpreting those tax treaties.  
See also J. F. Avery Jones and D. A. Ward, “Agents as permanent establishments under the OECD Model Tax 
Convention”, 33 European Taxation (1993), 154 et seq., at 155 et seq. and 160 et seq., where the authors note 
that Article 5(5) OECD Model appears to have been originally drafted in French and infer from this that the 
expression “an authority to conclude contracts in the name of the enterprise” (“des pouvoirs […] de conclure 
des contrats au nom de l’entreprise” in the French official version) was originally intended to have the meaning 
it had under the French code and, more generally, in civil law jurisdictions, i.e. as a synonym of the expression 
“an authority to conclude contracts legally binding the enterprise”. The genesis of the above OECD Model 
expression and the inference derived from it by the authors has been also taken into account by the Rapporteur 
Public of the French Conseil d’Etat in order to support her conclusion on the meaning of the identical 
expression employed in the 1995 France-United Kingdom tax treaty (See Conseil d’Etat (France), 31 March 
2010, Société Zimmer Ltd v. Ministre de l’Economie, des Finances et de l’Industrie, 12 ITLR, 739 et seq., 
conclusions of the Rapporteur Public at 780). 
1447 The need for the interpreter to rely on the OECD English and French official versions is even more critical 
in connection with the use of the OECD Commentary. The following case is apt to illustrate this issue.  
In 1996, the Austrian Supreme Administrative Court (see Verwaltungsgerichtshof (Austria), 31 July 1996, case 
no. 92/13/0172, available on the IBFD Tax Treaty Case Law Database), interpreting Article 16 of the 1974 
Austria-Switzerland tax treaty, which makes reference to “Aufsichtsrats- oder Verwaltungsratsvergütungen” in 
its sole German authentic text, concluded that payments made to a member of a Swiss “Verwaltungsrat” (i.e. a 
company organ similar to an Anglo-Saxon “board of directors”) were outside the scope of Article 16 of that tax 
treaty. In supporting its conclusion, the Court noted that the relevant part of Article 16 of the 1974 Austria-
Switzerland tax treaty substantially reproduced the (French) text of Article 16 of the 1963 OECD Draft. The 
Court inferred from this that the OECD Commentary to that model was relevant in order to interpret Article 16 
of the tax treaty. It then referred to the German translation, prepared by the German Ministry of Finance in 
collaboration with the Austrian and Swiss Ministries of Finance, of the Commentary to Article 16 of the 1963 
OECD Draft, which mentioned solely “Aufsichtsräte” (i.e. a company organ similar to the French “conseil de 
surveillance”) and not “Verwaltungsräte” (the following German versions of the Commentary, in contrast, 
mentioned both). According to the Court, the exclusive reference to “Aufsichtsräte” in the Commentary was 
evidence of the fact that company organs entrusted with both management and supervisory functions were 
outside the scope of Article 16 of the OECD Draft, which was limited to organs carrying on exclusively 
supervisory functions.  
It is doubtful, however, whether the Court would have argued for the same interpretation, had it referred to the 
French official version of the Commentary to the OECD 1963 Draft, which made reference to both the “conseil 
d’administration” and the “conseil de surveillance” (see, with regard to the position of Austrian scholars on the 
subject matter, V. E. Metzler, “Austria”, in G. Maisto (ed.), Multilingual Texts and Interpretation of Tax 
Treaties and EC Tax Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2005), 137 et seq., at 141). 
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these languages, are among the authentic languages of a bilateral treaty, and if it is 
evident that a certain treaty provision is a mere translation of a provision of the OECD 
model, it is therefore well justified to focus more on the English or French version of the 
OECD model that was copied and to put less emphasis on other language versions, even 
if they are authentic as well.”1448 
 
Moreover, the relevance of the English and French official versions of the OECD Model 
for the purpose of interpreting (multilingual) tax treaty provisions based thereon remain 
unaffected by the fact that the specific tax treaty at stake is authenticated neither in the 
English, nor in the French language.  
 Nothing in the VCLT precludes the interpreter from taking into account such 
versions for the purpose of construing a tax treaty. It has been already mentioned1449 that, 
with regard to treaties in general, the VCLT system allows the recourse to non-authentic 
treaty versions as supplementary means of interpretation, the interpretative weight to be 
attributed thereto varying in accordance with the available evidence that such language 
versions may contribute to establishing the common intention of the parties.1450  
 In connection with tax treaties based on the OECD Model, the English and 
French official versions of the Model are clearly worth being attributed a significant 
weight in the quest for such a common intention and for the purpose of supporting the 
treaty construction put forward, since it is only reasonable to assume that the agreement 
of the parties has been reached, most probably even without lengthy discussions, on the 
basis of such versions, as supplemented by the Commentary thereon.1451 In this case, it 
would appear restrictive to label the OECD Model official versions as “supplementary 
means of interpretation” of the tax treaty to be construed since, where the tax treaty is 
based on and indirectly reproduces the OECD Model in its English and/or French 
versions, recourse to such versions as interpretative tools is the fairest and most sensible 
way to ascertain the common intention of the parties, i.e. to determine in good faith the 
ordinary contextual meaning of the terms employed in the authentic texts of the tax 
                                                     
1448 M. Lang, “The Interpretation of Tax Treaties and Authentic Languages”, in G. Maisto, A. Nikolakakis and 
J. M. Ulmer (eds.), Essays on Tax Treaties. A Tribute to David A. Ward (Amsterdam: IBFD and Canadian Tax 
Foundation, 2013), 15 et seq, at 22-23 (see also M. Lang, “Auslegung von Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen und 
authentische Vertragssprachen”, 20 Internationales Steuerrecht (2011), 403 et seq.). See, in slightly different 
terms, G. Maisto (ed.), Multilingual Texts and Interpretation of Tax Treaties and EC Tax Law (Amsterdam: 
IBFD Publications, 2005), at xxv. According to Vogel, the term “context” in Article 3(2) should also cover the 
OECD Model and its Commentary (see K. Vogel et al., Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions (The 
Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997), p. 215, m.no. 72).  
See, however, apparently contra, Cadosch, who maintains that “[i]f there is no deviating result between the 
official language of each contracting State, then the English version should not question this result” (R. 
Cadosch, “Switzerland”, in G. Maisto (ed.), Multilingual Texts and Interpretation of Tax Treaties and EC Tax 
Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2005), 303 et seq., at 313 and 314). 
1449 See section 3.2.4 of Chapter 4. 
1450 With regard to the relevance, for the purpose of interpreting a tax treaty, of the initialled version drafted in 
the lingua franca used in the course of negotiations, notwithstanding the fact that it was not then authenticated 
as a treaty text, see P. Sundgren, “Interpretation of tax treaties authenticated in two or more languages: a case 
study”, 73 Svensk skattetidning (2006), 378 et seq., available on-line at the following URL: 
http://www.skatter.se/index.php?q=node/1079; accessed on 23 July 2011. 
1451 See also the arguments developed in the following part of this section.  
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treaty, or their intended special meaning.1452  
 This perspective is shared by Lang, who, on the one hand, admits that the English 
and the French official versions of the OECD Model could qualify as “supplementary 
means of interpretation” under Article 32 VCLT and, on the other hand, proves to be 
unsatisfied with the limited role that they would play as such, since “[m]aterial falling 
under article 32 of the VCLT is accorded only a secondary role in the interpretation of 
treaties.” According to that author, “[i]f it can be established by reference to the text of 
the treaty that a double taxation convention is, in principle, based on the OECD model, 
an interpretation in good faith requires that the original language versions of the model 
be consulted in the interpretation process. […] If the contracting states merely translated 
the wording of the OECD model in drafting a certain provision, it is only reasonable to 
assume that they intended such a provision to have the meaning it has as expressed in the 
English and French versions of the OECD model. The general rule of interpretation in 
article 31(1) of the VCLT thus establishes the relevance of the original language 
versions of the OECD model in the interpretation process. […] For OECD Member 
countries, article 5(b) of the concention on the OECD might come into play here. In the 
case of doubt and in the absence of other indications to the contrary, it may be assumed 
that OECD member countries wanted to comply with the OECD recommendation and 
thus intended only to translate the OECD model into other languages. However, if they 
have made a reservation to a certain provision of the model, this might indicate the 
contrary.”1453 
 Similarly, in the Smallwood case,1454 the Special Commissioners made reference 
                                                     
1452 See Vogel in K. Vogel et al., Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 1997), p. 45, m.no. 81: “If the text of the OECD MC has been adopted unchanged, it is to be 
assumed that the contracting States intended to conform to the Council’s recommendation. It follows that when 
interpreting such treaties, whether or not official versions are drafted in one or more languages, the model in 
both its original language versions (English and French) should be considered in addition to the individual 
treaty text(s), as should the MC Commentary.” 
1453 See M. Lang, “The Interpretation of Tax Treaties and Authentic Languages”, in G. Maisto, A. Nikolakakis 
and J. M. Ulmer (eds.), Essays on Tax Treaties. A Tribute to David A. Ward (Amsterdam: IBFD and Canadian 
Tax Foundation, 2013), 15 et seq., at 26-29 (see also M. Lang, “Auslegung von Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen 
und authentische Vertragssprachen”, 20 Internationales Steuerrecht (2011), 403 et seq.). 
Lang, correctly from this author’s perspective, applies the same principle in connection to tax treaty provisions 
that are derived from the United Nations Model: “More difficulties could arise if certain treaty provisions, or 
the treaty as a whole, are taken from the UN model. In such a case, similar deliberations have to be made as in 
the context of the OECD model. However, the interpretation of provisions taken from the UN model could 
require examining even more language versions. Additional difficulties might be due to the fact that the UN 
model is to a large extent based on the OECD model. If a bilateral treaty primarily follows the UN model and 
the corresponding provision of that model has itself been copied from the OECD model, more attention will be 
paid to the English and French versions of the OECD model. The situation is comparable to the interpretation 
of a treaty that was drafted in certain languages, with additional languages being authenticated over time. It is 
obvious that more emphasis should be placed on the languages that were the working languages when that 
provision of the treaty was drafted. If this was done in the OECD context, those working languages were 
English and French” (see M. Lang, “The Interpretation of Tax Treaties and Authentic Languages”, in G. 
Maisto, A. Nikolakakis and J. M. Ulmer (eds.), Essays on Tax Treaties. A Tribute to David A. Ward 
(Amsterdam: IBFD and Canadian Tax Foundation, 2013), 15 et seq., at 29-30). 
1454 Special Commissioners (United Kingdom), 19 February 2008, Smallwood and another v. Revenue and 
Customs Commissioners, 10 ITLR, 574 et seq. 
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to the French official version of Article 4(3) OECD Model in order to construe the sole 
English authentic text of Article 4(3) of the 1981 Mauritius-United Kingdom tax treaty, 
which exactly reproduced the English official version of Article 4(3) of the 1963 OECD 
Draft. The Special Commissioners, in particular, held that the term “effective”, used in 
the treaty tie-breaker rule to indirectly qualify the term “place of management”, should 
have been understood in the sense of the French “effective” (siège de direction 
effective), as used in Article 4(3) OECD Model, which connoted real management.1455 
 
It should be finally noted that, although it is true that the OECD Model itself present 
some instances of prima facie discrepancies between its official versions, such prima 
facie discrepancies are quite limited in number and may be removed by the analogical 
application of the interpretative rules enshrined in Article 33 VCLT.  
 A straightforward (but amusing) example1456 is represented by the use of the term 
“artiste” in the English official version of Article 17 OECD Model and of (seemingly) 
the same term in the French official version thereof. Indeed, as some scholars have 
pointed out,1457 the term “artiste”1458 in the English language is generally used to denote 
entertainers of a more frivolous, less serious nature than those denoted by the term 
“artist”,1459 such as entertainers acting in cabarets. On the contrary, the French term 
“artiste” is commonly used to denote both types of entertainers, i.e. both frivolous and 
serious ones.1460 As the above-mentioned scholars put it, “there is some question about 
whether Article 17 does not apply to performers of serious art as opposed to more 
frivolous entertainers.”1461 However, on the one hand, it should be noted that the English 
term “artiste” is an ambiguous one, since it may also be used with a broad meaning in 
order to denote all kinds of entertainers (although it is perhaps employed less commonly 
as such),1462 and, on the other hand, there is nothing in the OECD Commentary that 
                                                     
1455 Ibidem, at 610. 
1456 A second entertaining (and fake) example is reported in J. Sasseville, “The OECD Model Convention and 
Commentaries”, in G. Maisto (ed.), Multilingual Texts and Interpretation of Tax Treaties and EC Tax Law 
(Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2005), 129 et seq., at 132, where the author notes that, while the English 
official version of Article 6 OECD makes reference to “livestock and equipment”, the French official version 
thereof uses the corresponding expression “cheptel mort ou vif”, which might “suggest that while a live cow is 
immovable property in both versions, a dead cow is immovable property only in French”. As the Sasseville 
correctly points out, however, “[t]he mistake underlying that suggestion […] is that “cheptel mort” is really a 
translation of the word “equipment”.”  
A third, thornier, instance is represented by the possible prima facie discrepancy between the terms “corporate 
rights” and “parts sociales” employed in the English and French official versions of Article 10(3) OECD 
Model, with regard thereto see J. F. Avery Jones et al., “The Definitions of Dividends and Interest in the 
OECD Model: Something Lost in Translation?”, 1 World Tax Journal (2009), 5 et seq., at 19 et seq. 
1457 See K. Vogel et al., United States Income Tax Treaties (The Hague: Kluwer Law and Taxation, 1989 – 
loose-leaf), commentary to Article 17. 
1458 The term “artiste” is used both in the English official version of Article 17 OECD Model and, several 
times, in the Commentary thereto. 
1459 The term “artist” is only used twice in the English official version of the Commentary to Article 17 of the 
2010 OECD Model (paragraph 18 thereof). 
1460 See Le Grand Robert de la Langue Française. Tome I (Paris: Le Robert, 1990), p. 580.  
1461 See K. Vogel et al., United States Income Tax Treaties (The Hague: Kluwer Law and Taxation, 1989 – 
loose-leaf), commentary to Article 17. 
1462 See Dictionary.com Unabridged. Random House, Inc. (accessed 22 Apr. 2011). 
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might support the conclusion that only more frivolous entertainers fall within the scope 
of Article 17 OECD Model. Thus, the latter conclusion should be discharged by the 
interpreter in light of the overall context. 
 
3.4. The influence of the OECD Model on the drafting of tax treaties authentic texts 
  
The authentic texts of tax treaties drafted in the official languages of the contracting 
States are often influenced by either of the two OECD Model official versions,1463 
especially in the choice of the terms employed.1464  
                                                     
1463 It is interesting to note that, according to Sasseville (Head of the Tax Treaty Unit of the OECD Centre for 
Tax Policy and Administration), the “practical reality is that, nowadays, the OECD work on tax treaties is 
primarily carried on in English and the French version is usually a translation” (see J. Sasseville, “The OECD 
Model Convention and Commentaries”, in G. Maisto (ed.), Multilingual Texts and Interpretation of Tax 
Treaties and EC Tax Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2005), 129 et seq., at 130.  
On the pros and cons of having the OECD Model drafted in two official languages, rather in just one language, 
see the analysis of Le Gall (J. P. Le Gall, “OECD MC: One or two official languages?”, in G. Maisto (ed.), 
Multilingual Texts and Interpretation of Tax Treaties and EC Tax Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2005), 
327 et seq., at 328-330), who summarizes them as follows: 
- Pros: (i) two official languages secure a double entry into the legal systems that, traditionally at least, divide 
the world, i.e. common law and civil law systems; each official version is thus supposed to take into account 
the principles, concepts and terms used in the relevant country; (ii) each official version is meant to express 
and reflect the same concept: therefore, comparing the two versions allows a better understanding of the 
meaning of the Model provisions and makes it possible to elicit discrepancies between two seeming different 
wordings that might refer, in part at least, to different situations; (iii) the two versions can be used directly in 
bilateral treaties where either the two contracting States are countries using one of the two languages or are 
countries using each of the two languages, this advantage resulting in reducing costs and lessening the risks of 
mistakes or misunderstandings (it must be remarked, however, that Le Gall does not seem entirely convinced 
that such pros really represent significant advantages, in particular pro (ii) – see ibidem, at 329).  
- Cons: (i) having just one official version would save time, since only one text would have to be consulted; (ii) 
having just one official version would eliminate the difficulties stemming from the comparison of the two 
official versions and the possible discrepancies existing between them, thus creating greater legal security; (iii) 
giving up one of the two official versions would impose a greater demand for accuracy on the part of the 
drafters of the model, since having two versions is sometime an invitation to laziness; (iv) having only one 
official version of the OECD Model could lead to the elaboration of common concepts in the international tax 
language. 
While the author generally agrees that the reduction of the official languages of the OECD Model to just one 
would trigger more advantages than disadvantages, both quantity and quality-wise, he is skeptical with regard 
to the possibility of such a choice to boost the elaboration of common concepts in the international tax 
language, since, as the present study hopefully demonstrates, it is the very structure of the model, as well as the 
background context of its application, i.e. (a) the close interaction between tax treaties and the underlying 
domestic tax law, (b) the fact that tax treaties are made to be applied by tax lawyers, tax authorities and 
national (tax) courts and tribunals and (c) the absence of a international judiciary entrusted with the task of 
applying, or even just interpreting, tax treaties uniformly, that makes it difficult (if not impossible) as a matter 
of fact to forsake the renvoi to domestic law concepts and legal categories.  
1464 See, accordingly, G. Toifl, “Die Besteuerung von Geschäftsführern, Vorständen und Aufsichtsräten 
international tätiger Unternehmen”, in W. Gassner and M. Lang (eds.), Besteuerung und Bilanzierung 
international tätiger Unternehmen - 30 Jahre Steuerrecht an der Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien (Vienna: Orac, 
1998), 379 et seq., at 389; G. Maisto (ed.), Multilingual Texts and Interpretation of Tax Treaties and EC Tax 
Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2005), at xxv. According to Parolini, independently of whether the 
drafted text of Italian tax treaties is in English or French, the Italian authentic text thereof appears to be 
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In particular, the terms used in tax treaties are often those that most closely resemble, 
from a morphological and phonetic perspective, the terms employed in the official 
version of the OECD Model that is taken as a benchmark by the treaty negotiators, even 
where the former terms are not legal jargon terms under the domestic law of the 
contracting States, but just day-to-day proxy of these, or where they are not the legal 
jargon terms most commonly used in the statutes concerning the taxes covered by the 
treaties.1465  
 Sometimes it even happens that the terms employed in the treaty have a day-to-
day or legal jargon meaning (under the law of the relevant contracting State) that appears 
to diverge from the meaning that should be reasonably attached thereto in the context of 
the tax treaty provision in which they are used and in light of the OECD Model.  
 Moreover, in a similar fashion States often develop their own translations of the 
OECD Model, or their own models based thereon,1466 and then tend to reproduce the 
texts of such translations (or national models) as their own language authentic texts of 
the tax treaties concluded with other States.1467  
 
                                                                                                                                  
generally influenced by the French official version of the OECD Model, probably because of the similarities 
existing between the languages, as well as between the legal systems of France and Italy (see A. Parolini, 
“Italy”, in G. Maisto (ed.), Multilingual Texts and Interpretation of Tax Treaties and EC Tax Law 
(Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2005), 245 et seq., at 248-251 and the examples reported there). 
At the same time, however, certain terms and expressions used in the OECD Model are derived from legal 
jargon terms used under the law of certain OECD member States. In this respect, it has been pointed out that 
the current OECD Model has been developed on the basis of previous tax treaty models, in particular those 
drafted under the auspices of the League of Nations, which in turn had been developed taking as benchmark 
the tax treaties in force between continental European States at the beginning of the twentieth century and, 
therefore, borrowing terms from their respective domestic laws. This would explain why certain terms 
currently used in the English official version of the OECD Model are (or were) alien to the legal culture of 
common law countries, those terms having being literally “translated” into English from other languages (see J. 
F. Avery Jones et al., “The Origins of Concepts and Expressions used in the OECD Model and their Adoption 
by States”, 60 Bulletin for international taxation (2006), 220 et seq., at 220).   
1465 For instance, with regard to Italian tax treaties, the title of the article corresponding to Article 13 OECD 
Model in the Italian authentic text is generally “Utili di capitale”, which appears to be a “literal translation” of 
the title of the French official version of Article 13 OECD Model “Gains en capital”. As correctly pointed out 
by Parolini (see A. Parolini, “Italy”, in G. Maisto (ed.), Multilingual Texts and Interpretation of Tax Treaties 
and EC Tax Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2005), 245 et seq., at 252) the term “Utili di capitale” is not 
a legal jargon term under Italian law (either in tax law, or in private law), the corresponding legal jargon term 
used for income tax law purposes being “plusvalenze”. 
1466 Both (the translation and the model) being drafted in the official language(s) of the drafting State. 
1467 See, for instance, with regard to Germany and Austria, V. E. Metzler, “Austria”, in G. Maisto (ed.), 
Multilingual Texts and Interpretation of Tax Treaties and EC Tax Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2005), 
137 et seq., at 137 and A. Rust, “Germany”, in G. Maisto (ed.), Multilingual Texts and Interpretation of Tax 
Treaties and EC Tax Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2005), 221 et seq., at 221-222; with regard to 
Switzerland, R. Cadosch, “Switzerland”, in G. Maisto (ed.), Multilingual Texts and Interpretation of Tax 
Treaties and EC Tax Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2005), 303 et seq., at 304; with regard to Belgium, 
R. De Boek, “Belgium”, in G. Maisto (ed.), Multilingual Texts and Interpretation of Tax Treaties and EC Tax 
Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2005), 165 et seq., at 168; with regard to the Netherlands, S. Douma, 
“Netherlands”, in G. Maisto (ed.), Multilingual Texts and Interpretation of Tax Treaties and EC Tax Law 
(Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2005), 267 et seq., at 269 and 277.  
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A similar phenomenon occurs where the authentic treaty text (or texts), drafted in a 
contracting State’s official language(s), literally reproduces the text of the English or 
French official version of the OECD Model, in such cases the terms employed in the 
treaty being different from the legal jargon terms used in the domestic law of that 
contracting State. This is mainly due to three reasons:  
(i) the terms used in the relevant OECD Model official version are “literal” 
translations of terms used in the other official language version of the OECD 
Model, or translations of terms employed in older tax treaties used as source of 
inspiration by the Model drafters;1468  
(ii) the terms used in the relevant OECD Model official version derive from the 
domestic law of a State other than the contracting State applying the tax treaty;1469 
or  
(iii) the terms used in the relevant OECD Model official version were intended to 
have a scope different from that of the terms used under the domestic law of the 
States whose official language is the same language employed in the Model.1470 
 
The following examples, taken from the Italian and Belgian tax treaty practice, are 
illuminating in that respect. 
 The legal jargon term used in the ITC1471 to denote employment income1472 is 
“redditi di lavoro dipendente”;1473 however, in Article 15 (or its equivalent) of the tax 
treaties concluded by Italy the expression “lavoro subordinato” is used instead of “lavoro 
dipendente”.  
 Similarly, the legal jargon term used in the ITC to denote an alienation is 
“cessione”;1474 however, in Article 13 (or equivalent) of the tax treaties concluded by 
Italy the term “alienazione” is used instead of “cessione”.  
                                                     
1468 See footnote 1464. 
1469 This is often the case, for instance, with reference to the United Kingdom and the United States.  
1470 See, with regard to the employment of the term “alienation” in the English official version of Article 13 
OECD Model, J. F. Avery Jones et al., “The Origins of Concepts and Expressions used in the OECD Model 
and their Adoption by States”, 60 Bulletin for international taxation (2006), 220 et seq., at 249-250 and 
references therein. 
1471 Presidential Decree no. 917 of 22 December 1986. 
1472 It is interesting to note that, in the sentence preceding the footnote reference, the term “employment 
income” is used just as a different sign to denote the same denotata of “the legal jargon term used in the Italian 
income tax code”, which in turn is used as a perfect synonym for the following “redditi di lavoro dipendente” 
(as in a tautology). There is no attempt to determine what the concept associated with the term “employment 
income” is where the latter is used as English legal jargon term (if it is used at all); that would be useless for 
the purpose of the reasoning expressed by the sentence and, furthermore, by far too complicated. A similar 
mental process instinctively occurs where an interpreter who has knowledge of the legal system, and related 
legal jargon, of a certain State (e.g. France) reads and attributes a meaning to a term from a different legal 
jargon (e.g. Japanese); that Japanese legal jargon term is treated as if it were an exact synonym for the French 
legal jargon term that dictionaries or practice shows to correspond to the former term (just a different sign that 
denotes the same denotata of the former term). 
1473 See arts. 49 et seq. ITC. 
1474 As of September 2010, the term “cessione” appears more than fifty times in the ITC; in contrast, the term 
“alienazione” as such is not used at all (the term “alienate”, which is derived from it, is employed just once). 
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 The French official version of the OECD Model1475 generally employed the term 
“activité industrielle au commerciale” as an equivalent of the term “business” used in the 
English official version thereof, most probably because it reflected the terminology 
employed in the French general tax code.1476 Interestingly, Italian tax treaties, which are 
generally based on the French official version of the 1963 OECD Draft Model,1477 use 
the term “attività industriale e commerciale” in their Italian authentic texts, although this 
term is used neither in the Italian civil code, nor in the ITC, which both employ the term 
“attività commerciale”.1478  
 The French authentic texts of Belgian tax treaties generally employ the term 
“gains en capital” in Article 13 (or equivalent) while the legal jargon term under Belgian 
domestic law is “plus-values”. Similarly, while in the French authentic text of Article 12 
(or equivalent) of Belgian tax treaties the term “redevances” is commonly used, the 
corresponding legal jargon expressions used in the Belgian Income Tax Code are 
“revenus de la location, de l’affermage, de l’usage et de la concession de biens” or 
“revenues de biens”.1479  
 
The above analysis constitutes a strong argument in support of the appropriateness of a 
loose approach in the application of the renvoi provided for in Article 3(2) of OECD 
Model-based tax treaties.  
 Hence, the terms actually used in the authentic treaty text drafted in the official 
language of a contracting State should be given the meaning that not only such terms, 
but also their legal jargon synonyms and proxies in the official language of that State 
have for the purpose of that State’s domestic law, unless the context otherwise requires.  
 Similarly, where the interpreter has to select the legal jargon term that, under the 
law of the contracting State applying the treaty (e.g. the Netherlands), corresponds to the 
term employed in the authentic treaty text to be interpreted, which is a drafted in a 
language (e.g. English) other than the language in which the domestic law of that State is 
drafted (i.e. Dutch), he should take into account not only the terms that, according to 
bilingual dictionaries, correspond to the relevant treaty term, but also their legal jargon 
synonyms and proxies under the law of the State applying the treaty (i.e. Netherlands 
law), unless the context otherwise requires. 
 This point, as it is strictly connected with the analysis of the renvoi to domestic 
                                                     
1475 Before the amendments introduced by the OECD in 2000. 
1476 See J. Sasseville, “The OECD Model Convention and Commentaries”, in G. Maisto (ed.), Multilingual 
Texts and Interpretation of Tax Treaties and EC Tax Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2005), 129 et seq., 
at 130. 
1477 See G. Maisto, “La traduzione dei testi giuridici redatti in più lingue e l’interpretazione delle convenzioni 
per evitare le doppie imposizioni”, Rivista di Diritto Tributario. Parte Quarta (2004), 131 et seq., at 132, 
where the author submits that the French official version of the OECD Model seems to have been used as a 
model for the drafting of the Italian authentic texts of the major part of the tax treaties concluded by Italy. 
1478 The term “attività commerciale” is given different meanings for the purpose of the Italian Civil Code and 
the ITC, respectively; see F. Avella, “Italy”, in G. Maisto (ed.), The meaning of “enterprise”, “business” and 
“business profits” under Tax Treaty and EU Tax Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2011), 341 et seq., at 
351 et seq. and 364 et seq. 
1479 See R. De Boek, “Belgium”, in G. Maisto (ed.), Multilingual Texts and Interpretation of Tax Treaties and 
EC Tax Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2005), 165 et seq., at 169. 
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law encompassed in Article 3(2) OECD Model, will be further dealt with in section 
5.3.2.4 of this chapter. 
 
3.5. A plea for the consistent interpretation of tax treaties based on the OECD 
Model  
 
On the basis of the preceding analysis, a sound argument may be put forward in favor of 
the consistent interpretation of corresponding provisions of different tax treaties,1480 
concluded by different contracting States on the basis of the OECD Model and drafted in 
different authentic languages.  
 
Clearly, such provisions are made of different signs and are part of different documents: 
as such, they may theoretically be construed independently from each other and be 
attributed diverging meanings.  
  
However, a relevant number of these provisions are part of the authentic texts of tax 
treaties that have been authenticated in the French and/or English languages as well. As 
previously discussed, under Article 33(3) VCLT all authentic texts of a treaty (must) 
have the same meaning: thus, with regard to each distinct tax treaty, all corresponding 
provisions in the different authentic texts, i.e. those drafted in the official languages of 
the contracting States and those drafted in the English and/or French languages (if 
different and existing), must be given the same utterance meaning by the interpreter. 
 Moreover, from the fact that each State generally drafts and concludes its tax 
treaties along the same pattern, by reproducing to a great extent:  
(a) the text of the OECD Model, for the purpose of drafting the French and/or 
English authentic texts of those treaties, and  
(b) its own standard translation of the OECD Model, for the purpose of drafting 
the authentic text of those treaties in its own language (if not English or French),  
one may draw the inference that:  
(i) all provisions of different tax treaties concluded by a certain State, which 
present the same wording in the authentic texts drafted in the official language of 
that State and/or in English and French are intended to be interpreted consistently 
by that very same State;  
(ii) due to the rule of law established by Article 33(3) VCLT,1481 the same holds 
true for the corresponding provisions encompassed in the other languages 
authentic texts of those tax treaties;  
(iii) considering the remarkably high number of tax treaties in force and the fact 
that they are patterned for the most part along the lines of the English or French 
                                                     
1480 Except the effects stemming from the renvoi to the contracting States’ domestic law provided for in Article 
3(2). 
1481 All authentic texts of a (tax) treaty must be attributed the same utterance meaning under Article 33(3) 
VCLT. 
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official versions of the OECD Model, which is purported to promote the 
application by all countries of the same or similar tax treaty rules to comparable 
situations,1482 all tax treaty provisions that directly1483 or indirectly1484 reproduce 
the provisions of the OECD Model should be interpreted consistently.1485  
 
This explains the rather considerable number of references made by national courts and 
tribunals to decisions delivered by foreign judiciaries, including courts and tribunals of 
States not being party to the specific treaty to be construed, interpreting similar worded 
provisions of other tax treaties.1486 As Baker put it: “Cases on the application of 
standardized provisions of double taxation conventions […] have immense relevance in 
many countries. (This is one of the reasons for this set of law reports)”.1487 They 
indubitably represent an item of evidence of the ordinary meaning to be given to OECD 
Model standard terms and expressions used in OECD Model-based tax treaties. 
 For instance, Sir Christopher Staughton, in his dissenting opinion in the Memec 
case,1488 referred to a decision delivered by the German Bundesfinanzhof with regard to 
Article 28 of the 1971 Germany-Switzerland tax treaty, allegedly similar to the one Sir 
                                                     
1482 See paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Introduction to the OECD Model. 
1483 This is the case with regard to any provision included in the French or English authentic text of a tax treaty 
and which exactly (or very similarly) reproduces the corresponding provision of the English or French official 
versions of the OECD Model. 
1484 This is the case with regard to any provision included in the authentic text of a tax treaty drafted in the 
official language of a contracting State, in the case either (i) such a tax treaty also includes a French or English 
authentic text and that provision, as worded in the French or English authentic text, exactly (or very similarly) 
reproduces the corresponding provision of the English or French official versions of the OECD Model, or (ii) 
the former provision exactly (or very similarly) reproduces a provision included in another tax treaty concluded 
by the same State, which in turn includes a  French or English authentic text and that provision, as worded in 
the French or English authentic text, exactly (or very similarly) reproduces the corresponding provision of the 
English or French official versions of the OECD Model. The same holds true with regard to the provisions 
included in the authentic texts drafted in a different language (i.e. not in French, English, or the official 
language of that State), whenever the treaty of which it is part also includes an authentic text in French, English 
or the official language of that State and the corresponding provision included in that text reproduces directly 
or indirectly a provision of the OECD Model. 
1485 This conclusion is strengthened, with regard to OECD member States, by the Recommendation adopted by 
of the OECD Council on 23 October 1997 (doc C(97)195/final), which provides that (i) member States should 
“conform to the Model Tax Convention, as interpreted by the Commentaries thereon”, when concluding new 
or revising existing tax treaties and (ii) their tax administrations should “follow the Commentaries on the 
Articles of the Model Tax Convention, as modified from time to time, when applying and interpreting the 
provisions of their bilateral tax conventions that are based on these Articles”, thus recommending an uniform 
interpretation and application of tax treaty provisions substantially reproducing  the OECD Model provisions.  
1486 See the statement by Kogels (H. Kogels, “Tools for interpretation issues”, in G. Maisto (ed.), Multilingual 
Texts and Interpretation of Tax Treaties and EC Tax Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2005), 326 et seq., 
at 326), according to whom “[i]n order to reach a common interpretation, knowledge of the interpretation by 
judges in the contracting States is essential”. See also M. Edwardes-Ker, Tax Treaty Interpretation. The 
International Tax Treaties Service (Dublin: In-Depth, 1994 – loose-leaf), at 5.04, 24.05, 24.06, 25, 28 and 29; 
K. Vogel et al., Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997), 
pp. 39-42; D. A. Ward, “Use of foreign court decisions in interpreting tax treaties”, in G. Maisto (ed.), Courts 
and Tax Treaty Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2007), 161 et seq., in particular at 175-185. 
1487 P. Baker, 1 ITLR, at 728-729. 
1488 Court of Appeal of England and Wales (United Kingdom), 9 June 1998, Memec Plc v. IRC, 1 ITLR, 3 et 
seq. 
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Christopher Staughton had to construe.1489 In that respect, he maintained that this 
decision of the Bundesfinanzhof was to be regarded as an indication of the willingness of 
Germany to similarly construe the provision at stake before him, i.e. Article XVIII(1)(b) 
of the 1964 Germany-United Kingdom tax treaty. Thus, “in the interest of uniformity”, 
Sir Christopher Staughton found that the United Kingdom should do the same.1490 
                                                     
1489 The reference made by Sir Christopher Staughton, however, appears puzzling, since Article 28 of the 1971 
Germany-Switzerland tax treaty seems similar to the provision he had to construe, i.e. Article XVIII(1)(b) of 
the 1964 Germany-United Kingdom tax treaty, neither in respect of its wording, nor in respect of its object and 
purpose (the preservation of the right to levy withholding taxes on certain items of income by the source State). 
1490 See Court of Appeal of England and Wales (United Kingdom), 9 June 1998, Memec Plc v. IRC, 1 ITLR, 3 
et seq., at 27-28. See also Federal Court of Appeal (Canada), 24 February 2000, R v. Dudney, 2 ITLR, 627 et 
seq., at 636, where the court made reference to a decision of the Belgian Court of Appeal (Belgium not being 
party to the interpreted treaty); Conseil d’Etat (France), 28 June 2002, Re Société Schneider Electric, 4 ITLR, 
1077 et seq., conclusions of the Commissaire du Gouvernement at 113, where reference was made to a 
decision of the Court of Appeal of London (the United Kingdom not being party to the interpreted treaty); New 
South Wales Supreme Court (Australia), 4 December 2002, Unisys Corp v. FCT, 5 ITLR, 658 et seq., at 670-
671, para. 44, where it was stated both that “[w]hen interpreting a [tax treaty] in international tax law, it has 
been held in a number of jurisdictions that recourse may be had to the Official Commentary to the OECD 
models” and that “courts have had regard to decisions in other jurisdictions in international comity in an 
attempt to achieve international uniformity”, and paras. 48-50; Supreme Court (India), 7 October 2003, Union 
of India and another v. Azadi Bachao Andolan and another, 6 ITLR, 233 et seq., at 268-269, where the court 
referred to a decision of the Federal Court of Canada, at 270-272, where there court referred to two decisions 
of the Federal Court of Australia, at 272-273, where the court referred to a decision of the Tax Court of 
Canada, and at 274, where the court made reference to a decision of the High Court of England and Wales; 
Income Tax Appellate Tribunal of Mumbai (India), 1 March 2005, Hindalco Industries Ltd v. Assistant 
Commissioner of Income Tax, 8 ITLR, 1 et seq., at 9 and 19-20, paras. 11-13 and 30, where the tribunal made 
reference to decisions of Canadian, German and English courts in order to interpret the 1989 India–United 
States tax treaty; Tax Court (Canada), 24 October 2006, Canwest Mediaworks Inc v. Canada, 9 ITLR, 189 et 
seq., at 199, para. 23, where the court referred to a decision of the French Conseil d’Etat and a decision of the 
Finnish Supreme Administrative Court; Income Tax Appellate Tribunal of Mumbai (India), 13 April 2007, 
Mashreqbank psc v. Deputy Director of Income Tax, 9 ITLR, 1062 et seq., at 1070, para. 10, where the tribunal 
referred to a decision of the Federal Court of Canada for the purpose of interpreting the 1992 India-United 
Arab Emirates tax treaty; Tax Court (Canada), 22 April 2008, Prévost Car Inc v. R, 10 ITLR, 736 et seq., at 
762-765, paras. 85-93, where the court took into account a decision of the England and Wales Court of 
Appeals for the purpose of interpreting the 1986 Canada-Netherlands tax treaty; Income Tax Appellate 
Tribunal of Pune (India), 21 January 2009, DaimlerChrysler India Private Ltd v. Deputy Commissioner of 
Income Tax, 11 ITLR, 811 et seq., at 838-839, para. 56, where the tribunal noted that, due to the “widespread 
uniformity of many of the provisions of bilateral tax treaties, most of which are directly or indirectly derived 
from the OECD Model and Commentaries, it is not uncommon that a court in country A may find it useful in 
interpreting a tax treaty between country A and country B to refer to and gain guidance from a decision of a 
court in, say, country C interpreting a treaty between county C and B or even C and D where the treaty 
provision is virtually the same as the treaty provision in issue”; ibidem, at 838-848, where the court made 
reference to judgments from the German Bundesfinanzhof, the United States Court of Appeal, the French 
Conseil d’Etat and the United Kingdom House of Lords for the purpose of construing Article 24(4) of the 1995 
Germany-India tax treaty; District Court of Oslo (Norway), 16 December 2009, Dell Products (NUF) v. Tax 
East, 12 ITLR, 829 et seq., at 858; Income Tax Appellate Tribunal of Mumbai (India), 22 March 2010, J Ray 
McDermott Eastern Hemisphere Ltd v. Joint Commissioner of Income Tax, 12 ITLR, 915 et seq., at 930, where 
the tribunal referred to the decision of a Belgian court for the purpose of interpreting the 1982 India-Mauritius 
tax treaty; see also First-Tier Tribunal (United Kingdom), 1 April 2010, FCE Bank plc v. Revenue and 
Customs Commissioners, 12 ITLR, 962 et seq., at 983-991, where the tribunal made reference to three 
decisions of the Supreme Courts of the Netherlands, Finland (Administrative Court) and Sweden 
(Administrative Court) in order to support its interpretation of Article 24(5) of the 1975 United Kingdom-
PART II: CHAPTER 5 
 424 
It goes without saying that such foreign court decisions may vary to a 
considerable extent both in the results achieved and in the arguments used in support 
thereof.1491 However, their possible inconsistency does not represent a significant 
drawback in the practice of national judiciaries of referring to them, since those 
decisions are binding neither at the public international level, nor at the domestic level 
on those national judiciaries. As Lord Diplock maintained in the Fothergill case,1492 
“[a]s respects decision of foreign courts, the persuasive value of a particular court's 
decision must depend on its reputation and its status, the extent to which its decisions are 
binding on courts of co-ordinate and inferior jurisdiction in its own country and the 
coverage of the national law reporting system.”  
 
Similarly, it is not unusual to find in national case law mention and rely on other States’ 
tax authorities practice (even with regard to States that are not party to the treaty to be 
construed).1493 
 
3.6. Textual comparison: subsequent versions of the OECD Model, deviations from 
                                                                                                                                  
United States tax treaty and, in addition, explicitly noted that it regarded “as important that courts give 
consistent interpretations of treaty provisions contained in the OECD Model that are widely used in tax 
treaties”.  
See, for older case law, M. Edwardes-Ker, Tax Treaty Interpretation. The International Tax Treaties Service 
(Dublin: In-Depth, 1994 – loose-leaf), Chapter 29. 
1491 Lord Wilberforce of the House of Lords (United Kingdom) noted, in respect of the Convention on the 
Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by Road (concluded in Geneva on 19 May 1956), that such 
Convention “has been accepted by more than 20 states some of them close to English ways of thought. I cannot 
credit them all, or some average of them, with recognizably superior, or even different, methods of 
interpretation. We should of course try to harmonise interpretation but […] courts in six member countries 
have produced 12 different interpretations of particular provisions – so uniformity is not to be reached by that 
road. To base our interpretation of this Convention on some assumed, and unproved, interpretation which other 
courts are to be supposed likely to adopt is speculative as well as masochistic.” (House of Lords (United 
Kingdom), 9 November 1977, James Buchanan & Co. Ltd v. Babco Forwarding and Shipping (U.K.) Ltd, 
[1978] AC 141, at 154).  
1492 House of Lords (United Kingdom), 10 July 1980, Fothergill v. Monarch Airlines Ltd, [1981] AC 251, at 
284.  
1493 See, for instance, Supreme Administrative Court (Sweden), 23 December 1987, case RÅ 1987 ref. 162, 
Regeringsrättens årsbok (1987), where the Court referred to the practice followed by the tax authorities of the 
other contracting State (United Kingdom) for the purpose of interpreting Article XII(3) of the 1960 Sweden-
United Kingdom tax treaty; Authority for Advance Rulings (India), 28 April 1999, Y’s Application, 2 ITLR, 66 
et seq., at 78; Tax Court (Canada), 27 June 2002, Edwards v. R, 5 ITLR, 1 et seq., at 36, paras. 83-84; 
Borgarting Appeals Court (Norway), 13 August 2003, PGS Geographical AS v. Government of Norway, 6 
ITLR, 212 et seq., at 231 where it was mentioned that periods of less than six months appear not to have been 
found sufficient in any practice to trigger the existence of a permanent establishment (notably, the Court seems 
to have taken inspiration from paragraph 6 of the Commentary to Article 5 of the OECD Model in order to 
establish such a practice, although no reference was made to it); Supreme Court (Norway), 8 June 2004, PGS 
Exploration AS v. State of Norway, 7 ITLR, 51 et seq., at 81, para. 61; Supreme Court (Norway), 24 April 
2008, Sølvik v Staten v/Skatt Øst, 11 ITLR, 15 et seq., at 35-36, para. 43, where the Court referred to 
governments’ and tax authorities’ practice form Denmark, Canada and the United Kingdom.  
See also M. Edwardes-Ker, Tax Treaty Interpretation. The International Tax Treaties Service (Dublin: In-
Depth, 1994 – loose-leaf), at 28.05. 
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the OECD Model and differences with other tax treaties concluded by the 
contracting States  
 
The existence of a Model on which most of the tax treaties currently in force are based 
and the consequent broad uniformity of such treaties cause national courts and tribunals 
to pay particular attention to the discrepancies existing:  
(i) between the subsequent versions of the OECD Model,  
(ii) between the OECD Model and the tax treaty to be interpreted, as well as 
(iii) between the tax treaty to be interpreted and the other tax treaties concluded 
by the contracting States of the former. 
  
For instance, the fact that the tax treaty to be interpreted is designed along the lines of 
the OECD Model sometimes triggers the analysis of the changes introduced in the 
Model itself and the assessment of the possible reason thereof, for the purpose of 
interpreting a tax treaty provision that reproduces or resembles the corresponding OECD 
Model provision before, or after that change.1494 
 
Likewise, deviations from the OECD Model provisions existing at the date of the treaty 
conclusion (or negotiation) are sometimes queried by national courts and tribunals in 
order to determine what the reasons for these might have been and how those reasons 
may affect the construction of the relevant tax treaty provisions.1495  
                                                     
1494 See, for instance, Hoge Raad (Netherlands), 9 December 1998, case 32709, 1 ITLR, 839 et seq., at 854, 
dealing with the significance of the move of the PE construction provision from paragraph 2 of Article 5 of the 
1963 OECD Draft Model (which substantially reproduced the corresponding provision of the 1958 Report of 
the Fiscal Committee of the OEEC) to new paragraph 3 of Article 5 of the 1977 OECD Model for the purpose 
of interpreting Article 2.2(2)(a)(gg) of the 1959 Netherlands-Germany tax treaty; Federal Court (Australia), 29 
April 2005, McDermott Industries (Aust) Pty Ltd v. Commissioner of Taxation, 7 ITLR, 800 et seq., at 813-814, 
paras. 42-44, dealing with the modification of the royalty definition in Article 12(2) of the 1992 OECD Model.  
1495 See Federal Court (Australia), 20 December 1988, Thiel v. Commissioner of Taxation, [1988] FCA 443, in 
particular at para. 38 of the separate opinion of Sheppard J.; High Court (Australia), 22 August 1990, Thiel v. 
Commissioner of Taxation, 171 Commonwealth Law Reports, 338 et seq., para. 15 of the separate opinion of 
McHuge J.; Federal Court of Appeal (Canada), 8 November 1993, Crown Forest v. Canada, 94 DTC 6107, 
para. 17 of the opinion of Heald J.A.; Supreme Court (Canada), 22 June 1995, Crown Forest v. Canada, [1995] 
2 SCR 802, paras. 55 et seq. per Iacobucci J.; Hoge Raad (Netherlands), 1 November 2000, case 35398, 3 
ITLR, 466 et seq., at 483-484, para. 3.5, where the absence of Article 24(6) of the OECD Model in the 
corresponding Article of the 1986 Canada-Netherlands tax treaty was interpreted as evidence of the intention 
of the Contracting States to exclude the application of the treaty non-discrimination provisions to taxes other 
than those referred to in Article 2 of the very same treaty (contra the Opinion of Advocate General Wattel at 
495, para. 8); Tax Court (Canada), 27 June 2002, Edwards v. R, 5 ITLR, 1 et seq., at 26, paras. 37-38, where 
the court noted that (i) the text of Article 2 of the 1986 Canada-China tax treaty differed significantly from the 
corresponding OECD Model article, due in particular to the absence of any reference to taxes imposed on 
behalf of the contracting States’ political subdivisions or local authorities and that (ii) Canada, in that respect, 
had expressly reserved its position in the OECD Commentary and, as a consequence, drew the conclusion that 
the relevant part of the OECD Commentary on Article 2 could not apply in order to interpret the above-
mentioned tax treaty provision; Tax Court (Canada), 24 February 2003, Cloutier v. R, 5 ITLR, 878 et seq., at 
887, para. 18; Supreme Court (Norway), 8 June 2004, PGS Exploration AS v. State of Norway, 7 ITLR, 51 et 
seq., at 75-76, para. 44 where the Court concluded that the extension of the scope of the “construction 
permanent establishment” provision in Article 5(2) of the 1978 Ivory Coast-Norway tax treaty (according to 
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Finally, comparison with other tax treaties concluded by the two States party to the tax 
treaty to be interpreted is occasionally carried out by national courts and tribunals for the 
purpose of determining additional elements in support of the possible alternative 
constructions of the tax treaty provisions before them.1496  
 In that respect, the analysis of other tax treaties concluded by the contracting 
States may be helpful in order to ascertain their policy in respect of certain provisions or 
issues in the application of the treaties to which they are party.1497  
                                                                                                                                  
which a building site or construction or assembly project is deemed to constitute a permanent establishment 
independently of its duration), as compared to the corresponding provision of the OECD Model, had no 
relevance for the purpose of interpreting the general definition of permanent establishment provided for in 
Article 5(1) of that tax treaty; Tax Court (Canada), 8 April 2005, Allchin v. R, 7 ITLR, 851 et seq., at 871-872, 
paras. 50-51, where the Court concluded that the OECD Commentary on Article 4, for the part dealing with the 
“habitual abode” tie-breaker test (theoretically relevant for the case at stake), was not useful in interpreting the 
1980 Canada-United States tax treaty since, while in the OECD Model that test was to be used (i) where a 
person did not have a permanent home available in either State (i.e. without passing through the “centre of vital 
interests” test) or (ii) where the State in which he had the centre of his vital interests could not be determined, 
in the 1980 Canada-United States tax treaty the “centre of vital interest” test was to be applied in case (i), 
leaving the “habitual abode” applicable only in case (ii) (one might question, indeed, the significance of such a 
difference for the purpose of assessing the relevance of the OECD Commentary paragraphs discussing the 
“habitual abode” test); by analogy, Tax Court (Canada), 16 May 2008, Knights of Columbus v. R, 10 ITLR, 827 
et seq., at 840-843 and 855, where the Court (and one of its three expert witnesses) took note of the presence, 
in the 2001 United Nations Model, of a special provision dealing with the existence of permanent 
establishments of insurance companies (Article 5(6) of that Model), which was absent in both the OECD 
Model and the relevant tax treaty, as well as of the fact that both the OECD Commentary and the United 
Nations Commentary noted that such kind of provision was directed at obviating the possibility that insurance 
companies doing large-scale business in a State could not be taxed therein due to the absence of a permanent 
establishment, and drew the inference that the contracting States (Canada and the United States) were most 
probably aware of the above-mentioned possibility and of the chance to insert a specific provision as a remedy, 
so that the non-inclusion of such a provision could be regarded as an acceptance by those States of the 
possibility that insurance companies resident of the other contracting State and doing large-scale business in 
their territory could escape tax liability therein due to the absence of a permanent establishment, such 
acceptance being probably justified in light of the reciprocity of its effects on both States’ tax revenues (see, 
similarly, Tax Court (Canada), 16 May 2008, American Income Life Insurance Company v. Canada, 11 ITLR, 
52 et seq., at 80, paras. 85-86); Federal Court (Australia), 10 October 2008, Virgin Holdings SA v. 
Commissioner of Taxation, 11 ITLR, 335 et seq., at 345, paras. 26 and 27, where the Court noted that Article 2 
of the 1980 Australia-Switzerland tax treaty did not contain paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 2 OECD Model, 
without drawing any strong inference from it; Federal Court (Australia), 3 February 2009, Undershaft Ltd and 
Undershaft BV v. Commissioner of Taxation, 11 ITLR, 652 et seq., at 708, para. 148, where the Court 
highlighted the main differences, relevant for the solution of the case at stake, between the 1976 Australia-
Netherlands tax treaty, on the one hand, and the 1977 OECD Model, on the other hand, for the purpose of 
construing Articles 7 and 13 of the former.  
1496 See, in support of a very cautious employment of such practice, K. Vogel et al., Klaus Vogel on Double 
Taxation Conventions (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997), pp. 49-51, m.nos. 84-87. 
1497 See, for instance, Cour de Cassation (Belgium), 12 October 1973, Dobbelmann Gmbh v. Belgium, 
Pasicrisie belge. Arrets de la cour de Cassation (1974), 159 et seq., where the court made reference to other 
two tax treaties concluded by Belgium in order to construe the expression “montant brut des dit dividendes” 
used in Article 10 of the 1967 Belgium-Germany tax treaty; similarly, Cour de Cassation (Belgium), 21 
February 1979, Société Anonyme de Participations et d’Études, Compagnie Saint-Gobain Pont a Mousson v. 
Belgium, Pasicrisie belge. Arrets de la cour de Cassation (1979), 737 et seq.; Hoge Raad (Netherlands), 1 
November 2000, case 35398, 3 ITLR, 466 et seq., Opinion of the Advocate General Wattel at 489-490, where 
the wording of the non-discrimination articles of the tax treaties concluded by the Netherlands with Brazil and 
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Vietnam, as well as the explanatory notes to those treaties were analysed and it was concluded that, even in the 
absence of a provision similar to Article 26(2) of the OECD Model, the non-discrimination article might be 
applied to taxes other than those mentioned in Article 2; Federal Court (Canada), 8 November 2002, Pacific 
Network Services Ltd and another v. Minister if National Revenue, 5 ITLR, 638 et seq., at 648, para. 26, where 
the court (however) rejected the view that the different wordings of Article XXVII of the 1980 Canada-United 
States tax treaty and of Article 26 of the 1975 Canada-France tax treaty (both concerning exchange of 
information) would trigger different obligations on the tax authority requested to exchange information; 
Supreme Court (India), 7 October 2003, Union of India and another v. Azadi Bachao Andolan and another, 6 
ITLR, 233 et seq., at 274 where the 1982 India-Mauritius tax treaty was compared to the 1989 India-United 
States tax treaty, the latter including a limitation on benefits provision absent in the former; Federal Court of 
Appeal (Canada), 13 October 2003, Edwards v. R, 6 ITLR, 564 et seq., at 568-569, paras. 22-26, where the 
court, in order to determine whether the 1986 Canada-China tax treaty also applied to Hong Kong from 1997 
onwards, made reference to both the 1984 China-United Kingdom and the 1984 China-United States tax 
treaties, as well as to Baker’s position regarding the applicability of the 1984 China-United Kingdom tax treaty 
to Hong Kong and to the position expressed, with reference to the same issue, in the United States Technical 
Explanations to the 1984 China-United States tax treaty; Supreme Court (Norway), 8 June 2004, PGS 
Exploration AS v. State of Norway, 7 ITLR, 51 et seq., at 76, para. 45 where the court referred to the special 
provisions concerning activities carried out on the continental shelf included in the tax treaties and amending 
protocols concluded by Norway in the ‘70s, although ultimately recognizing that such provisions were not 
aimed at changing, and thus had no bearing on the construction of, the general definition of permanent 
establishment; Federal Court (Australia), 29 April 2005, McDermott Industries (Aust) Pty Ltd v. Commissioner 
of Taxation, 7 ITLR, 800 et seq., at 814-815, paras. 46-49, where the Court referred to the 1953 Australia-
United States tax treaty, which included a provision similar to the one encompassed in the 1969 Australia-
Singapore tax treaty at stake before the Court; Tax Court (Canada), 22 December 2005, Sutcliffe v. Canada, 8 
ITLR, 563 et seq., at 580-581, paras. 80-81, where the Court, in order to construe Article XV(3) of 1980 
Canada-United States tax treaty, reviewed other tax treaties concluded by Canada and inferred from them the 
policy of Canada (and its treaty partners) concerning the taxation of pilots engaged in international flights; 
somewhat similarly, Tax Court (Canada), 24 October 2006, Canwest Mediaworks Inc v. Canada, 9 ITLR, 189 
et seq., at 194, para. 5, and at 197, paras. 16-17, where the court allowed a senior advisor on tax treaties with 
the Canada Revenue Agency, who had been involved in negotiating 20 treaties over ten years, to testify to his 
experience with regard to the reason why Canada insisted to include a specific type of provision (i.e. the FAPI 
provision) in some of its tax treaties, in order to grasp the possible intention of at least one of the contracting 
States with regard to the provision at stake; High Court (Ireland), 31 July 2007, Kinsella v. Revenue 
Commissioners, 10 ITLR, 63 et seq., at 74, where the Court pointed out that the researches made had not been 
able to uncover any other treaty, entered into by Ireland, containing the unusual wording of Article 2(2) of the 
1971 Italy-Ireland tax treaty; Tax Court (Canada), 16 May 2008, Knights of Columbus v. R, 10 ITLR, 827 et 
seq., at 842-843, with regard to the practice of Canada and the United States to include special “insurance 
business” permanent establishment provisions in their tax treaties, which was considered potentially relevant in 
order to interpret Article V of the 1980 Canada-United States tax treaty; Income Tax Appellate Tribunal of 
Pune (India), 10 September 2008, Automated Securities Clearance Inc v. Income Tax Officer, 11 ITLR, 201 et 
seq., at 227-228, paras. 54-59, where the tribunal warned about the inference that differently-worded 
provisions included in different tax treaties concluded by the same State should be always attributed different 
meanings, tax treaties remaining the products of bilateral negotiations, whose wording largely depend on the 
comfort level of the treaty partners with the words so employed; Authority for Advance Rulings  (India), 30 
September 2009, Gearbulk AG v. Director of Income Tax, 12 ITLR, 495 et seq., at 506, para. 10, where the 
authority carried on a comparative analysis of how profits from the operation of ships in international traffic 
were dealt with in various tax treaties concluded by India, in order to determine whether they were taxable in 
India under the 1994 India-Switzerland tax treaty; Tax Court (Canada), 8 April 2010, TD Securities (USA) LLC 
v. R, 12 ITLR, 783 et seq., at 816, footnote 9, where the Court, in the context of construing the 1980 Canada-
United States tax treaty and applying it to income derived by a United States fiscally transparent LLC, made 
reference to the fact that Canada had earlier amended its tax treaty with France in order to expressly recognize 
partnerships and other fiscally transparent entities for the purpose of the application of the latter treaty; Income 
Tax Appellate Tribunal of Mumbai (India), 22 March 2010, J Ray McDermott Eastern Hemisphere Ltd v. Joint 
Commissioner of Income Tax, 12 ITLR, 915 et seq., at 925-927, where the tribunal analysed the “construction 
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 Interestingly, courts have proved willing to peruse and compare both earlier and 
later treaties and have alternatively used the result of such an analysis to support the 
view that the different wording was evidence of a different intended meaning of the 
provisions under scrutiny, or to argue for the thesis that the different wording of the 
other (later or earlier) treaty better elucidated the meaning that the contracting States 
intended to attach to the treaty provision to be construed. 
 With regard to this practice, the analysis of the various authentic texts of the 
different tax treaties compared and, in particular, of their drafted texts proves to be a 
useful tool for the interpreter, providing strong evidence of the common understanding 
of the parties with regard to unusual provisions. Such an analytical technique, for 
instance, might be conveniently employed in order to inquire the causes, if any, of the 
different wordings employed in the subject-to-tax provisions included in Austrian tax 
treaties,1498 in which, although the German authentic texts use a variety of different terms 
and expressions such as “steuerpflichtig sein”, “der Besteuerung unterworfen”, “der 
Besteuerung unterliegen”, “besteuert werden” and “der Steuer unterliegen”, the English 
authentic texts all employ the uniform term “subject-to-tax”.1499  
 
3.7. Conclusions on research question a)  
 
The analysis carried out in the previous sections has demonstrated that the role played by 
the OECD Model official versions (English and French) in respect of (multilingual) tax 
treaties based on such a Model is similar to that played by the drafted text for the 
purpose of interpreting multilingual treaties. 
 To put it differently, the OECD Model official versions represent significant 
evidence of the intention of the parties with regard to the meaning of tax treaty 
provisions drafted along the lines of the OECD Model. Thus, the interpreter should take 
them into account as primary means of interpretation in order to establish the utterance 
(ordinary or special) meaning of the relevant treaty terms and expressions. 
                                                                                                                                  
permanent establishment” provisions included in the tax treaties concluded by India and deviating from the 
wording of the OECD and United Nations Models, in that they all include a reference to the aggregation of all, 
or connected, sites, projects and activities carried on by a non-resident enterprise in order to determine the 
existence of a permanent establishment thereof in India, and inferred from the absence of such a reference in 
the tax treaty to be interpreted (the 1982 India-Mauritius tax treaty) that such an aggregation was generally not 
allowed under that treaty.  
See also, with regard to subsequent tax treaties concluded by the treaty parties, the case law referred to in M. 
Edwardes-Ker, Tax Treaty Interpretation. The International Tax Treaties Service (Dublin: In-Depth, 1994 – 
loose-leaf), at 26.01, 26.02 and 26.03. 
1498 See M. Schilcher, Die Vermeidung der doppelten Nichtbesteuerung durch subject-to-tax-Klauseln (Vienna: 
Linde, 2004), p. 57. 
1499 The drawback of such drafting is highlighted by Metzler, who notes that in the Austrian tax treaty practice 
subject-to-tax-clauses are generally interpreted very differently, mainly due to the huge variety of terms and 
expressions used in the German authentic texts of the relevant treaties; the author concludes that, for a more 
uniform interpretation of these clauses, a more conscientious use of such German terms and expressions would 
be preferable (see V. E. Metzler, “Austria”, in G. Maisto (ed.), Multilingual Texts and Interpretation of Tax 
Treaties and EC Tax Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2005), 137 et seq., at 149).  
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 With specific reference to the subject of this study, the OECD Model official 
versions constitute a key element to be taken into account by the interpreter in order to 
remove the prima facie discrepancies in meaning among the tax authentic treaty texts in 
accordance with Article 33(4) VCLT, i.e. by applying the rules of interpretation 
enshrined in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT. This holds true also in cases where none of the 
authentic treaty texts is drafted in English or French. 
 
In addition, the impact of the OECD Model official versions on the drafting of the 
authentic texts of tax treaties based on such a Model constitutes a strong argument in 
support of the following conclusions. 
 First, it supports the appropriateness of a loose approach in the application of the 
renvoi provided for in Article 3(2) of OECD Model-based tax treaties, in the sense that 
the terms actually used in the authentic treaty texts should be given the meaning that not 
only such terms, but also their legal jargon synonyms and proxies in the official 
language of the State applying the treaty, have for the purpose of that State’s domestic 
law, unless the context otherwise requires. This point, being strictly connected with the 
analysis of the renvoi to domestic law encompassed in Article 3(2) OECD Model, will 
be further analysed in section 5.3.2.4 of this chapter. 
 Second, it supports the inclusion, among the means of interpretation to be used 
for removing the prima facie discrepancies in meaning between the authentic treaty texts 
in accordance with Articles 31 and 32 VCLT, of certain elements and items of evidence. 
In particular, it constitutes the main foundation of the argument that all tax treaty 
provisions that directly or indirectly reproduce the provisions of the OECD Model 
should be interpreted consistently, which in turn justifies the practice of having recourse 
to the decisions delivered by foreign judiciaries and the practices of foreign tax 
authorities (including those of States that are not party to the specific treaty to be 
construed) in order to establish the ordinary meaning to be given to OECD Model 
standard terms and expressions (used in OECD Model-based tax treaties) under Articles 
31 and 32 VCLT. Moreover, it justifies the recourse by the interpreter, as supplementary 
means of interpretation, to the analysis of the differences existing (i) between the 
subsequent versions of the OECD Model, (ii) between the OECD Model and the tax 
treaty to be interpreted, as well as (iii) between the tax treaty to be interpreted and other 
tax treaties concluded by the contracting States of the former, for the purpose of 
establishing the intention of the parties, i.e. the utterance meaning of the relevant tax 
treaty provision. 
  
4. The OECD Model Commentary as part of the overall context 
4.1. Research question addressed in this section  
 
The present section is aimed at tackling the following research question, here briefly 
illustrated by means of an example. 
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b) What is the relevance of the OECD Commentary for the purpose of interpreting 
multilingual tax treaties? 
 
Consider a tax treaty authenticated in English and French, Article 12 of which 
reproduces without significant deviations Article 12 of the OECD Model. The interpreter 
might be faced with an interpretative issue regarding the meaning to be attributed to the 
terms “copyright” and “droit d’auteur” employed in the English and French authentic 
texts, respectively, of that article. In particular, he might have to decide whether or not 
the right of an actor to authorize the reproduction of a movie in which he acted falls 
within the scope of the two above-mentioned terms, thus triggering the application of 
Article 12.  
 In the French legal jargon, the term “droit d’auteur” does not seem to encompass 
such a right, which, on the contrary, appears to be denoted by the term “droit voisin” (to 
the “droit d’auteur”). However, in the English legal jargon, the term “copyright” seems 
to include within its scope the right of an actor to authorize the reproduction of a movie 
in which he acted. Therefore, a prima facie discrepancy in meaning appears to exist 
between the English and French authentic texts of the treaty. 
 In that respect, paragraph 18 of the Commentary to Article 12 OECD Model 
seems to support a broad interpretation of the terms "copyright" and “droit d’auteur”, 
such as to include droits voisin. According to that paragraph, where the musical 
performance of a musician (or orchestra director) is “recorded and the artist has 
stipulated that he, on the basis of his copyright [author’s note: “droit d’auteur” in the 
French official version]1500 in the sound recording, be paid royalties on the sale or public 
playing of the records, then so much of the payment received by him as consists of such 
royalties falls to be treated under Article 12”.  
 The question thus arises whether and to what extent the interpreter should take 
into account the content of paragraph 18 of the Commentary to Article 12 OECD Model 
in order remove the prima facie discrepancy in meaning between the two authentic treaty 
texts. 
 
4.2. Introduction  
 
“The Commentaries are not binding, but they are the best evidence of the generally 
accepted interpretation of OECD-style conventions”.1501 
 
                                                     
1500 The relevant excerpt of paragraph 18 of the Commentary to Article 12 OECD Model, in its French official 
version, reads as follow: “Lorsqu'en vertu du même contrat ou d'un contrat distinct, la prestation musicale est 
enregistrée et que l'artiste a accepté, sur la base de ses droits d'auteur concernant l'enregistrement, de recevoir 
des redevances sur la vente ou sur l'audition publique des disques, la partie de la rémunération reçue qui 
consiste en de telles redevances relève de l'article 12”. 
1501 Baker, 5 ITLR, at 1004, in commenting on a decision of the French Conseil D’Etat (Conseil d’Etat 
(France), 30 June 2003, Minister for the Economy, Finance and Industry v. Interhome AG, 5 ITLR, 1001 et 
seq.), which made reference to the post-2003 OECD Commentaries in order to interpret a 1966 tax treaty in 
relation to tax years in the 1980s.  
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The relevance of the OECD Commentary for tax treaty interpretation has been the 
subject of a striking number of articles and books. It is not the purpose of this section to 
review, discuss or comment on such publications, nor to comprehensively deal with the 
subject matter.1502 Its much more limited aim1503 is to establish the relevance of the 
OECD Commentary for the purpose of interpreting multilingual tax treaties and, more 
specifically, of removing prima facie discrepancies in meaning among tax authentic 
treaty texts. 
 
From a historical perspective, each tax treaty model developed by or under the auspices 
of international organizations, from the League of Nations onward, has been 
accompanied by commentaries explaining the intended meaning of the model 
provisions.1504 The practice of providing commentaries to the relevant models was 
probably taken from that of providing commentaries or explanatory reports to 
multilateral treaties.1505 
 With specific regard to the OECD Commentary, starting from 1992 the OECD 
practice has always been to modify it every two or three years, generally without 
                                                     
1502 The two most recent and comprehensive studies on the matter, where a conspicuous number of further 
references may be found, are: S. Douma and F. Engelen (eds.), The Legal Status of the OECD Commentaries 
(Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2008) and D. A. Ward et al., The Interpretation of Income Tax Treaties with 
Particular Reference to the Commentaries on the OECD Model (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2005). 
1503 The present section does not deal with the interpretative issues stemming from the fact that the parties to a 
tax treaty have entered reservations or observations to the OECD Commentary, if they are OECD member 
States, or expressed their positions thereon, if they are not OECD member States; likewise, for the purpose of 
the analysis carried out in this section (unless otherwise provided), it is assumed that no reservation, 
observation or position has been expressed by the contracting States.  
The issues connected with the interpretation of tax treaty provisions reproducing the OECD Model provisions, 
in respect of which one or both the contracting States have entered observations in the OECD Commentary, 
have been throughly analysed in G. Maisto, “The Observations on the OECD Commentaries in the 
Interpretation of Tax Treaties”, 59 Bulletin for international taxation (2005), 14 et seq. See also D. A. Ward et 
al., The Interpretation of Income Tax Treaties with Particular Reference to the Commentaries on the OECD 
Model (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2005), pp. 64-78.   
1504 See D. A. Ward et al., The Interpretation of Income Tax Treaties with Particular Reference to the 
Commentaries on the OECD Model (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2005), p. 3. The authors added that over 
the years the OECD Commentaries “have expanded, have become more detailed and sometimes have departed 
in several places from what could fairly be said to be the literal or textual interpretation of the Model to a 
point where it is widely believed that the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs […] is sometimes attempting to 
change the Model by changing its interpretation” (see ibidem, p. 4, emphasis added). According to this author, 
however, the idea that the Commentary often attributes to the OECD Model provisions certain meanings 
further than their proper (literal or textual) meanings is flawed and theoretically dangerous: it is flawed since 
none may be said to know the intended meaning of an utterance better than the person that actually uttered it 
and, in the case at stake, the Commentary is drawn up by the same organization that created the respective 
model; it is theoretically dangerous since it relies on and upholds the view that utterances have an intrinsic 
meaning, separate from their overall context (which, in this case, clearly encompasses the relevant 
commentaries) and independent from the relation existing (or intended to exist) between the speaker and the 
hearers, thus employing an utopian argument in order to justify the substitution of the meaning preferred by the 
authors (or other interpreters) for the meaning intended by the international organization that drew up the 
model (which, in turn, makes it an apologetic argument in favor of the constructions chosen by the 
interpreters). 
1505 See ibidem, p. 3. 
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introducing any related change in the Model Convention.1506 
 
No scholar has ever seriously questioned the potential relevance of the OECD 
Commentary for the purpose of interpreting tax treaties. Most likely, this is due to the 
effect that the Commentary may have on the consistent construction of those treaties. 
According to Vogel, for instance, “OECD MC and its Commentary are very important 
for the interpretation of tax treaties in that they provide a source from which the courts of 
different States can seek a common interpretation.”1507 
 
Similarly, the review of national courts and tribunals’ case law has shown that judiciaries 
do, in many cases, refer to the OECD Commentary in order to construe tax treaty 
provisions.1508  
 The relevance attributed to the OECD Commentary, however, varies significantly 
from country to country and, sometimes, also within a single jurisdiction. On the one 
hand, a considerable number of courts and tribunals have expressed the view that the 
OECD Commentary is one of the most important elements to be taken into account for 
the purpose of interpreting tax treaties patterned along the lines of the OECD Model.1509 
                                                     
1506 Accordingly, as of 1992, the OECD started to publish the Model and its Commentary in loose-leaf form.  
1507 See K. Vogel et al., Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 
1997), p. 43, m.no. 79. 
1508 In addition to the case law cited here below, see the decisions of national courts and tribunals referred to in 
M. Edwardes-Ker, Tax Treaty Interpretation. The International Tax Treaties Service (Dublin: In-Depth, 1994 – 
loose-leaf), at 26.11 and 26.12. 
1509 See, for instance, Supreme Court (Canada), 22 June 1995, Crown Forest v. Canada, [1995] 2 SCR 802, 
para. 55; Tax Court (Canada), 30 October 1998, Dudney v. R, 1 ITLR, 371 et seq., at 376-379; Court of Federal 
Claims (United States), 7 July 1999, National Westminster Bank v. US, 1 ITLR, 725 et seq., at 737 and 748; 
Hoge Raad (Netherlands), 9 December 1998, case 32709, 1 ITLR, 839 et seq., at 853-854; Federal Court of 
Appeal (Canada), 24 February 2000, R v. Dudney, 2 ITLR, 627 et seq., at 632-634; Hoge Raad (Netherlands), 1 
November 2000, case 35398, 3 ITLR, 466 et seq., Opinion of Advocate General Wattel at 493, where it is 
stated that, in respect of tax treaty provisions reproducing OECD Model provisions, the OECD Commentary 
must prevail unless there are clear indications that both contracting States intended to deviate from that 
standard; Court of Appeal of The Hague (Netherlands), 27 February 2001, case BK-98/02743, 3 ITLR, 631 et 
seq., at 644, para 6.2; Conseil d’Etat (France), 27 July 2001, Re SA Golay Buchel France, 4 ITLR, 249 et seq., 
conclusions of the Commissaire du Gouvernement at 261; Corte Suprema di Cassazione (Italy), 7 March 2002, 
Ministry of Finance (Tax Office) v. Philip Morris Gmbh, 4 ITLR, 903 et seq., at 938 and 941-945, where 
(ironically with hindsight) the Court referred to the OECD Commentary more than ten times in order to 
support its decision; Supreme Administrative Court (Finland), 20 March 2002, Re A Oyj Abp, 4 ITLR, 1009 et 
seq., at 1065 and 1070-1071; Corte Suprema di Cassazione (Italy), 25 May 2002, case 7682; Federal Court 
(Canada), 8 November 2002, Pacific Network Services Ltd and another v. Minister if National Revenue, 5 
ITLR, 638 et seq., at 650-654, paras. 32, 36, 38, 40 and 44; New South Wales Supreme Court (Australia), 4 
December 2002, Unisys Corp v. FCT 5 ITLR, 658 et seq., at 671, para. 46 and at 676, para. 66; Corte Suprema 
di Cassazione (Italy), 6 Decembre 2002, case 17373, where the OECD Commentary is referred to fourteen 
times; Conseil d’Etat (France), 30 June 2003, Minister for the Economy, Finance and Industry v. Interhome 
AG, 5 ITLR, 1001 et seq., conclusions of the Commissaire du Gouvernement at 1031, 1034, 1037-1038 and 
1040; Court of Federal Claims (United States), 14 November 2003, National Westminster Bank plc v. United 
States of America, 6 ITLR, 292 et seq., at 304; Corte Suprema di Cassazione (Italy), 23 April 2004, case 7851; 
Supreme Court (Norway), 8 June 2004, PGS Exploration AS v. State of Norway, 7 ITLR, 51 et seq., at 76, para. 
46, where it was stated that the OECD Commentary is an important source of law in the interpretation of tax  
treaties, including those concluded between member and non-member States of the OECD; Tax Court 
(Canada), 8 April 2005, Allchin v. R, 7 ITLR, 851 et seq., at 864-872, para. 35, quoting Iacobucci J. in Crown 
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Forest (see Supreme Court (Canada), 22 June 1995, Crown Forest v. Canada, [1995] 2 SCR 802, para. 55), 
para. 40, para. 47 and para. 51, where the Court, however, concluded that the OECD Commentary on Article 4, 
for the part dealing with the “habitual abode” tie-breaker test (theoretically relevant for the case at stake) was 
not useful in interpreting the relevant tax treaty since, while in the OECD Model that test was to be used (i) 
where a person did not have a permanent home available in either State (i.e. without passing through the 
“centre of vital interests” test) or (ii) where the State in which he had the centre of his vital interests could not 
be determined, in the relevant tax treaty the “centre of vital interest” test was to be applied in case (i), leaving 
the “habitual abode” applicable only in case (ii) (one might question, indeed, the significance of such a 
difference for the purpose of assessing the relevance of the OECD Commentary paragraphs discussing the 
“habitual abode” test); Special Commissioners (United Kingdom), 7 June 2005, UBS AG v. Revenue and 
Customs Commissioners, 7 ITLR, 893 et seq., at 906-907, para. 10, where it was said that “the negotiators on 
both sides could be expected to have the Commentary in front of them and can be expected to have intended 
that the meaning in the Commentary should be applied in interpreting the treaty when it contains the identical 
wording and neither party had made an observation disagreeing with the Commentary” and, with reference to 
the explanation of Article 24(3) OECD Model provided for in the OECD Commentary thereto, that “[i]t seems 
clear that the parties to the treaty intended that such explanation should be more important than the ordinary 
meaning  to be given to the terms of that phrase. This is either on the basis that the existence of the Model and 
the Commentaries demonstrate that the parties intended it as a special meaning within art 31(4) of the Vienna 
Convention, or that the Vienna Convention does not purport to be a comprehensive statement of the method of 
treaty interpretation”; ibidem, at 917-919, paras. 22, 24 and 25; Tax Court (Canada), 22 July 2005, Yoon v. R, 8 
ITLR, 129 et seq., at 140-144, paras. 21, 23, 28, 33 and 38; Federal Court  (Switzerland), 29 November 2005, A 
Holding ApS v. Federal Tax Administration, 8 ITLR, 536 et seq., at 558, para. 3.4.5., where the Court affirmed 
that OECD member States are in principle obliged to take into account the OECD Model and the Commentary 
thereto in order to interpret their treaties (at least with regard to those concluded with other OECD member 
States); Tax Court (Canada), 22 December 2005, Sutcliffe v. Canada, 8 ITLR, 563 et seq., at 580, para. 79, at 
584, para. 107, and 589, para. 136; Court of Appeal of England and Wales (United Kingdom), 2 March 2006, 
Indofood International Finance Limited v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA, London Branch, 8 ITLR, 653 et seq., at 
674-675, para. 42 per Sir Andrew Morritt, and 683-684, para. 74 per Chadwick LJ.; Income Tax Appellate 
Tribunal of Mumbai (India), 30 September 2005, Metchem Canada Inc v. Deputy Commissioner of Income 
Tax, 8 ITLR, 1043 et seq., at 1049 and 1050, where the tribunal noted that the OECD Commentary had a key 
roe in determining the scope and connotation of Article 24(2) of the 1985 Canada-India tax treaty and that 
when tax treaty expressions or clauses are picked up from the OECD Model, the normal presumption is that the 
persons using the said clauses or expressions are aware about the meanings assigned thereto by the OECD and 
intend to use them in the same sense and for the same purpose, unless a contrary intention is specifically 
expressed in the text of the treaty or additional protocol (the tribunal, furthermore, explicitly extended such a 
reasoning to tax treaties involving a non-OECD country); Administrative Court (Luxembourg), 17 January 
2006, Re XXX SA, 9 ITLR, 176 et seq., at 186, where it was stated that provisions of a tax treaty copied from 
the OECD Model should be applied in light of the OECD Commentary since the main purpose of that Model is 
to enable the problems that arise most commonly in the field of international juridical double taxation to be 
resolved in an uniform fashion; First Council of Taxpayers (Brazil), 19 October 2006, Eagle Distribuidora de 
Bebidas SA v. Second Group of the Revenue Department in Brasilia, 9 ITLR, 627 et seq., at 657-658; See Court 
of Appeal of England and Wales (United Kingdom), 21 February 2007, UBS AG v, Revenue and Customs 
Commissioners, 9 ITLR, 767 et seq., at 776, para. 25 per Moses LJ., at 788, para. 61 per Arden LJ.; House of 
Lords (United Kingdom), 23 May 2007, NEC Semi-Conductors Ltd and Other test claimants v. Inland Revenue 
Commissioners, 9 ITLR, 995 et seq., at 1002, para. 16 per Lord Hoffmann, who extended by analogy the 
reasoning underlying the OECD Commentary on Article 24(1), according to which, in order to determine 
whether a discrimination prohibited by that article exists, it must be assessed whether two residents are being 
treated differently “solely by reason of having a different nationality”, to Article 24(5) of the Model 
(corresponding to Article 24(5) of the 1975 United States-United Kingdom tax treaty and Article 25(3) of the 
1969 Japan-United Kingdom tax treaty, whose interpretation was at stake before the court), in the sense that, in 
order to determine whether a discrimination prohibited by Article 24(5) OECD Model exists, it should be 
assessed whether resident companies are treated differently solely on grounds that their capital is owned by 
persons resident of the other contracting State; Tax Court (Canada), 28 September 2007, Garcia v. Canada, 10 
ITLR, 179 et seq., at 183-184, para. 12; Income Tax Appellate Tribunal of New Delhi (India), 26 October 
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On the other hand, some courts and tribunals have found that the OECD Commentary is 
of limited relevance for the purpose of interpreting tax treaties, or even that recourse 
thereto is permissible only in order to confirm an independently clear meaning or to 
construe otherwise ambiguous, obscure or unreasonable provisions.1510  
                                                                                                                                  
2007, Rolls-Royce plc v. Director of Income Tax, 10 ITLR, 327 et seq., at 348, paras. 20 and 21, where the 
tribunal reproduced, without quoting its source, the content of paragraphs 4 and 4.1 of the 2003 Commentary 
to Article 5 of the OECD Model in order to support its solution of the controversy before it; Court of Appeals 
(United States), 15 January 2008, National Westminster Bank plc v. United States of America, 10 ITLR, 423 et 
seq., at 432, where the Court affirmed that the OECD Commentary to the 1963 OECD Draft, on which the 
1975 United Kingdom-United States tax treaty was based, was part of the “entire context” to be taken into 
account for the purpose of interpreting that tax treaty; ibidem, at 435, 436, 439 and 442; District Court of Tel 
Aviv-Yafo (Israel), 30 December 2007, Yanko-Weiss Holdings (1996) Ltd v. Holon Assessing Office, 10 ITLR, 
524 et seq., at 546, where the Court stated that (i) it is sufficient that one of the two contracting States is a 
member of the OECD in order to create an expectation among both contracting States that the interpretation of 
a OECD Model-type tax treaty will be based on the Commentary thereof, as is published from time to time, 
and that (ii) the uniform interpretation and application by courts in the contracting States of OECD Model-type 
tax treaties in inherently necessary by virtue of a contractual act that becomes a part of the law in the 
contracting States; Corte Suprema di Cassazione (Italy), 15 February 2008, case 3889, where the Court, at 
para. 2.1, in order to support the conclusion that the 2005 amendments made in the Commentary to Article 5 
OECD were not decisive in the case at stake, maintained that (i) the OECD Commentary is not legally binding 
under international law and that (ii) it is relevant that the Italian government entered a specific observation to 
such amendments in the Commentary; Special Commissioners (United Kingdom), 19 February 2008, 
Smallwood and another v. Revenue and Customs Commissioners, 10 ITLR, 574 et seq., at 605, where the 
Special Commissioners held that the OECD Commentary is an important means of interpretation of tax treaties 
following the OECD Model since, in such a case, the negotiators on both sides could be expected to have 
intended that the meaning in the Commentary should be applied in interpreting the tax treaty, that being true 
with regard to both OECD member States and non-member States; ibidem, where the Special Commissioners 
argued that, if the OECD Commentary contains a clear explanation of the meaning of the term, it seems clear 
that the parties to the treaty intended that such an explanation should be more important than the ordinary 
meaning  to be given to the terms of that phrase, either on the basis that the existence of the Model and the 
Commentaries demonstrate that the parties intended it as a special meaning within Article 31(4) VCLT, or that 
the VCLT is not purported to be a comprehensive statement of the methods of treaty interpretation (see also 
First-Tier Tribunal (United Kingdom), 1 April 2010, FCE Bank plc v. Revenue and Customs Commissioners, 
12 ITLR, 962 et seq., at 972); Tax Court (Canada), 22 April 2008, Prévost Car Inc v. R, 10 ITLR, 736 et seq., at 
765, paras. 95-96 and at 767, para. 100; Tax Court (Canada), 16 May 2008, Knights of Columbus v. R, 10 
ITLR, 827 et seq., at 843, para. 48, at 844, para. 49, at 845-846, paras. 54-55 and 57, at 848, para.  65; Supreme 
Court (Norway), 24 April 2008, Sølvik v Staten v/Skatt Øst, 11 ITLR, 15 et seq., at 34, para. 47, at 35, para. 49, 
and at 38, para. 66; Tax Court (Canada), 16 May 2008, American Income Life Insurance Company v. Canada, 
11 ITLR, 52 et seq., at 63-64, paras. 37-38, at 71-72, para. 59, at 75-76, para. 73 and at 80, para. 87; Corte 
Suprema di Cassazione (Italy), 17 October 2008, case 25374, para. 5.3; Federal Court of Appeal (Canada), 26 
February 2009, Prévost Car Inc v. R, 11 ITLR, 757 et seq., at 767, para. 10 and at 768, para. 14; Tax Court 
(Canada), 9 September 2009, Lingle v. R, 12 ITLR, 55 et seq., at 65, paras. 11 and 12, and at 68, para. 17; Tax 
Court (Canada), 8 April 2010, TD Securities (USA) LLC v. R, 12 ITLR, 783 et seq., at 819, para. 77, where the 
Court noted that the OECD Commentary, in the absence of any relevant reservation or observation, reflected 
the intentions of the OECD member States with respect to treaties based upon the OECD Model; Income Tax 
Appellate Tribunal of Mumbai (India), 22 March 2010, J Ray McDermott Eastern Hemisphere Ltd v. Joint 
Commissioner of Income Tax, 12 ITLR, 915 et seq., at 927, para. 10, at 929, paras. 13-14, at 932, para. 16, and 
at 934, para. 19, referring to both the 2005 OECD Commentary and the 2001 United Nations Commentary to 
Article 5(3) of the respective models (and, in paragraph 16, also to the Technical Explanations to the 1996 
United States Model); Corte Suprema di Cassazione (Italy), 8 April 2010, case 8488, where the Court affirmed 
that, in order to interpret Article 5 of the 1976 Italy-Switzerland tax treaty, it was necessary to make reference 
to the Commentary to Article 5 OECD Model, since the actual treaty was based on such a Model. 
1510 See, for instance, High Court (Australia), 22 August 1990, Thiel v. Commissioner of Taxation, 171 
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 As often happens where one is called to categorize human behavior, the dividing 
line between the two approaches is sometimes blurred, either because the approach 
followed is not overtly elucidated by the courts, or because it is pointed out in a vague or 
ambiguous manner.  
 Additionally, the case law review has revealed that national courts and tribunals 
sometimes make reference to other documents issued by the OECD, such as reports or 
discussion drafts, in order to support their interpretative solutions.1511 The relevance of 
                                                                                                                                  
Commonwealth Law Reports, 338 et seq., para. 10 of the opinion of Dawson J. and para. 13 of the opinion of 
McHugh J.; Borgarting Appeals Court (Norway), 13 August 2003, PGS Geographical AS v. Government of 
Norway, 6 ITLR, 212 et seq., at 229-230, where the Court maintained that, with regard to tax treaties concluded 
by States non-member of the OECD, the OECD Commentary may be relevant as a supplementary means of 
interpretation, in particular where those tax treaties reproduce the wording of the OECD Model and do not 
contain any evidence pointing to a contrary interpretation (note, however, the more drastic approach of the 
Assessment Board and the District Court, which apparently denied any relevance to the OECD Commentary 
with regard to tax treaties concluded by Norway with OECD non-member States – ibidem, at 229); Supreme 
Administrative Court (Czech Republic), 10 February 2005, AAA v. Financial Directorate, 8 ITLR, 178 et seq., 
at 204, where the OECD Commentary appears to be regarded as a supplementary means of interpretation under 
Article 32 VCLT; implicitly, Income Tax Appellate Tribunal of Kolkata (India), 22 August 2005, ABN Amro 
Bank NV v. Assistant Director of Income Tax International Taxation & Assistant Director of Income Tax 
International Taxation v. Bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi Ltd, 8 ITLR, 502 et seq., at  521-522, paras. 25-26, where 
the tribunal denied the deductibility of interest “paid” by permanent establishments located in India to their 
foreign banks head offices under Article 7 of the relevant tax treaties, read in conjunction with Indian domestic 
tax law, since under the latter “the payment of expenditure to self” is not deductible (such a conclusion is 
clearly at variance with the long standing position taken by the OECD (and international practice) and reflected 
in paragraph 19 of the 1994 Commentary to Article 7 of the OECD Model); High Court (Ireland), 31 July 
2007, Kinsella v. Revenue Commissioners, 10 ITLR, 63 et seq., at 73-75, where the OECD Commentary was 
considered a supplementary means of interpretation under the VCLT; Income Tax Appellate Tribunal of 
Mumbai (India), 4 July 2008, Assistant Director of Income Tax (International Taxation) v. M/S Chiron 
Behring Gmbh & Co, 11 ITLR, 83 et seq., at 89, para. 12, where the tribunal stated that “when the language of 
the treaty is unambiguous and does not admit of any doubt whatsoever, there is no need to make a reference to 
the Commentaries [and] all the authorities are bound by the [clear treaty] and cannot take  the assistance of 
Commentaries for accepting or rejecting any claim of the person in disregard to it. These can be referred to in a 
situation where the scope of an article is not clearly emanating from the language used. So these have only a 
persuasive value and cannot override the specific provisions of the treaty”; Income Tax Appellate Tribunal of 
Mumbai (India), 13 August 2008, Deputy Director and Assistant Director of Income Tax (International 
Taxation) v. Balaji Shipping (UK) Ltd, 11 ITLR, 103 et seq., at 199, where the tribunal (quoting a previous 
order of its) noted that “the commentary on the Model Convention can be taken assistance of only if the 
language of the treaty is drafted loosely or in an inclusive way or it does not unearth the intention of the 
Contracting States in a lucid manner”; Federal Court (Australia), 10 October 2008, Virgin Holdings SA v. 
Commissioner of Taxation, 11 ITLR, 335 et seq., at 344, para. 24, where the Court quoted McHugh J in High 
Court (Australia), 22 August 1990, Thiel v. Commissioner of Taxation, 171 Commonwealth Law Reports, 338 
et seq., at 357, affirming that the supplementary means of interpretation provided for in Article 32 VCLT 
include the OECD Model and its Commentary; Income Tax Appellate Tribunal of Mumbai (India), 29 
September 2008, Assistant Director of Income Tax v. Delta Airlines Inc, 12 ITLR, 344 et seq., at 353, para. 10 
and at 355, para. 12 (in the latter paragraph, the tribunal held that, where the contracting States define within a 
tax treaty a term that is undefined in the OECD Model, the meaning attributed to that term in the OECD 
Commentary cannot be applied in order to expand the scope of such a term as defined in the treaty itself); 
Supreme Court (Japan), 29 October 2009, Glaxo Kabushiki Kaisha v. Director of Kojimachi Tax Office, 12 
ITLR, 645 et seq., at 654, para. 4, describing the OECD Commentary as a supplementary means of 
interpretation under Article 32 VCLT. 
1511 See, for instance, Federal Commission of Appeal in Tax Matters (Switzerland), 28 February 2001, Re V 
SA,  4 ITLR,  191 et seq., at 209 and 213, referring to the Report Double Taxation Conventions and the Use of 
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these documents varies depending on (i) whether they are final versions or drafts subject 
to discussion and (ii) whether their conclusions have been incorporated into the OECD 
Commentary. 
 
4.3. The reason for relying on the OECD Commentary in order to interpreter 
OECD Model-based tax treaties 
 
Most of the studies carried out by scholars in the last decades have concerned not so 
much the question of whether the OECD Commentary might be relied on for the purpose 
of construing tax treaties, but - essentially - to what extent the interpreter should rely on 
it. In particular, the major studies published recently have focused on the question of 
whether the OECD Commentary should be considered to be legally binding.1512  
                                                                                                                                  
Conduit Companies, adopted by the OECD Council on 27 November 1986; Supreme Court (Denmark), 4 
February 2003, Halliburton Company Germany Gmbh v. Ministry of Taxation, 5 ITLR, 784 et seq., at 806-808, 
where the Court analysed the 1985 OECD Report Taxation Issues Relating to International Hiring-out of 
Labour; High Court of Justice of England and Wales (United Kingdom), 7 October 2005, Indofood 
International Finance Limited v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA, London Branch, 8 ITLR, 236 et seq., at 252, 254 
and 255, paras. 32, 33 and 41, where the Court analysed the content of the Report Double Taxation 
Conventions and the Use of Conduit Companies, adopted by the OECD Council on 27 November 1986; 
Federal Court  (Switzerland), 29 November 2005, A Holding ApS v. Federal Tax Administration, 8 ITLR, 536 
et seq., at 558, para 3.4.5., where the Court made reference to the Report Double Taxation Conventions and the 
Use of Conduit Companies, adopted by the OECD Council on 27 November 1986; Income Tax Appellate 
Tribunal of New Delhi (India), 26 October 2007, Rolls-Royce plc v. Director of Income Tax, 10 ITLR, 327 et 
seq., at 355, para. 24.1, where the tribunal summarized (but did not apply under the specific circumstances of 
the case) the new OECD approach on the attribution of profits to permanent establishments, as resulting from 
the report The Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments – Parts I (General Considerations), II 
(Banks) and III (Global Trading), released by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs in December 2006, 
although without quoting its source; Special Commissioners (United Kingdom), 19 February 2008, Smallwood 
and another v. Revenue and Customs Commissioners, 10 ITLR, 574 et seq., at 615, where the Special 
Commissioners, for the sake of completeness, referred to the discussion draft The impact of the 
Communications Revolution on the Application of “Place of Effective Management” as a Tie Breaker Rule, 
released in 2001 by the Technical Advisory Group on Monitoring the Application of Existing Treaty Norms 
for the Taxation of Business Profits of the OECD, noting that, although it did not present the official views of 
the OECD and did not have the status of evidence, it represented the view of informed commentators and thus 
might be taken into account as useful background information; Special Commissioners (United Kingdom), 19 
November 2008, Bayfine UK Products and another v. Revenue and Customs Commissioners, 11 ITLR, 440 et 
seq., at 479-481, paras. 61-63, where the Special Commissioners made reference to the OECD Partnerships 
Report, although admitting not deriving much direct assistance from it; Income Tax Appellate Tribunal of 
Delhi (India), 16 October 2009, New Skies Satellites NV v. Assistant Director of Income Tax & Shin Satellite 
Public Company Limited v. Deputy Director of Income Tax, 12 ITLR, 409 et seq., at 438-439, referring to the 
2001 Report (to Working Party 1 of the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs)Tax Treaty Characterization 
Issues Arising From E-Commerce issued by the Technical Advisory Group on Treaty Characterization of 
Electronic Commence Payments; Tax Court (Canada), 8 April 2010, TD Securities (USA) LLC v. R, 12 ITLR, 
783 et seq., at 816-818, where the Court made reference to the OECD Partnerships Report in order to construe 
the 1980 Canada-United States tax treaty in relation to income derived by a United States fiscally transparent 
LLC.  
See also, for older case law, M. Edwardes-Ker, Tax Treaty Interpretation. The International Tax Treaties 
Service (Dublin: In-Depth, 1994 – loose-leaf), at 26.16. 
1512 See, for instance, S. Douma and F. Engelen (eds.), The Legal Status of the OECD Commentaries 




In this regard, the author respectfully submits that the question of whether the OECD 
Commentary is “legally binding” under public international law (not to mention 
domestic law) is misleading and the recurrent use by scholars of the term “binding”, 
either to affirm or to negate the need for courts and tribunals to base their decisions on 
the Commentary, is regrettable.1513 
 It should go without saying that the OECD Commentary, taken as an OECD legal 
instrument, does not impose any legal obligation whatsoever binding on the contracting 
States party to a tax treaty,1514 as is pointed out at paragraph 29 of the Introduction to the 
OECD Model.  
 However, that is not the issue at stake. To say that the OECD Commentary is not 
an instrument legally binding on the contracting States is not a relevant answer to the 
fundamental question that the tax treaty interpreter, at the international law level, should 
ask himself, since such a question is not (i) whether the OECD Commentary, taken as an 
OECD legal instrument, is legally binding on the contracting States and the courts called 
to apply that treaty, but (ii) what is the utterance meaning of the sole relevant binding 
instrument between the contracting States, i.e. the tax treaty.  
 The issue, therefore, is one of “reasonableness” of the meaning attributed to the 
treaty and of the arguments supporting it and not one of “bindingness” of an 
international legal instrument.1515 
 
In this respect, there is nothing at the international law level, and surely even less at the 
domestic law level, that compels the interpreter to always attribute to tax treaty 
provisions the meaning attached by the OECD Commentary to the corresponding OECD 
Model provisions. In each case, an analysis of the overall context may lead the 
interpreter to conclude, and provide him with reasonable arguments to support such a 
conclusion, that the parties intended to attach to a certain treaty term or expression a 
meaning different from the one that could be determined on the basis of the OECD 
                                                                                                                                  
(Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2008); D. A. Ward et al., The Interpretation of Income Tax Treaties with 
Particular Reference to the Commentaries on the OECD Model (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2005), in 
particular Chapter 4; F. Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law (Amsterdam: IBFD 
Publications, 2004), section 10.9.; D. A. Ward, “The Role of the Commentaries on the OECD Model in the 
Tax Treaty Interpretation Process”, 60 Bulletin for international taxation (2006), 97 et seq., at 99-100; F. 
Engelen, “Some Observations on the Legal Status of the Commentaries on the OECD Model”, 60 Bulletin for 
international taxation (2006), 105 et seq. See also K. Vogel et al., Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation 
Conventions (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997), pp. 46-47, m.no. 82b. 
1513 See H. Thirlway, “The Role of International Law Concepts of Acquiescence and Estoppel”, in S. Douma 
and F. Engelen (eds.), The Legal Status of the OECD Commentaries (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2008), 
29 et seq., at 32.  
1514 See the first entry of the definition of the term “binding” on the Merriam-Webster's Dictionary of Law 
(retrieved on 30 June 2011 from Dictionary.com website: http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/binding). 
1515 In the words of Thirlway, “the problem is […] one of the correct legal inferences [author’s note: the 
meaning of the tax treaty] to be drawn from the facts [author’s note: the behavior of the parties and, more 
generally, the overall context]” (see H. Thirlway, “The Role of International Law Concepts of Acquiescence 
and Estoppel”, in S. Douma and F. Engelen (eds.), The Legal Status of the OECD Commentaries (Amsterdam: 
IBFD Publications, 2008), 29 et seq., at 34). 
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Commentary existing at the time of the treaty’s conclusion (or as later modified), leaving 
aside the fact that the Commentary wording itself is subject to interpretation, like any 
other written text.  
 That said, it seems to the author more than reasonable to imagine that OECD 
member States had in mind the OECD Model and its Commentary (at that time) when 
they concluded a tax treaty following to a large extent such a Model and, therefore, that 
they intended to attach the meaning elucidated in the Commentary to the treaty terms 
and expressions that reproduce, directly or indirectly, those used in the OECD Model 
official versions.  
 Disregarding the interpretation given in the OECD Commentary amounts in itself 
to choosing a different interpretation:  
(i) in favor of which, normally, less evidence exists of the agreement between the 
contracting States1516 and  
(ii) whose possibility of representing the original common will of the parties is 
ontologically not different from that of the OECD’s interpretation (i.e. the 
interpretation put forward in the OECD Commentary), due to the ambiguity and 
vagueness of the relevant terms, expressions, and provisions.  
Thus, a refusal by a court or tribunal to apply the interpretation put forward in the OECD 
Commentary, at least in cases of treaties concluded between OECD member States, 
could open the door for the criticism that the court or tribunal has deliberately substituted 
its will for the common will of the contracting States.  
 Such an inference appears particularly difficult to refute when one considers the 
non-binding recommendations on tax treaties adopted by of the OECD Council.1517  
 The last of these recommendations, which was issued on 23 October 1997, 
provides that (i) member States should “conform to the Model Tax Convention, as 
interpreted by the Commentaries thereon”, when concluding new or revising existing tax 
treaties and (ii) their tax administrations should “follow the Commentaries on the 
Articles of the Model Tax Convention, as modified from time to time, when applying 
and interpreting the provisions of their bilateral tax conventions that are based on these 
Articles”.1518  
 Where an OECD Member State had followed the OECD Model in drafting one of 
its tax treaties, the most reasonable inferences that may be drawn are that:  
(a) such a State intended to fully (and not just partially) implement the OECD 
recommendation and, therefore, intended to conclude a tax treaty establishing the 
same legal rules provided for by the OECD Model, i.e. those legal rules resulting 
from the combined reading of the OECD Model and its Commentary;1519  
                                                     
1516 The interpretation included in the OECD Commentary, in fact, (i) is explicitly agreed upon by the OECD 
member States as the substantive content of an OECD Council recommendation, (ii) may be explicitly 
disagreed upon by OECD non-member States in the very same OECD Commentary, and (iii) is generally well-
known and discussed upon by tax lawyers (including tax officials) dealing with tax treaty law.  
1517 See Articles 5(b) and 6 of the Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), concluded in Paris on 14 December 1960, and Article 18(b) of the OECD Rules of 
Procedure.  
1518 See OECD doc C(97)195/final (emphasis added). 
1519 No one could seriously maintain that the rules provided for by the OECD Model differ from those (if any) 
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(b) such a State intended the terms and expressions used in the tax treaty to have 
the meaning provided for (even by means of examples) in the OECD 
Commentary, since the latter is the only official instruction manual publicly 
available, the only one that the persons applying the treaty certainly have the 
chance to consult;1520  
(c) such a State did not intend to voluntarily cause legal uncertainty or 
misunderstandings with the other contracting State by attaching to the tax treaty 
terms and expressions meanings different from those agreed upon by its duly 
authorized representatives at the OECD level and with reference to which no 
dissenting opinion is publicly available. 
 
Based on the above, the author believes that, in the absence of any significant departure 
of the tax authentic treaty texts from the OECD Model or of any extra-textual evidence 
of a contrary agreement between the parties,1521 the interpreter should construe any tax 
treaty concluded between OECD member States in accordance with the OECD 
Commentary,1522 any other construction being less reasonable.1523  
                                                                                                                                  
resulting from the ordinary meaning of the paragraphs of the OECD Commentary, since this is the 
understanding of the international organization (the OECD) that has issued the Model.  
1520 This argument is less tenable with regard to those OECD member States that publish their own models and 
related commentaries (e.g. the United States). However, on the one hand, where the wording of the OECD 
Model and that of the national model do not diverge, it is uncommon that the national commentary takes a 
position conflicting with that of the OECD Commentary and, on the other hand, in the case of a conflict 
between the two commentaries, arguments (a) and, partially, (c) would still give precedence to an 
interpretation based on the OECD Commentary, rather than on the national commentary.     
1521 For instance, where the relevant contracting States have expressed an observation with reference to the 
interpretation put forward in the OECD Commentary. 
1522 See a similar conclusion, although argued on the basis of a different vantage point, may be found in: 
American Law Institute, Federal Income Tax Project. International Aspects of United States Income Taxation, 
II. Proposals on United States Income Tax Treaties (Philadelphia: American Law Institute, 1992), p. 54; M. 
Edwardes-Ker, Tax Treaty Interpretation. The International Tax Treaties Service (Dublin: In-Depth, 1994 – 
loose-leaf), at 23.25; H. G. Ault, “The Role of the OECD Commentaries in the Interpretation of Tax Treaties”, 
22 Intertax (1994), 144 et seq., at 145 et seq.; K. Vogel et al., Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions 
(The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997), pp. 44-45, m.nos. 80-81; J. F. Avery Jones, “The binding nature 
of the OECD Commentaries from the UK point of view”, in S. Douma and F. Engelen (eds.), The Legal Status 
of the OECD Commentaries (Amsterdam: IBFD, 2008), 157-162, at 161 (cf. the narrow position of Edwardes-
Ker, which the author does not share, in M. Edwardes-Ker, Tax Treaty Interpretation. The International Tax 
Treaties Service (Dublin: In-Depth, 1994 – loose-leaf), at 19.01);  
1523 In the Martin Ellis Lecture held on 31 August 2000 at the Institute of International and Comparative 
Taxation at the University of Leiden, Vogel supported the idea that the interpretations put forward in the 
OECD Commentary should be given different weight depending (foremost) on the amount of time elapsed 
between their inclusion in the Commentary and the time of the conclusion of the relevant tax treaty. He 
maintained the following: “If the meaning attributed to a term by the Commentaries was not the “ordinary 
meaning” when the treaty was concluded, in particular, if the amendment is a more recent one [author’s note: 
from the analysis of the previous paragraphs of the article, it seems that Vogel would consider a period of 
approximately 20-25 years sufficiently long for the OECD Commentary meaning to acquire the status of 
“ordinary meaning” of a term in the international tax language], we must examine whether the meaning 
conveyed by the Commentaries can be presumed to have been agreed upon as a “special meaning” within the 
meaning of Art. 31(4) of the Vienna Convention. I suggest that such an assumption be considered justified only 
when, between the amendment to the Commentaries and the conclusion of the particular treaty, enough time 
has elapsed for the amendment to seep through to the common consciousness of international tax experts who 
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 Does this mean that the contracting States are bound by the OECD Commentary? 
According to the author, both the question and any answer to it are irrelevant, since they 
involve giving a name to a meaning, not a meaning to a name.  
 
A similar conclusion should be also drawn with regard to tax treaties concluded between 
OECD member and non-member States.  
 First, although it is obviously possible that, under international law, contracting 
States decide to attach different meanings to the same text included in two or more of 
their treaties, even where such treaties reproduce to a large extent a model developed by 
an international organization, this is not the most natural conclusion to draw. Thus, if 
one starts from the premise that OECD member States, when concluding tax treaties 
with each other, intend to interpret those tax treaties in accordance with the OECD 
Commentary,1524 the natural inference that follows is that such States will do the same 
when concluding tax treaties with OECD non-member States.  
 Second, unless evidence of a different agreement exists, the most reasonable 
assumption is that the other contracting State, i.e. an OECD non-member State, also 
intended to interpret the relevant tax treaty in accordance with the OECD Model. This 
inference is based on the following arguments:  
(i) a different conclusion would amount to admitting that no agreement between 
the contracting States has ever been reached on some of the rules of law to be 
incorporated into the treaty;  
(ii) the representatives of the OECD non-member State could (or should) have 
figured out the intention of the other party’s representatives on the basis of the 
above analysis and, where dissenting, should have better expressed their 
dissenting opinion and registered it, in order to avoid misunderstandings;  
(iii) the OECD Commentary is also generally known and consulted by the tax 
administrations and the practitioners of OECD non-member States;  
                                                                                                                                  
are not members of Working Party No. 1. The time necessary for this should not be estimated too short – I 
suggest a period of ten years, but this may be open to discussion. Moreover, that the Commentaries were 
adopted as a “special meaning” can be assumed, in my view, only between the OECD Member countries. […] 
If the amendment is too recent for such seeping through, the Commentaries may still serve as a “supplementary 
means of interpretation”, subject to the limitations of Art. 32 of the Vienna Convention” (K. Vogel, “The 
Influence of the OECD Commentaries on Treaty interpretation”, 54 Bulletin for international taxation (2000), 
612 et seq., at 616).    
The author does not share the conclusion reached by Vogel. In light of the arguments put forward in this 
section, although the longstanding presence of some interpretations in the OECD Model may of course have a 
certain impact on the level of reasonableness of the inference that the contracting States intended to attribute to 
the tax treaty’s undefined terms and expressions the meaning attached thereto by the OECD Commentary, such 
inference remains, in the author’s eyes, by far more reasonable than any other in the absence of clear evidence 
to the contrary, either resulting from a departure of the tax treaty provisions from the corresponding OECD 
Model provisions, or from extra-textual elements. Moreover, as succinctly stated by Avery Jones, “[g]iven the 
amount of work that goes into the Commentary one doubts if states intend it to have only [the] status [of 
supplementary means of interpretation under the VCLT]” (see J. F. Avery Jones, “The binding nature of the 
OECD Commentaries from the UK point of view”, in S. Douma and F. Engelen (eds.), The Legal Status of the 
OECD Commentaries (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2008), 157 et seq., at 162).  
1524 Which is the conclusion just reached and argued.  
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(iv) since 1997 many OECD non-member States1525 have started to participate in 
the annual meetings organized by the Committee on Fiscal Affairs of the OECD  
(in order to discuss issues related to the negotiation, application and interpretation 
of tax treaties), as well as to set out their positions concerning the OECD Model 
and Commentary within the Commentary itself;1526  
(v) the Commentary to the United Nations Model Tax Convention,1527 in the 
drafting of which non-OECD member States generally participate, largely 
reproduces and refers to the OECD Commentary for the purpose of interpreting 
those provisions of the United Nations Model Tax Convention that do not depart 
from those of the OECD Model (i.e. the large majority of the provisions of the 
United Nations Model Tax Convention).1528  
 
A corollary of such inferences is that OECD non-member States should be assumed 
willing to interpret in accordance with the OECD Commentary also the tax treaties 
concluded with other OECD non-member States, absent clear evidence to the 
contrary.1529  
 In that respect, Edwardes-Ker, commenting on the statement of the American 
Law Institute, according to which it would normally be wholly unrealistic to think that 
treaty negotiators who adopted language derived from the OECD Model did not 
knowingly accept the common meaning of that language as agreed among the OECD 
member States (i.e. that expressed in the OECD Commentary),1530 claimed that such a 
                                                     
1525 More precisely, 31 OECD non-member States as of 2010 (see paragraph 4 of the 2010 OECD Model 
Introduction – Non-OECD Economies’ Positions on the OECD Model Tax Convention).  
1526 See paragraphs 2-3 of the 2010 OECD Model Introduction – Non-OECD Economies’ Positions on the 
OECD Model Tax Convention. 
1527 The first sentence of paragraph 36 of the Introduction to the 2001 United Nations Model reads as follows: 
“If the negotiating parties decide to use in a treaty wording suggested in the United Nations Model Convention, 
it is to be presumed that they would also expect to derive assistance in the interpretation of that wording from 
the relevant Commentary.” 
1528 It is true that the United Nations Model and Commentary are updated much less frequently than the OECD 
ones and that, therefore, it is not infrequent that the United Nations Commentary to a certain provision of the 
Model reproduces the wording of the corresponding OECD Commentary as it stood before its most recent 
amendments. However, it is the author’s opinion that, in light of the fact that the Commentary to the United 
Nations Model generally fully reproduces the text of the preceding OECD Commentary where the underlying 
Model provisions are the same and, in such cases, it commonly states that the OECD Commentary is fully 
relevant for or pertinent to the interpretation of the United Nations Model provisions (e.g. with regard to 
Article 23A of the Model, p. 278 of the United Nations Commentary), the view may be reasonably supported 
that, where later OECD Commentaries  concern provisions common to both Models and do not conflict with 
previous OECD Commentaries, the text of the former will most probably be referred to, or included, in the 
next United Nations Commentary and, since such later OECD Commentaries do not conflict with the current 
United Nations Commentary, they should be taken into account in order to construe tax treaty articles 
reproducing both the OECD Model and the United Nations Model provisions.  
1529 With reference to tax treaties concluded by OECD non-member States, Vogel notes that when the text of 
the treaty coincides with that of the OECD Model and the context does not suggest a different interpretation, 
the parties should be presumed as well to have intended to adopt the meaning conveyed by the OECD Model 
and its commentary (K. Vogel et al., Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 1997), pp. 45-46, m.no. 82). 
1530 American Law Institute, Federal Income Tax Project. International Aspects of United States Income 
PART II: CHAPTER 5 
 442 
statement “undoubtedly applies to tax treaties negotiated between OECD Members. It 
probably applies to tax treaties modeled on OECD lines between a State which is not an 
OECD Member and a State which is an OECD Member. It may also apply to tax treaties 
modeled on OECD lines between two States which are not OECD Members.”1531  
 
4.4. The relevance of the OECD Commentaries subsequent to the tax treaty 
conclusion 
 
The question of whether and to what extent changes to the OECD Commentary made 
after the conclusion of a tax treaty should be taken into account for the purpose of 
construing it has become particularly pressing since the OECD, in 1992, adopted the 
concept of an ambulatory Model and started issuing new OECD Commentary releases 
every two or three years.1532 
 
In this respect, the approaches followed by national courts and tribunals have proved 
significantly heterogeneous, some courts appearing willing to rely on the last available 
version of the OECD Commentary,1533 while others seeming more hesitant to use a 
                                                                                                                                  
Taxation, II. Proposals on United States Income Tax Treaties (Philadelphia: American Law Institute, 1992), p. 
54. 
1531 M. Edwardes-Ker, Tax Treaty Interpretation. The International Tax Treaties Service (Dublin: In-Depth, 
1994 – loose-leaf), at 23.24.  
1532 The OECD’s position in this respect is spelt out in the Introduction to the OECD Model, which devises the 
idea of the ambulatory application of the OECD Commentary (see paras. 3 and 33-36 of the Introduction to the 
OECD Model). 
1533 I.e. the OECD Commentary as relevantly modified after the conclusion of the tax treaty to be interpreted. 
See Authority for Advance Rulings (India), 28 April 1999, Y’s Application, 2 ITLR, 66 et seq., at 77 and 81; 
Court of Appeal of The Hague (Netherlands), 27 February 2001, case BK-98/02743, 3 ITLR, 631 et seq., at 
645, para 6.5; High Court (Denmark), 6 April 2001, Halliburton Company Germany Gmbh v. Ministry of 
Treasury, 4 ITLR, 19 et seq., at 45-46, where the Court, after having pointed out that both the tax treaties to be 
applied (i..e. the 1948 Denmark-United States tax treaty and the 1955 Denmark-Canada tax treaty) pre-dated 
the OECD Model and that the facts at issue occurred in 1990 and thus pre-dated the 1992 changes to the 
OECD Commentary to Article 15, concerning cases of hiring-out of labor (new paragraph 8 therof), resolved 
the case in accordance with the solution adopted in the 1992 Commentary, with regard to which none of the 
interested Contracting States entered any observation (interestingly the Court emphasized that, although the 
concept of hiring-out of labor was not known when those tax treaties were concluded, the interpretation put 
forward in the Commentary did not constitute a material change to such treaties); similarly, the majority 
opinion in Supreme Court (Denmark), 4 February 2003, Halliburton Company Germany Gmbh v. Ministry of 
Taxation, 5 ITLR, 784 et seq., at 813-814; Supreme Administrative Court (Finland), 20 March 2002, Re A Oyj 
Abp, 4 ITLR, 1009 et seq., at 1065, where the Court stated that, in the spirit of the VCLT, the amendments later 
made to the OECD Commentary have significance as an aid to tax treaty interpretation and that, as the 
Commentary describes the practices of the OECD member countries, the subsequent changes and amendments 
to it are relevant particularly to matters which concern new situations and phenomena (in the specific case, the 
Court referred to the paragraphs added in 1992 to the Commentary to Article 1 OECD Model, which 
concerned the interaction between domestic CFC rules and tax treaties, in order to support its construction of 
the 1976 Belgium-Finland tax treaty); Hoge Raad (Netherlands), 21 February 2003, case 37024, 5 ITLR, 818 et 
seq., at 876, para. 3.7; Supreme Court (Norway), 8 June 2004, PGS Exploration AS v. State of Norway, 7 ITLR, 
51 et seq., at 77, paras. 48-49, where the Court concluded that the OECD Commentary to the 2003 OECD 
Model is of great importance for the interpretation of tax treaties concluded before 2003, to the extent that the 
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provisions of the 2003 OECD Model correspond to the provisions  of those earlier tax treaties; Federal Court  
(Switzerland), 29 November 2005, A Holding ApS v. Federal Tax Administration, 8 ITLR, 536 et seq., at 546, 
para 3.4.5., where it was stated that later OECD Commentaries are supplementary means of interpretation, 
since they are generally intended to clarify already existing rules (ibidem, at 259-269, paras. 3.6.-3.6.3.); 
District Court of Tel Aviv-Yafo (Israel), 30 December 2007, Yanko-Weiss Holdings (1996) Ltd v. Holon 
Assessing Office, 10 ITLR, 524 et seq., at 546, where it was affirmed that the OECD Commentaries that have 
been changed with regard to unchanged articles are to be applied even with reference to treaties concluded 
prior to the changes, since the Commentaries give expression to the consensus among the States that are 
members of the OECD as to the correct application and proper interpretation of existing provisions in specific 
situations; Special Commissioners (United Kingdom), 19 February 2008, Smallwood and another v. Revenue 
and Customs Commissioners, 10 ITLR, 574 et seq., at 606, where it was held: “The relevance of commentaries 
adopted later than the treaty is more problematic because the parties cannot have intended the new commentary 
to apply at the time of making the treaty. However, to ignore them means that one would be shutting one’s 
eyes to advances in international tax thinking, such as how to apply the treaty to payments for software that 
had not been considered when the treaty was made. The safer option is to read the later commentary and then 
decide in light of its content what weight should be given to it” (the author acknowledges that such an excerpt 
could be quoted as well as an instance of courts and tribunals seeming more hesitant to use later Commentaries 
in order to construe previously concluded tax treaties; however, in the author’s opinion, it shows the theoretical 
willingness of the Special Commissioners to take into account, and even significantly rely on, later 
Commentaries as long as they do not revert the common understanding of the parties as reasonably inferred 
from previous Commentaries and other items of evidence; in fact, at 615, with regard to the possibility to use 
the 2000-amended OECD Commentary on Article 4(3) in order to interpret Article 4(3) of the 1981 Mauritius-
United Kingdom tax treaty, the Special Commissioners held: “We see no reason why this approach should not 
be adopted even though it is in the commentary issued after the treaty. It is not significantly different from the 
earlier commentary”; see also, in this respect, First-Tier Tribunal (United Kingdom), 1 April 2010, FCE Bank 
plc v. Revenue and Customs Commissioners, 12 ITLR, 962 et seq., at 972 and 994); Supreme Court (Norway), 
24 April 2008, Sølvik v Staten v/Skatt Øst, 11 ITLR, 15 et seq., at 34-35, paras. 47-48, where one gets the 
impression that the Court, for the purpose of favoring the inter-temporal dynamic application of tax treaties, 
would be even willing to construe them according to well-proved and generally accepted State practice 
superseding the latest version of the OECD Commentary; Income Tax Appellate Tribunal of Mumbai (India), 
13 august 2008, Deputy Director and Assistant Director of Income Tax (International Taxation) v. Balaji 
Shipping (UK) Ltd, 11 ITLR, 103 et seq., at 120-124, where the tribunal, quite interestingly, after having 
pointed out that recourse to the OECD Commentary should be limited to cases where “the language of the 
treaty is drafted loosely or in an inclusive way or it does not unearth the intention of the Contracting States in a 
lucid manner” and having noted that this was the case with regard to the tax treaty provision at stake (ibidem, 
at 119), made abundant reference to the Commentary on Article 8 OECD Model, as modified in 2005, for the 
purpose of interpreting Article 9 of the 1993 India-United Kingdom tax treaty (corresponding to Article 8 
OECD Model); Federal Court of Appeal (Canada), 26 February 2009, Prévost Car Inc v. R, 11 ITLR, 757 et 
seq., at 766-767, paras. 9-11, where the Court maintained that later Commentaries should be considered a 
relevant guide to the interpretation and application of previously concluded tax treaties, where the wording of 
such treaties mirror the wording of the OECD Model and those commentaries (i) represent a fair interpretation 
of such wording, (ii) do not conflict with the Commentary existing at the time of the treaty conclusion and (iii) 
neither Contracting State has registered an objection (i.e. an observation) to those later commentaries (it is to 
be noted that, in this regard, the Court made reference to the 2003 OECD Model Introduction, where “the 
OECD invites its members to interpret their bilateral treaties in accordance with the Commentaries ‘as 
modified from time to time’ (para 3) and ‘in the spirit of the revised commentaries’ (para 33)”); Tax Court 
(Canada), 18 September 2009, Antle and others v. R, 12 ITLR, 359 et seq., at 398-399, para. 96, where the 
Court made reference to paragraphs 7 and 9 of the Commentary to Article 1 OECD Model, as modified in 
2003, in order to construe the 1980 Barbados-Canada tax treaty; Supreme Court (Japan), 29 October 2009, 
Glaxo Kabushiki Kaisha v. Director of Kojimachi Tax Office, 12 ITLR, 645 et seq., at 654, para. 4, where 
reference is made to the Commentary to Article 7 OECD Model, as amended in 2003, for the purpose of 
interpreting Article 7 of the 1994 Japan-Singapore tax treaty; Tax Court (Canada), 8 April 2010, TD Securities 
(USA) LLC v. R, 12 ITLR, 783 et seq., at 814-816, where the Court made reference to the Commentary to 
Article 1 of the OECD Model (as modified in 2000 in order to include the conclusions of the OECD 
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version of the Commentary modified1534 after the conclusion of the tax treaty to be 
interpreted.1535 
 
In the author’s opinion, at the international law level later Commentaries should be 
heavily relied on for the purpose of interpreting formerly concluded tax treaties,1536 
unless evidence exists of a common intention of the parties to differently construe the tax 
                                                                                                                                  
Partnerships Report) in order to interpret the 1980 Canada-United States tax treaty (before new paragraph 
IV(6), made by the 2007 protocol, entered into force) and noted that neither Canada nor the United States made 
an observation on the new relevant paragraphs of the 2000 OECD Commentary. 
1534 Obviously, the modification here is intended to concern parts of the Commentary relevant for the purpose 
of construing the tax treaty provisions at stake before the court or tribunal. 
1535 See Administrative Court of Appeal of Paris (France), 30 January 2001, Re Schneider SA, 3 ITLR, 529 et 
seq., conclusions of the Commissaire du Gouvernement at 554; Conseil d’Etat (France), 28 June 2002, Re 
Société Schneider Electric, 4 ITLR, 1077 et seq., conclusions of the Commissaire du Gouvernement at 1117; 
Supreme Court (Denmark), 4 February 2003, Halliburton Company Germany Gmbh v. Ministry of Taxation, 5 
ITLR, 784 et seq., minority opinion at 816; Conseil d’Etat (France), 30 June 2003, Minister for the Economy, 
Finance and Industry v. Interhome AG, 5 ITLR, 1001 et seq., conclusions of the Commissaire du 
Gouvernement at 1039, where, although concluding that the paragraphs of the OECD Commentary included 
(or modified) after the conclusion of the relevant tax treaty cannot clarify the meaning of its provision 
(author’s note: probably in the sense that they cannot be regarded as an expression of the common intention of 
the parties in respect of the meaning to be attributed to these provisions), nonetheless conceded that they are an 
important indication of the generally accepted interpretation of provisions drafted along the lines of those 
included in the OECD Model; Court of Federal Claims (United States), 14 November 2003, National 
Westminster Bank plc v. United States of America, 6 ITLR, 292 et seq., at 310-312 where, with reference to two 
OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs’ discussion drafts (i.e. the discussion draft The Attribution of Profits to 
Permanent Establishments, released by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs in February 2001, and part II 
(Banks) of the Discussion draft The Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments, released by the OECD 
Committee on Fiscal Affairs in March 2003), the Court held that they were not relevant for the purpose of 
interpreting the 1975 United States-United Kingdom tax treaty, since (among other reasons) they were many 
years subsequent to the treaty and thus offered no insights into the genuine shared expectations of the parties; 
Conseil d’Etat (France), 30 December 2003, Re Société Andritz Sprout Bauer, 6 ITLR, 604 et seq., at 638-639; 
Tax Court (Canada), 18 August 2006, MIL (Investments) SA v. Canada, 9 ITLR, 25 et seq., at 52, para. 86, 
where the Court concluded that “one can only consult the OECD commentary in existence at the time the 
treaty was negotiated without reference to subsequent revisions”; Tax Court (Canada), 10 September 2009, 
Garron and others v. R, 12 ITLR, 79 et seq., at 130-131, paras. 374-376, where the Court (strictly speaking in 
an obiter dictum) affirmed the relevance of the 1977 OECD Commentary in order to interpret the 1980 
Barbados–Canada tax treaty and, in particular, to tackle the issue of the interaction between Canadian anti-
avoidance provisions and that treaty, thus implicitly rejecting the relevance of the 2003 Commentary for that 
purpose (in this respect, however, it could be taken the view that the 2003 amendments to the Commentary to 
Article 1 of the OECD Model contradicted the position expressed in the OECD Commentaries preceding the 
conclusion of the Barbados-Canada tax treaty and only because of this specific circumstance was it appropriate 
not to take the 2003 Commentary into account in order to construe that treaty); Conseil d’Etat (France), 31 
March 2010, Société Zimmer Ltd v. Ministre de l’Economie, des Finances et de l’Industrie, 12 ITLR, 739 et 
seq., conclusions of the Rapporteur Public at 778 and 781. See also the similar position taken by the Danish tax 
authorities in the Casino Copenhagen case (see High Court (Denmark), 3 February 2000, Casino Copenhagen 
K/S v. Ministry of Taxes, 3 ITLR, 447 et seq., at 451) accepting the irrelevance of the 1992 changes to the 
OECD Commentary to Article 15, concerning the meaning of the term “employer”, with regard to a tax treaty 
concluded in 1961 and facts occurred in 1991.  
1536 See M. Edwardes-Ker, Tax Treaty Interpretation. The International Tax Treaties Service (Dublin: In-
Depth, 1994 – loose-leaf), at 26.04: “It is arguable that the OECD Member States have already agreed to use 
later OECD commentary to interpret earlier tax treaties – in line with the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs’ 
conclusions to this effect”. 
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treaty texts.1537  
 Indeed, based on the analysis carried out in the previous section, it seems 
reasonable to envisage that OECD member States intend(ed) to attach to the terms and 
expressions of their tax treaties the meanings expounded in later OECD Commentaries, 
since:  
(i) the OECD Council Recommendation so provides;  
(ii) these meanings are going to be “previous” Commentaries meanings for the 
tax treaties subsequently concluded by the same States;  
(iii) the most sensible presumption in this respect, as previously outlined, is that, 
in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, each State intends to attach the 
same meaning to the same (or corresponding) wording used in all its OECD 
Model-based tax treaties;  
(iv) those States concurred in the drafting and approval of the later Commentaries 
through their authorized representatives at the OECD Council and Committee for 
Fiscal Affairs.  
Foremost, it appears more reasonable that the OECD member States intend to interpret 
their tax treaties (in particular those concluded with each other) in accordance with the 
current OECD Commentary rather than to construe those treaties in a different fashion 
since, while elements and items of evidence exist in support of the former conclusion, 
generally no element other than the very same (vague and ambiguous) texts of those tax 
treaties may be relied on in order to support the latter conclusion. Only where the 
analysis of the overall context showed evidence of the possible intention of the 
contracting States to attribute a meaning different from that elucidated in later OECD 
Commentaries to the treaty terms and expressions could the interpreter fairly conclude 
for the irrelevance of later Commentaries on the basis of his balanced assessment of the 
conflicting items of evidence. 
 
The most popular argument employed by scholars and judiciaries to support a very 
limited recourse to later OECD Commentaries is that the contracting States could not 
have intended, at the moment of concluding the tax treaty, to interpret it in accordance 
with the subsequent OECD Commentary. Thus, from a diachronic perspective, the later 
OECD Commentary could not be regarded as representing the common understanding of 
the parties at the time of the treaty conclusion.  
 While this argument may have some merit where tax treaties are interpreted and 
applied at the domestic law level, mainly due to the limits and requirements imposed by 
the constitutions of many States to their governments and parliaments in connection with 
the conclusion of treaties and their implementation in the domestic law systems, at the 
international law level its appeal is fairly narrow.  
                                                     
1537 The interpreter should look for such evidence in the deviations of the tax treaty texts from the OECD 
Model, or in extra-textual elements. The different meanings theoretically attributable to the OECD Model-type 
provisions (as compared to those attached thereto by the OECD Commentary) should not be regarded, in this 
respect, as evidence of a different intention of the parties exactly because those provisions are presumed to be 
generally construed by the parties in accordance with later OECD Commentaries (a different approach in that 
respect would lead to a circular inference).  
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 Under Articles 31-33 VCLT, indeed, the interpreter is called upon to determine 
the utterance meaning of the tax authentic treaty texts, which must be based on all 
elements that diachronically may provide a reliable evidence of the common intention of 
the parties in that respect, including elements subsequent to the treaty conclusion. 
Articles 31(3)(a) and (b) VCLT, for instance, clearly attribute significant relevance to the 
subsequent agreements between and the subsequent practice of the contracting States for 
the purpose of construing the treaty.  
 Moreover, it is interesting to recall that the main reason why the travaux 
préparatoires had been (de)classified among the supplementary means of interpretation 
in the VCLT is that they normally record only interim and partial agreements (if any) 
reached among the parties in the course of the negotiations, or even only the position of 
some of the parties, so that in most cases there is no adequate evidence that they 
represent the final agreement of the contracting States as regard to the interpretation of 
the treaty provisions.  
 This specific problem, however, does not concern the Commentaries to the 
OECD Model, since such Commentaries are published together with, or after, the 
relevant Model. Similarly, if one accepts the theoretical relevance of the OECD 
Commentary for the purpose of interpreting tax treaties, the risk does not exist that the 
interpretations put forward in the OECD Commentaries published after the treaty 
conclusion represent just an interim and not the final agreement between the contracting 
States as regards the interpretation of that treaty. Clearly, one could argue that the OECD 
Commentaries do not reflect the agreement of the parties at all, but such an argument 
concerns the different issue of the relevance, for interpretative purposes, of a legally 
non-binding international law instrument and does not impinge on the theoretical 
capability of a later instrument to properly record the actual and current agreement of the 
parties in respect of a previously concluded treaty. 
 
The authors and judges upholding the theoretical relevance of later OECD 
Commentaries1538 have generally drawn the limit to the use of such Commentaries by 
means of the following two conditions:  
(i) they represent a fair interpretation of the wording of the relevant tax treaty and  
(ii) they do not conflict with the Commentary existing at the time of the treaty 
conclusion.  
With regard to the first condition, it is the author’s view that, due to the vague and 
sometime ambiguous wording of the OECD Model (reproduced in the relevant tax 
treaty), which, on the one hand, has to deal with future facts and circumstances and, on 
the other hand, has to provide within few pages a standardized system of rules capable of 
interacting with and connecting the contracting States’ heterogeneous income tax 
systems,1539 the interpreter should be very cautious in concluding that later OECD 
                                                     
1538 See, for instance, Federal Court of Appeal (Canada), 26 February 2009, Prévost Car Inc v. R, 11 ITLR, 757 
et seq., at 766-767, paras. 9-11; D. A. Ward et al., The Interpretation of Income Tax Treaties with Particular 
Reference to the Commentaries on the OECD Model (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2005), pp. 110-111; D. 
A. Ward, commentary to Prévost Car Inc v. R, 11 ITLR, 757 et seq., at 763-764. 
1539 Which generally differ from each other to a significant extent and are built on thousands of pages of 
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Commentaries do not represent a fair interpretation of the wording of the relevant tax 
treaty, unless the position set out in the OECD Commentary can be said to be manifestly 
absurd or unreasonable, which is unlikely to be the case. In any event, this test does not 
appear different from that applicable in respect to earlier OECD Commentaries. 
 With regard to the second condition,1540 the author submits that it should not be 
seen as an absolute one, since the interpreter is bound in any case to look for and 
establish the treaty utterance meaning: as the analysis of the inter-temporal law issue has 
shown,1541 in treaty law “the intention of the parties is really the key”.1542 Hence, the 
subsequent evolution of legal concepts and constructions of standard treaty provisions, 
as in the case of later OECD Commentaries, should be taken in due regard for the 
purpose of interpreting treaties concluded earlier where it appears reasonable that this 
was (or is) the intention of the parties. The assessment and balancing of the contrary 
items of evidence remains in the discretion of the interpreter, in light of the treaty’s 
overall context. 
 
Ultimately, for the same reasons set out in the previous section, the above conclusions 
appear applicable by analogy in respect of tax treaties concluded by OECD non-member 
States as well.   
 
4.5. Conclusions on research question b) 
 
The analysis carried out in the previous sections has led the author to conclude that:  
(i) in the absence of any significant departure in the tax authentic treaty texts from 
the OECD Model, or of any extra-textual evidence of a contrary agreement 
between the parties, the interpreter should construe OECD Model-based tax 
treaties in accordance with the OECD Commentary, any other construction 
appearing less reasonable; and  
(ii) later OECD Commentaries should be heavily relied on for the purpose of 
                                                                                                                                  
statutes, tax authorities positions and case law. 
1540 The additional proposition of the ITG that “there is little or no legal justification for the use of [later] 
commentaries where they fill gaps in the Model by purporting to fill gaps in the commentaries” appears 
questionable, in particular as it is far from clear what a “gap in the Model” is (see D. A. Ward et al., The 
Interpretation of Income Tax Treaties with Particular Reference to the Commentaries on the OECD Model 
(Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2005), pp. 110-111). For instance, the alleged existence of a “gap” in a 
OECD Model distributive rule article invariably leads to the application of another article (e.g. Article 21, or 
Article7). Is that really a gap? Wouldn’t the interpreter in any case look for an interpretation of the former 
article allowing him to apply it, if he considered it reasonable to conclude that the contracting States could 
have never intended to apply the latter article in the case actually at stake? How to distinguish at all a proper 
gap from the case where vague terms or expressions are used? See, in this respect, L. De Broe and J. 
Werbrouck, “Kroniek Internationaal Belastingrecht 2001-2002”, in Tijdschrift Rechtspersonen en 
Vennootschappen (2002), 604 et seq., in particular at 607 et seq. 
1541 See section 2.3.3.4 of Chapter 3 of Part II. 
1542 See R. Higgins, “Some Observations on the Inter-Temporal Rule in International Law”, in: J. Makarczyk 
(ed.), Theory of International Law at the Threshold of the 21st Century, Essays in honour of Krzysztof 
Skubiszewski (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1996), 173 et seq., at 181. 
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interpreting formerly concluded tax treaties, unless evidence exists of a common 
intention of the parties to construe them differently.  
 
This implies that the OECD Commentaries, both previous and subsequent to the 
conclusion of the relevant tax treaty, constitute a key element to be taken into account by 
the interpreter in order to remove the prima facie discrepancies in meaning among the 
tax authentic treaty texts in accordance with Article 33(4) VCLT, in particular by 
applying the rules of interpretation enshrined in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT.  
 
As a final remark, it may be pointed out that the OECD Commentary, like any other 
written text, also requires being construed, in order to be used in the process of tax treaty 
interpretation.1543  
 In this respect, the author submits that the interpreter should establish the 
utterance meaning of the OECD Commentary in light of its overall context, i.e. through 
the analogical application of the rules encompassed in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT, and 
that, whenever a prima facie discrepancy in meaning arises between the English and 
French official versions thereof, such a discrepancy should be removed on the basis of 
the analogical application of the rules enshrined in Article 33(4) VCLT.  
 
 
5. The interpretation of legal jargon terms employed in (multilingual) tax 
treaties  
5.1. Research questions addressed in this section  
 
The present section is aimed at tackling the following issue. 
 
c) The relevance of Article 3(2) of OECD Model-based multilingual tax treaties 
for the purpose of their interpretation 
 
This issue may be divided into the following questions, here briefly illustrated by means 
of examples. 
 
i. Does Article 3(2) have an impact on the nature of the potential 
discrepancies in meanings among the authentic texts of a multilingual tax 
treaty? Where this question is answered in the affirmative, which are the 
                                                     
1543 See B. Arnold, “The Interpretation of Tax Treaties: Myths and Realities”, 64 Bulletin for international 
taxation (2010), 2 et seq., especially at 8-9. For judicial instances of interpretation of the OECD Commentary, 
see Supreme Court (Denmark), 4 February 2003, Halliburton Company Germany Gmbh v. Ministry of 
Taxation, 5 ITLR, 784 et seq., at 816; Income Tax Appellate Tribunal of Delhi (India), 29 August 2008, Fugro 
Engineers BV v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, 11 ITLR, 421 et seq., at 434-435, para. 4; District 
Court of Oslo (Norway), 16 December 2009, Dell Products (NUF) v. Tax East, 12 ITLR, 829 et seq., at 859; 
Tax Court (Canada), 9 September 2009, Lingle v. R, 12 ITLR, 55 et seq., at 71-72, para. 28. See also the 
interpretation of paragraph 3 of the Commentary on Article 3(1) OECD Model in M. Edwardes-Ker, Tax 
Treaty Interpretation. The International Tax Treaties Service (Dublin: In-Depth, 1994 – loose-leaf), at 8.07. 
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various types of prima facie discrepancies that may arise? Should the 
interpreter put all of them on the same footings for the purpose of 
interpreting multilingual tax treaties?  
 
While the various authentic texts of a multilingual treaty are generally interpreted in 
accordance with their own genius,1544 the presence of Article 3(2) in OECD Model-based 
tax treaties may have a bearing on such a practice.  
 Consider a tax treaty authenticated in two languages, for instance Italian and 
German. The typical discrepancy that may emerge between the two authentic texts is the 
one arising by comparing the meanings that they have where interpreted in accordance 
with their own genius, i.e.:  
(a) the meaning that the Italian text has where construed on the basis of the 
meaning that the terms employed therein have in the Italian language and under 
Italian law, with  
(b) the meaning that the German text has where construed on the basis of the 
meaning that the terms employed therein have in the German language and 
under German law. 
For instance, where the treaty to be interpreted used the terms “impresa” and 
“Unternehmen” in the Italian and German authentic texts of Article 7, these two terms 
might be construed on the basis of the meaning that they have under Italian and German 
law, respectively. Where such meanings were not absolutely equal (as actually is the 
case, for example, with respect to certain forestry and agriculture activities), a prima 
facie discrepancy may be said to exist between the two texts. 
However, the presence of Article 3(2) may raise the question of whether the 
interpreter may and should compare a different pair of meanings. Consider, in this 
respect, a tax treaty authenticated in the Italian and English language. Where Italy is 
applying the treaty, the first part of Article 3(2) requires non-defined terms to be 
construed in accordance with the meaning that they have under Italian law. In this case, 
the easiest way to comply with such a rule is probably to use the Italian authentic text in 
order to interpret the relevant article of the treaty, thereby determining what meaning the 
terms used in the Italian text (or proxies thereof) have under Italian law. Nevertheless, 
nothing prohibits the interpreter from employing the English text in order to construe the 
relevant article of the treaty. In this case, the interpreter should determine the domestic 
law meaning of the Italian term that he considers best corresponding to the English term 
employed in the English authentic text. 
 It could happen, for instance, that the Italian text used the term “lavoro 
autonomo” in a certain article of the treaty, while the English authentic text used the 
term “employment”. The Italian term that is generally considered to correspond to the 
English term “employment” is the term “lavoro subordinato” (or “lavoro dipendente”). 
Under Italian (tax) law, the concepts corresponding to the terms “lavoro autonomo” and 
                                                     
1544 See YBILC 1966-II, p. 100, para. 23, per Sir Humphrey Waldock, according to whom attributing legal 
value to a comparison for the purpose of determining the ordinary meaning of the terms in the context of the 
treaty could have encouraged attempts to transplant concepts of one language into the interpretation of a text in 
another language with a resultant distortion of the meaning of the treaty. 
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“lavoro subordinato” are quite different, the former denoting as prototypical items the 
activities carried on by a self-employed person. Therefore, in this case a prima facie 
discrepancy may be said to exist between the two authentic texts.  
 The question thus arises of whether those two types of discrepancies should be 
equally taken into account by the interpreter for the purpose of interpreting multilingual 
tax treaties, or, on the contrary, whether they should be differently weighted and 
reconciled by the interpreter. In order to properly answer this first question, the response 
to the following questions appears particularly relevant.  
 
ii. Is there any obligation for the interpreter to reconcile (at least to a certain 
extent) the prima facie divergent authentic texts of an OECD Model-based 
tax treaty? 
 
With regard to the above-described types of discrepancies, the foremost question that the 
interpreter should ask himself is whether any obligation exists for him to take care and 
reconcile them,1545 at least to a certain extent and in certain occasions, or whether he may 
always and exclusively rely on the meaning emerging from the interpretation of one 
authentic text, taken in isolation. In particular, doubts may arise of whether the 
interpreter is entitled to rely exclusively on the domestic law meaning of the terms 
employed in the authentic text drafted in the official language of the State applying the 
treaty (if existing), disregarding the possible existence of prima facie different meanings 
that might be determined on the basis of the other authentic texts.  
 With regard to the two examples made in the previous section, the question would 
be whether the interpreter was allowed to simply construe the treaty in accordance with 
the meaning that the terms “impresa” and “lavoro autonomo” have under Italian law, 
without the need to reconcile them with the meaning that the terms “Unternehmen” and 
“lavoro subordinato” (which is regarded as corresponding to the English term 
“employment”) have under German and Italian domestic law, respectively.  
 
iii. If the previous question is answered in the affirmative, to what extent must 
the differences of meaning deriving from the attribution of the domestic law 
meanings to the corresponding legal jargon terms used in the various 
authentic texts be removed (e.g. in accordance with Article 33(4) VCLT) 
and, instead, to what extent must such differences be preserved in 
accordance with Article 3(2)?  
 
Assume that the Italy-United Kingdom tax treaty, authenticated in the English and 
Italian languages, makes reference to the “board of directors” of a company in the 
authentic English text of Article 16, while in the authentic Italian text thereof it employs 
the term “consiglio di amministrazione”.1546 Although under the Italian Civil Code the 
                                                     
1545 A similar question may be asked in respect of the alleged divergences existing between the apparent 
meanings of the terms employed in one of the authentic treaty texts and those underlying the corresponding 
terms used in the OECD Model official versions.  
1546 Actually, the Italian authentic text of the 1988 Italy-United Kingdom tax treaty employs the expression 
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“consiglio di amministrazione” is entrusted with pure management functions, bilingual 
dictionaries generally equate it to the “board of directors”, which under English law is 
entrusted with both management and supervisory functions.  
In this case, the interpreter faced with such a prima facie discrepancy should decide 
whether: 
(a) that discrepancy should be removed by attributing the same meaning to both the 
terms “board of directors” and “consiglio di amministrazione”, for instance by 
attaching to the latter the broader meaning of the former (or vice versa), or 
whether  
(b) Article 3(2) of the treaty required those terms to be construed more narrowly 
where Italy applies the tax treaty and more broadly where the United Kingdom 
applies it.1547 
 
This question is particularly relevant where the interpreter has to decide whether the 
income received by an English resident member of the “collegio sindacale” of an Italian 
resident company, which is the company organ entrusted with control and supervisory 
functions under the Italian Civil Code, is covered by Article 16 of the treaty.  
 
iv. What is the relevance of Article 3(2) for the purpose of resolving the prima 
facie discrepancies in meaning among the various authentic texts, where the 
treaty’s final clause provides that a certain authentic text is to prevail in the 
case of divergences? 
 
Consider the previous example and assume that the Italy-United Kingdom tax treaty 
included a French authentic text, prevailing in the case of discrepancies in meaning 
among the various authentic texts, which employed the term “conseil de surveillance” in 
Article 16. Under French law, the “conseil de surveillance” is entrusted with both 
management and supervisory functions, similar to the “board of directors” under English 
law.  
 The question thus arises of whether the existence of the prevailing French text 
demands that the interpreter attribute to the Italian text the same (broader) meaning that 
the other two texts have where construed in accordance with English and French laws, as 
the case may be,, or, on the contrary, whether Article 3(2) of the treaty requires him to 
attach to the term “consiglio di amministrazione” the narrower meaning it has under 
Italian law whenever Italy applies the treaty. 
 
                                                                                                                                  
“consiglio di amministrazione o […] collegio sindacale”; however, for the sake of the example, it is assumed 
that the reference to the “collegio sindacale” is not included in that treaty (as is the case with regard to many 
other Italian tax treaties). 
1547 Assuming here, for the sake of simplicity, that Italy applies the treaty whenever a person resident in the 
United Kingdom receives income in his capacity as a member of the management or supervisory boards of 
companies set up under Italian law and the United Kingdom applies the treaty whenever a person resident in 
Italy receives income in his capacity as a member of the management and supervisory board of companies set 
up under the laws of the United Kingdom. 
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5.2. Introduction and structure of this section 
 
A quick look at the authentic texts of any OECD Model-type tax treaty will show, to 
practitioners experienced in the domestic income tax law of the contracting States, that a 
large part of the terms used in those texts are the same legal jargon terms used under 
domestic law or may be considered synonyms and proxies thereof.  
 
With regard to such terms, the author has already mentioned the difficulties connected to 
their uniform interpretation, in particular where their construction is meant to be 
autonomous. It is thus unsurprising that domestic courts and tribunals generally do not 
embark on an attempt to construe an autonomous meaning of such terms, considering the 
problems and uncertainties connected to that quest where the interpreter is faced with 
complex and diverse national systems of tax law subject to frequent changes.1548  
 In order to overcome this difficulty, contracting Stateshave relied for many years 
on their respective domestic law meanings in order to construe tax treaties. As Sasseville 
put it, “[c]learly, it would be impossible to draft a treaty and to know exactly what is the 
meaning of the terms used under the legal system of each State. In order to protect both 
contracting parties and avoid endless negotiations, the most practical approach is for 
each country to be reasonably certain that it will be able to apply the treaty on the basis 
of its own understanding of what it has agreed to, based on its own legal system.”1549  
 
The principal means to achieve this result is to include in tax treaties a provision similar 
to Article 3(2) OECD Model, which ensures many practical advantages, such as:  
(i) the fact that taxpayers, tax officials and tax courts may rely on the familiar 
meaning of legal jargon terms under their respective domestic law in order to 
interpret the treaty;  
(ii) the limitation of the otherwise numerous alternative meanings that might be 
attached to treaty undefined legal jargon terms;  
(iii) the resulting smoother interaction between the relief rules provided for in the 
tax treaty and the charging rules established under domestic law; 
(iv) legal certainty.1550   
 
Similarly, other provisions of the OECD Model refer to the domestic laws of the 
contracting States for the purpose of their interpretation. 
 
The impact of Article 3(2), and other treaty provisions referring to the domestic laws of 
                                                     
1548 See accordingly J. F. Avery Jones et al., “The interpretation of tax treaties with particular reference to 
article 3(2) of the OECD Model”, British Tax Review (1984), 14 et seq. and 90 et seq., at 15-16. 
1549 J. Sasseville, “The OECD Model Convention and Commentaries”, in G. Maisto (ed.), Multilingual Texts 
and Interpretation of Tax Treaties and EC Tax Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2005), 129 et seq., at 
133. 
1550 See K. Vogel et al., Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 
1997), p. 208, m.no. 60; Belgian Tax Authoriries in the Circular Letter No. AFZ/2004/0053 of 16 January 
2004. 
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the contracting States, on the interpretation of tax treaties by national courts and 
tribunals has been tremendous. Good evidence thereof is the overwhelming recourse to 
domestic law made by national courts and tribunals for the purpose of interpreting the 
undefined legal jargon terms employed in the relevant tax treaty provisions, including 
the undefined terms used in the definition of other terms.1551  
                                                     
1551 See Federal Court (Canada), 23 July 1990, Hale v. R, 90 DTC 6481, at 6487-6488, where the Court 
referred to domestic law for the purpose of deciding whether the income derived by a former employee of a 
Canadian resident company from stock appreciation rights, granted to him by that company during the 
employment period, was to be regarded as “salaries, wages and other similar remuneration” under Article 15 of 
the 1978 Canada-United Kingdom tax treaty; Court of Appeal of Brussels (Belgium), 30 April 1998, NV Immo 
Part v. Belgium, 1 ITLR, 463 et seq., at  479-481, where the judge made reference to domestic law in order to 
determine whether a United States general partnership was to be treated as fiscally transparent and, therefore, 
to whom its income should be attributed for tax treaty purposes, and at 483, where the judge referred to 
domestic law for the purpose of characterizing as an advance payment (in contrast to income) a certain 
payment in cash; Hoge Raad (Netherlands), 28 October 1998, case 32330, 1 ITLR, 551 et seq., at 559 and 564, 
where the Court referred to domestic law in order to interpret the expression “any income” used in Article 
27(1) of the 1980 United Kingdom-Netherlands tax treaty; Conseil d’Etat (France), 9 February 2000, Re 
Hubertus AG, 2 ITLR, 637 et seq., conclusions of the Commissaire du Gouvernement at 653-654 and 656; 
Bundesfinanzhof (Germany), 21 September 1999, Re A Foreign Silent Partnership, 2 ITLR, 859 et seq., at 866, 
where the Court made reference to domestic law for the purpose of determining whether income from an 
atypical silent partnership (“Atypische stille Gesellschaft” in German) constitute business profits for the 
purpose of the relevant tax treaty; Administrative Court of Appeal of Paris (France), 30 January 2001, Re 
Schneider SA, 3 ITLR, 529 et seq., at 545, where the Court referred to domestic law for the purpose of 
determining the meaning of the expression “Les bénéficies d’une entreprise d’un Etat contractant” in cases 
where the CFC rule applies under French domestic law; High Court (Denmark), 6 April 2001, Halliburton 
Company Germany Gmbh v. Ministry of Treasury, 4 ITLR, 19 et seq., at 41-42, where the Court made 
reference to domestic law in order to construe the terms “employer” and “employee” (and their corresponding 
Danish terms), as used in the 1948 Denmark-United States tax treaty and the 1955 Denmark-Canada tax treaty, 
in the case of hiring out of labor; similarly, the majority opinion in Supreme Court (Denmark), 4 February 
2003, Halliburton Company Germany Gmbh v. Ministry of Taxation, 5 ITLR, 784 et seq., at 813; Conseil 
d’Etat (France), 27 July 2001, Re SA Golay Buchel France, 4 ITLR, 249 et seq., at 257-258 and conclusions of 
the Commissaire du Gouvernement at 260-261, where both the Court and the Commissaire pointed out that 
although the term “interest” was autonomously defined in Article 12(3) of the relevant tax treaty, thus 
excluding the possibility of attributing to that term the meaning it had under French domestic law, the terms 
(“créances de tout nature”) used in the definition provided for in Article 11(3) were not in turn defined and, 
therefore, they were to be given the meaning they had under French domestic law, unless the context required a 
different construction, in accordance with Article 3(2) of the treaty (explicitly contra, Supreme Administrative 
Court (Czech Republic), 10 February 2005, AAA v. Financial Directorate, 8 ITLR, 178 et seq., at 202; the 
court, however, in its following arguments, made abundant reference to Czech Republic private law, in 
particular to the private law and income tax law meaning of the Czech term corresponding to “corporate right”, 
in order to construe Article 10 of the relevant tax treaties - ibidem, at 203); Hoge Raad (Netherlands), 7 
December 2001, case 35231, 4 ITLR, 558 et seq., at 576, para. 3.3, in which the Court referred to domestic law 
in order to determine whether the recapture of the premiums on annuity policies, previously deducted by a 
taxpayer for the purpose of determining its taxable income, on the occasion of the surrender of the annuity by 
the non-resident taxpayer was to be regarded as an item of income for the purpose of the relevant tax treaty 
(question answered in the negative since, under Netherlands domestic law, such a recapture is seen as a 
negative personal allowance – i.e. a recapture of previously deducted personal allowances – and not as an item 
of income); Income Tax Appellate Tribunal of Mumbai (India), 27 September 2001, Clifford Chance (United 
Kingdom) v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, 4 ITLR, 711 et seq., at 732, para. 53, where the tribunal 
made reference to domestic law in order to determine the meaning of the term “business profits”; Federal Court 
of Appeal of Montreal (Canada), 15 March 2002, Wolf v. R, 4 ITLR, 755 et seq., at 768-773 per Desjardins JA., 
at 781-787 per Decary JA. and at 788 per Noel JA., where reference was made to the civil code of Quebec and 
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domestic case law (both in common and civil law) for the purpose of determining whether the contractual 
relationship between a United States resident taxpayer and a Canadian resident company was to be regarded as 
one of “independent personal services” under Article XIV of the 1980 Canada-United States tax treaty, or as 
one of “dependent personal services” under Article XV of the same treaty; Supreme Administrative Court 
(Finland), 20 March 2002, Re A Oyj Abp, 4 ITLR, 1009 et seq., at 1068, where the Court referred to domestic 
law in order to determine whether the CFC income imputed to a parent company was part of the “business 
profits” of the latter company for the purpose of Article 7 of the 1976 Belgium-Finland tax treaty; Conseil 
d’Etat (France), 28 June 2002, Re Société Schneider Electric, 4 ITLR, 1077 et seq., at 1107-1108, and 
conclusions of the Commissaire du Gouvernement at 1118-1126, where reference to domestic law was made 
for the purpose of determining the meaning of the expression “Les bénéficies d’une entreprise d’un Etat 
contractant” in cases where CFC rule applies under French domestic law; Federal Court of Appeal (Canada), 4 
February 2004, Beame v. R, 6 ITLR, 767 et seq., at 772-724, paras. 17-21, where the Court made reference to 
domestic law in order to interpret the term “income” used in Article VI(1) of the 1966 Canada-Ireland tax 
treaty; Tax Court (United States), 29 June 2004, Abeid v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 7 ITLR, 202 et 
seq., at 207, where the Court made reference to the domestic tax law meaning of the expression “adequate and 
full consideration”, which was used in the definition of “annuities” provided for in the English authentic text of 
Article 20(5) of the 1975 Israel-United States tax treaty; Administrative Court (Luxembourg), 17 January 
2006, Re XXX SA, 9 ITLR, 176 et seq., at 187-188, where reference to domestic law was made for the purpose 
of interpreting the term “déduction” in Article 24(1)(b) of the 1986 Luxembourg-Spain tax treaty (the court 
concluded that, since under Luxembourg’s domestic law a credit for foreign taxes is allowed only against 
Luxembourg corporate tax, and not against Luxembourg municipal business tax, under the 1986 Luxembourg-
Spain tax treaty Spanish taxes might be credited only against Luxembourg corporate tax, notwithstanding the 
fact that also Luxembourg municipal business tax was regarded as an income tax under Article 2 of the treaty); 
First Council of Taxpayers (Brazil), 19 October 2006, Eagle Distribuidora de Bebidas SA v. Second Group of 
the Revenue Department in Brasilia, 9 ITLR, 627 et seq., at 658, where reference was made to domestic law in 
order to determine whether the term “pagos” (“paid”) in the Portuguese authentic text of Article 10 of the 1974 
Brazil-Spain tax treaty might be construed as denoting the attribution of the profits of a subsidiary, tax resident 
of Spain, to its parent company, tax resident of Brazil, under the CFC rule of the latter State; Conseil d’Etat 
(France), 29 December 2006, Ministre de l’Economie, des Finances et de l’Industrie v. Société Bank of 
Scotland, 9 ITLR, 683 et seq., at 703, where the Court affirmed that the re-characterization, under French anti-
avoidance law, (i) of a usufruct agreement on non-voting preference  shares (of a French resident subsidiary) 
into a loan agreement and (ii) of a dividend payment (by the French resident subsidiary) into a loan 
reimbursement on behalf of the non-resident parent company debtor, might be applied as  well for the purpose 
of the relevant tax treaties (i.e. the tax treaty between France and the State of residence of the parent company 
and the tax treaty between France and the State of residence of the usufructuary – loan creditor); High Court 
(Ireland), 31 July 2007, Kinsella v. Revenue Commissioners, 10 ITLR, 63 et seq., at 79-81, where the Court 
referred to domestic law for the purpose of determining the meaning of the term “days” as used in Article 
3(1)(e)(ii)(bb) of the 1971 Italy-Ireland tax treaty, according to which “the term ‘resident of Italy’ means […] 
any other person who is resident in Italy for the purposes of Italian tax and […] if resident in Ireland [for the 
purposes of Irish tax] is present therein for a period or periods not exceeding in the aggregate 91 days in the 
fiscal year”; Tax Court (Canada), 28 September 2007, Garcia v. Canada, 10 ITLR, 179 et seq., at 187-194, in 
particular paras. 28, 37, 41, 42, 47 and 49, where the Court made reference to Canadian domestic law, as 
interpreted by Canadian courts (see Supreme Court (Canada), 25 January 1983, Nowegijick v. R, [1983] 1 SCR 
29 and Tax Court (Canada), 10 November 2006, Kuwalek v. R, 2007 DTC 199), for the purpose of construing 
the term “derived” as used in Article XV(1) of the 1980 Canada-United States tax treaty and, more specifically, 
of determining whether the sentence “salaries, wages and other similar remuneration derived by a resident of a 
Contracting State in respect of an employment shall be taxable only in that State”, found in Article XV(1), 
prevented Canada from taxing a bonus accrued to an employee when he was tax resident of (and working in) 
the United States, but paid when he had already become tax resident of Canada (for treaty purposes): the Court 
concluded that, since under Canadian domestic law employment income (including bonuses) is taxable when 
received, Article XV(1) of the tax treaty did not preclude Canada from taxing the bonus; Bundesfinanzhof 
(Germany), 17 October 2007, Re a Partnership, 10 ITLR, 628 et seq., at 646, where the Court relied on 
domestic law for the purpose of  interpreting the undefined term “debt claim” (“Forderung” in the German 
authentic text)  used in Article 11 of the 1989 Germany-United States tax treaty; Tax Court (Canada), 22 April 




Against this background, the author has decided to devote the first part of this section to 
the study of the functioning of the rule of interpretation provided for in Article 3(2) 
OECD Model. This analysis is carried out in section 5.3. 
 Likewise, section 5.4 examines the other provisions of the OECD Model that 
refer to the contracting States’ domestic laws for the purpose of construing undefined 
legal jargon terms. 
 Finally, section 5.5, elaborating on the results of the analysis carried out in the 
previous sections, attempts to answer the research questions outlined in section 5.1.  
                                                                                                                                  
2008, Prévost Car Inc v. R, 10 ITLR, 736 et seq., at 750, para. 40 and at 757, para. 62, where the Court, in 
connection with the interpretation of the terms “beneficial owner” and “bénéficiaire effective” in the English 
and French authentic texts of Article 10(2) of the 1986 Canada-Netherlands tax treaty, noted (i) that the 
concept of beneficial owner is not recognized in the civil law of Quebec, (ii) that the term “beneficial owner” is 
used in the English official version of the Canadian Income Tax Act, but its tax treaty correspondent 
“bénéficiaire effective” is not in the French official version thereof (other terms such as “propriété effective” 
and “droit de bénéficiaire” are used instead) and (iii) that such terms are not defined in the Canadian Income 
Tax Act; ibidem, at  765-769, in particular paras. 95, 98-100 and 105, where the Court concluded that (a) in 
both (Canadian) common law and civil law, the persons that ultimately receive the income are the owners of 
the income property, (b) in that respect and within the Canadian Income Tax Act system, the beneficial owner 
is the person who enjoys and assumes all the attributes of the ownership, i.e. the true owner of the property 
(income), (c) such a meaning applies as well to the terms “beneficial owner” and “bénéficiaire effective” as 
used in the relevant tax treaty; Federal Court (Australia), 10 October 2008, Virgin Holdings SA v. 
Commissioner of Taxation, 11 ITLR, 335 et seq., at 345-346, paras. 28-31, where the Court referred to 
domestic law for the purpose of construing the term “the Australian income tax” employed in Article 2(1)(a) of 
the 1980 Australia-Switzerland tax treaty; Federal Court (Australia), 3 February 2009, Undershaft Ltd and 
Undershaft BV v. Commissioner of Taxation, 11 ITLR, 652 et seq., at 698-699, paras. 102-106, where the Court 
referred to the tax imposed by the Commonwealth under the 1936 Australian Income Tax Assessment Act for 
the purpose of construing the expression “the Commonwealth income tax” employed in the 1967 Australia-
United Kingdom tax treaty; Federal Regional Court (Brazil), 4 June 2009, Federal Union v. Copesul – 
CIA/Petrochimica do Sul, 12 ITLR, 150 et seq., at 164 et seq., where the Court relied on domestic law in order 
to determine whether the term “lucros das empresas” (“business profits”), employed in the 1984 Brazil-Canada 
tax treaty and in the 1975 Brazil-Germany tax treaty, denoted also fees for technical services; Tax Court of 
Münster (Germany), 22 February 2008, Re Reduction of Profits in Connection with the Sale of Shares in S, 12 
ITLR, 274 et seq., at 305-306, where the Court concluded that a hidden distribution of profits by a Netherlands 
resident subsidiary to a German resident parent company (substantially a transfer pricing secondary 
adjustment) constituted a dividend for the purpose of Articles 13 and 20 of the 1959 Germany-Netherlands tax 
treaty (corresponding to Articles 10 and 23 OECD Model, respectively), since the treaty did not include any 
definition of dividends and, under German domestic tax law (to which Article 2(2) of the tax treaty made a 
renvoi), that type of hidden distribution of profits was treated as a dividend (note that the court referred to the 
domestic law of Germany, as the State applying the treaty under Article 2(2) thereof, for the purpose of 
determining whether the Netherlands had a right to tax such hidden distribution under Article 13(4) of the tax 
treaty; it is however unclear if this amounted to a rejection of the OECD approach to conflicts of income 
qualification, since apparently the same qualification took place under Netherlands domestic law – see ibidem, 
at 306); see, implicitly, Court of Appeal of England and Wales (United Kingdom), 8 July 2010, Smallwood and 
another v. Revenue and Customs Commissioners, 12 ITLR, 1002 et seq., at 1021, para. 36, where Patten LJ 
noted that Article 13(4) of the 1981 Mauritius-United Kingdom tax treaty only established the basis of taxation 
of gains for a residual category of property (i.e. property other than those dealt with in paragraphs 1 through 3 
of the same Article 13) and, thus, was not concerned with how each of the contracting States chose to tax gains 
on the basis of residence: he therefore concluded that the issue of whether the taxpayer should be resident in 
the State at the time of disposal or at some other point in time was a matter for that very same State to decide 
as part of its own domestic law.  
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5.3. Article 3(2) OECD Model: history, structure and functioning 
 
5.3.1. History of Article 3(2) OECD Model 
 
No provision comparable to Article 3(2) OECD Model was included in the draft models 
and works drawn up under the auspices of the League of Nations and the Organization 
for European Economic Cooperation (hereafter “OEEC”). Despite this, the problem of 
allocating taxing rights among States having different categorizations of income had 
been already mentioned in the 1923 Report to the League of Nations prepared by Bruins, 
Einaudi, Selingman and Stamp, who noted that “the economic conception of income is 
so complex and that of the legal and statutory definitions of income by different 
countries are so diverse that the problem of double taxation is much more seriously 
complicated for this class of taxes than for any other”.1552 
 
Interestingly, in addition to not including any general rule similar to Article 3(2) OECD 
Model, the draft models up to the 1946 League of Nations London draft contained 
almost no definition of income types or categories. On the contrary, as Avery Jones has 
also noted,1553 the common law countries, in particular the United States, had by the 
forties started to include more and more definitions of income types, as well as income 
sources.1554 It is therefore not unexpected to find that a provision closely resembling 
Article 3(2) of the 1963 OECD Draft had been included, for the first time, in a tax treaty 
concluded between two common law countries, Article II(3) of the 1945 United States-
United Kingdom tax treaty, which reads as follows:  
 
In the application of the provisions of the present Convention by one of the Contracting 
Parties any term not otherwise defined shall, unless the context otherwise requires, have 
the meaning which it has under the laws of that Contracting Party relating to the taxes 
which are the subject of the present Convention. 
 
From then on, a provision containing a general renvoi to the law of the State applying 
the treaty was included in almost all tax treaties concluded by common law countries 
                                                     
1552 See League of Nations Economic and Financial Commission, “Report on Double Taxation, submitted to 
the Financial Committee of the League of Nations by Professors Bruins, Einaudi, Seligman and Sir Josiah 
Stamp”, EFS 73, F 19 (Geneva: 3 April 1923), at 45. One possible reason why, notwithstanding this warning, 
no specific rule dealing with the possible qualification conflicts arising from the different domestic 
categorizations of income was included in the League of Nations drafts is that, at that time, “many pioneer 
international tax practitioners were convinced that the meaning of the “international tax language” in tax treaty 
should, and would, be determined by international or supranational courts” (see M. Edwardes-Ker, Tax Treaty 
Interpretation. The International Tax Treaties Service (Dublin: In-Depth, 1994 – loose-leaf), at 2.02 and 
10.01). 
1553 See J. F. Avery Jones, “The interaction between tax treaty provisions and domestic law”, in G. Maisto 
(ed.), Tax Treaties and Domestic Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2006), 123 et seq., at 124. 
1554 See the 1942 Canada-United States and the 1945 United Kingdom-United States tax treaties. 
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and, after some years, in those concluded between civil law countries as well.1555  
 The origin of such a provision may be traced back to the Unites States and United 
Kingdom domestic laws and regulations.1556 In particular, the United States Regulations 
issued in 1940 under Article XXI of the 1939 United States-Sweden tax treaty, although 
the latter did not include a provision resembling Article 3(2) OECD Model, provided 
that any term used in those regulations and not defined in the treaty was to be given the 
meaning expressed by the definition (if any) included in the Internal Revenue Code.1557 
Yet this provision of the United States Regulations made no reference at all to the 
context. It was only in Article II(3) of the 1945 United States-United Kingdom tax treaty 
that contracting States, for the first time, made the application of the domestic law 
meaning to undefined treaty terms explicitly subject to the condition that the context did 
not otherwise require. That addition is generally considered to have its roots in the 
United Kingdom domestic law, where expressions such as “unless the context otherwise 
requires” had been largely used in statutes since the end of the XIX century.1558 
 
As far as the author is aware, Article 3(2) was suddenly included in the 1963 OECD 
Draft without any documented discussion, among the OECD member States’ 
representatives, on its purpose, scope, and significance. The English official version of 
Article 3(2) of the 1963 OECD Draft reads as follows (emphasis added):  
 
As regards the application of the Convention by a Contracting State any term not otherwise 
defined shall, unless the context otherwise requires, have the meaning which it has under 
the laws of that Contracting State relating to the taxes which are the subject of the 
Convention. 
 
In the 1977 OECD Model, the English official version of Article 3(2) was modified to a 
limited extent, most probably without any aim of changing its substance1559 (emphasis 
added): 
 
As regards the application of the Convention by a Contracting State any term not defined 
therein shall, unless the context otherwise requires, have the meaning which it has under 
                                                     
1555 See, in this respect, J. F. Avery Jones et al., “The interpretation of tax treaties with particular reference to 
article 3(2) of the OECD Model”, British Tax Review (1984), 14 et seq. and 90 et seq., at 18-19. 
1556 See J. F. Avery Jones et al., “The interpretation of tax treaties with particular reference to article 3(2) of the 
OECD Model”, British Tax Review (1984), 14 et seq. and 90 et seq., at 18, footnote 14. 
1557 See United States Regulations T.D. 4975, 1940-2 C.b. 43, 52. See also the Regulations issued under the 
1942 Canada-United States tax treaty §519.1(b), §519.110(a) and §519.114(b); and those issued under the 
1939 France-United States tax treaty §514.1(b), which made reference to the more general “internal revenue 
laws” for interpretive purposes. 
1558 See J. F. Avery Jones et al., “The interpretation of tax treaties with particular reference to article 3(2) of the 
OECD Model”, British Tax Review (1984), 14 et seq. and 90 et seq., at 93, in particular footnote 16. 
1559 See, accordingly, M. Edwardes-Ker, Tax Treaty Interpretation. The International Tax Treaties Service 
(Dublin: In-Depth, 1994 – loose-leaf), at 10.01 and J. F. Avery Jones et al., “The interpretation of tax treaties 
with particular reference to article 3(2) of the OECD Model”, British Tax Review (1984), 14 et seq. and 90 et 
seq., at 19, in particular  footnote 17; contra C. van Raad, “Interpretatie van belastingverdragen”, 47 
Maandblad Belasting Beschouwingen (1978), 49 et seq., at 52-53, footnotes 19 and 21. 
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the law of that State concerning the taxes to which the Convention applies. 
 
A more extensive amendment was included in the 1995 version, primarily in order to 
explicitly deal with the issue of the static or ambulatory reference to the contracting 
States’ domestic law.1560 This amendment led the English official version of Article 3(2) 
OECD Model in its current shape (emphasis added): 
 
As regards the application of the Convention at any time by a Contracting State, any term 
not defined therein shall, unless the context otherwise requires, have the meaning that it 
has at that time under the law of that State for the purposes of the taxes to which the 
Convention applies, any meaning under the applicable tax laws of that State prevailing 
over a meaning given to the term under other laws of that State. 
 
The current French official version of Article 3(2) OECD Model reads as follows:  
 
Pour l'application de la Convention à un moment donné par un État contractant, tout terme 
ou expression qui n'y est pas défini a, sauf si le contexte exige une interprétation différente, 
le sens que lui attribue, à ce moment, le droit de cet État concernant les impôts auxquels 
s'applique la Convention, le sens attribué à ce terme ou expression par le droit fiscal de cet 
État prévalant sur le sens que lui attribuent les autres branches du droit de cet État. 
  
An analysis of the possible bearing of the above-reported amendments of the English 
official version of Article 3(2) OECD Model, as well as of the changes that the French 
official version has gone through,1561 is made in the following sections of this chapter.  
 
With regard to the Commentary, the 1963 OECD Draft was quite laconic. It read, at 
paragraph 8: 
 
The rule of interpretation laid down in paragraph 2 corresponds to similar provisions 
normally appearing in double taxation Conventions. The rule of interpretation in paragraph 
2 of Article 6 on the taxation of income from immovable property, which has to be 
regarded as "lex specialis" is in no way affected by the present general rule of 
interpretation. 
 
In the Commentary to the 1977 OECD Model, the above paragraph was replaced by the 
following (equally laconic) one: 
 
This paragraph provides a general rule of interpretation in respect of terms used in the 
Convention but not defined therein. 
 
The Commentary was significantly expanded in 1992 in order to deal with certain issues 
                                                     
1560 I.e. whether the reference to the domestic law of the contracting States was intended as a reference to the 
domestic law as existing at the time of the treaty conclusion, or at the time of its application to a specific set of 
facts. This issue is dealt with in section 5.3.2.3 of this chapter. 
1561 In 1977 the French official version of Article 3(2) OECD Model had been modified so that the expression 
“législation […] régissant” was replaced by the expression “droit […] concernant”.  
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concerning the interpretation and application of tax treaty provisions similar to Article 
3(2) OECD Model which had been pointed out by international tax scholars. In 1995, the 
OECD polished the wording of the existing paragraphs, without changing their 
substance, and added new paragraph 13.1, dealing with the amendments made in the 
1995 version of Article 3(2) OECD Model. From then on, the Commentary to Article 
3(2) OECD Model has remained untouched. It reads as follows:  
 
11. This paragraph provides a general rule of interpretation for terms used in the 
Convention but not defined therein. However, the question arises which legislation must be 
referred to in order to determine the meaning of terms not defined in the Convention, the 
choice being between the legislation in force when the Convention was signed or that in 
force when the Convention is being applied, i.e. when the tax is imposed. The Committee 
on Fiscal Affairs concluded that the latter interpretation should prevail, and in 1995 
amended the Model to make this point explicitly. 
 
12. However, paragraph 2 specifies that this applies only if the context does not require an 
alternative interpretation. The context is determined in particular by the intention of the 
Contracting States when signing the Convention as well as the meaning given to the term 
in question in the legislation of the other Contracting State (an implicit reference to the 
principle of reciprocity on which the Convention is based). The wording of the Article 
therefore allows the competent authorities some leeway. 
  
13. Consequently, the wording of paragraph 2 provides a satisfactory balance between, on 
the one hand, the need to ensure the permanency of commitments entered into by States 
when signing a convention (since a State should not be allowed to make a convention 
partially inoperative by amending afterwards in its domestic law the scope of terms not 
defined in the Convention) and, on the other hand, the need to be able to apply the 
Convention in a convenient and practical way over time (the need to refer to outdated 
concepts should be avoided). 
  
13.1. Paragraph 2 was amended in 1995 to conform its text more closely to the general and 
consistent understanding of member states. For purposes of paragraph 2, the meaning of 
any term not defined in the Convention may be ascertained by reference to the meaning it 
has for the purpose of any relevant provision of the domestic law of a Contracting State, 
whether or not a tax law. However, where a term is defined differently for the purposes of 
different laws of a Contracting State, the meaning given to that term for purposes of the 
laws imposing the taxes to which the Convention applies shall prevail over all others, 
including those given for the purposes of other tax laws. States that are able to enter into 
mutual agreements (under the provisions of Article 25 and, in particular, paragraph 3 
thereof) that establish the meanings of terms not defined in the Convention should take 
those agreements into account in interpreting those terms. 
 
 
5.3.2. The renvoi to domestic law provided for in Article 3(2) OECD Model 
5.3.2.1. Forward 
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“Article 3(2) was a brilliant solution. The result is that in any case where the treaty 
relieves a category of income from tax, the relief corresponds exactly with the internal 
law taxing provision. This is far more important than that the treaty category of income 
has the same scope in each State” 1562 
 
As Arnold puts it, “[a] tax treaty is negotiated by a particular country with its domestic 
tax system in mind. Tax treaties limit domestic tax; they do not generally impose tax 
themselves. Tax treaties make sense only in the context of a domestic tax system; they 
are accessory to domestic tax systems and do not have any independent existence or 
meaning. This relationship between tax treaties and domestic law is illustrated by Art. 
3(2) of the OECD Model”.1563  
 Such a relationship between tax treaties and the contracting States’ domestic law 
may, and generally does, lead the former to have different effects when applied by the 
two contracting States.1564  
 
From a tax policy perspective, the great difficulty in achieving equality of tax treatment 
in both contracting States, due to the interaction between the tax treaty provisions and 
the (generally different) domestic tax law provisions,1565 might have as its natural 
consequence that of driving contracting States to make all possible efforts in order to 
render such an interaction as effective and efficient as possible, so as at least to render 
tax treaties easy to apply and avoid instances of double non-taxation.  
 That is what OECD member States actually did through Article 3(2) OECD 
Model, the latter establishing the rule of law by means of which domestic law provisions 
are made capable of interacting with tax treaty provisions: via Article 3(2), tax treaty 
provisions are construed as the rules best fitting the underlying domestic tax law rules of 
the two contracting States.  
 The unavoidable other side of the coin is that, where each contracting State 
construes the relevant treaty terms in accordance with the meaning they (or synonyms 
and proxies thereof) have under its own domestic law, the frequent difference of 
meaning between the corresponding terms used under the domestic laws of the two 
contracting States inevitably leads to a difference between the meanings attributed to the 
                                                     
1562 J. F. Avery Jones, “The interaction between tax treaty provisions and domestic law”, in G. Maisto (ed.), 
Tax Treaties and Domestic Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2006), 123 et seq., at 125. 
1563 B. Arnold, “The Interpretation of Tax Treaties: Myths and Realities”, 64 Bulletin for international taxation 
(2010), 2 et seq., at 9-10. 
1564 See Supreme Court (United States), 29 April 1963, Maximov v. United States, 373 U.S. 49 (1963), at 54. 
1565 See M. Edwardes-Ker, Tax Treaty Interpretation. The International Tax Treaties Service (Dublin: In-
Depth, 1994 – loose-leaf), at 12.01, according to whom “tax treaties will not normally have an equal fiscal 
effect in each contracting State. This is because the effect of a tax treaty in each State will primarily depend 
upon each State’s tax laws – and each State’s tax laws will differ. […] Accordingly, the ordinary meaning of 
reciprocally-expressed tax treaty terms should not be distorted in an attempt to achieve “equality of effect”. A 
tax treaty must simply be applied – regardless of its effect (if any) in each State”. The author, in this respect, 
(also) refers to the following case law: District Court for Northern District of California (United States), 6 
April 1956, American Trust Company v. James G. Smyth, 141 F. Supp. 414, and Supreme Court (United 
States), 29 April 1963, Maximov v. United States, 373 U.S. 49 (1963). See also ibidem at 10.02 and 10.03. 
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very same treaty provisions by the two contracting States,1566 unless the context requires 
a uniform meaning to be attached thereto. Such differences of meaning may in turn lead 
the two contracting States, depending on the facts of the case, to apply two different 
treaty provisions (distributive rules) in comparable circumstances.  
 
Article 3(2) is often said to encompass a renvoi to the substantive lex fori,1567 i.e. a type-
II renvoi. Tax treaties are, in the vast majority of cases, interpreted and applied in order 
to determine whether they limit the taxing rights that a contracting State has under its 
domestic tax law; therefore, they are generally construed and applied together with and 
in relation to domestic tax law. Differently from what happens in the field of private law, 
where the rules of private international law applicable in one State may lead a court of 
that State to make reference to and apply the substantive private law rules of a different 
State in order to solve a dispute, in the income tax field domestic courts and tribunals 
generally do not apply (and enforce) other States’ domestic tax law, but only their own 
States’ domestic tax law. This means that tax treaties are, in most cases, interpreted and 
applied by the courts and tribunals of the State whose domestic income tax law may be 
limited by the treaty provisions to be construed. For this reason, Article 3(2) OECD 
Model, which makes reference to the law of the contracting State applying the treaty, 
may appear to encompass a renvoi to the lex fori. 
 However, this classification appears misleading and based on an “accident” (in its 
philosophical sense) of the renvoi established by Article 3(2). The main purpose of 
Article 3(2) renvoi is to guarantee a correspondence and a strict interaction between the 
domestic law provisions imposing tax on certain categories of income and the tax treaty 
provisions relieving that taxation, which entails an ontological renvoi to the domestic 
law that encompasses the latter provisions; it is only by “accident” that the latter is also 
the domestic law of the State of the court or tribunal deciding the relevant case, since it 
is theoretically possible that this is not the case.1568 Moreover, it leads to the wrong 
inference that the national court or tribunal, faced with a case (also) concerning the 
                                                     
1566 Fantozzi, in this respect, affirms that “in the case of [tax treaties], there is the meeting of two legal worlds, 
often very different. The treaty, in its various linguistic versions, becomes the means by which these two 
different worlds communicate, the screen through which the two legal systems see each other. It is, then, clear 
that in this context, the meaning to be attributed to the words requires a deeper understanding of the juridical 
concept beneath the words, as it applies in the other country’s legal system. […] one could say that the 
interpreter of a [tax treaty] deals with fluid concepts and therefore translation needs, necessarily, to be coupled 
with classification – since the envelop [author’s note: i.e. the “words”] has to be hard, this time is the container 
[author’s note: i.e. the “words”] that gives the shape to the content [author’s note: i.e. the “ juridical 
concept”]” (A. Fantozzi, “Conclusions”, in G. Maisto (ed.), Multilingual Texts and Interpretation of Tax 
Treaties and EC Tax Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2005), pp. 335 et seq., at 338). 
1567 See, for instance, K. Vogel et al., Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 1997), p. 208, m.no. 59); S. Bariatti, L’interpretazione delle convenzioni internazionali di diritto 
uniforme  (Padova: Cedam, 1986), p. 313, footnote 114.  
1568 E.g. where a case is submitted to an arbitral tribunal; or in the much more common case of a national court 
called to apply a provision similar to Article 23-A OECD Model, for the purpose of which it is compelled to 
check whether the other contracting State may tax the relevant item of income according to the provision of the 
tax treaty (where the court is willing to follow the directions encompassed in the Commentary to Article 23 
OECD Model).   
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interpretation and application of a specific tax treaty provision, must construe all the 
provisions of that tax treaty by reference of its own domestic law, unless it is otherwise 
explicitly provided. However, as the OECD has recognized since 2000 in paragraphs 
32.1-32.7 of the Commentary to Article 23 OECD Model,1569 there are cases where the 
relevant national court or tribunal has to look at the other contracting State’s law rather 
than at its own law, for the purpose of interpreting certain tax treaty provisions, namely 
where a court of the residence State is to decide, for the purpose of granting tax relief 
under Article 23 of a OECD Model-type tax treaty, whether the other contracting State 
may tax an item of income of the taxpayer in accordance with the provisions of that 
treaty.   
 Article 3(2) renvoi, therefore, should be better considered to be a type-IV renvoi, 
the relevant domestic law being that of the State whose right to tax under its own income 
tax law might be limited by the tax treaty provisions to be interpreted,1570 or, where the 
treaty provisions may not have such effect, the law of the State bound by the application 
of those provisions.   
 
Finally, the role that the overall context plays for the purpose of the renvoi provided for 
in Article 3(2) OECD Model is worth highlighting.  
 First, the overall context determines the limes of the concept, underlying each tax 
treaty undefined term, which cannot be crossed by means of the renvoi to the domestic 
law concepts.1571  
 Second, treaty undefined legal jargon terms are sometimes ambiguous under the 
domestic law of the State applying the treaty. In those cases, the underlying domestic 
law concept to be applied in order to construe the treaty provision employing that legal 
jargon term must be selected among the various possible domestic law concepts on the 
basis of an analysis of the overall context.  
Third, where the contracting States’ official languages are not used as authentic 
languages of the treaty, the issue arises as to what should be considered the terms that, in 
the legal jargon of such contracting States, correspond to the terms used in the authentic 
texts of the treaty. Such correspondence should be established by the interpreter on the 
basis of the overall context, in particular by taking into account specialized bilingual 
dictionaries, comparative law studies, other tax treaties concluded by the contracting 
States (where both languages1572 are used as authentic treaty languages), the object and 
purpose of the relevant tax treaty provision, other related provisions of the treaty, the 
OECD Commentary.1573  
                                                     
1569 See also paragraph 8.10 of the Commentary to Article 15 OECD Model. 
1570 I.e. where provisions similar to those covered in Chapters III to V  and Article 24 of the OECD Model are 
at stake. 
1571 The overall context, in fact, requires the interpreter to disregard the part of the domestic law concept (i.e. 
the denotata) that lays outside those limes. The role played by the overall context in this respect is analysed in 
section 5.3.3.2 of this chapter.  
1572 I.e. the official language of the States party to the tax treaty to be interpreted and (at least) one authentic 
language of such a treaty. 
1573 Such means of interpretations establish the correspondence between two terms of two distinct legal jargons 
based on (i) the similarity of the functions performed by the concepts underlying those two terms in their 
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  Fourth, the overall context generally guides the interpreter in deciding whether 
proxies and assimilations under domestic law are to be taken into account for the 
purpose of construing the undefined treaty terms.  
 
The following subsections analyse the most relevant theoretical issues arising from the 
application of Article 3(2) OECD Model.  
 
5.3.2.2. Which State is applying the tax treaty? Interaction between Article 3(2) and 
the tax relief rule 
 
For a long time scholars have debated on which contracting State should be regarded as 
the State applying the tax treaty for purposes of applying Article 3(2).  
 This debate has been particularly lively in respect of the case where the residence 
State has to determine whether it must grant exemption or credit under a tax relief article 
drafted along the lines of Articles 23-A and 23-B OECD Model, which compel the 
residence State to grant relief whenever an item of income may be taxed by the other 
contracting State “in accordance with the provisions of [the tax treaty]”.  
 In this respect, the main issue is whether the residence State, in order to determine 
whether the other contracting State may tax a certain item of income in accordance with 
the provisions of the tax treaty, may construe the latter provisions by attributing to their 
undefined legal jargon terms the meaning they have under its own domestic law, 
disregarding the meaning that the very same (or corresponding) terms have under the 
law of the other contracting State. This issue is commonly referred to as a matter 
concerning “conflicts of qualification”.1574 
 
Two conflicting solutions have been put forward by scholars in order to solve “conflicts 
of qualification”, both somewhat relying (although to a different extent) on the meaning 
of the term “application” employed in Article 3(2) OECD Model and, more generally, on 
the object and purpose of that article. 
 
According to a first solution, each contracting State always refers to its own domestic 
law in order to determine the intension of undefined treaty terms and expressions.1575 
 Under this approach, while the source State1576 applies its domestic law meanings 
in order to interpret the distributive rules and, therefore, determine whether it is entitled 
                                                                                                                                  
respective legal systems and (ii) the overlapping of the prototypical items (facts and things) denoted (and non-
denoted) by those two terms. 
1574 See Commentary to Article 23 OECD Model, Section E. Conflicts of qualification. 
1575 See K. Vogel, “La clause de renvoi de l’article 3, par. 2 Modèle de Convention de l’OCDE”, in Réflexions 
offertes a Paul Sibille. Études de fiscalité (Brussels: Bruylant, 1981), 857 et seq., at 960 ; K. Vogel et al., Klaus 
Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997), pp. 212-213, m.no. 66 ; 
K. Vogel and R. A. Prokisch, “General Report”, in International Fiscal Association, Cahiers de droit fiscal 
international, Vol. 78a (Deventer: Kluwer, 1993), 55 et seq., at 78-79. 
1576 The term “source State” is used here to denote the contracting State that is not the State of residence for the 
purpose of the treaty. 
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to tax (and to what extent) certain items of income or capital, the residence State applies 
its domestic law meanings in order to interpret the distributive rules, as well as to 
determine which of them it would have applied if it had been the source State.1577 Only 
where, under such a fiction (i.e. had the residence State been the source State), the 
source State appeared entitled to tax the relevant item of income or capital under one of 
the distributive rules,1578 would the residence State be bound to relieve juridical double 
taxation under Article 23 of the treaty, since in such a case it would regard the source 
State as entitled to tax “in accordance with the provisions of [the tax treaty]”. 
 The main drawback to this solution is that it may easily lead to instances of 
double taxation (and double non-taxation), thus frustrating the object and purpose of the 
tax treaty. The double taxation (and non-taxation) is generally caused by the fact that the 
two contracting States may consider that two different distributive rule articles apply to a 
specific set of facts, due to the different scope of these articles as determined by the two 
States through the attribution to their undefined legal jargon terms, via Article 3(2), of 
the different meanings these terms have under their respective domestic laws. 
 In order to counteract this undesirable result, the interpreter could take the view 
that the context requires a “uniform” interpretation avoiding double (non-) taxation.1579 
This heavy reliance on the context, however, drastically increases the unpredictability of 
the interpretation, since different interpreters (with different cultural backgrounds) are 
likely to apply different uniform “contextual” meanings to the same treaty term, and thus 
this appears detrimental to legal certainty.  
 
According to a second solution, in contrast: 
(i) both contracting States apply the distributive rule articles, as interpreted by 
attributing to their undefined legal jargon terms the meanings they have under 
their respective domestic laws, in order to check whether those articles prevent 
them from taxing the relevant items of income;  
(ii) the residence State, in addition, applies the tax relief article in order to assess 
whether it is obliged to grant exemption or credit.1580  
In case (ii), however, the residence State is simply applying the tax relief article (and no 
longer the distributive rule articles) and the only undefined legal jargon terms that it 
must interpret by means of the renvoi to its own domestic law are the terms employed in 
such an article (not the terms employed in the distributive rule articles, which are not 
                                                     
1577 See Vogel in K. Vogel et al., Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 1997), pp. 211-212, m.nos. 65 and 65a, who maintains that “’application’ is every decision by a 
tax authority or a court of law on a tax question for which the treaty is considered or should be considered”. 
1578 I.e. under any of the provisions of Articles 6 through 22, as interpreted by the residence States by 
attributing to their undefined terms and expressions the meanings they have under its own domestic law. 
1579 See M. Edwardes-Ker, Tax Treaty Interpretation. The International Tax Treaties Service (Dublin: In-
Depth, 1994 – loose-leaf), at 5.04, 7.02, 8.14 and 8.20, who submits that references to unilateral domestic law 
should, as far as possible, be avoided in favor of an autonomous contextual meaning, the treaty language being 
an “international tax language”. 
1580 Obviously, step (ii) is not carried out by the residence State in cases where it cannot tax the relevant item of 
income under the applicable (from its perspective) distributive rule; this may be the case, in certain cases, 
where tax treaty articles resembling Articles 8, 19 and 20 OECD Model are considered applicable by the 
residence State. 
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applied by the residence State for the purpose of granting relief). Where the tax relief 
article does not include any term denoting a category of income, it is irrelevant for the 
purpose of applying that article which term used in the distributive rule articles would 
denote the relevant item of income under the residence State’s domestic law. The only 
question that the residence State must answer is whether the source State may tax the 
relevant items of income where it (the source State) applies the treaty distributive rules, 
i.e. where those rules are interpreted on the basis of the meaning that the legal jargon 
terms used therein have under the domestic law of the source State.1581 
 The most important advantage of this solution is to avoid that the interpretation 
and application of tax treaties based on the renvoi encompassed in Article 3(2) lead, per 
se, to double taxation or non-taxation.1582 This is also a relevant argument favoring the 
interpretation of Articles 3(2) and 23 OECD Model underlying such a solution:1583 it is 
indeed reasonable to consider that those articles have to interact in such a way as to 
                                                     
1581 See J. F. Avery Jones et al., “The interpretation of tax treaties with particular reference to article 3(2) of the 
OECD Model”, British Tax Review (1984), 14 et seq. and 90 et seq., at 50”; J. F. Avery Jones et al., “Credit 
and Exemption under Tax Treaties in case of Differing Income Categorization”, 36 European Taxation (1996), 
118 et seq., at 133 and 142 et seq.  See also, although based on a more restrictive interpretation of the term 
“application” used in Article 3(2), J. F. Avery Jones, “United Kingdom”, in International Fiscal Association, 
Cahiers de droit fiscal international, Vol. 78a (Deventer: Kluwer, 1993), 597 et seq., at 609); J. F. Avery 
Jones, “Qualification Conflicts: the Meaning of Application in Article 3(2) of the OECD Model”, in H. Beisse 
et al. (eds.), Festschrift für Karl Beusch zum 68. Geburtstag am 31. Oktober 1993 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 
1993), 43 et seq., at 47. 
This approach has been criticized for many years by other scholars, such as, for instance, K. Vogel et al., Klaus 
Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997), pp. 211-213, m.nos. 
65-66; P. Baker, Double Taxation Conventions (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2001 – loose-leaf), m.no. E.21; M. 
Edwardes-Ker, Tax Treaty Interpretation. The International Tax Treaties Service (Dublin: In-Depth, 1994 – 
loose-leaf), at 8.20; G. Melis, L’interpretazione nel diritto tributario (Padova: Cedam, 2003), pp. 679-685. For 
a reply to the most severe criticism, see See J. Avery Jones et al., “Credit and Exemption under Tax Treaties in 
case of Differing Income Categorization”, 36 European Taxation (1996), 118 et seq., at 133 and 142, who, 
however, recognized that the practice of many States pointed towards a different solution (see ibidem, at 135 
and 143-146). 
On the other hand, the American Law Institute faced the issue without taking a clear position on whether the 
residence State was required to follow the source State’s domestic law characterization of the relevant items of 
income when granting tax relief under OECD Model-type tax treaties, although recommending it as a proper 
solution to be implemented where the mutual agreement procedure failed to solve the conflicts of qualification 
between the contracting States (see American Law Institute, Federal Income Tax Project. International 
Aspects of United States Income Taxation, II. Proposals on United States Income Tax Treaties (Philadelphia: 
American Law Institute, 1992), at 62 and 237). 
1582 Double non-taxation may, in any case, result where the residence State exempts the relevant items of 
income under Articles 8, 19 and 20 of a OECD Model-type tax treaty, as construed by attributing to their 
undefined legal jargon terms the meaning they have under the residence State’s domestic law, and the other 
contracting State exempts as well such items of income under different provisions of the treaty, as construed by 
attributing to their undefined legal jargon terms the meaning they have under the other contracting State’s 
domestic law. 
1583 See K. Vogel et al., Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 
1997), p. 212, m.no. 66, where Vogel highlights, as the sole argument in favor of this solution, “its reasonable 
result”. See also F. Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law (Amsterdam: IBFD 
Publications, 2004), pp. 504-505, who supports this solution on the basis that it is demanded by an 
interpretation of tax treaties in good faith and in light of their object and purposes (in particular, by the 
principle of effectiveness). 
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avoid, as much as possible, double taxation1584 and non-taxation in the quite common 
situations where the two contracting States attribute different meanings under their 
respective domestic laws to the same (or corresponding) undefined legal jargon treaty 
term(s).    
 On the other hand, one of its main limits lies in the fact that its functioning is 
strictly intertwined with the wording of Article 23 OECD Model and its effectiveness in 
avoiding double taxation and non-taxation may depend on the absence in the tax relief 
article of terms denoting categories of income. Unfortunately, States do not generally 
follow the wording of Article 23 OECD Model in their tax treaties and, in many cases, 
they make treaty relief subject to their domestic law relief rules,1585 or make explicit 
reference in the treaty relief article to certain items of income (e.g. dividends) by means 
of terms denoting them.1586 Whenever the text of the treaty relief provision significantly 
departs from the text of Article 23 OECD Model, the treaty text must be analysed in 
order to determine whether and to what extent this solution may apply in the specific 
case.  
 Another significant limit of this solution is that it requires the residence State to 
assess whether the source State applied correctly the tax treaty on the basis of the latter 
State’s domestic law. This implies knowledge by the taxpayer, the tax authorities and the 
courts of the residence State of the domestic law of the source State and, more 
specifically, of the meaning that the undefined legal jargon terms employed in the treaty 
distributive rule articles have under that law. This assessment often represents a 
significant procedural burden and may raise issues under the domestic law of the 
residence State with regard to (i) the person with whom the burden to prove the law of 
the other contracting State lies, (ii) the actual threshold of such a burden and (iii) the 
consequences stemming from its non-satisfaction.1587  
                                                     
1584 Especially in light of the fact that the most important goal of double tax treaties, often expressly mentioned 
in their titles, as well as in the heading and corpus of the tax relief articles (where expressions such as “double 
taxation shall be avoided” are employed), is to avoid double taxation.  
1585 This is particularly true with regard to States using the credit method to relieve international juridical 
double taxation. See, accordingly, J. F. Avery Jones et al., “Credit and Exemption under Tax Treaties in case of 
Differing Income Categorization”, 36 European Taxation (1996), 118 et seq., at 120, where further references 
are made. One of the possible reasons for the recurrent deviations from the wording of the OECD Model is that 
relief provisions are generally very detailed and complicated rules and States may probably find it more 
convenient to have recourse to already drafted and tested domestic law provisions, rather than look for new 
solutions to be implemented in their tax treaties. 
1586 See J. F. Avery Jones et al., “Credit and Exemption under Tax Treaties in case of Differing Income 
Categorization”, 36 European Taxation (1996), 118 et seq., at 133-138. This case is different from the case 
where the tax treaty relief article refers to (named or unnamed) income taxable by the source State in 
accordance with a certain article of the tax treaty, such as where reference is made to taxation in accordance 
with Articles 10 and 11 (see Article 23 OECD Model or Article 23(4) of the 1986 Italy-China tax treaty); in the 
latter case, in fact, the issue is in all relevant respects analogous to the issue that normally arises where the tax 
relief article simply states that the residence State must exempt the income or give a credit for the taxes levied 
by the source State where the latter may tax the income in accordance with the provisions of the tax treaty. 
1587 Such issues are interconnected with the questions of (a) the applicability of the principle iura novit curia 
and (b) whether the residence State’s courts, not being persuaded of the actual content of the other contracting 
State’s domestic law, may apply the lex fori under the (rule of evidence) presumption that the other contracting 
State’s domestic law corresponds to the law of the residence State with regard to the specific aspect at stake 
(see, with reference to a case where the court of a contracting State needed to determine the concept of tax 




This conflict of views among scholars was allegedly put to an end in 2000 by the OECD, 
which amended the Commentary to Article 23 OECD Model to substantially embrace 
the second solution.1588  
 Among OECD member States, only the Netherlands1589 and Switzerland1590 
entered observations in respect of the new paragraphs of the Commentary dealing with 
“conflicts of qualification” and no position was expressed by OECD non-member States 
opposing this.  
 
Finally, it is the author’s impression that the way in which the issue discussed in this 
section is resolved significantly affects the choice, made by the interpreter, to attribute to 
undefined legal jargon treaty terms their domestic law meaning or, in contrast, some 
uniform “contextual” meaning.  
 The interpreters who decide to follow the first solution generally tend to attribute 
a uniform “contextual” meaning to undefined tax treaty terms, in order to avoid possible 
issues of double taxation and non-taxation.1591  
 On the other hand, the interpreters opting for the second solution generally tend to 
attribute to undefined tax treaty terms their domestic law meanings, due to the 
comparatively higher ease of application and guarantee of legal certainty that 
characterize the attribution of the relevant domestic law meaning as compared to the 
attribution of a uniform “contextual” meaning, the instances of double taxation and non-
taxation being in any case reduced by the operation of the OECD approach to conflicts 
of qualification.1592 
 
                                                                                                                                  
residence under the law of the other contracting State, the application by the Tax Court of Canada in the Yoon 
case of the lex fori as a presumptive proxy of the law of the other contracting State - Tax Court (Canada), 22 
July 2005, Yoon v. R, 8 ITLR, 129 et seq., at 137-139, paras. 12-17). 
1588 See paragraphs 32.2 and 32.3 of the Commentary to Article 23 OECD Model. 
1589 The Netherlands rejects the automatic application of the second solution to its tax treaties as long as they 
do not include any specific provision to that extent, or a mutual agreement has been reached in that respect 
with the competent authorities of the other contracting State (see paragraph 80 of the Commentary to Article 
23 OECD Model). 
1590 Switzerland, on the contrary, reserves its right not to apply the solution adopted by the OECD only insofar 
the conflict of qualification results from a modification to the internal law of the source State subsequent to the 
conclusion of the tax treaty (see paragraph 81 of the Commentary to Article 23 OECD Model; see also the 
Swiss reservation at paragraph 27 of Annex II to the OECD Partnerships Report). 
1591 See, for instance, K. Vogel et al., Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 1997), pp. 215-216, m.nos. 73-74; M. Edwardes-Ker, Tax Treaty Interpretation. The 
International Tax Treaties Service (Dublin: In-Depth, 1994 – loose-leaf), Chapters 8 and 10; M. Lang, “Die 
Bedeutung des originär innerstaatlichen Rechts für die Auslegung von Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen (Art. 3 
Abs. 2 OECD Musterabkommen)”, in G. Burmester and D. Endres (eds.), Außensteuerrecht, 
Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen und EU-Recht im Spannungsverhältnis: Festschrift für Helmut Debatin zum 
70. Geburtstag (Munich: Beck, 1997), 283 et seq., at 303 et seq. 
1592 See, for instance, J. F. Avery Jones et al., “The interpretation of tax treaties with particular reference to 
Article 3(2) of the OECD Model”, British Tax Review (1984), 14 et seq. and 90 et seq., at 108; C. van Raad, 
“Interpretatie van belastingverdragen”, 47 Maandblad Belasting Beschouwingen (1978), 49 et seq., at 52. 
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5.3.2.3. Whether the renvoi to domestic law should be intended as static or ambulatory  
 
In 1995, Article 3(2) of the OECD Model was amended “to conform more closely to the 
general and consistent understanding of [OECD] Member states”1593 that the renvoi to 
the contracting States’ domestic law, for the purpose of interpreting undefined treaty 
terms, was to be regarded as ambulatory, i.e. referring to the domestic law in force at the 
time of the treaty application, and not as static, i.e. referring to the domestic law in force 
at the time of the treaty conclusion. 
 However, most of the tax treaties currently in force do not explicitly affirm the 
ambulatory nature of the renvoi, since they are based either on the 1963 OECD Draft, or 
on the original version of the 1977 OECD Model. It is therefore relevant to examine 
whether, and on the basis of which arguments, the ambulatory nature of the renvoi to the 
contracting States’ domestic law may be upheld in the absence of the unambiguous 
wording included in the 1995 version of Article 3(2) OECD Model.  
 
First and foremost, in 19921594 the OECD had already modified the Commentary to 
Article 3 OECD Model in order to make clear that the reference to domestic law in 
Article 3(2) should be regarded as reference to the law in force at the time of the treaty 
application, unless the context required a different interpretation.1595 
   
Second, scholars have generally expressed their preference for the dynamic application 
of the renvoi encompassed in Article 3(2) on the basis of the following arguments. 
 First, the ambulatory application of the renvoi to the contracting States’ domestic 
law leads to significant practical advantages, such as:1596  
(i) tax treaties are easier to apply if the interpreter does not have to investigate what 
the law was at the time of the treaty conclusion;  
(ii) static interpretation leads to a more frequent need for revision of tax treaties, in 
order to make them workable in the context of subsequently modified domestic 
tax laws and capable of fulfilling their primary purpose of avoiding double 
taxation (and non-taxation);  
(iii) if the static approach were embraced, the interpreter would have to answer 
the uneasy question of what the relevant moment is that should be regarded as the 
                                                     
1593 See paragraph 13.1 of the Commentary to Article 3 OECD Model. 
1594 I.e. before Article 3(2) OECD Model was amended in 1995. 
1595 See paragraphs 11 and 12 of the Commentary to Article 3 OECD Model. See also Report Tax Treaty 
Override, adopted by the OECD Council on 2 October 1989, at R(8)-4, para. 4. b). On the 1992 amendments of 
the Commentary to Article 3 OECD Model, see K. van Raad, “Additions to Article 3(2) (Interpretation) and 24 
(Non-Discrimination) of the 1992 OECD Model and Commentary”, 20 Intertax (1992), 671 et seq., at 672-
674. 
1596 See J. F. Avery Jones et al., “The interpretation of tax treaties with particular reference to article 3(2) of the 
OECD Model”, British Tax Review (1984), 14 et seq. and 90 et seq., at 41 and 46; M. Edwardes-Ker, Tax 
Treaty Interpretation. The International Tax Treaties Service (Dublin: In-Depth, 1994 – loose-leaf), at 9.05; G. 
Tixier, G. Gest and J. Kerogues, Droit Fiscal International (Paris: Librairies Techniques, 1979), para. 474; K. 
Vogel et al., Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997), p. 
64, m.no. 124d. 
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time of the treaty conclusion, the possible choices being the date of initialing, of 
signature, of ratification, or of entry into force of the treaty;  
(iv) if the static approach were embraced, in cases of later amendments to the 
treaty, the interpreter should decide whether the domestic law in force at the date 
of the amendments (or that in force at the time of the treaty original conclusion) is 
to be taken into account.  
Furthermore, the analogical application of the doctrine of inter-temporal law developed 
in the field of public international law1597 seems to support the application of the 
ambulatory approach, since that would appear to be the original intention of the parties, 
as emerging from the analysis of the nature and structure of the treaty and from its object 
and purpose.1598 
 A limited support for the static approach has been found in the argument that the 
alternative (ambulatory) approach would give the contracting States the opportunity to 
alter the scope of their international obligations by means of changing their domestic law 
after the conclusion of the relevant treaty.1599 However, the decisive counterargument 
has been put forward that major domestic law amendments, subsequent to the treaty 
conclusion, would not in most cases be relied upon for the purpose of treaty 
interpretation, either because the context, part of which must be the effects of the treaty 
when it was originally negotiated, requires an interpretation preserving the original 
effects,1600 or, in any case, because their application would unacceptably (i.e. against 
good faith) impair the originally balance or affect the original object and purpose of the 
tax treaty.1601 
 
Third, national case law, except the decision delivered by the Supreme Court of Canada 
in the Melford case,1602 points consistently in the direction of the ambulatory application 
                                                     
1597 See section 2.3.3.4 of Chapter 3 of Part II. 
1598 See J. F. Avery Jones et al., “Interpretation of tax treaties”, 40 Bulletin for international taxation (1986), 75 
et seq., at 85 per Sir Ian Sinclair. See, similarly, M. Edwardes-Ker, Tax Treaty Interpretation. The 
International Tax Treaties Service (Dublin: In-Depth, 1994 – loose-leaf), at 10.01. 
1599 See K. Vogel et al., Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 
1997), p. 64, m.no. 124d. 
1600 Actually, the same holds true even where the contrary perspective is taken: where a static approach to the 
renvoi is embraced, the context may nonetheless require an ambulatory renvoi in specific instances. In both 
cases, what really matters is how the interpreter counter-weights the different interests at stake (e.g. ease of 
treaty application; effective interaction between domestic law and treaty law; pacta sunt servanda). See, in this 
respect, M. Lang, “Die Interpretation des Doppelbesteuerungsabkommens zwischen Deutschland und 
Österreich”, 38 Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft (1992), 573 et seq., who, with regard to the 1954 Austria-
Germany tax treaty, which does not include any provision similar to Article 3(2) OECD Model, suggests a 
static renvoi in connection with certain undefined legal jargon terms, thus indirectly supporting the idea that 
the choice between the static and the ambulatory approaches depends on the specific characteristics of the 
treaty provisions to be interpreted and of the later changes in the contracting States’ domestic law.  
1601 See J. F. Avery Jones et al., “The interpretation of tax treaties with particular reference to article 3(2) of the 
OECD Model”, British Tax Review (1984), 14 et seq. and 90 et seq., at 47-48; J. F. Avery Jones et al., 
“Interpretation of tax treaties”, 40 Bulletin for international taxation (1986), 75 et seq., at 85 per Sir Ian 
Sinclair. See, similarly, F. Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law (Amsterdam: IBFD 
Publications, 2004), pp. 496-497, who makes also reference to Article 26 VCLT. 
1602 Supreme Court (Canada), 28 September 1982, Melford Developments Inc. v. R, [1982] 2 SCR 504, in 
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of the renvoi encompassed in Article 3(2), subject to the context not requiring otherwise. 
 In almost all cases cited in section 5.2 of this chapter, national courts and 
tribunals made reference, for the purpose of interpreting undefined legal jargon terms, to 
the domestic law in force in the relevant tax year. Although it is possible that the 
domestic law existing at that date was the same as that existing at the time of the treaty 
conclusion, the fact that neither the competent judiciaries, nor the parties to the dispute 
raised any issues in that respect constitutes relevant evidence of the (more or less 
conscious) praxis to regard the renvoi in Article 3(2) as ambulatory in nature.  
 Moreover, some decisions explicitly express a preference for the ambulatory 
approach.1603  
 
Fourth, the praxis of tax authorities is generally oriented towards the ambulatory 
application of Article 3(2).1604 
 
Finally, an analysis of other articles of the OECD Model seems to provide additional 
support to the conclusion that the renvoi to the contracting States’ domestic law found in 
Article 3(2) OECD Model should be regarded as ambulatory.  
 First, where a contracting State introduces a new tax, to which the treaty applies 
pursuant to Article 2(4), in place of the tax existing at the time of the treaty conclusion, 
new definitions are accordingly introduced in its legal system. It would appear absurd 
that the definitions concerning the old tax should be relevant in order to interpret and 
apply the treaty with regard to the new tax, which would be the straightforward 
conclusion if a static approach were embraced.1605 Moreover, paragraph 8 of the 
Commentary to Article 2 OECD Model states that “each State undertakes to notify the 
other of any significant changes made to its taxation laws by communicating to it, for 
example, details of new or substituted taxes. Member countries are encouraged to 
communicate other significant developments as well, such as new regulations or judicial 
decisions”, which supports the conclusion that subsequent chances in the statutes, case 
law and practice of a contracting State may affect the interpretation and application of 
                                                                                                                                  
particular at 514. Note, however, that Section 3 of the Canadian Income Tax Conventions Interpretation Act 
(RSC 1985, c. I-4, section 3), which was enacted in 1985 and applies retrospectively, makes it clear that, from 
a Canadian standpoint, Article 3(2) had always been intended to be ambulatory and not static in its application, 
contrary to the view expressed by the Supreme Court of Canada. 
1603 See Supreme Court (Denmark), 4 February 2003, Halliburton Company Germany Gmbh v. Ministry of 
Taxation, 5 ITLR, 784 et seq., at 813 (see, however, the minority opinion in ibidem, at 816); High Court 
(Denmark), 6 April 2001, Halliburton Company Germany Gmbh v. Ministry of Treasury, 4 ITLR, 19 et seq., at 
41-42; High Court (Ireland), 31 July 2007, Kinsella v. Revenue Commissioners, 10 ITLR, 63 et seq., at 81; 
Federal Court (Australia), 10 October 2008, Virgin Holdings SA v. Commissioner of Taxation, 11 ITLR, 335 et 
seq., at 351, para. 43; Federal Court (Australia), 3 February 2009, Undershaft Ltd and Undershaft BV v. 
Commissioner of Taxation, 11 ITLR, 652 et seq., at 699, para. 108; Cour de Cassation (Belgium), 21 December 
1990, case F1851N (available on the IBFD Tax Treaty Case Law Database). 
1604 See, for instance, United States Letter Ruling 78-44-008; United States Revenue Ruling 80-243; United 
States Revenue Ruling 78-423. 
1605 See, similarly, J. F. Avery Jones et al., “The interpretation of tax treaties with particular reference to article 
3(2) of the OECD Model”, British Tax Review (1984), 14 et seq. and 90 et seq., at 32; F. Engelen, 
Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2004), pp. 489-490. 
PART II: CHAPTER 5            
 
 471 
such treaty.1606  
 Second, with regard to Article 4 OECD Model, “[i]t would be impossible to apply 
the treaty to people who were or were not resident under a definition which was no 
longer applicable.”1607 
 
A somewhat connected issue is whether domestic law changes subsequent to the events 
that trigger the tax liability are to be taken into account for the purpose of applying 
Article 3(2). 
 It seems to the author that different circumstances may lead to different 
conclusions in this respect. However, as a broad generalization:  
(i) where changes in statutes and new court decisions have retroactive effect 
under domestic law, in the sense that they are aimed at properly construing 
existing law, they should be taken into account for the purpose of Article 3(2); 
while in contrast,  
(ii) changes in statutes having prospective effect and which, therefore, do not 
apply ratione temporis to the events triggering the tax liability1608 should be 
disregarded in the application of Article 3(2).1609  
 
A similar solution should apply in respect of the interpretation of statutory provisions1610 
and the construction of unwritten principles of law, in particular those developed by 
domestic courts.  
 First, interpreters (including judiciaries) are generally regarded as construing the 
law as it has always been.1611  
 Second, if the renvoi to the contracting States’ domestic law were intended as a 
static reference to the general accepted meanings of the relevant treaty terms, according 
to national administrative practice, case law and scholarly writings, at the time of the 
treaty conclusion, the construction of treaty provisions would become an almost 
                                                     
1606 See similarly J. F. Avery Jones et al., “The interpretation of tax treaties with particular reference to article 
3(2) of the OECD Model”, British Tax Review (1984), 14 et seq. and 90 et seq., at 32. 
This reading also supports the conclusion that the terms “law” and “droit”, as used in article 3(2) OECD 
Model, refer to all relevant domestic rules and principles of law, independently of their origin (legislative, 
judicial, administrative, or by mere praxis). See section 5.3.2.7 of this chapter. 
1607 J. F. Avery Jones et al., “The interpretation of tax treaties with particular reference to article 3(2) of the 
OECD Model”, British Tax Review (1984), 14 et seq. and 90 et seq., at 34. See also the references made by the 
authors to the official interpretations of legislations enacted in the United States, the Netherlands and Sweden, 
all of which confirm that such States interpret Article 4 OECD Model (and the corresponding provisions of 
their tax treaties) as containing an ambulatory renvoi to the contracting States’ domestic law, rather than a 
static one (ibidem, at 33-34). 
1608 Typically because they are aimed at modifying or replacing the rules of law previously in force.  
1609 See Supreme Court (Norway), 24 April 2008, Sølvik v Staten v/Skatt Øst, 11 ITLR, 15 et seq., at 37, paras. 
62-64. 
1610 Both those existing at the time of the treaty conclusion and those subsequently introduced. 
1611 See the obiter comment by Lord Radcliffe in House of Lords (United Kingdom), 16 July 1959, Ostime v. 
Australian Mutual Provident Society, 38 TC 492, at 519-520. See also J. F. Avery Jones et al., “The 
interpretation of tax treaties with particular reference to article 3(2) of the OECD Model”, British Tax Review 
(1984), 14 et seq. and 90 et seq., at 47, who maintain that “the reversal of a decision on appeal after the 
conclusion of a treaty would be taken into account in determining the law at the date of the treaty.” 
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unworkable task for the interpreter, due to the difficulty of determining the settled or 
generally accepted domestic law meaning (if any) of the relevant treaty terms at a 
specific point in time in the (sometimes very distant) past. This would frustrate one of 
the major purposes of Article 3(2), namely that of rendering simpler and less uncertain 
the interpretation and application of tax treaties, by matching the meaning under 
domestic law and the meaning under treaty law of the same or similar terms.  
 Third, the static reference to the meaning that domestic law terms had at the time 
of the treaty conclusion would possibly jeopardize the interaction between the charging 
provisions under domestic tax law and the relief provisions under tax treaties in cases 
where the domestic law meaning has in the meantime changed. This, in turn, could 
create potential room for double non-taxation and lead to unexpected results in terms of 
allocation of taxing rights between the contracting States.1612  
  
Therefore, what the interpreter should do, when interpreting a tax treaty by reference to 
the contracting States’ domestic law, is simply to ascertain the current (broadly 
accepted) meaning of the relevant domestic law terms and apply that meaning for the 
purpose of construing the tax treaty, unless the context requires a different interpretation.  
 
5.3.2.4. Undefined legal jargon terms in the treaty and their proxies under the 
contracting States’ domestic law 
 
In 1984, the International Tax Group stated that “[o]ne might expect that Article 3(2) 
directs one to internal law for the meaning of an identical item”.1613 
 Similarly, Vogel seems to support the thesis that Article 3(2) applies only in so 
far as the undefined terms used in the tax treaty are exactly the same ones used under the 
domestic law of the relevant contracting State.1614 However, this comment loses part of 
its significance in light of the fact that Vogel considers that, where Article 3(2) does not 
apply, “this does not unconditionally preclude an interpretation according to the 
domestic law of the State applying the treaty […]. The only result of not applying Art. 
3(2) is that the treaty interpreting process is not tied to the narrow standard of Art. 3(2) 
(which only allows for an interpretation other than according to the domestic law when 
the context ‘requires’ this), so that more space remains for an independent 
                                                     
1612 See the comments in J. F. Avery Jones, “The interaction between tax treaty provisions and domestic law”, 
in G. Maisto (ed.), Tax Treaties and Domestic Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2006), 123 et seq., at 125-
126. 
1613 See J. F. Avery Jones et al., “The interpretation of tax treaties with particular reference to article 3(2) of the 
OECD Model”, British Tax Review (1984), 14 et seq. and 90 et seq., at 20. 
1614 See K. Vogel et al., Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 
1997), pp. 209-210, m.no 62, where Vogel refers to the different position upheld by Wassermeyer (F. 
Wassermeyer, “Die Auslegung von Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen durch den Bundesfinanzhof”, 67 Steuer 
und Wirtschaft (1990), 404 et seq., at 410) and to the decision of the High Court (Australia) in the Thiel case 
(High Court (Australia), 22 August 1990, Thiel v. Commissioner of Taxation, 171 Commonwealth Law 
Reports, 338 et seq.). See also, K. Vogel and R. A. Prokisch, “General Report”, in International Fiscal 
Association, Cahiers de droit fiscal international, Vol. 78a (Deventer: Kluwer, 1993), 55 et seq., at 79. 





In this respect, the author submits that the fact that the term used in the relevant tax 
treaty exactly matches a term used under the domestic law of the State applying the 
treaty does not seem to be the proper test to be carried out in order to draw a line 
between cases where the interpreter may apply the renvoi to domestic law enshrined 
Article 3(2) and cases where he may not.  
 As previously mentioned, the terms used in the authentic treaty texts drafted in 
the official languages of the contracting States are often influenced by the terminology 
of the OECD Model and, as a consequence, such terms frequently differ from those 
typically used in the respective income tax statutes.  
 It would seem unreasonable, in light of the relevant role played by Article 3(2) 
renvoi as a link between the tax treaty relief provisions and the contracting States’ 
domestic law charging provisions, to infer from these terminological differences that the 
intention of the contracting States was not to apply that renvoi with regard to those treaty 
terms that are just proxies (or synonyms) of the legal jargon terms employed in the 
domestic tax law. On the contrary: it appears more sensible to treat such treaty terms as 
corresponding, for the purpose of Article 3(2), to their domestic law proxies and to 
assess, on the basis of the analysis of the overall context, whether it is unreasonable to 
apply their domestic law meaning for the purpose of interpreting the treaty. 
 Moreover, where the relevant tax treaty was not authenticated in any of the 
official languages of the contracting State applying it, or where the prevailing authentic 
text was to be interpreted, a narrow construction of Article 3(2) would make its 
application virtually impossible.1616 
  
Other scholars have similarly upheld this conclusion1617 and national courts and tribunals 
                                                     
1615 See K. Vogel et al., Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 
1997), p. 210, m.no 62. 
1616 It is interesting to note that, where the tax treaty is authenticated only in one language (generally an 
international lingua franca), contracting States sometimes insert legal jargon terms of their own official 
languages in the sole authentic text of the treaty, in order to avoid uncertainties and inconsistencies by the 
interpreters in the selection of the domestic law meaning to be attributed to the foreign language terms. For 
instance, Article 16 of the 1996 Denmark-Netherlands tax treaty, which has been authenticated only in the 
English language, provides as follows: 
“Directors' fees or other remuneration derived by a resident of one of the States in his capacity as a 
member of the board of directors, a "bestuurder" or a "commissaris" of a company which is a resident 
of the other State may be taxed in that other State”. 
Paragraph IX of the 1996 Protocol to that treaty reads: “It is understood that "bestuurder" or "commissaris" of a 
Netherlands company means persons, who are nominated as such by the general meeting of shareholders or by 
any other competent body of such company and are charged with the general management of the company and 
the supervision thereof, respectively”. 
1617 See B. Arnold, “The Interpretation of Tax Treaties: Myths and Realities”, 64 Bulletin for international 
taxation (2010), 2 et seq., at 13; J. F. Avery Jones, “The interaction between tax treaty provisions and domestic 
law”, in G. Maisto (ed.), Tax Treaties and Domestic Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2006), 123 et seq., 
at 133-134; J. F. Avery Jones, “Problems of Categorising Income and Gains for Tax Treaty Purposes”, British 
Tax Review (2001), 382 et seq., at 393; H. Pijl, “Aantekeningen bij de lex-fori-bepaling in belastingverdragen”, 
Weekblad Fiscaal Recht (1995), 1254 et seq.; F. Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International 
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have repeatedly endorsed its underlying approach.1618  
   
That said, two inferences may be drawn from the analysis of Article 3(2), read in its 
context, and the relevant case law.  
 First, from a general perspective, the quest for the domestic legal jargon meaning 
of undefined treaty terms is not a process autonomous from the analysis of the overall 
context. The search for the former influences and is influenced by the analysis of the 
latter, since:  
(i) the domestic law meanings of undefined treaty terms and their possible 
domestic law proxies constitutes a relevant part of the overall context and, in turn,  
(ii) the overall context influences the selection of the domestic law proxies, as 
well as the choice of the relevant domestic law meaning of polysemic domestic 
legal jargon terms.  
The attempt to separate these two activities in watertight compartments is, in most cases, 
mainly aimed at achieving clarity of exposition and must be recognized for what 
essentially is: nothing more than a rhetorical device.  
 Second, in order to select the appropriate domestic law proxy, a semantic and 
functional analysis is generally necessary. On the one hand, the interpreter has to 
examine the functions served by the domestic law concepts underlying the various 
corresponding terms employed in the authentic treaty texts (and in the OECD Model 
official version), as well as the items prototypically denoted and non-denoted by those 
terms, under the domestic laws of the contracting States and of other States employing 
those terms. He may then select, as domestic law proxy of the relevant treaty term (if 
any), the term denoting the same or similar prototypical items and whose underlying 
domestic law concept serves the same or a similar function in the domestic law system 
of the contracting State applying the treaty.1619 On the other hand, the functions that the 
concept underlying the relevant treaty term, whatever it may be, should serve within the 
treaty rule of which it is part may help the interpreter to support the choice of a specific 
domestic law proxy (if any), especially where the concept underlying the latter serves 
similar functions in the domestic law system of the contracting State applying the treaty. 
Obviously, the functional and semantic analysis may lead the interpreter to conclude that 
no adequate domestic law proxy exists and provide him with the arguments to support 
such inference.  
 
5.3.2.5. Undefined legal jargon terms in the treaty and assimilations under the 
contracting States’ domestic law 
                                                                                                                                  
Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2004), p. 488; P. J. Wattel and O. Marres, “Characterization of Fictitious 
Income under OECD-Patterned Tax Treaties”, 43 European Taxation (2003), 66 et seq., at 71. 
1618 See, for instance, Court of Appeals (United States), 16 January 1963, Samman, 313 F.2d 461, paras. 5, 6 
and 8; Hoge Raad (Netherlands), 4 November 1992, case 27222, BNB 1993/38; Tax Court (United States), 11 
April 1983, Estate of Burghardt, 80 T.C. 705. 
1619 Fortunately, such a task is rendered easier by the existence of dictionaries (legal dictionaries, bilingual 
dictionaries, thesaurus dictionaries), as well as of legal textbooks and encyclopedias.   




Another issue in the application of the renvoi enshrined in Article 3(2) concerns cases 
where the domestic statutes of the contracting States bring certain items within the scope 
of the relevant legal jargon term by means of explicit assimilations (sometimes referred 
to as “deeming provisions”), such items being otherwise excluded from it in light of the 
ordinary domestic law meaning of that term, or of its statutory definition.1620   
 The task for the interpreter, in this respect, is (i) to decide whether, for the 
purpose of construing a tax treaty provision employing such a term, the latter should be 
regarded as also denoting the above-mentioned assimilated items and (ii) how to 
properly support its conclusion. 
 
The analysis of the OECD materials available on the subject matter does not allow 
concluding univocally in either sense.1621  
 However, by reading such materials in light of paragraphs 9.2, 22 and 22.1 of the 
Commentary to Article 1 OECD Model, which have been added in 2003, one may 
reasonably infer that the OECD intends to attribute a decisive role to the overall context, 
in order to solve the issue on a case-by-case basis, and that no firm bar to the use of 
domestic law assimilations for the purpose of construing tax treaties is intended to 
operate. In particular, the overall context of the treaty would support the application of 
domestic law assimilations, for the purpose of construing undefined legal jargon terms in 
the treaty, whenever cases of improper use of the tax treaty were at stake and those 
assimilations could prevent such abuses. 
 
Similarly, national courts and tribunals have taken different approaches on whether 
domestic law assimilations have a bearing on the interpretation of legal jargon treaty 
terms.  
 For instance, the Bundesfinanzhof (Germany) and the lower court (Finanzgericht) 
of Munich did not attribute decisive weight to the fact that, under Spanish law on 
inheritance, property transfers and legal documents, options to buy immovable property 
in Spain were treated as if they were immovable property (though they were not fully 
equated to, or defined as immovable property), in order to decide whether capital gains 
from the alienation of such options were governed by Article 13(1) of the 1966 
                                                     
1620 See, for instance, the case of the assimilation of (otherwise) non-resident persons to resident persons for 
income tax purposes, on which J. F. Avery Jones et al., “The interpretation of tax treaties with particular 
reference to article 3(2) of the OECD Model”, British Tax Review (1984), 14 et seq. and 90 et seq., at 33-34 
and Supreme Administrative Court (Portugal), 25 March 2009, A and another v. Portuguese Treasury, 11 
ITLR, 1001 et seq., at 1019. 
1621 See the position expressed by the OECD with regard to: the case of the assimilation of interest payments to 
dividends under domestic law thin capitalization provisions (dealt with in paragraph 25 of the Commentary to 
Article 10 OECD Model); the case of the assimilation to profits distribution of the gain stemming from the sale 
of shares by a shareholder to the issuing company in connection with the liquidation thereof (dealt with in 
paragraph 31 of the Commentary to Article 13 OECD Model); the case of the assimilation of real estate 
companies to immovable property for the purpose of capital gains taxation (see footnote 1 to paragraph 21 of 
the Commentary to Article 13 of the 1963 OECD Draft; paragraph 23 of the Commentary to Article 13 OECD 
Model, as existing before the amendments made in 2003; Report Tax Treaty Override, adopted by the OECD 
Council on 2 October 1989, at R(8)-12 and 13, paras. 31-32). 
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Germany-Spain tax treaty.1622 Similarly, the very same Bundesfinanzhof, for the purpose 
of construing the term “substantial interest [in a company]” employed in Article IX(3) of 
the 1956 Canada-Germany tax treaty, did not attach relevance to the German domestic 
law provision deeming a substantial interest to exist where, in cases of holdings acquired 
by the vendor through a donation, the donor had at any time within the five years prior to 
the alienation a holding of more than 25% in the capital of the company.1623 However, 
the tax court of Baden-Wurttemberg apparently reached a contrary conclusion with 
regard to a similar case.1624  
 On the contrary, the Supreme Court of Canada seemed to consider a Canadian 
domestic law provision, deeming fees paid for the guarantee of borrowings to be 
“interest” for withholding tax purposes, capable of affecting the meaning of the 
undefined term “interest” used in Article III(5) of the 1956 Canada-Germany tax 
treaty.1625 Likewise, the Tax Review Board of Canada held that Article 106(2) of the 
Income Tax Act of Canada, which has the effect of (re)characterizing the proceeds from 
the disposition of a life interest in a Canadian trust as income, rather than as component 
of a capital gain, was decisive in order to characterize such proceeds as income for the 
purpose of the 1978 Canada-United Kingdom tax treaty.1626  
 In the same vein, the Hoge Raad (the Netherlands) appeared to admit the 
theoretical relevance of domestic law assimilations for the purpose of construing 
undefined treaty terms under Article 3(2), provided that the context does not require a 
different interpretation.1627  
 Similarly, the Federal Court of Australia found that that Australian limited 
partnerships, although not being legal entities under commercial law, should be 
considered legal entities for the purpose of Article 11(9)(a) of the 1982 Australia-United 
States tax treaty, since they are deemed as such under Australian tax law.1628 
                                                     
1622 Bundesfinanzhof (Germany), 19 May 1982, case IR 257/78, Bundessteuerblatt. Teil II (1982), 768 et seq. 
1623 Bundesfinanzhof (Germany), 13 December 1989, case IR 39/87, Bundessteuerblatt. Teil II (1990), 379 et 
seq. 
1624 See M. Edwardes-Ker, Tax Treaty Interpretation. The International Tax Treaties Service (Dublin: In-
Depth, 1994 – loose-leaf), at 8.08. 
1625 Supreme Court (Canada), 28 September 1982, Melford Developments Inc. v. R, [1982] 2 SCR 504, with 
regard to which, see the similar conclusion drawn in M. Kandev, “Tax Treaty Interpretation: Determining 
Domestic Meaning Under Article 3(2) OECD Model”, 55 Canadian Tax Journal (2007), 31 et seq., at 54. See 
also Federal Court of Appeal (Canada), 12 March 1980, Associates Corporation of North America v. R, 80 
DTC 6140. 
1626 Tax Review Board (Canada), 25 January 1983, Doris Lillian Gadsden v. Minister of National Revenue, 83 
DTC 127, at 71. See also Federal Court (Canada), 22 January 1985, The Estate of the Late John N Gladden v. 
R, 85 DTC 5188; seemingly contra Tax Court (Canada), 21 November 1983, William C. Krafve v. the Minister 
of National Revenue, 84 DTC 1002. 
1627 See Hoge Raad (Netherlands), 5 September 2003, cases 37651 and 37670, BNB 2003/379 and 2003/381. 
See, to a similar extent, Federal Court (Canada), 28 March 1991, Utah Mines Ltd. v. R, 91 DTC 5245.  
The author’s conclusion, with regard to the approach taken by the Hoge Raad in respect of the relevance of 
domestic law assimilations for the purpose of treaty interpretation, seems to be shared by F. Engelen, 
Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2004), pp. 494-495 
and M. Kandev, “Tax Treaty Interpretation: Determining Domestic Meaning Under Article 3(2) OECD 
Model”, 55 Canadian Tax Journal (2007), 31 et seq., at 55. 
1628 Federal Court (Australia), 22 October 2008, Deutsche Asia Pacific Finance Inc v. Commissioner of 
Taxation, 11 ITLR, 365 et seq., at 398-399, para. 90. 




Scholars have also examined the relevance of domestic law assimilations for the purpose 
of applying Article 3(2). In particular, the (more limited) issue of the tax treaty 
characterization of fictitious income provided for under the domestic laws of the 
contracting States has been recently dealt with by Wattel, Marres and Lang. 
 The first two authors, in an article published in 2003 as an adaptation of an 
Opinion written by Wattel in his capacity as Advocate General of the Hoge Raad (the 
Netherlands), maintained the following. “In general, fictitious income does not fall under 
the specified income allocation provisions (Arts. 6-20) of an OECD Model-type tax 
treaty because it is not “paid” (“payé”) or “derived” (“reçu”). Fictitious income does not, 
however, escape the ambit of the treaty altogether. It is covered by the “other income” 
provision (Art. 21 OECD Model), which does not use terms like “derived” or “paid,” 
and results in allocation to the residence state of the taxpayer. […] However, the lex 
specialis of Art. 3(2) of the OECD Model (interpretation by reference to domestic law) 
[…] with the exception of its “good faith” and “context” requirements […] may still, 
based on the meaning of the equivalents of “derived” or “paid” in domestic tax law, 
bring fictitious income within the scope of one of Arts. 6-20 of the OECD Model. But 
even if this is the case, “good faith” and the “context” of the allocation provisions 
(especially the “permanency of commitments” of the contracting states) as a rule still 
preclude the carry-over of domestic law fictions to treaty characterization. We see three 
exceptions to this rule: (i) the domestic fictitious income provision was already statutory 
law before the treaty was signed, and the treaty partner was therefore able to take it into 
account during negotiations; (ii) in the fiscal year to which the treaty must be applied, 
the domestic law of both contracting states included a similar fiction (reciprocity of 
legislation), or (iii) the contracting states published a joint document in a timely and 
proper fashion […] that brings the fictitious income under a specific treaty provision and 
which enjoys sufficient democratic legitimacy to be viewed as an executive protocol to 
the treaty.”1629 
 Lang, however, pointed out that the distinction between real and fictitious income 
is often subtle and arbitrary, which makes untenable the conclusion that only Article 21 
of OECD Model-type tax treaties is generally applicable to fictitious income.1630 
Moreover, the author pointed out that Article 3(2) OECD Model should apply with 
regard to any meaning attributed to legal jargon terms under domestic tax law (including 
fictions), unless the context otherwise requires and, in that respect, he maintained that he 
                                                     
1629 P. J. Wattel and O. Marres, “Characterization of Fictitious Income under OECD-Patterned Tax Treaties”, 
43 European Taxation (2003), 66 et seq., at 66; see ibidem, at 74 and 79; at 78, the authors also seem to admit 
the relevance of subsequent domestic legal fictions in cases of fraus tractatus, provided that certain conditions 
are met. 
1630 See M. Lang, ““Fictitious Income” and tax treaties”, in H. van Arendonk, F. Engelen and S. Jansen (eds.), 
A Tax Globalist. Essays in honour of Maarten J. Ellis (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2005), 34 et seq., at 
36-37 and 44, where the author maintains that the “underlying assumption of the ideas presented by 
Wattel/Marres is that it is possible to draw a line between fictitious and real income. […] For a definition of 
“fictitious income”, it is necessary to know what “real income” is. But is there such a thing as real income? 
[…] If one goes that far, the question arises if it is possible to distinguish between real and fictitious income, or 
if income is everything the law declares to be income”. 
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could not “see why the answer should depend on the time when the bilateral tax treaty 
was signed [and] why reciprocity should play a role”.1631 The literal meanings of treaty 
terms such as “derived”, “received” and “paid” should not be overemphasized; such 
words should be intended as merely expressing that a certain tax liability is allocated to a 
certain taxpayer by law. Therefore, according to Lang, there should not even be the 
necessity to distinguish between fictitious and real income under the contracting States’ 
domestic law: “Every single tax liability must be examined for the purpose of identifying 
the applicable allocation rule of the OECD Model Convention”.1632 
  
The above analysis proves that no clear and consistent answer has been given so far to 
the question of whether assimilations under the contracting States’ domestic laws should 
be taken into account for the purpose of construing treaty undefined legal jargon terms in 
accordance with Article 3(2). This leaves the interpreter with a broad discretion as to 
whether and how to actually rely on them. From a formal standpoint, taking into account 
that:  
(i) it is often difficult to convincingly distinguish between definitions and 
assimilations under domestic law,1633  
(ii) the effect and purpose of domestic law assimilations is to render the rules of 
law, which are ordinarily applicable to the items denoted by a certain term, also 
applicable to the items denoted by the assimilated terms and  
(iii) one of the main benefits achieved by means of Article 3(2) is to guarantee the 
correspondence between the scope of the domestic charging rules and the tax 
treaty relief rules,  
the author believes that the most sensible solution is to always consider domestic law 
assimilations for the purpose of Article 3(2) renvoi. That said, the final decision on 
whether a certain domestically assimilated item should be regarded as denoted by the 
relevant treaty term remains subject to the overall context not requiring a different 
interpretation. 
 
5.3.2.6. The classification of foreign legal concepts for the purpose of Article 3(2)  
 
The classification of foreign legal concepts (especially private or commercial law 
concepts) for domestic law purposes may affect the application of the renvoi 
encompassed in Article 3(2) of OECD Model-based tax treaties. In fact, although Article 
3(2) mainly makes reference to domestic tax law meanings and classifications, domestic 
tax law, in turn, generally refers to and relies on domestic private law concepts for 
purposes of its application, such domestic private law concepts often not perfectly 
                                                     
1631 See ibidem, at 41 and 42. 
1632 See ibidem, at 47 and 48. 
1633 See, similarly, M. Lang, ““Fictitious Income” and tax treaties”, in H. van Arendonk, F. Engelen and S. 
Jansen (eds.), A Tax Globalist. Essays in honour of Maarten J. Ellis (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2005), 
34 et seq., at 48, where the author maintains that “[i]t is very difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish between 
fictitious and real income. Income is whatever the legislator declares to be income.” 
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overlapping with their correspondent foreign legal concepts (if any).  
 In this respect, the problems that the interpreter faces may be grouped into two 
main clusters: (i) whether an assimilation of foreign private law concepts to domestic 
private law concepts is allowed for the purpose of domestic tax law and (ii) to which 
domestic private law concept the foreign private law concept may be assimilated for the 
purpose of applying domestic tax law, if any at all.1634 
 
Maisto distinguishes among five different legislative techniques used under domestic tax 
law in order to establish the scope of the terms and expressions employed therein, the 
use of which may have different effects on the possibility to include a foreign legal 
concept within the scope of such domestic law terms or expressions:1635  
 First, domestic tax law may include a reference to the domestic private statutory 
provisions defying or covering the relevant terms or expressions. Such a technique may 
lead to the exclusion, from the scope of the domestic tax law provision, of situations 
regulated by foreign law. 
 Second, domestic tax law may employ, together with domestic private law terms, 
foreign legal jargon terms, such as “trust” in civil law States. This gives evidence of the 
intention to broaden the scope of the domestic tax law provision and to include situations 
governed by foreign private law, although in a rather ambiguous and vague manner, 
since (i) the foreign legal jargon terms might be (and generally are) associated with 
different legal concepts in different States and (ii) other States may use different terms to 
denote somewhat similar legal concepts.  
 Third, domestic tax law may include ad hoc definitions making reference to the 
legal or economic effects or characteristics of the defined legal concept. Although such 
effects or characteristics may, more or less partially, reproduce those typical of certain 
domestic private law concepts, such a formulation clearly opens the way to include 
foreign private law concepts in the scope of the relevant domestic tax law provisions.  
 Fourth, domestic tax law may provide for specific rules on the characterization of 
foreign legal concepts for domestic tax law purposes, such as the rules on the 
characterization of foreign entities for corporate tax purposes. 
 Fifth, domestic tax law may simply employ legal jargon terms that typically 
denote domestic private law concepts.1636  
 Under the last technique, the interpreter clearly bears the burden of deciding 
whether, to what extent and how the assimilation of foreign legal concepts to domestic 
legal concepts should be made.1637 However, although less evident, such a complex task 
                                                     
1634 See, by analogy, paragraphs 11-14 of the OECD Partnerships Report. 
1635 See G. Maisto (ed.), Multilingual Texts and Interpretation of Tax Treaties and EC Tax Law (Amsterdam: 
IBFD Publications, 2005), at xxvii-xxviii. 
1636 See the issue of the domestic tax law status of foreign entities in Germany, where the relevant statutes are 
silent on the issue, while courts and tax law scholars have generally maintained that foreign entities have to be 
treated similarly to the domestic entities that are the most similar thereto from a legal structure standpoint (on 
the German Typenvergleich approach, see H. Debatin, “Subjektfähigkeit ausländischer Wirtschaftsgebilde im 
deutschen Steuerrecht”, Der Betriebsberater (1988), 1155 et seq., at 1157, and further references therein).    
1637 See, for instance, Court of Appeal of England and Wales (United Kingdom), 9 June 1998, Memec Plc v. 
IRC, 1 ITLR, 3 et seq., where the Court had to decide whether a silent partnership agreement concluded under 
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is to be performed as well with regard to the other four techniques, in relation to which 
the interpreter must in any case to establish whether, under the relevant tax law 
provisions, the assimilation of foreign legal concepts to domestic law concepts is 
excluded or not.1638 
 
From a tax treaty perspective, the similarities between foreign law concepts and the 
domestic law concepts may be also taken into account in order to argue whether, 
notwithstanding the absence of a sufficient proximity for justifying an assimilation under 
domestic tax law, the overall context of the treaty requires an interpretation entailing the 
domestic and foreign law concepts to be treated alike for tax treaty purposes.1639 This 
issue is further examined in section 5.3.3 of this chapter. 
 
5.3.2.7. The domestic law of the contracting States relevant for the application of 
Article 3(2) OECD Model 
 
With regard to the quest for the domestic law meaning of treaty undefined legal jargon 
                                                                                                                                  
German law between a United Kingdom resident company and its German resident subsidiary, according to 
which the former had the right to participate in the profits of the latter in its quality of silent partner thereof, 
was to be considered a transparent partnership agreement for the purpose of the United Kingdom domestic tax 
law and, thus, of the 1964 Germany-United Kingdom tax treaty.  
See also Administrative Court of Paris (France), 23 March 2005, case 92-12625 Société Publi-Union, Revue de 
Jurisprudence Fiscale (1996), No. 1463, where the Court had to decide whether the sums paid to an American 
publisher for the right to use a copyright (under the relevant copyright law of the United States) were royalties 
for the purpose of Article 11(3) of the 1967 France-United States tax treaty, according to which “Royalties 
derived from copyrights [author’s note: “droit d’autour” in the French authentic text] of literary, artistic, or 
scientific works […] by a resident of one Contracting State shall be taxable only in that Contracting State”. The 
Court held that such sums did not constitute royalties for the purpose of the 1967 France-United States tax 
treaty, one of the arguments in support of such a conclusion being that the payment was not for the right to use 
a “droit d’auteur” since under French law the rights held by a publisher could not be assimilated to a “droit 
d’auteur”, which is an inalienable right attached to the individual that created the relevant intellectual work 
(see, in this, respect C. Legros, “France”, in G. Maisto (ed.), Multilingual Texts and Interpretation of Tax 
Treaties and EC Tax Law (Amsterdam: IBFD, 2005), 199 et seq., at 216-217). 
1638 This is the case also where the first technique is used. See Articles 117 and 120(1) of the Italian Income 
Tax Code, which expressly provides that only companies listed in Article 73(a) of the same Code and, more 
precisely only “società per azioni, in accomandita per azioni, a responsabilità limitata”, are entitled to opt for 
the tax consolidation regime as controlled companies; this reference, however, leaves open the question 
whether companies formed in accordance with foreign company law that are similar to “società per azioni, in 
accomandita per azioni, a responsabilità limitata” formed under Italian company law are entitled to opt for such 
a tax regime as well. 
1639 For instance, in the above-mentioned case Administrative Court of Paris (France), 23 March 2005, case 92-
12625 Société Publi-Union, Revue de Jurisprudence Fiscale (1996), No. 1463, the Court could have concluded 
that the overall context required the interpreter to consider the sums paid to the American publisher for the 
right to use the copyright under American law as paid for the right to use a “droit d’auteur”, for instance by 
arguing that the term “copyright” was used in the English authentic text of the treaty and that its underlying 
concept under American law broadly corresponded to the concept underlying the term “droit d’auteur” under 
French law. In such a way, the Court would have attached relevance to the other contracting State’s domestic 
law, as explicitly mentioned in paragraph 12 of the Commentary to Article 3 OECD Model and embedded in 
the idea of reciprocity underlying treaties. 
PART II: CHAPTER 5            
 
 481 
terms, two main questions arise:  
(i) whether the relevant domestic law meanings are limited to those expressed by 
means of statutory definitions;  
(ii) which are the fields of domestic law where such a quest is to be carried out.  
  
As far as question (i) is concerned, both the English and French official versions of the 
OECD Model seem to suggest that the meaning to be given to undefined legal jargon 
terms is the meaning attributed to such terms when the domestic law of the relevant 
contracting State is applied.1640 Thus, the only relevant question to be answered by the 
interpreter is the following: which is the intension of this term for the purpose of the 
application of the contracting State’s domestic law?  
 To say that the quest for the domestic law meaning should be limited to legal 
definitions in statutes1641 is, from a semantic and logical perspective, meaningless. It is a 
                                                     
1640 The International Tax Group seems to uphold the view that the renvoi encompassed in Article 3(2) OECD 
Model has always be intended as a renvoi to the entire system of legal concepts, rules and principles relevant 
for the purpose of the taxes covered by the treaty (i.e. including those concepts, rules and principles endorsed 
by the case law and practice) and not only to enacted statutes seems; accordingly, in Avery Jones et al., “The 
interpretation of tax treaties with particular reference to article 3(2) of the OECD Model”, British Tax Review 
(1984), 14 et seq. and 90 et seq., at 19, the authors maintain, with regard to the changes made in the English 
and French official versions of article 3(2) between the 1963 OECD Draft and the 1977 OECD Model, that 
“[i]n English the change from “laws … relating to” to “law … concerning” might be construed as a change 
from statute law to law generally but it is unlikely that any change is meaning would be applied” and that “[i[n 
English, laws can sometimes mean statute law but it is often used in the wider sense, as in Halsbury’s Laws of 
England. […] It follows from what is said in the text that we do not accept van Raad’s point that there is a 
change in meaning of the English text, but it is certainly true of the French” (footnote 17). See, apparently 
contrary, F. Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 
2004), p. 484, footnote 1388. 
The French version of the 1963 OECD Draft employed the expression “législation […] régissant”, while the 
1977 version “droit […] concernant”. It is worth noting, in this respect, that the 1963 French version (“le sens 
qui lui est attribué par la législation dudit Etat régissant les impôts faisant l’objet de la Convention”), which 
literally referred to the meaning attributed to the undefined legal jargon terms in the treaty by the statutes 
governing the taxes covered by the treaty, was changed in 1977 and brought in line with the English version, 
most probably in order to avoid speculations with regard to the possible difference of meaning between them. 
The author’s position, in this respect, as it will be expanded in the remainder of the section, is that not much 
weight should be placed on the use of the terms “législation” and “laws”, instead of “droit” and “law” in the 
treaty text, since, on the one hand, such terms are used inconsistently in the OECD Commentary (the English 
official version of the 2010 OECD Commentary to Article 3(2) uses the term “legislation” three times, the term 
“law” three times and the term “laws” three times – a marvelous example of par condicio; the French official 
version, in turn, uses the term “législation” four times, the term “droit” twice and the term “lois” three times) 
and, on the other hand, no meaning may be said to exist without an interpretative process and, therefore, 
without reliance on extra-textual, i.e. extra-statutory, means such as case law, administrative practice and 
scholars’ writings (see G. Tarello, L’interpretazione della legge (Milano: Giuffrè, 1980), Chapter I, in 
particular pp. 24-33, and references therein).  
1641 See, for instance, the following quotations, often interpreted as supporting the above-mentioned approach. 
K. Vogel and R. A. Prokisch, “General Report”, in International Fiscal Association, Cahiers de droit fiscal 
international, Vol. 78a (Deventer: Kluwer, 1993), 55 et seq., at 79: “This means that domestic law may only be 
referred to for the interpretation of words or groups of words, used in the convention. This clause does not 
indicate that one may generally use principles of domestic law in the interpretation of the convention or to 
clarify unclear parts of the convention by reference to domestic law. In the US and Canada this is understood 
in a different way. The clause is understood to refer to the domestic law of the applying state in a general way, 
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false representation of what the interpreter may do (and actually does), caused by a 
misunderstanding of what “meaning” is. The relation between terms and their underlying 
concepts, which is the foundation of the meaning to be attributed to terms, is never 
entirely expressed by means of definitions and, in many cases, it is not at all expressed 
thereby:1642 it necessarily relies on the encyclopedic knowledge of the persons using the 
relevant terms. This implies that, even if the renvoi encompassed in Article 3(2) were 
construed as being limited to the domestic law meanings expressed by means of 
statutory definitions, the renvoi would lead inevitably the interpreter to attribute to the 
treaty terms the meaning expressed by the statutory definitions as supplemented by the 
underlying relevant encyclopedic knowledge, i.e. a meaning that is never entirely 
expressed by virtue of the sole statutory definitions.  
 
This conclusion has the following two corollaries.  
 First, the actual domestic law meaning of statutorily defined terms is not 
established (solely) on the basis of some alleged “dictionary” meanings of the terms used 
in the definition, but mainly on the basis of the meaning attributed by the interpreter to 
the latter terms in light of his background encyclopedic knowledge, which, in the field of 
tax law, is principally made of up case law, administrative positions (rulings and 
circulars) and scholarly writings.1643  
 Second, one is naturally led to ask oneself why, then, the meanings to be attached 
to undefined legal jargon terms in the treaty should be limited to those meanings that are 
expressed by means of statutory definitions, considering that the interpreter in any case 
is compelled to look outside the domestic law definition in order to find the relevant 
meaning. One could counter-argue to the latter inference that, where a definition is at 
stake, the level of legal certainty is higher than in cases where the relevant terms are 
undefined. The author is not convinced by such an argument. Although it is true that 
definitions may help in identifying the prototypical denotata of the defined terms, the 
same result is often achieved by means of case law, administrative positions and 
                                                                                                                                  
including legal principles and legal concepts similar to those used by the convention. But this interpretation 
does not correspond to the wording and context of Article 3(2) MC. The provision is found under the heading 
“General Definitions”; this implies that it is concerned only with the definition of terms and does not refer in a 
general way to groups of legal rules and especially not to relatively unclear legal concepts or traditions.” 
Ibidem, at 80: “Hence if a term is only defined in private law or in the provisions of a tax law that is not 
covered by the convention, references to domestic law are excluded.” 
K. Vogel et al., Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997), 
p. 209, m.no. 62: “Art. 3(2) […] governs no more than the interpretation of words (‘terms’) used in the treaty. 
It provides no justification for reliance on general legal principles or domestic law in interpreting treaty law, or 
for closing loopholes within the treaties by reference to domestic law”.  
K. Vogel et al., Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997), 
pp. 210-211, m.no. 62b: “The law of the State applying the treaty referred to by Art. 3(2) could, if only the 
English version of the [Model Convention] were authoritative, include case law […] The French version’s use 
of ‘droit’ excludes an interpretation of this type, however; ‘law’ (Recht) in the sense of Art. 3(2) includes, 
therefore, only legislative and administrative laws, and other abstract-general rules subordinate to them 
(decrees etc.)”. 
1642 See section 2.3 of Chapter 2 of Part I. 
1643 See the concept of “open texture of law” developed in H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1994), pp. 124-135. 
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scholars’ writings. Moreover, with regard to non-prototypical items, the construction by 
case law, administrative positions and scholar’s writings is as much determinative where 
there are statutory definitions as in the absence thereof. This logical conclusion is 
reinforced by the wording of Article 3(2), which, in its current versions, makes reference 
to “meaning” and “sens”, “law” and “droit”, without employing any terms such as 
“definition”.1644     
 
To sum up, a system of law does not exist without its own case law, practice and 
elaboration by jurists, since the latter constitute a necessary part of the background 
encyclopedic knowledge necessary to attribute meanings to the terms used in the statutes 
that are the foundations of the former. Thus, the reference to domestic law encompassed 
in Article 3(2) OECD Model cannot be seriously intended as a reference to the formal 
legislation (statutes), segregated from its interpretation by judges, practitioners and 
scholars operating within (and for) that legal system. That would not be a reference to 
domestic law, but simply to documents without any generally accepted meaning. If, in 
contrast, the reference were so intended, the purpose of Article 3(2) to make easier and 
more certain the interpretation and application of tax treaties by means of a renvoi to the 
domestic law concepts1645 underlying the undefined legal jargon terms in the treaty 
would be deprived of any effectiveness.1646 Similarly, where the reference was so 
                                                     
1644 The Commentary to Article 3 OECD Model makes reference to domestic law definitions, by stating in 
paragraph 13.1 that “where a term is defined differently for the purposes of different laws of a Contracting 
State, the meaning given to that term for purposes of the laws imposing the taxes to which the Convention 
applies shall prevail over all others, including those given for the purposes of other tax laws” (emphasis 
added). In the context in which such statement is made, however, the verb “to define” appears used as a mere 
synonym of “to be attributed a meaning”, no evidence existing that the OECD intended, by choosing that 
precise term, to convey the idea that only the meanings expressed by means of legal definitions should be taken 
into account.  
In any event, i.e. even where the interpreter considered that a definition of the relevant treaty terms must be 
found in the domestic law of the State applying the treaty, it seems reasonable that such definitions include 
those provided for in other fields of law of that very same State to which income tax law implicitly or 
explicitly, statically or dynamically, refers. See, in this respect, G. Melis, L’interpretazione nel diritto 
tributario (Padova: Cedam, 2003), pp. 143-161, and the vast bibliography therein.  
1645 As previously mentioned, some authors have held that Article 3(2) is just concerned with the definition of 
“terms” and that it has nothing to do with “legal concepts” (see, for instance K. Vogel and R. A. Prokisch, 
“General Report”, in International Fiscal Association, Cahiers de droit fiscal international, Vol. 78a 
(Deventer: Kluwer, 1993), 55 et seq., at 79). However, although it is true that Article 3(2) deals with the 
interpretation of terms, this implies that it concerns the quest for the underlying (domestic legal) concepts that 
must be regarded as corresponding to those terms for the purpose of applying the treaty provisions. See, in this 
respect, the different views expressed by Ward, van Raad and Vogel in J. F. Avery Jones et al., “Interpretation 
of tax treaties”, 40 Bulletin for international taxation (1986), 75 et seq., at 85. 
1646 See R. Sacco, Introduzione al diritto comparato (Torino: UTET, 1992), at 43 et seq., who highlights the 
need to take into account the various substantive sources of law  (“formanti” in the Italian language), such as 
statutes, case law and scholarly writings, in order to figure out the law actually governing in a certain 
jurisdiction; J. Malherbe and R. De Boeck, “The Belgian Experience”, in G. Maisto (ed.), Multilingual Texts 
and Interpretation of Tax Treaties and EC Tax Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2005), 3 et seq., at 14, 
where the authors note that it is sometimes remarkable to see how French and Dutch case law in Belgium “cut 
the Gordian knot of a complex legal (tax) problem in completely different ways, often under the influence of 
differing Walloon and Flemish doctrines”; M. Barassi, “Comparazione giuridica e studio del diritto tributario 
straniero”, in V. Uckmar (ed.), Diritto Tributario Internazionale (Padova: Cedam, 2005), 1499 et seq., at 1509. 
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intended, the application of Article 3(2) would fail, in a significant number of cases, to 
guarantee that the scope of the contracting States’ domestic law charging provisions is 
the same of the corresponding tax treaty relief provisions.  
 Accordingly, Sasseville states that Article 3(2) “does not required (sic) a 
definition, as some commentators and the courts have sometimes suggested. It merely 
requires that the words have a certain meaning under domestic law”1647 and that “[t]he 
word “law” is, of course, sufficiently broad to cover both the legislation and the 
jurisprudence of a Contracting State.”1648 Similarly, Arnolds points out that “[t]he 
meaning of a term under domestic law may include a meaning established by domestic 
courts interpreting the term for domestic purposes in accordance with the applicable 
domestic approach to statutory interpretation.”1649  
 In turn, this implies that, in determining the meaning that a legal jargon term does 
have under the law of the contracting State applying the tax treaty and in supporting his 
conclusion, the interpreter is bound to use the interpretative principles and techniques 
applicable under the (tax) law of that State.1650 In this respect, the International Tax 
Group has convincingly maintained that “[f]inding internal law is something which is 
done in accordance with the rules of interpretation adopted in the State concerned.”1651 
 The case law of national courts and tribunals appears to confirm this construction 
of the renvoi encompassed in Article 3(2).1652 
                                                     
1647 J. Sasseville, “The OECD Model Convention and Commentaries”, in G. Maisto (ed.), Multilingual Texts 
and Interpretation of Tax Treaties and EC Tax Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2005), 129 et seq., at 
134. 
1648 J. Sasseville, “Interpretation of Double Taxation Conventions in Canada: An Update”, 48 Bulletin for 
international taxation (1994), 374 et seq., at 375. See also J. F. Avery Jones et al., “The interpretation of tax 
treaties with particular reference to article 3(2) of the OECD Model”, British Tax Review (1984), 14 et seq. and 
90 et seq., at 19. 
1649 B. Arnold, “The Interpretation of Tax Treaties: Myths and Realities”, 64 Bulletin for international taxation 
(2010), 2 et seq., at 13. 
1650 The author believes that a brief side remark is necessary with regard to his last proposition. The author is 
rather skeptical with regard to the possibility that interpretative principles and techniques might substantially 
change from one jurisdiction to another, since any interpretative exercise consists in the common human 
cognitive activity of attributing meanings to words. Therefore, the difference existing among different 
jurisdictions in that respect (as well as the difference between interpretation under domestic law and 
interpretation under treaty law, or between interpretation under private law and interpretation under criminal 
law) does not lie in which principles and techniques are applied, but in how such principles and techniques are 
actually used and balanced: the different results of the interpretative process are generally due to (and 
supported by a reference to) the different mix of weights that the interpreters attribute to the goals they want to 
achieve and interests they want to enhance or preserve (such as, in the tax law field, the principles of legality, 
non-discrimination, equality, reasonableness, ability to pay and the need to preserve the coherence of the tax 
system and the State’s revenue, as well as the legitimate expectation of the taxpayers). Such a possible 
different mix of weights, of course, may be influenced to a certain extent by the domestic law principles of 
“interpretation”, either established under statutes, or by judicial practice. 
See, in that respect, K. Vogel et al., Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 1997), pp. 33-34, m.nos. 61 and 63; R. Lenz, “Tax Law Interpretation; - International Trends”, 
Rassegna Tributaria (1987), 155 et seq., at 155; B. Arnold, “The Interpretation of Tax Treaties: Myths and 
Realities”, 64 Bulletin for international taxation (2010), 2 et seq., at 14.  
1651 J. F. Avery Jones et al., “The interpretation of tax treaties with particular reference to article 3(2) of the 
OECD Model”, British Tax Review (1984), 14 et seq. and 90 et seq., at 24. 
1652 See, for instance, District Court of Tel Aviv-Yafo (Israel), 30 December 2007, Yanko-Weiss Holdings 




Question (ii) may appear to a large extent irrelevant in practice, since the vast majority 
of undefined treaty terms, or proxies thereof, are used in (and therefore have a meaning 
for the purpose of) the contracting States’ domestic income (or capital) tax law.  
 However, it might be the case that a certain treaty undefined legal jargon term, or 
a proxy thereof, is not used in the domestic income (or capital) tax law of the contracting 
State applying the treaty, although it is used in other fields of domestic law, for instance 
in private law.1653 A prima facie reading of Article 3(2), in this regard, might lead the 
interpreter to conclude that the renvoi to such fields of domestic law is not allowed under 
that article.1654 However, the counter-argument might be put forward that the wording of 
Article 3(2), both in its French and English official versions, is broad enough to allow a 
construction according to which the renvoi can be made to any field of domestic law 
where the undefined treaty term is employed as a legal jargon term, as long as that term 
bears some relevance for the purpose of domestic income tax,1655 for instance because, 
                                                                                                                                  
(1996) Ltd v. Holon Assessing Office, 10 ITLR, 524 et seq., at 544, substantially upholding the interpretative 
nature (for tax treaty purposes) of domestic anti-avoidance provisions; Federal Court of Appeal (Canada), 26 
September 1997, Attorney General of Canada v. William F. Kubicek, 97 DTC 5454, para. 8; Court of Appeal 
of England and Wales (United Kingdom), 9 June 1998, Memec Plc v. IRC, 1 ITLR, 3 et seq., at 14, with regard 
to the meaning to be given to the treaty term “paid to” on the basis of the domestic tax law characterization of 
the partnership receiving the relevant item of income. 
1653 A side question, in this respect, is whether the meaning of the same or similar terms used in European 
Union primary or secondary law might be referred to via Article 3(2) renvoi.  Convincingly, Vogel (see K. 
Vogel et al., Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997), p. 
211, m.no. 62b) and Avella (see F. Avella, “La qualificazione dei redditi nelle Convenzioni internazionali 
contro le doppie imposizioni stipulate dall’Italia”, Rivista di Diritto Tributario. Parte Quinta (2010), 45 et seq., 
at 54; F. Avella, “Il beneficiario effettivo nelle convenzioni contro le doppie imposizioni: prime pronunce nella 
giurisprudenza di merito e nuovi spunti di discussione”, Rivista di Diritto Tributario. Parte Quinta (2011), 14 
et seq., at 22 et seq.; F. Avella, “Using EU Law To Interpret Undefined Tax Treaty Terms: Article 31(3)(c) of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and Article 3(2) of the OECD Model Convention”, World Tax 
Journal (2012), 95 et seq., at 113 et seq.) answer in the affirmative.   
1654 See K. Vogel et al., Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 
1997), p. 210, m.no. 62. At m.no. 62a, Vogel states that “[i]f a term has a meaning only in a field other than 
that of tax law or a meaning under tax law only with respect to taxes not covered by the treaty, Art. 3(2) will be 
inapplicable”. It should be mentioned that a term does not have any meaning in a field of law only where it is 
not employed at all in that field; however, where a certain term (or a proxy thereof) is used in a certain field of 
law, e.g. income tax law, it must have a meaning for the purpose of such field of law, even if that meaning is 
not expressed by means of definition; in the latter case, where the undefined term is attributed a meaning by 
means of implicit renvoi to other fields of law, that term still has a meaning for the purpose of income tax law 
and, therefore, the issue here discussed is irrelevant in that respect. 
1655 Where one of the other tax treaties concluded by the contracting State applying the relevant treaty contains 
a specific definition of term to be interpreted, the issue arises of whether one may refer to the definition in the 
former treaty in order to construe the undefined term of the latter treaty. Theoretically, since the former tax 
treaty is part of the domestic law of the relevant contracting State, one may argue that Article 3(2) of the latter 
treaty allows using the definition encompassed in the former treaty for the purpose of construing an undefined 
legal jargon term of the latter treaty. However, the context of the latter treaty might require a different 
interpretation, due to the bilateral nature of tax treaties and the limited scope of such a treaty definition within 
the legal system of the State applying the treaty (see, accordingly, J. F. Avery Jones et al., “The interpretation 
of tax treaties with particular reference to article 3(2) of the OECD Model”, British Tax Review (1984), 14 et 
seq. and 90 et seq., at 25; F. Avella, “La qualificazione dei redditi nelle Convenzioni internazionali contro le 
doppie imposizioni stipulate dall’Italia”, Rivista di Diritto Tributario. Parte Quinta (2010), 45 et seq., at 55).  
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where it was employed under domestic tax law in a context similar to that in which it is 
used in the tax treaty, it would be most probably attributed that meaning it has under the 
other field of law.  
This appears to be a more sound solution than that to disregard from the outset a 
reference to other fields of domestic law on the basis of the fact that the undefined legal 
jargon term in the treaty, or a proxy thereof, is not currently used in the domestic income 
tax law of the State applying the treaty.1656 For instance, it would appear 
unreasonable1657 not to consider the meaning that terms such as “trademark”, “patent” or 
“design or model” have under the domestic private law of the relevant contracting State 
simply because such terms are not used under its domestic income tax law, for example 
because income received as consideration for the right to use a trademark is taxed under 
that tax law as part of a residual category encompassing all income derived from letting 
other persons to exploit any of the taxpayer’s exclusive rights. 
 The OECD Commentary on Article 3 upholds such position. Commenting on the 
1995 addition to Article 3(2) OECD Model, which reads “any meaning under the 
applicable tax laws of that State prevailing over a meaning given to the term under other 
laws of that State”, the Commentary makes the following statement: “Paragraph 2 was 
amended in 1995 to conform its text more closely to the general and consistent 
understanding of Member States. For purposes of paragraph 2, the meaning of any term 
not defined in the Convention may be ascertained by reference to the meaning it has for 
the purpose of any relevant provision of the domestic law of a Contracting State, 
whether or not a tax law. However, where a term is defined differently for the purposes 
of different laws of a Contracting State, the meaning given to that term for purposes of 
the laws imposing the taxes to which the Convention applies shall prevail over all 
others, including those given for the purposes of other tax laws.”1658 
 In this regard, Engelen points out that, if Article 3(2) were interpreted as meaning 
that the renvoi to domestic law fields other than income (or capital) tax law is not 
allowed, the 1995 addition to Article 3(2) OECD Model, which according to the 
Commentary thereof constitutes a mere clarification, would have no purpose or effect. 
The author thus argues that the principle ut res magis valeat quam pereat leads one to 
assume that, pursuant to Article 3(2), the meaning of any treaty undefined term may be 
ascertained by reference to the meaning that it has for the purposes of any relevant 
                                                     
1656 See the relevance that domestic private law concepts have played in the decision Tax Court (United States), 
16 October 1984, Pierre Boulez v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 83 T.C. 584. 
This case aptly illustrates the additional issue of whether, in a situation where the relevant domestic law 
meaning is looked for in the field of substantive private law, such a domestic law meaning should be the one 
that the relevant term has (i) in the domestic substantive private law of the State applying the treaty, or (ii) in 
the substantive private law of the State to which the relevant private international law rules of the State 
applying the treaty make reference. This question, however, is not one that may be answered in the abstract, 
but just with regard to the specific circumstances of the case. 
1657 This unreasonableness derives from the fact that such a discharge would run contrary to one of the most 
important objects and purposes of Article 3(2), namely that of simplifying the application of tax treaties by 
courts, taxpayers and tax authorities of the contracting States, for whom the respective States’ domestic law 
systems and legal concepts constitute a fundamental part of their encyclopedic knowledge. 
1658 Paragraph 13.1 of the Commentary to Article 3 OECD Model, emphasis added. 
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provision of the domestic law of a contracting State.1659 
  
Finally, a related issue that arises with regard to question (ii) is what the interpreter 
should do where the very same term is (or similar terms are) used in various provisions 
of the domestic law of the State applying the treaty and different meanings are attached 
to such a term for the purpose of these various provisions.  
 A first answer is given by the text of Article 3(2) OECD Model, which, as 
amended in 1995,1660 provides that any meaning under the applicable tax laws of that 
State prevails over the meanings given to the term under other laws of that State. 
Moreover, as previously mentioned, the Commentary to Article 3 OECD Model further 
clarifies that the meaning given to the undefined legal jargon term in the treaty for the 
purpose of the laws imposing the taxes to which the Convention applies prevails even 
over the meanings that the term has for the purposes of other tax laws.  
 However, it may be that the very same term is used in different provisions of the 
very same domestic tax law,1661 but with different meanings. In such a case, it would 
seem reasonable to apply the meaning that is attributed to that term for the purpose of the 
tax law provision that appears to be the most closely connected to, or relevant for, the tax 
treaty provision to be interpreted. In this case, the “overall context”, more than requiring 
a meaning other than the domestic law meaning to be attributed to the undefined legal 
jargon term, would require the most relevant meaning to be applied of the various 
meanings available under the contracting State’s domestic law.1662  
 That said, it must be emphasized that a construction in good faith of the tax treaty 
does not seem to preclude the interpreter from attributing to a treaty term the meaning 
that it has under a domestic field of law other than tax law, where the non-tax law 
meaning appears to be more appropriate than the tax law meaning on the basis of the 
overall context. That could be the case, for instance, where the domestic non-tax law 
meaning is the (general) private law meaning of terms such as employment, enterprise, 
                                                     
1659 F. Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 
2004), pp. 485-486. See, in slightly different terms, J. Sasseville, “Interpretation of Double Taxation 
Conventions in Canada: An Update”, 48 Bulletin for international taxation (1994), 374 et seq., at 375-376. 
1660 With a clarifying intent, according to paragraph 13.1 of the Commentary to Article 3 OECD Model. 
1661 E.g. it may be used twice (with different meanings) in the statute imposing the tax to which the treaty 
applies, or it may be used in two related statutes (with different meanings), both concerning the tax to which 
the treaty applies. 
1662 See, similarly, F. Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law (Amsterdam: IBFD 
Publications, 2004), pp. 487-488, who makes reference to the decision delivered by the Hoge Raad 
(Netherlands) in the case 38461/2003 (Hoge Raad (Netherlands), 12 December 2003, case 38461, BNB 
2004/123). That case concerned a Belgian resident individual who sold shares held in a Netherlands resident 
company back to the company itself. The issue arose of whether the income derived by the Belgian taxpayer 
was to be considered a dividend or a capital gain for the purpose of the 1970 Belgium-Netherlands tax treaty. 
Under the Netherlands Income Tax Act, the difference between the selling price and the cost of acquisition was 
taxied as a capital gain, while under the Netherlands Dividend Withholding Tax Act, the difference between 
the selling price and the average paid-up capital was treated as dividend and thus subject to withholding tax. 
The Hoge Raad argued that, since under Netherlands domestic tax law the withholding tax might be fully 
credited against the tax on the capital gain (and refunded, where exceeded the latter), the income of the Belgian 
resident individual was to be treated as a capital gain for the purpose of the 1970 Belgium-Netherlands tax 
treaty and, therefore, exempted from tax in the Netherlands.  
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or copyright and the tax meaning is a very unusual meaning, expressed by a statutory 
definition introduced after the treaty conclusion and employed in a context far removed 
from the context where the term is used in the tax treaty.  
   
 
5.3.3. Where the context requires otherwise 
5.3.3.1. The context for the purpose of Article 3(2) OECD Model 
 
As previously noted, it is the author’s belief that the context to be taken into account for 
the purpose of Article 3(2) OECD model is the overall context. 
 Since what constitutes the overall context has already been broadly analysed in 
this study, the present section just deals with a few limited issues that, in the author’s 
perspective, may puzzle the tax treaty interpreter. 
 
The first issue arises from the reading of paragraph 12 of the Commentary to Article 1 
OECD Model, which states that “[t]he context is determined in particular by the 
intention of the Contracting States when signing the Convention as well as the meaning 
given to the term in question in the legislation of the other Contracting State (an implicit 
reference to the principle of reciprocity on which the Convention is based)” (emphasis 
added). 
 This statement is misleading since it may appear to put on the same level of 
analysis items that pertain to logically distinct planes:  
(i) the meaning given to the term in question in the legislation of the other 
Contracting State is one of the elements that should be taken into account in order 
to determine the meaning to be attributed to the relevant treaty term, while  
(ii) the intention of the Contracting States when signing the Convention, if 
referring to such a term, is exactly the meaning to be attributed thereto.  
Read from this perspective, while the meaning given to the term in question in the 
legislation of the other Contracting State is actually part of the context, intended as the 
set of all elements and items of evidence that might be relevant in order to determine the 
utterance meaning of the treaty term,1663 the intention of the Contracting States when 
signing the Convention is that utterance meaning and, therefore, cannot be part of the 
context relevant to determine itself.  
 This leads to the conclusion that the phrase the intention of the Contracting States 
when signing the Convention refers to the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole, as 
well as the to the object and purpose of the specific treaty provision where the term to be 
interpreted is employed. 
                                                     
1663 In that perspective, the author wonders why the OECD Committee for Fiscal Affairs decided in 1995 to 
substitute the term “determined” for the term “constituted” in the above sentence of paragraph 12 of the 
Commentary to Article 3 OECD Model (fortunately, the French official version of that paragraph maintained 
the original term “constitué”). What must be determined is the meaning to be attributed to the relevant treaty 
term and the context represents the tool at the disposal of the interpreter to determine such a meaning: it is not 
the tool that has to be determined.   




The second issue concerns the narrow intension that is attributed to the term “context” 
by some scholars.  Engelen, for instance, maintains that the context for the purpose of 
Article 3(2) refers “to the particular context in which a term is used in the treaty. 
Interpreted in this way, the term ‘context’ as used in Article 3(2) comprises the treaty as 
a whole, including the preamble and annexes, as well as its object and purpose, but not 
any means of interpretation extraneous to the treaty.”1664 The author then goes on to 
conclude that, in all events, “any common interpretation that is binding on the parties 
under international law must always prevail over the meaning that the term in question 
has under their domestic laws, regardless of whether the agreement may be regarded as 
‘context’ for the purpose of the application of Article 3(2)” and refers, as examples, to 
any separate agreement related to the tax treaty concluded by the parties and to the tacit 
agreement to interpret and apply the provisions of a tax treaty that are identical to those 
of the OECD Model in accordance the Commentary thereon.1665    
 Although the conclusion reached by Engelen actually widens his first proposition 
about the scope of the term context as used in Article 3(2),1666 it seems to leave outside 
the scope of that term some of the additional elements and items of evidence referred to 
in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT (and, more generally, in the “overall context”), including 
those elements and items of evidence on the basis of which the interpreter may infer that 
the parties have reached an implicit agreement to interpret the tax treaty in accordance 
with the OECD Commentary. One might argue that all those elements and items of 
evidence should be in any case taken into account for the purpose of determining the 
content of the agreement actually reached by the parties, as directly or indirectly required 
by the VCLT. This, however, is tantamount to saying that all possibly relevant elements 
and items of evidence are to be taken into account as part of the context for the purpose 
of Article 3(2).  
 
Third, principles of law and legal doctrines that are, in their fundamental constitutive 
elements, so widespread as to represent “general principles of law recognized by 
civilized nations”1667 are obviously part of the overall context and are, therefore, relevant 
in order to construe tax treaties. Moreover, their general acceptance also makes them 
potentially relevant in order to regulate the relations between the contracting States 
subsequent to the conclusion of the relevant treaty. 
 In this respect, Vogel notes that “[o]ne such principle is the nearly universal rule 
that legal acts undertaken absent good faith are to be disregarded. A more concrete 
version embodied in tax systems of most developed States is that artificial arrangements 
                                                     
1664 See F. Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 
2004), p. 482. 
1665 Ibidem. 
1666 The author questions how the contracting States’ negotiators could have ever agreed to regard the very 
same treaty text as part of the context for the purpose of Article 3(2) and, at the same time, not to regard other 
relevant agreements between them as part of the same context, but, that notwithstanding, to consider such 
agreements decisive in order to determine the meaning of the undefined treaty terms.  
1667 See Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. 
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obviously motivated by tax considerations only and without any reasonable business 
purpose are not recognized under fiscal law: in such cases the ‘substance’ of the 
transaction is considered instead of its legal ‘form’ […]. Being a ‘general legal 
principle’, this rule also governs the legal relations of States with one another. Thus, if a 
State attempts to evade its tax treaty responsibilities, those legal consequences which 
would have resulted from a bona fide legislative construct are considered to have 
occurred instead of the legal consequences brought about by the ‘artificial’ legal 
structure.”1668  
 On the other hand, the general principle mentioned by Vogel should also be taken 
into account by the interpreter when construing the tax treaty, since it is reasonable to 
assume that the contracting States had that principle of law in mind when they concluded 
the treaty and agreed on how the distributive rule articles were to be interpreted. It would 
be difficult, in this respect, to maintain that the application by a contracting State of its 
domestic law general “anti-avoidance” or “substance over form” rule or principle,1669 in 
connection with the application of a tax treaty, would amount to not applying the treaty 
in good faith, or to breaching its treaty obligation, since the very same fact that such a 
domestic law principle or rule reflects a “general principle of law recognized by civilized 
nations” would make it a relevant part of the overall context. To hold the contrary would 
imply the premise that the parties implicitly agreed not to apply such “general principle 
of law recognized by civilized nations” in connection with a tax treaty that should work 
as a link between and interact with their respective tax systems, which in turn are or 
might be based on such a generally accepted principle. Since such a premise seems, at 
least to the author, rather unsound, the burden to convincingly prove this implicit 
agreement should rest fairly with the person invoking that construction.1670    
 
5.3.3.2. The alternative construction required by the context 
 
One of the main issues faced by the interpreter when applying Article 3(2) is to decide 
what alternative constructions of the tax treaty provision under review are suggested by 
the overall context and whether one or more of these constructions should be applied in 
the case at stake instead of the interpretation based on the contracting State’s domestic 
                                                     
1668 K. Vogel et al., Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 
1997), p. 66, m.no. 125b. 
1669 Or even the application of its domestic law specific “anti-avoidance” provisions, as far as they do not go 
beyond the limits of the above-mentioned “general principle” (which is a matter of interpretation to establish). 
1670 See, however, Hoge Raad (Netherlands), 6 December 2002, case 36773, 5 ITLR, 680 et seq., where the 
Court found that no evidence whatsoever existed of a common intention of the contracting States (Belgium and 
the Netherlands) to treat dividends paid to the acquirer of shares as dividends paid to the vendor of those shares 
(by the company whose shares had been sold) for the purpose of applying Article 10 of the 1970 Belgium-
Netherlands tax treaty and, therefore, did not take into account such deemed attribution of dividends, based on 
the Netherlands case law doctrine of just taxation (richtige heffing), for the purpose of interpreting and 
applying Article 10 of the 1970 Belgium-Netherlands tax treaty. For a brief analysis of this decision, see F. 
Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2004), pp. 
497-500. 
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law meaning.  
  
Scholars appear to favor significantly different approaches in this respect. 
 
Some have maintained that domestic law meanings should be used only as last resort and 
that contextual meanings should generally be given precedence.1671 Somewhat similarly, 
the American Law Institute has taken the position that “reference to domestic law 
ordinarily should be made only when other interpretative techniques do not support a 
treaty interpretation”, based on the thesis that such an approach would promote the 
development of uniform interpretations of tax treaty provisions.1672 
 Notably, this position has been upheld notwithstanding the general contrary 
practice of national tax authorities and courts.1673 As Edwardes-Ker noted, although 
courts and tax authorities should search for “contextual meanings”, they rarely do so.1674  
 Moreover, this view has been promoted even though the quest for a uniform 
contextual meaning often leads different interpreters to different “uniform” meanings: 
the hope remains that, although “[t]heir findings may differ […] such differences should 
decrease as contextual meanings are thoroughly researched. The existence of such 
(hopefully decreasing) differences is preferable to forcing a residence State to accept a 
source State’s (possibly incorrect) definitions.”1675  
 The arguments most commonly put forward in order to support this position may 
be summarized as follows:1676  
(i) the reference to the domestic law of one contracting State is a reference to the 
unilateral view of one of the parties on the meaning of a treaty term, while 
treaties should be interpreted according to the common understanding of the 
parties;  
                                                     
1671 See, for instance, J. B. J. Peeters, Internationaal Belastingrecht in Nederland (Amsterdam: L.J. Veen’s 
Uitgeversmaatschappij, 1954), at 138; H. Debatin and O. L. Walter, Handbook on the United States-Germany 
Tax Convention (Amsterdam: IBFD PUblications, 1966 – loose-leaf), at A 5.1.2; G. Tixier, G. Gest and J. 
Kerogues, Droit Fiscal International (Paris: Libraires Techniques, 1979), paras. 414 and 417; M. Edwardes-
Ker, Tax Treaty Interpretation. The International Tax Treaties Service (Dublin: In-Depth, 1994 – loose-leaf), 
at 7.10, 8.10 and 8.14; M. Lang, “Die Bedeutung des originär innerstaatlichen Rechts für die Auslegung von 
Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen (Art. 3 Abs. 2 OECD Musterabkommen)”, in G. Burmester and D. Endres 
(eds.), Außensteuerrecht, Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen und EU-Recht im Spannungsverhältnis: Festschrift 
für Helmut Debatin zum 70. Geburtstag (Munich: Beck, 1997), 283 et seq., at 302 et seq. 
1672 American Law Institute, Federal Income Tax Project. International Aspects of United States Income 
Taxation, II. Proposals on United States Income Tax Treaties (Philadelphia: American Law Institute, 1992), at 
61. 
1673 See, however, the contrary decision in Supreme Administrative Court (Sweden), 23 December 1987, case 
RÅ 1987 ref. 162, Regeringsrättens årsbok (1987) (also reported in summary in IBFD Tax Treaty Case Law 
Database); the decision was taken by a majority of 3 to 2 judges. See also Hoge Raad (Netherlands), 6 
December 2002, case 36773, 5 ITLR, 680 et seq., Opinion of the Advocate General at 701-702, point 3.3; 
ibidem, at 709-719, points 5.5 and 5.6. 
1674 See M. Edwardes-Ker, Tax Treaty Interpretation. The International Tax Treaties Service (Dublin: In-
Depth, 1994 – loose-leaf), at 8.20. 
1675 See ibidem, at 8.20. 
1676 See M. Edwardes-Ker, Tax Treaty Interpretation. The International Tax Treaties Service (Dublin: In-
Depth, 1994 – loose-leaf), at 8.14 and reference therein. 
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(ii) the reference to the domestic law of the contracting States is likely to lead to 
different meanings to be attributed to the same (or corresponding) terms by the 
two contracting States, thus creating instances of double taxation and non-
taxation;  
(iii) domestic law may change, either by means of statutory amendments, or by 
means of the evolution of case law and practice, which may lead the tax treaties 
to be applied in a way unanticipated by and contrasting with the original 
common understanding of the parties;  
(iv) an undefined legal jargon term employed in a tax treaty may correspond, under 
the domestic law of either contracting State, to more than one concept, which 
contributes to increase uncertainty in the application of the treaty;  
(v) the undefined legal jargon term used in the tax treaty might be employed in the 
domestic law of either contracting State in a context and against a background, 
which includes the object and purpose of the provision of which it is a part, 
wholly unrelated, or not sufficiently related to the context and background of 
the tax treaty, thus leading to unsatisfactory results.  
  
Those arguments, however, can be rejected one by one for the following reasons:  
(i) since the parties explicitly agreed that tax treaty terms should be construed on 
the basis of their (unilateral) domestic law meaning, unless the context 
otherwise provides, such (unilateral) domestic law constructions are in 
accordance with the common understanding of the parties; 
(ii) the approach to conflicts of qualification endorsed by the OECD, in the 
Commentary to Article 23 OECD Model, removes the risk of double taxation 
and non-taxation in most cases;  
(iii) the ambulatory construction of treaty terms in accordance with the evolution of 
the domestic law meaning of those terms favors the correspondence between 
domestic charging provisions and treaty relief provisions, as well as the ease of 
application of the treaty; the interpreter remains free to adopt an interpretation 
different from that based on the subsequently modified domestic law meaning 
of the relevant treaty terms, where the former appears unreasonable on the basis 
of the context;  
(iv) the ambiguity of undefined treaty terms under the domestic laws of the 
contracting States is generally matched by their ambiguity where a contextual 
approach is taken, in both cases the analysis of the overall context being capable 
of reducing it; on the contrary, the possible contextual meanings that might be 
arrived at by the interpreter often present a more significant vagueness than the 
corresponding domestic law meanings, since, unless the OECD Commentary 
has taken a position thereon, the former are developed by courts, tax authorities 
and scholars of different States with different legal backgrounds and 
encyclopedic knowledge;  
(v) where the undefined treaty terms are employed, under domestic law, in a 
context and against a legal background wholly unrelated, or not sufficiently 
related, to the context and background of the tax treaty, the interpreter may 
PART II: CHAPTER 5            
 
 493 
adopt an interpretation different from that based on domestic law, arguing that 
the context requires it. 
From this vantage point, the proposition that contextual uniform meanings should be 
applied, as far as possible, in order to construe tax treaties boils down to the proposition 
that, in some cases, it is preferable to apply an interpretation other than that based on the 
domestic law meaning of the undefined treaty terms.  
 Accordingly, some scholars have taken the view that “the context must […] be 
reasonably strong to the internal law meaning to be ousted”,1677 while others have 
maintained that “it is impossible to infer from Art. 3(2) a systematic preference for 
interpretation from the context over interpretation by reference to national law” and that 
“both interpretation procedures must be viewed in mutual reciprocity”.1678  
 
This brief overview of the contrasting positions taken by international tax scholars on the 
matter constitutes enough evidence to support the proposition that, in respect of the 
question whether the context requires an interpretation other than that based on the 
renvoi to the domestic law of the State applying the treaty, the interpreter enjoys a 
significant discretion.  
 Nonetheless, the author considers that, in order to be reasonably grounded, the 
interpreter’s arguments in support of his conclusion should take into account the 
following aspects.      
 
First, one should never lose sight of the fact that tax treaties are made to be interpreted 
and applied by local operators, such as tax practitioners, national courts and tax 
authorities, and not by international lawyers. Currently, the only three systems actually 
employed at the supranational level in order to deal with (and possibly solve) issues 
concerning the interpretation and application of tax treaties are the mutual agreement 
procedure provided for in Article 25 of OECD Model-type tax treaties and, to a much 
lesser extent, the arbitration procedures provided for under some tax treaties1679 and the 
                                                     
1677 J. F. Avery Jones et al., “The interpretation of tax treaties with particular reference to article 3(2) of the 
OECD Model”, British Tax Review (1984), 14 et seq. and 90 et seq., at 108. See similarly C. van Raad, 
“Interpretatie van belastingverdragen”, 47 Maandblad Belasting Beschouwingen (1978), 49 et seq., at 52. 
1678 K. Vogel et al., Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 
1997), p. 214, m.no. 70. See also ibidem, m.no. 71; J. M. Mössner, “Zur Auslegung von 
Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen” in K.-H. Böckstiegel et al. (eds.), Volkerrecht, Recht der Internationalen 
Organisationen, Weltwirtschaftsrecht: Festschrift Für Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern (Köln: Heymann, 1988), 403 
et seq., at 426; B. J. Arnold and M. J. McIntyre, International Tax Primer. Second Edition (The Hague: Kluwer 
Law International, 2002), at 115-116. 
The position taken by Arnold and McIntyre, although also relying on the idea of the mutual reciprocity of the 
two interpretation procedures, appears more neutral than that endorsed by Vogel and the International Tax 
Group. According to the authors, “the words of Article 3(2) do not establish any clear preference for domestic 
law meanings or treaty meanings for undefined terms. In addition, we see no strong policy reason for 
establishing any residual presumption in favour of a domestic or treaty meaning. The meaning of undefined 
terms in a tax treaty should be determined by reference to all of the relevant information and all of the relevant 
context” (see ibidem). 
1679 See, for instance, Article XXVI(6) and (7) of the 1980 Canada-United States tax treaty; Article 29(5) of the 
1992 Netherlands-United States tax treaty; Article 25(5) and (6) of the 1989 Germany-United States tax treaty. 
See also Article 25(5) OECD Model. 
PART II: CHAPTER 5 
 494 
Convention on the elimination of double taxation in connection with the adjustment of 
profits of associated enterprises.1680  
 As more than once noted in the present study, the construction by local operators 
of the undefined legal jargon terms in the treaty on the basis of the meaning they (or 
proxies thereof) have under the domestic law of the State applying the treaty 
significantly enhances the ease of application and the predictability of the interpretation 
of the relevant treaty provisions.1681  
 
Second, the renvoi to domestic law meanings finds an outer limit in the need to prevent 
the interpretation of the relevant treaty provision being absurd or unreasonable1682 in 
light of the overall context.1683 Thus, the effects stemming from the construction of the 
relevant treaty provision cannot contrast with the effects that, on the basis of the overall 
context, the interpreter may reasonably envisage the parties intend those provisions to 
have in the specific case at stake.  
 Therefore, the issue of which should prevail -  the domestic law meaning or a 
conflicting contextual meaning - is not the correct question to be asked. The accurate 
question is, on the contrary, how strong is the indication that may be drawn from the 
overall context that the parties, in the specific case, would agree to attribute a meaning 
other than the domestic law meaning to the relevant undefined treaty term. If such an 
indication is strong enough, i.e. if the interpreter is more persuaded that the parties 
would so agree, rather than not, such other meaning, being the utterance meaning of the 
term, must obviously prevail over the domestic law meaning. The matter, therefore, is 
one of persuasion of the interpreter and capacity thereof to reasonably argue in favor of 
the selected meaning.  
 
Third, the task for the interpreter is rendered more burdensome by the fact that the 
overall context comprises many heterogeneous elements and items of evidence,1684 
                                                     
1680 Done in Brussels on 23 July 1990 (90/436/EEC). 
1681 See S. Bariatti, L’interpretazione delle convenzioni internazionali di diritto uniforme (Padova: Cedam, 
1986), at pp. 170-171, who highlights that the general application of international treaties by national courts 
and tribunals is a factor detrimental to their uniform interpretation.  
1682 I.e. not in good faith. According to Avery Jones, “[c]ontext, in the expression unless the context otherwise 
requires therefore has a wider meaning than in the Vienna Convention, and is important in avoiding the 
inappropriate use of internal law definitions. In Padmore v. IRC ([1989] STC 493) it was argued that a body of 
persons does not include a partnership because there was an internal tax law definition which did not include a 
partnership, but the court held on the basis of the wording of the treaty, which differed from the Model, that the 
context otherwise required, so that the internal law definition should not be used” (J. F. Avery Jones, “United 
Kingdom”, in International Fiscal Association, Cahiers de droit fiscal international, Vol. 78a (Deventer: 
Kluwer, 1993), 597 et seq., at 610). 
1683 See, for instance, Income Tax Appellate Tribunal of Mumbai (India), 1 March 2005, Hindalco Industries 
Ltd v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, 8 ITLR, 1 et seq., at 18, para. 29.1 and at 20, para. 30. 
1684 Such as, for instance, the domestic tax laws of the contracting States in force at the time of the treaty 
conclusion; the current domestic tax law of the other contracting State; the domestic private law of the 
contracting States (both current and in force at the time of the treaty conclusion); the domestic tax law of other 
States member of the OECD; the generally accepted principles of law; the Commentary to the OECD Model 
(both in its current version and in the version existing at the time of the treaty conclusion); other applicable 
rules principle of international law between the contracting States; the object and purpose of the treaty, the 
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generally pointing not at a single meaning, but at a group of meanings that overlap only 
to a limited extent and that are perceived by the interpreter as characterized by different 
levels of relevance. In addition, as mentioned in the first part of the present study, these 
various “contextual” meanings are never clearly shaped, but are always characterized by 
vagueness: they are not purely black and white pictures, but are made up of (i) black and 
white areas, representing the prototypical denotata and non-denotata, and (ii) more or 
less large gray areas, representing items that might be considered by a significant group 
of people as denoted and by another significant group as not denoted by the relevant 
term. These gray areas, in turn, may be darker or lighter, according to whether it is more 
or less generally accepted that the corresponding items are denoted, rather than not 
denoted by the term.  
 Therefore, with regard the specific item at stake in the case faced by the 
interpreter, it is possible that under all possible contextual meanings the item is clearly 
denoted (or not denoted) by the relevant treaty term, but it is equally likely that the item 
is clearly denoted under some and clearly not denoted under the other meanings, or that, 
while being clearly denoted (or not denoted) under some meanings, under the others it is 
doubtful whether it is denoted by the relevant treaty term.  
 The interpreter should thus confront, in the course of his argumentation, the result 
stemming from the solution of this puzzle with that deriving from the attribution of the 
(selected) domestic law meaning to the relevant treaty term and, in the case of conflict, 
supporting the chosen solution on the basis of the relative strength of the opposite items 
of evidence. Obviously, the existence of a clear convergence, under the various 
contextual meanings, on the specific item being denoted (not denoted) by the relevant 
treaty term, which contrasted with the fact that such an item is not denoted (denoted) by 
the same term under the domestic law meaning of the latter, would constitute a strong 
argument for the interpreter to support the conclusion that “the context otherwise 
requires”.1685  
  
Fourth, the interpreter should also assess whether the relevant undefined legal jargon 
term is used in significantly different contexts (i) under the contracting State’s domestic 
law and (ii) under the treaty. In the affirmative case, one might reasonably question 
whether the contracting States intended that domestic law meaning to be applied for the 
purpose of interpreting the treaty and the arguments in favor of the meanings based on 
                                                                                                                                  
context of the provision to be interpreted (including its object and purpose itself and the rules that may 
expressed by other provisions of the treaty); the interpretation of similarly worded tax treaty provisions by the 
courts of other States; etc. 
1685 According to some authors, the burden of proving that the context requires an interpretation different from 
that based on the domestic law meaning should rest with the party invoking the contextual meaning (see J. 
Sasseville, “The OECD Model Convention and Commentaries”, in G. Maisto (ed.), Multilingual Texts and 
Interpretation of Tax Treaties and EC Tax Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2005), 129 et seq., at 134; 
implicitly, J. F. Avery Jones et al., “The interpretation of tax treaties with particular reference to article 3(2) of 
the OECD Model”, in British Tax Review (1984), 14 et seq. and 90 et seq., at 108).  
For a court decision where the “choice” between the domestic law meaning and the contextual meanings is 
explicitly dealt with in terms of onus of proof, see Income Tax Appellate Tribunal of Mumbai (India), 1 March 
2005, Hindalco Industries Ltd v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, 8 ITLR, 1 et seq., at 14, para. 18. 
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the overall context would gain relative weight.  
 The Hoge Raad (the Netherlands), for example, has endorsed the view that 
domestic law meanings should not be used in order to construe undefined legal jargon 
terms in a treaty where those terms are used in a different context under domestic law. In 
particular, in the case 37024/20031686 the Court maintained that, since the expression 
“[being] present”, as used in Article 15 of the 1991 Netherlands-Nigeria tax treaty, was 
neither defined in that treaty, nor used in any similar context under Netherlands domestic 
tax law, such an expression was to be construed in accordance with the rules of 
interpretation provided for in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT.  
 Similarly, according to Engelen, it is reasonable to assume that the contracting 
States intended the renvoi to their domestic law provisions to apply only in so far as 
those provisions are relevant for the purpose of the interpretation of the treaty provisions 
concerned, which in turn implies that the undefined treaty terms are to be used under the 
contracting States’ domestic law in a context similar to the one in which they are 
employed in the tax treaty.1687 
 
The array of instances where the interpreter must evaluate whether the context requires 
an interpretation different from the one based on the domestic law meaning of the 
relevant undefined treaty terms is almost endless.1688  
 Some cases, however, require a brief analysis due to their frequency and 
relevance for the subject of the present study.  
 
A first instance concerns the case where the legal jargon terms used in the authentic text 
drafted in the official language of the State applying the treaty are followed (generally 
within parenthesis) by the corresponding legal jargon terms used (alone) in another 
authentic text.1689 In this case, it might be reasonably argued that the context requires an 
                                                     
1686 Hoge Raad (Netherlands), 21 February 2003, case 37024, 5 ITLR, 818 et seq., at 876, para. 3.5. See, 
similarly, Hoge Raad (Netherlands), 21 February 2003, case 37011, BNB 2003/177. 
1687 See F. Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 
2004), p. 487. 
1688 See, for instance, High Court (Ireland), 31 July 2007, Kinsella v. Revenue Commissioners, 10 ITLR, 63 et 
seq., at 79-81; High Court (Ireland), 24 June 1994, Travers v. O’Siochain, The Irish Reports (1994), 199 et 
seq.; Supreme Court (Denmark), 4 February 2003, Halliburton Company Germany Gmbh v. Ministry of 
Taxation, 5 ITLR, 784 et seq., at 813; See Federal Court of Appeal (Canada), 4 February 2004, Beame v. R, 6 
ITLR, 767 et seq., at 775, para. 25; Court of Appeal of England and Wales (United Kingdom), 21 February 
2007, UBS AG v, Revenue and Customs Commissioners, 9 ITLR, 767 et seq., paras. 71 and 74. See also The 
relevance attributed by Hemmelrath to the type and intensity of the economic ties typically existing between 
the business activity of an enterprise and the State where it has a permanent establishment in order to support 
the conclusion that the terms “business profits” and “enterprise” (as well as the corresponding terms employed 
in the authentic texts drafted in languages other than English) should be interpreted autonomously and not by 
reference to the domestic law of the contracting State applying the treaty, since the application of the domestic 
law meaning “would bring about inappropriate results” (see A. Hemmelrath in K. Vogel et al., Klaus Vogel on 
Double Taxation Conventions (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997), pp. 406-407, m.nos. 23-26; 
contra F. Wassermeyer, in H. Debatin and F. Wassermeyer (eds.), Doppelbesteuerung: DBA (Munich: Beck, 
1997 – loose-leaf), at m.n. 16a to Article 7). 
1689 See Article 3(1)(a) of the 1999 Italy-United States tax treaty, where the term “associazione commerciale” is 
followed by the term “(trust)” in the Italian authentic text. 
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interpretation different from that based on the domestic law meaning of the terms used in 
the authentic text drafted in the language of the contracting State applying the treaty, e.g. 
an interpretation based on the meaning that the terms in parenthesis have under the 
domestic law of the States using them, which might or might not be the other contracting 
State.1690  
 Similarly, the use in one authentic text of a term different from the corresponding 
legal jargon term commonly employed under the domestic law of the State in whose 
official language that authentic text is drafted may sometimes be regarded, if matched by 
other contextual elements, as evidence of the parties’ intention to attribute to the former 
term a wider, or narrower, intension than the one the latter term has under that 
contracting State’s domestic law.1691 
 
Another case concerns situations where, under the relevant domestic tax law, a fine 
distinction exists between two (or more) terms (assume terms “A” and “B”) with similar 
functions and a similar or neighboring scope, one of which (“A”) is actually employed in 
the tax treaty to be construed. In such a case, the interpreter might argue that the analysis 
of the overall context leads to the conclusion that treaty term “A” should be given a 
meaning wider than the meaning that it has under the domestic law of the State applying 
the treaty, so as to include the meaning that term “B” has under that law.1692 
                                                     
1690 A fortiori the “contextual meaning” may be suggested by the meaning of the corresponding legal jargon 
terms under the law of the other contracting State where the term used in the authentic treaty text drafted in the 
official language of the State applying the treaty is not a legal jargon term (see Gomi and Ozawa, Explanation 
Article by Article of the Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty (nichibei sozei joyaku chikujo kaisetsu) (1979), p. 71, cited in J. 
F. Avery Jones et al., “The interpretation of tax treaties with particular reference to Article 3(2) of the OECD 
Model”, British Tax Review (1984), 14 et seq. and 90 et seq., at 53-54). 
1691 See, with regard to the use of the term “alienation” in Article 13 OECD Model, Federal Court (Australia), 
20 August 1997, Commissioner of Taxation v. Lamesa Holdings BV, [1997] FCA 785; J. F. Avery Jones et al., 
“The Origins of Concepts and Expressions used in the OECD Model and their Adoption by States”, 60 Bulletin 
for international taxation (2006), 220 et seq., at 249-250. See also the use, in the Italian authentic text of the 
Italian OECD Model-based tax treaties, of the terms “Redditi immobiliari” in the title and “beni immobili” in 
the corpus of Article 6, while the legal jargon term used under Italian income tax law, i.e. “redditi fondiari”, is 
never used in the treaty text; one sensible explanation of this terminological choice is that the contracting State 
intended Article 6 of the treaty to have a wider scope than that of “redditi fondiari” under Italian law. 
1692 See, similarly, M. Edwardes-Ker, Tax Treaty Interpretation. The International Tax Treaties Service 
(Dublin: In-Depth, 1994 – loose-leaf), at 8.16, criticizing the exaggerated attention paid by Franklyn J. of the 
Western Australia Supreme Court and Sheppard L.J. and Lee L.J of the Australia Full Federal Court in the 
Thiel case to the distinction existing under Australian income tax law between the terms “carry on” and “carry 
out” for the purpose of interpreting the expressions “an enterprise carried on by a resident” and “the enterprise 
carries on business”, as used in Articles 3(1)(f) and 7(1) of the 1980 Australia-Switzerland tax treaty. 
Edwardes-Ker notes that this very same approach was taken by the Australia High Court, who reversed the 
decision of the above-mentioned lower courts (see High Court (Australia), 22 August 1990, Thiel v. 
Commissioner of Taxation, 171 Commonwealth Law Reports, 338 et seq.). See also Hoge Raad (Netherlands), 
18 September 1985, case 22926, BNB 1985/333, with regard to the need to apply Article 16 of the 1970 
Belgium-Netherlands tax treaty also to payments made to a Belgian resident company in its capacity as 
director of a Netherlands resident “besloten vennootschap met beperkte aansprakelijkheid” (“BV”), 
notwithstanding the fact that the Dutch authentic text of that article made exclusive reference to directors of 
resident “naamloze vennootschappen” (“NV”). See, similarly, R. C. Palma, “Income Taxation of Intellectual 
and Industrial Property and Know-How: Conundrums in the Interpretation of Domestic and Treaty Law”, 44 
European Taxation (2004), 480 et seq., with regard to whether the term “droit d’auteur” employed in Article 
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Finally, it is generally agreed that the context may require not attributing the current 
domestic law meaning to the relevant undefined treaty terms in situations where the 
domestic law meaning has changed after the treaty conclusion.1693  
 According to paragraph 12 of the Commentary to Article 3 OECD Model,1694 the 
ambulatory renvoi to the contracting States’ domestic law “applies only if the context 
does not require an alternative interpretation. The context is determined in particular by 
the intention of the Contracting States when signing the Convention as well as the 
meaning given to the term in question in the legislation of the other Contracting State”. 
Paragraph 13 then continues: “Consequently, the wording of paragraph 2 provides a 
satisfactory balance between, on the one hand, the need to ensure permanency of 
commitments entered into by States when signing a convention (since a State should not 
be allowed to make a convention partially inoperative by amending afterwards in its 
domestic law the scope of terms not defined in the Convention) and, on the other hand, 
the need to be able to apply the Convention in a convenient and practical way over time 
(the need to refer to outdated concepts should be avoided).”1695 
 Scholars have pointed out in this respect that the qualifying expression “unless 
the context otherwise requires” might constitute “an important limitation on the power of 
one of the contracting States to alter radically the application of its treaties by amending 
the definitions in its internal law, even if Article 3(2) is to have ambulatory effect.”1696 
                                                                                                                                  
12 of OECD-type tax treaties (or the corresponding terms used under the laws of other civil law countries and 
in their tax treaties) should be construed as also denoting those rights that under French private law are not, 
strictly speaking, denoted by such a legal jargon term, but by the term “droit voisin”, for the example the right 
of actors to authorize the reproduction of the movies in which they acted (see, in this respect, their explicit 
inclusion under Article 12(3) of the 1994 France-United States tax treaty and their implicit inclusion in the 
scope of Article 12 OECD Model, as resulting from paragraph 18 of the Commentary to Article 12 OECD 
Model; see, apparently in accordance, Risoluzione n. 12/E of 9 February 2004 issued by the Italian Agenzia 
delle Entrate, although with regard to the 1992 Italy-Germany tax treaty, which extends the treatment provided 
for royalties to “similar payments”). 
1693 These cases also offer the chance to illustrate that the meaning required by the overall context is not always 
a uniform meaning, but may be different for the two contracting States. In fact, where the interpreter finds that 
the application of the domestic law meaning, as amended after the treaty conclusion, for the purpose of 
construing the relevant treaty provision, would lead to a substantial alteration of the original allocation of 
taxing rights between the contracting States, he then often concludes that the domestic law meaning in force at 
the time of the treaty conclusion should apply instead of the current one. Such a meaning, however, although 
being a “contextual” meaning in the sense of Article 3(2) OECD Model, may be different with regard to the 
two contracting States, since it consists of the meaning that the relevant treaty term had under the law of each 
contracting State at the time of the treaty conclusion.   
1694 As amended in 1995. 
1695 See also paragraph 52 of the Commentary to Article 25 OECD Model, which seems to suppor the view that 
where subsequent domestic law changes shift the originally agreed allocation of taxing rights between the 
parties, the context requires such domestic law changes to be disregarded for the purpose of construing 
undefined legal jargon terms in the treaty.  
1696 D. A. Ward, “The Income Tax Conventions Interpretation Act,” in Report of Proceedings of the Thirty-
Fifth Tax Conference, 1983 Conference Report (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1984), 602 et seq., at 609. 
See, similarly, M. Edwardes-Ker, Tax Treaty Interpretation. The International Tax Treaties Service (Dublin: 
In-Depth, 1994 – loose-leaf), at 9.05. At 9.11; F. Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International 
Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2004), p. 490; P. J. Wattel and O. Marres, “Characterization of Fictitious 
Income under OECD-Patterned Tax Treaties”, 43 European Taxation (2003), 66 et seq., at 66, 74 and 79 
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 National courts and tribunals have also generally upheld this position.1697 
 
There are, however, cases where, although the attribution to the relevant treaty term of a 
domestic law meaning modified after the treaty conclusion leads to a change of the 
original allocation of taxing rights, the interpreter might reasonably argue that the 
context does not require a different meaning to be applied.   
 For instance, the fact that both contracting States, after the conclusion of the 
treaty, have modified their domestic laws by introducing substantially equivalent legal 
rules or principles, might be referred to in order to support the conclusion that the 
attribution of the current domestic law meaning (reflecting such a newly introduced rule 
or principle) to a treaty term, although significantly modifying the original allocation of 
taxing rights, does not run counter to a good faith construction of the treaty, since the 
change in the allocation of taxing rights is in this case reciprocal and, may be, almost 
symmetrical. On the one hand, although it is true that the parties could have not (and 
probably did not) forecast the introduction of such a rule or principle at the time of the 
treaty’s conclusion, nonetheless they anticipated the possibility that changes in their 
domestic law could affect the treaty when they included Article 3(2) therein. On the 
other hand, the reciprocity of the changes in the application of the treaty provisions1698 
allows the sensible inference that such changes are agreed upon by both parties.1699 
Moreover, the interpretation and application of the relevant treaty provision in light of 
the new domestic law rule or principle, for a certain period of time, by both contracting 
States might be seen as evidence of the subsequent practice in the application of the 
treaty, which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation under 
Article 31(3)(b) VCLT. 
 An analogous argument might be put forward where the rule or principle 
subsequently introduced by a contracting State conforms to a rule or principle already in 
                                                                                                                                  
(although in respect of the more limited subject of the fictitious income provisions made in the contracting 
States’ domestic law after the conclusion of the treaty); J. F. Avery Jones, “The interaction between tax treaty 
provisions and domestic law”, in G. Maisto (ed.), Tax Treaties and Domestic Law (Amsterdam: IBFD 
Publications, 2006), 123 et seq., at 133; J. F. Avery Jones et al., “The interpretation of tax treaties with 
particular reference to article 3(2) of the OECD Model”, British Tax Review (1984), 14 et seq. and 90 et seq., at 
47-48; J. F. Avery Jones et al., “Interpretation of tax treaties”, 40 Bulletin for international taxation (1986), 75 
et seq., at 85 per Sir Ian Sinclair. 
1697 See, for instance, Hoge Raad (Netherlands), 5 September 2003, cases 37651 and 37670, in BNB 2003/379 
and 2003/381; Hoge Raad (Netherlands), 5 September 2003, case 37657, BNB 2003/380. For a comment of 
the relevant aspects of these decisions, see F. Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law 
(Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2004), pp. 491-497 and 501-502).  
1698 Such changes should not be regarded as changes to the treaty, since the treaty provided from the outset for 
the possibility of prospective changes in the effects of its application, due to changes in the underlying 
domestic laws. 
1699 See the somewhat similar reasoning in K. van Raad, “Additions to Article 3(2) (Interpretation) and 24 
(Non-Discrimination) of the 1992 OECD Model and Commentary”, 20 Intertax (1992), 671 et seq., at 674; F. 
Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2004), pp. 
494-495; . P. J. Wattel and O. Marres, “Characterization of Fictitious Income under OECD-Patterned Tax 
Treaties”, 43 European Taxation (2003), 66 et seq., at 66, 74 and 79. See, however, contra M. Lang, 
““Fictitious Income” and tax treaties”, in H. van Arendonk, F. Engelen and S. Jansen (eds.), A Tax Globalist. 
Essays in honour of Maarten J. Ellis (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2005), 34 et seq., at 41-42. 
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force in the other contracting State at the time of the treaty conclusion.    
 Similarly, the fact that, after the conclusion of the treaty, a certain rule or 
principle of law has become widespread in the domestic tax law systems of developed 
States (other than the contracting States),1700 could be relied upon by the interpreter in 
order to argue that the context does not require attributing to the relevant treaty term a 
meaning different from the one it has under the contracting State’s domestic law, as 
modified after the treaty conclusion in order to incorporate the above-mentioned rule or 
principle.  
 Lastly, one might even argue that, where only one contracting State has 
subsequently introduced in its domestic law a legal rule or principle that, if referred to 
for the purpose of interpreting the tax treaty, would lead to a substantial change in the 
original allocation of taxing rights between the parties, such a rule or principle might 
nevertheless be referred to for the purpose of construing undefined legal jargon terms on 
the basis of Article 3(2) where the above-mentioned contracting State has actually 
construed the treaty in such a way for a sufficiently long period of time and the other 
contracting State has never protested, therefore silently acquiescing, or has explicitly 
endorsed that interpretation.1701  
 
5.4. Specific tax treaty definitions that refer to domestic law 
 
Apart from Article 3(2), other provisions of OECD Model-based tax treaties refer, 
explicitly or implicitly, to the domestic law of the contracting States in order to interpret 
legal jargon terms. This section briefly analyses such further references and, where 
relevant, assesses the analogies and differences with the renvoi encompassed in Article 
3(2). 
 
Under Article 3(1)(b), the term “company” is defined as denoting also “any entity that is 
treated as a body corporate for tax purposes”, i.e. by means of an implicit reference to 
domestic tax law.  
 Interestingly, paragraph 3 of the Commentary to Article 3 OECD Model provides 
that the term company “covers any taxable unit which is treated as a body corporate 
according to the tax laws of the Contracting State in which it is organised”. One may 
argue that such a clarification by the Commentary falls short in that the term “company”, 
bearing a special relevance for the purpose of applying Articles 5(7), 10 and 16 OECD 
Model, where it is further qualified by the term “resident”, should include any entity 
treated as body corporate for tax purposes under the law of the contracting State of 
which it is a treaty resident, regardless of the private or company laws under which it is 
organized.  
 This renvoi appears to be ambulatory, due to the strict link between “company” 
                                                     
1700 This argument would also hold true, a priori, where such a rule or principle was already widespread in the 
domestic tax law systems of developed States at the time of the treaty conclusion. 
1701 See, similarly, K. Vogel et al., Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 1997), p. 67, m.no. 126.   
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and “resident” under Articles 5(7), 10 and 16 the OECD Model and the fact that the term 
“resident”, under Article 4 OECD Model, is defined by means of an ambulatory 
reference to the contracting States’ domestic law (see below). 
 
Article 3(1)(g)(ii) OECD Model defines “national”, in relation to a contracting State, as 
any legal person, partnership or association deriving its status as such from the “laws” in 
force in that contracting State. 
 The overall context suggests that the reference is intended to be to the private or 
company law of the relevant contracting State, i.e. the law that confer to such bodies of 
person their existence and status. 
 Moreover, it seems reasonable to conclude that the reference to such a law should 
be ambulatory, since it would not make sense to denote as nationals, for the purpose of 
the treaty, bodies of person that no longer derive their status as such from the domestic 
law of the relevant contracting State. This conclusion is further supported by the fact 
that, until 1992, the definition of “national” was included in Article 24 OECD Model, 
which requires an ambulatory approach in order to tackle discrimination caused by later 
changes occurred in the domestic laws of the contracting States.   
 The above comments apply, by analogy, to the implicit reference to the 
contracting States’ laws on the acquisition or loss on nationality or citizenship 
encompassed in Article 3(1)(g)(i) OECD Model.1702  
  
Article 4(1) OECD Model provides that, for the purposes of the relevant treaty, “the term 
"resident of a Contracting State" means any person who, under the laws of that State, is 
liable to tax therein by reason of his domicile, residence, place of management or any 
other criterion of a similar nature, and also includes that State and any political 
subdivision or local authority thereof”.1703  
 The explicit reference to the contracting State’s domestic laws in the first 
sentence appears intended to refer to the domestic tax laws to which the treaty applies, 
on the basis of (i) the reference to the person’s liability to tax in that State, (ii) the overall 
structure of the OECD Model and (iii) the role played by the term “resident” within the 
various distributive rule articles. On the other hand, the reference to the State and its 
political subdivisions and local authorities encompassed in the second sentence implies a 
renvoi to the constitutional and administrative laws of that State.  
 In both cases, the reference to the contracting State’s domestic law should be 
regarded as ambulatory, since “[i]t would be impossible to apply the treaty to people 
who were or were not resident under a definition which was no longer applicable”,1704 as 
                                                     
1702 See also paragraph 8 of the Commentary to Article 3 OECD Model.  
1703 For a case where the court decided that the term “resident” was to be interpreted in accordance with 
domestic tax law, although the treaty contained a definition thereof departing from such law, see High Court of 
Justice of England and Wales (United Kingdom), 1 March 1982, IRC v. Exxon Corporation, [1982] STC 356. 
This case is commented on, and strongly criticized, with reference to the application by Goulding J. of the 
principle of effectiveness in order to give effect to the intended purpose of the relevant treaty provision, in M. 
Edwardes-Ker, Tax Treaty Interpretation. The International Tax Treaties Service (Dublin: In-Depth, 1994 – 
loose-leaf), at 6.04.  
1704 See J. F. Avery Jones et al., “The interpretation of tax treaties with particular reference to article 3(2) of the 
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well as to political subdivisions and local authorities no longer existing under the 
relevant contracting State’s domestic law.  
 
Under Article 6 OECD Model, the term "immovable property" has, in the first place, 
“the meaning which it has under the law of the Contracting State in which the property 
in question is situated.”1705 
 In this respect, the International Tax Group seems to uphold the view that the 
renvoi is intended to the general law of the contracting State in which the property is 
situated.1706 However, one may argue that evidence exists to support the view that the 
reference should be intended primarily to be to the domestic tax law of that State. First, a 
contextual analysis shows that, in the very same Article 6(2), a reference is specifically 
made to “general law”1707 in order to include in the intension of “immovable property” 
the rights to which the provisions of private law concerning landed property apply. 
Moreover, the tax treaty practice of certain States seems to point to the same conclusion. 
Under certain Canadian tax treaties, for example, the immovable property article makes 
reference to “real property” in the English authentic text and to “biens immeubles” in the 
French authentic text.1708 Since “real property” and “biens immeubles” do have the same 
meaning under Canadian tax law, but they have different meanings under Canadian 
general law,1709 the only construction removing the potential divergence of meaning 
would appear to be that based on a renvoi to Canadian domestic tax law.   
 No clear evidence, other than that referred to with regard to Article 3(2) OECD 
Model, seems to exist in favor of the static or ambulatory nature of the renvoi 
encompassed in Article 6.  
 
Article 10(3) OECD Model provides that the term "dividends", for the purpose of Article 
10, includes income from “other corporate rights which is subjected to the same taxation 
treatment as income from shares by the laws of the State of which the company making 
the distribution is a resident”. 
 The strict context, in this case, clearly suggests that the renvoi is intended to the 
                                                                                                                                  
OECD Model”, British Tax Review (1984), 14 et seq. and 90 et seq., at 34. 
1705 See Article 6(2) OECD Model. 
1706 See J. F. Avery Jones et al., “The interpretation of tax treaties with particular reference to article 3(2) of the 
OECD Model”, British Tax Review (1984), 14 et seq. and 90 et seq., at 35. 
1707 “Droit privé” in French.  
1708 E.g. Article VI of the 1980 Canada-United States tax treaty, where however the term “real property” is 
explicitly given the meaning it does have under the “taxation” laws of the State where it is situated; Article 6 of 
the 1980 Australia-Canada tax treaty, as amended by the 2002 protocol (before the amendment there was no 
reference to domestic law in Article 6, so that Article 3(2) applied directly and the tax law meaning was 
adopted for interpretation purposes; it is doubtful whether the contracting States wanted to change such a 
renvoi to the domestic tax law by means of the insertion of the reference to the domestic law directly in Article 
6, since the overall changes made by the protocol seem more oriented to bring into operation the “standard” 
Canadian treaty definition of “immovable/real” property); Article 6 of the 1980 Canada-New Zeeland tax 
treaty; Article 6 of the 1987 Canada-Papua New Guinea tax treaty, where however the “real property” is 
explicitly given the meaning it does have under the “taxation” laws of the State where it is situated. 
1709 See J. F. Avery Jones et al., “The interpretation of tax treaties with particular reference to article 3(2) of the 
OECD Model”, British Tax Review (1984), 14 et seq. and 90 et seq., at 35. 
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domestic tax law of the State of residence of the distributing company (i.e. the laws 
concerning the taxes to which the treaty applies).  
 In contrast, no clear evidence, other than those referred to with regard to Article 
3(2) OECD Model, seems to exist in favor of the static or ambulatory nature of this 
renvoi. 
 
Under Article 11(6) OECD Model, where the amount of the interest payments between 
related parties is not at arm’s length, the excess part of the payments “shall remain 
taxable according to the laws of each Contracting State, due regard being had to the 
other provisions of [the treaty]”. 
 Also in this case, the strict context of the provision supports the view that the 
reference should be regarded as made to the relevant “tax laws” of the contracting States 
(i.e. the laws concerning the taxes to which the treaty applies).  
 For the same reason, it seems reasonable to conclude that the renvoi has an 
ambulatory nature, since the excess part of the payments may “remain taxable” only 
“according to the laws of each contracting State” in force in the relevant tax year.  
 With regard to Article 11 OECD Model, it is also interesting to note that 
paragraph 21 of the Commentary thereto states that “[i]t has seemed preferable not to 
include a subsidiary reference to domestic laws in the text; this is justified by the 
following considerations: […] b) the formula employed offers greater security from the 
legal point of view and ensures that conventions would be unaffected by future changes 
in any country's domestic laws”. This statement seems to imply that a reference to 
domestic law, where included, would have been regarded as ambulatory in nature.1710 
 
Article 12(4) OECD Model provides for a rule similar, in all relevant respects, to that 
encompassed in Article 11(6) OECD Model. Thus, the comments made in relation to the 
latter apply, by analogy, to the former. 
 
In Article 23 OECD Model, no reference is made to the contracting States’ domestic 
law. However, as paragraph 60 of the Commentary to Article 23 OECD Model points 
out with regard to the credit method provision, “[a] number of conventions […] contain 
a reference to the domestic laws of the Contracting States and further provide that such 
domestic rules shall not affect the principle laid down in Article 23 B”. 
 This statement has been interpreted, correctly according to the author, as implying 
that the reference to the domestic credit method rules should be regarded as ambulatory 
and that, in any case, subsequent domestic law changes should not be taken into account 
where affecting the principle laid down in the treaty article.1711 
                                                     
1710 See, accordingly, See J. F. Avery Jones et al., “The interpretation of tax treaties with particular reference to 
article 3(2) of the OECD Model”, British Tax Review (1984), 14 et seq. and 90 et seq., at 36. 
1711 See J.F. Avery Jones et al., “The interpretation of tax treaties with particular reference to article 3(2) of the 
OECD Model”, British Tax Review (1984), 14 et seq. and 90 et seq., at 37. See also the decision of the 
Supreme Court (Canada) in the Interprovincial  Pipe Line Company case, where the Court, with specific 
reference to the interpretation of article XV of the 1942 Canada-United States tax treaty, according to which, 
“[a]s far as [might] be in accordance with the provisions of the Income Tax Act”, Canada agreed to allow a 
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Finally, the various references to the domestic (tax and other) laws of the contracting 
States in the treaty articles dealing with mutual agreement procedures, exchange of 
information and assistance in the collection of taxes should be regarded as made to the 
rules and principles of law in force at the time of their application, due to the essentially 
procedural and administrative nature of such articles.1712 
 
With regard to the above implicit and explicit references to the contracting States’ 
domestic law, Edwardes-Ker1713 expresses the view that they are justified, from a policy 
perspective, by the fact that the use of the domestic law meaning in such cases is 
axiomatic,1714 necessary,1715 or helpful.1716 As a consequence, in these cases the context 
does not generally require a different meaning to apply.  
 He also adds that, “if a tax treaty is to remain effective, these meanings must 
normally be those current at the time a dispute arises – and not those originally 
applicable when this tax treaty was first concluded. It must be presumed that this was the 
original intention of the parties.”1717   
 
To conclude, it is worth noting that while the rules of interpretation provided for in 
Article 3(1) and 3(2) OECD Model explicitly establish that the domestic law meanings 
must be applied unless the context otherwise requires, other rules, in particular those 
encompassed in Articles 4(1), 6(2) and 10(3) OECD Model, do not. 
 One might infer, from the presence in the former and the absence in the latter 
provisions of a reference to the context requiring a different interpretation, that with 
regard to the latter the drafters intended to apply the domestic law meaning without 
exception. With regard to Article 6(2) and 10(3), this construction may find further 
support in the narrow scope of such a renvoi, which might be considered to be limited to 
Articles 6 and 10,1718 as well as to the few other articles that explicitly refer thereto.1719 
                                                                                                                                  
credit for the income tax levied by the United States at source, stated that the effect of that article “was to 
establish mutual covenant to apply as between each country whatever foreign tax credit provision the 
respective domestic laws of each country might from time to time adopt” (see Supreme Court (Canada), 1 April 
1968, Interprovincial Pipe Line Company v. R., [1968] SCR 498 - emphasis added).  
1712 See, the similar conclusion reached, in respect of Article 26 OECD Model, by J.F. Avery Jones et al., “The 
interpretation of tax treaties with particular reference to article 3(2) of the OECD Model”, British Tax Review 
(1984), 14 et seq. and 90 et seq., at 38. 
1713 See M. Edwardes-Ker, Tax Treaty Interpretation. The International Tax Treaties Service (Dublin: In-
Depth, 1994 – loose-leaf), at 8.01-8.06 and 9.07. 
1714 For instance, with regard to terms “nationality” and “citizenship” employed in Article 3(1)(g)(i) OECD 
Model and the terms “political subdivision” and “local authority” used in Article 4 OECD Model. 
1715 For instance, with regard to the terms “domicile”, “residence” and “place of management” used in Article 4 
OECD Model.  
As a matter of fact, Edwardes-Ker does not refer to these terms employed in Article 4 OECD Model, but 
simply to “residence”, which however is the term defined therein; the reference therefore seems intended to the 
terms used to define “residence” by means of a renvoi to the domestic law of the relevant contracting State. 
1716 For instance with regard to the term “immovable property” employed in Article 6 OECD Model. 
1717 See M. Edwardes-Ker, Tax Treaty Interpretation. The International Tax Treaties Service (Dublin: In-
Depth, 1994 – loose-leaf), at 9.07. 
1718 See the wording of Article 10(3): “the term “dividends” as used in this article means”. 
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Edwardes-Ker, in this respect, maintains that the definitions employed in the OECD 
Model that make explicit reference to the domestic laws of the contracting State “do not 
provide that these domestic definitions are not to apply “where the context otherwise 
requires” – precisely because this tax treaty context does not require them to apply.”1720  
 However, an approach that rejects in advance the possibility that the overall 
context might require an interpretation different from the one stemming from the 
application of the contracting States’ domestic law meaning appears to be over-rigid, 
since it eliminates from the outset an interpretative tool that might be helpful in order to 
construe the tax treaty provisions in a reasonable manner,1721 especially in cases where 
the domestic law of the relevant State had gone through drastic changes that the parties 
could not have plausibly anticipated.1722 In this respect, it would seem adequate to just 
require a severe burden of proof to be satisfied in order for a meaning other than the 
domestic law meaning to apply. Moreover, as the treaty definitions referring to the 
domestic law of the contracting States are also often made up of other undefined terms, 
which in turn must be construed either in accordance with Article 3(2), if legal jargon 
terms, or solely in accordance with the rules encompassed in Articles 31-33 VCLT, if 
non-legal jargon terms, the influence of the overall context on the construction of 
defined treaty terms in any case will remain great.1723 
 
5.5. The role of the renvoi to domestic law in the interpretation of multilingual tax 
treaties  
 
5.5.1. The right to rely on a single text: the relevance of the authentic text drafted in 
                                                                                                                                  
1719 E.g. Articles 13(1) and 21(2) OECD Model, which both refer to the definition of “immovable property” 
provided for in Article 6(2) OECD Model. 
1720 M. Edwardes-Ker, Tax Treaty Interpretation. The International Tax Treaties Service (Dublin: In-Depth, 
1994 – loose-leaf), at 8.01. 
1721 See, for instance, House of Lords (United Kingdom), 5 February 1975, Oppenheimer v. Cattermole, 50 TC 
159. 
1722 See the example given by Edwardes-Ker (see M. Edwardes-Ker, Tax Treaty Interpretation. The 
International Tax Treaties Service (Dublin: In-Depth, 1994 – loose-leaf), at 8.02) with regard to the term 
“national”. In this respect, the author seems to support the view that the movement of the definition of 
“national” from Article 24 to Article 3 OECD Model could have an impact on whether the context might (now) 
require the domestic law meaning of the term “national” not to be applied (while it might not, when the 
definition was encompassed in Article 24) in cases of a substantial change in the domestic law meaning. This 
different outcome would be supported by the fact that Article 3(1) OECD Model (as amended in 1992) 
explicitly provides that the domestic law meaning is to be applied “unless the context otherwise requires”, 
while a similar provision was missing in the definition provided for in Article 24(2) of the 1977 OECD Model. 
In light of the history of the definition of the term “national” in of the OECD Model, the author doubts that the 
movement of such a definition from Article 24 to Article 3 implies a change in the drafters’ intention to make 
it subject (or not) to the context requiring otherwise.  
1723 This is true, for instance, with reference to the expression “any other criterion of a similar nature” 
employed in Article 4 OECD Model, which qualifies the reference to the domestic law of the could-be-
residence State, as well as with reference to the term “corporate rights” used in Article 10(3) OECD Model, 
which qualifies the income that is to be subjected to the same taxation treatment as income from shares in order 
to be characterized as “dividends” for the purpose of Article 10. 
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the official language of the State applying the treaty 
 
As previously mentioned, the renvoi to domestic law encompassed in Article 3(2) 
applies only in so far as undefined legal jargon terms in the tax treaty are at stake.  
 Where this is the case and no prima facie divergence of meanings is alleged to 
exist among the various authentic texts, the combined reading of Article 33 VCLT and 
Article 3(2) entitles the interpreter to exclusively employ the authentic text drafted in the 
official language of the State applying the treaty (if existing) and to construe the relevant 
treaty provision on the basis of the domestic law meaning that the legal jargon terms 
used in that text (or their proxies) have under the domestic law of that State.  
 The interpreter remains, however, under the duty to determine whether the 
context requires a different interpretation. In this respect, the analysis carried out in 
previous section 5.3.3 is applicable. For the purpose of the present section, it is 
nonetheless worth noting that, in order to assess whether the context requires a different 
interpretation: 
(i) Article 33 VCLT allows the interpreter to disregard the other authentic texts; 
and 
(ii) the interpreter should take into account the OECD Model (official versions) 
and its Commentary, where the treaty is based on that Model. 
  
Similarly, where the tax treaty is authenticated only in one language,1724 other than the 
official languages of the contracting States, Article 3(2) directs the interpreter to 
construe undefined legal jargon terms in accordance with the meaning that the 
corresponding terms, expressed in the official language of the contracting State applying 
the treaty, have under the domestic law of that State. 
 In order to choose the relevant “corresponding terms” under the law of the State 
applying the treaty, the interpreter should use all available elements and items of 
evidence, such as bilingual (legal) dictionaries, thesaurus dictionaries, (comparative) law 
textbooks and encyclopedias, the authentic texts of other tax treaties concluded by that 
State and drafted in its own official language, as well as the tax treaty model of that 
State, if publicly available. 
 For instance, where Article 7 of an Italian tax treaty authenticated only in 
English1725 employs the term “enterprise”, Article 3(2) would direct the interpreter to 
construe that term in accordance with the meaning that the corresponding terms 
“impresa” has under Italian income tax law. The term “impresa” should be chosen as 
domestic law term corresponding to the treaty term “enterprise”, since, among other 
things:  
                                                     
1724 In the very remote case that the tax treaty is authenticated in two or more languages, but not in the official 
language of the State applying the treaty, Article 33 VCLT enables the interpreter to rely exclusively on one 
authentic text and Article 3(2) directs the interpreter to construe the undefined legal jargon terms employed in 
that text in accordance with the meaning that the corresponding terms, expressed in the official language of the 
contracting State applying the treaty, do have under the domestic law of that State. In this regard, the 
conclusions drawn in respect of monolingual tax treaties and multilingual tax treaties authenticated also in the 
official language of the State applying the treaty are relevant mutatis mutandis.  
1725 This is a purely hypothetic case, since all Italian tax treaties are authenticated (also) in the Italian language. 
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(i) the former is the term generally used in the Italian authentic texts of Italian tax 
treaties; and 
(ii) a bilingual (legal) dictionary normally indicates those two terms as synonyms.  
Obviously, in this case as well the interpreter may conclude that the context requires an 
interpretation different from the one based on the domestic law meaning. 
 
 
5.5.2. The solution of prima facie divergences between the authentic treaty texts 
5.5.2.1. The nature and significance of the prima facie divergences: conclusions on 
research questions c-i) 
 
This subsection deals with the following research questions: 
 
i. Does Article 3(2) have an impact on the nature of the potential discrepancies in 
meanings among the authentic texts of a multilingual tax treaty? Where this 
question is answered in the affirmative, which are the various types of prima 
facie discrepancies that may arise? Should the interpreter put all of them on the 
same footing for the purpose of interpreting multilingual tax treaties?  
 
In order to accurately tackle them, it is appropriate to start the analysis from the 
classification of the different types of divergences of meaning that may emerge from the 
interpretation of legal jargon terms in accordance with Article 3(2). 
  
A first type of prima facie divergence may be said to exist between two accurately 
(although not perfectly) corresponding legal concepts existing under the laws of the two 
contracting States (“type-A divergence”).  
 Often, such concepts are pointed to by the corresponding terms employed in the 
two authentic texts drafted in the official languages of the contracting States. For 
instance, the terms “impresa” and “Unternehmen” used in the Italian and German 
authentic texts of the 1989 Germany-Italy tax treaty point to the respective underlying 
legal concepts existing under Italian and German tax laws. Where these two concepts 
were found to be not absolutely equal (as actually is the case, for example in respect to 
certain forestry and agriculture activities), a (limited) divergence may be said to exist 
between them. 
 However, this type of difference may also emerge where the tax treaty is 
authenticated only in one (neutral) language. In the latter case, the interpreter also has to 
face the additional burden of determining which is the legal jargon term in the official 
language of the State applying the treaty best corresponding to the legal jargon term 
employed in the authentic treaty text (drafted in a different language). 
 For instance, if the Germany-Italy tax treaty had been authenticated only in the 
English language, the treaty term “enterprise” would point to the domestic legal concept 
underlying the legal jargon term “impresa” where Italy applied the treaty and, in 
contrast, to the domestic legal concept underlying the term “Unternehmen” where 
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Germany applied the treaty.  
  
A second type of divergence1726 may be seen to exist between two legal concepts both 
existing under the law of the State applying the treaty (“type-B divergence”). Generally, 
those legal concepts are: 
(i) the one underlying the legal jargon term used in the authentic text drafted in 
the official language of that State; and  
(ii) the one underlying the legal jargon term (expressed in the official language of 
the State applying the treaty) that is considered by the interpreter to best 
correspond to the legal jargon term employed in another authentic text.1727 
For instance, the Italian text of an Italian tax treaty may use the term “lavoro autonomo” 
in a certain article, while the English authentic text uses the term “employment”. The 
Italian legal jargon term that is generally considered to best correspond to the English 
term “employment” is the term “lavoro subordinato” (or “lavoro dipendente”); the latter 
is, in fact, the term that is generally used in Article 15 of Italian OECD Model-based tax 
treaties and one of the terms that is generally indicated as a synonym of the term 
“employment” in bilingual (legal) dictionaries. Under Italian (tax) law, the concepts 
corresponding to the terms “lavoro autonomo” and “lavoro subordinato” are significantly 
different, the former denoting as prototypical items the activities carried on by a self-
employed person. In this case a divergence may be said to exist between the two Italian 
legal concepts.  
 In the majority of cases, however, the type-B divergence is less obvious. For 
instance, the English authentic text of Article 16 of the 1988 Italy-United Kingdom tax 
treaty, similar to Article 16 of the OECD Model, makes exclusive reference to the 
“board of directors” of a company, while the Italian authentic text thereof employs the 
expression “consiglio di amministrazione o […] collegio sindacale”. Although the Italian 
Civil Code entrusts the “consiglio di amministrazione” with pure management functions 
and the “collegio sindacale” with control and supervisory functions, bilingual 
dictionaries generally equate the “consiglio di amministrazione” to the “board of 
directors” and the “collegio sindacale” with the “board of statutory auditors”. On this 
basis, one might reach the conclusion that the Italian legal jargon term best 
corresponding to the English term “board of directors” is “consiglio di 
amministrazione”, whose underlying legal concept is narrower than the one 
corresponding to the compound expression “consiglio di amministrazione o […] collegio 
sindacale”. In such a case, the conclusion would be drawn that the two legal concepts are 
different. 
  
From a quantitative perspective, on the other hand, the significance of the divergences 
                                                     
1726 This second type of divergence may theoretically emerge as well with regard to the two (or more) authentic 
texts drafted in the official languages of a single contracting State. The issues connected to this case, however, 
are not different from those characterizing the instance of two (or more) authentic texts drafted in the official 
language of one contracting State and in another language. 
1727 I.e. the authentic text drafted in the official language of the other contracting State, or an authentic text 
drafted in a different language. 
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existing among the relevant legal concepts may vary within a spectrum where the 
extremes are: 
(i) the case of legal concepts sharing all their prototypical items and presenting 
only limited differences with regard to the peripheral items that are within their 
respective scope; and  
(ii) the case of legal concepts not sharing any of their respective prototypical 
items. 
The first case is, for instance, that previously illustrated with reference to the comparison 
of the domestic law concepts underlying the terms “impresa” and “Unternehmen”. 
 The second case is, for instance, that previously illustrated with reference to the 
comparison between (i) the Italian law concept underlying the term “lavoro autonomo” 
and (ii) the Italian law concept underlying the term “lavoro subordinato”. 
 
In light of the above analysis, the prima facie discrepancy in meaning resulting from the 
comparison of two authentic treaty texts, drafted in the respective official languages of 
the contracting States, may be examined and described in terms of type-A and type-B 
divergences.1728  
 In particular, a first case of prima facie discrepancy may emerge as a pure type-A 
divergence. This is the case where the relevant legal jargon terms employed in the two 
authentic texts appear to be very accurate correspondents, under the respective domestic 
laws, in light of all elements and items of evidence available (e.g. bilingual legal 
dictionaries, comparative law textbooks, comparative legal studies, etc.). From a 
quantitative perspective, pure type-A divergences generally concern only peripheral 
items. Even in cases where the discrepancy concerns prototypical items as well, it is 
usually not so significant and pervasive to make the interpreter doubt, in the absence of 
other decisive elements and items of evidence, that the parties intended to interpret the 
relevant treaty provision in accordance with the meaning that the term employed in the 
text drafted in the official language of the State applying the treaty (or a proxy thereof) 
has under the domestic law of that State. The prima facie discrepancy between the terms 
“impresa” and “Unternehmen” employed in the Italian and German authentic texts of the 
1989 Germany-Italy tax treaty represents a good instance of this type of discrepancy.  
 A second case of prima facie discrepancy emerges as a combination of type-A 
and type-B divergences, in the sense that the discrepancy is caused:  
(i) not only by the fact that the two best corresponding terms, under the respective 
domestic laws of the two contracting States, have two (more or less) divergent 
meanings (type-A divergence),   
(ii) but also and predominantly by the fact that the two terms employed in the 
authentic treaty texts do not appear to be accurate correspondents, under the 
respective domestic laws, more similar terms (and thus concepts) existing under 
such laws (type-B divergence). 
From a quantitative perspective, this second kind of discrepancy in concerns both 
                                                     
1728 The same holds true, by analogy, where one (or even both) of the compared authentic texts is drafted in a 
language other than the official languages of the contracting States. 
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prototypical and peripheral items and, in extreme cases, makes the interpreter seriously 
doubt whether the parties intended to interpret the relevant treaty provision in 
accordance with the meaning that the term employed in the text drafted in the official 
language of the State applying the treaty (or a proxy thereof) has under the domestic law 
of that State. For example, where the Italian authentic text of the 1989 Germany-Italy tax 
treaty employed the term “attività economica” instead of “impresa”, the former having a 
much wider scope than the latter under Italian law, the prima facie discrepancy in 
meaning between the Italian and the German authentic texts could be viewed not only as 
caused by the ontological discrepancies existing between the two best correspondent 
terms under the Italian and German domestic laws (i.e. the terms “impresa” and 
“Unternehmen”), but also by the fact that the term “attività economica” is used in the 
Italian authentic text instead of the more closely corresponding term “impresa”.  
 
At a first level of analysis, thus, the author may conclude that pure type-A divergences 
are inherently caused by the use of legal jargon terminology in a tax treaty and, 
therefore, they should be generally accepted as such and dealt with through the 
application of the renvoi encompassed in Article 3(2): the relevant domestic law 
meaning should be selected by the interpreter on the basis on which contracting State is 
applying the treaty.1729 
 In contrast, prima facie discrepancies caused by the interaction between type-A 
and type-B divergences should be examined more carefully and, where the effect of the 
type-B divergence was significant, the interpreter should critically assess whether the 
context requires the attribution of a meaning other than the domestic law meaning of the 
legal jargon term employed in the authentic text drafted in the official language of the 
State applying the treaty (e.g. the meaning that the legal jargon term, which best 
corresponds to the term used in the other authentic text(s) of the treaty, has under the 
domestic law of the State applying the treaty).1730 
 
5.5.2.2. The need to reconcile of the prima facie divergences: conclusions on research 
question c-ii)  
 
In the last part of the previous section, the author preliminarily concluded that it would 
seem reasonable for the interpreter to closely look at the prima facie discrepancies 
caused by the interaction between type-A and type-B divergences and, where the effect 
of the type-B divergence was significant, to critically assess whether the context requires 
the attribution of a meaning other than the domestic law meaning of the legal jargon 
term employed in the authentic text drafted in the official language of the State applying 
the treaty. This preliminary conclusion implies that the interpreter should try to reconcile 
the prima facie discrepancy. 
                                                     
1729 The actual application of such domestic law meaning would obviously remain subject to the context not 
requiring otherwise 
1730 I.e., in the previous example, the meaning of the term “impresa” (and not of the term “attività economica”) 
under Italian law. 
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 From a systematic perspective, however, such a preliminary conclusion calls for a 
prior fundamental question to be answered:  
 
ii. Is there any obligation for the interpreter to reconcile (at least to a certain 
extent) the prima facie divergent authentic texts of an OECD Model-based tax 
treaty? 1731 
 
In fact, from the outset the possibility cannot be excluded that, under the system of 
renvoi provided for in Article 3(2) OECD Model, the interpreter is entitled to always and 
exclusively rely on the legal concepts underlying the legal jargon terms employed in the 
authentic text drafted in the official language of the State applying the treaty (if 
existing), disregarding the possible existence of different legal concepts underlying the 
terms employed in the other authentic treaty texts.   
 This raises the question whether the interpreter is under an obligation to reconcile 
(at least to a certain extent) the prima facie divergent authentic texts of an OECD Model-
based tax treaty, or, in contrast, he may always and exclusively rely on the legal concepts 
underlying the legal jargon terms employed in the authentic text drafted in the official 
language of the State applying the treaty. 
  
The answer to such a question should be looked for in the intention of the parties.  
 In this respect, several items of evidence exist supporting the view that the parties 
probably intended the interpreter to carry out a (limited) reconciliation of the relevant 
authentic texts of OECD Model-based tax treaties.  
 
First, tax treaties generally do not contain any explicit derogation to the customary 
international law principle that the interpreter may rely on any of the authentic treaty 
texts in order to construe its provisions.  
 To read in the renvoi to the law of the contracting State applying the treaty, 
encompassed in Article 3(2), an unconditional and compulsory obligation for the 
interpreter to rely exclusively on the authentic text drafted in the official language of that 
State, for the purpose of construing the treaty, may be regarded as  reading too much in 
the language of Article 3(2), such a significant departure from customary international 
law reasonably requiring a more precise and explicit wording to be considered to have 
been intended by the parties.1732  
 
                                                     
1731 A similar question (and a similar answer) holds true with regard to the alleged divergences existing 
between the legal concepts underlying the terms employed in one of the authentic treaty texts and those 
underlying the corresponding terms used in the OECD Model official versions.  
1732 The alternative view of the absence of an obligation for the interpreter to reconcile the authentic treaty texts 
(al least in certain cases and to a certain extent), which appears even less sensible than the one just described, 
would be to consider that the parties intended:  
(i) the treaty to have multiple meanings, not depending (solely) on the domestic laws of the 
contracting States, but from the very same wording of its authentic texts and  
 (ii) to entitle the interpreter to choose the meaning that best suits his purpose by selecting the 
authentic text that supports it. 
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Second, since the tax treaty is based on the OECD Model, the argument may be put 
forward that the general meaning determined on the basis of the OECD Model (official 
versions) and the OECD Commentary constitutes a limit to the meaning attributable to 
the legal jargon terms used in the authentic texts drafted in the official language of the 
State applying the treaty.1733  
 This also implies that, where one of the authentic treaty texts, other than the one 
drafted in the official language of the State applying the treaty, reproduces the English or 
French official version of the OECD Model, the interpreter should take care of and 
reconcile the alleged difference between those two authentic texts. For instance, where a 
specific tax treaty appears to be based on the OECD Model and Article 15 thereof, in its 
English authentic text, reproduces Article 15 of the OECD Model, it would be difficult 
to reasonably argue that the interpreter may exclusively rely on the Italian authentic text 
of such an article, which employs the term “lavoro autonomo”,1734 and attribute to the 
latter term the meaning it has under Italian law, completely disregarding the English 
authentic text and the corresponding provision of the OECD Model. 
 
Third, the fact that certain tax treaties are authenticated only in one neutral language,1735 
or provide for a prevailing text (generally drafted in a neutral language) in the case of 
divergences may be seen as supporting the argument that, with respect to tax treaties in 
general, the corresponding legal concepts under the law of the two contracting States 
should not be too different from each other.1736  
 For instance, where an OECD Model-based tax treaty is authenticated only in 
English and uses the term “employment” in Article 15, the interpreter must construe the 
latter term by attributing to it the meaning that the best corresponding Italian legal jargon 
term has under Italian law. The corresponding term, in this case, is probably “lavoro 
subordinato”1737 and not “lavoro autonomo”. It appears difficult to support the 
conclusion that provisions of two Italian treaties similarly structured and that present the 
same (or a similar) wording in their respective English authentic texts (“employment”) 
could be interpreted in a significantly different way (with regard to prototypical items, 
i.e. typical employment income and typical independent activity income) only because 
one of the two treaties was also authenticated in the Italian language (and employed in 
the Italian authentic text the term “lavoro autonomo”) and the other was not. 
 
Fourth, although extremely remote in practice, it may happen that a tax treaty is 
authenticated in two languages that are not the official languages of either of the 
contracting States. In this case, where a significant prima facie divergence of meaning 
existed between the corresponding legal jargon terms used in such authentic texts, the 
interpreter should at least partially reconcile the two authentic texts in order to select the 
                                                     
1733 See sections 3 and 4 of this chapter.  
1734 See the example in section 5.5.2.1. 
1735 I.e. they are authenticated in the official languages of neither of the contracting States.  
1736 Otherwise, similarly worded (in the neutral authentic language) tax treaties concluded by the same State 
could end up being construed in significantly divergent ways. 
1737 See the example in section 5.5.2.1. 
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domestic legal jargon term, and thus the domestic law meaning, corresponding to the 
terms actually used in the treaty.  
 For instance, where an Italian tax treaty based on the OECD Model was 
authenticated solely in English and French and a provision thereof employed the terms 
“employment” and “activités de caractère indépendant” in the English and French 
authentic texts, respectively, the interpreter should at least partially reconcile those two 
terms in order to decide which Italian domestic law term corresponds thereto and, 
therefore, which domestic law meaning should be used pursuant to Article 3(2). 
 
Finally, although theoretically possible, it does not seem reasonable to lightly assume 
that the contracting States intended to have two completely different (sets of) rules in 
force where they each apply the treaty. 
 Gaja, in this respect, maintains that the renvoi to the domestic law of the 
contracting State applying the treaty “involves reconciling the texts in order to define a 
general meaning, while the more precise meaning is established according to the law of 
the relevant contracting State”.1738 He adds that, in any case, under Article 3(2) OECD 
Model, the domestic law meaning of any undefined treaty term “would have to be 
consistent with the general meaning that the term has under the treaty”.1739 
 In order to decide whether, in any actual instance, this outer limit would be 
crossed by attributing to the relevant undefined treaty term the meaning it has under the 
domestic law of the contracting State applying the treaty, the interpreter relies on the 
context. Such a context, more than being the intent of the parties,1740 or embodying the 
parties’ common intention,1741 is made of all the elements and items of evidence that 
may help the interpreter in establishing and arguing for the common intention of the 
                                                     
1738 See G. Gaja, “The perspective of international law”, in G. Maisto (ed.), Multilingual Texts and 
Interpretation of Tax Treaties and EC Tax Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2005), 91 et seq., at 99. 
1739 See G. Gaja, “The perspective of international law”, in G. Maisto (ed.), Multilingual Texts and 
Interpretation of Tax Treaties and EC Tax Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2005), 91 et seq., at 100, 
where the author notes that, “[s]hould there be any divergence among the authentic texts of a tax treay that 
follows the OECD Model, these would have to be first reconciled in order to define the general meaning of the 
provision, including the general meaning of the relevant term. The reference to the law of one of the 
contracting States for the determination of the meaning of a term would only come into play once the 
framework has been defined”. 
1740 See S. I. Katz, “United States”, in International Fiscal Association, Cahiers de droit fiscal international, 
Vol. 78a (Deventer: Kluwer, 1993), 615 et seq., at 650, who affirms: “The intent of the contracting parties is 
the context. There is no question of whether contextual interpretation is preferred to domestic. The very 
concept of the context implies that it must be.”  
Obviously, if one equates the intent of the parties to the context, no other solution may be accepted other than 
that of a contextual interpretation (i.e. the interpretation that reflects the intention of the parties). This, 
however, is a circular argument. The real issue, which is hidden by (and in) Katz’s proposition, is “which is the 
meaning intended by the parties?” There is no ready answer to be found to that question anywhere (otherwise, 
one would seriously have to question the sanity of those hundreds of tax scholars that have painstakingly dealt 
with such issue). So, Katz ends up changing the form, but not the substance of the problem: the interpreter is 
still left with a handful of items of evidence and elements on the basis of which he must decide (and argue for) 
whether the parties (would) intend, in the specific situation, the domestic law meaning, or some other meaning, 
to apply.    
1741 See M. Edwardes-Ker, Tax Treaty Interpretation. The International Tax Treaties Service (Dublin: In-
Depth, 1994 – loose-leaf), at 7.10. 
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parties: it is the overall context that must be used in order to determine the treaty 
utterance meaning. 
 
5.5.2.3. The partial reconciliation of the prima facie divergences: the fundamental role 
of Article 3(2) OECD Model and its interaction with Article 33(4) VCLT. 
Conclusions on research question c-iii) 
 
In the previous section, the author has concluded that the interpreter should carry out a 
limited reconciliation of the various authentic texts, at least in certain cases, where the 
tax treaty is based on the OECD Model. The following question thus arises: 
 
iii. To what extent must the differences of meaning deriving from the attribution of 
the domestic law meanings to the corresponding legal jargon terms used in the 
various authentic texts be removed (e.g. in accordance with Article 33(4) VCLT) 
and, instead, to what extent must such differences be preserved in accordance 
with Article 3(2)?  
  
In this respect, the author has already pointed out the position upheld by Gaja, to which 
he substantially adheres, providing that Article 3(2) OECD Model “involves reconciling 
the texts in order to define a general meaning, while the more precise meaning is 
established according to the law of the relevant contracting State”.1742  
 In other words, the interpreter may rely exclusively on the domestic law meaning 
of the legal jargon terms employed in the treaty as long as it significantly overlaps with 
the “general meaning” established on the basis of the overall context and, in particular, 
of the reconciliation of the relevant authentic texts.1743 Thus, as long as the domestic law 
meaning and the “general meaning” significantly overlap and considering that, where it 
exists, the authentic treaty text drafted in the official language of the State applying the 
treaty provides the interpreter with the most direct and immediate access to the domestic 
law (concepts) of that State, it is reasonable to conclude that the selection of the 
appropriate domestic law meaning under Article 3(2) should be made by the interpreter 
on the basis of that authentic text. This solution limits the discretion of the interpreter in 
selecting the appropriate domestic law meaning, since it attributes significant weight to 
the evidence of the intention of the parties represented by their choice of a specific legal 
jargon term in the official language of the State applying the treaty and, thus, of its 
underlying legal concept over the others which are theoretically available.  
                                                     
1742 See G. Gaja, “The perspective of international law”, in G. Maisto (ed.), Multilingual Texts and 
Interpretation of Tax Treaties and EC Tax Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2005), 91 et seq., at 99. 
1743 See G. Gaja, “The perspective of international law”, in G. Maisto (ed.), Multilingual Texts and 
Interpretation of Tax Treaties and EC Tax Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2005), 91 et seq., at 100, 
where the author notes that, “[s]hould there be any divergence among the authentic texts of a tax treay that 
follows the OECD Model, these would have to be first reconciled in order to define the general meaning of the 
provision, including the general meaning of the relevant term. The reference to the law of one of the 
contracting States for the determination of the meaning of a term would only come into play once the 
framework has been defined”. 
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 Consider, for example, Article 16 of the 1988 Italy-United Kingdom tax treaty, 
whose English authentic text makes exclusive reference to the “board of directors” of a 
company, while the Italian authentic text thereof employs the expression “consiglio di 
amministrazione o […] collegio sindacale”.1744 It may be plausibly argued that the legal 
concepts underlying the expressions “board of directors” and “consiglio di 
amministrazione o […] collegio sindacale” under English and Italian law, respectively, 
overlap substantially. They both point to a common “general meaning”, i.e. the company 
organs that, under the relevant company law, carry out the management, control and 
supervisory functions. Since the legal concept underlying the legal jargon term used in 
the Italian authentic text substantially overlaps with the above “general meaning”, it is 
reasonable to use the more precise meaning of the former in order to construe the treaty 
where Italy is the State applying it.  
 
Hence, the analysis to be performed by the interpreter is one that fits perfectly in the 
dynamics of Article 3(2): the interpreter is to construe the treaty on the basis of the 
domestic law meaning of the relevant legal jargon term employed in the authentic text 
drafted in the official language of the contracting State applying the treaty (for instance 
“consiglio di amministrazione o […] collegio sindacale”),1745 unless the context requires 
a different interpretation. In this respect, the author submits that the context requires a 
different interpretation whenever the domestic law meaning does not sufficiently overlap 
with the “general meaning”. 
 For this purpose, as already pointed out in section 5.5.2.2 of this chapter, the 
context coincides with the overall context and, therefore, it is made up of all the 
elements and items of evidence that may help the interpreter to determine and argue for 
the (common) utterance meaning of the parties. In the case of multilingual treaties, the 
overall context obviously includes the corresponding terms used in the various authentic 
texts (in the previous example “board of directors” and “consiglio di amministrazione o 
[…] collegio sindacale”) and their underlying legal concepts. It also encompasses the 
corresponding terms employed in the English and French versions of the OECD Model 
(in the previous example “board of directors” and “conseil d’administration ou de 
surveillance”), as well as in the OECD Commentary, if the treaty is based on the OECD 
Model.  
 In order to determine the “general meaning”, where a prima facie divergence of 
meaning is put forward, the interpreter is required to partially reconcile the allegedly 
divergent authentic texts. The reconciliation, in this case, is characterized as “partial” in 
the sense that it is sufficient for the interpreter to find out the prototypical items that the 
corresponding terms employed in the various authentic texts are intended (by the parties) 
to denote (not to denote) and the functions played by their intended (by the parties) 
underlying concepts within the respective legal systems. In fact, the “general meaning” 
is determined (also) on the basis of:  
                                                     
1744 See section 5.5.2.1 above. 
1745 Or the domestic law meaning of that State’s legal jargon term corresponding to the term used in the treaty, 
in the case none of the authentic treaty texts has been drafted in that State’s official language.  
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(i) the common prototypical items that the interpreter considers the parties 
intended to denote (not to denote) by means of the relevant treaty terms and/or  
(ii) the common functions played by the legal concepts, which the interpreter 
considers the parties meant to correspond to the relevant treaty terms, within the 
respective legal systems.  
In the previous example, for instance, the “general meaning” is determined by taking 
into account that (a) both the English and the Italian expressions denotes statutory 
company organs provided for under the applicable corporate governance systems and (b) 
the functions carried out by such bodies, in their respective corporate governance 
systems, are similar, i.e. management and/or control and/or supervisory functions. 
 It seems reasonable to conclude that such a reconciliation must be carried out, 
unless evidence of a different agreement of the parties exists, on the basis of the rules 
encompassed in Article 33(4) VCLT, i.e. by interpreting the various authentic texts in 
accordance with Articles 31 and 32 VCLT and, where a divergence persists, by favoring 
the meaning that best reconciles the texts having regard to the object and purpose of the 
treaty.  
 The significance of Article 33 VCLT in this process, however, is not limited to 
the direct comparison of the legal jargon terms employed in the various authentic texts. 
Since (i) the overall context includes the various authentic texts of the provision to be 
interpreted and those of its related provisions and (ii) such provisions are also made of 
non-legal jargon terms, it is possible that the construction of these provisions, as 
expressed in the various authentic texts, may show some possible differences of meaning 
not due to the legal jargon terms employed therein. Such potential differences should be 
removed in accordance with Article 33(4) VCLT. The resulting interpretations, which 
may shed light on the object and purpose of the relevant treaty provision and its 
interaction with other related provisions, must be then taken into account by the 
interpreter in order to determine whether the context otherwise requires and, more 
specifically, to establish the “general meaning” of the relevant legal jargon terms.   
 Where the interpreter concludes that the domestic law meaning of the legal jargon 
term employed in the authentic text drafted in the official language of the State applying 
the treaty does not sufficiently overlap with the “general meaning” of the relevant 
(corresponding) treaty terms, he should consequently not apply the former meaning in 
order to construe the treaty. In its place, the interpreter should apply the domestic law 
meaning that best fits the overall context and that best matches with the “general 
meaning”, unless the context otherwise requires. For the purpose of establishing such a 
domestic law meaning, and thus the relevant domestic legal jargon term, the interpreter 
should use all the available elements and items of evidence of the parties’ intention, 
among which bilingual (legal) dictionaries, thesaurus dictionaries, (comparative) law 
textbooks and encyclopedias, the authentic texts of other tax treaties concluded by the 
State applying the treaty (drafted in its own official language), the tax treaty model of the 
latter State, if publicly available, the OECD Model official versions of the relevant treaty 
article and the OECD Commentary.  
 For instance, where the Italian text of an Italian tax treaty uses the term “lavoro 
autonomo” in a certain article, while the English authentic text uses the term 
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“employment”, a prima facie discrepancy between those authentic texts arises, since the 
former term, under Italian law, typically denotes the activities carried on by self-
employed persons. Where, on the basis of the overall context, the interpreter concludes 
that the “general meaning” corresponding to the terms “lavoro autonomo” and 
“employment” is akin to the meanings of “employment” under English law and “emploi 
salarié” under French law,1746 the interpreter should attribute to the treaty terms “lavoro 
autonomo” and “employment” the meaning that the term “lavoro subordinato”1747 has 
under Italian tax law whenever Italy applies the treaty, unless the context otherwise 
requires, since the term “lavoro subordinato” is the one generally used in Article 15 of 
Italian OECD Model-based tax treaties and one of the terms that is generally indicated as 
a synonym of the terms “employment” and “emploi (salarié)” in bilingual (legal) 
dictionaries. 
 
To sum up, if a prima facie divergence is alleged to exist among the domestic law 
meanings of the legal jargon terms used in the various authentic texts, the domestic law 
meaning of the legal jargon term employed in the authentic text drafted in the official 
language of the contracting State applying the treaty1748 should be used in order to 
construe the meaning of the relevant treaty provision, unless the overall context requires 
a different interpretation, for instance where the comparison of the relevant authentic 
texts1749 shows that such a domestic law meaning does not sufficiently overlap with the 
“general meaning”.  
 However, where such domestic law meaning does substantially overlap with the 
“general meaning” and, more generally, the overall context does not require a different 
interpretation, any prima facie divergence of meanings is resolved by means of the 
renvoi of Article 3(2), which provides the interpreter with a clear rule for choosing 
which, among the prima facie divergent meanings, must be attributed to the relevant 
treaty term(s) in each specific case. To put it differently, where legal jargon terms are at 
stake, Article 3(2) actually operates as if it were a rule establishing the prevailing 
authentic text in accordance with Article 33(1) VCLT,1750 provided that the context does 
not require a different interpretation. 
 Obviously, the activity of establishing the “general meaning” and assessing 
whether the domestic law meaning and the “general meaning” sufficiently overlap 
entails a significant dose of discretion by the interpreter, which is limited only by the 
(good faith) requirement to support the chosen conclusions with reasonable arguments.  
 
If the issue is looked at from the perspective of the distinction between type-A and type-
B divergences, the following conclusions may be drawn. 
                                                     
1746 “Emploi salarié” is the term used in the French official version of Article 15 OECD Model. 
1747 Or “lavoro dipendente”. 
1748 Or the domestic law meaning of that State’s legal jargon term corresponding to the term used in the treaty, 
in case none of the authentic treaty texts has been drafted in that State’s official language. 
1749 Or the comparison between the authentic text(s) and the OECD Model official versions. 
1750 In this case, however, there is evidence of the agreement of the parties to make the “prevailing” text 
applicable from the outset, subject to the overall context not requiring otherwise. 
PART II: CHAPTER 5 
 518 
 Where the prima facie discrepancies among the authentic treaty texts are caused 
exclusively by type-A divergences, the domestic law meaning of the terms employed in 
the various authentic texts commonly overlaps with their “general meaning”. In these 
cases, therefore, Article 3(2) does not require, on the basis solely of such a prima facie 
discrepancy, the interpreter to attribute to the relevant terms employed in the authentic 
text drafted in the official language of the State applying the treaty a meaning other than 
the one they have under the domestic law of that State.1751 
 Where the prima facie discrepancies are caused by the interaction between type-A 
and type-B divergences, however, it is more probable that some of the domestic law 
meanings of the terms employed in the various authentic texts do not sufficiently overlap 
with their “general meaning”. This risk appears somewhat related to the impact that the 
type-B divergence has on the prima facie discrepancy. In these cases, the interpreter 
must carefully assess whether the meaning that the terms employed in the authentic text 
drafted in the official language of the State applying the treaty have under the domestic 
law of that State sufficiently overlaps with the “general meaning” thereof and, where this 
is not the case, he has to establish what is the different meaning required by the context. 
Such an alternative meaning might be the meaning that, under the domestic law of the 
State applying the treaty, best corresponds to the “general meaning” of the relevant 
treaty terms, or, where the context so requires, a uniform and autonomous meaning. 
 
Scholars have sometimes taken a different position on this issue. 
Sundgren,1752 for instance, in commenting on the decision of the Supreme 
Administrative Court of Sweden in the case RÅ 2004 not 59,1753 which concerned the 
interpretation of the 1966 Peru-Sweden tax treaty, held the following: “The initial 
statement by the [Court] that both the Swedish and the Spanish texts are authoritative for 
interpretation purposes is of course correct. The following conclusion, however, that, by 
reference to article II § 2 of the treaty1754 – the so called lex fori rule – the Swedish text 
shall have precedence when the treaty is applied in Sweden but that in cases of 
uncertainty the Spanish text, too, shall be considered is not.  The reason herefor is that 
the lex fori rule is an instrument for determining the meaning of terms that have not been 
defined in the treaty which may lead to the adoption of the internal law meaning of the 
term of the country applying the treaty and this has nothing to do with the interpretation 
problems stemming from divergent language versions. This is a different problem that 
shall be resolved by application of the above cited rules in article 33 of the Vienna 
Convention. And, in contrast to the conclusion of the [Court], the fundamental principle 
of article 33 and the starting point for its application is the equality of the texts, not that 
                                                     
1751 It obviously remains possible that some other element of the overall context requires the interpreter to 
attribute to the relevant treaty term a meaning other than the current domestic law meaning. See, in this respect, 
section 5.3.3.2 of this chapter. 
1752 See P. Sundgren, “Interpretation of tax treaties authenticated in two or more languages: a case study”, 73 
Svensk skattetidning (2006), 378 et seq., available on-line at the following URL: 
http://www.skatter.se/index.php?q=node/1079; accessed on 23 July 2011). 
1753 Supreme Administrative Court (Sweden), 25 March 2004, case RÅ 2004 ref. 59, Regeringsrättens årsbok 
(2004) (a summary in English is available at the IBFD Tax Treaty Case Law Database).  
1754 Similar, in all relevant respects, to Article 3(2) of the 1963 OECD Draft. 
PART II: CHAPTER 5            
 
 519 
any of them shall take precedence. Nor, of course, does article 33 of the Vienna 
Convention refer to any internal law meaning of the term being interpreted.” 
In light of the previous analysis, the author disagrees with the position expressed 
by Sundgren. The renvoi encompassed in Article II(2) of the 1966 Peru-Sweden tax 
treaty removes the prima facie discrepancies emerging from the comparison of the 
authentic treaty texts, in so far as the latter employ undefined legal jargon terms whose 
meaning must be looked for, in the first place and unless the context otherwise 
requires,1755 under the domestic law of the contracting State applying the treaty. In these 
cases, in fact, under the rule of law provided for in Article II(2), the existence of a 
difference in meaning between the Spanish and Swedish authentic texts, as construed in 
accordance with the meanings that the relevant undefined treaty terms have under the 
domestic laws of Peru and Sweden, respectively, does not constitute a problem at all: 
where it is Peru applying the treaty, the meaning resulting from the Spanish authentic 
text applies; conversely, where it is Sweden to apply the treaty, the meaning resulting 
from the Swedish authentic text applies. This holds true provided that the domestic law 
meaning so determined sufficiently overlaps with the “general meaning” determined on 
the basis of the contextual analysis (including textual comparison).  
  In this respect, it is interesting to highlight that the very same Sundgren notes 
that, “[h]owever, one must also keep in mind that the problem facing the interpreter in 
this case is indeed  also to determine the meaning of an undefined term in the treaty, 
namely the term “income from a source”. The interpretation task of the case is thus 
twofold; a) to solve, according to Article 33 of the Vienna Convention, the problem of 
the diverging language meanings and b) to determine, according to Article II § 2 of the 
treaty the meaning of an undefined term.  It is, however, a difficult task to separate these 
two sets of rules because it is likely even if not intentional that the different languages of 
the contracting state will tend to reflect also these states’ domestic law meanings. But the 
fact that the [Court] has based its interpretation approach only on the lex fori rule of the 
treaty nourishes the suspicion that the Court has not contemplated Article 33 of the 
Vienna Convention at all.”1756 
 
5.5.2.4. The solution of the prima facie divergences where a prevailing text exists: 
conclusions on research question c-iv) 
 
One could wonder whether the above conclusions remain valid even where the tax 
                                                     
1755 In that respect, Sundgren carries out a very well-structured and in depth analysis of the overall context in 
order to establish whether capital gains from the sale of shares must be considered to be income (“rédito” and 
“inkomst” in the Spanish and Swedish authentic treaty texts, respectively) for the purpose of Article XVII(2) 
of the 1966 Peru-Sweden tax treaty (see P. Sundgren, “Interpretation of tax treaties authenticated in two or 
more languages: a case study”, 73 Svensk skattetidning (2006), 378 et seq., available on-line at the following 
URL: http://www.skatter.se/index.php?q=node/1079; accessed on 23 July 2011). 
1756 See P. Sundgren, “Interpretation of tax treaties authenticated in two or more languages: a case study”, 73 
Svensk skattetidning (2006), 378 et seq., available on-line at the following URL: 
http://www.skatter.se/index.php?q=node/1079; accessed on 23 July 2011. 
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treaty’s final clause provides that, in the case of any divergence of interpretation between 
the authentic texts drafted in the official languages of the contracting States, the text 
authenticated in the lingua franca (generally English or French) will prevail.  
 
In this respect, the following research question should be properly answered: 
 
iv. What is the relevance of Article 3(2) for the purpose of resolving the prima facie 
discrepancies in meaning among the various authentic texts, where the treaty’s 
final clause provides that a certain authentic text is to prevail in the case of 
divergences? 
 
It is the author’s opinion that such a final clause has only a limited bearing on the 
conclusions reached in the previous sections.  
 In particular, this type of final clause may be relevant in order to assess whether 
the overall context requires an interpretation different from that determined by 
attributing to the legal jargon term employed in the authentic text drafted in the language 
of the State applying the treaty the meaning it has under the domestic law of the latter.  
 As previously mentioned, since (i) the overall context includes the various 
authentic texts of the provision to be interpreted and those of its related provisions and 
(ii) such provisions are also made of non-legal jargon terms, it is possible that the 
constructions of these provisions, as expressed in the various authentic texts, may show 
some possible differences of meaning not due to the legal jargon terms employed 
therein. Such prima facie differences, where persisting after an interpretation of the 
relevant authentic texts based on Articles 31 and 32 VCLT, should be resolved, where 
the final clause so provides, by giving preference to the interpretation stemming from the 
prevailing text (the one drafted in the lingua franca). The resulting interpretation, which 
may shed light on the object and purpose of the relevant treaty provision and its 
interaction with other related provisions, must be then taken into account by the 
interpreter in order to determine whether the context otherwise requires and, more 
specifically, to establish the “general meaning” of the relevant legal jargon terms.  
 Moreover, the meanings that relevant legal jargon term1757 employed in the 
prevailing treaty text has under the domestic laws of the States using it1758 are part of the 
overall context and, as such, may play a direct role in establishing the “general meaning” 
of the corresponding terms used in the various authentic texts. In this case, where the 
interpreter cannot establish such a “general meaning” by reconciling the various 
authentic texts through an interpretation thereof based on Article 31 and 32 VCLT, the 
“general meaning” should be determined on the basis of the prevailing text, i.e. it should 
                                                     
1757 Or proxies thereof. 
1758 I.e., generally, the meaning that the relevant term has under the domestic laws of the States having, as their 
official language, the language in which the prevailing treaty text is drafted. By recourse to bilingual 
dictionaries, legal dictionaries and legal textbooks and encyclopedia, the interpreter may also establish which 
are the terms, in the official languages of the contracting State applying the treaty (and their underlying 
concepts in the respective legal system), which are commonly regarded as corresponding to the terms (and 
underlying concepts) used in the prevailing treaty text, and determine their domestic law meanings 
accordingly. 
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be derived from the legal jargon term employed in that text.  
 Take for instance, the 1925 Germany-Italy tax treaty, which has been 
authenticated only in the German and Italian languages. According to Articles 5(3) and 
11(2) of that treaty, the provisions concerning dividends paid to shareholders apply as 
well to income (profits distribution) from other rights1759 that are similar in nature to 
shares, but not to income derived from other forms of participation in companies, to 
which other provisions of the tax treaty apply. A prima facie discrepancy exists between 
the German and the Italian authentic texts of the above-mentioned article, since the 
former uses the term “Wertpapieren”, while the latter employs the term “valori 
mobiliari” for the English term rights. In fact, while in the German language the legal 
jargon term “Wertpapieren” substantially correspond to the English term “securities”, 
thus requiring the incorporation of the relevant rights into certificates for circulation 
purposes,1760 the Italian legal jargon term “valori mobiliari” has a wider bearing and 
might be used to denote corporate rights not represented by securities, i.e. not 
incorporated in any certificate.1761 Therefore, a construction of the German text in 
accordance with German domestic law would lead to the conclusion that the treaty 
provisions concerning the taxation of income from shares do not apply to profits 
distributed by companies whose capital is not represented by securities, while an 
interpretation of the Italian authentic text made in accordance with Italian domestic law 
would lead to the opposite conclusion. If, by assumption, the 1925 Germany-Italy tax 
treaty had provided for an English authentic text to prevail in the case of divergences and 
the English text of Articles 5(3) and 11(2) had employed the term “securities”, the 
interpreter would have had a good argument to conclude that the “general meaning” of 
the relevant treaty terms in the three authentic languages excluded rights in the capital of 
the distributing company not incorporated in certificates. As a consequence, where Italy 
was applying the treaty, the interpreter should have concluded that the context required 
an interpretation other than the one based on the domestic law meaning of the term 
“valori mobiliari”. The opposite conclusion would have been reached where the 
hypothetical prevailing text had used the term “rights”, instead of “securities”.    
  
On the other hand, it is clearly possible (and generally probable) that a single interpreter 
may attribute different meanings to the same treaty provision depending on which 
contracting State applies it. In this case, however, as long as the domestic law meanings 
of the terms employed in the various authentic texts substantially overlap with each other 
and with their “general meaning”, it is not the multilingual character of the tax treaty that 
causes a single treaty provision1762 to have two different meanings when applied by the 
two contracting States. It is the reference to those States’ domestic law encompassed in 
                                                     
1759 The author chose the term “rights” for the present English translation as a neutral term, that being a term 
used more than once in the current English official version of Article 10(3) OECD Model. 
1760 See K. Vogel et al., Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 
1997), p. 39, m.no. 72a. 
1761 See G. Melis, L’Interpretazione nel Diritto Tributario (Padova: Cedam, 2003), p. 622. 
1762 According to Article 33 VCLT, a treaty provision remains a single treaty provision regardless of the 
number of authentic texts by means of which it is expressed. 
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Article 3(2) of the tax treaty (and, therefore, the treaty intrinsic multijuarlism) that 
entails it: two texts, one treaty; one treaty, two rules. This multiplicity of meanings, 
therefore, is outside the scope and purpose of the treaty’s final clause; it is not an issue 
that clause deals with.1763  
 Take, for instance, Article 15 of the 1978 Brazil-Italy tax treaty. It employs the 
term “emprego” in the Portuguese authentic text and the term “attività dipendente” in the 
Italian authentic text as corresponding to the term “employment” used in the English 
authentic text, which prevails in the case of doubt. Assuming that the “general meaning” 
of such terms substantially corresponds to the meaning of the term “employment” under 
English law, the domestic law meaning of the term “attività dipendente” under Italian 
law (the same, mutatis mutandis, holds true for the Portuguese term “emprego”) 
substantially overlaps with that “general meaning” (in the sense that the prototypical 
employment relations are covered by both). It is therefore reasonable for the interpreter 
to use the Italian law meaning of the term “attività dipendente” to construe Article 15 
where Italy is the contracting State applying the treaty. The fact that the English text 
prevails in the case of divergences does not compel the interpreter to set aside the Italian 
domestic law meaning of the term “attività dipendente” only because the item of income 
at stake (for instance, the income paid for an activity carried out by a person under the 
coordination, but not under the full control and direction, of a third party), which is 
denoted by the latter term under Italian law, it is not denoted by the term “employment” 
under, say, English law. 
 
Accordingly, the author rejects the position taken by Edwardes-Ker that “there may be 
no alternative to an autonomous interpretation of terms in a tax treaty where the sole text 
[…], or the text which is to prevail in the case of a divergence of interpretation […], is 




5.5.3. The relevance of non-authentic versions 
 
It has already been pointed out that, in the system of the VCLT, no explicit relevance is 
attached to non-authentic language versions, such as the official translations produced by 
                                                     
1763 This conclusion is further supported by the following analysis. If the interpreter decided to rely solely on 
the prevailing text, in order to interpret the legal jargon terms employed therein he should, pursuant to Article 
3(2), refer to the meanings that those terms have under the law of the contracting State applying the treaty. 
Unfortunately, however, such terms most probably do not have any meaning under that domestic law since 
they are not used in it, the domestic law of that contracting State being drafted solely in the official language of 
that State. The interpreter, therefore, should decide which terms, expressed in the latter language, best 
correspond to the terms used in the prevailing treaty text: in order to do so, the best guidance available would 
certainly be the authentic treaty text drafted in the official language of the contracting State applying the treaty. 
Which would bring the interpreter back to the starting point, provided that the domestic law meaning of the 
relevant term employed in that text substantially overlaps with the “general meaning” common to the 
corresponding terms used in the various authentic texts. 
1764 See M. Edwardes-Ker, Tax Treaty Interpretation. The International Tax Treaties Service (Dublin: In-
Depth, 1994 – loose-leaf), at 7.02. 
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the contracting States. However, it has also been submitted that nothing seems to prevent 
the interpreter from taking them into account as supplementary means of interpretation, 
attributing an interpretative weight to them that varies depending on the available 
evidence that such language versions may contribute to determining the common 
intention of the parties.1765  
 
Consider a tax treaty authenticated only in a neutral language, a non-authentic version of 
which exists drafted in the official language of a contracting State. If such a non-
authentic version had been issued by the government of the latter State and the treaty 
negotiators had been closely involved in its drafting, the interpreter would have a 
reasonable argument to support the view that the meaning that the above contracting 
State intended to attribute to the terms employed in the authentic treaty text is the 
meaning that the corresponding legal jargon terms used in the non-authentic version 
(official translation) have under that State’s domestic law. This conclusion is 
strengthened where the latter terms reproduce those generally used by that contracting 
State in the authentic texts of other tax treaties drafted in its own official language,1766 
since in this case it reasonable to assume that the other contracting State was aware of 
the former State’s treaty practice when concluding the treaty.1767 
 
Notably, the official translation may play a role in this process of meaning refinement 
only insofar the domestic law meaning determined on the basis thereof substantially 
overlaps with the “general meaning” established by construing the sole authentic treaty 
text in accordance with Articles 31 and 32 VCLT. In order to establish such a “general 
meaning”, the interpreter may still use the official translation as a supplementary means 
of interpretation, but, as such, its weight in the interpretative and argumentative process 
will be limited. 
 
The evidential value of the official translations clearly increases where both official 
translations issued by the contracting States point to the same “general meaning”. In this 
case, the interpreter might even have an argument to challenge the “general meaning” 
prima facie resulting from the authentic treaty text and to construe the latter more 
liberally in light of such enlightening supplementary means of interpretation, as well as 
to critically review its initial assessment of the other available interpretative elements 
and items of evidence.  
 Whether the interpreter will ultimately attribute to the terms employed in the sole 
authentic treaty text the prima facie “general meaning” established on the basis of that 
text, or the apparently conflicting “general meaning” determined on the basis of the 
                                                     
1765 See, in particular, section 3.2.4 of Chapter 4 of Part II. 
1766 The same reasoning applies with regard to the official tax treaty model (containing a provision similar to 
the one included in the tax treaty to be interpreted) of that State, provided that it is publicly available for 
consultation. 
1767 Obviously, this conclusion would hold true unless the context required a different interpretation, for 
instance where the domestic law meaning so determined appeared outside the scope of the “general meaning” 
established on the basis of the sole authentic treaty text. 
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contracting States’ official translations is a matter of discretionary judgment. The choice 
for the latter alternative, nonetheless, should be supported by strong arguments relying 
on the actual facts and circumstances, in the absence of which preference should be 
given to the “general meaning” established on the basis of the authentic treaty text.  
 
In the previous sections, it has also been submitted that non-authentic language versions 
may come into play as documents on which the subsequent practice of the parties is 
based, particularly where they have been put into public circulation and relied upon by 
all the parties for the purpose of applying the relevant treaty. This, however, does not 
seem to be a realistic scenario with regard to tax treaties.  
 
 
5.5.4. Two special instances of interaction between Article 3(2) OECD Model and 
Article 33 VCLT 
 
To conclude, two special instances of the interaction between Article 3(2) of OECD 
Model-type tax treaties and Article 33 VCLT are practically illustrated by the following 
examples. 
 
The first instance concerns the 1967 France-United States tax treaty, which was 
authenticated solely in the French and English languages. Article 11(6) of that treaty 
provides that: 
 
Royalties paid for the use of […] property […] in a State shall be treated as income from 
sources within that State 
 
Les redevances payées dans un Etat pour l’usage […] des biens […] sont considérées 
comme des revenues ayant leur source dans cet Etat  
 
While the English authentic text seems to suggest that the source of the royalties is the 
State where the property is used, the French authentic text seems to point to the State 
where the payment is made, which in turn raises the issue of which is to be regarded as 
the State of payment where the payor, the payee and the bank accounts credited and 
debited are situated in different States. 
 In this respect, the suggestion has been made that the application of Article 33(4) 
VCLT would favor the meaning ordinarily attributable to the English authentic text since 
the place of payment is of less significance than the place of use in determining the 
source of royalties.1768  
 This a typical example of how the encyclopedic knowledge and personal 
background of the interpreter may play a decisive role in choosing the interpretation to 
be given to a treaty provision, where no clearly conclusive elements and items of 
evidence appear to exist in favor of one of the possible alternative constructions. The 
                                                     
1768 See J. F. Avery Jones et al., “The interpretation of tax treaties with particular reference to Article 3(2) of 
the OECD Model”, British Tax Review (1984), 14 et seq. and 90 et seq., at 103. 
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solution proposed, in fact, is argued for solely on the basis of an alleged major 
“significance” of one criterion over another, without any analysis of the solutions 
adopted by the same States in other treaties and in the OECD Model, of the economic 
studies available (if any) concerning the primacy of the place of use as criterion of 
economic allegiance, of the relevant provisions of the domestic tax laws of the 
contracting States, of the administrative issues connected with establishing the States 
where the intangible property is used and with apportioning for tax purposes the royalty 
payment among such States. In a nutshell, the solution proposed is not argued for on the 
basis of any in-depth analysis committed to determine the possible common intention of 
the parties and, as such, it might be criticized as one substituting the preference of the 
interpreter for the agreement of the parties. 
 From a procedural standpoint, however, the major flaw of such a solution is that 
of not attempting to apply Article 2(2) of the tax treaty, which corresponds to Article 
3(2) of the OECD Model. This could have perhaps shown that the English and French 
texts reflected the criteria used under the domestic law of the United States and France, 
respectively, for the purpose of determining the source of royalty payments. If that was 
the case, the apparent divergence of meanings would have proved to be an actual 
divergence of meanings demanded by the operation of the general rule of interpretation 
provided for under Article 2(2) of the treaty. Each contracting State would have been 
entitled to tax the royalties sourced within its territory according to its domestic law and 
the other State (the residence State) would have been then obliged to relieve juridical 
double taxation in accordance with Article 23 of the tax treaty.1769 From this standpoint, 
the “general meaning” of the corresponding expressions used in the English and French 
authentic texts of the treaty seems to coincide with the concept of “royalty source” under 
the respective domestic laws, since the concepts underlying such expressions appear to 
have a similar function within the respective tax systems. 
 France and the United States later modified the wording of Article 11(6) of the 
treaty by means of Article VI of the 1988 Protocol, which seems to support the above 
construction of the original texts (and, thus, of the original intention of the parties). 
According to the new English texts (emphasis added): 
 
(a) Royalties shall be deemed to arise in a Contracting State when the payer is that State 
itself, a local authority, a statutory body or a resident of that State 
(b) Where, however, the person paying the royalties, whether he is a resident of a 
Contracting State or not, has in a Contracting State a permanent establishment or a fixed 
base in connection with which the liability to pay the royalties was incurred, and such 
royalties are borne by such permanent establishment or fixed base, then such royalties 
shall be deemed to arise in the Contracting State in which the permanent establishment or 
fixed base is situated. 
(c) Notwithstanding subparagraphs (a) and (b), royalties paid for the use of or the right to 
                                                     
1769 The only authentic drawback of this approach is that both contracting States could claim the royalties as 
sourced in their respective territories, thus determining a possible instance of double taxation due to a conflict 
of qualification (one State considerying Article 11 applicable, while the other considering Articles 6 or 22 
applicable). That, however, is a problem common to other cases of conflicts of qualification and should be 
solved accordingly. 
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use property in the United States shall be deemed to arise therein 
 
The second instance illustrates how Article 33 VCLT may be relied upon in order 
interpret the very same Article 3(2) of the relevant tax treaty.  
 Article 3(2) of the 1970 Belgium-Unites States tax treaty presents a curious 
potential difference of meanings among its three authentic texts. On the one hand, the 
English and Dutch texts provide that each undefined term has the meaning it has under 
the domestic law of the State whose tax is being determined, “unless the context 
otherwise requires” (“tenzij het zinsverband anders vereist”).1770 On the other hand, the 
French authentic text does not contain any reference to the fact that the context might 
require a different interpretation.  
 In this case, the interpreter could argue that the reference to the context should be 
regarded as implicit in the French authentic text of Article 3(2), since (i) it seems more 
plausible that the parties unknowingly omitted the reference in one of three authentic 
texts, rather than erroneously inserted it in two of them; (ii) the reference to the context 
otherwise requiring may be considered an explicit expression of the principle that tax 
treaties are to be interpreted in good faith;1771 (iii) both the English and  French official 
versions of the OECD Model, as well as the United States Model and the vast majority 
of the tax treaties concluded by the two contracting States, include a reference to the 
context in Article 3(2) and one may presume that, if such States actually intended to 
depart from that customary standard, they would have made it clear.  
 
 
6. The practice of national courts and tribunals in interpreting multilingual tax 
treaties 
 
In the vast majority of cases domestic courts and tribunals refer to a single authentic text 
for the purpose of construing tax treaty provisions, that text generally being the one 
drafted in the official language of the State of the court or tribunal.  
 A proof of this statement is given by the fact that in the first 12 annual volumes of 
the International Tax Law Reports, there are fewer than ten decisions in which the 
                                                     
1770 The Dutch term “zinsverband” has sometimes been considered to have a narrower meaning than the 
English term “context”: according to De Broe, the former would ordinarily denote solely the text of the treaty 
to be interpreter and not external (extra-textual) materials, thus being narrower even of the context as defined 
by Article 31(2) VCLT (see L. De Broe, International Tax Planning and Prevention of Abuse. A Study under 
Domestic Tax Law, Tax Treaties and EC Law in relation to Conduit and Base Companies (Amsterdam: IBFD 
Publications, 2008), pp. 276-277).  According to that author, however, Article 33(4) VCLT should lead the 
interpreter to attribute to such a term the wider meaning that the terms “context” and “contexte” seem to have 
in the English and French authentic texts of Belgian tax treaties (where used). See, similarly, Hoge Raad, 5 
September 2003, case 37651, BNB 2003/379. See, contra, with reference to Netherlands tax treaties, F. 
Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2004), 
p.490. 
1771 See Article 31(1) VCLT. See also, although concerning the requirement of an implicit limitation to the 
ambulatory nature of Article 3(2) renvoi, J. F. Avery Jones et al., “The interpretation of tax treaties with 
particular reference to article 3(2) of the OECD Model”, British Tax Review (1984), 14 et seq. and 90 et seq., at 
48.  
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competent court or tribunal has taken into account more than one authentic text in order 
to interpret the relevant tax treaty.1772  
 
As previously discussed, such a practice is in line with customary international law, as 
reflected in Article 33 VCLT.1773 That notwithstanding, this approach presents the 
inconvenience that possible alternative interpretations, which could be suggested by the 
analysis of the other authentic texts of the tax treaty, are not taken into account by the 
interpreter, especially where the latter tend to attribute an overwhelming relevance to the 
letter of the treaty over the other elements of the overall context.  
 The unattractive effects of this approach may be amplified by the time factor. 
Where the tax treaty was concluded many years before its application, it probably 
employs legal jargon terms that were chosen by the contracting States on the basis of the 
domestic legal systems in force at the time of the treaty conclusion, which could have 
gone through major changes since then. As a result, the legal concepts underlying the 
legal jargon terms used in the treaty could no longer have the same function in the 
current domestic legal environment as they had in the domestic legal system in force at 
the time of the treaty conclusion and, therefore, the reference thereto for the purpose of 
construing the corresponding terms employed in the treaty could lead to unsatisfactory 
results. To put it differently, a plain “literal” interpretation of such terms, without a full 
understanding of the reasons why they had been selected and employed in the treaty at 
the time of its conclusion, as well as of the object and purpose of the treaty provisions 
employing them, might lead to constructions that are unreasonable or lacking in the 
appropriate argumentative support. In that respect, the comparison of different authentic 
texts may be sometimes useful to highlight prima facie discrepancies that, in turn, could 
be regarded as requiring a review of the initial “too literal” construction of the tax treaty 
                                                     
1772 See also the statement of De Boek according to which “Belgian courts and tribunals seem reluctant to 
consult and compare on their own initiative the different authentic versions of a treaty, or to give precedence to 
a text in a language different from that of the court over the text in the lingua fori. One result of this approach 
[…] is that Belgian case law on divergent formulations in different treaty languages is virtually non-existent” 
(R. De Boek, “Belgium”, in G. Maisto (ed.), Multilingual Texts and Interpretation of Tax Treaties and EC Tax 
Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2005), 165 et seq., at 166; ibidem, at 179); see, similarly, the statement 
of Rust that even in German case law “it is very rare to find a decision in which the court refers to the other 
language version” (A. Rust, “Germany”, in G. Maisto (ed.), Multilingual Texts and Interpretation of Tax 
Treaties and EC Tax Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2005), 221 et seq., at 226) and that of Waldburger, 
according to whom it is extremely seldom that issues of tax treaty linguistic discrepancies are raised and 
discussed before Swiss courts (see R. Waldburger, “Die Auslegung von Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen in der 
Rechtsprechung des Schweizerischen Bundesgerichts”, in M. Lang, J. M. Mössner, R. Waldburger (eds.), Die 
Auslegung von Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen in der Rechtsprechung der Höchstgerichte Deutschlands, der 
Schweiz und der Österreichs (Vienna: Linde, 1998), 51 et seq., at 56. 
1773 Contra, K. Vogel et al., Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 1997), p. 38, m.no. 72.  
On the other hand, the judicial practice of using a language version (typically a translation in the official 
language of the court or tribunal) other than the authentic texts of the relevant tax treaty in order to construe its 
provisions (this is often the case where the tax treaty to be interpreted has only one authentic text, drafted in a 
language different from the official language of the contracting State applying the treaty) appears not be in 
conformity with Article 33 VCLT, unless such language version is used as an aid to the construction of the 
authentic text of the tax treaty. 
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provisions at stake in light of the overall context of the treaty.1774 
 
The few cases found by the author in which courts and tribunals have dealt with the 
multilingual character of the relevant tax treaty are reported below. These cases do not 
add much to the analysis carried out in the previous sections of this chapter and in 
Chapter 4. 
 
In a decision delivered on 14 April 1965, the District Court of Tokyo (Japan), made 
reference to the English authentic text of the 1954 Japan-United States tax treaty in order 
to clarify the meaning of the Japanese authentic text thereof.1775 
 
In the Furness Withy case, Thurlow J. of the Exchequer Court (Canada) had recourse to 
and relied on a French translation of the 1946 Canada-United Kingdom tax treaty, which 
had been authenticated only in English, in order to interpret Article V of that treaty.1776 
However, Abbott J. of the Supreme Court, while upholding the decision of the lower 
court, explicitly stated that he did “not rely upon the translation of the Convention”,1777 
most probably since the French translation was not an authoritative text for interpretative 
purposes.1778 
 
In case 16305 of 4 February 1970,1779 the Hoge Raad (the Netherlands), made reference 
                                                     
1774 Consider, for example, Articles 5(3) and 11(2) of the 1925 Germany-Italy tax treaty, which provide that the 
provisions of the tax treaty concerning dividends paid to shareholders apply as well to income (profits 
distribution) from other rights that are similar in nature to shares, but not to income derived from other forms 
of participation in companies. A prima facie discrepancy exists between the German and the Italian authentic 
texts of those articles, since the former use the term “Wertpapieren”, while the latter employ the term “valori 
mobiliari” for the English term rights: while the German legal jargon term “Wertpapieren” substantially 
corresponds to the English term “securities”, thus requiring the incorporation of the relevant rights into 
certificates for circulation purposes, the Italian legal jargon term “valori mobiliari” has a wider bearing and 
might be used to denote corporate rights not represented by securities, i.e. not incorporated in any certificate. In 
that respect, it is interesting to note that, while German scholars and courts have generally resolved such a 
discrepancy in favor of the meaning prima facie attributable to the German authentic text (see, for instance, K. 
Vogel et al., Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997), p. 
39, m.no. 72a; A. Rust, “Germany”, in G. Maisto (ed.), Multilingual Texts and Interpretation of Tax Treaties 
and EC Tax Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2005), 221 et seq., at 230-231; Tax Court of Rheinland-
Pfalz (Germany), 2 April 1980, case V 351/79, Entscheidungen der Finanzgerichte (1980), 357 et seq.; 
Bundesfinanzhof (Germany), 9 December 1981, case IR 78/80, Bundessteuerblatt. Teil II (1982), 243 et seq.; 
Tax Court of Munich (Germany), 22 July 1998, case 9 K 2830/97, Haufe-Index 952357), Italian tax authorities 
have construed the treaty in accordance with the prima facie meaning of the Italian authentic text (see G. B. 
Galli and A. Miraulo, “Italy”, in International Fiscal Association, Cahiers de droit fiscal international, Vol. 
78a (Deventer: Kluwer, 1993), 385 et seq., at 395; G. Melis, L’Interpretazione nel Diritto Tributario (Padova: 
Cedam, 2003), p. 622). 
1775 District Court of Tokyo (Japan), 14 April 1965, 11 Shomu Geppo, 817 et seq., cited in M. Nakazato, 
“Japan”, in International Fiscal Association, Cahiers de droit fiscal international, Vol. 78a (Deventer: Kluwer, 
1993), 407 et seq., at 414. 
1776 Exchequer Court (Canada), 24 August 1966, Furness, Withy and Co. v. R., 66 DTC 5358, para. 22.  
1777 Supreme Court (Canada), 29 January 1968, Furness, Withy and Co. v. R., in 68 DTC 5033, at 5035.  
1778 See similarly M. Edwardes-Ker, Tax Treaty Interpretation. The International Tax Treaties Service (Dublin: 
In-Depth, 1994 – loose-leaf), at 20.04. 
1779 Hoge Raad (Netherlands), 4 February 1970, case 16305, BNB 1970/71. 
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to both the Dutch and German authentic texts of Article 2 of the 1959 Germany-
Netherlands tax treaty and construed them as both requiring a single construction project 
to last more than twelve months before a permanent establishment came to existence. 
 
In the Vauban case,1780 Addy J. of the Federal Court (Canada), compared the French and 
English authentic texts of Article 13(III) of the 1951 Canada-France tax treaty and noted 
that, while the former read “Les produits ou redevances (royalties) provenant de la vente 
[…]”, the latter read “The proceeds of royalties (redevances) derived from the sale 
[…]”.1781 On the basis of such a comparison, he concluded: “It seems clear that there is a 
typographical error in the English version and that the word “of” between the words 
“proceeds” and “royalties” should read “or,” the correct text therefore being: “The 
proceeds or royalties (redevances) derived from ...” ”.1782 
 
In case 18010 of 26 January 1977,1783 the Hoge Raad (the Netherlands) had to decide 
whether the relief limitation provided for under Article 6 of the 1967 Netherlands-United 
Kingdom tax treaty in relation to income not remitted to the United Kingdom applied 
also to pension payments from the Netherlands to United Kingdom resident persons, the 
latter being otherwise exempt in the Netherlands under Article 20 of the treaty. The 
English authentic text of Article 6 provided that “[w]here under any provision of [the 
treaty] income is relieved from Netherlands tax and, under the law in force in the United 
Kingdom, an individual, in respect of the said income, is subject to tax by reference to 
the amount thereof which is remitted to or received in the United Kingdom and not by 
reference to the full amount thereof, then the relief to be allowed under the [treaty] in the 
Netherlands shall apply only to so much of the income as is remitted to or received in the 
United Kingdom”.1784 The Dutch authentic text of Article 6, however, used the term 
“vermindering” as corresponding to the English term “relief”, the former being a legal 
jargon term generally used for denoting a reduction or decrease in taxation, as opposed 
to the term “vrijstelling”, which denotes an exemption from tax. The Hoge Raad 
compared the two authentic texts and concluded that Article 6 applied only where there 
was a reduction of tax under the relevant treaty provision, such as for instance under the 
dividends article, while it did not apply where the treaty provided for an exemption, as 
was the case with regard to pension payments under Article 20 of the treaty, due to the 
clear wording of the Dutch authentic text.1785  
                                                     
1780 Federal Court (Canada), 5 September 1975, Vauban Productions v. R, 75 DTC 5371. 
1781 Emphasis added. 
1782 Federal Court (Canada), 5 September 1975, Vauban Productions v. R, 75 DTC 5371, paras. 9-10. 
1783 Hoge Raad (Netherlands), 26 January 1977, case 18010, BNB 1977/111. See also O. C. R. Marres and S. 
van Weeghel, Jurisprudentiebundel IBR (Deventer: Kluwer, 2008), pp. 1458 et seq.  
1784 Emphasis added. 
1785 The reference to the clear wording of the Dutch authentic text should probably be read in light of Article 
3(2) of the treaty, which, for the purpose of interpretation, made a renvoi to the domestic law meaning of the 
contracting State applying the treaty, subject to the context not requiring a different interpretation: the term 
“vermindering” being a legal jargon term under Netherlands domestic tax law, the Court possibly found that its 
domestic law meaning was unambiguous and applied it.  
The Court, however, could have convincingly held differently on the basis of the context requiring the 
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In the IR 63/80 case,1786 the Bundesfinanzhof (Germany) had to decide whether the 
income received by a German resident taxpayer, formally employed by a German 
resident company, for a short-term (147 days) activity carried on in Spain for the benefit 
and under the direction of a Spanish resident company, was taxable in Spain and, 
therefore, to be exempted in Germany under the 1966 Germany-Spain tax treaty. As a 
matter of fact, although the salary relating to such an activity had been formally paid to 
the employee by the German employer, it was then charged, together with other 
auxiliary costs, by the latter to the Spanish resident company.  
 The Court concluded that the Spanish resident company was to be regarded as the 
employer (“Arbeitgeber” in the German authentic text) for the purpose of Article 15 of 
the treaty and, as a consequence, the income was taxable in Spain and had to be 
exempted from tax in Germany under Article 23(1) of the treaty.  
 In supporting its decision, the Bundesfinanzhof made reference to the two sole 
authentic texts of Article 15(2)(b), in the German and Spanish languages, and compared 
the different wording used therein. It noted that, while the German authentic text referred 
to an employer (“die Vergütungen von einem Arbeitgeber oder für einen Arbeitgeber 
gezahlt werden, der nicht in dem anderen Staat ansässig ist”),1787 the Spanish authentic 
text employed the more general term person (“Las remuneraciones se pagan por o en 
nombre de una persona que no es residente del otro Estado”).1788 According to the 
German tax authorities, this different wording was to be ascribed to the fact that the only 
text drafted and agreed upon by the negotiators was in English1789 and that the Spanish 
and German authentic texts were later translations. The Court, however, referred to 
Article 33 VCLT and stated that, on the one hand, both authentic texts were equally 
authoritative for interpretative purposes and, on the one hand, they were presumed to 
have the same meaning. It considered that, under Article 3(2) of the treaty (similar to 
Article 3(2) of the 1963 OECD Draft), it was possible to disregard the meaning 
attributed to a treaty undefined term by the domestic laws of the contracting States where 
the context plainly pointed to the (different) meaning agreed upon by the parties: in the 
case at stake, the context1790 required the salary to be regarded as paid by or on behalf of 
the Spanish resident company, since it was deductible from the latter’s profits taxable in 
                                                                                                                                  
interpreter to disregard the domestic law meaning. It could have argued, for instance, that the object and 
purpose of Article 6 was to avoid there being little or no taxation in the Netherlands on items of income not 
taxed in the United Kingdom due to the absence of remittance. In this respect, a construction of Article 6 
purported to make it applicable also in the case of potential exemptions in the Netherlands, due to the operation 
of the given treaty provisions, would have appeared more consonant with the object and purpose of the 
provision itself. Moreover, the Court could have held that an exemption from tax might be denoted as being an 
extreme case of “reduction” of the tax normally applied under Netherlands domestic law due to the tax treaty 
(see, substantially in accordance, J. F. Avery Jones et al., “The interpretation of tax treaties with particular 
reference to article 3(2) of the OECD Model”, British Tax Review (1984), 14 et seq. and 90 et seq., at 103). 
1786 Bundesfinanzhof (Germany), 21 August 1985, case IR 63/80, in Bundessteuerblatt. Teil II (1986), 4 et seq. 
1787 Emphasis added. 
1788 Emphasis added. In Article 15(2)(c), however, the term “persona” was qualified by the expression “para 
quien se trabaje”. 
1789 Interestingly, that draft did not become an authentic text of the treaty. 
1790 Which included the overall structure of Article 15, in particular Article 15(2)(b) and (c). 





In case 1169-1987,1791 the Supreme Administrative Court (Sweden) had to interpret 
Articles II(2) and XII(3) of the 1960 Sweden-United Kingdom tax treaty, as modified by 
the 1968 Protocol. For the purpose of construing such articles, the Court majority paid 
particular attention to the English authentic text thereof since, although both the English 
and Swedish texts of the treaty were authentic, the 1968 Protocol had been negotiated in 
English and thus the English text might, in the specific case, be regarded as expressing 
more accurately the common intention of the parties. 
 Under Article XII(3) of the treaty, gains from the alienation of properties, other 
than immovable property and movable property forming part of the business property of 
a permanent establishment, were taxable only in the State of residence. However, Article 
II(2) of the English authentic text provided as follows:  
 
“Where under this Convention income from a source [author’s note: “inkomst från 
inkomstkälla” in the Swedish authentic text] in one of the territories is relieved from tax in 
that territory and, under the law in force in the other territory, an individual, in respect of 
the said income, is subject to tax by reference to the amount thereof which is remitted to or 
received in that other territory and not by reference to the full amount thereof, then the 
relief to be allowed under this convention in the first-mentioned territory shall apply only 
to so much of the income as is remitted to or received in the other territory.”  
  
The issue before the Court concerned whether the gain realized by a Swedish citizen, 
emigrated in the United Kingdom with his family and considered resident but not 
domiciled therein for tax purposes, from the alienation of shares in a Swedish resident 
company was taxable in Sweden under the 1960 Sweden-United Kingdom tax treaty. 
The taxpayer, being resident but not domiciled in the United Kingdom, would have been 
subject to tax therein on such a gain only insofar as the proceeds from the alienation of 
the shares had been remitted to the United Kingdom, which was not the case. The main 
interpretative issue before the Court, thus, was whether the gain had to be considered 
“income from a source” in Sweden for the purpose of Article II(2). 
 The Court first noted that, under Swedish income tax law, gains from the 
alienation of shares in Swedish companies realized by non-resident taxpayers were 
taxable in Sweden if the taxpayer had been resident of Sweden at any time during the ten 
years proceeding the year of alienation. However, Article XII(3) of the treaty 
theoretically precluded Sweden from taxing such a gain. That conclusion could be 
reversed only by means of the application of Article II(2), which implied the need for the 
Court to interpret it.  
 In this respect, the Court pointed out that, in construing a tax treaty, the 
fundamental task for the interpreter is to determine the original (common) intention of 
                                                     
1791 Supreme Administrative Court (Sweden), 23 December 1987, case RÅ 1987 ref. 162, Regeringsrättens 
årsbok (1987) (also reported in summary in IBFD Tax Treaty Case Law Database). The decision was taken by 
a majority of three to two judges. See also P. Sundgren, “Interpretation of Tax Treaties – A Case Study”, 
British Tax Review (1990), 286 et seq.; and M. Edwardes-Ker, Tax Treaty Interpretation. The International 
Tax Treaties Service (Dublin: In-Depth, 1994 – loose-leaf), at 20.05. 
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the parties and that, in order to do so in the specific case, the starting point was 
represented by the Swedish authentic text of the treaty, although the interpreter could 
rely as well on the other authentic texts in order to elucidate the intended meaning of the 
terms employed. Since the treaty negotiations seemed, in the Court’s eyes, to have been 
conducted in the English language, the Court concluded that, in the specific case, the 
English text was to be attributed a particular weight for the purpose of determining the 
original intention of the parties.1792 
 A careful analysis of the English authentic text led the court to investigate the 
meaning the term “income”, being a legal jargon term, had under the domestic law of the 
United Kingdom. The answer found by the Court was that United Kingdom tax law 
draws a clear line between the concepts underlying the terms “income” and “capital 
gains”. Moreover, while the expressions “inkomst från inkomstkälla” was not used under 
Swedish tax law, the corresponding English “income from a source” was recognized as a 
well-known legal jargon term under United Kingdom tax law. In particular, the Court 
emphasized that gains derived from the alienation of shares in a Swedish resident 
company would clearly not be denoted by the term “income from source” under United 
                                                     
1792 The decision was harshly criticized by Sundgren (see P. Sundgren, “Interpretation of Tax Treaties – A Case 
Study”, British Tax Review (1990), 286 et seq., at 299-301), who submitted that the Court majority, in 
attributing more weight to the drafted text over the other authentic text, committed a clear violation of the 
principle of equality of texts (quoting P. Germer, “Interpretation of Plurilingual Treaties: A Study of Article 33 
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties”, 11 Harvard International Law Journal (1970), 400 et seq., 
at 400 and 418; see, accordingly, K. Vogel et al., Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions (The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International, 1997), p. 39, m.no. 72a). He then added that it is quite normal that the process of 
negotiating bilateral tax treaties is conducted in English by Swedish representatives and that the text initialed at 
the end of such a process is drafted in the English language only. However, according to Sundgren, after the 
negotiations are concluded, a lot of efforts goes into the Swedish translation and subsequently all future 
authentic texts are meticulously scrutinized by both contracting States before signing them. He concluded by 
stating that “[t]he fact that the text was originally drawn up in English and initialled by civil servants 
representing the treaty partners must not be regarded as a concession by Sweden for interpretative purposes. 
This is the whole point of equally authoritative texts” (ibidem, at 300). The author, however, agrees with 
Edwardes-Ker (see M. Edwardes-Ker, Tax Treaty Interpretation. The International Tax Treaties Service 
(Dublin: In-Depth, 1994 – loose-leaf), at 20.05) holding: “The equality of treaty texts cannot change the reality 
that all treaty texts may not be equally clear […] It does not alter the fact that a treaty text in one language 
(such as that in which it was originally negotiated, drafted and initialed) may well be a truer reflection of both 
States’ understanding than an equally authoritative, albeit less helpful, text which only came into existence as a 
translation of this initialed text.”  
Noticeably, the very same Sundgren, with regard to a subsequent case (Supreme Administrative Court 
(Sweden), 25 March 2004, case RÅ 2004 ref. 59, Regeringsrättens årsbok (2004), stated the following: “The 
preparatory works of tax treaties are very few. However, the negotiations of these treaties made by Sweden are 
always conducted in English and will thus always result in an initialled draft in that language. The Swedish 
Government Bill (prop. 1967:26) of the Sweden-Peru treaty explicitly mentions the existence of this initialled 
English version. This draft of the treaty is clearly a part of the preparatory work thereof and one would imagine 
that every responsible interpreter, facing a plurilingual treaty with a divergence in its authentic texts, would 
jump at the opportunity to examine such a third English text.” He then continued noting that the English 
initialled text of the 1966 Sweden-Peru tax treaty (i.e. its drafted text) contained “interesting information not 
only regarding the divergence between the two [authentic texts of the tax treaty], but it also cast[ed] light […] 
on the negotiation process which is of interest in general to the understanding of the final text(s)” (see P. 
Sundgren, “Interpretation of tax treaties authenticated in two or more languages: a case study”, 73 Svensk 
skattetidning (2006), 378 et seq., available on-line at the following URL: 
http://www.skatter.se/index.php?q=node/1079; accessed on 23 July 2011). 
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Kingdom law since capital gains were outside the intension of that term and, at the same 
time, such gains would not be denoted by the expression “inkomst från inkomstkälla” 
under Swedish tax law either since, on the basis of Swedish case law, such capital gains, 
although being considered to form part of the income of the taxpayer, were generally 
considered not to have any source. It ultimately concluded, with a majority of three to 
two judges, that the term “income from a source” was to be construed as not including 
capital gains arising from the sale of Swedish companies’ shares.1793  
 In order to support its conclusion, the Court also made reference to the Swedish 
government bill bringing the 1968 Protocol into force, which stated that the amendments 
made by the Protocol, among which the provision of Article II(2), were of a formal 
nature and that capital gains from the alienation of properties, other than immovable 
property and movable property forming part of the business property of a permanent 
establishment, were to be taxed only in the residence State. From such notations, the 
Court drew the inference that the intention of the parties, when they agreed upon the text 
of the 1968 Protocol, was not to extend the right to tax of Sweden over such capital gains 
realized by a United Kingdom resident. In addition, the Court observed that the United 
Kingdom tax authorities had repeatedly taken the position that Article II(2) did not apply 
to capital gains, that being a relevant subsequent practice by a contracting State giving 
evidence of its interpretation of the treaty provisions.  
 
In the IR 369/83 case,1794 the Bundesfinanzhof (Germany) had to decide whether a 
German resident individual who carried out some engineering activities in Italy was to 
be exempt in Germany under Article 7(1)(1) of the 1925 Italy-Germany tax treaty. In 
that respect, the Bundesfinanzhof analysed both the German and the Italian authentic 
texts of Article 7(1)(1) and concluded that both attributed an exclusive taxing right to the 
source State only under the condition that the taxpayer had the power of dispose over the 
premises where he performed his activity.1795 Since, as a matter of fact, the taxpayer did 
                                                     
1793 In the separate opinion of the two dissenting judges, holding in favor of the application of Article II(2) to 
capital gains, heavy emphasis was put on the object and purpose of Article II(2), namely the avoidance of the 
double non-taxation otherwise caused by the United Kingdom domestic law providing for taxation on a 
remittance basis of resident but not domiciled individuals. 
The argument developed by the dissenting judges was broadly built upon the following points: (i) the term 
“inkomst”, as used under Swedish domestic tax law, denoted both ordinary income and capital gains; (ii) the 
previous point constituted strong evidence of the fact that the Swedish negotiators, when agreeing upon the text 
of the 1968 Protocol, intended the terms “inkomst” and “income”, as employed in new Article II(2) of the 
treaty, to denote capital gains as well; (iii) in the text of the 1960 Sweden-United Kingdom tax treaty, the terms 
“inkomst” and “income” had been generally used to denote both ordinary income and capital gains; (iv) the 
expression “inkomst från inkomstkälla” was to be construed, in its context, as simply requiring that a certain 
item of income had a sufficiently strong connection with the territory of a contracting State; (v) the object and 
purpose of Article II(2), i.e. to avoid double non-taxation where no remittance to the United Kingdom had 
occurred, would have been frustrated by an interpretation excluding capital gains from the scope of that article; 
(vi) capital gains realized by Swedish non-resident individuals from the alienation of shares in Swedish 
resident companies became taxable in Sweden only in 1983 and, therefore, they could not be the subject of any 
intended exclusion by the parties at the time of the conclusion of the 1968 Protocol.  
1794 Bundesfinanzhof (Germany), 3 February 1988, case IR 369/83, Bundessteuerblatt. Teil II (1988), 486 et 
seq.  
1795 According to the Court, such a condition was implicitly required by the use of the terms “fester 
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not have any control over the premises where he performed his activities, the Court 
concluded that Germany could tax the relevant income.   
 
In a decision delivered on 10 May 1989,1796 the Tax Recourse Commission of Zurich 
(Switzerland) held that the term “vorübergehend” employed in the German authentic text 
of Article X of the 1951 Switzerland-United States tax treaty, dealing with income from 
labor and personal services, was to be given the same meaning as the corresponding term 
“temporarily present” used in the English authentic text thereof. The relevant part of 
Article X of the English authentic text reads as follows: 
 
“An individual resident of [the United States] shall be exempt from [Switzerland] tax upon 
compensation for labor or personal services performed in [Switzerland] if he is temporarily 
present in [Switzerland] for a period or periods not exceeding a total of 183 days during 
the taxable year […]”1797  
 
According to the commission, since the terms “vorübergehend” and “temporarily 
present” were not defined within the treaty, they had to be construed autonomously and 
in accordance with the common intention of the contracting States. In that respect, the 
commission found that the English term “temporarily present” expressed more clearly 
the intention of the parties to distinguish, for the purpose of applying Article X, between 
(i) those individuals that intended to remain in the source State temporarily, who were to 
be exempt from tax in that State, and (ii) those intending to remain there indefinitely, 
who might be taxed by the source State even where present therein for less than 184 days 
during the relevant taxable year.1798  
 
In the cases 25373 and 25419 of 1989,1799 the Hoge Raad (the Netherlands) had to 
decide whether the income to be taken into account in the denominator of the fraction 
used to determine the tax exemption (with progression) under Article XVIII(2) of the 
1957 Canada-Netherlands tax treaty was the overall taxable income,1800 i.e. the overall 
income reduced by the personal and family deductions to which the taxpayer was 
entitled under Netherlands domestic tax law, or the overall income before the application 
of such deductions.1801  
 The Court found that the income to be taken into account in the denominator of 
the fraction was the overall taxable income. In supporting such a conclusion, the Court 
                                                                                                                                  
Mittelpunkt” and “sede fissa” in the German and Italian authentic texts of Article 7(1)(1), respectively.  
1796 Tax Recourse Commission (Switzerland), 10 May 1989, Steuerentscheid (1989), A 31.1, No. 4. 
1797 Article X(1) and (2) of the 1951 Switzerland-United States tax treaty, interpolations by the author.  
1798 For an analysis of the interaction between the requirement of the “temporarily presence” and that of the 
“183-days presence”, see, with regard to similarly worded provisions included in other tax treaties, Hoge Raad 
(Netherlands), 29 September 1999, cases 33267 and 34482, BNB 2000/16 and BNB 2000/17 and Tax Court of 
Köln (Germany), 28 November 1983, case 169/80 E, Entscheidungen der Finanzgerichte (1984), 460 et seq. 
(all briefly dealt with in this section). 
1799 Hoge Raad (Netherlands), 13 September 1989, case 25419, BNB 1990/60, and 6 December 1989, case 
25373, BNB 1990/44. 
1800 “Belastbaar inkomen” under Netherlands domestic law. 
1801 “Onzuiver inkomen” under Netherlands domestic law. 
PART II: CHAPTER 5            
 
 535 
noted that, while the Dutch authentic text of the treaty could be seen as ambiguous in 
that respect, the English authentic text was clearer in referring to the taxable income as 
determined under Netherlands domestic law.1802 Moreover, the Court found its 
conclusion to be further supported by the contextual analysis of the treaty provisions, in 
particular Article II(2) (corresponding to Article 3(2) OECD Model), and of the 
interrelation between the distributive rule Articles and Article XVIII (1) and (2).  
  
In the Thiel case,1803 the High Court of Australia was faced with the interpretation of 
Article 7 of the 1980 Australia-Switzerland tax treaty. In carrying on that task, three 
judges of the Court mentioned that, as the English and German authentic texts of the tax 
treaty were agreed to be equally authoritative, the meaning of the term “enterprise”, used 
in the English authentic text of Article 7, might have been illuminated by evidence of the 
meaning of the corresponding German term.1804 Unfortunately, the judges did not push 
the analysis further since no such evidence had been provided and the parties before the 
Court proved unable to agree upon a translation of the German text into English.1805 
  
In the case IR 106/87,1806 the Bundesfinanzhof (Germany) compared the German and 
English authentic texts of Article VI(2) of the 1964 Germany-United Kingdom tax treaty 
and concluded that they had the same meaning, i.e. that the reduction to 20% of the 
maximum withholding tax on inter-company dividends applied even in cases where the 
recipient of the dividends was exempt from tax in its State of residence. In fact, although 
a subject-to-tax condition was provided for under paragraph 1 of Article VI, which set 
out the general rule applicable to dividends paid by companies resident of one State to 
residents of the other State, the Court found that both the English and German authentic 
texts of paragraph 2 made clear that its provision applied notwithstanding the provision 
of paragraph 1. 
  
In the Gu case,1807 Bonner T.C.J. of the Federal Court (Canada) compared the French 
and English authentic texts of Article 19 of the 1986 Canada-China tax treaty (but not 
the equally authoritative Chinese text). He found that comparison, in particular with 
regard to the words “receives for the purpose of his maintenance, education or training” 
in the English text and the words “reçoit pour couvrir ses frais d'entretien, d'études ou de 
                                                     
1802 See, in particular, the decision delivered by the Court in case 25373 and the Opinion of Advocate General 
Van Soest to case 25419. 
1803 High Court (Australia), 22 August 1990, Thiel v. Commissioner of Taxation, 171 Commonwealth Law 
Reports, 338 et seq. 
1804 Ibidem, at para. 9 of the judgment delivered by Mason C.J., Brennan J. and Gaudron J. See, similarly, 
Federal Court (Australia), 4 March 1997, Lamesa Holdings BV v. Commissioner of Taxation, [1997] FCA 134, 
where the Court, for the purpose of interpreting Article 13 of the 1976 Australia-Netherlands tax treaty, 
admitted the evidence provided for by a Netherlands tax treaty expert suggesting that there was no divergence 
in the meaning between the Dutch and English authentic text thereof. 
1805 Ibidem. 
1806 See Bundesfinanzhof (Germany), 7 February 1990, case IR 106/87, 159 Sammlung der Entscheidungen des 
Bundesfinanzhofs, 518 et seq. For a similar straightforward comparison see Tax Court of Baden-Württemberg 
(Germany), 16 August 1996, case K 42/92, Entscheidungen der Finanzgerichte (1997), 82 et seq.  
1807 Federal Court (Canada), 26 April 1991, Chun Gu v. R, 91 DTC 821. 
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formation” in the French text, useful. He concluded: “That language is quite unsuited to 
describe a payment of ordinary salary no matter how the recipient ultimately spends it. 
The language suggests that the payments must in some way be related to the recipient's 
maintenance costs, education costs or training costs. Payments are not received to cover 
costs of a specified class simply because the recipient ultimately spends the money to 
meet costs of the type named.”1808  
 
In the Crown Forest case,1809 Muldoon J. of the Federal Court (Canada) compared the 
French and English authentic texts of the 1980 Canada-United States tax treaty in order 
to interpret Article IV(1) thereof, without finding any discrepancy.  
 
In case 28217 of 1992,1810 the Hoge Raad (the Netherlands) had to deal with an issue 
similar to the one tackled in the previously-mentioned cases 25373 and 25419 of 1989. 
In particular, the question to be answered was whether the income to be taken into 
account in the denominator of the fraction used to determine the tax exemption (with 
progression) under Article 20(3) of the 1959 Germany-Netherlands tax treaty was the 
overall taxable income,1811 i.e. the overall income reduced by the personal and family 
deductions to which the taxpayer was entitled under Netherlands domestic tax law, or the 
overall income before the application of such deductions.1812  
 Under Article 20(3) of the treaty, the Netherlands had to allow as deduction, from 
the tax payable according to its domestic law, the amount of such tax computed on the 
basis of the ratio between (i) the income taxable in Germany according to the tax treaty 
and (ii) the total income. The terms used to indicate the total income in the two authentic 
texts of Article 20(3)1813 of the treaty were “alle inkomensbestanddelen” in Dutch and 
“Gesamteinkommen” in German. In addition, Article 20(2) of the treaty, with reference 
to the exemption that Germany had to grant to its residents for income taxable in the 
Netherlands according to the treaty distributive rules, preserved the possibility for the 
former State to apply to the remaining income the tax rate that it would have applied to 
the taxpayer’s total income in the absence of the tax treaty. In this case, while the 
German authentic text of Article 20(2) employed the very same term 
“Gesamteinkommen” to refer to such total income, the Dutch authentic text used the 
different expression “het gehele inkomen”.  
 The Hoge Raad, unlike what it had done in respect of the differently worded 
Article XVIII(2) of the 1957 Canada-Netherlands tax treaty, held that the income to be 
taken into account in the denominator of the treaty tax exemption ratio was the overall 
income before the application of the personal and family deductions.1814 In arguing in 
                                                     
1808 Ibidem, para. 12. 
1809 Federal Court (Canada), 2 April 1992, Crown Forest v. Canada, 92 DTC 6305, at 6309-63011, in 
particular para. 23.  
1810 Hoge Raad (Netherlands), 15 April 1992, case 28217, BNB 1992/223. 
1811 “Belastbaar inkomen” under Netherlands domestic law. 
1812 “Onzuiver inkomen” under Netherlands domestic law. 
1813 The 1959 Germany-Netherlands tax treaty had been authenticated only in the Dutch and German 
languages.  
1814 I.e. the “onzuiver inkomen” under Netherlands domestic law. 
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favor of this conclusion the Court mentioned the discrepancy, in the Dutch authentic 
text, between the terminology used in Article 20(2) and that employed in Article 20(3) of 
the tax treaty and compared it with the consistent terminology adopted in the German 
authentic text thereof. Arguably,1815 since it was aware that the German Bundesfinanzhof 
had interpreted the term “Gesamteinkommen” in Article 20(2) of that tax treaty as 
denoting the taxpayer’s net taxable income,1816 the Hoge Raad found that the German 
term “Gesamteinkommen” might be attributed two different meanings for the purpose of 
Article 20(2) and Article 20(3) , as the use of two different terms in the corresponding 
articles of the Dutch authentic text indicated.  
 
In case 27222 of 1992,1817 the Hoge Raad (the Netherlands) upheld a decision of the 
lower court of Hertogenbosch, according to which the terms “maatschappelijk” and 
“capital social”, usedy in the Dutch and French authentic texts, respectively, of Article 9 
of the 1951 Netherlands-Switzerland1818 tax treaty, bore the same meaning and denoted 
the capital issued by the company paying out the dividends and not the properly 
authorized, but not yet issued, capital thereof. 
 
In the Li case,1819 Isaac C.J. of the Federal Court of Appeal (Canada) compared the 
French and English authentic texts of Article 19 of the 1986 Canada-China tax treaty. 
The English authentic text referred to “a student, apprentice or business trainee […] who 
is present in the first-mentioned Contracting State solely for the purpose of his education 
or training”, while the French authentic text referred to “un étudiant, un stagiaire ou un 
apprenti […] qui séjourne dans le premier État contractant à seule fin d'y poursuivre ses 
études ou sa formation”.1820 Isaac C.J. found that “[a]lthough the English version of 
Article 19 is arguably ambiguous, the use of the phrase qui séjourne in the French 
version, which is equally authoritative, puts it beyond doubt that the presence in Canada 
of which the Article speaks […] is a temporary one.”1821 
 
In the case Ngee Hin Chong,1822 the parties referred to both the English and the 
Malaysian authentic texts of Article 18(2) of the 1981 Australia-Malaysia tax treaty. 
Under the former, pensions paid by a contracting State in respect of services rendered 
thereto “shall be taxable in that State”; under the latter, in the English translation agreed 
upon by the parties to the litigation, such pensions “may be taxed” in that State.1823  
                                                     
1815 That was not expressly mentioned, indeed.  
1816 Bundesfinanzhof (Germany), 11 October 1967, case IR 86/67, 90 Sammlung der Entscheidungen des 
Bundesfinanzhofs, 74 et seq. 
1817 Hoge Raad (Netherlands), 4 November 1992, case 27222, BNB 1993/38. 
1818 As amended through 1966. 
1819 Federal Court of Appeal (Canada), 5 November 1993, Qing Gang K. Li v. R, 94 DTC 6059. 
1820 Emphasis added. 
1821 Federal Court of Appeal (Canada), 5 November 1993, Qing Gang K. Li v. R, 94 DTC 6059, at 6062. 
1822 Administrative Appeals Tribunal of Adelaide (Australia), 3 April 1998, Ngee Hin Chong v. CoT, 1 ITLR, 
75 et seq.  
1823 See Administrative Appeals Tribunal of Adelaide (Australia), 3 April 1998, Ngee Hin Chong v. CoT, 1 
ITLR, 75 et seq, at 81. 
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The Court concluded that the two authentic texts were to be construed as meaning 
that both the contracting State paying the pension and the contracting State of residence 
of the recipient were entitled to tax such payments, contrary to the argument of the 
taxpayer, according to whom they were taxable only in the State paying them. In 
supporting that conclusion, the Court made reference to Article 31 VCLT and, in 
accordance therewith, analysed the object and purpose of the tax treaty and the context 
of Article 18(2) thereof, including its object and purpose and other articles of the very 
same tax treaty.1824 In particular, the Court noted that, where the contracting States 
intended to deny the taxing right of one of them, they explicitly did so by using the term 
“only” in the English authentic text of the tax treaty, such as in Articles 7, 8, 14, 17 and 
18(1). Moreover, it noted that Articles 22 and 23, for the purpose of eliminating juridical 
double taxation by means of the credit method, made reference, inter alia, to Article 18 
and that reference could be said not to be absurd only where Article 18(2) was construed 
as allowing concurrent taxation. Finding the meaning of the provision at stake plain, 
where interpreted in accordance with Article 31 VCLT, the Court did not find necessary 
to have recourse to the supplementary means of interpretation provided for under Article 
32 VCLT.1825 This conclusion and the underlying reasoning were upheld by the Federal 
Court of Australia.1826 
 
In the Memec case,1827 one of the issues that the Court of Appeal of England and Wales 
had to decide was whether, for the purpose of the application of Article XVIII(1)(b) of 
the 1964 Germany-United Kingdom tax treaty,1828 the term “dividend” used therein was 
to be attributed the same meaning it had for the purpose of Article VI of the treaty, 
where a definition of “dividends” was provided, or the meaning it had under the 
domestic law of the United Kingdom.   
 In that respect, Gibson L.J. of the Court of Appeal first noted1829 that Article II(3) 
of the tax treaty (corresponding to Article 3(2) OECD Model) directed the interpreter 
towards the domestic law meaning with respect to terms “not otherwise defined in the 
[…] Convention” and that such an expression should be construed as meaning “not 
otherwise relevantly defined”. Moreover, in light of the fact that the definition of 
“dividends” in Article VI started with the expression “[t]he term “dividends” as used this 
article means […]” and that such a definition had not been included in Article II, 
together with the other general definitions, he concluded that it was not the intention of 
the contracting States to extend the relevance of that definition outside the scope of 
                                                     
1824 See Administrative Appeals Tribunal of Adelaide (Australia), 3 April 1998, Ngee Hin Chong v. CoT, 1 
ITLR, 75 et seq., at 90-92. 
1825 See Administrative Appeals Tribunal of Adelaide (Australia), 3 April 1998, Ngee Hin Chong v. CoT, 1 
ITLR, 75 et seq., at 92 
1826 See Federal Court of Australia, 16 May 2000, Ngee Hin Chong v. CoT, 2 ITLR, 707 et seq., in particular at 
726. 
1827 Court of Appeal of England and Wales (United Kingdom), 9 June 1998, Memec Plc v. IRC, 1 ITLR, 3 et 
seq. 
1828 As amended by the 1970 protocol. 
1829 Court of Appeal of England and Wales (United Kingdom), 9 June 1998, Memec Plc v. IRC, 1 ITLR, 3 et 
seq., at 21.  
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Article VI, i.e. that the context did not require the interpreter to use the definition 
included in Article VI in order to construe the term “dividend” found in Article XVIII, 
which thus had to be attributed the legal jargon meaning it had under the domestic law of 
the United Kingdom according to Article II(3) of the treaty. Such a conclusion was also 
supported by the fact that, on the one hand, the Protocol to the treaty concluded on 23 
March 1970 modified both the definition of the term “dividends” in Article VI and the 
text of Article XVIII, but without including in the latter any reference to the former, and, 
on the other hand, where a definition encompassed in a specific article of the tax treaty 
was to be used for the purpose of construing other articles thereof the contracting States 
expressly stated it.1830 
 The taxpayer, conversely, put forward the argument that the French official 
version of Article 10(3) of the 1963 OECD Draft, on which Article VI(4) of the 1964 
Germany-United Kingdom tax treaty was based, could be construed differently since it 
started with the more neutral clause “Le terme «dividendes» employé dans le présent 
article”. The Gibson L.J., however, was not very impressed with such an over-subtle 
point of potential linguistic discrepancy and aptly noted that, although he was 
theoretically open to take into account a text other than an authentic text of the treaty 
such as the French official version of the 1963 OECD Draft concerning the same 
provision, he considered that treaty interpretation was far from being a mere “literal” 
interpretation of texts in which such linguistic nuances could play a relevant role.1831  
 
In cases 33267 and 34482 of 1999,1832 the Hoge Raad (the Netherlands) was faced with 
the interpretation of Article 10(2)(a) of the 1959 Germany-Netherlands tax treaty, 
according to which income derived from employment was taxable solely in the 
contracting State of residence if the employee was present in the other State 
“temporarily” for a total of no more than 183 days in one calendar year and other 
conditions were met.  
 The two sole authentic texts of the treaty, in the Dutch and German languages, 
read as follows (excerpt): 
 
“indien deze werknemer […] tijdelijk in totaal niet meer dan 183 dagen gedurende een 
kalenderjaar, in de andere Staat verblijft” 
 
“wenn dieser Arbeitnehmer […] sich vorübergehend, zusammen nicht mehr als 183 Tage 
im Lauf eines Kalenderjahres, in dem anderen Staat aufhält” 
 
The Court had to decide whether the term “temporarily” (“tijdelijk” in the Dutch 
                                                     
1830 E.g. in Articles VIII(1) and XVI(1) of the tax treaty. 
1831 See Court of Appeal of England and Wales (United Kingdom), 9 June 1998, Memec Plc v. IRC, 1 ITLR, 3 
et seq., at 21. See also ibidem, at p. 20, where Gibson L.J. summarized the principles of interpretation to be 
applied in order to construe tax treaties, by making reference to the VCLT and rejecting any “literal 
interpretation” (quoting Mummery J in High Court of Justice of England and Wales (United Kingdom), 9 
February 1990, IRC v. Commerzbank, 63 TC 218, at 234-236). 
1832 See Hoge Raad (Netherlands), 29 September 1999, cases 33267 and 34482, BNB 2000/16 and BNB 
2000/17. 
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authentic text and “vorübergehend” in the German authentic text) had a meaning 
autonomous from the following reference to a stay of no more that 183 days in one 
calendar year. If that had been the case, it would have been possible for an employee to 
be present in the source State for less than 184 days in a calendar year, but still not be 
there “temporarily”, for example where he had been present in such a State continuously 
in the preceding or subsequent calendar year. 
 In this respect, one of the arguments put before the Court was that a seeming 
discrepancy existed between the Dutch and the German authentic texts, a comma being 
present in the latter after the term “vorübergehend”, but missing in the former after the 
corresponding term “tijdelijk”. According to the tax authorities and the Court of Appeal, 
the presence of the comma in the German authentic text could have been seen as 
evidence of the intention of the parties to treat the text after the comma as an apposition, 
i.e. a mere elucidation of the meaning to be attached to the term “vorübergehend”, which 
would not have had thus any autonomous meaning.1833    
The Court, however, was not very impressed by such an argument. It ruled, 
instead, that the term “tijdelijk” was to be interpreted in its context and in light of the 
object and purpose of the entire provision of which it was part. It first observed that 
Article 10 of the 1959 Germany-Netherlands tax treaty was obviously derived from 
Article 9 of the 1954 Austria-Germany tax treaty, which in turn was based on Article VI 
of the 1946 League of Nations London Draft.1834 By analyzing the two tax treaties and 
the London Draft from which they were derived, the Court found that there was no clear 
indication that the term “temporarily” (or its equivalents) had been intended by the 
drafters as superfluous synonym for the 183-day rule.1835 On the contrary, the intended 
meaning of that term was to be determined in light of its ordinary meaning and of the 
object and purpose of Article 10(2) of the treaty, i.e. to facilitate the international 
movement of employees by means of a rule that prevented the shifting of taxing rights 
from the residence to the source State where the employees were present in the latter 
State only for a brief period of time (i.e. temporarily).1836 According to the Court, the 
different punctuation in the German authentic text did not change the result of its 
analysis. It therefore concluded that, while in the case of a stay of more than 183 days 
per calendar year in the source State the income received was always taxable exclusively 
by the latter State, a stay of less than 184 days per calendar year led to the same result 
                                                     
1833 See, in this sense, also H. Pijl, “Mutual agreement tussen Duitsland en Nederland: Inkomsten uit niet-
zelfstandige arbeid”, 64 Maandblad Belasting Beschouwingen (1995), 286 et seq., at 287. 
1834 The relevant paragraph of Article VI of the 1946 League of Nations London Draft, which substantially 
reproduced Article VII(2) of the 1943 League of Nations Mexico Draft, reads as follows in its English official 
version: “2. A person having its fiscal domicile in one Contracting State shall, however, be exempt from 
taxation in the other Contracting State in respect of such remuneration if he is temporarily present within the 
latter State for a period or periods not exceeding a total of one hundred and eighty-three days during the 
taxable year, and shall remain taxable in the first State”. 
1835 In this respect, the Court seemed to have applied the principle of interpretation expressed by the maxim “ut 
res magis valeat quam pereat”. 
1836 The same result would be substantially achieved under the current text of the OECD Model. See, in the 
same sense, K. Vogel, “Tax Treaty Monitor”, 54 Bulletin for international taxation (2000), 254 et seq., at 254-
255. 
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where that stay was not considered to be of a temporary nature.1837 
Finally, the Hoge Raad rejected the idea to be bound by a decree1838 reflecting 
the outcome of a mutual agreement reached by the Netherlands and Germany competent 
authorities under the provision of the tax treaty, according to which the terms “tijdelijk” 
and “vorübergehend” had no separate meaning from the 183-days rule. According to the 
Court, that decree did not remove the judges’ obligation under Netherlands law to 
interpret the treaty where a case was referred thereto by the tax authorities or a taxpayer.  
Interestingly, the Tax Court of Köln (Germany)1839 reached a diametrically 
opposite conclusion in interpreting the identically written provision encompassed in the 
German authentic text of Article 13(4) of the 1959 France-Germany tax treaty. The 
Court maintained that the term “vorübergehend” was not to be construe autonomously, 
but in connection with the 183-days rule, in the sense that, whenever the stay in the 
source State did not exceed 183 days in the calendar year, the employee presence therein 
was to be regarded as temporary.1840 It must be emphasized that the Court, in order to 
support its conclusion, relied on the equally French authentic text of the provision, which 
read: “les revenus provenant d'un travail dépendant ne peuvent être imposés que dans 
l'Etat Contractant dont le salarié est le résident […] si le séjour temporaire de celui-ci 
dans l'autre Etat n'excède pas une durée totale de 183 jours au cours d'une année civil”. 
According to the Court, the French authentic text was perfectly clear, not leaving rooms 
for alternative interpretations. 
 
In the case Re X BV,1841 the Hoge Raad (the Netherlands) referred to all three authentic 
texts1842 of the 1986 Canada-Netherlands tax treaty concluding that there was no 
apparent difference among the relevant terms used therein1843 and that they should be 
attributed the meaning that appeared to best fit the context of the treaty as a whole.   
 
In the case Wolf,1844 Decary J.A. of the Federal Court of Appeal of Montreal (Canada) 
analysed the possible differences in meaning existing between the term “personal 
services” used in the English authentic text of the 1980 Canada-United States tax treaty 
and the term “professions” used in the French authentic text thereof. He promptly 
concluded that, although at first blush and in common parlance the latter term might 
appear to have a more restrictive and somewhat more elitist meaning, the context where 
                                                     
1837 In the decision concerning case 34482, the Court also maintained that such interpretation was supported by 
a letter of the Netherlands Ministry of Finance dated 23 January 1967, in which the Ministry upheld the view 
that the term “tijdelijk” in Article 10(2)(a) of the 1959 Germany-Netherlands tax treaty had an autonomous 
meaning, additional to the requirement of the 183-days rule.  
1838 Decree of 13 July 1995.  
1839 Tax Court of Köln, 28 November 1983, case 169/80 E, Entscheidungen der Finanzgerichte (1984), 460 et 
seq. 
1840 See, arriving at the same conclusion, Bundesfinanzhof (Germany), 10 July 1996, case IR 4/96, 
Bundessteuerblatt. Teil II (1997), 15 et seq. 
1841 See Hoge Raad (Netherlands), 1 November 2000, case 35398, 3 ITLR, 466 et seq., at 483, para 3.4. 
1842 I.e. the English, French and Dutch authentic texts. 
1843 I.e. “any taxation”, “aucune imposition” and “onderscheidenlijk”,used in the English, French and Dutch 
authentic texts, respectively, of Article 24(3) of the treaty.  
1844 Federal Court of Appeal of Montreal (Canada), 15 March 2002, Wolf v. R, 4 ITLR, 755 et seq. 
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such terms were used (i.e. Articles XIV and XV of the above-mentioned tax treaty) made 
clear that the apparently wider meaning of “personal services” was intended by the 
contracting States to apply to both terms.1845  
 
In the PGS Geophysical case,1846 the Borgarting Appeals Court (Norway) compared the 
French (sole) authentic text of Article 5 of the 1978 Ivory Cost-Norway tax treaty with 
the English official version of the corresponding article of the OECD Model and 
concluded that the terms “stable” and “fixe”, in the former, and “permanent” and 
“fixed”, in the latter, all seem to require permanent establishments to be connected to a 
specific place and to last for a minimum amount of time.1847 
 
In the case RÅ 2004 ref. 59,1848 the Supreme Administrative Court (Sweden) had to 
decide whether the capital gains derived by two Swedish companies from the sale of the 
shares of two Peruvian companies were taxable in Sweden under the 1966 Peru-Sweden 
tax treaty. According to the Court, such capital gains were, under Article X of that treaty, 
taxable exclusively in Peru. However, the issue arose of whether Sweden, 
notwithstanding Article X, was entitled to tax these capital gains under Article XVII(2) 
of the treaty, according to which income from sources in Peru which under the laws of 
Peru and in accordance with the tax treaty was subject to tax in Peru was to be exempt 
from Swedish tax. The Spanish and Swedish sole authentic texts of that article read as 
follows:1849 
 
Con sujeción a las disposiciones del Artículo VIII, el rédito de fuente en el Perú que de 
acuerdo con las leyes del Perú y de conformidad con este Convenio está sujeto a impuesto 
en el Perú, ya sea directamente o por deducción, estará eximido del impuesto Sueco   
 
Där icke bestämmelserna i artikel VIII annat föranleda skall inkomst från inkomstkällor i 
Peru, vilken inkomst enligt peruansk lag och i överensstämmelse med detta avtal är 
underkastad beskattning i Peru vare sig direkt eller genom skatteavdrag, vara undantagen 
från svensk skatt 
 
The Court found that Article XVII(2) was a subject-to tax clause, whose main purpose 
was to avoid double non-taxation of income taxable exclusively in Peru under the treaty 
distributive rules, but not subject to tax therein under its domestic law.1850 Nonetheless, 
                                                     
1845 See Federal Court of Appeal of Montreal (Canada), 15 March 2002, Wolf v. R, 4 ITLR, 755 et seq., at 781, 
para. 101. 
1846 Borgarting Appeals Court (Norway), 13 August 2003, PGS Geographical AS v. Government of Norway, 6 
ITLR, 212 et seq. 
1847 See ibidem at 230. 
1848 Supreme Administrative Court (Sweden), 25 March 2004, case RÅ 2004 ref. 59, Regeringsrättens årsbok 
(2004) (a summary in English is available at the IBFD Tax Treaty Case Law Database). 
1849 Emphasis added. 
1850 In the same vein, Sundgren maintains that Article XVII(2) of the 1966 Peru-Sweden tax treaty “is not an 
article to prevent double taxation, it is an article to impose taxation once in order to prevent double non-
taxation” (see P. Sundgren, “Interpretation of tax treaties authenticated in two or more languages: a case 
study”, 73 Svensk skattetidning (2006), 378 et seq., available on-line at the following URL: 
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overturning the decision of the Advance Rulings Board,1851 it considered that capital 
gains were not to be considered to be income (“rédito” and “inkomst” in the Spanish and 
Swedish authentic texts) for the purpose of Article XVII(2) and, therefore, concluded 
that Sweden was not entitled to tax the capital gains realized by the two Swedish 
companies, notwithstanding the fact that they were not subject to tax under Peruvian 
domestic law. 
 In supporting its interpretation, the Court recalled that the tax treaty had been 
drawn up in the Swedish and Spanish languages and that both texts were to be 
considered equally authentic. It noted that, when Sweden is to apply the treaty, the 
Swedish authentic text should primarily be used, due to Article II(2) of the treaty;1852 
however, in cases of uncertainty, the Spanish text is to be considered as well. In the 
instance at stake, the comparison of the two authentic texts showed a prima facie 
discrepancy, since, while on the basis of the Swedish text it was uncertain whether 
Article XVII(2) applied to capital gains, such a possibility appeared improbable on the 
basis of the use of the term “rédito” in the Spanish authentic text.  The Court then found 
that such a conclusion was also supported by the analysis of Article 1, which listed the 
taxes covered by the treaty, since, with reference to Peru, it separately mentioned the 
taxes on income (“impuestos sobre la renta”) and the tax on capital gains from the 
alienation of immovable property (“el impuesto a las ganancias de capital provenientes 
de la transferencia de inmuebles”).  
 According to the Court, since the structure of the Spanish text practically 
excluded capital gains from the scope of Article XVII(2), the tax treaty could not be 
interpreted other than as precluding Sweden from taxing capital gains under its Article 
X.  
 
In the Mil Investments case,1853 the Tax Court of Canada noted a possible discrepancy 
between the English and the French authentic texts of the preamble of the 1989 Canada-
Luxembourg tax treaty, the former employing the term “fiscal evasion”, while the latter 
using the term “évasion fiscale”, which could be regarded as the French synonym for the 
English term “tax avoidance”. The Court then emphasized that, in the following 1999 
Canada-Luxembourg tax treaty, the potential issue was set aside by using the term 
“fraude fiscale” in the French authentic text of the preamble, which fairly corresponded 
                                                                                                                                  
http://www.skatter.se/index.php?q=node/1079; accessed on 23 July 2011).  
Westberg, however, submits that Article XVII(2) “is a provision on the method for elimination of double 
taxation and not a subject-to-tax clause. It simply says that exemption must be provided by Sweden in respect 
of income from Peruvian sources subject to tax in Peru” and continues by noting that such interpretation “is 
based on the wording of the text, which in the author’s opinion is supported by the commentaries in the 
Swedish Government Bill (proposition 1967:26, pages 25 and 26), which state that the treaty was modelled in 
accordance with the previous treaty between Sweden and Argentina (from 1962). It explicitly adds that 
taxation must take place in the state of source, if not otherwise provided, and that such income is exempt from 
taxation in the state of residence” (see B. Westberg, “Summary of Case RÅ 2004 not 59. Editor’s notes”, in 
IBFD Tax Treaty Case Law Database). 
1851 Which based its decision on the sole Swedish authentic text. 
1852 Which resembled Article 3(2) of the 1963 OECD Draft. 
1853 Tax Court (Canada), 18 August 2006, MIL (Investments) SA v. Canada, 9 ITLR, 25 et seq. 
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to the term “fiscal evasion” employed in the English authentic text thereof.1854 From the 
overall review of the arguments put forward by the Court, it does not seem that the latter 
placed any significance on such possible discrepancy in the preamble to the treaty in 
order to interpret it. 
 
In the UBS case,1855 the Court of Appeal of England and Wales made reference to the 
French authentic text of Article 23(2) of the 1977 United Kingdom-Switzerland tax 
treaty, according to which “L'imposition d'un établissement stable qu'une entreprise d'un 
Etat contractant a dans l'autre Etat contractant n'est pas établie dans cet autre Etat d'une 
façon moins favorable que l'imposition des entreprises de cet autre Etat qui exercent la 
même activité”, for the purpose of interpreting the English authentic text thereof, in 
particular the expression “The taxation […] shall not be less favourably levied”, and 
concluded that both conveyed the same idea of a reference to the whole system whereby 
the liability to tax is imposed.1856 
 
In the Prévost case,1857 the Tax Court of Canada quoted both the English and French 
authentic texts of Article 10(1) and (2) of the 1986 Canada-Netherlands tax treaty1858 and 
then compared the terms “beneficial owner”, “bénéficiaire effectif” and “uiteindelijk 
gerechtigde” used in the English, French and Dutch authentic texts of Article 10(2) of 
that treaty, respectively.1859 The textual comparison does not seem to have played a 
decisive role in the arguments developed by the court. 
 
The Supreme Court of Norway, in the Sølvik case,1860 compared the Norwegian and 
English authentic texts of Article 3(2) of the 1971 Norway-United States tax treaty 
(corresponding to Article 4(2) OECD Model) in order to properly construe and apply 
it.1861 However, from the analysis of the decision, it does not seem that the Court drew 
any significant inferences from such a comparison. 
 
In the Lingle case,1862 Campbell J of the Tax Court of Canada stated that, where a treaty 
is concluded in two authentic texts, Article 33(4) VCLT “allows a comparison of the 
texts in order to adopt ‘… the meaning which best reconciles the texts having regard to 
the object and purpose of the treaty …’ (sic)”.1863  
 However, notwithstanding the reference to the last part of Article 33(4) 
                                                     
1854 See Tax Court (Canada), 18 August 2006, MIL (Investments) SA v. Canada, 9 ITLR, 25 et seq., at 50, 
footnote 14. 
1855 Court of Appeal of England and Wales (United Kingdom), 21 February 2007, UBS AG v, Revenue and 
Customs Commissioners, 9 ITLR, 767 et seq. 
1856 See Court of Appeal of England and Wales (United Kingdom), 21 February 2007, UBS AG v, Revenue and 
Customs Commissioners, 9 ITLR, 767 et seq., at 775, para. 23 per Moses LJ. 
1857 Tax Court (Canada), 22 April 2008, Prévost Car Inc v. R, 10 ITLR, 736 et seq. 
1858 Ibidem, at 745-746, paras. 27-28. 
1859 Ibidem, at 747, para. 30. 
1860 Supreme Court (Norway), 24 April 2008, Sølvik v Staten v/Skatt Øst, 11 ITLR, 15 et seq.  
1861 See ibidem, at 33, paras. 42-44, at 35, para. 51, and at 38, para. 66.  
1862 Tax Court (Canada), 9 September 2009, Lingle v. R, 12 ITLR, 55 et seq. 
1863 Ibidem, at 71, para. 25. 
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VCLT,1864 the analysis of the arguments employed by Campbell J. shows that what he 
actually did was to remove the potential divergence of meanings between the French and 
English authentic texts of Article 4(2) of the 1980 Canada-United States tax treaty by 
applying the principles of interpretation provided for in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT. In 
fact, the judge:  
(i) found that, while the English expression “in which he has an habitual abode” 
was, per se, ambiguous, the corresponding French expression “où elle séjourne de 
façon habituelle” was not, the latter thus removing the potential ambiguity of the 
former,1865  
(ii) made abundant references to the Commentary to Article 4(2) OECD Model in 
order to construe the above expressions,1866  
(iii) discussed the possible dictionary meanings of the term “habitual”,1867  
(iv) construed such expressions against the background of the whole of Article 
4(2)1868 and  
(v) made reference to Article 31 VCLT and the need to look for and implement 
the common intention of the parties.1869 
 
Finally, in the Dell Products case,1870 the District Court of Oslo (Norway) was faced 
with the apparent discrepancy between the English and Norwegian authentic texts of 
Article 5(5) of the 2000 Ireland-Norway tax treaty, the former employing the expression 
“authority to conclude contracts in the name of the enterprise” and the latter using the 
expression “fullmakt til å slutte kontrakter på vegne av foretaket”, which may be 
translated as “authority to conclude contracts on behalf of the enterprise”.1871  
 The disagreement between the parties and, thus, the issue to be decided was of a 
purely legal nature and consisted of whether such expressions required the contract 
entered into by the agent on behalf of the principle to be “legally binding” on the latter, 
or just “binding in reality” thereon. The parties supported their positions on the basis of 
                                                     
1864 Actually, the last part of Article 33(4) VCLT does not simply allow a comparison of the various authentic 
texts, a procedure that is generally permitted under Article 33 (as evidenced by (i) the absence of any 
preclusion of textual comparison in the whole Article 33 VCLT and (ii) the explicit reference to text 
comparison in the first part of Article 33(4) VCLT and in the commentary to Article 29 of the 1966 Draft); it 
demands that, except where a particular text prevails or the prima facie difference in meaning is removed by 
the application of Articles 31 and 32 VCLT, the meaning which best reconciles the texts having regard to the 
object and purpose of the treaty is adopted (note the form “shall be adopted” at the end of Article 33(4) 
VCLT). 
1865 See Tax Court (Canada), 9 September 2009, Lingle v. R, 12 ITLR, 55 et seq., at 71, para. 26 (see also 
Federal Court of Appeal (Canada), 10 June 2010, Lingle v. R, 12 ITLR, 996 et seq., at 999, para. 6). 
1866 Ibidem, at 68-72, paras. 20-24 and 28 (see also Federal Court of Appeal (Canada), 10 June 2010, Lingle v. 
R, 12 ITLR, 996 et seq., at 999, para. 8). 
1867 Ibidem, at 71, para. 27. 
1868 Ibidem, at 72, para. 28, where he referred to paragraph 10 of the Commentary to Article 4(2) OECD Model, 
according to which the tie-breaker rule should reflect “such an attachment that it is felt to be natural that the 
right to tax devolves upon that particular State”, as well as to the objects and purposes of the treaty.  
1869 Ibidem, at 72, para. 29. 
1870 District Court of Oslo (Norway), 16 December 2009, Dell Products (NUF) v. Tax East, 12 ITLR, 829 et 
seq.. 
1871 Ibidem, at 841 and 857. 
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the English (legal bindingness) and Norwegian (bindingness in reality) authentic texts of 
Article 5(5).1872  
 Interestingly, the Court noted that the wording of both the English and Norwegian 
authentic texts of Article 5(5) was reasonably open to support both interpretations and 
thus decided the matter on the basis of the evidence provided for in the OECD 
Commentary and in light of the object and purpose of Article 5(5).1873 
 
In case 1550 of 3 February 2012,1874 the Corte Suprema di Cassazione (Italy) made 
reference to the French authentic text of Article 18(2) of the 1981 Italy-Luxembourg tax 
treaty in order to establish the domestic law meaning of the term “previdenza sociale” 
employed in the Italian authentic text thereof.  
 According to the Court, the term used in the French authentic text, i.e. “sécurité 
sociale”, could have been seen as more correctly expressing the intention of the parties 
in respect of the scope of Article 18(2) of the treaty.1875 Thus, pursuant to Article 3(2) of 
the treaty, it construed the term “previdenza sociale” employed in the Italian authentic 
text in accordance with the meaning that the term “sicurezza sociale”, which it found to 
better correspond to the French term “sécurité sociale”, has under Italian law. 
 
  
7. Conclusions  
 
The rules of interpretation enshrined in Articles 31-33 VCLT also apply to tax treaties. 
This is confirmed by the case law of national judiciaries, as well as by the generally 
concordant positions expressed by scholars on that subject matter. This entails that the 
conclusions drawn by the author, with regard to the interpretation of multilingual 
treaties, in Chapter 4 of this Part remains generally valid also in respect of tax treaties. 
 
In this respect, it is nonetheless worth highlighting the following, which idiosyncratically 
relate to tax treaties based on the OECD Model.  
 First, the overall context must be seen as comprising the OECD Commentary, 
which often plays a decisive role in removing the prima facie discrepancies in meaning 
among the tax authentic treaty texts in accordance with Articles 31 and 32 VCLT.  
 Similarly, the overall context should be regarded as comprising the decisions 
delivered by foreign judiciaries and the practices of foreign tax authorities (including 
those of States that are not party to the specific treaty to be construed), which are helpful 
for the purpose of establishing the ordinary meaning to be given to OECD Model 
standard terms and expressions (used in OECD Model-based tax treaties) under Articles 
                                                     
1872 Ibidem, at 857; see also ibidem at 848, for the claimant, and 853, for the defendant, who also asserted that 
the English authentic text was open enough to allow such an interpretation. 
1873 Ibidem, at 858-860. 
1874 Corte Suprema di Cassazione, 3 February 2012, case 1550 (available on-line on the website: www.ipsoa.it). 
1875 Article 18(2) of the 1981 Italy-Luxembourg tax treaty reads as follows (emphasis added):  
“Nonobstant les dispositions du paragraphe 1er, les pensions et autres sommes payées en application 
de la législation sur la sécurité sociale d'un Etat contractant sont imposables dans cet Etat”. 
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31 and 32 VCLT and, thus, in order to remove the prima facie discrepancies in meaning 
among the tax authentic treaty texts.  
 Third, the interpreter should be allowed to have recourse, as supplementary 
means of interpretation, to the analysis of the differences existing (i) between the 
subsequent versions of the OECD Model, (ii) between the OECD Model and the tax 
treaty to be interpreted, as well as (iii) between the tax treaty to be interpreted and other 
tax treaties concluded by the contracting States of the former, for the purpose of 
establishing the intention of the parties and removing the prima facie discrepancies in 
meaning among the tax authentic treaty texts. 
 Finally, the role played by the OECD Model official versions (English and 
French) in respect of multilingual tax treaties must be regarded as similar to that played 
by the drafted text for the purpose of interpreting other multilingual treaties. Thus, the 
OECD Model official versions constitute a key element to be taken into account by the 
interpreter in order to remove the prima facie discrepancies in meaning among the tax 
authentic treaty texts in accordance with Article 33(4) VCLT, i.e. by applying the rules 
of interpretation enshrined in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT. This holds true also in cases 
where none of the authentic treaty texts is drafted in English or French. 
 
Where the tax authentic treaty texts employ legal jargon terms, however, the application 
of the rules established in Article 33 VCLT, in order to remove the prima facie 
discrepancies in meaning among the authentic treaty texts, must be reconciled with the 
renvoi to domestic law provided for in Article 3(2) of OECD Model-based tax treaties, 
for the purpose of interpreting such terms. 
 It is the author’s opinion that the interpreter, where faced with prima facie 
discrepancies in meaning among the tax authentic treaty texts caused by the construction 
of legal jargon terms, should partially reconcile those texts in order to establish the 
“general meaning” underlying the corresponding legal jargon terms employed therein in 
light of the overall context. However, as long as the domestic law meaning of the legal 
jargon terms employed in the treaty significantly overlaps with their “general meaning”, 
the interpreter is allowed to rely exclusively on the former, unless the context requires an 
interpretation different from that based on the current domestic law meaning under the 
law of the State applying the treaty. Since the authentic treaty text drafted in the official 
language of the State applying the treaty provides the interpreter with the most direct and 
immediate access to the domestic law (concepts) of that State, it is reasonable to 
conclude that the selection of the appropriate domestic law meaning under Article 3(2) 
should be made by the interpreter on the basis of that authentic text. This solution limits 
the discretion of the interpreter in selecting the appropriate domestic law meaning, since 
it attributes a significant weight to the evidence of the intention of the parties represented 
by their choice of a specific legal jargon term in the official language of the State 
applying the treaty and, thus, of its underlying legal concept over the others theoretically 
available. 
 In cases where the treaty’s final clause provides that a certain authentic text is to 
prevail in the case of divergences, the prevailing text may play a preeminent role in 
establishing the “general meaning” of the corresponding terms used in the various 
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authentic texts. In particular, if the interpreter cannot establish such a “general meaning” 
by reconciling the various authentic texts through an interpretation thereof based on 
Articles 31 and 32 VCLT, the “general meaning” must be determined on the basis of the 
prevailing text. On the other hand, as long as the domestic law meanings of the terms 
employed in the various authentic texts substantially overlap with each other and with 
their “general meaning”, it is not the multilingual character of the tax treaty to cause a 
single treaty provision to have two different meanings when applied by the two 
contracting States; it is the reference to those States’ domestic law encompassed in 
Article 3(2) of the tax treaty that entails it. This multiplicity of meanings, therefore, is 
outside the scope and purpose of the treaty’s final clause. 
 








Both Articles 33 and 79(3) VCLT deal with the (apparent) lack of concordance between 
two or more authentic texts of a treaty. However, while the former concerns prima facie 
differences between authentic texts that must be removed by means of interpretation, the 
latter deals with apparent discrepancies in meaning among the authentic treaty texts1876 
caused by an error in one of such texts, which must be corrected in accordance with one 
of the procedures specified in Article 79(1) and (2) VCLT. 
 
Errors affecting treaties may be classified as (i) factual errors and (ii) technical errors in 
the treaty text(s).1877  
Factual errors consist of misunderstandings of facts and circumstances relevant 
for the treaty’s existence and application, as well as disagreements between the 
contracting States on the meaning (of certain parts) of the treaty. Factual errors may be 
broadly divided into (a) non-fundamental errors, which may be overcome by means of 
interpretation;1878 and (b) fundamental errors related to matters constituting the 
conditions to the parties’ agreement to be bound by the treaty. The latter errors may 
invalidate the contracting States’ consent to treaties.1879 
Technical errors are mere inaccuracies in the text(s) of a treaty that are 
recognized as such by the parties and must consequently be rectified by mutual consent. 
 
Article 79 VCLT deals with technical errors. According to paragraph 1, where the 
parties find and agree upon the existence of an error in the authenticated text(s) of the 
                                                     
1876 Under the VCLT system, the authentic treaty texts, in the parties’ intention, always have the same meaning. 
1877 On the distinction between different kinds of errors affecting treaties, see the commentary on Article 14 
(Absence of error) of the First Report on Law of Treaty submitted to the ILC by Lauterpacht, acting as Special 
Rapporteur (YBILC 1953-II, pp. 153-154); see also M. Tabory, Multilingualism In International Law and 
Institutions (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1980), pp. 178-179. 
1878 Such errors may also consist of discrepancies between the various authentic texts of a treaty. In such a case, 
however, the error must be distinguished from a technical error since (i) the discrepancy is not recognized as a 
mere error in the wording of the treaty by all the parties and therefore (ii) the apparent difference of meaning 
between the authentic texts must be removed by means of interpretation (i.e. by applying Articles 31, 32 and 
33 VCLT). 
1879 On the possibility that a treaty is found to not bind a contracting State, where its consent to be bound was 
based on an error, see Article 48 VCLT, which specifies that the error must relate to a fact or situation that was 
assumed by a contracting State to exist at the time when the treaty was concluded and formed an essential basis 
of that State’s consent to be bound by the treaty. See also, among others, R. Jennings and A. Watts (eds.), 
Oppenheim’s International Law. Volume I. Peace (London: Longman, 1992), pp. 1288-1289; A. MacNair, The 
Law of Treaties (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), p. 211. Lauterpacht described these kinds of errors as 
mistakes that “go to the root of the matter and affect the essential aspect of the treaty” (see YBILC 1953-II, p. 
154). 
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treaty, such an error must be corrected. Paragraph 1 also put forward three possible 
techniques of correction,1880 which may in any case be derogated from by the parties. 
The correction has effect ex tunc, unless the parties decide otherwise.1881  
Paragraph 3 makes clear that the above rules on the correction of errors also apply 
where two or more authentic texts exist and there is a lack of concordance among such 
texts that the parties agree should be corrected.  
 
2. Historical background and preparatory work 
 
In the First Report on the Law of Treaties submitted to the ILC by Sir Humphrey 
Waldock, Articles 24 and 25 dealt specifically with the correction of errors in the treaty 
text(s).1882 In the commentary thereto, the Special Rapporteur pointed out that the 
formulation of those provisions was primarily based on the precedents cited in the 
Hackwort’s Digest of International Law,1883 due to the absence of any tentative article 
dealing with the correction of errors both in the Reports on the Law of Treaties prepared 
by the previous Special Rapporteurs and in the Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties 
with Comments prepared by the Harvard Research in International Law.1884 
 
The relevant text of draft Article 24 read as follows:1885  
 
 Article 24. 
 The correction of errors in the texts of treaties for which there is no depositary 
1. Where a typographical error or omission is discovered in the text of a treaty for which 
there is no depositary after the text has been signed, the signatory States shall by mutual 
agreement correct the error […] 
2. The provisions of paragraph 1 shall also apply mutatis mutandis to any case where there 
are two or more authentic texts of such a treaty which are discovered not to be concordant 
and the parties are agreed in considering that the wording of one of the texts is inexact and 
                                                     
1880 They are: (i) initialed corrections made in the original text of the treaty; (ii) corrections set out in a specific 
instrument (to be executed or exchanged); (iii) corrections in a new treaty text, which is executed by the same 
procedure as in the case of the original text.   
1881 See Art. 79(4) VCLT. 
1882 YBILC 1962- II, pp. 80-81. The relevant difference between Articles 24 and 25 consisted in that the former 
dealt with treaties without depositaries and the latter with treaties with depositaries. For an exhaustive review 
of the legislative history of Article 79 VCLT, see S. Rosenne, The Law of Treaties – A Guide to the legislative 
history of the Vienna Convention (New York: Oceana Publications, 1970), pp. 398-401. 
1883 G. H. Hackworth, Digest of International Law. Volume V (Washington: United States Government Printing 
Office, 1943), pp. 93-101. In addition to this source, the Special Rapporteur referred to the information 
contained in the Summary of the Practice of the Secretary-General as Depositary of Multilateral Agreements 
with regard to treaties with a depositary. See YBILC 1962-II, pp. 80-81 and YBILC 1962-I, p. 182, para. 60 
and p. 185, para. 87. 
1884 Research in International Law, “Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties with Comments”, 29 American 
Journal of International Law - Supplement (1935), 653 et seq. 
1885 With reference to the specific issue of multilingual treaties, Article 25 is not different, as a matter of 
substance, from Article 24. The only significant departures relate to the procedure to be followed for 
modifying the text(s) of the treaty, due to the existence of a depositary. 
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requires to be amended in order to bring it into harmony with the other text or texts.  
 
According to the commentary to Article 24, the need to introduce articles dealing with 
the correction of errors was due to the frequency with which errors and inconsistencies 
were found in the treaties’ texts. More importantly, the commentary noted that the 
correction of such errors and inconsistencies essentially appeared to be a matter for 
agreement between the parties.1886    
 
The ILC discussed the topic for the first time at its 657th meeting, held on 5 June 1962. 
The discussion was centered mainly on defining the types of errors that could be 
corrected by means of the procedures listed in the draft articles. 
At the outset, Mr Lachs pointed out the need for a modification of the scope of 
Articles 24 and 25, due to the possible existence of errors other than typographical errors 
or omission. In that respect, according to Mr Lachs, the issue at stake was strictly 
connected to that concerning the distinction between changes in the text of a treaty that 
have to be treated as corrections as opposed to those that have to be considered 
amendments and reservations. As example, he referred to the case of the 1929 Warsaw 
Convention,1887 where the term “transporteur” was used (confused) for the term 
“expéditeur” and the parties to the treaty agreed on the correctness of the latter. Mr 
Lachs recalled that when that convention entered into force all the contracting parties 
were obliged to ratify the correction. The Senate of the United States, however, 
charcaterized the change as a reservation and the United States ratified it as such.1888   
Mr Bartos agreed with Mr Lachs’s the statement that not only typographical 
errors and omissions may occur in treaties. He labeled errors other than those of a 
typographical kind “substantive” errors. To illustrate the issue, he made reference to two 
cases. The second case related to the Agreement concerning minor frontier traffic 
between Italy and Yugoslavia of 3 February 1949.1889 In an annex of that agreement, a 
list of towns excluded from the frontier traffic had been erroneously substituted for a list 
of the towns between which the traffic was allowed. Interestingly, Mr Bartos affirmed 
that, “although that error had been purely technical, the results had exceeded the scope of 
typographical errors or omissions”, thus meaning that (i) technical errors include 
typographical errors and omissions, but should not be limited thereto and (ii) substantive 
errors may be of a technical nature. However, he did not put forward a detailed or 
comprehensive definition of “technical errors”.1890  
Mr Gros also agreed that the procedures to be used in the case of correction of 
errors should not be limited to typographical errors or omissions. In that respect, he gave 
the example of frontier treaties in which the wrong elevations had been referred to in the 
                                                     
1886 See YBILC 1962-II, p. 80. 
1887 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules regarding International Air Transport, concluded in 
Warsaw on 12 October 1929. 
1888 See YBILC 1962-I, p. 183, para. 64. 
1889 United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 33, p. 142. 
1890 See YBILC 1962-I, p. 183, para. 65. 
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text through errors in map reading.1891 
Mr Jiménez de Aréchaga warned the ILC about the possible risks connected to 
the inclusion of substantive errors in the scope of Articles 24 and 25. He stated that the 
ILC should have been careful not to include the kind of errors vitiating the consent to be 
bound and, therefore, capable of invalidating the treaties. In that respect, where the scope 
of Article 24 had been broadened to include substantive errors, the structure of the article 
could have proved unsatisfactory. In particular, the phrase “States shall by mutual 
agreement correct the error”, in the context of Article 24(1) as a whole, could have been 
read as meaning that any contracting party claiming the existence of an error in a treaty 
provision (e.g. the incorrect description of a river) could have considered itself not 
bound by such a provision. Therefore, according to Mr Jiménez de Aréchaga, before 
broadening the scope of Article 24, the ILC should have made clear in the text thereof 
that the agreement of the parties on the existence of the error was a prerequisite to its 
correction.1892  
Sir Humphrey Waldock, in replying to the above comments, stated that it was of 
primary importance to distinguish between the case of correction of errors, on the one 
hand, and that of amendments to the treaty, on the other. According to the Special 
Rapporteur, when dealing with substantive errors, it was difficult to draw a line between 
these two cases and much depended on whether or not the parties agreed that an error 
had in fact occurred. In this context, difficulties mainly arose where the consensus of the 
parties upon the existence of an error was lacking and, especially in cases of misuse of 
words in different authentic texts, the issue verged on the subject of amendments. 
Therefore, according to Sir Humphrey Waldock, the ILC should have proceeded very 
cautiously in extending the scope of Article 24(1).1893 
Mr Paredes found that the text of Article 24 could be amplified to deal also with 
substantive errors altering the relationship between the parties and jeopardizing the very 
existence of the treaty. However, he made clear that whenever the parties did not agree 
upon the existence of a substantive error in the text, the issue should be decided by the 
International Court of Justice.1894 It should be noted that in the first part of his comment 
Mr Paredes, as well as Mr Gros and Mr Tunkin in their subsequent interventions,1895 
seemed to use the term “purely technical errors” as a synonym for “typographical 
errors”.  
Ultimately, Mr Lachs and Mr Tunkin pointed out that the prerequisite for the 
agreement of the parties upon the existence of an error seemed already present in the text 
of Article 24(1) and, therefore, they agreed on the possibility to extend the scope thereof 
to include the correction of any kind of error.1896 
 
When the discussion turned to the content of Article 25, the focus moved to the possible 
                                                     
1891 See YBILC 1962-I, p. 183, para. 67. 
1892 See YBILC 1962-I, pp. 183-184, para. 70. 
1893 See YBILC 1962-I, p.184, para. 75. 
1894 See YBILC 1962-I, p.184, paras. 76-77. 
1895 See YBILC 1962-I, p.184, paras. 78 and 81. 
1896 See YBILC 1962-I, p.184, paras. 80 and 81. 
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lack of concordance between the various texts of multilingual treaties. 
Sir Humphrey Waldock, in replying to a comment of Mr de Luna, said that errors 
arising from the lack of concordance were particularly frequent and could involve points 
of substance. In those cases, where the parties agreed on the existence of such errors, the 
procedure for correction should be the same laid down for “technical errors”.1897  
Mr Rosanne suggested the possible need to distinguish between the faulty 
concordance of the language versions (i.e. texts) actually negotiated and the lack of 
concordance of the translated versions, which was more likely to be due to 
inadvertence.1898 In that respect, however, Mr Bartos pointed out that the authentic texts 
in other languages were not regarded as translations, which seemed to suggest the 
artificiality of the distinction drawn by Mr Rosenne.1899 
Finally, Mr Verdross said that the problem of technical errors, on the existence of 
which the parties could presumably easily reach an agreement, was quite different from 
that created by the lack of concordance between the various language versions (i.e. texts) 
of a treaty. According to Mr Verdross, such lack of concordance could have been to 
some extent deliberate and might give rise to difficulties of interpretation. He concluded 
that the issue of the interpretation of the text of a treaty drawn up in several languages 
was an entirely different one from that of the correction of errors in the text.1900 The 
Special Rapporteur agreed on that the lack of concordance between authentic texts 
drawn up in several languages constituted a serious problem, which often also involved 
questions of interpretation.1901  
 At the end of the discussion, Mr Pal (Chairman) proposed to refer Articles 24 and 
25 to the Drafting Committee for redrafting them in light of the comments made during 
the debate. The ILC so agreed. 
 
The redrafted version of Article 24 was re-introduced for discussion at the ILC’s 661st 
meeting, held on 13 June 1962.1902 The relevant parts thereof read as follows: 
 
 Article 24. 
 The correction of errors in the texts of treaties for which there is no depositary 
1. Where an error is discovered in the text of a treaty for which there is no depositary after 
the text has been authenticated, the interest states shall by mutual agreement correct the 
error […]  
2. The provisions of paragraph 1 shall also apply where there are two or more authentic 
texts of a treaty which are not concordant and where it is proposed to consider the wording 
                                                     
1897 See YBILC 1962-I, p.185, para. 90. Note that the term “technical errors” seems here to be used by Sir 
Humphrey Waldock as a synonym for “typographical errors”. 
1898 See YBILC 1962-I, p.185, para. 92. 
1899 See YBILC 1962-I, p.185, para. 93. 
1900 See YBILC 1962-I, p.185, para. 94. 
1901 See YBILC 1962-I, p.185, para. 95. 
1902 The redrafted text of Article 25 (dealing with the correction of errors in the texts of treaties for which there 
is a depositary) was re-introduced for discussion at the ILC’s 662nd meeting, held on 14 June 1962 (see YBILC 
1962-I, pp. 217 et seq., paras. 1-12). No issue relevant for the present study was raised during those 
discussions.   
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of one of the text inexact and requiring to be corrected.1903  
 
From a comparative analysis of the original and the redrafted articles, it can be seen that 
the scope had been broadened to encompass not only the correction of typographical 
errors and omission, but also errors of substance that are “discovered” in the treaty texts 
and the correction of which is agreed upon by the parties. With specific reference to 
multilingual treaties, it was clarified that the same procedure provided for the correction 
of errors discovered in a single text was also applicable in the case of discordance 
between two or more authentic texts. Furthermore, the text of paragraph 2 was 
simplified. Apart from that, as the same Special Rapporteur pointed out, the redrafted 
article did not fundamentally differ from the original.1904 
 
During the following discussion, Mr Bartos pointed out that Mr Rosenne and he 
understood that the new text of Article 24(2) also covered discrepancies between the 
different versions of a treaty drawn up in several languages. He therefore asked the 
Special Rapporteur if he agreed to insert an explanation to that effect in the commentary, 
which would eliminate the need to lay down the rule in the article itself.1905 
Mr Liang, however, stated that the wording of paragraph 2 was still 
unsatisfactory. In particular, he said that he was not quite clear as to the force of the 
expression “it is proposed”. In that respect, he suggested modifying the second part of 
that paragraph to read “and where it is considered that the wording of one of the texts is 
inexact and requires to be corrected".1906 In replying to such a point, Sir Humphrey 
Waldock noted that, in his original draft, he had stressed the need for the parties to agree 
that an error had occurred, to avoid the danger of a party unilaterally declaring the text 
inexact and using that as an excuse for not accepting the treaty. He concluded that, in the 
Drafting Committee’s view, the reference to the mutual agreement of the parties 
expressly provided for in paragraph 1 extended to paragraph 2 and the proposal referred 
to in the second part of the paragraph had to be a “formal” one. Accordingly, he 
suggested replacing the second part of paragraph 2 with the expression “and where it is 
proposed to correct the wording of one of the texts".1907  
 At the end of the discussion, Mr Pal (Chairman) proposed to refer once again 
Article 24 to the Drafting Committee for redrafting it in light of the comments made 
during the debate. The ILC so agreed. 
 
The redrafted version of Article 24 was presented at the ILC and adopted thereby 
without any discussion at its 668th meeting, held on 26 June 1962.  
The relevant parts of Article 24, as adopted by the Commission, read as 
follows:1908 
                                                     
1903 See YBILC 1962-I, pp. 212-213, para. 11. 
1904 See YBILC 1962-I, p. 213, para. 12. 
1905 See YBILC 1962-I, p. 213, para. 16. 
1906 See YBILC 1962-I, p. 213, para. 19. 
1907 See YBILC 1962-I, p. 213, paras. 20 and 22. 
1908 See YBILC 1962-I, pp. 259-260, para. 48. 





The correction of errors in the texts of treaties for which there is no depositary 
1. Where an error is discovered in the text of a treaty for which there is no depositary after 
the text has been authenticated, the interested states shall by mutual agreement correct the 
error […]   
2. The provisions of paragraph 1 shall also apply where there are two or more authentic 
texts of a treaty which are not concordant and where it is proposed to correct the wording 
of one of the texts.  
 
In the process of drafting the Report of the Commission to the General Assembly, 
covering the work of the ILC during its fourteenth session, the Commission made a few 
minor changes, leaving the substance of the article untouched, and renumbered it as 
Article 26.1909 
The commentary included in the Report of the Commission to the General 
Assembly made clear that paragraph 1 dealt with the corrections of “errors in the text” 
and that such errors might be due either to typographical mistakes, or to a misdescription 
or mis-statement due to a misunderstanding. As a result, the correction could also affect 
the substantive meaning of the texts authenticated. In this respect, the commentary 
clarified that where the contracting States were not agreed as to the text being erroneous, 
a dispute arose and the “mistake” was of a kind that belonged to another branch of the 
law of treaties.1910 Only where the contracting States were agreed as to the existence of 
an error was the matter simply one of correction of error, therefore falling under Article 
26.1911 
The commentary went on to affirm the applicability of the same article (and 
techniques of correction) in cases of rectifications of discordant authentic texts drawn up 
in two or more languages.1912 In addition, it pointed out that the ILC noted that the issue 
may also arise of correcting not the authentic text itself but (non-authentic) versions of 
the treaty prepared in other languages. According to the ILC, however, this was not a 
matter of altering an authentic text of the treaty and, therefore, it was unnecessary for the 
article to cover the point. In these cases, the contracting States could modify the 
translation(s) by mutual agreement without any special formality.1913  
 
In response to the comments put forward by the Japanese, Swedish and United States 
governments, Sir Humphrey Waldock proposed a new draft of Article 26 in his Fourth 
Report on the Law of Treaties.1914 The relevant part thereof read as follows: 
 
 Article 26. 
                                                     
1909 See YBILC 1962-II, p. 183. 
1910 I.e. that of interpretation and, under a different perspective, invalidation of treaties. 
1911 See YBILC 1962-II, p. 183, para. 2 of the commentary. 
1912 See YBILC 1962-II, pp. 183-184, para. 3 and para. 5, first sentence, of the commentary. 
1913 See YBILC 1962-II, p. 184, para. 5 of the commentary. 
1914 With regard to both the governments’ comments and the Special Rapporteur’s observations and proposals, 
see YBILC 1965-II, pp. 60-61. 
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 The correction of errors in the texts of treaties for which there is no depositary 
1. Unless otherwise agreed between the interested States, where an error is discovered in 
the text of a treaty for which there is no depositary after the text has been authenticated, the 
error shall be corrected […] 
2. Paragraph 1 applies also where there are two or more authentic texts of a treaty which 
are not concordant and where it is agreed to correct the wording of one of the texts. 
 
For the purpose of the present analysis, it is noteworthy that the reference to the 
agreement of the parties on the correction of the wording of two or more discordant 
authentic texts was made explicit in paragraph 2. In contrast, the reference to the 
agreement of the parties as to the existence of an error and its correction was not 
unambiguous in the text of new paragraph 1. Finally, the Special Rapporteur reduced the 
paragraphs of the article from 4 to 2, thus partially satisfying the instances of curtailment 
of the provisions of Articles 26 and 27 put forward by the Japanese government (which, 
additionally, had proposed to consolidate Articles 26 and 27 in a single article).  
 
The new text was discussed by the ILC at its 802nd meeting, held on 15 June 1965. 
Mr Castrén suggested, as a matter of form, following the Japanese proposal of 
consolidating the content of the original Articles 26 and 27 in a single article, while 
retaining the substance of the new articles drafted by the Special Rapporteur.1915 Mr 
Ruda and Mr Tunkin also supported the proposal for an amalgamation of Articles 26 and 
27.1916 
Similarly, Mr Elias called for more simplification in the text of Articles 26 and 
27,1917 while Mr Rosanne warned the ILC of the physiological danger deriving from 
having many provisions dealing with the various manifestations of error.1918 Mr Ago 
agreed on such points.1919 
The discussion then turned once again on the scope of Articles 26 and 27, i.e. to 
which kind of errors those articles should apply. The issue was raised by Mr Reuter, 
according to whom Article 26 was not comprehensible to anyone unfamiliar with the 
ILC’s previous proceedings and the meaning of the term “error”, as used in that article, 
was also not very clear. He recalled that the only definition of such a term was given in 
Article 34(4),1920 which referred to an “error in the wording” as opposed to an error of 
substance, but concluded that also such a reference was unclear. According to Mr 
Reuter, the current text of Article 26 could be interpreted as also covering much more 
serious errors than typographical errors. Since different categories of error raised widely 
different problems, some of which could prove very serious (such as in the case of errors 
                                                     
1915 See YBILC 1965-I, p. 186, para. 8. 
1916 See YBILC 1965-I, p. 187, paras. 18, 20 and 33. 
1917 See YBILC 1965-I, p. 187, para. 12. 
1918 In the Special Rapporteur’s Fourth Report on the Law of Treaties, the articles dealing with errors were 
four: Articles 26, 27, 27(bis) and 34. For Mr Rosanne’s comment, see YBILC 1965-I, p. 187, paras. 13-14. 
1919 See YBILC 1965-I, p. 187, para. 23. 
1920 With regard to the text of Article 34, dealing with errors invalidating the contracting States’ consent to be 
bound by the treaty, see YBILC 1963-II, p. 195. Article 34(4) read as follows: 
4. When there is no mistake as to the substance of a treaty but there is an error in the wording of its text, the error 
shall not affect the validity of the treaty and articles 26 and 27 then apply. 
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of translation), Mr Reuter suggested that the ILC defer consideration of Articles 26 and 
27 and make a careful study of each category of error. He concluded that, in any event, 
Articles 26 and 27 as they stood did not make it clear that they referred to all kinds of 
error, so long as the contracting States agreed to correct them. On the contrary, such a 
scope of Articles 26 and 27 should have been made clear right at the beginning of the 
articles.1921 
The other members of the ILC, however, did not share Mr Reuter’s position. The 
Special Rapporteur, in summarizing the discussion that took place on the matter, made 
clear that Articles 26 and 27 dealt with errors “in expression” (i.e. errors “in the 
wording”, using the expression adopted in Article 34(4)), while Article 34 dealt with 
errors “in substance”. The foremost difference between these two kinds of error was that, 
with reference to the former, the parties recognized their existence and agreed on their 
correction, while the same did not hold true with reference to the latter.1922 The origin or 
type of the errors (e.g. clerical errors, typographic errors, translation errors, etc.) was not 
relevant for the purpose of applying Articles 26 and 27, the only decisive criterion being 
the agreement of the parties as to its existence and correction. Second, as pointed out by 
Mr Tunkin, Mr Yasseen and Mr Ago, in the case of errors “in expression”, the content of 
the treaty provision was agreed upon by the parties and its unique meaning was not 
correctly and univocally expressed by the wording of the provision, which therefore 
needed to be corrected, while, in the case of errors “in substance” affecting the text of a 
treaty, different parties were attributing different meanings to the same treaty provision, 
e.g. due to the diverse terms used in two authentic texts of a treaty. As a consequence, 
the latter kind of error could, in contrast to the former, also vitiate the parties’ consent to 
be bound by the treaty. In such a case, Article 34 was applicable.1923 Some ILC 
members, however, agreed that these concepts could be expressed more clearly in the 
text of the relevant articles than they currently were.1924  
At the end of the discussion, the Special Rapporteur referred to the distinction 
between cases involving the correction of errors and those involving the amendment of a 
treaty: “Even where the parties agreed that the text of the treaty contained some 
infelicitous expression, which might perhaps be unfortunate because of some political 
nuance, the case would still be one of error in expression. If, however, the parties 
admitted that the text was completely correct but merely wished to change it by 
agreement, the case was really one of amendment and should be governed by the 
separate provisions on the amendment of treaties”.1925 
Finally, in replying to a comment of Mr Tsuruoka,1926 Mr Rosenne and Sir 
Humphrey Waldock clarified that the issue of the correction of an error could arise even 
after the ratification of a treaty and the provisions of Articles 26 and 27 would apply also 
                                                     
1921 See YBILC 1965-I, p. 188, paras. 26, 29 and 31. 
1922 See YBILC 1965-I, p. 189, paras. 51-52. See also the concurrent position expressed by Mr Pal (YBILC 
1965-I, p. 189, para. 47). 
1923 See YBILC 1965-I, pp. 188-189, paras. 32, 37 and 39.  
1924 See YBILC 1965-I, pp. 188-189, paras. 37, 39 and 51. 
1925 See YBILC 1965-I, p. 190, para. 53. 
1926 See YBILC 1965-I, p. 190, paras. 58 and 60. 
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in that event.1927   
The articles under analysis were ultimately referred to the Drafting Committee 
with a view of shortening them in light of the discussion held.  
 
The discussion was resumed at the ILC’s 815th meeting, held on 1 July 1965. 
Mr Bartos (Chairman) invited the ILC to consider the new text of Article 26 
proposed by the Drafting Committee, which also incorporated the substance of previous 
Article 27. The relevant parts of new Article 26 read as follows:1928 
 
 Article 26. 
 Correction of errors in texts or in certified copies of treaties 
1. Where, after the authentication of the text of a treaty, the contracting States are agreed 
that it contains an error, the error shall, unless they otherwise decide, be corrected […] 
3. The rules in paragraphs 1 and 2 apply also where the text has been authenticated in two 
or more languages and it appears that there is a lack of concordance which it is agreed 
should be corrected.  
 
With specific reference to paragraph 3, Sir Humphrey Waldock explained that it dealt 
with the case, unlike that considered by paragraph 1, in which there was no error in the 
text, but a lack of concordance between two or more language versions.  
 Such a clarification, however, seems a bit puzzling to the author. If the parties 
agree on the existence of a lack of concordance, which they decide to eliminate by 
modifying one (or more) of the authentic texts, it follows that they also at least implicitly 
agreed that the modified authentic text(s) was/were unsatisfactory in expressing the 
concept they agreed upon and that was correctly expressed by the other authentic text(s). 
The author cannot see any difference between the logical process that leads to the 
correction in cases dealt with in paragraph 3 and that foreseen in paragraph 1. In both 
cases, the activity is directed to (i) discovering the presence of a written expression that 
does not properly convey the concept agreed upon by the parties (the error) and (ii) 
correcting such a written expression, whether in the single authentic text, solely in some 
of the various authentic texts, or in all the various authentic texts (the correction of the 
error). 
 
The text of new Article 26 was adopted by the ILC and Sir Humphrey Waldock and Mr 
Reuter (acting Chairman of the Drafting Committee) were entrusted with the settlement 
of few minor drafting issues.  
The above text, with some slight modifications, was finally incorporated in 
Article 79 VCLT, whose relevant parts read as follows: 
 
 Article 79  
 Correction of errors in texts or in certified copies of treaties  
1. Where, after the authentication of the text of a treaty, the signatory States and the 
                                                     
1927 See YBILC 1965-I, p. 190, paras. 59 and 62. 
1928 See YBILC 1965-I, p. 276, para. 6. 
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contracting States are agreed that it contains an error, the error shall, unless they decide 
upon some other means of correction, be corrected […] 
3. The rules in paragraphs 1 and 2 apply also where the text has been authenticated in two 
or more languages and it appears that there is a lack of concordance which the signatory 
States and the contracting States agree should be corrected.  
 
3. Analysis of Article 79 VCLT 
 
The purpose of Article 79 VCLT is to establish methods to rectify errors and 
inconsistencies found in the authentic texts of the treaty.1929 The article, however, leaves 
the contracting States free to decide both whether to proceed to a formal correction of 
the text and the method of correction to be adopted.1930   
 
In order for Article 79 VCLT to be applicable, it is necessary that a two-pronged 
condition is satisfied: there must be:  
(i) a technical error in some of the authentic texts of the treaty that  
(ii) all contracting States recognize as such.  
The first prong highlights that the focus of the analysis carried out by the parties is on 
the language expressions encompassed in the text of the treaty and not on some extra-
textual element; moreover, it specifies that there must be a technical error, i.e that the 
treaty text is different from how it should be in order to properly express the meaning 
attached thereto by the contracting States.  
 The second prong makes clear that the above-mentioned error is to be recognized 
as such by all contracting States, i.e. that, according to all of them, some authentic texts 
do not properly convey the agreed meaning they attached thereto from the outset. 
Therefore, in order for Article 79 VCLT to apply in relation to a specific error, there 
must be full agreement among the parties on the concept underlying the language 
expression containing the error and, hence, on the meaning it conveys.  
 
Where the existence of the above-mentioned error is not agreed upon by all contracting 
States, the error falls outside the scope of Article 79 VCLT.1931 In that case, the 
following scenarios may be hypothesized.  
First, all contracting States agree on the meaning that the specific language 
expression should convey, but, although some of them maintain that language expression 
does not properly convey such a meaning, others consider that it does and are thus not 
willing to replace it with a new language expression. Generally, where this scenario 
occurs, while there is no apparent disagreement among the contracting States on the 
meaning of the currently used language expression when the prototypical denotata 
thereof are taken into account, disagreement may arise when non-prototypical cases are 
assessed as falling within or outside the scope of such an expression. In the latter case, 
                                                     
1929 See paragraph 1 of the commentary to Article 74 of the 1966 Draft (YBILC 1966-II, p. 272). 
1930 See paragraph 3 of the commentary to Article 74 of the 1966 Draft (YBILC 1966-II, p. 272). 
1931 See paragraph 1 of the commentary to Article 74 of the 1966 Draft (YBILC 1966-II, p. 272). 
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the disagreement may be removed by means of interpretation under articles 31-33 
VCLT.  
Second, the contracting States do not agree on the meaning that the language 
expression should convey and, for that reason, some of them maintain that the language 
expression does not accurately convey its proper meaning, while others maintain that it 
does so. In this scenario, there is an issue of interpretation of the language expression 
currently used in the treaty, which has to be solved in accordance with Articles 31-33 
VCLT. 
Third, the disagreement on the meaning to be conveyed by the language 
expression is so relevant that an error invalidating the contracting States’ consent to be 
bound by the treaty might be deemed to exist. Article 48 VCLT will apply to this case. 
In light of the above, the statement made by the ILC in paragraph 1 of the 
commentary to Article 74 of the 1966 Draft (corresponding to Article 79 VCLT), 
according to which “the correction may affect the substantive meaning of the text as 
authenticated”, appears awkward. The author submits that it should be read in its context 
as pointing out that the correction might, in extreme cases, alter the utterance meaning of 
the language expression; however, it can never modify the meaning originally attached 
thereto by the contracting States, since the general effect ex tunc1932 of the correction 
implies that the contracting States have not intended such meaning to be modified at all 
by the correction. Moreover, if that were not the case, corrections would mingle with 
amendments.1933  
 
With regard to the type of errors that may be corrected by means of Article 79 VCLT, 
paragraph 1 of the commentary to Article 74 of the 1966 Draft refers to typographical 
mistakes, misdescriptions or mis-statements due to misunderstandings.1934  
 With reference to the type of errors specifically governed by Article 79(3), 
Tabory included among them the lack of concordance due to differences in punctuation, 
spelling errors, typographical errors, omissions, numeric differences and inaccurate 
translations.1935  
 These lists, however, are by no means intended to be comprehensive, since, as the 
analysis of the relevant preparatory works clearly shows, Article 79 VCLT is meant to 
apply to all technical errors in the text of a treaty recognized as such by the contracting 
States, no regard being paid to their origin and typology.  
 Technical errors in the texts of the treaty comprise the lack of concordance 
between authentic texts drawn up in different languages. Therefore, where the 
contracting States agree that some authentic texts do not properly convey the agreed 
meaning of a certain treaty provision, while the others do, the former are corrected in 
order to better convey such a meaning. As previously stated, there is no substantial 
                                                     
1932 See Article 79(4) VCLT and paragraph 6 of the commentary to Article 74 of the 1966 Draft (YBILC 1966-
II, p. 273). 
1933 Amendments are separately dealt with in Part IV of the VCLT (Articles 39 through 41 thereof). 
1934 See YBILC 1966-II, p. 272. 
1935 See M. Tabory, Multilingualism In International Law and Institutions (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & 
Noordhoff, 1980), pp. 183-184 and, in particular, footnotes 73, 74 and 75 therein.  
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difference between the logical process that leads to the correction in cases dealt with in 
paragraph 3 of Article 79 VCLT and that foreseen in paragraph 1 thereof. In both cases, 
the activity is directed to (i) discovering the presence of a language expression that does 
not properly convey the concept agreed upon by the contracting States (the error) and (ii) 
correcting such a language expression, whether in the single authentic text, solely in 
some of the various authentic texts, or in all the various authentic texts (the correction of 
the error). 
 
Finally, it is worth reflecting on the statement by Tabory that “the borderline between 
the correction of technical errors and the interpretation of discordant meanings in 
multilingual documents in certain instances, is doubtful and unclear”.1936 The author, in 
order to substantiate her statement, referred to the case of the correction of the Chinese 
authentic text of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide1937 and, in particular, to the controversy within the Sixth Committee of the UN 
General Assembly on whether the amendment of the Chinese authentic text of the 
Convention constituted a revision or a rectification thereof.1938  
Tabory’s statement may be agreed upon if it is considered to refer solely to the 
decision-making process by means of which the contracting States assess whether the 
proposed new text of the treaty conveys the agreed meaning better than the 
corresponding current authentic text. Undoubtedly, in the course of this process, various 
interpretative issues come out, such as:  
(i) whether the current authentic texts all convey the same meaning;  
(ii) whether there is a meaning clearly agreed upon by all contracting States;  
(iii) whether the proposed new text of the treaty properly conveys the meaning 
expressed by the other authentic texts; or  
(iv) whether the proposed new text may cause more interpretative difficulties than 
the current authentic text does.  
In particular, a key issue that might emerge in this phase concerns the actual shape of the 
supposedly agreed meaning of the treaty provision at stake, if such a meaning exists at 
all.  
However, once all contracting States have gone through such a decision-making 
process, have agreed upon the existence of an error and have corrected it according to 
the provisions of Article 79 VCLT, the borderline between the correction of technical 
errors and the interpretation of prima facie discordant authentic texts become absolutely 
sharp, due to the agreed rejection of the old text by the contracting States and their 
decision to rely solely on the new authentic text1939 for interpretative purposes. The 
                                                     
1936 See M. Tabory, Multilingualism In International Law and Institutions (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & 
Noordhoff, 1980), p. 184 and p. 216, point 6. 
1937 See “Resolutions of the General Assembly Concerning the Law of Treaties: Memorandum prepared by the 
Secretariat”, 14 February 1963, in YBILC 1963-II, pp. 32-35, paras. 144-154.  
1938 With regard to the debate within the Sixth Committee, see “Resolutions of the General Assembly 
Concerning the Law of Treaties: Memorandum prepared by the Secretariat”, 14 February 1963, in YBILC 
1963-II, pp. 33-35, para. 153. 
1939 Together with the other languages authentic texts still in force. 
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borderline is thus drawn by the declared agreement among all contracting States. No 
longer does an interpretative issue concern the relation between the rejected text and the 
new text, nor the relation between the former and the other languages authentic texts. 
The only interpretative issues remaining concern the meaning to be attributed to the 
various (current) authentic texts and the possible existence of a discordance among the 
apparent meanings thereof. The existence of such issues, however, logically has nothing 
to do with any previous or subsequent correction of errors. 
Conversely, until the contracting States agree on the existence of an error and 
correct it under the provisions of Article 79 VCLT any alleged inconsistency existing 
among the meanings attributable to the various authentic texts is to be resolved by means 
of interpretation, according to the provisions of Articles 31-33 VCLT. In this respect, the 
very same fact that the existence of an error is not clear-cut and is still debated among 
the contracting States makes absolutely clear-cut and uncontroversial the fact that Article 
79 VCLT cannot apply, while Article 33 VCLT must.1940 
 
 
                                                     
1940 See the issue rose by Tabory in distinguishing the cases where Articles 79 or 33 VCLT would apply (see 
M. Tabory, Multilingualism In International Law and Institutions (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 
1980), pp. 184-185). In this regard, it is interesting to recall that, according to paragraph 1 of the commentary 
to Article 74 of the 1966 Draft (YBILC 1966-II, p. 272), “[i]f there is a dispute as to whether or not the alleged 
error or inconsistency is in fact such, the question is not one simply of correction of the text but becomes a 
problem of mistake which falls under article 45. The present article only concerns cases where there is no 
dispute as to the existence of the error or inconsistency”.  



















In section 1 of Chapter 3 of Part I the author, by transposing in the field of international 
treaties the results of the semantic analysis carried out in Chapter 2 of Part I, established 
the fundamental principles of a normative theory on treaty interpretation, which should 
operate as a compass for the interpreters whenever construing treaties and arguing for 
their chosen interpretations.  
 In that respect, the author concluded that (i) treaty provisions are inherently 
characterized by ambiguity and vagueness and (ii) their effectiveness heavily depends on 
how the parties take into account the overall context when drafting them. In turn, point 
(ii) presupposes that the addressees (interpreters) of the treaty integrate its 
underspecified provisions, in order to reduce their vagueness and ambiguity, by using the 
overall context. The fact that both the parties and the interpreters heavily rely on the 
overall context constitutes a praxis of the international community (as such, it constitutes 
part of its underlying cooperative principle). This allows for the possibility of 
implicatures, i.e. meanings that are not explicitly conveyed by the treaty provisions, but 
that are nonetheless inferred from the overall context. 
 On such a basis, the author further concluded that the treaty interpretative process 
has as its only possible goal the utterance meaning, i.e. the meaning(s) that any 
reasonable interpreter would assign to the treaty text, as expression of the intention of 
the parties, given:  
(a) the various meanings that the grammar and the semantic specifications of the 
terms used in the treaty allow it to have and  
(b) the interpreter’s analysis of and inferences from the overall context.  
That excludes the relevance of any meaning, other than the utterance meaning, for 
interpretative purposes.  
 The author considered the overall context to include all those elements and items 
of evidence that may be helpful for the purpose of determining and arguing for the 
utterance meaning of the relevant treaty provision. In particular, the overall context 
incorporates: 
(a)  the subject matter of the treaty and its object and purpose [world spoken of]; 
(b) the international legal context of which the treaty is part, the legal systems of 
the States concluding the treaty, the encyclopedic (legal) knowledge of the 
persons involved in its drafting, the expected encyclopedic (legal) knowledge 
of the addressees of the treaty, the commonly accepted principles of behavior 
in the international community (including any cooperative principle of 
communication), every reasonable inference that the drafters and the 
addresses might be expected to derive from the above [common ground]; 
(c) the text that precedes and succeeds the provision to be interpreted [co-text]. 
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Furthermore, the author elucidated a few other principles of treaty interpretation derived 
as corollaries from the above fundamental principles. 
 
The positive analysis carried out by the author in section 2 of Chapter 3 of Part II 
showed that the rules and principles of treaty interpretation enshrined in Articles 31 and 
32 VCLT, as construed by international law scholars and applied by (international) 
courts and tribunals, do not significantly depart from the principles of interpretation 
established by the author on the basis of his normative analysis. Rather, the latter 
principles may be usefully employed by the interpreter as a compass in order to choose 
among the various (sometimes conflicting) solutions that scholars, courts and tribunals 
have upheld in the application of Articles 31 and 32 VCLT. 
 In particular, Articles 31 and 32 VCLT appear to spell out the most significant 
part of the overall context that the cooperative principle of the international community 
requires the community members to take into account when drafting and interpreting 
treaty provisions. Certainly the overall context is not limited to the means and rules of 
interpretation enshrined in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT, the former including, for instance, 
also generally accepted principles of logic and good sense.1941 However, Articles 31 and 
32 VCLT specify the most relevant part of what has to be taken into account in order to 
make the treaty effective by means of interpretation. 
This implies that no utterance meaning, i.e. no meaning of a specific treaty 
provision, may be said to exist before the interpreter has gone through the unitary 
process of construing the relevant text in light of the overall context and, in particular, of 
the rules and means of interpretation enshrined in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT (as 
illustrated by the metaphor of the crucible).1942 Any “meaning” arrived at without going 
through such a process is not a meaning; it is just an illusion of a meaning, a mere guess. 
It is, thus, the formal process of reasonably arguing and supporting the interpretation of a 
treaty provision on the basis of its overall context that divides (utterance) meanings from 
mere guesses about the speaker’s meaning. Since no single “true” meaning exists, which 
is inherently due to the fact that the meaning we look for is the utterance meaning, what 
really does matter is not the result of the enquiry, but the process followed to support it.  
 
More specifically, the comparison between the principles of interpretation stemming 
from the author’s normative analysis and those resulting from the positive analysis 
carried out in section 2 of Chapter 3 of Part II led to the following remarks. 
 The author’s principle (i), according to which treaty interpretation must be seen as 
a posteriori analytical argument, is implicit in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT, in the sense 
that under those articles any interpretation put forward by the interpreter must appear fair 
                                                     
1941 Such as, for instance, (i) the logical principles of inference and (ii) the principles and maxims of treaty 
interpretation not codified in the VCLT, since considered by the ILC as principles of logic and good sense of 
non-binding character (see commentary on Articles 27-28 of the 1966 Draft - YBILC 1966-II, p. 218, para. 4). 
1942 As Lauterpacht put it, “The controversial expression becomes scientifically clear only after we have caused 
to pass through it the “galvanic current” – to use Mr Justice Holmes’ phrase – not only of the whole document 
but of all the evidence available” (see H. Lauterpacht, “Some Observations on Preparatory Work in the 
Interpretation of Treaties”, 48 Harvard Law Review (1935), 549 et seq., at 572). 
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and reasonable (in good faith) where assessed in light of all arguments that may be built 
up on the elements and items of evidence provided for by those very same articles.  
 The author’s principles (ii) and (iii), i.e. the quest of the interpreter is directed at 
establishing the intention of the parties by determining the utterance meaning of the 
treaty text, overlap with the rule of interpretation provided for by Articles 31 and 32 
VCLT, according to which the primary duty of the interpreter is to reasonably elucidate 
the meaning of the treaty text, which is presumed to represent the authentic expression of 
the parties’ intention, by construing it on the basis of all elements and items of evidence 
provided for by those articles.  
 With reference to the author’s principle (iv), which deals with what constitutes 
the overall context, its has been already noted that Articles 31 and 32 VCLT appear to 
spell out the most significant part of such context. 
 The author’s principle (v), i.e. none of the elements of the overall context is 
inherently superior to the others and the weight that any of such elements should be 
given for the purpose of establishing the utterance meaning depends on the 
circumstances of the case, corresponds to the principle stemming from the hierarchical 
structure of Articles 31 and 32 VCLT. In the VCLT system, the various means of 
interpretation encompassed in Article 31 VCLT are all of an equal status, while those 
referred to in Article 32 VCLT play a subsidiary role because experience shows that they 
are generally less reliable and more ambiguous and provide vague hints of the intention 
of the parties. Nonetheless, where the supplementary means of interpretation contribute 
to reasonably establishing the agreement of the parties with regard to the interpretation 
of the treaty, such an agreement must be taken into account as a primary means of 
interpretation under Article 31 VCLT. 
The author’s principle (vi), i.e. the treaty text should be construed on the basis of 
all implicatures that may be derived from the text and the overall context, is implicit in 
the principle of good faith referred to in Article 31 VCLT, which rejects a mere literal 
approach and requires the treaty to be construed reasonably, honestly and fairly, thus 
allowing the interpreter to imply terms in the treaty (in addition to, or as replacement of 
the treaty terms) for the purpose of giving efficacy to the intention of the parties that may 
be inferred from the express provisions of the treaty. 
 The author’s principle (vii), i.e. the relevance of the treaty text must not be 
overestimated since such text is inherently characterized by ambiguity and vagueness 
and is made of underspecified clauses that need to be expanded by semantic and 
pragmatic inferences, underlies both Articles 31 and 32 VCLT. This is evidenced by: 
(a) the preeminent role played by the extra-textual and co-textual (broad context) 
means of interpretation, provided for in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT, for the 
purpose of establishing the ordinary meaning of the treaty terms;  
(b) the express recognition of the possibility that the parties intended to attribute 
an unusual meaning (special meaning) to some of the treaty terms;  
(c) the fact that good faith rejects a mere literal approach and requires the 
interpreter to discharge those meanings that appear manifestly absurd or 
unreasonable in light of the particular circumstances of the case. 
The same holds true with regard to the author’s principle (viii), i.e. the relevance of 
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grammatical constraints must not be overestimated. 
 The author’s principle (ix), i.e. there is a plausible presumption that the parties 
intended to attribute to the treaty terms their jargon meanings whenever a particular 
jargon has been used in drafting the treaty, is implicit in the concept of ordinary meaning 
referred to in Article 31 VCLT, according to which, where a term is used in a technical 
context, its ordinary meaning should be generally considered to coincide with the 
meaning attributed to that term in the relevant technical jargon.  
 The author’s principle (x), i.e. the interpreter should consider that the contracting 
States’ representatives in most cases choose the terms to be employed in the treaty on the 
basis of the approximate overlapping between the prototypical items denoted by those 
terms and the items that they intended to be covered by those terms, may be seen as 
underlying Articles 31 and 32 VCLT, in particular as underlying:  
(a) the requirement that the treaty terms must be given the ordinary meaning that 
best fits in their context and suits the object and purpose of the treaty; 
(b) the possibility that, in certain cases, a special meaning must be attributed to 
treaty terms; 
(c) the fact that good faith rejects a mere literal approach and requires the 
interpreter to discharge the meanings that appear manifestly absurd or 
unreasonable in light of the context and the treaty object and purpose. 
The author’s principle (xi), in particular the need to assess whether the parties intended 
treaty terms to be attributed a uniform meaning by all contracting States, or whether they 
intended each State to interpret those terms on the basis of its own (legal) concepts, is 
not explicitly dealt with in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT. It is, however, obvious that:  
(a) both the ordinary and the special meanings to be determined under Article 31 
VCLT may be either uniform (and autonomous) international meanings, or 
specific national meanings; and  
(b) it is for the interpreter to establish, on the basis of the means of interpretation 
provided for in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT, whether the parties intended a 
uniform international meaning or a specific national meaning to be attributed 
to the treaty terms. 
The author’s principle (xii), i.e. the interpreter should take into account any subsequent 
act of the parties that directly or indirectly may shed light on the meaning that they 
attribute to the treaty, is explicitly recognized by Article 31(3) VCLT. 
 
Since the interpretative principles stemming from the author’s semantics-based 
normative analysis proved not to conflict with the generally accepted rules of 
interpretation enshrined in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT, the author employed such 
principles, as well as a construction of Articles 31-33 VCLT based thereon, as the 
cornerstones of his normative legal theory on the interpretation of multilingual (tax) 
treaty, i.e. for the purpose of answering the research questions addressed in this study.  
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2. Conclusions drawn by the author with regard to the research 
questions  
2.1. Questions concerning all multilingual treaties 
 
a) Must all authentic texts be given the same status for the purpose of interpreting 
multilingual treaties? 
 
Under Article 33(1) VCLT, all authentic texts are equally authoritative for treaty 
interpretation purposes, in the sense that each of them may be (autonomously) relied 
upon in order to construe the treaty.  
 However, the positive analysis carried out by the author has shown that the 
drafted text (i.e. the text that has been discussed during the negotiations and eventually 
drafted as result thereof) may sometimes be given more weight than the other texts for 
the purpose of construing the treaty, since there is a reasonable presumption that it may 
more accurately reflect the common intention of the parties, in particular where the 
treaty negotiators were not involved in the subsequent drafting and examination of the 
other authentic texts. In this perspective, the drafted text appears relevant (i) as a proxy 
of the travaux préparatoires, where the latter are not fully available, and (ii) in order to 
corroborate the evidence emerging from other means of interpretation. Thus, the 
interpreter should throw the drafted text (as such) in the crucible and use it, according to 
Articles 31-33 VCLT, in order to solve prima facie divergences of meaning among the 
various authentic texts and, according to Articles 31 and 32 VCLT, in order to determine 
the meaning to be reasonably attributed to the relevant treaty terms and the object and 
purpose of the treaty. 
 Nothing in the VCLT precludes the interpreter from taking into account the 
drafted text of a treaty as previously described. Rather, good faith seems to impose on 
the interpreter the duty to attribute the appropriate weight thereto for the purpose of 
construing multilingual treaties.   
 
Those conclusions are substantially in line with principle (vi) established by the author 
in section 2 of Chapter 3 of Part I on the basis of his semantics-based normative analysis, 
according to which, since the quest of the interpreter is directed at establishing the 
common intention of parties, it is reasonable for him to attribute, in the case of a prima 
facie discrepancy in meaning among the authentic treaty texts, a particular relevance to 
the text that was originally drafted by the contracting States’ representatives and on 
which was formed the consensus among them, for the purpose of removing that prima 
facie discrepancy.  
 
 
b) What is the relevance of non-authentic texts for the purpose of construing 
(multilingual) treaties? 
 




 The original draft articles prepared by Sir Humphrey Waldock and included in his 
Third Report on the Law of Treaties overtly dealt with the relevance of such language 
versions for the purpose of treaty interpretation. In particular, Article 75(5) of his Third 
Report established that non-authentic language versions could be used as subsidiary 
evidence of the intention of the parties where the application of all other rules of 
interpretation left the meaning of a term, as expressed in the authentic text(s), ambiguous 
or obscure.1943 
 Then, in the course of its sixteenth session, the ILC decided to drop that provision 
on the grounds that it could have opened the door too much to the use of non-authentic 
versions of a treaty for the purpose of its interpretation. 
 
That said, nothing in the text or in the travaux préparatoires of the VCLT seems to 
prevent the interpreter from taking non-authentic language versions into account as 
supplementary means of interpretation,1944 attributing thereto an interpretative weight 
that may vary depending on the available evidence that such language versions may 
contribute to determine the common intention of the parties. Quite the opposite, since the 
supplementary means of interpretation covered by Article 32 VCLT are generally 
regarded as including all means of interpretation (other than those referred to in Article 
31 VCLT) that may shed some light on the meaning of the treaty,1945 it is reasonable to 
conclude that non-authentic language versions may be considered within the scope of 
Article 32 VCLT and accordingly used, depending on the circumstances of the case.1946 
For instance, unilateral documents such as the official treaty translations 
produced by the contracting States are potentially relevant, since they may give a hint of 
the practice followed by a party, or of the treaty meaning according to a party;1947 where 
the other parties were informed about such documents and positions and did not object to 
them, they might even be considered (although not lightly) to have been tacitly agreed 
upon. The same holds true, mutatis mutandis, with regard to multilateral documents such 
as treaty official versions. 
 
In a slightly different perspective, non-authentic language versions may come into play 
as documents on which the subsequent practice of the parties is based. In particular, 
where non-authentic language versions have been put into public circulation and relied 
upon by the parties for the purpose of applying the relevant treaty, they could give rise to 
                                                     
1943 See also YBILC 1964-II, p. 65, para. 10. 
1944 See YBILC 1966-II, p. 223, para. 20. 
1945 See I. Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1984), p. 116. See also F. Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law (Amsterdam: IBFD 
Publications, 2004), pp. 334-339 and the references included therein. 
1946 See, in this respect, YBILC 1966-II, p. 226, para. 9; M. Hilf, Die Auslegung mehrsprachiger Verträge. Eine 
Untersuchung zum Völkerrecht und zum Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Berlin: Springer-
Verlag, 1973), pp. 105-108; F. Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law (Amsterdam: 
IBFD Publications, 2004), p. 398.  
1947 See, however, Italian-United States Conciliation Commission, 20 September 1958, Flegenheimer case – 
decision No. 182, 14 Reports of International Arbitral Awards, 327 et seq., para. 66, letter a). 
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issues of possible (i) estoppel and acquiescence, (ii) establishment by practice of a 
common interpretation of the treaty, or (iii) amendment by practice of the treaty.1948 
In this respect, it is interesting to make a reference to the Taba Arbitration,1949 
where the Arbitral Tribunal had to decide upon the exact location of part of the border 
between Egypt and Israel (also) on the basis of a treaty concluded in 1906 between the 
former Turkish Sultanate and the Khedivate of Egypt. This treaty had been drafted in the 
Turkish language only; however, the treaty was then translated into Arabic and from 
Arabic into English. The tribunal noted that the “English translations were printed in a 
number of official sources and apparently were relied on thereafter” and that “it 
transpired that […] no authorities since before the First World War had ever consulted 
the authentic Turkish text, not even the Parties to this dispute.”1950 The tribunal 
concluded that, for interpretative purposes, it would have followed the general practice 
of the parties and thus referred to the English translation and not to the authentic Turkish 
text.1951  As fairly pointed out by Gardiner, the decision of the tribunal to rely mainly on 
the English translation for the purpose of construing the 1906 treaty must be seen as 
“coloured by the greater significance to be attached to how the treaty had been 
implemented in practice”.1952 
 
Finally, the above conclusions appear coherent with principle (vii) established by the 
author in section 2 of Chapter 3 of Part I on the basis of his semantics-based normative 
analysis, according to which the interpreter may take into account the non-authentic 
language versions of a treaty for the purpose of construing the latter, the interpretative 
weight attributable to such language versions depending on the available evidence that 
they may contribute to ascertain the common intention of the parties.1953 
                                                     
1948 See, similarly, R. Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 363.  
1949 Arbitral Tribunal, 29 September 1988, Case concerning the location of boundary markers in Taba between 
Egypt and Israel, 20 Reports of International Arbitral Awards, 1 et seq. 
1950 See Arbitral Tribunal, 29 September 1988, Case concerning the location of boundary markers in Taba 
between Egypt and Israel, 20 Reports of International Arbitral Awards, 1 et seq., para. 45.  
1951 See Arbitral Tribunal, 29 September 1988, Case concerning the location of boundary markers in Taba 
between Egypt and Israel, 20 Reports of International Arbitral Awards, 1 et seq., para. 45. 
1952 See R. Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 362. It must be noted, 
however, that the above-mentioned statement of the tribunal has to be read against its proper background, i.e. 
taking into account that the establishment of frontiers is a field of international law where it is customarily 
accepted that the subsequent practice of the parties plays a major role for the purpose of interpreting the 
relevant treaties. In this respect, the arbitral tribunal had the chance to deal with the issue of the possible 
divergence between the meaning reasonably attributable to the text of the treaty and the practice followed by 
the parties; in paragraph 210 of its award it made reference to the ICJ decision in the Temple of Preah Vihear 
case (ICJ, 15 June 1962, Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), judgment) and stated the following: 
“If a boundary line is once demarcated jointly by the parties concerned, the demarcation is considered to be an 
authentic interpretation of the boundary agreement even if deviations may have occurred or if there are some 
inconsistencies with maps. This has been confirmed in practice and legal doctrine, especially for the case that a 
long time has elapsed since demarcation. […] It is therefore to be concluded that the demarcated boundary line 
would prevail over the Agreement if a contradiction could be detected.”  
1953 For instance, the fact that both official translations produced by the contracting States of a bilateral treaty 
seem to suggest the same construction of a certain treaty provision, which in contrast appears ambiguous on 
the basis of the sole authentic text, may reasonably lead the interpreter to construe the treaty in accordance with 





c) Is there any obligation to perform a comparison of the different authentic texts 
anytime a multilingual treaty is interpreted? 
 
Under the VCLT, the interpreter is under no obligation to take into account more than 
one authentic text whenever construing and applying a multilingual treaty. Except where 
a prima facie divergence among the authentic treaty texts is put forward, the interpreter 
has the right to rely on any single authentic text in order to determine the utterance 
meaning of the relevant treaty provision, which is to be ascertained on the basis of the 
rules of interpretation provided for in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT.1954  
 Article 33(1) VCLT states that the text is equally authoritative (for interpretative 
purposes) in each authentic language, unless an agreement to the contrary exists. 
Furthermore, according to Article 33(3) VCLT, the terms of a treaty are presumed to 
have the same meaning in each authentic text. The combination of these two provisions, 
read in their context, establishes the following:  
(i) a rule of law according to which every treaty provision has just a single 
meaning, which is equally expressed by each of its authentic texts;  
(ii) a rebuttable presumption that each authentic text is accurate enough to 
guarantee that the interpretation of the treaty based solely on it leads to the same 
utterance meaning that could be derived through an interpretation based on any of 
the other authentic texts.  
 
This means that the various authentic texts must always be attributed the same utterance 
meaning, since it is established by the rule of law that they have the same meaning. 
Thus, from a logical perspective, referring to a divergence in meaning between the 
various authentic texts is erroneous since such texts cannot have different meanings;1955 
it would be more correct to speak of a divergence between the meanings provisionally 
attributed to the various authentic texts (construed in isolation from each other), or of a 
prima facie apparent (not real) divergence of meanings.1956 
At the same time, a combined reading of Articles 33(1) and 33(3) VCLT 
                                                     
1954 See I. Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1984), pp. 148-149; Commentary to Article 29 of the 1966 Draft (YBILC 1966-II, p. 225, para. 7). On the 
(low) frequency of having recourse, by the ICJ, to the rules of interpretation provided for by Article 33 VCLT, 
as compared to those enshrined in Articles 31-32 VCLT, see R. Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 16-17 and 33 (footnote 93). 
1955 See commentary to Article 29 of the 1966 Draft, in which it is stressed that “in law there is only one treaty - 
one set of terms accepted by the parties and one common intention with respect to those terms - even when two 
authentic texts appear to diverge” (YBILC 1966-II, p. 225, paras. 6); see also YBILC 1966-II, p. 225, paras. 7.  
1956 It is submitted here that Engelen concluded the same, as a matter of substance, although through different 
linguistic expressions: “However, even then [ed.’s note: when it is “established that the terms of the treaty 
actually do not have the same meaning in each text”] it must be assumed that the different authentic texts were 
always intended to mean the same, despite the failure of the parties to accurately express their common 
intention in each text, and the interpreter should bear this in mind when reconciling the different texts in 
accordance with the principles of Article 33(4) VCLT” (see F. Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under 
International Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2004), p. 394). 
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establishes the rebuttable presumption (ii) that the meaning provisionally attributed to 
any of the authentic texts, taken in isolation, is the utterance meaning of the treaty.1957 
 
The interpreter of course remains free to take into account more than one authentic text 
in his quest for the utterance meaning of the treaty. 
 
These conclusions appear in line with principles (i), (ii) and (iii) established by the 
author in section 2 of Chapter 3 of Part I on the basis of his semantics-based normative 
analysis, according to which: 
(i) for the purpose of interpreting one authentic text of a multilingual treaty, the 
other authentic texts are part of the overall context and, therefore, may be used in 
order to construe the former;  
(ii) since the relevance of the treaty text(s) must not be overestimated, where the 
parties have agreed that more than one treaty text is authentic, it is reasonable to 
infer that those parties intended to allow treaty interpretation to be based on any 
of such authentic texts, taken in isolation, together with the elements of the 
overall context other than the other authentic texts; and 
(iii) the interpretation of a multilingual treaty on the basis of just one of its 
authentic texts is not different from the interpretation of a monolingual treaty and 
therefore the principles applicable to the interpretation of the latter apply to the 
interpretation of the former.  
                                                     
1957 The position of most scholars is confusing (and confused) on this point, a widespread conclusion being that 
upon the discovery of a prima facie divergence between the authentic texts, the presumption of Article 33(3) 
VCLT that the terms of the treaty have the same meaning in each text is rebutted and ceases to hold true (to 
this extent, see F. Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law (Amsterdam: IBFD 
Publications, 2004), pp. 391-392). Tabory, for instance, affirmed that upon discovery on an unclear passage, a 
textual divergence or a difference of opinion, “the presumption in Article 33(3) VCLT ceases to hold” (see M. 
Tabory, Multilingualism In International Law and Institutions (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 
1980), p. 198). Similarly, Germer attributed to Article 33(3) VCLT a limited function and stated that the latter 
was a consequence of the very nature of the presumption, which was acknowledged by Sir Humphrey Waldock 
(at the ILC 874th meeting); he concluded that when an international adjudicator is confronted with a divergence 
between the different authentic texts of a treaty, the presumption of Article 33(3) VCLT does not give him any 
guidance, so that he has to resort to the rules set forth in Article 33(4) VCLT (see P. Germer, “Interpretation of 
Plurilingual Treaties: A Study of Article 33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties”, 11 Harvard 
International Law Journal (1970), 400 et seq., at 414). However, the author submits that (i) the Special 
Rapporteur, in the course of the ILC 874th meeting, never referred to such a limited presumption of equal 
meaning of the authentic texts (he never used the word “presumption” at all, indeed), but simply discussed the 
right to rely on a single authentic text (see, similarly, F. Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under 
International Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2004), pp. 393-394); (ii) the right to rely on one single text 
is a strict consequence of the presumption that each authentic text is accurate enough to guarantee that the 
interpretation of the treaty based solely thereon leads to the same utterance meaning that could be determined 
through an interpretation based on any of the other authentic texts, and not of the rule (non-rebuttable 
presumption) that all authentic texts have the same meaning; (iii) Article 33(4) VCLT does not set aside Article 
33(3) VCLT, but, on the contrary, it is built thereon: in fact, it requires the interpreter to determine the common 
meaning of the various authentic texts by applying the rules of interpretation enshrined in Articles 31 and 32 
VCLT and, where this is not possible, to adopt the meaning that best reconciles the texts (both provisions 
supporting the idea of the treaty unity and of the interconnected equality of meaning of the various authentic 





d) If the previous question is answered in the negative, when does an obligation to 
compare the different authentic texts arise? 
 
Under Article 33 VCLT, any authentic text may be construed by the interpreter in 
isolation, on the basis of the rules of interpretation enshrined in Articles 31 and 32 
VCLT.1958 The result of such a construction is the provisional utterance meaning of the 
treaty. 
That implies that no utterance meaning exists before one text has been properly 
construed on the basis of the rules of interpretation enshrined in Articles 31 and 32 
VCLT; therefore, no unclearness, ambiguity, unreasonableness may be said to exist 
before that interpretative process has been brought to its end.  
This further implicates that, even where a prima facie unclearness, ambiguity or 
unreasonableness of the construed text arises, the interpreter continues to be entitled to 
base its interpretation on one single text, taken in isolation. Only where the ambiguity, 
unclearness or unreasonableness results at the end of the interpretative process, i.e. after 
all available elements and items of evidence (other than the other authentic texts) have 
been referred to and employed in legal arguments is the interpreter compelled to 
compare the various texts as an aid to solve such an interpretative issue. 
 
Thus, where none of the interested parties has put forward an alleged discrepancy in 
meanings between some of the authentic texts and the interpretation based on a single 
text, taken in isolation, has led to a clear, unambiguous and reasonable meaning, the 
provisional utterance meaning may be considered the real common utterance meaning of 
the treaty. 
 
In contrast, where any of the interested parties has put forward an alleged discrepancy in 
meanings among the authentic treaty texts, the interpreter is obliged to compare the 
apparently divergent texts and to interpret them in light of that comparison, by applying 
the rules of interpretation enshrined in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT,1959 in order to 
determine their real common utterance meaning.1960  
 
From a procedural standpoint, the above conclusions imply that each interested party 
may legally rely on a single authentic text until the application of the treaty gives rise to 
                                                     
1958 It must be noted that the interpreter, in the event he, through the analysis of the travaux préparatoires or 
otherwise, discovers which is the drafted text and that the other authentic texts are mere translations thereof, 
should have recourse to the analysis of and the comparison with that drafted text for the reasons noted in 
section 3.2 of Chapter 4 of Part II. 
1959 Where one unambiguous, clear and reasonable meaning (the utterance meaning) cannot be attributed to all 
the texts by applying the rules of interpretation enshrined in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT, the utterance meaning 
to be adopted under Article 33(4) VCLT is the one that best reconciles the texts, having regard to the object 
and purpose of the treaty. This solution provided for by Article 33(4) VCLT is analysed in section 3.5 of 
Chapter 4 of Part II. 
1960 See the reference to the application of Articles 31 and 32 VCLT in Article 33(4), first part, VCLT.  
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a dispute based on the apparent diverging meanings of some of the authentic treaty 
texts.1961 
It goes without saying that an a contrario reading of such a conclusion does not 
hold true; the interpreter remains free to analyse each authentic text and to compare such 
texts with each other whenever he considers it helpful to do so. 
 
The above conclusions appear to be supported by principles (ii), (iv) and (v) established 
by the author in section 2 of Chapter 3 of Part I on the basis of his semantics-based 
normative analysis.  
 In particular, according to principle (ii), where the parties have agreed that more 
than one treaty text is authentic, it is reasonable to infer that those parties intended to 
allow treaty interpretation to be based on any of the authentic texts, taken in isolation, 
together with the elements of the overall context other than the other authentic texts. 
Thus, in order to establish the utterance meaning of a treaty text, the interpreter is 
allowed to use the entire overall context, any segregation of the latter in elements that 
can be used and elements that cannot be used for that purpose being wholly artificial. 
The utterance meaning is the result of a single complex interpretative process and only at 
the end of such a process, taken as a whole, may an utterance meaning be said to exist. 
This principle should direct the interpreter to reject the solution, proposed by some 
scholars, of considering the texts’ comparison compulsory whenever the meaning of a 
certain authentic text is still unclear, ambiguous or unreasonable where interpreted under 
Article 31 VCLT, but before duly taking into account the supplementary means of 
interpretation of Article 32 VCLT. Except for cases of alleged differences of meaning 
among some of the authentic texts, text comparison becomes compulsory only where the 
utterance meaning, i.e. the meaning of the interpreted text as established on the basis of 
the entire overall context, is unclear, ambiguous or unreasonable. 
 According to principle (iv), any alleged discrepancy in meaning among the 
authentic texts of a treaty is just apparent, since the treaty is an instrument for the parties 
to convey a single message and, therefore, it must always be attributed a single utterance 
meaning, notwithstanding the numbers of its authentic texts. As a consequence, under 
principle (v), the interpreter must remove such alleged discrepancies by establishing the 
single utterance meaning of all authentic texts. These principles confirm the generally 
accepted conclusion that the interpreter must take into account all the relevant authentic 
texts whenever a prima facie divergence of meaning among them is put forward and 
must remove such a divergence by establishing the single utterance meaning thereof. 
 
 
e) How should the interpreter solve the prima facie discrepancies among the various 
authentic texts emerging from the comparison? 
 
In most of the cases where the interpreter is faced with two or more authentic texts, he 
                                                     
1961 See similarly W. Rudolf, Die Spreche in der Diplomatie und internationalen Verträgen (Frankfurt: 
Athenäum Verlag, 1972), p. 61. 
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will be able to interpret them so as to find a common, clear, unambiguous and reasonable 
meaning and to plausibly justify his construction on the basis of the rules of 
interpretation enshrined in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT (including the possibility of taking 
into account non-authentic versions of the treaty and the opportunity to ascribe a special 
relevance to the drafted text).  
 Even in cases where the construction of an authentic text, taken in isolation, 
according to Articles 31 and 32 VCLT leaves the meaning thereof ambiguous or 
obscure, the comparison with other authentic texts may prove a decisive aid for the 
interpreter in order to clear up his doubts and arrive at an univocal solution, which may 
be reasonably supported from a logical and legal standpoint. 
 
The recourse to Articles 31 and 32 VCLT implies that no rigid ad hoc rule of 
interpretation is applied in order to remove the prima facie discrepancies in meaning 
among the authentic treaty texts, but the solution actually adopted and the arguments to 
support it are selected on the basis of the treaty’s overall context. 
In particular, the rule of restrictive interpretation does not play a specific role for 
the solution of apparent divergences of meanings among the authentic treaty texts under 
the system of the VCLT and has been explicitly rejected as such by the ILC. Whether a 
restrictive interpretation is to be adopted in any specific case depends upon the nature 
and history of the treaty, its object and purpose, the particular context in which the 
ambiguous terms occur and the situation dealt with in that case.  
Though, in the infrequent cases where the comparison of the authentic texts does 
not prove a sufficient aid to remove all the ambiguities of such texts, where only one 
reasonable and clear meaning1962 exists that is common to the various authentic texts, 
such a meaning will be generally selected as being the only interpretative solution 
logically possible. This preference for the only meaning common to the authentic texts 
being compared does not represent, however, the application of a rigid ad hoc rule, but a 
mere instance of treaty interpretation in good faith and in light of the overall context. 
 
These conclusions appear in line with principles (iv), (v), (vi) and (vii) established by the 
author in section 2 of Chapter 3 of Part I on the basis of his semantics-based normative 
analysis, according to which: 
(iv) any alleged discrepancy in meaning among the authentic texts of a treaty is merely 
apparent, since the treaty is an instrument intended by the parties to convey a single 
message; 
(v) the interpreter must remove the prima facie discrepancy in meaning among the 
authentic treaty texts by construing them in accordance with the general principles of 
                                                     
1962 I.e. one single intension common to the various authentic texts (e.g. text A may mean X or Y; text B may 
mean X or Z: X is the only common intension possible and, as such, it will be probably selected as the treaty 
meaning) and not one particular denotatum that is common to all the possible extensions of the various 
authentic texts (e.g. text A appears to mean just X; text B appears to mean just Y; however the denotata of X – 
its extension – are a subgroup of the denotata of Y; the conclusion that the meaning X must be selected since it 
represents the most restrictive interpretation capable of reconciling the various authentic texts cannot be 
upheld, since that solution consists of choosing one meaning over another simply because the former denotes a 
number of referents smaller that the latter). 
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treaty interpretation; in particular, the relevance of the treaty texts for the purpose of 
establishing the single utterance meaning should not be overestimated; 
(vi) for the purpose of removing the prima facie discrepancy in meaning among the 
authentic treaty texts, it is reasonable to attribute a particular relevance to the text that 
has been originally drafted by the contracting States’ representatives and on which the 
consensus among them was formed; 
(vii) the interpreter may take into account non-authentic language versions of a treaty for 
the purpose of construing it; the interpretative weight that should be attributed thereto 
varies depending on the available evidence that they may contribute to ascertain the 
common intention of the parties. 
 
 
f) What should the interpreter do where the prima facie discrepancies could not be 
removed by means of (ordinary) interpretation? 
 
Under Article 33(4) VCLT, where a comparison of the authentic treaty texts discloses a 
difference in meaning that the application of Articles 31 and 32 VCLT does not remove, 
the interpreter must adopt “the meaning which best reconciles the texts”. Such an 
expression must be read in its context, which first and foremost includes the underlying 
principle of the unity of the treaty and the connected rule of law, reflected in Article 
33(3) VCLT, that all authentic texts do have the same meaning.1963  
 In that context, the use of the term “reconcile” simply means that the interpreter 
must attribute to all authentic texts a single meaning, notwithstanding the fact that such a 
meaning could not be provisionally attributed to all those texts on the basis of an 
interpretation made in accordance with the provisions of Articles 31 and 32 VCLT.  
 
The activity of the interpreter thus consists in choosing one of the provisional utterance 
meanings attributable to the various authentic texts in accordance with the provisions of 
Articles 31 and 32 VCLT and attributing it to all other authentic texts.  
 The possibility of adopting a meaning that could not be reasonably attributed to 
any of the authentic texts on the basis of the principles enshrined in Articles 31 and 32 
VCLT should be rejected, unless exceptional and very strong evidence exists in favor of 
such a solution, since it appears contrary to the whole system of interpretation provided 
for in the VCLT, where the texts of the treaty are the starting point of the interpretative 
process and the attribution of meaning must comply with the rules provided for in 
Articles 31 and 32 VCLT. That solution also appears unreasonable, in that it implies that 
the contracting States failed to fairly convey their intended message through all the 
authentic texts, even where due weight is given to the overall context. 
 
The meaning to be selected by the interpreter in order to reconcile the authentic treaty 
texts should be the one that best reflects the common intention of the parties.  
 In order to select that meaning, the interpreter assesses and balances all available 
                                                     
1963 See principle (iv) established by the author in section 2 of Chapter 3 of Part I. 
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elements and items of evidence, although he appears bound to ascribe a significant 
weight to the object and purpose of the treaty due to the specific reference thereto in 
Article 33(4) VCLT. In other terms, the object and purpose of the treaty works as the 
most important yardstick for the interpreter to choose, among the meanings provisionally 
attributed to the authentic treaty texts on the basis of the principles enshrined in Articles 
31 and 32 VCLT, the real utterance meaning of the treaty. 
 In that respect, since treaties generally have many objects and purposes, the 
interpreter should use as yardstick those objects and purposes that appear relevant with 
respect to the provision to be interpreted and should balance them in order to find a 
reasonable equilibrium with reference to the specific situation at stake. 
 
Finally, the last sentence of Article 33(4) VCLT should be construed as a rule that 
indirectly allows the interpreter to take, as the “special meaning” that the parties 
intended to attach to a certain term used in one of the authentic treaty texts, the (ordinary 
or special) meaning provisionally attributed to the corresponding term used in another 
authentic text and ultimately chosen by the interpreter as the real utterance meaning, i.e. 
as the meaning that “best reconciles the texts, having regard to the object and purpose of 
the treaty”. Under this perspective:  
(i) the fact that the (ordinary or special) meaning provisionally attributed to a 
certain term(s) in one (or more) authentic text(s) is regarded as the meaning 
“which best reconciles the texts, having regard to the object and purpose of 
the treaty”, is thus taken as the decisive evidence of the common intention of 
the parties to attach that meaning, as a “special meaning”, to the 
corresponding terms used in the other authentic texts; 
(ii) the last sentence of Article 33(4) VCLT is regarded as a rule of a purely 
procedural nature, purported to offer a way out to those interpreters that 
considered the attribution of a certain special meaning to the relevant treaty 
term to be an intolerable stretching of its reasonable meaning. 
 
So construed, the rule provided for in the last sentence of Article 33(4) VCLT appears an 
eminently reasonable solution, since: 
(a) it is in line with principle (iv) established by the author in section 2 of Chapter 3 
of Part I on the basis of his semantics-based normative analysis, according to 
which any alleged discrepancy in meaning among the authentic texts of a treaty 
is merely apparent, since the treaty is an instrument for the parties to convey a 
single message and, therefore, it must always be attributed a single utterance 
meaning, notwithstanding the number of its authentic texts; 
(b) it restates the content of principle (v) established by the author in section 2 of 
Chapter 3 of Part I on the basis of his semantics-based normative analysis, in 
that, on the one hand, it requires the interpreter to establish the final utterance 
meaning on the basis of the overall context and, in particular, of the parties’ 
object and purpose and, on the other hand, it does not overestimate the 
relevance of the treaty texts for the purpose of establishing the final utterance 
meaning, providing the possibility for the interpreter to attach to the terms used 
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in certain authentic texts a special meaning that might seem prima facie 
difficult to attribute thereto, but which nonetheless appears to best suit the 
parties’ intention and the treaty object and purpose. 
 
 
g) Where the treaty provides that a certain authentic text is to prevail in the case of 
divergences: 
i. At which point of the interpretative process must there be recourse to such 
a prevailing text? 
ii. What if the prevailing text is ambiguous or obscure? 
iii. What about the contrast between the prevailing text and the other 
authentic texts, if the latter are coherent among themselves? 
 
The application of a treaty provision giving priority to a particular text, in cases of 
divergences in meaning among the authentic treaty texts, requires the interpreter to 
establish at which stage of the interpretative process the prevailing text should be given 
such a priority.  
 
The VCLT is silent in this respect and the case law of national and international courts 
and tribunals does not provide any clear guidance. 
 According to the ILC, that issue should be resolved by determining, in each case, 
the intention of the parties with regard to the meaning of the relevant final clause.  
 This conclusion, although reasonable in theory, presents a significant drawback in 
its actual application, since “final clauses are nearly always drawn up somewhat 
automatically”,1964 so that it is reasonable to assume that the contracting States generally 
do not really discuss with each other the meaning to be attached thereto and, even worse, 
they probably do not have any accurate idea of when the prevailing text should be given 
precedence.  
 
The author submits that, unless some decisive evidence to the contrary is available, final 
clauses providing for a prevailing text in the case of divergences should be construed as 
requiring the interpreter to compare the prima facie divergent authentic texts in light of 
all available elements and items of evidence, in order to determine whether a 
reconciliation is possible by applying the rules of interpretation enshrined in Articles 31 
and 32 VCLT, before relying exclusively on the prevailing text.  
The apparently divergent authentic texts, therefore, should be construed in light 
of the overall context and compared with each other in the quest for a common meaning. 
Only where, at the end of the interpretative process, no (provisional) common meaning 
may be reasonably said to exist should preference be given to the meaning of the 
prevailing text.  
 This solution substantially corresponds to principle (viii) established by the 
                                                     
1964 See J. Hardy, “The Interpretation of Plurilingual Treaties by International Courts and Tribunals”, 37 British 
Yearbook of International Law (1961), 72 et seq., at 132. 
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author in section 2 of Chapter 3 of Part I on the basis of his semantics-based normative 
analysis, according to which, where the treaty provides that a specific text has to prevail 
in cases of discrepancy in meanings among the authentic texts, it appears reasonable to 
assume that the parties intended the utterance meaning of that text to prevail only where 
an interpretation based on the prima facie divergent authentic texts and the overall 
context does not lead the interpreter to convincingly attribute a single utterance meaning 
to all such texts.  
 
From a different perspective, where the meaning attributable to the prevailing text, 
construed in isolation from the other texts and according to the rules of interpretation 
enshrined in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT, is ambiguous, obscure or unreasonable, there is 
still a chance that the analysis of the other authentic texts may shed some light on the 
utterance meaning of the former.  
 That holds particularly true where a single meaning is attributable to all other 
texts and it appears clear, unambiguous and reasonable. Even in this case, however, the 
interpreter is not bound to attribute such a common meaning to the prevailing text as 
well. The VCLT does not dispose over any mechanical rule in that respect, since the ILC 
and, arguably, the Vienna Conference considered that, although attributing to the 
unclear, ambiguous, or unreasonable (prevailing) text of a treaty the clear, unambiguous 
and reasonable meaning of the other texts appears to be a common sense solution, that 
might not always be the correct one since much might depend on the circumstances of 
each case and the evidence of the intention of the parties. In the improbable event that 
the interpreter is not persuaded to extend to the prevailing text the meaning common to 
the other texts, the prevailing text meaning must be theoretically adopted according to 
the final clause. In this scenario, the utterance meaning of the other authentic texts may 
still be relevant in directing the interpreter in his task of elucidating the meaning of the 
prevailing text. 
 
Finally, where the clear, unambiguous and reasonable meanings attributable to the 
prevailing text and to the other texts appear to conflict with each other, textual 
comparison may shed light on possible alternative meanings, or alternative arguments to 
support those meanings, which might have been overlooked by the interpreter engaged 
in construing the authentic texts in isolation. It is thus possible that textual comparison 
may direct the interpreter towards the attribution of the same meaning to all authentic 
texts. 
 However, where this is not the case, the final clause requires the interpreter to 




h) What is the impact on the answers to be given to the previous questions of the fact 
that legal jargon terms are employed in the treaty texts?  
 
The presence of legal jargon terms in the authentic texts of a treaty does not change the 
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goal of its interpreter, which remains establishing the utterance meaning of its 
provisions. 
 Similarly, the interpreter continues to be entitled to rely on any single authentic 
text, taken in isolation, for the purpose of interpreting the treaty and he is still required to 
remove the prima facie discrepancies in meaning by applying the rules of interpretation 
enshrined in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT and, where this proves unsuccessful, by adopting 
the meaning attributable to the prevailing text or, absent a prevailing text, the meaning 
which best reconciles the texts having regard to the object and purpose of the treaty.  
 
At a more in-depth level of analysis, however, the interaction between the multilingual 
nature of the treaty and the use therein of legal jargon terms may play a substantial role. 
 
Under a first perspective, the multilingual character of the treaty comes into play as an 
element that the interpreter may assess in order to establish how the parties intended to 
construe the legal jargon terms employed in the treaty. 
 In particular, where the treaty is authenticated in all the official languages of the 
contracting States and, due to its nature, it strictly interacts with the contracting States’ 
domestic laws, the interpreter could be led to conclude that the parties intended the legal 
jargon terms employed in the treaty to be attributed their technical meanings under the 
domestic law of the contracting State applying the treaty. In this case, in fact, the 
interpreter might regard the linguistic aspect so deeply intertwined with the legal 
characterization aspect, for the purpose of the treaty application, as to render such 
solution almost unavoidable.1965  
 The treaty term expressed in the official language of the State applying the treaty, 
in that respect, would work as the key to unlock the door of the appropriate domestic law 
meaning, i.e. as a guide for the interpreter to select the domestic law meaning that the 
parties considered to best fit in the context of the relevant treaty provision. 
 
Under a second perspective, the fact that the interpretation concerns legal jargon terms 
significantly influences the detection and resolution of the prima facie discrepancies in 
meaning among the authentic treaty texts.  
 In fact, based on the assumption that the concepts underlying the legal jargon 
terms employed in one legal system do not normally have perfect correspondents in 
other legal systems, but just general correspondents (if any), i.e. concepts that fulfill 
                                                     
1965 Similarly Fantozzi pointed out, with reference to tax treaties (although his analysis applies well beyond 
such a narrow field), that there is an intrinsic difficulty in trying “to single out the “linguistic” issues relating to 
the interpretation of double tax conventions from the broader “classification” issues. The two concepts are 
deeply intertwined, and I therefore do not know if it is possible to define where the thin line that divides the 
two exactly lies. I find it rather easier to imagine them as two sides of the same coin. In the various hypotheses 
the interpreter/translator can be faced with, there is, in my view, always a part of each aspects. […] For the 
treaty to apply […] it is required that a treaty situation takes place. It is therefore required that the State which 
has to give up part of its power to tax recognizes the material event occurred in the other State, as represented 
by a legal concept. The definition of this legal concept involves issues of both kinds: linguistic and 
classification issues.” (A. Fantozzi, “Conclusions”, in G. Maisto (ed.), Multilingual Texts and Interpretation of 
Tax Treaties and EC Tax Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2005), 335 et seq., at 335-336). 
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similar functions within the respective legal systems and with which they share a 
considerable part of their prototypical denotata (and non-denotata),1966 the interpreter 
shall not look for an exact correspondence, but just for a general correspondence among 
the domestic law concepts underlying the legal jargon terms used in the various 
authentic texts in order to establish that no (even prima facie) discrepancy exists among 
such texts. 
 For instance, where a treaty concluded between Austria and Italy is authenticated 
in the German and Italian languages and employs the terms “Unternehmen” and 
“impresa”, the interpreter, in order to conclude that there is no discrepancy in meaning 
between those two terms, shall be satisfied in ascertaining that the legal concepts 
underlying these two terms under Austrian and Italian domestic laws general correspond 
with each other, in the sense that they fulfill similar functions within the respective legal 
systems1967 and share a substantial part of their prototypical denotata (and non-
denotata).1968  The fact these two concepts do not perfectly overlap shall not be 
considered significant in order to establish whether a discrepancy in meaning exists 
between the two texts. 
 
Once such a general correspondence has been established, any discrepancy in meaning 
among the authentic treaty texts may no longer be considered to exist and the interpreter 
has to proceed to determine the utterance meaning of the legal jargon treaty terms on the 
basis of whichever authentic text. 
 Thus, for instance, where the interpreter concludes that the parties intended to 
attribute a uniform and autonomous meaning to a certain legal jargon treaty term, he will 
construe such a term on the basis of the overall context and by taking into account the 
various corresponding concepts under the domestic laws of the contracting States. In the 
previous example, where the treaty was in force between Austria, Italy, France and 
Spain, the interpreter would consider, as part of the overall context, the domestic law 
meanings that the treaty terms “Unternehmen” and “impresa” and their corresponding 
terms “entreprise” and “empresa” have under the respective Austrian, Italian French and 
Spanish domestic laws.1969 The result of his interpretation, due to the loose relation 
existing between the autonomous treaty meaning and the corresponding domestic law 
meanings under the laws of the contracting States, will be regarded as a reasonable 
construction of any of the corresponding legal jargon terms employed in the authentic 
treaty texts. 
                                                     
1966 See the position expressed by the United States representative at the Vienna Conference with regard to the 
impossibility of reconciling the different authentic texts of a treaty where different systems of law were 
involved, due to the fact that often there is no legal concept in one system that exactly corresponds to a certain 
legal concept in the other system (UNCLT-1st,, p. 189, para. 41). See also, in this respect, the comment on Part 
III of the 1964 Draft made by the Yugoslavian government (YBILC 1966-II, p. 361). 
1967 E.g. both are used by the respective legal system in order to distinguish certain economic activities from 
others, in connection with bankruptcy procedures, the requirement to keep accounts, etc. 
1968 E.g. they both denote banking activities, insurance activities, sale and production of goods activities, 
certain activities in the provision of services, etc. 
1969 He could take into account as well the domestic law meanings of other corresponding terms under the laws 
of non-member States, as long as he may reasonably argue for their relevance for his current analysis.  
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 Similarly, where the interpreter concludes that the parties intended to attribute to 
a certain legal jargon treaty term the meaning that it has under the substantive lex 
fori,1970 he will construe such a term in accordance with the domestic law meaning that it 
(or its corresponding term in the legal jargon of the State of the referred court) has under 
the substantive lex fori. In the previous example, where the treaty in force between 
Austria, Italy, France and Spain was to be interpreted by a French court, the interpreter 
would attribute to the treaty terms “Unternehmen” and “impresa” the meaning that the 
term “entreprise” has under French domestic law. The result of his interpretation, due to 
the loose correspondence required and expected between the domestic law meaning 
under the lex fori and the domestic law meaning under the laws of the other contracting 
States, will be regarded as a reasonable construction of any of the corresponding legal 
jargon terms employed in the authentic treaty texts. 
 
However, where the interpreter establishes that no general correspondence may be 
considered prima facie to exist among the legal jargon terms employed in the various 
authentic texts, e.g. because their underlying concepts under the relevant domestic laws 
do not fulfill similar functions and do not share any significant part of their prototypical 
denotata (and non-denotata), the interpreter must remove the consequent apparent 
discrepancy in meanings among the authentic treaty texts by applying the rules of 
interpretation enshrined in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT and, where this proves 
unsuccessful, by adopting the meaning attributable to the prevailing text or, absent a 
prevailing text, the meaning which best reconciles the texts having regard to the object 
and purpose of the treaty.1971 In the previous example, where the Italian authentic text of 
the treaty employed the term “attività economica” instead of “impresa”, the former 
having a much wider scope than the latter under Italian law, a prima facie discrepancy in 
meaning might be considered to exist between the Italian and the German authentic 
texts. An interpretation of those texts based on Articles 31 and 32 VCLT could then lead 
the interpreter to conclude that the general meaning underlying the treaty terms 
“Unternehmen” and “attività economica” is that characterizing the terms 
“Unternehmen”, “impresa” (and not “attività economica”), “entreprise” and “empresa” 
under Austrian, Italian French and Spanish domestic laws.  
 Once the prima facie discrepancy has been set aside and the general meaning 
underlying all legal jargon terms employed in the authentic treaty texts has been 
established, the more precise meaning that the parties intended to attach thereto (i.e. the 
utterance meaning) will be determined by the interpreter according to the circumstances.  
 For instance, where the interpreter concludes that the parties intended to attribute 
to a certain legal jargon treaty term the meaning that it has under the substantive lex 
fori,1972 he will construe such a term in accordance with the domestic law meaning that it 
(or its corresponding term in the legal jargon of the State fori) has under the substantive 
                                                     
1970 The same, however, holds true as well with regard to other types of renvoi. 
1971 See, although with specific regard to tax treaties, G. Gaja, “The perspective of international law”, in G. 
Maisto (ed.), Multilingual Texts and Interpretation of Tax Treaties and EC Tax Law (Amsterdam: IBFD 
Publications, 2005), 91 et seq., at 99-100. 
1972 The same, however, holds true as well with regard to other types of renvoi. 
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lex fori. In the previous example, where the treaty was to be interpreted by a French 
court, the interpreter would attribute to the treaty terms “Unternehmen” and “attività 
economica” the meaning that the term “entreprise” has under French domestic law. The 
result of his interpretation, due to the loose correspondence required and expected 
between the domestic law meaning under the lex fori and the domestic law meaning 
under the laws of the other contracting States, will be regarded as a reasonable 
construction of any of the corresponding legal jargon terms employed in the authentic 
treaty texts. 
 
Finally, whenever faced with the interpretation of a legal jargon treaty term, the 
interpreter has to assess whether, for the purpose of construing that term, he should also 
take into account legal jargon proxies and assimilations under the relevant domestic law. 
 
The above conclusions are substantially in line with principle (ix) established by the 
author in section 2 of Chapter 3 of Part I on the basis of his semantics-based normative 
analysis. That principle highlights that, especially where the relevant treaty is 
authenticated in all the official languages of the contracting States, the question may 
arise whether the parties intended the relevant terms used in the various authentic texts to 
be attributed a uniform meaning, or whether they intended each State to interpret those 
terms in accordance with the meaning that the term employed in the text authenticated in 
its own official language has under its domestic law.   
 According to principle (ix), the interpreter should first answer such a question on 
the basis of the treaty text(s) and the overall context and then determine the utterance 
meaning of the relevant treaty provision: 
(a) in the case a uniform meaning was intended by the parties, by attributing a 
particular relevance to the overall context and to the prototypical items 
denoted by all, or most of the terms employed in the various authentic texts; 
(b) in the case a uniform meaning was not intended by the parties, by construing 
the treaty in accordance with the (national) meaning of the term used in the 
text authenticated in the official language of the State applying the treaty, 
provided that such term is similar to the (majority of the) terms used in the 
other authentic texts. Where the test of similarity fails, the reasonable 
suspicion may arise that the parties did not intend the relevant treaty 
provision to be construed in accordance with the (national) meaning of that 
term.  
For the purpose of such a comparison, two terms, construed in accordance with their 
respective national meanings, may be considered similar:  
(a) when they share most of their prototypes, or  
(b) in case their prototypes are limited to a few or do not coincide, when most of 
the features (including their function in the relevant field of knowledge) that 
characterize such prototypes coincide or, at least, present strong similarities.  
What does constitute the greatest part of the respective prototypes and their distinctive 
features, which have to be taken into account for the purpose of assessing the similarity, 
cannot be said in vacuo. The answer to that question depends upon:  
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(a) the nature of and the functions performed by the concepts underlying those 
terms;  
(b) the overall context in which those terms are used (in particular the object and 
purpose of the provision containing those terms). 
 
 
2.2. Questions specifically concerning multilingual tax treaties 
 
a) What is the relevance of the OECD Model official versions for the purpose of 
interpreting multilingual tax treaties (either authenticated also in English and/or 
French, or authenticated in neither of such languages) and monolingual tax treaties 
authenticated neither in English nor in French? 
 
The role played by the OECD Model official versions (English and French) in respect of 
(multilingual) tax treaties based on such a Model is similar to that played by the drafted 
text for the purpose of interpreting multilingual treaties. 
 To put it differently, the OECD Model official versions represent significant 
items of evidence of the intention of the parties with regard to the meaning of tax treaty 
provisions drafted along the lines of the OECD Model. Thus, the interpreter should take 
them into account as primary means of interpretation in order to establish the utterance 
(ordinary or special) meaning of the relevant treaty terms and expressions. 
 With specific reference to the subject of this study, the OECD Model official 
versions constitute a key element to be taken into account by the interpreter in order to 
remove the prima facie discrepancies in meaning among the tax authentic treaty texts in 
accordance with Article 33(4) VCLT, i.e. by applying the rules of interpretation 
enshrined in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT. This also holds true in cases where none of the 
authentic treaty texts is drafted in English or French. 
 
In addition, the impact of the OECD Model official versions on the drafting of the 
authentic texts of tax treaties based on such a Model constitutes a strong argument in 
support of the following conclusions. 
 First, it supports the appropriateness of a loose approach in the application of the 
renvoi provided for in Article 3(2) of OECD Model-based tax treaties, in the sense that 
the terms actually used in the authentic treaty texts should be given the meaning that not 
only such terms, but also their legal jargon synonyms and proxies in the official 
language of the State applying the treaty have for the purpose of that State’s domestic 
law, unless the context otherwise requires.  
 Second, it supports the inclusion, among the means of interpretation to be used 
for removing the prima facie discrepancies in meaning between the authentic treaty texts 
in accordance with Articles 31 and 32 VCLT, of certain elements and items of evidence. 
In particular, it constitutes the main foundation of the argument that all tax treaty 
provisions that directly or indirectly reproduce the provisions of the OECD Model 
should be interpreted consistently, which in turn justifies the practice of having recourse 
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to the decisions delivered by foreign judiciaries and the practices of foreign tax 
authorities (including those of States that are not party to the specific treaty to be 
construed) in order to establish the ordinary meaning to be given to OECD Model 
standard terms and expressions (used in OECD Model-based tax treaties) under Articles 
31 and 32 VCLT. Moreover, it justifies the recourse by the interpreter, as supplementary 
means of interpretation, to the analysis of the differences existing (i) between subsequent 
versions of the OECD Model, (ii) between the OECD Model and the tax treaty to be 
interpreted, as well as (iii) between the tax treaty to be interpreted and other tax treaties 
concluded by the contracting States of the former, for the purpose of establishing the 
utterance meaning of the relevant tax treaty provision. 
 
 
b) What is the relevance of the OECD Commentary for the purpose of interpreting 
multilingual tax treaties? 
 
It is the author’s opinion that: 
(i) in the absence of any significant departure by the tax authentic treaty texts from 
the OECD Model, or of any extra-textual evidence of a contrary agreement 
between the parties, the interpreter should construe OECD Model-based tax 
treaties in accordance with the OECD Commentary, any other construction 
appearing less reasonable; and  
(ii) later OECD Commentaries should be heavily relied on for the purpose of 
interpreting formerly concluded tax treaties, unless evidence exists of a common 
intention of the parties to construe them differently.  
 
This implies that the OECD Commentaries, both previous and subsequent to the 
conclusion of the relevant tax treaty, constitute a key element to be taken into account by 
the interpreter in order to remove the prima facie discrepancies in meaning among the 
tax authentic treaty texts in accordance with Article 33(4) VCLT, in particular by 
applying the rules of interpretation enshrined in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT.  
 
From a different perspective, the OECD Commentary, like any other written text, must 
be construed in order to be used in the process of tax treaty interpretation.1973  
 In that respect, the author submits that the interpreter should establish the 
utterance meaning of the OECD Commentary in light of its overall context, i.e. through 
the analogical application of the rules encompassed in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT, and 
                                                     
1973 See B. Arnold, “The Interpretation of Tax Treaties: Myths and Realities”, 64 Bulletin for international 
taxation (2010), 2 et seq., especially at 8-9. For judicial instances of interpretation of the OECD Commentary, 
see Supreme Court (Denmark), 4 February 2003, Halliburton Company Germany Gmbh v. Ministry of 
Taxation, 5 ITLR, 784 et seq., at 816; Income Tax Appellate Tribunal of Delhi (India), 29 August 2008, Fugro 
Engineers BV v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, 11 ITLR, 421 et seq., at 434-435, para. 4; District 
Court of Oslo (Norway), 16 December 2009, Dell Products (NUF) v. Tax East, 12 ITLR, 829 et seq., at 859; 
Tax Court (Canada), 9 September 2009, Lingle v. R, 12 ITLR, 55 et seq., at 71-72, para. 28. See also the 
interpretation of paragraph 3 of the Commentary on Article 3(1) OECD Model in M. Edwardes-Ker, Tax 
Treaty Interpretation. The International Tax Treaties Service (Dublin: In-Depth, 1994 – loose-leaf), at 8.07. 
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that, whenever a prima facie discrepancy in meaning arose between the English and 
French official versions thereof, such a discrepancy should be removed on the basis of 
the analogical application of the rules enshrined in Article 33(4) VCLT.  
 
 
c) With regard to the relevance of Article 3(2) of OECD Model-based multilingual tax 
treaties for the purpose of their interpretation:  
 
(i) Does Article 3(2) have an impact on the nature of the potential discrepancies in 
meanings among the authentic texts of a multilingual tax treaty? Where this 
question is answered in the affirmative, which are the various types of prima facie 
discrepancies that may arise? Should the interpreter put all of them on the same 
footing for the purpose of interpreting multilingual tax treaties?  
 
Where tax legal jargon treaty terms are interpreted in accordance with Article 3(2), a 
first type of divergence that may emerge is that between two accurately (although not 
perfectly) corresponding legal concepts existing under the laws of the two contracting 
States (“type-A divergence”).  
 Often such concepts are pointed at by the corresponding terms employed in the 
two authentic texts drafted in the official languages of the contracting States. For 
instance, the terms “impresa” and “Unternehmen” used in the Italian and German 
authentic texts of the 1989 Germany-Italy tax treaty point to the respective underlying 
legal concepts existing under Italian and German tax laws. Where these two concepts 
were found to be not absolutely equal (as actually is the case, for example in respect to 
certain forestry and agriculture activities), a (limited) divergence might be said to exist 
between them. 
 However, this type of divergence may also emerge where the tax treaty is 
authenticated only in one (neutral) language. In the latter case, the interpreter has to face 
the additional burden of determining which is the legal jargon term in the official 
language of the State applying the treaty that best corresponds to the legal jargon term 
employed in the authentic treaty text (drafted in a different language). 
 For instance, where the Germany-Italy tax treaty had been authenticated only in 
the English language, the treaty term “enterprise” would point to the domestic legal 
concept underlying the legal jargon term “impresa” where Italy applied the treaty and, in 
contrast, to the domestic legal concept underlying the term “Unternehmen” where 
Germany applied the treaty.  
  
A second type of divergence1974 may be seen to exist between two legal concepts both 
existing under the law of the State applying the treaty (“type-B divergence”). Generally, 
those legal concepts are: 
                                                     
1974 This second type of divergence may theoretically emerge also with regard to the two (or more) authentic 
texts drafted in the official languages of a single contracting State. The issues connected to this case, however, 
are not different from those characterizing the instance of two (or more) authentic texts drafted in the official 
language of one contracting State and in another language. 
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(i) the one underlying the legal jargon term used in the authentic text drafted in 
the official language of that State; and  
(ii) the one underlying the legal jargon term (expressed in the official language of 
the State applying the treaty) that is considered by the interpreter to best 
correspond to the legal jargon term employed in another authentic text.1975 
For instance, it may happen that the Italian text of an Italian tax treaty uses the term 
“lavoro autonomo” in a certain article, while the English authentic text uses the term 
“employment”. The Italian legal jargon term that is generally considered to best 
correspond to the English term “employment” is the term “lavoro subordinato” (or 
“lavoro dipendente”); the latter is, in fact, the term that is generally used in Article 15 of 
Italian OECD Model-based tax treaties and one of the terms that is usually indicated as a 
synonym for the term “employment” in bilingual (legal) dictionaries. Under Italian (tax) 
law, the concepts corresponding to the terms “lavoro autonomo” and “lavoro 
subordinato” are significantly different, the former denoting as prototypical items the 
activities carried on by a self-employed person. In this case a divergence may be said to 
exist between the two Italian legal concepts.  
 In the majority of cases, however, type-B divergence is less obvious. For 
instance, the English authentic text of Article 16 of the 1988 Italy-United Kingdom tax 
treaty, similar to Article 16 of the OECD Model, makes exclusively reference to the 
“board of directors” of a company, while the Italian authentic text thereof employs the 
expression “consiglio di amministrazione o […] collegio sindacale”. Although the Italian 
Civil Code entrusts the “consiglio di amministrazione” with pure management functions 
and the “collegio sindacale” with control and supervisory functions, bilingual 
dictionaries generally equate the “consiglio di amministrazione” with the “board of 
directors” and the “collegio sindacale” with the “board of statutory auditors”. On this 
basis, one might reach the conclusion that the Italian legal jargon term best 
corresponding to the English term “board of directors” is “consiglio di 
amministrazione”, whose underlying legal concept is narrower than the one 
corresponding to the compound expression “consiglio di amministrazione o […] collegio 
sindacale”. In such a case, the conclusion would be drawn that the two legal concepts are 
different. 
  
From a quantitative perspective, the significance of the divergences existing among the 
relevant legal concepts may vary within a spectrum, having as extremes: 
(i) the case of legal concepts sharing all their prototypical items and presenting 
only limited differences with regard to the peripheral items that are within their 
respective scope; and  
(ii) the case of legal concepts not sharing any of their respective prototypical 
items. 
The first case is, for instance, that previously illustrated with reference to the comparison 
of the domestic law concepts underlying the terms “impresa” and “Unternehmen”. 
                                                     
1975 I.e. the authentic text drafted in the official language of the other contracting State, or an authentic text 
drafted in a different language. 
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 The second case is, for instance, that previously illustrated with reference to the 
comparison between (i) the Italian law concept underlying the term “lavoro autonomo” 
and (ii) the Italian law concept underlying the term “lavoro subordinato”. 
 
The prima facie discrepancy in meaning resulting from the comparison of two authentic 
treaty texts, drafted in the respective official languages of the contracting States, may be 
examined and described in terms of type-A and type-B divergences.1976  
 In particular, a first case of prima facie discrepancy may emerge as a pure type-A 
divergence. This is the case where the relevant legal jargon terms employed in the two 
authentic texts appear to be very accurate correspondents under the respective domestic 
laws, in light of all elements and items of evidence available (e.g. bilingual legal 
dictionaries, comparative law textbooks, comparative legal studies, etc.). From a 
quantitative perspective, pure type-A divergences generally concern only peripheral 
items. Even in cases where the discrepancy concerns also prototypical items, it is usually 
not so significant and pervasive as to make the interpreter doubt, in the absence of other 
decisive elements and items of evidence, that the parties intended to interpret the 
relevant treaty provision in accordance with the meaning that the term employed in the 
text drafted in the official language of the State applying the treaty (or a proxy thereof) 
has under the domestic law of that State. The prima facie discrepancy between the terms 
“impresa” and “Unternehmen” employed in the Italian and German authentic texts of the 
1989 Germany-Italy tax treaty represents a good instance of this type of discrepancy.  
 A second case of prima facie discrepancy emerges as a combination of type-A 
and type-B divergences, in the sense that the discrepancy is caused:  
(i) not only by the fact that the two best corresponding terms, under the respective 
domestic laws of the two contracting States, have two (more or less) divergent 
meanings (type-A divergence),   
(ii) but also and predominantly by the fact that the two terms employed in the 
authentic treaty texts do not appear to be accurate correspondents, under the 
respective domestic laws, more similar terms (and thus concepts) existing under 
such laws (type-B divergence). 
From a quantitative perspective, this second kind of discrepancy often concerns both 
prototypical and peripheral items and, in extreme cases, makes the interpreter seriously 
doubt whether the parties intended to interpret the relevant treaty provision in 
accordance with the meaning that the term employed in the text drafted in the official 
language of the State applying the treaty (or a proxy thereof) has under the domestic law 
of that State. For example, if the Italian authentic text of the 1989 Germany-Italy tax 
treaty had employed the term “attività economica” instead of “impresa”, the former 
having a much wider scope than the latter under Italian law, the prima facie discrepancy 
in meaning between the Italian and the German authentic texts could have been viewed 
not only as caused by the ontological discrepancies existing between the two best 
corresponding terms under the Italian and German domestic laws (i.e. the terms 
                                                     
1976 The same holds true, by analogy, where one (or even both) of the authentic texts being compared is drafted 
in a language other than the official languages of the contracting States. 
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“impresa” and “Unternehmen”), but also by the fact that the term “attività economica” is 
used in the Italian authentic text instead of the more closely corresponding term 
“impresa”.  
 
At a first level of analysis, thus, the author may conclude that pure type-A divergences 
are inherently caused by the use of legal jargon terminology in the tax treaty and, 
therefore, they should be generally accepted as such and dealt with through the 
application of the renvoi encompassed in Article 3(2): the relevant domestic law 
meaning should be selected by the interpreter on the basis of which contracting State 
applies the treaty.1977 
 In contrast, prima facie discrepancies caused by the interaction between type-A 
and type-B divergences should be examined more carefully and, where the effect of the 
type-B divergence was significant, the interpreter should critically assess whether the 
context requires the attribution of a meaning other than the domestic law meaning of the 
legal jargon term employed in the authentic text drafted in the official language of the 
State applying the treaty (e.g. the meaning that the legal jargon term which best 
corresponds to the term used in the other authentic text(s) of the treaty has under the 
domestic law of the State applying the treaty).1978 
 
 
(ii) Is there any obligation for the interpreter to reconcile (at least to a certain extent) 
the prima facie divergent authentic texts of an OECD Model-based tax treaty?1979 
 
The possibility cannot be dismissed from the outset that, under the system of renvoi 
provided for in Article 3(2) OECD Model, the interpreter is entitled to always and 
exclusively rely on the legal concepts underlying the legal jargon terms employed in the 
authentic text drafted in the official language of the State applying the treaty (if 
existing), disregarding the possible existence of different legal concepts underlying the 
terms employed in the other authentic treaty texts.   
 This raises the question whether the interpreter is under an obligation to reconcile 
(at least to a certain extent) the prima facie divergent authentic texts of an OECD Model-
based tax treaty, or, on the contrary, he may always and exclusively rely on the legal 
concepts underlying the legal jargon terms employed in the authentic text drafted in the 
official language of the State applying the treaty. 
   
The answer to such a question should be looked for in the intention of the parties.  
 In that respect, several items of evidence exist supporting the view that the parties 
                                                     
1977 The actual application of such a domestic law meaning would obviously remain subject to the context not 
requiring otherwise 
1978 I.e., in the previous example, the meaning of the term “impresa” (and not of the term “attività economica”) 
under Italian law. 
1979 A similar question (and a similar answer) holds true with regard to the alleged divergences existing 
between the legal concepts underlying the terms employed in one of the authentic treaty texts and those 
underlying the corresponding terms used in the OECD Model official versions.  
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probably intended the interpreter to carry out a (limited) reconciliation of the relevant 
authentic texts of OECD Model-based tax treaties whenever a prima facie discrepancy in 
meanings is put forward.  
 
First, tax treaties generally do not contain any explicit derogation to the customary 
international law principle that the interpreter may rely on any of the authentic treaty 
texts in order to construe its provisions.  
 To read in the renvoi to the law of the contracting State applying the treaty, 
encompassed in Article 3(2), an unconditional and compulsory obligation for the 
interpreter to rely exclusively on the authentic text drafted in the official language of that 
State, for the purpose of construing the treaty, may be regarded as to read too much into 
the language of Article 3(2), such a significant departure from customary international 
law reasonably requiring a more precise and explicit wording to be considered as 
intended by the parties.1980 
 The right for the interpreter to rely on any authentic text in order to interpret the 
treaty, together with the possibility that a prima facie discrepancy in meanings exists 
among such texts, makes it necessary for the interpreter to reconcile such texts at least 
where a type-B divergence is at stake. 
 
Second, since the tax treaty is based on the OECD Model, the argument may be put 
forward that the general meaning determined on the basis of the OECD Model (official 
versions) and the OECD Commentary constitutes a limit to the meaning attributable to 
the legal jargon terms used in the authentic texts drafted in the official language of the 
State applying the treaty.  
 This also implies that where one of the authentic treaty texts, other than the one 
drafted in the official language of the State applying the treaty, reproduces the English or 
French official version of the OECD Model, the interpreter should take care to reconcile 
the alleged difference between those two authentic texts. For instance, where a specific 
tax treaty appears to be based on the OECD Model and Article 15 thereof, in its English 
authentic text, reproduces Article 15 of the OECD Model, it would be difficult to 
reasonably argue that the interpreter may exclusively rely on the Italian authentic text of 
such an article, which employs the term “lavoro autonomo”,1981 and attribute to the latter 
term the meaning it has under Italian law, completely disregarding the English authentic 
text and the corresponding provision of the OECD Model. 
 
Third, the fact that certain tax treaties are authenticated only in one neutral language,1982 
                                                     
1980 The alternative view of the absence of an obligation for the interpreter to reconcile the authentic treaty texts 
(al least in certain cases and to a certain extent), which appears even less sensible than the one just described, 
would be to consider that the parties intended:  
(i) the treaty to have multiple meanings, not depending (solely) on the domestic laws of the 
contracting States, but from the very same wordings of its authentic texts and  
 (ii) to entitle the interpreter to choose the meaning that best suits his purpose by selecting the 
authentic text that supports it. 
1981 See above example. 
1982 I.e. they are authenticated in the official languages of neither contracting State.  
CONCLUSIONS 
 592 
or that they provide for a prevailing text (generally drafted in a neutral language) in the 
case of discrepancies, may be seen as supporting the argument that, with regard to tax 
treaties in general, the corresponding legal concepts under the law of the two contracting 
States should not be too different from one another.1983  
 For instance, where an OECD Model-based tax treaty is authenticated only in 
English and uses the term “employment” in Article 15, the interpreter must construe the 
latter term by attributing to it the meaning that the best corresponding Italian legal jargon 
term has under Italian law. The best corresponding term, in this case, is probably “lavoro 
subordinato” and not “lavoro autonomo”. In that respect, it would appear difficult to 
support the conclusion that the provisions of two Italian treaties similarly structured and 
which present the same (or a similar) wording in their respective English authentic texts 
(“employment”) could be interpreted in a significantly different way (with regard to 
prototypical items, i.e. typical employment income and typical independent activity 
income) only because one of the two treaties was also authenticated in the Italian 
language (and employed the term “lavoro autonomo” in the Italian authentic text) and 
the other was not. 
 
Fourth, although extremely remote in practice, it may happen that a tax treaty is 
authenticated in two languages that are not the official languages of either contracting 
State. In this case, where a significant prima facie divergence of meaning existed 
between the corresponding legal jargon terms used in such authentic texts, the interpreter 
should at least partially reconcile the two authentic texts in order to select the domestic 
legal jargon term, and thus the domestic law meaning, corresponding to the terms 
actually used in the treaty.  
 For instance, where an Italian tax treaty based on the OECD Model was 
authenticated solely in English and French and a provision thereof employed the terms 
“employment” and “activités de caractère indépendant” in the English and French 
authentic texts, respectively, the interpreter should at least partially reconcile those two 
terms in order to decide which Italian domestic law term corresponds thereto and, 
therefore, which domestic law meaning should be used pursuant to Article 3(2). 
 
Finally, although theoretically possible, it does not seem reasonable to lightly assume 
that the contracting States intended to have two completely different (sets of) rules in 
force where they apply the treaty. 
 Gaja, in that respect, maintains that the renvoi to the domestic law of the 
contracting State applying the treaty “involves reconciling the texts in order to define a 
general meaning, while the more precise meaning is established according to the law of 
the relevant contracting State”.1984 He adds that, in any case, under Article 3(2) OECD 
Model, the domestic law meaning of any undefined treaty term “would have to be 
                                                     
1983 Otherwise, similarly worded (in the neutral authentic language) tax treaties concluded by the same State 
could end up being construed in significantly divergent manners. 
1984 See G. Gaja, “The perspective of international law”, in G. Maisto (ed.), Multilingual Texts and 
Interpretation of Tax Treaties and EC Tax Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2005), 91 et seq., at 99. 
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consistent with the general meaning that the term has under the treaty”.1985 
 In order to decide whether, in any actual instance, the outer limit of the general 
meaning would be crossed by attributing to the relevant undefined treaty term the 
meaning it has under the domestic law of the contracting State applying the treaty, the 
interpreter relies on the context. Such context, more than being the intent of the 
parties,1986 or embodying the parties’ common intention,1987 is made up of all the 
elements and items of evidence that may help the interpreter in establishing and arguing 
for the common intention of the parties: it is the overall context that must be used in 
order to determine the treaty utterance meaning. 
 
 
(iii) If the previous question is answered in the affirmative, to what extent must the 
differences of meaning deriving from the attribution of the domestic law meanings 
to the corresponding legal jargon terms used in the various authentic texts be 
removed (e.g. in accordance with Article 33(4) VCLT) and, instead, to what extent 
must such differences be preserved in accordance with Article 3(2)?  
 
The interpreter may rely exclusively on the domestic law meaning of the legal jargon 
terms employed in the treaty as long as it significantly overlaps with the “general 
meaning” established on the basis of the overall context and, in particular, of the 
reconciliation of the relevant authentic texts.1988 Thus, as long as the domestic law 
                                                     
1985 See G. Gaja, “The perspective of international law”, in G. Maisto (ed.), Multilingual Texts and 
Interpretation of Tax Treaties and EC Tax Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2005), 91 et seq., at 100, 
where the author notes that, “[s]hould there be any divergence among the authentic texts of a tax treay that 
follows the OECD Model, these would have to be first reconciled in order to define the general meaning of the 
provision, including the general meaning of the relevant term. The reference to the law of one of the 
contracting States for the determination of the meaning of a term would only come into play once the 
framework has been defined”. 
1986 See S. I. Katz, “United States”, in International Fiscal Association, Cahiers de droit fiscal international, 
Vol. 78a (Deventer: Kluwer, 1993), 615 et seq., at 650, who affirms: “The intent of the contracting parties is 
the context. There is no question of whether contextual interpretation is preferred to domestic. The very 
concept of the context implies that it must be.”  
Obviously, if one equates the intent of the parties to the context, no other solution may be accepted other than 
the contextual interpretation (i.e. the interpretation that reflects the intention of the parties). This, however, is a 
circular argument. The real issue, which is hidden by (and in) Katz’s proposition, is “which is the meaning 
intended by the parties?” There is no ready answer given anywhere to that question (otherwise, one would have 
to seriously question the sanity of those hundreds of tax scholars that painstakingly have dealt with such 
issues). So, Katz ends up changing the form, but not the substance of the problem: the interpreter is still left 
with a handful of items of evidence and elements on the basis of which he must decide (and argue for) whether 
the parties (would) intend, in the specific situation, the domestic law meaning, or some other meaning, to 
apply.    
1987 See M. Edwardes-Ker, Tax Treaty Interpretation. The International Tax Treaties Service (Dublin: In-
Depth, 1994 – loose-leaf), at 7.10. 
1988 See G. Gaja, “The perspective of international law”, in G. Maisto (ed.), Multilingual Texts and 
Interpretation of Tax Treaties and EC Tax Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 2005), 91 et seq., at 100, 
where the author notes that, “[s]hould there be any divergence among the authentic texts of a tax treay that 
follows the OECD Model, these would have to be first reconciled in order to define the general meaning of the 
provision, including the general meaning of the relevant term. The reference to the law of one of the 
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meaning and the “general meaning” significantly overlap and considering that, where 
existing, the authentic treaty text drafted in the official language of the State applying the 
treaty provides the interpreter with the most direct and immediate access to the domestic 
law (concepts) of that State, it is reasonable to conclude that the selection of the 
appropriate domestic law meaning under Article 3(2) should be made by the interpreter 
on the basis of that authentic text. This solution limits the discretion of the interpreter in 
selecting the appropriate domestic law meaning, since it attributes a significant weight to 
the evidence of the intention of the parties represented by their choice of a specific legal 
jargon term in the official language of the State applying the treaty and, thus, of its 
underlying legal concept over the others theoretically available.  
 Consider, for example, Article 16 of the 1988 Italy-United Kingdom tax treaty, 
whose English authentic text makes exclusive reference to the “board of directors” of a 
company, while the Italian authentic text thereof employs the expression “consiglio di 
amministrazione o […] collegio sindacale”. It may be plausibly argued that the legal 
concepts underlying the expressions “board of directors” and “consiglio di 
amministrazione o […] collegio sindacale” under English and Italian law substantially 
overlap. They both point to a common “general meaning”, i.e. the company organs that, 
under the relevant company law, carry out the management, control and supervisory 
functions. Since the legal concept underlying the legal jargon term used in the Italian 
authentic text substantially overlaps with the above “general meaning”, it is reasonable 
to use the more precise meaning of the former in order to construe the treaty where Italy 
is the State applying it.  
 
Hence, the analysis to be performed by the interpreter is one that fits perfectly in the 
dynamics of Article 3(2): the interpreter is to construe the treaty on the basis of the 
domestic law meaning of the relevant legal jargon term employed in the authentic text 
drafted in the official language of the contracting State applying the treaty (for instance 
“consiglio di amministrazione o […] collegio sindacale”),1989 unless the context requires 
a different interpretation. In that respect, the author submits that the context requires a 
different interpretation whenever the domestic law meaning does not sufficiently overlap 
with the “general meaning”. 
 For this purpose, the context coincides with the overall context and, therefore, is 
made up of all elements and items of evidence that may help the interpreter to determine 
and argue for the (common) utterance meaning of the parties. In the case of multilingual 
treaties, the overall context obviously includes the corresponding terms used in the 
various authentic texts (in the previous example “board of directors” and “consiglio di 
amministrazione o […] collegio sindacale”) and their underlying legal concepts. It also 
encompasses the corresponding terms employed in the English and French versions of 
the OECD Model (in the previous example “board of directors” and “conseil 
d’administration ou de surveillance”), as well as the OECD Commentary, if the treaty is 
                                                                                                                                  
contracting States for the determination of the meaning of a term would only come into play once the 
framework has been defined”. 
1989 Or the domestic law meaning of that State’s legal jargon term corresponding to the term used in the treaty, 
in the case none of the authentic treaty texts has been drafted in that State’s official language.  
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based on the OECD Model.  
 In order to determine the “general meaning”, where a prima facie discrepancy in 
meaning is put forward, the interpreter is required to partially reconcile the allegedly 
divergent authentic texts. The reconciliation, in this case, is characterized as “partial” in 
the sense that it is sufficient for the interpreter to find out the prototypical items that the 
corresponding terms employed in the various authentic texts are intended (by the parties) 
to denote (or not to denote) and the functions played by their intended (by the parties) 
underlying concepts within the respective legal systems. In fact, the “general meaning” 
is determined (also) on the basis of:  
(i) the common prototypical items that the interpreter considers the parties 
intended to denote (or not to denote) by means of the relevant treaty terms and/or  
(ii) the common functions played by the legal concepts, which the interpreter 
considers the parties meant to correspond to the relevant treaty terms, within the 
respective legal systems.  
In the previous example, for instance, the “general meaning” is determined by taking 
into account that (a) both the English and the Italian expressions denote statutory 
company organs provided for under the applicable corporate governance systems and (b) 
the functions carried out by such bodies, in their respective corporate governance 
systems, are similar, i.e. management and/or control and/or supervisory functions. 
 It seems reasonable to conclude that such a reconciliation must be carried out, 
unless evidence of a different agreement of the parties exists, on the basis of the rules 
encompassed in Article 33(4) VCLT, i.e. by interpreting the various authentic texts in 
accordance with Articles 31 and 32 VCLT and, where a divergence persists, by favoring 
the meaning that best reconciles the texts having regard to the object and purpose of the 
treaty.  
 The significance of Article 33 VCLT in this process, however, is not limited to 
the direct comparison of the legal jargon terms employed in the various authentic texts. 
Since (i) the overall context includes the various authentic texts of the provision to be 
interpreted and those of its related provisions and (ii) such provisions are also made of 
non-legal jargon terms, it is possible that the construction of these provisions, as 
expressed in the various authentic texts, may show some possible differences of meaning 
not due to the legal jargon terms employed therein. Such potential differences should be 
removed in accordance with Article 33(4) VCLT. The resulting interpretations, which 
may shed light on the object and purpose of the relevant treaty provision and its 
interaction with other related provisions, must be then taken into account by the 
interpreter in order to determine whether the context otherwise requires and, more 
specifically, to establish the “general meaning” of the relevant legal jargon terms.   
 Where the interpreter concludes that the domestic law meaning of the legal jargon 
term employed in the authentic text drafted in the official language of the State applying 
the treaty does not sufficiently overlap with the “general meaning” of the relevant 
(corresponding) treaty terms, he should consequently not apply the former meaning in 
order to construe the treaty. In its place, the interpreter should apply the domestic law 
meaning that best fits in the overall context and that best matches with the “general 
meaning”, unless the context otherwise requires. For the purpose of establishing such a 
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domestic law meaning, and thus the relevant domestic legal jargon term, the interpreter 
should use all available elements and items of evidence of the parties’ intention, among 
which bilingual (legal) dictionaries, thesaurus dictionaries, (comparative) law textbooks 
and encyclopedias, the authentic texts of other tax treaties concluded by the State 
applying the treaty (drafted in its own official language), the tax treaty model of the 
latter State, if publicly available, the OECD Model official versions of the relevant treaty 
article and the OECD Commentary.  
 For instance, where the Italian text of an Italian tax treaty uses the term “lavoro 
autonomo” in a certain article, while the English authentic text uses the term 
“employment”, a prima facie discrepancy between those authentic texts arises, since the 
former term, under Italian law, typically denotes the activities carried on by self-
employed persons. Where, on the basis of the overall context, the interpreter concludes 
that the “general meaning” corresponding to the terms “lavoro autonomo” and 
“employment” is akin to the meanings of “employment” under English law and “emploi 
salarié” under French law,1990 the interpreter should attribute to the treaty terms “lavoro 
autonomo” and “employment” the meaning that the term “lavoro subordinato”1991 has 
under Italian tax law whenever Italy applies the treaty, unless the context otherwise 
requires, since the term “lavoro subordinato” is the one generally used in Article 15 of 
Italian OECD Model-based tax treaties and one of the terms that is generally indicated as 
a synonym of the terms “employment” and “emploi (salarié)” in bilingual (legal) 
dictionaries. 
 
To sum up, if a divergence is alleged to exist among the domestic law meanings of the 
legal jargon terms used in the various authentic texts, the domestic law meaning of the 
legal jargon term employed in the authentic text drafted in the official language of the 
contracting State applying the treaty1992 should be used in order to construe the meaning 
of the relevant treaty provision, unless the overall context requires a different 
interpretation, for instance where the comparison of the relevant authentic texts1993 
shows that such a domestic law meaning does not sufficiently overlap with the “general 
meaning”.  
 However, where such domestic law meaning does substantially overlap with the 
“general meaning” and, more generally, the overall context does not require a different 
interpretation, any prima facie divergence of meanings is resolved by means of the 
renvoi of Article 3(2), which provides the interpreter with a clear rule for choosing 
which among the prima facie divergent meanings must be attributed to the relevant 
treaty term(s) in each specific case. To put it differently, where legal jargon terms are at 
stake, Article 3(2) actually operates as if it were a rule establishing the prevailing 
authentic text in accordance with Article 33(1) VCLT,1994 provided that the context does 
                                                     
1990 “Emploi salarié” is the term used in the French official version of Article 15 OECD Model. 
1991 Or “lavoro dipendente”. 
1992 Or the domestic law meaning of that State’s legal jargon term corresponding to the term used in the treaty, 
in the case none of the authentic treaty texts has been drafted in that State’s official language.  
1993 Or the comparison between the authentic text(s) and the OECD Model official versions. 
1994 In this case, however, there is evidence of the agreement of the parties to make the “prevailing” text 
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not require a different interpretation. 
 Obviously, the activity of establishing the “general meaning” and assessing 
whether the domestic law meaning and the “general meaning” sufficiently overlap 
entails a significant dose of discretion by the interpreter, which is limited only by the 
(good faith) requirement to support the chosen conclusions with reasonable arguments.  
 
If the issue is looked at from the perspective of the distinction between type-A and type-
B divergences, the following conclusions may be drawn. 
 Where the prima facie discrepancies among the authentic treaty texts are caused 
exclusively by type-A divergences, the domestic law meanings of the terms employed in 
the various authentic texts commonly overlap with their “general meaning”. In these 
cases, therefore, Article 3(2) does not require, on the basis solely of such a prima facie 
discrepancy, the interpreter to attribute to the relevant terms employed in the authentic 
text drafted in the official language of the State applying the treaty a meaning other than 
the one they have under the domestic law of that State.1995 
 Where the prima facie discrepancies are caused by the interaction between type-A 
and type-B divergences, however, it is more probable that some of the domestic law 
meanings of the terms employed in the various authentic texts do not sufficiently overlap 
with their “general meaning”. This risk appears somewhat related to the impact that the 
type-B divergence has on the prima facie discrepancy. In these cases, the interpreter 
must carefully assess whether the meaning that the terms employed in the authentic text 
drafted in the official language of the State applying the treaty have under the domestic 
law of that State sufficiently overlaps with the “general meaning” thereof and, where this 
is not the case, he has to establish what the different meaning required by the context is. 
Such an alternative meaning might be the meaning that, under the domestic law of the 
State applying the treaty, best corresponds to the “general meaning” of the relevant 
treaty terms, or, where the context so requires, a uniform (and autonomous) meaning. 
 
 
(iv) What is the relevance of Article 3(2) for the purpose of resolving the prima facie 
discrepancies in meaning among the various authentic texts, where the treaty’s 
final clause provides that a certain authentic text is to prevail in the case of 
discrepancies? 
 
Final clauses providing for a prevailing text in the case of discrepancies generally have 
only a limited bearing on the above conclusions.  
 In particular, such final clauses may be relevant in order to assess whether the 
overall context requires an interpretation different from that determined by attributing to 
the legal jargon term employed in the authentic text drafted in the language of the State 
applying the treaty the meaning it has under the domestic law of the latter.  
                                                                                                                                  
applicable from the outset, subject to the overall context not requiring otherwise. 
1995 It obviously remains possible that some other element of the overall context requires the interpreter to 
attribute to the relevant treaty term a meaning other than the current domestic law meaning.  
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 As previously mentioned, since (i) the overall context includes the various 
authentic texts of the provision to be interpreted and those of its related provisions and 
(ii) such provisions are also made up of non-legal jargon terms, it is possible that the 
constructions of these provisions, as expressed in the various authentic texts, may show 
some possible differences of meaning not due to the legal jargon terms employed 
therein. Such potential differences, where persisting after an interpretation of the 
relevant authentic texts based on Articles 31 and 32 VCLT, should be resolved under the 
treaty’s final clause by giving preference to the interpretation stemming from the 
prevailing text. The resulting interpretation, which may shed light on the object and 
purpose of the relevant treaty provision and its interaction with other related provisions, 
must then be taken into account by the interpreter in order to determine whether the 
context otherwise requires and, more specifically, to establish the “general meaning” of 
the relevant legal jargon terms.  
 Moreover, the meanings that the relevant legal jargon term1996 employed in the 
prevailing treaty text has under the domestic laws of the States using it1997 are part of the 
overall context and, as such, may play a direct role in establishing the “general meaning” 
of the corresponding terms used in the various authentic texts. In this case, where the 
interpreter cannot establish such a “general meaning” by reconciling the various 
authentic texts through an interpretation thereof based on Articles 31 and 32 VCLT, the 
“general meaning” should be determined on the basis of the prevailing text, i.e. it should 
be derived from the legal jargon term employed in that text.  
 Take for instance, the 1925 Germany-Italy tax treaty, which has been 
authenticated only in the German and Italian languages. According to articles 5(3) and 
11(2) of that treaty, the provisions concerning dividends paid to shareholders apply as 
well to income (profits distribution) from other rights1998 that are similar in nature to 
shares, but not to income derived from other forms of participation in companies, to 
which other provisions of the tax treaty apply. A prima facie discrepancy exists between 
the German and the Italian authentic texts of the above-mentioned article, since the 
former uses the term “Wertpapieren”, while the latter employs the term “valori 
mobiliari” for the English term rights. In fact, while in the German language the legal 
jargon term “Wertpapieren” substantially correspond to the English term “securities”, 
thus requiring the incorporation of the relevant rights into certificates for circulation 
purposes,1999 the Italian legal jargon term “valori mobiliari” has a wider bearing and 
                                                     
1996 Or proxies thereof. 
1997 I.e., generally, the meaning that the relevant term has under the domestic laws of the States having, as their 
official language, the language in which the prevailing treaty text is drafted. By recourse to bilingual 
dictionaries, legal dictionaries and legal textbooks and encyclopedias, the interpreter may also establish what 
the terms are, in the official languages of the contracting State applying the treaty (and their underlying 
concepts in the respective legal system), which are commonly regarded as corresponding to the terms (and 
underlying concepts) used in the prevailing treaty text, and determine their domestic law meanings 
accordingly. 
1998 The author chose the term “rights” for the present English translation as a neutral term, that being a term 
used more than once in the current English official version of Article 10(3) OECD Model. 
1999 See K. Vogel et al., Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 
1997), p. 39, m.no. 72a. 
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might be used to denote corporate rights not represented by securities, i.e. not 
incorporated in any certificate.2000 Therefore, a construction of the German text in 
accordance with German domestic law would lead to the conclusion that the treaty 
provisions concerning the taxation of income from shares do not apply to profits 
distributed by companies whose capital is not represented by securities, while an 
interpretation of the Italian authentic text made in accordance with Italian domestic law 
would lead to the opposite conclusion. If, by assumption, the 1925 Germany-Italy tax 
treaty had provided for an English authentic text to prevail in the case of divergences and 
the English text of Articles 5(3) and 11(2) had employed the term “securities”, the 
interpreter would have had a good argument for concluding that the “general meaning” 
of the relevant treaty terms in the three authentic languages excluded rights in the capital 
of the distributing company non-incorporated in certificates. As a consequence, where 
Italy was applying the treaty, the interpreter should have concluded that the context 
required an interpretation other than the one based on the domestic law meaning of the 
term “valori mobiliari”. The opposite conclusion would have been reached where the 
hypothetical prevailing text had used the term “rights”, instead of “securities”.    
  
On the other hand, it is clearly possible (and generally probable) that a single interpreter 
may attribute different meanings to the same treaty provision depending on which 
contracting State applies it. In this case, however, as long as the domestic law meanings 
of the terms employed in the various authentic texts substantially overlap with each other 
and with their “general meaning”, it is not the multilingual character of the tax treaty that 
causes a single treaty provision2001 to have two different meanings when applied by the 
two contracting States. It is the reference to those States’ domestic law encompassed in 
Article 3(2) of the tax treaty (and, therefore, the treaty-intrinsic multijuarlism) that 
entails it: two texts, one treaty; one treaty, two rules. This multiplicity of meanings, 
therefore, is outside the scope and purpose of the treaty’s final clause; it is not an issue 
that clause deals with.2002  
 Take, for instance, Article 15 of the 1978 Brazil-Italy tax treaty. It employs the 
term “emprego” in the Portuguese authentic text and the term “attività dipendente” in the 
Italian authentic text as corresponding to the term “employment” used in the English 
authentic text, which prevails in the case of doubt. Assuming that the “general meaning” 
                                                     
2000 See G. Melis, L’Interpretazione nel Diritto Tributario (Padova: Cedam, 2003), p. 622. 
2001 According to Article 33 VCLT, a treaty provision remains a single treaty provision regardless of the 
number of authentic texts by means of which it is expressed. 
2002 This conclusion is further supported by the following analysis. If the interpreter decided to rely solely on 
the prevailing text, in order to interpret the legal jargon terms employed therein he should, pursuant to Article 
3(2), refer to the meanings that those terms have under the law of the contracting State applying the treaty. 
Unfortunately, however, such terms most probably do not have any meaning under that domestic law since 
they are not use therein, the domestic law of that contracting State being drafted solely in the official language 
thereof. The interpreter, therefore, should decide which terms, expressed in the latter language, best correspond 
to the terms used in the prevailing treaty text: in order to do so, the best guidance available would certainly be 
the authentic treaty text drafted in the official language of the contracting State applying the treaty. Which 
would bring the interpreter back to the starting point, provided that the domestic law meaning of the relevant 
term employed in that text substantially overlaps with the “general meaning” common to the corresponding 
terms used in the various authentic texts. 
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of such terms substantially corresponds to the meaning of the term “employment” under 
English law, the domestic law meaning of the term “attività dipendente” under Italian 
law (the same, mutatis mutandis, holds true for the Portuguese term “emprego”) 
substantially overlaps with that “general meaning” (in the sense that the prototypical 
employment relations are covered by both). It is, therefore, reasonable for the interpreter 
to use the Italian law meaning of the term “attività dipendente” to construe Article 15 
where Italy is the contracting State applying the treaty. The fact that the English text 
prevails in the case of discrepancies does not compel the interpreter to set aside the 
Italian domestic law meaning of the term “attività dipendente” only because the item of 
income at stake (for instance, the income paid for an activity carried out by a person 
under the coordination, but not under the full control and direction, of a third party), 
which is denoted by the latter term under Italian law, it is not denoted by the term 
“employment” under, say, English law. 
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- Belgium-India tax treaty (1993) 
- Belgium-Kazakhstan tax treaty (1998) 
- Belgium-Malta tax treaty (1974) 
- Belgium-Netherlands tax treaty (1970) 
- Belgium-Nigeria tax treaty (1989) 
- Belgium-Romania tax treaty (1996) 
- Belgium-Tunisia tax treaty (1975) 
- Belgium-Unites States tax treaty (1970) 
- Benin-France tax treaty (1975) 
- Brazil-Canada tax treaty (1984) 
- Brazil-Germany tax treaty (1975) 
- British Mandate for Palestine, conferred by the League of Nation on Great Britain on 
24 July 1924 
- Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters, concluded in Brussels on 27 September 1968. 
- Bulgaria-Italy tax treaty (1988) 
- Burkina Faso-France tax treaty (1965) 
- Canada-China tax treaty (1986) 
- Canada-Denmark tax treaty (1955) 
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- Canada-France tax treaty (1951) 
- Canada-France tax treaty (1975) 
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- Canada-Netherlands tax treaty (1986) 
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- Canada-United States tax treaty (1942) 
- Canada-United States tax treaty (1980) 
- Charter of the United Nations, signed in San Francisco on 26 June 1945  
- Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, concluded in Chicago on 7 
December 1944 
- China-Italy tax treaty (1986) 
- China-United Kingdom tax treaty (1984) 
- China-United States tax treaty (1984) 
- Community Patent Convention, concluded in Luxembourg on 15 December 1975 
- Congo (Republic of)-France tax treaty (1987) 
- Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and 
Broadcasting Organizations, concluded in Rome on 26 October 1961 
- Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil 
Aviation, concluded in Montreal on 23 September 1971 
- Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, concluded in the 
Hague on 16 December 1970 
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- Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by 
Air, concluded at Warsaw on 12 October 1929 
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- European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, concluded in Strasbourg on 
27 January 1977 
- European Patent Convention, concluded in Munich on 5 October 1973  
- Extradition Agreement between Austria-Hungary and Italy, concluded in Florence on 
27 February 1869 
- Framework Convention on Climate Change, done in New York on 9 May 1992 
- France-Gabon tax treaty (1966)  
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- Netherlands-Singapore tax treaty (1971) 
- Netherlands-Suriname tax treaty (1975) 
- Netherlands-Switzerland tax treaty (1951) 
- Netherlands-United Kingdom tax treaty (1967) 
REFERENCE MATERIALS: TREATIES 
 644 
- Netherlands-United States tax treaty (1992) 
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- Peace Treaty between the Allied and Associated Powers and Italy, concluded in Paris 
on 10 February 1947 
- Peace Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, concluded in Brest-Litovsk on 3 March 1918 
- Peace Treaty of Neuilly, concluded on 27 November 1919 in Neuilly-sur-Seine 
- Peace Treaty of St. German, concluded on 10 September 1919 in Saint-Germain-en-
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- Peace Treaty of Trianon, concluded on 4 June 1920 in Versailles 
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- Protocol relating to a certain case of statelessness, concluded in the Hague on 12 
April 1930 
- Protocol relating to military obligations in certain cases of double nationality, 
concluded in the Hague on 12 April 1930 
- Protocols between Italy and Venezuela of 13 February and 7 May 1903, dealing with 
certain differences arisen between Italy and the United States of Venezuela in 
connection with the Italian claims against the Venezuelan Government 
- Special Agreement Between El Salvador and Honduras to Submit to the Decision of 
the International Court of Justice the Land, Island and Maritime Boundary Dispute 
Existing Between the Two States (1986) 
- Special Protocol concerning statelessness, concluded in the Hague on 12 April 1930 
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- Switzerland-Austria tax treaty (1953) 
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- Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, concluded in Rome on the 
25 March 1957  
- Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights between the United States 
of America and Iran, signed at Tehran on 15 August 1955 
- Treaty of Amity, Settlement, and Limits between the United States of America and 
Spain, concluded at Washington on 22 February 1819 
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of America, concluded in Rome on 2 February 1948 
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OTHER INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS AND DOCUMENTS 
 
- Council Directive 90/435/EEC of 23 July 1990  
- Council Directive 92/100/EEC of 19 November 1992 
- Novena Conferencia Internacional Americana, Actas y Documentos, Vol. IV 
- Report of the Human Rights Committee, 22 November 1978 (Yearbook of the 
Human Rights Committee 1977-78, vol. II) 
 
 






Permanent Court of International Justice 
- PCIJ, 12 August 1922, Competence of the International Labour Organization in 
Regard to International Regulation of the Conditions of Labour of Persons Employed 
in Agriculture, advisory opinion 
- PCIJ, 30 August 1924, The Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. Britain), 
judgment 
- PCIJ, 12 September 1924, Interpretation of Paragraph 4 of the Annex following 
Article 179 of the Treaty of Neuilly (Bulgaria v. Greece), judgment 
- PCIJ, 16 May 1925, Polish Postal Service in Danzig, advisory opinion 
- PCIJ, 7 September 1927, S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey), judgment 
- PCIJ, 8 December 1927, Jurisdiction of the European Commission of the Danube 
Between Galatz and Braila, advisory opinion 
- PCIJ, 19 August 1929, Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex (France v. 
Switzerland), order 
- PCIJ, 15 November 1932, Interpretation of the Convention of 1919 concerning 
Employment of Women during the Night, advisory opinion 
- PCIJ, 5 September 1933, Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Denmark v. Norway), 
judgment 
- PCIJ, 17 March 1934, Lighthouses case between France and Greece, judgment 
- PCIJ, 28 June 1937, Diversion of Water from the Meuse (Netherlands v Belgium), 
judgment 
- PCIJ, 5 December 1939, Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria, order 
 
International Court of Justice 
- ICJ, 28 May 1948, Conditions of Admission af a State to Membership In the United 
Nations (article 4 of the Charter), advisory opinion 
- ICJ, 9 April 1949, Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v. Albania), judgment 
- ICJ, 3 March 1950, Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a 
State to the United Nations, advisory opinion 
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- ICJ, 18 July 1950, Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and 
Romania, advisory opinion 
- ICJ, 1 July 1952, Ambatielos Case (Greece v. United Kingdom), judgment 
- ICJ, 22 July 1952, Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (United Kingdom v. Iran), judgment 
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(France v. United States of America), judgment 
- ICJ, 26 November 1957, Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v. India), 
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governing the guardianship of infants (Netherlands v. Sweden), judgment 
- ICJ, 26 May 1959, Aerial Incident of 27 July 1955 (Israel v. Bulgaria), judgment 
- ICJ, 12 April 1960, Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v. India), 
judgment 
- ICJ, 26 May 1961, Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), judgment 
- ICJ, 15 June 1962, Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), judgment 
- ICJ, 18 July 1966, South West Africa (Ethiopia/Liberia v. South Africa), judgment 
- ICJ, 21 June 1971, Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of 
South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council 
Resolution 276 (1970), advisory opinion 
- ICJ, 25 July 1974, Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v. Iceland), judgment 
- ICJ, 20 December 1974, Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), judgment 
- ICJ, 16 October 1975, Western Sahara, advisory opinion 
- ICJ, 19 December 1978, Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turkey), judgment 
- ICJ, 26 November 1984, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against 
Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), judgment 
- ICJ, 20 December 1988, Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v. 
Honduras), judgment 
- ICJ, 20 July 1989, Case concerning Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (United States of 
America v. Italy), judgment 
- ICJ, 12 November 1991, Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bassau v. 
Senegal), judgment 
- ICJ, 11 September 1992, Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador v. 
Honduras), judgment 
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- ICJ, 3 February 1994, Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Chad), 
judgment 
- ICJ, 15 February 1995, Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between 
Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), judgment 
- ICJ, 12 December 1996, Oil Platforms, (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of 
America), judgment, para.45 
- ICJ, 25 September 1997, Gabčikovo–Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), 
judgment 
- ICJ, 11 June 1998, Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria 
(Cameroon v. Nigeria), judgment 
- ICJ, 13 December 1999, Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana v. Namibia), judgment 
- ICJ, 27 June 2001, LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), judgment 
 
European Court of Justice 
- Advocate General Lagrange, 4 June 1962, Case 14/61, Hoogovens v. High Authority 
- ECJ, 6 October 1976, Case 12/76, Industrie Tessili Italiana Como v. Dunlop AG 
- ECJ, 6 October 1976, Case 14/76, A. De Bloos, SPRL v. Société en commandite par 
actions Bouyer 
- ECJ, 22 February 1979, Case 12/76, Henri Gourdain v. Franz Nadler 
- ECJ, 4 March 1982, Case 38/81, Effer SpA v. Hans-Joachim Kantner 
- ECJ, 26 May 1982, Case 133/81, Roger Ivenel v. Helmut Schwab 
- ECJ, 15 November 1983, Case 288/82, Duijnstee v. Goderbauer 
- ECJ, 24 June 1981, Case 150/80, Elefanten Schuh GmbH v. Pierre Jacqmain 
- ECJ, 9 July 1991, Case C-146/89, Commission v. United Kingdom 
 
European Court of Human Rights 
- ECtHR, 27 June 1968, Wemhoff v. Germany (Application no. 2122/64) 
- ECtHR, 27 October 1975, National Union of Belgian Police v. Belgium (Application 
no. 4464/70) 
- ECtHR, 8 June 1976, Engel et al. v. the Netherlands (Applications no. 5100/71, 
5101/71, 5102/71, 5354/72, 5370/72) 
- ECtHR, 25 April 1978, Tyrer v. the United Kingdom (Application no. 5856/72) 
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- HCtHR, 29 May 1986, Feldbrugge v. the Netherlands (Application no. 8562/79) 
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- ECtHR, 12 March 2003, Öcalan v. Turkey (Application no. 46221/99) 
 
World Trade Organization  
- WTO Appellate Body, 4 October 1996, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, AB-
1996-2, (WT/DS8-10-11/AB/R) 
- WTO Appellate Body, 12 October 1998, United States – Import Prohibition of 
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, AB-1998-4 (WT/DS58/AB/R) 
- WTO Appellate Body, 2 August 1999, Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of 
Civilian Aircraft, AB-1999-2 (WT/DS70/AB/R) 
- WTO Appellate Body, 14 December 1999, Argentina – Safeguard measures on 
Imports of Footwear, AB-1999-7 (WT/DS121/AB/R) 
- WTO Appellate Body, 14 December 1999, Korea – Definitive Safeguard Measure on 
Imports of Certain Dairy Products, AB-1999-8  (WT/DS98/AB/R) 
- WTO Appellate Body, 14 January 2002, United States – Tax Treatment for “Foreign 
Sales Corporations”, AB-2001-8 (WT/DS108/AB/RW) 
- WTO Appellate Body, 23 September 2002, Chile – Price Band System and 
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- WTO Appellate Body, 19 January 2004, United States – Final Countervailing Duty 
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- WTO Appellate Body, 7 April 2005, United States – Measures affecting the cross-
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- WTO Panel, 29 September 2006, European Communities – Measures Affecting the 
Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, (WT/DS291-292-293/R) 
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http://www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/gattpanels/tunadolphinII.pdf) 
- Arbitral Tribunal, 10 April 2001, Pope & Talbot Inc v. Canada, award on merit s of 
phase 2 (available on-line at the following url: 
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The purpose of the present study is to: 
- single out and clarify the most common types of issues emerging in the interpretation 
of multilingual tax treaties (i.e. tax treaties authenticated in two or more languages), 
and 
- suggest how the interpreter should tackle and disentangle such issues under public 
international law, with a particular emphasis on the kinds of arguments he should use 
and the kinds of elements and items of evidence he should rely upon in order to 
support his construction of the treaty. 
The issues on the interpretation of multilingual tax treaties dealt with in this study may 
be broadly divided in two groups ratione materiae: 
(i) those general in nature, which may potentially concern all multilingual treaties; 
(ii) those specific to multilingual tax treaties.  
 
Issues in group (i) appear to arise independently from the nature and content of the treaty 
actually at stake. Such issues may be formulated by means of the following research 
questions: 
a) Must all authentic texts be given the same status for the purpose of interpreting 
multilingual treaties? 
b) What is the relevance of non-authentic texts for the purpose of construing 
(multilingual) treaties?  
c) Is there any obligation to perform a comparison of the different authentic texts 
anytime a multilingual treaty is interpreted? 
d) If the previous question is answered in the negative, when does an obligation to 
compare the different authentic texts arise? 
e) How should the interpreter solve the prima facie discrepancies among the 
various authentic texts emerging from the comparison? 
f) What should the interpreter do where the prima facie discrepancies could not be 
removed by means of (ordinary) interpretation? 
g) Where the treaty provides that a certain authentic text is to prevail in the case of 
divergences: 
- At which point of the interpretative process must there be recourse to such a 
prevailing text? 
- What if the prevailing text is ambiguous or obscure? 
- What about the contrast between the prevailing text and the other authentic 
texts if the latter are coherent among themselves? 
h) What is the impact of the fact that legal jargon terms are employed in the treaty 




Issues in group (ii) relate specifically to multilingual tax treaties. They may be expressed 
by means of the following research questions: 
a) What is the relevance of the official versions of the OECD Model for the 
purpose of interpreting multilingual tax treaties (either authenticated also in 
English and/or French, or authenticated in neither of such languages)? 
b) What is the relevance of the OECD Commentary for the purpose of interpreting 
multilingual tax treaties? 
c) What is the relevance of Article 3(2) of OECD Model-based multilingual tax 
treaties for the purpose of their interpretation? 
 
In order to suggest valuable and durable solutions to the problem of how the interpreter 
should tackle and disentangle the various issues that he might face where confronted 
with a multilingual tax treaty, the author chose to anchor his analysis in an in-depth, 
stable and clear foundation. He decided to primarily approach his task on the basis of 
modern linguistic and, more specifically, semantic (here intended as including 
pragmatic) theories.   
 Following this approach, the author focuses on the answers that modern 
semantics has given to key questions such as:  
(i) What is the goal pursued by persons using (written) language as means of 
communication?  
(ii) How do persons actually create their utterances and use language in that respect? 
(iii) How do other persons interpret the utterances they hear or read?  
(iv) Why do utterances seem inextricably affected by vagueness and ambiguity?  
(v) How is it possible to reduce the impact of such vagueness and ambiguity in 
creating and/or interpreting utterances?  
On the basis of these answers, the author establishes the fundamental principles that 
should guide the interpreter whenever construing a treaty. Such principles work together 
as a yardstick, a parameter of value to be used in order to assess the appropriateness of 
any treaty interpretation in light of the explicit or implicit arguments supporting it. 
This is obviously a normative (prescriptive) type of legal analysis, which is 
purported to highlight the fundamental principles of treaty interpretation solely on the 
basis of semantics. Like all normative legal analyses, it raises the primary questions of:  
a) Whether its results also represent, at least to a certain extent, a reasonable 
approximation of the law as it stands; and  
b) What should be done with its results where they prove to conflict with the law 
as it stands.  
In order to answer question (a), the author has carried out a positive (descriptive) 
analysis, which is aimed at revealing how national and international courts and tribunals 
have approached the interpretation and application of treaties, in general, and tax 
treaties, in particular, as well as how international scholars have construed Articles 31-33 
VCLT and, with regard to tax treaties, Article 3(2) OECD Model. This positive analysis 
was aimed at providing the author with a map of the currently accepted rules and 
principles of interpretation, against which he could test the fundamental principles of 
treaty interpretation determined on the basis of his normative, semantics-based analysis. 
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With regard to question (b), the author has developed a theory of the interaction 
between normative and positive legal analyses. Adhering to the conclusions already 
drawn by some constitutionalists and general theorists of law, the author maintains that 
normative and positive legal analyses, as well as the results thereof, may be seen as 
interrelated and mutually affecting each other. In particular, it is the author’s belief that 
positive legal theory produces indirect constraints to normative legal theory by (i) setting 
significantly high costs (in terms of legal uncertainty, infringement of legal expectations, 
social and cultural transition) to be met in order to substitute the state of affairs that is 
proposed in the normative legal theory (first-best solution) for the status quo; and (ii) 
limiting the feasible set of legal rules and policies that may be implemented. 
In this respect, the rules and principles of treaty interpretation set forth in 
Articles 31-33 VCLT have been generally recognized as a codification of customary 
international law and, as such, applicable to all treaties. In addition, for more than forty 
years legal scholars, courts and tribunals have expressed their views on how such articles 
should be construed, i.e. on which legal rules and principles should be derived 
therefrom. Although the conclusions reached by those interpreters often vary to a 
considerable extent, certain mainstream constructions may be identified, as well as the 
outer borders beyond which any interpretation of those articles that was proposed would 
be rejected by the vast majority of international lawyers. Against this background, 
drawing a normative legal theory of treaty interpretation affirming principles that 
conflict with the generally accepted constructions of Articles 31-33 VCLT, or that lie to 
a significant extent outside the generally accepted borders of a perceived reasonable 
interpretation of such articles, would be equal to sustaining a legal theory of 
interpretation that, in the best case, could establish itself only in the very long run and 
would cause a protracted period characterized by more legal uncertainty than in the 
current state of affairs. However, since the purpose of the present research is to suggest 
how the interpreter should now tackle and disentangle the most common types of issues 
emerging from the interpretation of multilingual tax treaties under public international 
law, the author was not willing to accept the above-described drawbacks of a normative 
legal theory infringing the generally accepted rules and principles of treaty interpretation 
derived from Articles 31-33 VCLT. In the author’s intention, his normative legal theory 
should be shaped so as to fit within the generally accepted borders of a perceived 
reasonable interpretation of such articles; where the inferences drawn from the semantic 
analysis appear to lie outside those outer borders, such inferences should be disregarded 
for the purpose of setting up the author’s normative (semantics-based) theory of treaty 
interpretation. Hence, from a theoretical perspective, the author’s normative legal theory 
of interpretation must be regarded as a non-ideal normative theory (second-best 
solution). 
   
The dissertation includes three parts, in addition to the introduction. 
Part I comprises the analysis of relevant modern semantics works, as well as the 




Part II is purported to design the author’s normative legal theory on the 
interpretation of multilingual tax treaties based on the results of the semantics-based 
normative analysis carried out in Part I. Part II is divided into six chapters. Chapter 1 
draws a concise sketch of the linguistic practices in international affairs. Chapter 2 
provides the reader with a brief introduction to the VCLT. Chapter 3 carries out a 
positive legal analysis purported to illustrate the generally accepted constructions of 
Articles 31 and 32 VCLT and, at the same time, it is aimed at assessing whether the rules 
and principles of law resulting from such constructions conflict with the semantics-based 
principles of treaty interpretation established by the author in Part I, or, on the contrary, 
whether the latter may coexist with the former and be used in order to construe Articles 
31 and 32 VCLT. Chapter 4 is purported (i) to construe, as far as possible, Article 33 
VCLT in coherence with the results of the analysis carried out in the previous chapters, 
(ii) to assess whether such a construction is in line with any generally accepted 
interpretation of that article provided for by scholars, courts and tribunals and (iii) to 
compare the rules and principles of interpretation derived from Article 33 VCLT with 
the semantics-based principles of interpretation established in Part I, in order to highlight 
the existence and possibly investigate the reasons of any significant discrepancies 
between them. The construction of Article 33 VCLT based on the author’s semantics-
based normative analysis, so far as it does not encroach any generally accepted 
interpretation thereof, is employed as a legal basis in order to answer the seven research 
questions concerning the interpretation of multilingual treaties (in general) mentioned 
above. Chapter 5 deals with the research questions specifically concerning multilingual 
tax treaties. Chapter 6 analyses the rules governing the correction of errors in 
multilingual treaties, as established by Article 79(3) VCLT, and investigates the 
interaction between these rules and those provided for in Article 33 VCLT, both 
concerning, to a certain extent, the lack of concordance between two or more authentic 
texts of a treaty.  
Finally, Part III describes and systematically arranges the answers given to the 
research questions, thus spelling out the author’s normative legal theory on the 






INTERPRETATIE VAN MEERTALIGE BELASTINGVERDRAGEN  
 
 
Het doel van de huidige studie is om: 
- de meest voorkomende vraagstukken die opdoemen bij de interpretatie van meertalige 
belastingverdragen (d.w.z. belastingverdragen die in twee of meer talen zijn  
gewaarmerkt) vast te stellen en te verduidelijken; en 
- aanbevelingen te doen hoe de verdragsuitlegger deze vraagstukken onder international 
publiekrecht moet aanpakken en ontwaren, met bijzondere nadruk op de argumenten 
die hij moet gebruiken en het soort elementen en bewijsmiddelen waarop hij moet 
vertrouwen om zijn verdragsopbouw te ondersteunen. 
 
De vraagstukken betreffende de interpretatie van meertalige verdragen die in deze studie 
worden behandeld, kunnen in grote lijnen ratione materiae in twee groepen worden 
verdeeld: 
(i)   die van algemene aard, die potentieel alle meertalige verdragen kunnen betreffen; 
(ii)  deze die specifiek zijn voor meertalige belastingverdragen. 
 
Onder de eerste groep rijzen vraagstukken onafhankelijk van de aard en inhoud van het 
in het geding zijnde verdrag.  Deze vraagstukken mogen worden geformuleerd met 
behulp van de navolgende onderzoeksvragen: 
a) Moeten alle authentieke teksten dezelfde status krijgen voor het interpreteren 
van meertalige belastingverdragen? 
b) Welke relevantie hebben niet-authentieke teksten voor het analyseren van 
(meertalige) verdragen? 
c) Bestaat er een verplichting om telkens wanneer een meertalig verdrag wordt 
geïnterpreteerd de verschillende authentieke teksten met elkaar te 
vergelijken? 
d) Indien de vorige vraag ontkennend wordt beantwoord, wanneer ontstaat dan 
de verplichting  om de verschillende authentieke teksten te vergelijken? 
e) Hoe moet degene die een verdrag interpreteert prima facie afwijkingen tussen 
de verschillende authentieke teksten oplossen die resulteren van de 
vergelijking? 
f) Wat moet degene die een verdrag interpreteert doen als de prima facie 
afwijkingen door (normale) interpretatie niet konden worden weggewerkt? 
g) Indien het verdrag bepaalt dat een bepaalde authentieke tekst voorrang heeft 
in het geval van afwijkingen: 
- Op welk moment van het interpretatieproces moet de tekst die voorrang 
heeft worden gebruikt? 
   




- Wat moet worden gedaan met het verschil tussen de tekst die voorrang 
heeft en andere authentieke teksten, als laatstgenoemde zelf coherent zijn?  
h) Wat is het gevolg voor de antwoorden op de eerdere vragen van het feit dat in 
verdragen juridische termen worden gebruikt?    
 
De vraagstukken onder de tweede groep houden specifiek verband met meertalige 
verdragen. Zij kunnen tot uitdrukking worden gebracht met behulp van de navolgende 
onderzoeksvragen:    
a) Wat is de relevantie van de officiële versies van het OESO Modelverdrag 
voor de interpretatie van meertalige belastingverdragen (die ook zijn 
gewaarmerkt in het Engels en/of het Frans of in geen van die talen)? 
b) Wat is de relevantie van het OESO Commentaar voor de interpretatie van 
meertalige belastingverdragen? 
c) Wat is de relevantie van artikel 3(2) van het OESO Modelverdrag voor de 
interpretatie van meertalige verdragen die daarop zijn gebaseerd? 
 
Om waardevolle en duurzame oplossingen te kunnen aandragen voor het probleem hoe 
de uitlegger de verschillende vraagstukken, die hij onder ogen moet zien wanneer hij met 
een meertalig belastingverdrag wordt geconfronteerd, kan aanpakken of ontwaren, heeft 
de auteur ervoor gekozen om zijn analyse te verankeren in een diepgaand, stabiel en 
duidelijk 
fundament.  Hij besloot om zijn taak allereerst te benaderen op basis van moderne 
taalkundige en, meer specifiek. semantische (hier bedoeld als omvattend pragmatische) 
theorieën. 
 Deze benadering volgend, concentreert de auteur zich op de antwoorden die de 
moderne semantiek heeft gegeven op voorname vragen als: 
(i) Welke doel streven personen na die (geschreven) taal als communicatiemiddel 
gebruiken? 
(ii) Hoe creëren personen eigenlijk hun uitingen en hoe gebruiken ze taal in dat 
verband? 
(iii) Hoe interpreteren andere personen de uitingen die ze horen of lezen? 
(iv) Waarom lijken uitingen onvermijdelijk te zijn gekenmerkt door vaagheid en 
dubbelzinnigheid? 
(v) Hoe kan de invloed van deze onduidelijkheid en dubbelzinnigheid bij het creëren 
en/of interpreteren van uitingen worden verminderd? 
Op basis van deze antwoorden vestigt de auteur de basisprincipes die uitlegger als 
leidraad moet nemen voor het opstellen van een verdrag. Zulke beginselen vormen 
samen een maatstaf,  een parameter van waarde die moet worden gebruikt om de 
geschiktheid van enige verdragsinterpretatie vast te stellen in het licht van de expliciete 
en impliciete argumenten die haar ondersteunen.  
 Dit is duidelijk een normatief (prescriptief) type van juridische analyse, die 
beoogd om de fundamentele principes van verdragsinterpretatie louter te benaderen op 
basis van  semantiek.   
Zoals alle normatieve wettelijke analyses, doet dit allereerst de vraag rijzen of: 
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a) Haar resultaten ook, tenminste tot op zekere hoogte, een redelijke benadering           
van het geldende recht vormen; en 
b) Wat met de resultaten worden moet gedaan als ze in strijd te zijn met het 
geldende recht blijken te zijn? 
Om vraag a te kunnen beantwoorden heeft de auteur een positieve (beschrijvende) 
analyse doorgevoerd, die zowel beoogt om te openbaren hoe nationale en internationale 
hoven en tribunalen de interpretatie en toepassing van verdragen, in het algemeen, en in 
het bijzonder belastingverdragen,  hebben benaderd als ook hoe internationale 
wetenschappers de Artikelen 31-33 van het Verdrag van Wenen inzake het 
Verdragenrecht (VWiV) hebben geïnterpreteerd en met betrekking tot 
belastingverdragen, artikel 3(2) van het OESO Model. Deze positieve analyse beoogde 
om de auteur een overzicht te verschaffen van de momenteel aanvaarde regels en 
interpretatiebeginselen,  waarmee hij de fundamentele beginselen van 
verdragsinterpretatie kon testen die hij heeft bepaald met behulp van zijn normatieve, op 
semantiek gebaseerde analyse. 
 Met betrekking tot vraag (b) heeft de auteur een theorie van interactie tussen 
een normatieve en positieve wettelijke analyse ontwikkeld. Zich aansluitend bij de 
conclusies die reeds zijn getrokken door verschillende aanhangers van het 
constitutionalisme en algemene wetstheoretici, betoogt de auteur zowel dat normatieve 
en positieve wettelijke analyses,  als de resultaten daarvan, als met elkaar verband 
houdend en elkaar beïnvloedend moeten worden beschouwd.  In het bijzonder is de 
auteur van mening dat de positieve wetstheorie tot indirecte beperkingen voor de 
normatieve wetstheorie leidt,  doordat  (i)  een zeer hoge prijs  (in termen van wettelijke 
onzekerheid, inbreuken op wettelijke verwachtingen,  sociale en culturele overgang) 
moet worden betaald om over te stappen naar de situatie die is voorgesteld in de 
normatieve wetstheorie (eerste en beste oplossing) en (ii)  de geschikte wettelijke regels 
en beleidsvormen, die  zouden kunnen worden ingevoerd worden beperkt.  
 In dit verband, zijn de regels en principes  van verdragsinterpretatie , die zijn 
uiteengezet in artikel 31-33 van het VWiV, algemeen erkend als een codificatie van het 
gebruikelijke internationale recht en, als zodanig, toepasbaar op  alle verdragen. 
Daarnaast, hebben wetenschappers, gerechtshoven en tribunalen gedurende meer dan 
veertig jaar hun zienswijze tot uitdrukking gebracht hoe zulke artikelen moeten worden 
opgesteld, d.w.z. welke rechtsregels en principes daaruit moeten worden afgeleid. 
Hoewel de conclusies die door deze verdragsuitleggers zijn getrokken vaak sterk van 
elkaar verschillen, kunnen zowel enkele hoofdlijnen worden afgeleid, als de grenzen 
waarbuiten iedere voorgestelde interpretatie van deze verdragen door de grote 
meerderheid van internationale juristen zou worden verworpen.  Het tegen deze 
achtegrond opstellen van een normatieve wetstheorie voor het interpreteren van 
verdragen die principes bevestigd die in strijd zijn met de algemeen aanvaarde 
interpretatie van de artikelen 31-33 VWiV, of die voor een groot deel buiten de 
algemeen aanvaarde grenzen van een als redelijk aanvaarde interpretatie van zodanige 
artikelen ligt, zou gelijk zijn aan het opstellen van een wettelijke interpretatietheorie die, 
in het beste geval, zichzelf slechts op zeer lange termijn zou kunnen doorzetten en het 
zou leiden tot een langdurige periode, die wordt gekenmerkt door meer 
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rechtsonzekerheid dan onder de huidige stand van zaken. Echter, omdat  het doel van het 
huidige onderzoek is om aan te bevelen hoe de verdragsuitlegger nu de meest 
voorkomende types van vraagstukken die resulteren uit de interpretatie van meertalige 
verdragen onder internationaal publiekrecht moet aanpakken en ontwaren, wenste de 
auteur de bovenbeschreven nadelen van een normatieve wetstheorie  die een inbreuk 
vormen op de algemene aanvaarde regels en principes van verdragsinterpretatie welke 
worden afgeleid van de artikelen 31-33 VWiV niet te aanvaarden.  Het was de bedoeling 
van de auteur dat zijn normatieve wetstheorie zo moet worden ontworpen dat ze past 
binnen de algemeen aanvaarde grenzen van een als redelijk beschouwde interpretatie van 
zulke artikelen;  waar de invloeden resulterend van de semantische analyse buiten deze 
grenzen blijken  te liggen, moeten deze buiten beschouwing worden gelaten voor het 
opstellen van de normatieve op semantiek gebaseerde theorie van verdragsinterpretatie 
die de auteur heeft opgesteld. Uit theoretisch oogpunt, moet de normatieve wettelijke 
interpretatietheorie van de auteur daarom worden beschouwd als een niet-optimale 
normatieve theorie (tweede-beste oplossing). 
 
Naast de introductie omvat het proefschrift drie delen. 
 Deel 1 bevat zowel de analyse van relevante moderne semantische werken, als 
de illustratie van de op semantiek gebaseerde principes van verdragsinterpretatie die uit 
zulke analyse kunnen worden afgeleid.  
 Deel 2 heeft tot doel om de normatieve wetstheorie van de auteur betreffende de 
interpretatie van meertalige verdragen te ontwikkelen op basis van de resultaten van de 
op semantiek gebaseerde normatieve analyse die in deel 1 is uitgevoerd. Deel 2 is 
verdeeld in zes hoofdstukken. Hoofdstuk 1 bevat een bondige samenvatting van de 
taalkundige praktijken in internationale zaken. Het tweede hoofdstuk verschaft de lezer 
een korte introductie van het VWiV. In hoofdstuk drie is een positieve wettelijke analyse 
uitgevoerd om de algemeen aanvaarde uitleg van de artikelen 31 en 32 van het VWiV te 
illustreren en, tegelijkertijd, beoogt het om vast te stellen of de regels en wettelijke 
principes die voortvloeien uit die uitleg conflicteren met de op semantiek gebaseerde 
principes van verdragsinterpretatie die de auteur in deel 1 heeft ontwikkeld of dat de 
laatstgenoemden  kunnen samen  gaan met de eerstgenoemde en mogen worden gebruikt 
voor de uitleg van de artikelen 31 en 32 VWiV. Hoofdstuk 4 beoogd, voor zover 
mogelijk,  om (i) Artikel 33 VwiV uit te leggen in lijn met de analyse die is uitgevoerd 
in de voorafgaande hoofdstukken (ii) om na te gaan of zulke uitleg in lijn is met de 
algemeen aanvaarde uitleg van dat artikel die door wetenschappers, hoven en tribunalen 
is gegeven en (iii) om de regels en interpretatiebeginselen die zijn afgeleid van artikel 33 
VWiV te vergelijken met de op semantiek gebaseerde interpretatiebeginselen  die in het 
eerste deel zijn opgesteld om het bestaan te benadrukken van en mogelijk de oorzaken te 
onderzoeken van belangrijke afwijkingen daartussen. De uitleg van artikel 33 VwiV, die 
berust op de op de op semantiek gebaseerde normatieve theorie van de auteur, voor 
zover ze geen inbreuk maakt op enige algemeen aanvaarde interpretatie daarvan,  is 
gebruikt als een wettelijke basis om de zeven bovengenoemde onderzoeksvragen 
betreffende de interpretatie van meertalige verdragen (in het algemeen) te beantwoorden.  
Het vijfde hoofdstuk behandelt de onderzoeksvragen welke specifiek meertalige 
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belastingverdragen betreffen.  Hoofdstuk 6 analyseert de regels betreffende het 
corrigeren van fouten in meertalige verdragen, zoals opgesteld door artikel 79(3) VWiV, 
en onderzoekt de interactie tussen deze regels en die opgenomen in artikel 33 VWiV, 
die, tot op zekere hoogte, het gebrek aan overeenstemming tussen 2 of meer authentieke 
verdragsteksten betreft. 
 Het derde deel tenslotte beschrijft en rangschikt de antwoorden op de 
onderzoeksvragen op systematische wijze, en legt op deze wijze de normatieve 
wettelijke theorie van de auteur inzake de interpretatie van meertalige 
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